RICHARD GIRD,
CHINO RANCH.

THE WORKS OF THE FAMOUS Nicolas Machiavel, CITIZEN and SECRETARY OF FLORENCE.

WRITTEN

Originally in *ITALIAN*, and from thence newly and faithfully Translated into *ENGLISH*.

LONDON,

Printed for *John Starkey* at the *Miter* in *Fleetstreet*, near *Temple-Bar*, 1675.

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THE SEVERAL

TREATISES

Contained in this

BOOK.

1. THe Hiſtory of *Florence.*
2. The *Prince.*
3. The Original of the *Guelf* and *Ghibilin* Factions.
4. The Life of *Caſtruccio Caſtracani.*
5. The Murther of *Vitelli,* &c. by Duke *Valentino.*
6. The State of *France.*
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10. The Marriage of *Belphegor,* a Novel.
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THE

BOOK

THE EPISTLE TO CLEMENT. VII.

BEing commanded by your Holineſs (whilſt in a private condition) to write the Hiſtory of *Florence*, I addreſſed my ſelf to it with all the art and diligence wherewith nature and experience had endued me. Having deduc'd it to the times, in which, upon the death of *Magnifico Lorenzo de Medici*, the whole form and model of *Italy* was altered; and being to deſcribe the height and importance of what followed in a loftier and more vigorous ſtile, I judged it beſt to reduce what I had written till thoſe times into one Volume, and preſent it to your Holineſs, that you might at leaſt have a taſte of the fruit you had ſown your ſelf, and of my labour and cultivation. In the peruſal of this work your Holineſs will ſee firſt, to what ruine and convulſions our Country was expoſed for many Ages by the variations of Governments, after the declenſion of the Roman Empire in the Weſt. You will ſee how your Predeceſſors, the Venetians, the Kingdom of *Naples*, and the Dukedom of *Milan* took their turns of Empire and Soveraignty in this Province. You will ſee your own Country refuſing obe-

dience to the Emperors, by reaſon of the diviſions, and thoſe diviſions continuing till under the protection of your Family, it began to ſettle into a Government. And becauſe it was your Holineſs particular command, that in my character of your Anceſtors, I ſhould avoid all kind of flattery, true praiſe not being more pleaſing to you, than counterfeit is ungrateful; fearing in my deſcription of the bounty of *Giovanni*, the wiſdom of *Coſimo*, the courteſie of *Piero*, the magnificence and ſolidity of *Lorenzo*, I may ſeem to have tranſgreſſed your Holineſs direction, I do moſt humbly excuſe my ſelf, both in that and whatever elſe in my deſcriptions may appear unfaithful to your Holineſs diſſatisfaction; for finding the Memoirs and Relations of thoſe who in ſundry Ages made any mention of them, full of their commendations, I muſt either preſent them as I found them, or paſs them by as if I envied them. And if (as ſome write) under their great and egregious exploits there was always ſome latent and ambitious deſign, contrary to the intereſt and liberty of the Publick. I know nothing of it, and am not bound to relate it: for in all my narrations I never deſired to cloak or palliate a diſhonourable action, with an honourable pretence; nor to traduce a good action, though to a contrary end. But how far I am from flattery, is to be ſeen in the whole courſe of my Hiſtory, eſpecially in my ſpeeches, and private diſcourſes, which do plainly, and without reſervation, deſcribe with the Sentences, and order of their Language, the dignity and humour of the Perſons. I avoid likewiſe in all places ſuch words as are impertinent to the verity, or reputation of Hiſtory, ſo that no man who conſiders my Writings impartially, can charge me with adulation; eſpecially if he obſerves how little or nothing I have ſaid of your Holineſs own Father, whoſe life was too ſhort to diſcover him to the World, and I too downright to expatiate upon it. Nevertheleſs, had he done

nothing

nothing more but given your Holineſs to the World, that very thing outweighs all the actions of his Anceſtors, and ſhall leave more ages of honour to his Family, than his malevolent fortune took years from his life. I have endeavoured (Moſt Holy Sir) as far as might be done without blemiſh to the truth, to pleaſe all people, and it may ſo fall out I have pleaſed no body. If it ſhould, I ſhould not wonder, ſeeing in my judgment it is impoſſible to write any thing of our own times, without offence to ſeveral. Yet I come forth cheerfully into the field, hoping that as I am honoured and employed by your Holineſs goodneſs I ſhall be defended by your Holineſs judgment; and then with the ſame confidence and courage as I have writ now; I ſhall purſue my engagements if my life laſts, and your Holineſs continues amongſt us.

The

The Author's INTRODUCTION.

When I first took upon me to write the History of Florence, *and its transactions both at home and abroad, I thought to have begun at the year* 1434, *at which time the Family of the* Medici (*exalted by the merits of* Cosimo, *and his Father* Giovanni) *was in greater authority than any other in that City; believing that Messer* Leonardo d'Arezzo, *and Messer* Poggio, *two excellent Historians, had given particular description of all the passages before. But upon diligent perusal of their writings to inform my self of their orders and methods, that thereby my own might have better approbation, I found that in their narratives of the Florentine Wars, and foreign Negotiations, they had been accurate enough; but in their civil dissentions, their intrinsick animosities, and in the effects which followed them, they were either totally silent, or where any thing was mentioned, it was with such brevity and abrubtness as could yield neither profit nor recreation to the Reader. Which I conceive they did, either out of an opinion, that they were inconsiderable, and unworthy to be transmitted to Posterity; or else they apprehended a necessity of reflecting upon some great Persons, whose Family would be disobliged thereby; both which arguments (if I may speak it without offence) are beneath the grandeur and magnanimity of a great Person. For if any thing in History be delightful or profitable, it is those particular descriptions; if any thing be useful to such Citizens as have the Government in their hands, it is such as represents the feuds and dissentions in the Cities, that thereby they may be enabled to maintain their own unity at other peoples expence; if the example of any Commonwealth moves a man, certainly that which is written of ones own makes a much stronger impression; and if the factions of any State were ever considerable, the factions in* Florence *were not to be pretermitted; the greatest part of other States have not had above one, which sometimes has advanced, and sometimes ruined the Government; but* Florence *has had many divisions. Every body knows how in* Rome *after the expulsion of their Kings, there arose division betwixt the Nobles and the People, which continued till one of them was oppressed. So it was in* Athens, *and all the Common-wealths which flourished in those times; but in* Florence *the first dissention was betwixt the Nobles; the next betwixt the Nobles and Citizens; and then*

betwixt

betwixt the Citizens and the Plebs: in all which, one was no ſooner ſuperior, but it divided again; and the effects of thoſe diviſions were Murders, and Baniſhments, and diſperſion of Families, ſuch as never occurr'd in any City that can be remembred. And truly in my judgment, nothing demonſtrates the power of our City ſo much as the conſequences of thoſe diviſions, which were enough to have ſubverted and deſtroyed any other in the World. But ours grew ſtill greater thereby; ſo remarkable was the courage of the Citizens, and ſo efficacious their induſtry for the advancement of their Country, that thoſe few which ſurviv'd the miſeries of their Predeceſſors, did more by their conſtancy and courage towards the advancement of their intereſt, than the malignity of thoſe accidents could do to depreſs it. And doubtleſs had Florence *been ſo happy after it had freed it ſelf from the Empire, to have aſſum'd ſuch a form of Government as would have preſerv'd it in unity, I know not any Common-wealth either ancient or modern that would have exceeded it, or have been comparable to it either in riches or power. For it is obſervable, after the* Ghibilins *were driven out of the Town in ſuch numbers, as all* Tuſcany *and* Lombardy *were full of thoſe exiles; the* Guelfs, *and ſuch as were left behind in the expedition againſt* Arezzo, *(which was the year before the battel of* Campaldino*) were able to draw out of their own Citizens* 1200 *Horſe, and* 12000 *Foot. And afterwards in the War againſt* Philippo Viſconti *Duke of* Milan *being to try their fortune rather with their riches than their arms, (which at that time were very much weakned) in five years ſpace (which was the length of that War) the* Florentines *expended five millions, and* 500000 *Florins; and when that War was compoſed, to oſtentate and publiſh the power of that Common-wealth, they marched out with an Army, and beſieged* Lucca. *I do not ſee therefore, for what reaſon theſe diviſions ſhould not be worthy of relation; and if thoſe Noble Authors were reſtrained by fear of offending the memory of ſuch as they were to ſpeak of, they were mightily out, and ſeem not to have underſtood the ambition of mankind, and their deſire to have the names of themſelves and anceſtors tranſmitted to Poſterity; nor did they remember that many people, not having opportunity to make themſelves eminent by good and laudable acts, have endeavoured to compaſs it by any way, how ſcandalous and ignominious ſoever. Neither did they conſider that the actions which carry greatneſs along with them, as thoſe of Governments and States, what ends ſoever they have, and which way ſoever they are deſcribed, do ſtill leave more honour than infamy to their Family; the conſideration of which things prevailed with me to alter my deſign, and to begin my Hiſtory from the very foundation of the City: and becauſe it is not my intention to tranſcribe what has been*

done

done before by other people, I ſhall relate ſuch things only as occurr'd within the City to the year 1434, *mentioning the accidents abroad only ſo far as will be neceſſary for the intelligence of the other; after which year I ſhall give a particular deſcription both of the one and the other. Beſides, for the better and more laſting underſtanding of this Hiſtory, before I treat of* Florence, *I ſhall diſcourſe of the means by which* Italy *fell under the dominion of thoſe Potentates which govern'd it at that time; all which ſhall be comprehended in my four firſt Books: the firſt ſhall give a ſhort recital of all tranſactions in* Italy, *from the diſſolution of the Roman Empire to the year* 1434. *The ſecond ſhall give an account of all affairs from the foundation of the City of* Florence, *to the end of the War againſt the Pope, which commenc'd upon the expulſion of the Duke of* Athens: *the third ſhall conclude with the death of* Ladiſlaus *King of* Naples: *and in the fourth we ſhall end with the year* 1434, *from whence afterwards to our preſent times we ſhall give a particular Narrative of all proceedings both within the City and without.*

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THE

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE,

CONTAINING

An account of all the Heroick Enterprizes, Publick and Private Transactions; with the Civil Dissentions, Changes and Alterations in that

GOVERNMENT.

ALSO AN

Account of the Affairs of *ITALY*, and the Actions, Designs and Contrivances of most of the *PRINCES* and *STATES* therein.

IN

Eight Books.

By *NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.*

LONDON,

Printed for *John Starkey* at the *Miter* in *Fleetstreet*, near *Temple-Bar*, 1675.

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To His Holiness CLEMENT *the* VII.

THE people which live Northward beyond the *Rhine* and the *Danube*, being born in a healthful and prolifick Clime, do many times increase to such insustainable numbers, that part of them are constrained to abandon their Native, in quest of new Countries to inhabit. When any of those Provinces are overcharged, and disposed to disgorge; the Order they observe is to divide into three parts, so equally that each of the three consists of a just proportion of Noble and Ignoble, Rich and Poor. After which they cast Lots, and that part to whose fortune it falls, marches off to new Quartes where they can be found, while the other two disburden'd of their supernumeraries remain behind, and injoy their own Patrimonies in peace. These inundations and redundancies of people were the destruction of the Roman Empire, to which the Emperours themselves gave great opportunity, for having forsaken *Rome*, the ancient Seat of the Empire, and remov'd their Residence to *Constantinople*. They left the Western Empire more weak, as being more remote from their inspection, and by consequence more obnoxious both to their Governours and Enemies. And indeed, for the destruction of an Empire founded upon the bloud of so many brave men; there could not be less carelesness in the Princes, less treachery in the Ministers, nor less force and impetuosity in tohse who invaded: for one inundation being unable, several conspir'd and at last effected its ruine.

The Northern Nations healthful and prolifick.

Their method of evacuation upon their excessive increase.

Their excessive increase, the ruine of the Roman Empire.

The first from those Northern Countries who invaded that Empire (after the *Cimbri* which were vanquish'd by *Marius* a Citizen of *Rome*) were the *Visi Goti* or Western *Goths*, who after some Skirmishes and Conflicts upon the Confines of the Empire, were by concession of the Emperours assigned, and for a long time permitted quietly to possess a part of the Countrey along the *Danube*. And although upon several occasions, and at sundry times they invaded the Roman Provinces; yet by the vigilance and power of the Emperours they were alwayes repell'd. The last that overcame them so gloriously, was *Theodosius*, who having subdu'd them to his obedience, they did not (as formerly) create themselves a King, but contented themselves with his Government and Pay, they submitted to both, and serv'd him faithfully in his Wars: But *Theodosius* being dead, and his two Sons *Arcadius* and

The Western Goths, the first invaders of that Empire.

Honorius succeeding; not inheriting his Virtue and Fortune as well as his Crown, the Empire began to decline, and the Times (as their Emperour) to grow worse and worse.

To the three parts of the Empire, *Theodosius* in his life-time had preferred three Governours; *Ruffinus* to the East, *Stilico* to the West, and *Gildo* to the South; who all of them after the death of *Theodosius* despising the Title of Governours, resolv'd to make themselves Kings. *Gildo* and *Ruffinus* miscarried in their first Enterprise and were ruin'd: But *Stilico* being better at Hypocrisie than his Brethren, endeavoured to insinuate and work himself into a Confidence with the Emperours, yet with design so to perplex and disturb their Affairs, that he himself might afterwards with more ease leap up into the Saddle. To incense the *Visigots*, and provoke them to mutiny, he counsel'd the Emperours to abate and retrench their former allowance; and least they should not be sufficient for the molestation of the Empire, he contrived that the *Burgundi*, *Franchi*, *Vandali* and *Alani*, (Northern people like the other, and in motion for new Quarters) should fall likewise upon the Roman Provinces.

Rome sack'd by them, under the command of *Alaricus*.

The *Visigoti* as soon as they found themselves retrench'd, that they might be in better order to revenge it, created *Alaricus* their King, under whose Conduct they assayl'd the Empire; and after several Rencounters and Accidents, they over-ran all *Italy*, and sack'd *Rome*. Not long after, *Alaricus* died, and was succeded by *Ataulfus* who marrying *Placidia* the Emperours Sister, Articled upon the Match, to assist in the Relief of *France* and *Spain*, which Provinces were at that time much infested by the *Vandali*, *Burgundi*, *Alani*, and *Franchi* upon the aforesaid occasion. *Ataulfus* undertook only the *Vandali*, who having possest themselves of that part of *Spain* call'd *Betica*, being press'd hard by the *Visigoti*, and distressed beyond all remedy; they were call'd over by *Boniface* (who at that time Govern'd *Affrick* for the Emperours) to come and plant there, for those Provinces being then in Rebellion, he was afraid his ill Administration might be discovered. This Invitation and their own Exigence concurring, the *Vandals* embrac'd that Enterprize, and performed many memorable and brave things in *Affrick*, under *Genfericus* their King.

Boniface Governour of *Affrick* for the Emperour.

Gallia over-run by the *Franks*, and from them call'd *France*.

The *Hunni* Conquer and Denominate *Hungaria*.

In the mean time *Theodosius* the Son of *Arcadius* succeeded to the Empire, who regarding but little the Affairs of the West, gave those Nations the first thoughts of fixing in their New Conquests. Accordingly the *Vandali* in *Affrick*, the *Alani* and *Visigoti* in *Spain*, began to set up for themselves, and Lord it over the Natives. The *Franchi*, and the *Burgundi*, not only over-run and possess'd themselves of *France*, but according to the parts they possest, they gave it their Names; one of them being call'd *Francia*, and the other *Burgundia*. The success of their Camrades, inviting new multitudes to the subversion of the Empire, the *Hunni* fell upon *Pannonia* (which is a Province upon the banks of the *Danube*) and giving it their Name, have denominated it *Hungaria* to this very day. Then as an addition to the disorders, the Emperour finding himself attacked in so many places, to contract the number of his Enemies, he be gan first to treat and capitulate with the *Vandals*, then with the *Franks*, which Treaty increas'd the Authority of the *Barbarians*, and diminish'd his own. Nor was the Island of great *Britain* (call'd *England* at this day) exempt from its troubles: For the *Britains* grown apprehensive of the people which had Conquered *France*, and not discerning which way the Emperour would be able to defend them, call'd in the *Angli* (a Nation in *Germany*) to their assistance. The *Angli*, under the Conduct of *Vortiger* their King, undertook their defence, and at first behav'd themselves faithfully; afterwards their Opportunity increasing with their Power, they drove the Natives out of the Island, possess'd themselves of it, and gave it their Name in commutation for its liberty. Being robb'd of their Countrey, and made Valiant by Necessity, though they were not able to recover their own, the *Britains* began to think of invading some other, and planting themselves there. In this Resolution they cross'd the Seas with their whole Families, and possess'd themselves of those parts which lie upon the Coasts of *France*, and are call'd *Britain* to this day. The *Hunns* (who as was said before) had over-run *Pannonia*, being streightned and disturb'd in their quarters by other Nations, *viz.* the *Zepidi*, *Eruli*, *Turingi*, and *Ostrogoti* (or Eastern *Goths*) they rose again, and put themselves once more in motion for New Habitations. Not being able to force their way into *France*, which was at that time defended by the *Barbarians*, they fell into *Italy* under *Attila* their King, who not long before (to rid himself of a Partner in the Government) had slain *Bleda* his own Brother, and by that means made himself absolute. *Andaricus* King of the *Zepidi*, and *Velamir* King of the *Ostrogoti* remained as his Subjects. *Attila* having in this manner made his inroad into *Italy*, he besieg'd *Aquilegia*, lay (without interruption) two years before it, wasted the Countrey round about it, and dispersed the Inhabitants, which (as we shall afterwards declare) was the occasion of building the City of *Venice*. After he had taken, sack'd and demolish'd *Aquilegia*,

Britain call'd *Anglia* from the *Angli*.

The *Hunni* invade *Italy* under *Attila*.

Attila besieges and takes *Aquilegia*.

Aquilegia, and several other Towns, he advanc'd towards *Rome*, but forbore the destruction of it upon the intercession of the Pope, for whom *Attila* had so great Reverence and Veneration, that upon his single perswasion, he withdrew out of *Italy* into *Austria*, where he died. After *Attila*'s death, *Velamir* King of the *Ostrogoti*, with the Commanders of other Nations, took up Arms against *Tenricus* and *Eurius*, *Attila*'s Sons. One of them they kill'd, and forc'd the other with the *Hunni* back again over the *Danube* into their own Countrey: Upon which the *Ostrogoti* and *Zepidi* plac'd themselves in *Pannonia*, and the *Eruli* and *Turingi* remain'd upon the Bank of the *Danube*.

He advances to *Rome*, but retires at the request of the Pope.

The *Hunni* driven back over the *Danube*, return home.

Attila being departed out of *Italy*, *Valentinianus* at that time Emperour of the West, had a design to repair that Empire; and for his Capacity of defending it with more Ease and Convenience against the irruptions of the *Barbarians*, he quitted *Rome*, and setled his Residence at *Ravenna*. The Calamities wherewith the Western Empire had been oppressed, were the occasion that the Emperour residing at *Constantinople*, had many times transfer'd the possession of it to other people as a thing of great danger and expence, many times without the Emperour's permission; the *Romans* seeing themselves deserted, had created new Emperours in order to their defence; and sometimes other persons taking advantage of their own Interest and Authority, Usurp'd, as it happen'd when *Maximus* a Citizen of *Rome*, got possession of it after the death of *Valentinianus*, and forc'd his Widow *Eudoxa* to take him for her Husband, who desirous of revenge, and disdaining (being of Imperial extraction) the Embraces of so inferiour a person, she invited privately *Gensericus* King of the *Vandals* into *Italy*, remonstrating the Easiness and Utility of the Conquest; who allured by the Prize, was without much difficulty perswaded. He entred *Italy* with his Army, march'd up to *Rome*, found it abandon'd, sack'd it, and continued in it fourteen dayes; after which he took and plunder'd several other Towns, and having laden both himself and his Army with the Spoyl, he return'd into *Affrick*. The *Romans* returning (upon his departure) *Maximus* being dead, they made *Avicus* (a *Roman*) Emperour. After many occurrences both within *Italy* and without, and the death of several Emperours, the Empire of *Constantinople* fell into the hands of *Zeno*, and the Empire of *Rome* (by Stratagem and Artifice) to *Orestes*, and *Augustulus* his Son, who, preparing to defend it by force, were invaded by the *Eruli* and *Turingi* (plac'd as we said before upon the Banks of the *Danube*) Confederate for that Expedition under the Command of *Odoacres* their General. Of such places as they had thought good to baulk and leave empty, the *Lombards* possessed themselves, a Northern Nation like the rest, and Commanded by *Godoglio* their King, which were the last People that plagued *Italy*, as shall be shown in its place. *Odoacres* having made his way into *Italy*, he encountred, vanquish'd, and slew *Orestes* near *Pavia*, but *Augustulus* got off. After this Victory, that the Title might change with the Government, *Odoacres* caus'd himself to be call'd King of *Rome*, and was the first Chieftain of those Nations (which at that time over-ran the whole World) that thought of fixing in *Italy*; for (either suspecting their abilities to keep it by reason of the easiness and facility wherewith it might be reliev'd by the Emperour of the East, or for some other secret cause) the rest had ravag'd and plunder'd it, but they alwayes retir'd, and sought out other Countreys for their Establishment and Plantation.

New Emperours elected by the *Romans*, upon the non-residence of their old.

The *Lombards* invade *Italy*.

Odoacres call'd King of *Rome*, and the first of the *Barbarians* which thought of fixing in *Italy*.

In those dayes, the ancient Empire of *Rome* was reduc'd under these Princes. *Zeno* Governing in *Constantinople*, Commanded the whole Empire of the East. The *Ostrogoti* Commanded *Mesia*: The *Visigoti*, *Pannonia*: The *Suevi* and *Alani*, *Gascoigne* and *Spain*; The *Vandali Affrica*: The *Franchi* and *Burgundi*, *France*: The *Eruli* and *Turingi*, *Italy*. The Kingdom of the *Ostrogoti* was devol'd upon a Nephew of *Velamir*'s call'd *Theodorick*, who retaining an Amity with *Zeno* Emperour of the East, writ him word, That his *Ostrogoti* being in Valour superiour to other Nations, they thought it injust and unreasonable to be inferiour in Territory and Command, and that it would be impossible for him to confine them within the Limits of *Pannonia*. That being therefore necessitated to comply, and suffer them to take up Arms in quest of New Countreys, he could do no less then give him timely advertisement that he might provide against the worst, and if he pleas'd assign them some other Countrey, which by his Grace and Favour they might inhabit with more Latitude and Convenience. Whereupon *Zeno* partly out of fear, and partly desirous to drive *Odoacres* out of *Italy*, directed *Theodorick* against him, and gave him that Countrey for his pains when it was his fortune to catch it. *Theodorick* accepts the Proposition, removes from *Pannonia* (where he left the *Zepidi* his Friends) and marching into *Italy*, slew *Odoacres* and his *Son*, call'd himself King of *Rome* by his Example, and made *Ravenna* his Residence, upon the same Reasons as had prevail'd before with *Valentinian*: *Theodorick* was an excellent person both in War and Peace. In the first he was alwayes Victor, in the last a continual Benefactor, as that City and that Nation experimented often.

The Old Empire divided into Cantons.

Theodorick invades *Italy*, slays *Odoacres*, calls himself King of *Rome*, and held his residence at *Ravenna*.

He divided his *Ostrogoti* into several Countreys, appointing Governours over them, that might Command in time of Wars, and Correct in time of Peace. He inlarged *Ravenna*, and repair'd *Rome*, and restor'd all its Priviledges, except its Military Discipline. Without any noise or tumult of War, by his own single Wisdom and Authority, he kept all the *Barbarian Princes* (who had Cantonized the Empire) in their just bounds: He built several Towns and Castles between the *Adriatick-Sea* and the *Alps*, to obstruct any new Incursion by the *Barbarians*; and had not his many Virtues been sully'd and eclipsed towards his latter end by some Cruelties he committed upon a jealousie of being depos'd (as the deaths of *Simacus* and *Boetius*, both of them virtuous men, do sufficiently declare) his Memory would have been this day as honourable, as his Person was then: For by his Virtue and Bounty, not only *Rome* and *Italy*, but all the rest of the Western Empire was freed from the continual Conflicts, which for so many years it indur'd by the frequent irruption of the *Barbarians*, and reduc'd into good Order and Condition: And certainly if any times were ever miserable in *Italy*, and those Provinces which were over-run by the *Barbarians*, they were the times betwixt the Reigns of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, and his; for if it be consider'd what inconveniences, and damage do generally result to a Commonwealth or Kingdom upon alteration of Prince or Government, especially if effected not by forreign force, but civil dissention: If it be observed, how fatal the least Changes prove to Common-wealth or Kingdom how potent soever, it may easily be imagin'd how much *Italy* and other Provinces of the Roman Empire suffer'd in those dayes, losing not only their Government, but their Laws, Customs, Conversations, Religions, Language, Habits, and even their Names: The thoughts of any one of which things (without so great an accumulation) would make the stoutest heart to ake, much more the seeing and feeling of them. And as this was the destruction, so it was the foundation and augmentation of many Cities. In the number of those which were ruin'd was *Aquileia*, *Luni*, *Chiusi*, *Popolonia*, *Fiesole*, and many others. Among those which were new built, were *Venice*, *Siena*, *Ferrara*, *l'Aquila*, and several other both Towns and Castles, which for brevity sake I omit. Those which from small beginnings became great and considerable, were *Florence*, *Genoa*, *Pisa*, *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Bolonia*, to which may be added the ruine and reparation of *Rome*, and several other Cities which were demolish'd and rebuilt. Among these devastations, and inroads of new people, there sprang forth new Languages, as is visible by what is us'd both in *France*, *Spain*, and *Italy*, which being mixt with the Language of their Invaders and the ancient *Roman*, is become new, and clear another thing to what it was before. Besides not only the Provinces lost their Names, but particular places, Rivers, Seas, and Men; *France*, *Italy*, and *Spain*, being full of new Appellatives, quite contrary to what they were of old; as the *Po*, *Garda*, and *Archipelago*, for Rivers and Seas; and for Men, in stead of *Cesar* and *Pompey*, they began to be call'd *Peter*, *John*, *Matthew*, &c. But among all these Variations, the changing of their Religions was of no less importance, for the Custome and Prescription of the ancient Faith being in combat and competition with the Miracles of the New, many tumults and dissentions were created, which had the Christian Church been unanimous and entire, would never have happen'd: But the *Greek*, the *Roman*, the Church at *Ravenna* being in contention, and the Heretick, with the Catholick as furiously zealous, they brought great misery upon the World, as *Affrica* can witness, which suffer'd more by their Arrianism (which was the Doctrine of the *Vandals*) than by all their avarice and cruelty. Whilst men lived expos'd to so many persecutions, the terrour and sadness of their hearts was legible in their faces, for besides the multitude of Calamities they endured otherwise, great part of them had not power to betake themselves to the protection of God Almighty (who is the surest refuge of all that are in distress) for being uncertain whither their devotions were to be directed, they died miserably without any.

Theodorick therefore deserved no small praise, who was the first which gave them respite from the multitude of their Evils, and restored *Italy* to such a degree of Grandeur in the thirty eight years which he reigned there, that there was scarce any thing to be seen of its former desolation; But when he died, and the Government devolv'd upon *Atalaricus* the Son of *Amalasciunta* his Sister, in a short time (the malice of their Fortune being not exhausted as yet) they relaps'd, and fell over head and ears into their old troubles again: For *Atalaricus* dying not long after him, the Kingdom fell into the hands of his Mother, who was betray'd by *Theodate*, (a person she had call'd in to assist her in the Government.) She being remov'd, and he made King to the great dissatisfaction of the *Ostrogoths*, to whom that Usurpation had made him insufferably odious; *Justinian* the Emperour took courage, began to think of driving him out of *Italy*, and deputed *Belleſarius* his General for that Expedition, who before had Conquer'd *Affrica*, driven out the *Vandals*, and reduc'd

Theodorick dies.

reduc'd it under that Empire again; Having firſt poſſeſſed himſelf of *Sicily*, and from thence paſſed his Army into *Italy*, *Beleſarius* recovered *Naples* and *Rome*. The *Goths* foreſeeing their deſtruction, kill'd *Theodate* their King as the occaſion of all, and elected *Vitegetes* in his Place, who after ſeveral Skirmiſhes was at length beſieged and taken in *Ravenna* by *Belleſarius*, who (not proſecuting his Victory as was expected) was call'd back by *Juſtinian*, and his Command given to *Johannes* and *Vitalis*, who were much ſhort of him both in Virtue and Converſation; ſo that the *Gothi* took heart, and created *Ildovado* their King, who was at that time Governour of *Verona*: and being kill'd ſhortly after, the Kingſhip fell to *Totila*, who beat the Emperours Forces, recover'd *Tuſcany*, and ſubdu'd the Governours of all thoſe Provinces which *Belliſarius* had reduc'd. Upon which miſfortune *Juſtinianus* thought it neceſſary to ſend him again into *Italy*; but returning with ſmall Force, he rather loſt what he had gained before, than acquir'd any new Reputation. For *Totila* (whilſt *Belliſarius* lay incamped with his Army at *Hoſtia*) beſieg'd *Rome* and took it as it were under his Noſe, and then upon conſideration that he could neither well keep nor relinquiſh it, he demoliſh'd the greateſt part of it, forcing away the people, and carrying the Senators as Priſoners along with him, and taking no notice of *Belliſarius*, he advanc'd with his Army into *Calabria* to encounter and cut off certain ſupplies which were ſent out of *Greece* to reinforce him. *Belliſarius* ſeeing *Rome* abandon'd in this manner, addreſſed himſelf to a very honourable Enterpriſe, and entring the City, repair'd the Walls with all poſſible Celerity, and re-invited the Inhabitants when he had done. But Fortune concurr'd not to the nobleneſs of his deſign: for *Juſtinianus* being at that time invaded by the *Parthi*, *Belliſarius* was call'd back to repell the Invaſion. In obedience to his Maſter, he marched his Army out of *Italy*, and left that Province to the diſcretion of the Enemy, who ſeized again upon *Rome*, but us'd it not ſo barbarouſly as before, being wrought upon by the prayers of Saint *Benedict* (a perſon very eminent in thoſe times for his Sanctity) he apply'd himſelf rather to repair than deſtroy it. In the mean time *Juſtinian* had made a Peace with the *Parthi*, and reſolving to ſend new Supplies into *Italy*, he was diverted by a new Alarm from the *Sclavi* (another Northern people) who had paſs'd the *Danube*, and fallen upon *Illyria* and *Thrace*: So that *Totila* had his full ſwing, and was in a manner in poſſeſſion of all *Italy*. As ſoon as *Juſtinian* had Conquer'd the *Sclavi*, and ſetled the Countreys which they had invaded, he ſent a new Army into *Italy* under the Conduct of *Narſetes* an Eunuch, a brave Captain, and of great experience in the Wars. Being arrived in *Italy*, he fought, beat, and kill'd *Totila*; after whoſe death the remainder of the *Gothi* retir'd into *Pavia*, and made *Teia* their King. On the other ſide, *Narſete* after his Victory took *Rome*, and then marching againſt *Teia*, he ingaged him about *Nocera*, defeated his Army, and ſlew him among the reſt: By which diſaſter the very Name of the *Gothi* was well near extinguiſh'd in *Italy*, where they had reigned from the time of *Theodorick*, to this *Teia*, full ſeventy years. But *Italy* was ſcarce warm in its Liberty, when *Juſtinianus* dy'd, and left his Son *Juſtinus* to ſucceed, who by the Counſel of his Wife *Sophia*, recall'd *Narſete* out of *Italy*, and ſent *Longinus* in his Place. *Longinus*, according to the Example of his Predeceſſors, kept his *Reſidence* at *Ravenna*, in other things he digreſs'd, and particularly by introducing a new form of Government in *Italy*, not conſtituting Governours in every Province as the *Gothi* had done before, but deputing a Captain in every City or other Town of importance, with the Title of Duke. Nor in this diſtribution did he ſhow any greater favour to *Rome*, than to the reſt, for removing the Conſuls and Senate (Names which to that time had been ſacred among them) he conſtituted a Duke which he ſent every year from *Ravenna*, and his Government was call'd the Dukedom of *Rome*. But he that more immediately repreſented the Emperour at *Ravenna*, and had the Univerſal Government of *Italy*, was call'd *Eſarco*. This Diviſion not only facilitated the ruine of *Italy*, but haſten'd it exceedingly by giving the *Lombards* opportunity to poſſeſs it. *Narſete* was much diſguſted with the Emperour for calling him off from the Command of thoſe Provinces which by his own Virtue, and effuſion of his bloud he had acquir'd: And *Sophia* not thinking it injury ſufficient to get him recall'd, had given out contumelious words, as if ſhe would make him Spin among the reſt of the Eunuchs. Whereupon in great diſdain *Narſete* incourag'd *Alboino* King of the *Lombards*, (who at that time Govern'd in *Pannonia*) to invade *Italy* and poſſeſs it.

Belliſarius General for *Juſtinian* the Emperour.

Totila takes, ſacks, and burns *Rome*.

Narſetes a new General for *Juſtinian*.

Longinus alters the Government in *Italy*.

As was ſhown before, the *Lombards* were enter'd and had taken poſſeſſion of ſuch places upon the *Danube* as had been deſerted by the *Eruli* and *Turingi*, when *Odoacre* their King conducted them into *Italy*. They had continued there ſome time till their Kingdom fell to *Alboino*, for a daring and couragious man, under whom paſſing the *Danube*, they encounter'd with *Commodus* King of the *Zepidi* (a People planted in *Pannonia*) and overcame him. Among the reſt *Roſmunda* one of *Commodus* Daughters was taken Priſoner, whom *Alboinus* took

took for his Wife, made himself Lord of her Countrey, and mov'd by the barbarousness of his nature, he caus'd a Cup to be made of her Father's Skull, and in memory of that Victory, drank out of it very often. But being call'd into *Italy* by *Narsete*, with whom he had retain'd a Friendship in his Wars with the *Goths*; he left *Pannonia* to the *Hunni* (who, as we said before, return'd into their own Countrey after the death of *Attila*) march'd into *Italy*, and finding it so strangely Cantoniz'd and divided, he possessed (or rather surpriz'd) *Pavia*, *Milan*, *Verona*, *Vicenza*, all *Tuscany*, and the greater part of *Flaminia* (call'd now *Romagnia*): So that presuming from the greatness and suddenness of his Conquests, all *Italy* was his own, he made a solemn Feast at *Verona*, where much drinking having exalted his Spirits, and *Commodus* his Skull being full of Wine, he caus'd it to be presented to *Rosmunda* the Queen, who sate over against him at the Table, declaring (and that so loud she could not but hear) that at a time of such hearty and extraordinary Mirth, it was fit she should drink one Cup with her Father. Which Expression touching the Lady to the quick, she resolv'd to be reveng'd; and knowing that *Almachilde*, a young and valiant *Lombard*, had an intrigue with one of her Maids, she prevail'd that she might personate her one night, and lie with him her self. Accordingly *Almachilde* being introduc'd upon a time into a very dark place, he injoy'd *Rosmunda* instead of her Maid. The Business being done, *Rosmunda* discover'd her self, told him what was pass'd; That now it was at his Choice, whether he would kill *Alboino*, and injoy her and her Kingdom, or be kill'd himself for vitiating his Wife. *Almachilde* had no fancy to be slain, and therefore chose the other Proposition of killing his Master; but when they had kill'd him, they found themselves so far from acquiring the Kingdom, that they were afraid of being made away by the *Lombards*, out of the affection they bare to the Memory of *Alboino*; for which cause packing up with all the Jewels and Treasure they could make, they marched off to *Longinus* at *Ravenna*, who receiv'd them honourably.

Alboino kill'd by the Conspiracy of his Wife.

During these Troubles, *Justinus* the Emperour died, and *Tiberius* was elected in his Place; but being imploy'd in his Wars against the *Parthians*, he was not at leasure to send Relief into *Italy*. Which *Longinus* looking upon as an opportunity to make himself King of the *Lombards*, and of all *Italy* besides, by the help of *Rosmunda* and her Treasure; he imparted his Design to her, and perswaded her to kill *Almachilde*, and take him afterwards for her Husband. She accepted the Motion, and having in order thereunto prepar'd a Cup of Poison, she gave it with her own hand to *Almachilde* as he came thirsty out of a Bath, who having drank off half, finding it work, and great Convulsions within him, concluding what it was, he forc'd her to drink the rest, so that in a few hours both of them died, and *Longinus* lost all hopes of making himself King. In the mean time at a Convention of the *Lombards* at *Pavia* (which they had made their Metropolis) they created *Clefi* their King, who re-edified *Imola*, that had been destroyed by *Narsete*. He conquer'd *Rimini*, and in a manner all up as far as *Rome*, but died in the middle of his Cariere. This *Clefi* behav'd himself so cruelly, not only to Strangers, but even to the *Lombards* themselves, that the Edge of their Monarchical inclination being taken off, they would have no more Kings, but constituted Thirty, they call'd Dukes to Govern under them. Which Counsel was the cause the *Lombards* extended not their Conquests over all *Italy*, nor dilated their Dominion beyond *Benevento*; *Rome*, *Ravenna*, *Cremona*, *Mantua*, *Padua*, *Monfetice*, *Parma*, *Bolona*, *Faenza*, *Furii*, *Cesana*; some of them defended themselves for some time, other never fell at all under their subjection. For having no King, they were first render'd unapt for the Wars; and when afterwards they reassum'd their Old Government, and created Kings again, the small relish and taste the people had had of Liberty, render'd them less obedient to their Prince, and more contentious among themselves, and not only put a stop to the Career of their Victories at first, but was the occasion afterwards, that they were driven out of *Italy*. Things being in this posture with the *Lombards*; The *Romans*, and *Longinus* came to terms with them, and it was agreed, that Arms should be laid down on all hands, and each injoy what was in their proper possession.

The Authority of the Bishops of *Rome* began to increase.

About this time the Bishops of *Rome* began to take upon them, and to exercise greater Authority then they had formerly done. At first the Successors of Saint *Peter* were venerable and eminent for their Miracles, and the holiness of their Lives, and their Examples added dayly such numbers to the Christian Church, that to obviate or remove the Confusions which were then in the World: Many Princes turned Christians, and the Emperour of *Rome* being converted among the rest, and quitting *Rome*, to hold his Residence at *Constantinople*; the Roman Empire (as we have said before) began to decline, but the Church of *Rome* augmented as fast. Nevertheless, untill the coming in of the *Lombards*, all *Italy* being under the dominion either of Emperours or Kings, the Bishops assumed no more power then what was due to their Doctrine, and Manners; in Civil Affairs, they were

subject

subject to the Civil Power, imploy'd many times by the Emperours and Kings, as their Ministers; and many times executed for their ill Administration. But *Theodorick* King of the *Gothi*, fixing his Seat at *Ravenna*, was that which advanc'd their interest, and made them more considerable in *Italy*; for there being no other Prince left in *Rome*, the Romans were forc'd for Protection to pay greater Allegiance to the *Pope*. And yet their Authority advanc'd no farther at that time, than to obtain the Preference before the Church of *Ravenna*. But the *Lombards* having invaded, and reduc'd *Italy* into several Cantons; the Pope took the opportunity, and began to hold up his head: For being as it were Governour and Principal at *Rome*, the Emperour of *Constantinople* and the *Lombards* bare him a respect, so that the *Romans* (by mediation of their Pope) began to treat and confederate with *Longinus* and the *Lombards*, not as Subjects, but as Equals and Companions; which said Custom continuing, and the Popes entring into Allyance sometimes with the *Lombards*, and sometimes with the *Greeks*, contracted great reputation to their Dignity: But the destruction of the Eastern Empire following so close under the Reign of the Emperour *Eracleus*, in whose time the *Schiavi* (a people we mention'd before) fell again upon *Illyria* and over-ran it, and call'd it *Sclavonia*, from their own Name. The other parts of that Empire being infested first by the *Persians*, afterwards by the *Saracens* out of *Arabia*, under the Conduct of *Mahomet*, and last of all, by the *Turks*, and having lost several Provinces which were members of it, as *Soria*, *Affrica*, and *Egipt*: The Pope lost the convenience of the Emperours protection in time of Adversity; and the power of the *Lombards* increasing too fast on the other side, he thought it but necessary to address himself to the King of *France* for Assistance, so that the Wars which hapned afterwards in *Italy*, were occationed by the Popes, and the several inundations of *Barbarians*, invited by them; which manner of proceeding having continued to our times, has held, and does still hold *Italy* divided and infirm. But in my description of Occurrences betwixt those times and our own, I shall not inlarge upon the ruine of the Empire, which in truth, receiv'd but little assistance from the Popes, or any other Princes of *Italy*, till the dayes of *Charles* the 8*th*: but discourse rather how the Popes with their Censures, Comminations and Arms, mingled together with their indulgences, became formidable and reverenced, and how having made ill use both of the one and the other; they have lost the one intirely, and remain at the discretion of other people for the other. But to return to our Order. I say that *Gregory* the third being created Pope, and *Aistolfus* King of the *Lombards*; *Aistolfus* contrary to League and Agreement, seiz'd upon *Ravenna*, and made War upon the Pope: *Gregory* not daring (for the reasons aboveſaid, to depend upon the weakness of the Empire, or the fidelity of the *Lombards* (whom he had already found false) apply himself to *Pepin* the Second, who from Lord of *Austracia* and *Brabantia*, was become King of *France*, not so much by his own Virtue, as by the Chivalry of his Unkle *Pepin*, and *Charles Martel* his Father: For *Charles Martel* being Governour of that Kingdom, gave that memorable defeat to the *Saracens* near *Torsi* upon the River *Totra*, in which above 200000. of them were slain; upon the reputation of which Victory, under the discipline of his Father, and his own deportment in it besides, *Pepin* was afterwards made King of that Kingdom; to whom, when Pope *Gregory* apply'd himself for Relief against the *Lombards*: *Pepin* return'd Answer, that he would be ready to assist him, but he desir'd first to have the honour to see him, and pay his personal respect. Upon which Invitation, Pope *Gregory* went into *France*, passing thorow the *Lombards* quarters without any interruption, so great Reverence they bare to Religion in those dayes. Being arriv'd, and honourably receiv'd in *France*, he was after some time dismiss'd with an Army into *Italy*; which having besieg'd *Pavia*, and reduc'd the *Lombards* to distress, *Aistolfus* was constrain'd to certain terms of Agreement with the *French*, which were obtain'd by the intercession of the Pope, who desir'd not the death of his Enemy, but that he might rather be converted and live: Among the rest of the Articles of that Treaty, it was agreed, That *Aistolfus* should restore all the Lands he had usurped from the Church. But when the French Army was return'd into *France*, *Aistolfus* forgot his Ingagement, which put the Pope upon a second Application to King *Pepin*, who re-supply'd him again, sent a new Army into *Italy*, overcame the *Lombards*, and possessed himself of *Ravenna*, and (contrary to the desire of the Grecian Emperour) grave it to the Pope, with all the Lands under that *Exarcat*, and the Countrey of *Urbino*, and *la Marca* into the bargain. In the interim *Aistolfus* died, and *Desiderio* a *Lombard*, and Duke of *Tuscany*, taking up Arms to succeed him, begg'd Assistance of the Pope, with Promise of perpetual Amity for the future; which the Pope granted, as far as the other Princes would consent. At first *Desiderio* was very punctual, and observed his Articles to a hair, delivering up the Towns as he took them to the Pope, according to his Ingagement to King *Pepin*, nor was there any *Exarchus* sent afterwards from *Constantinople* to *Ravenna*

Bishops of *Rome* imploy'd as Ministers by the Emperors and Kings, and sometimes executed by them.

The Eastern Empire destroy'd in the time of *Heracleus* the Emperour.

Ravenna, but all was Arbitrary, and manag'd according to the pleasure of the Pope. Not long after, *Pepin* died, and *Charles* his Son succeeded in the Government, who was call'd the Great, from the greatness of his Exploits. About the same time *Theodore* the First was advanc'd to the Papacy, and falling out with *Desiderio*, was belieg'd by him in *Rome*. In this exigence the Pope had recourse to the King of *France* (as his Predecessor had done before him) and *Charles* not only supply'd him with an Army, but marching over the *Alps* at the Head of it himself, he belieg'd *Desiderio* in *Pavia*, took him and his Son in it, sent them both Prisoners into *France*, and went in person to *Rome*, to visit the Pope, where he adjudg'd and determin'd, *That his Holiness being God's Vicar, could not be subject to the Judgement of Man.* For which the Pope and People together, declar'd him Emperour, and *Rome* began again to have an Emperour of the West; and whereas formerly the Popes were confirm'd by the Emperours, the Emperour now in his Election was to be beholding to the Pope, by which means, the power and dignity of the Empire declin'd, and the Church began to advance, and by these steps to usurp upon the Authority of temporal Princes. The *Lombards* had been in *Italy* 222 years, so long as to retain nothing of their original Barbarity but their Name. *Charles* being desirous to reform *Italy*, in the time of *Leo* III. was contented they should inhabit and denominate the parts where they were born, which since then, have been call'd *Lombardy*; and because the Name of *Rome* was venerable among them; he appointed that part of *Italy* which was adjacent, and under the *Exarchat* of *Ravenna*, should be call'd *Romagnia*. Moreover, he created his Son *Pepin* King of *Italy*, extending his Jurisdiction as far as *Benevento*; all the rest was continued under the dominion of the Grecian Emperour, with whom *Charles* had made an Alliance.

The King of *France* exempts the Pope from all humane Jurisdiction.

Pascal created Pope. The Original of Cardinals.

During these Transactions, *Pascal* the First was elected Pope, and the Parish Priests in *Rome*, by reason of their propinquity and readiness at every Election, to adorn their power with a more illustrious Title, began to be call'd Cardinals; arrogating so much to themselves, (especially after they had excluded the Voices of the people) that seldom any Pope was created but by them out of their own Number. *Pascal* being dead, he was succeeded by *Eugenius* the Second, of the Order of *Santa Sabina*. *Italy* being in this manner under the Authority of the *French*, changed its Form and Oeconomy in some measure; for the Pope having incroach'd upon the Temporal Authority, created *Counts* and *Marquesses*, as *Longinus Exarchat* of *Ravenna*, had made Dukes before. After some few, *Ospurcus* a Roman succeeded to the Papacy, who not satisfied with the uncomliness of his Name, call'd himself *Sergius*, and the first occasion for the changing their Names, which has since been frequently practis'd at their several Elections. About this time *Charles* the *Emperour* died, and his Son *Lodouic* succeeded, yet not so quiently, but that there arose so many and so great differences betwixt his Sons, that in the dayes of his Grand-Children, the Empire was wrested from his Family, restor'd to the *Almans*, and the next German Emperour was call'd *Ainolfus:* Nor did *Charles* his Posterity by their dissentions, lose only the Empire, but their Soveraignty in *Italy* likewise; for the *Lombards* resuming Courage, fell foul upon the Pope and his *Romans*, who not knowing to whose protection to betake himself, was constrain'd to make *Berengarius* (Duke of *Friuli*) King of *Italy*. Incouraged by these Accidents the *Hunni* (who at that time were planted in *Pannonia*) took heart, and invaded *Italy*, but coming to a Battel with *Berengarius*, they were overthrown, and forc'd back again into *Pannonia*, or rather into *Hungaria*, it being at that time call'd by their Name. At that time *Romano* was Emperour of *Greece*, who being General of his Army had usurp'd upon *Constantine*, and forc'd the Government out of his hand; and because during these innovations, *Puglia* and *Calabria* (which as I said before, had subjected themselves to that Empire) were then in Rebellion; inrag'd at their insolence, he permitted the *Saracens* to possess those Countreys, if they could gain them; who invading them thereupon, immediately subdu'd them, and attempted upon *Rome*. But the *Romans*, (*Berengarius* being imploy'd against the *Hunni*) made *Alberigo*, Duke of *Tuscany* their General, by whose Valour their City was preserv'd, and the *Saracens* raising their Siege retir'd, built a Castle upon the Mountain *Gargano*, and from thence Lorded it over *Puglia* and *Calabria*, and infested all that part of *Italy* besides. Thus it was that *Italy* in those times was marvelously; afflicted towards the *Alps* by the *Hunni*, towards *Naples* by the *Saracens*; and it continued in that Agony several years, under three *Berengarii* successively; during which time the Pope and the Church were under no less perturbation; having no refuge to fly to, by reason of the dissention among the Western Princes, and the impotence of the Eastern. The City of *Genoa*, and all its Territory upon the Rivers, were over-run by the *Saracens*, which, by the resort of multitudes (driven thither out of their own Countrey) was the foundation of the Grandeur of *Pisa:* These Accidents happen'd in the year DCCCC XXXI. But *Ottone* Son of *Enricus* and *Matilda*, and Duke of *Saxony*, coming to

Ospurcus made Pope, changes his Name.

Eugenius the II. Pope.

The Orignal of *Pisa*. The Government of *Italy*, *Anno* 931.

to the Empire, and being a man of great reputation for his Conduct and Prudence, *Agabito* the Pope addreſſed himſelf to him, imploring his Aſſiſtance in *Italy* againſt the Tyrany of the *Berengarii*. The States of *Italy* in thoſe dayes, were govern'd in this manner. *Lombardy* was under the Juriſdiction of *Berengarius* the Third, and *Albertus* his Son. *Tuſcany* and *Romania* under the dominion of a Governour deputed by the Emperour of the Weſt. *Puglia* and *Calabria* were part under the *Greek* Empire, and part under the *Saracens*. In *Rome*, two Conſuls were created out of the Nobility every year, according to ancient Cuſtome, to which a Prefect was added to adminiſter Juſtice to the people. They had moreover a Counſel of Twelve; who provided Governours annually for all Towns under their Juriſdiction. The Pope had more or leſs power in *Rome*, and in all *Italy* according as his favour was more or leſs with the Emperour, or other perſons which were more potent then he. *Ottone*, to gratifie his requeſt, came into *Italy* with an Army, fought with the *Berengarii*, drove them out of their Kingdom (which they had injoy'd 55 years) and reſtor'd the Pope to his former dignity. *Ottone* had a Son, and a Grand-Child of his own Name, both which, one after the other, ſucceeded in the Empire, and in the time of *Ottone* the Third, Pope *Gregory* the Fifth was expelled by the *Romans*. *Ottone* undertook a new Expedition into *Italy* in his behalf, and having once again re-eſtabliſh'd him in his Chair, the Pope to be reveng'd of the *Romans*, took from them the power of Creating the Emperours, and confer'd it upon ſix German Princes; Three Biſhops, *Munſter*, *Treves* and *Colen*, and Three temporal Princes, the Duke of *Brandenburg*, the Prince *Palatine* of the *Rhine*, and the Duke of *Saxony*; and this happen'd in the year 1002. After the death of *Ottone* the Third, *Enrico* Duke of *Bavaria*, was created Emperour by the ſaid Electors, and was Crown'd twelve years after by *Stephanus* the Eighth. *Enricus* and *Simeonda* his Wife, were eminent for their Piety, having as a Teſtimony of it, built and endow'd ſeveral Churches, and among the reſt that of S. *Miniato*, near the City of *Florence*: In the year 1024, *Enrico* died, was ſucceeded by *Corrado* of *Suevia*, and he by *Enrico* II, who coming to *Rome*, and finding a Schiſm in the Church, and three Popes in being at the ſame time, he degraded them all, and cauſing *Clement* II. to be elected, was Crown'd Emperour by him. *Italy* was then govern'd partly by the People, partly by Princes, and partly by the Emperours Miniſters, the chiefeſt of which (to whom the reſt did in all matters of importance refer) had the Title of Chancellor. Among the Princes, the moſt powerful was *Gottifredus*, Husband to the Counteſs *Matilda*, who was Siſter to *Enricus* II. She and her Husband had the poſſeſſion of *Lucca*, *Parma*, *Reggio*, and *Mantua*, with all that Countrey which is now call'd the Patrimony of the Church. The Popes at that time had no ſmall trouble upon their hands, by reaſon of the ambition of the people of *Rome*; who having at firſt made uſe of the Papal Authority to free themſelves of the Emperours, as ſoon as the Popes had taken upon them the Regiment of the City, and reform'd things as they thought good themſelves, of a ſudden they became their Enemies; and they receiv'd more injury from the people, than from any other Chriſtian Prince whatſoever: Rebelling and mutining at the ſame time, the Popes by their Cenſures, made the whole Weſt to tremble; nor was the deſign of either of them leſs than to ſubvert the Authority and Reputation of the one and the other. *Nicolas* II. arriving at the Popedom, as *Gregory* V. had taken from the *Romans* the priviledge of Creating the Emperour; ſo he depriv'd them of their concurrence to the Election of the Pope, reſtraining it wholly to the ſuffrage of the Cardinals; nor contented with this, by agreement with the Princes which govern'd at that time in *Puglia* and *Calabria*, (for reaſons which ſhall be mentioned hereafter) he fotc'd all the Officers ſent thither by the people to aſſert their Juriſdiction, to pay Allegiance to the Pope, and ſome of them he diſplaced. After *Nicholaus* was dead, there happen'd a great Schiſm in the Church: The Clergy of *Lombardy* would not yield obedience to *Alexander* II. who was choſen at *Rome*, but created *Cadalo* of *Parma*, Anti-Pope. *Enrico* deteſting the extravagant dominion of the Popes, ſent to *Alexander* to reſign, and to the Cardinals, that they ſhould repair into *Germany*, in order to a new Election; ſo that he was the firſt Prince which was made ſenſible of the effects of their Spiritual Fulminations; for the Pope calling together a new Counſel at *Rome*, depriv'd him both of his Empire, and Kingdom: ſome of the *Italians* following the Pope's, and ſome of them the Emperour's party, was the foundation of that famous Faction betwixt the *Guelfs* and *Ghibellins*, in ſo much that for want of forreign inundations by the *Barbarians*, they turn'd their Arms upon themſelves, and tore out their own Bowels. *Enrico* being excommunicated, was forc'd by his own Subjects to come into *Italy*, where bare-footed, and upon his Knees he begg'd his Pardon of the Pope, in the year MLXXX. Notwithſtanding all this, not long after, there happen'd a new quarrel betwixt *Enrico* and the Pope; whereupon, provok'd by a new Excommunication, he ſent his Son *Enrico* with an Army, who by the Aſſiſtance of

Agabito Pope.

Gregory the 5. Pope, expell'd and reſtor'd; deveſts the Romans of their power of Creating Emperours, and confers it upon ſix Princes of *Germany*.

Clement 2d. Pope.

Nicolas 2d. Pope, excludes the Romans, and reduces the Papal Elections to the ſuffrage of Cardinals only.

Schiſm, and Anti-Popes in the Church.

The difference betwixt *Henricus* and the Pope, the ground of the *Guelf*, and *Ghibilin* Factions.

the *Romans* (whose hatred the Pope had contracted) besieg'd him in his Castle; but *Roberto Guiscardo* coming from *Puglia* to his relief, *Enrico* had not the courage to attend him, but rais'd his Siege and retir'd into *Germany*: However the *Romans* continued obstinate, and *Roberi* was forc'd to sack the Town, and reduce it to its ancient Ruines, from whence by several Popes it had been lately restor'd. And because from this *Roberto*, the Model of Government in the Kingdom of *Naples* did proceed, it will not (in my judgment) be superfluous to give a particular Narrative, both of his Countrey and Exploits. Upon the differences betwixt *Charlemain's* Heirs (as is said before) a new Northern people call'd *Normans*, took occasion to invade *France*, and possess'd themselves of that part of it, which is now call'd *Normandy*. Of this people, part went into *Italy*, in the time when it was infested by the *Berengarii*, the *Saracens*, and *Hunns*; setling in *Romania*, and performing very valiantly in all those Wars. Of *Tancred*, one of the Princes of those *Normans*, were born several Sons, among which, *William* call'd *Ferabar*, and *Roberto* call'd *Guiscardo*, were two. *William* arriv'd to be Prince, and the Tumults in *Italy*, were in some measure compos'd: But the *Saracens* having *Sicily* entire, and daily invasions made upon *Italy*, *William* entred into Confederacy with the Princes of *Capua*, and *Salerno*, and with *Miloreus* a Grecian (who by the Emperour of *Greece* was deputed Governour of *Puglia*, and *Calabria*) to invade *Sicily*, and in case of Victory, it was agreed among them, that both Prey and Countrey should be equally divided. The Enterprize was prosperous; they beat the *Saracens*, drove them out of the Countrey, and possess'd it when they had done. But *Milorcus* causing more Forces to be transported privately out of *Greece*, seiz'd the Island for the Emperour, and divided only the Spoil. *William* was not a little disgusted, but reserving his indignation for a more Convenient time, he departed out of *Sicily* with the Princes of *Capua* and *Salerno*; who having taken their leaves of him to return to their Homes, in stead of marching to *Romania*, as he pretended to them, he fac'd about with his Army towards *Puglia*, surpriz'd *Melfi*, and behav'd himself so well against the Forces of the Emperour, he made himself Master of most part of *Puglia* and *Calabria*, which Provinces at the time of *Nicolas* II. were Govern'd by his Brother *Roberto*, and because he had afterward great Contention with his Nephews about the inheritance of those States, he made use of the Pope's mediation, who readily comply'd, being desirous to oblige *Roberto*; that he might defend him against the German Emperour, and the people of *Rome*, and it afterwards happen'd (as we have said before) that at the instance of *Gregory* VII, he forc'd *Enrico* from *Rome*, and suppress'd the Sedition of the Inhabitants. *Robert* was succeeded by two of his Sons, *Roger* and *William*; to their Inheritance they annexed the City of *Naples*, and all the Countrey betwixt it and *Rome*; and besides that, they subdu'd *Sicily*, of which *Roger* was made Lord. But *William* going afterwards to *Constantinople*, to marry that Emperour's Daughter, *Roger* took advantage of his absence, seiz'd upon his Countrey, and elated by so great an acquest, caus'd himself first to be call'd King of *Italy*, but afterwards contenting himself with the Title of King of *Puglia* and *Sicily*; he was the first that gave Name and Laws to that Kingdom, which to this day it retains, though many times since, not only the Royal Bloud, but the Nation has been changed, for upon failure of the *Norman* Race, that Kingdom devolv'd to the *Germans*; from them, to the *French*; from the *French*, to the *Spaniards*; and from the *Spaniards*, to the *Flemens*, with whom it remains at this present. *Urbin* II. though very odious in *Rome*, was gotten to be Pope; but by reason of the dissentions there, not thinking himself secure in *Italy*, he remov'd with his whole Clergy into *France*: Having assembled many people together at *Anvers*, he undertook a Generous Enterprize, and by a learned Oration against the infidels, kindled such a fire in their minds, they resolv'd upon an Expedition into *Asia* against the *Saracens*, which Expedition (as all other of the same nature) was call'd afterwards *Crociate*, because all that went along in it, carry'd a red Cross upon their Arms, and their Cloths. The Chief Commanders in this Enterprize were *Gottefredi Eustachio*, *Alduino di Buglione* Earl of *Bologna*, and *Peter* the Hermit, a man of singular veneration both for his prudence and piety: Many Princes and Nations assisted with their Purses, and many private men serv'd as Voluntiers at their own Charges. So great an influence had Religion in those dayes upon the Spirits of Men, incourag'd by the Example of their several Commanders. At first the Enterprize was very successful, all *Asia minor*, *Syria*, and part of *Egypt* fell under the power of the Christians; during which War, the Order of the Knights of *Jerusalem* was instituted, and continued a long time in *Rhodes*, as a Bulwark against the *Turks*. Not long after the Order of the Knights Templers was founded, but it lasted not long, by reason of the dissoluteness of their Manners. At sundry times after these things, upon sundry occasions, many accidents fell out, in which several Nations, and particular men signaliz'd themselves. There were ingag'd in this Expedition, the Kings of *England* and *France*, the States of *Pisa*,

The Original of the Kingdom of *Sicily*.

Urbin 2d. Pope.

The first *Croisade*.

Pisa, *Venice*, and *Genoa*, all behaving themselves with great bravery, and fighting with variety of Fortune, till the time of *Saladine* the *Saracen*; but his Courage and Virtue improv'd by intestine differences among the Christians, rob'd them of the glory they had gain'd at the first, and chaced them out of a Countrey; where for Ninety years they had been so honourably, and so happily plac'd. After the death of Pope *Urban*, *Pascal* II. was chosen to succeed him, and *Enrico* IV. made Emperour, who coming to *Rome*, and pretending great friendship to the Pope, took his advantage, clapt both him and his Clergy in Prison, and never discharg'd them till they had impower'd him to dispose of the Churches in *Germany* as he pleas'd himself. About this time *Matilda* the Countess died, and gave her Patrimony to the Church. After the deaths of *Pascal* and *Enrie*, many Popes and many Emperours succeeded, till the Papacy fell to *Alexander* III. and the Empire to *Frederick Barbarossa* a *Swede*. The Popes of those dayes had many Controversies with the people of *Rome*, and the Emperours, which till the time of *Barbarossa*, rather increas'd than otherwise. *Frederick* was an excellent Soldier, but so haughty and high, he could not brook to give place to the Pope. Notwithstanding he came to *Rome* to be Crown'd, and return'd peaceably into *Germany*. But that humour lasted but little, for he return'd shortly into *Italy*, to reduce some Towns in *Lombardy*, which denyed him obedience. In this juncture, Cardinal *di S. Clemente* (a *Roman* born) dividing from Pope *Alexander*, was made Pope himself by a Faction in the Conclave. *Frederick* the Emperour being then incamp'd before *Crema*, *Alexander* complain'd to him of the Anti-Pope: *Frederick* reply'd, That they should both of them appear personally before him, and that then, hearing faithfully what each of them could say, he should be better able to determine which was in the right. *Alexander* was not at all satisfied with the Answer, but perceiving the Emperour inclining to the Adversary, he Excommunicated him, and ran away to King *Philip of France*. For all that *Frederick* prosecuted his Wars in *Lombardy*, took and dismantled *Milan*. Which put the Cities of *Verona*, *Padua*, and *Venice*, upon a Confederacy for their Common defence. In the mean time the Anti-Pope died, and *Frederick* presum'd to Create *Guido* of *Cremono* in his place. The *Romans* taking advantage of the Pope's absence, and the Emperour's diversion in *Lombardy*, had re-assum'd something of their former Authority, and began to require Obedience in the neighbouring places which had been anciently their Subjects. And because the *Tuscans* refus'd to submit, they march'd confusedly against them, but they being re-inforced by *Frederick*, gave the *Roman* Army such a blow, that since that time *Rome* could never recover its old Condition either for Populousness or Wealth. Upon these Events, Pope *Alexander* was return'd to *Rome*, presuming he might be safe there, by reason of the Animosity the *Romans* retain'd against the Emperour; and the Employment his Enemies gave him in *Lombardy*. But *Frederick* postponing all other respects, march'd with his Army to besiege *Rome*; *Alexander* thought it not convenient to attend him, but withdrew into *Puglia* to *William*, who upon the death of *Roger* (being next Heir) was made King. *Frederick* being much molested, and weaken'd by a Contagion in his Army, rais'd his Siege, and went back into *Germany*. The *Lombards* which were in League against him, to restrain their Excursions, and streighten the Towns of *Pavia* and *Tortona*; caus'd a City to be built (which they intended for the Seat of the War) and call'd it *Alexandria*, in honour to Pope *Alexander*, and defiance to the Emperour. *Guido* the new Anti-Pope died likewise, and *John* (of *Fermo*) was chosen in his room, who by the favour of the Imperial party, was permitted to keep his Residence in *Monte Fiascone*. Whilst *Alexander* was gone into *Tuscany*, invited by that people, that by his Authority they might be the better defended against the *Romans*. Being there, Embassadours came to him from *Henry King of England*, to clear their Masters innocence in the death of *Thomas Becket*, Arch-Bishop of *Canterbury*, with which he was publickly and most infamously aspersed. To inquire into the truth, the Pope sent two Cardinals into *England*, who (notwithstanding, they found not his Majesty in any manifest guilt) yet for the scandal of the Fact, and that he had not honour'd the said Arch-Bishop with the respect he deserved, they prescribed as a Penance, That he should call all the Barons of his Kingdom together, swear his Innocence before them, send 200 Soldiers to *Jerusalem*, to be paid by him for a twelve-month, and himself follow in person with as great a Power as he could raise, before three years were expir'd. That he should disanul all things pass'd in his Kingdom in prejudice to the Ecclesiastick liberty, and consent, that any of his Subjects whatever, should appeal to *Rome*; when, and as often, as they thought it convenient: All which Conditions were readily accepted, and that great Prince submitted to a Sentence, there is scarce a private person but would scorn at this day. But though his Holiness was so formidable to the Princes abroad, he was not so terrible in *Rome*; the people in that City would not be coaxed, nor perswaded to let him live there, though he protested he would meddle no

Pascal 2d.

Alexander 3d.

A new Anti-Pope.

The Pope's pennance to King *Henry* of *England*, upon the complaints about *Thomas Becket*.

farther then Eccleſiaſtical matters; by which it appears, things at a diſtance are more dreadful, then near at hand. In the mean time *Frederick* was return'd into *Italy*, with reſolution to make a new War upon the Pope; but whilſt he was buſie about his preparations, his Barons and Clergy gave him advertiſement, that they would all forſake him, unleſs he reconcil'd himſelf to the Church; ſo that changing his deſign, he was forc'd to go and make his ſubmiſſion at *Venice*; and pacification being made, the Pope in the Agreement deveſted the Emperour of all the Authority he pretended over *Rome*, and named *William* King of *Sicily* and *Puglia*, his Confederate. *Frederick* being an active Prince, and unable to lie ſtill; embarqu'd himſelf in the Enterprize into *Aſia*, to ſpend his Ambition againſt the *Turk*, which he could not do ſo effectually againſt the Pope; But being got as far as the River *Cidno*, allur'd by the clearneſs and excellence of the Waters, he would needs waſh himſelf in it, and that waſhing gave him his death. Thoſe Waters being more beneficial to the *Turks*, then all Excommunications to the Chriſtians, for whereas theſe only cool'd and aſſwag'd his Ambition, they waſh'd it away, and extinguiſh'd it quite.

Frederick being dead, nothing remain'd now to be ſuppreſs'd, but the contumacy of the *Romans*. After much argument and diſpute about their Creation of Conſuls, it was concluded, the *Romans*, according to ancient cuſtom, ſhould have liberty to chooſe them; but they ſhould not execute their Office, till they had ſworn fealty to the Church. Upon this accord *John* the Anti-Pope fled to *Monte Albano*, and dy'd preſently after. In the mean time, *William* King of *Naples* died alſo; and having left no Sons but *Tanacred* a Baſtard, the Pope deſign'd to have poſſeſs'd himſelf of his Kingdom, but by the oppoſition of the Barons, *Tanacred* was made King. Afterwards *Celeſtin* III. coming to the Papacy, and being deſirous to wreſt that Kingdom from *Tanacred*, he contriv'd to make *Enrico* (*Frederick's* Son) King, promiſing him the Kingdom of *Naples*, upon Condition he would reſtore ſuch Lands as belong'd to the Church, and to facilitate the buſineſs, he took *Goſtanza* (an ancient Maid, daughter to King *William*) out of a Monaſtery, and gave her him for his Wife; by which means the Kingdom of *Naples*, paſs'd from the *Normans* (who had founded it) and fell under the dominion of the *Germans*. *Henricus* the Emperour having firſt ſetled his Affairs in *Germany*, came into *Italy* with his Wife *Goſtanza*, and one of his Sons call'd *Frederick*, about four years of age, and without much difficulty poſſeſs'd himſelf of that Kingdom. *Tanacred* being dead, and only one Child remaining of his Iſſue, call'd *Roger*. Not long after *Enricus* died in *Sicily*, was ſucceeded in that Kingdom by *Frederick*; and *Otto* Duke of *Saxony*, choſen Emperour by the aſſiſtance of Pope *Innocent* III. But no ſooner had he got the Crown upon his Head, but contrary to the opinion of all men, he became Enemy to the Pope; ſeiz'd upon *Romania*, and gave out Orders for the aſſaulting that Kingdom; Upon which being Excommunicated by the Pope, and deſerted by his Friends, *Frederick* King of *Naples* was choſen Emperour in his place. The ſaid *Frederick* coming to *Rome* to be Crown'd, the Pope ſcrupl'd it, being jealous of his power, and endeavour'd to perſwade him out of *Italy*, as he had done *Otto* before; which *Frederick* diſdaining, retir'd into *Germany*, and making War upon *Otto*, overcame him at laſt. In the mean time *Innocent* died, who beſides other magnificent Works, built the Hoſpital *di Santo Spirito* at *Rome*. *Honorius* III. ſucceeded him, in whoſe Papacy were inſtituted the Orders of S. *Dominick*, and S. *Francis*, in the year MCCXVIII. *Honorious* Crown'd *Frederick*, to whom *John*, deſcended from *Baldwin* King of *Jeruſalem* (who commanded the remainder of the Chriſtians in *Aſia*, and retain'd that Title) gave one of his Daughters in marriage, and the Title of that Kingdom in Dower with her; and from that time, whoever is King of *Naples*, has that Title annex'd. In *Italy* at that time, they liv'd in this manner: The *Romans* had no more the Creation of Conſuls, but in lieu of it they inveſted ſometimes one, ſometimes more of their Senators with the ſame power. The League continued all the while, into which the Cities of *Lombardy* had entred againſt *Frederick Barbaroſſa*; and the Cities were theſe; *Milan*, *Breſcia*, *Mantua*, with the greater part of the Cities in *Romagnia*, beſides *Verona*, *Vicenza*, *Padua* and *Trevigi*. The Cities on the Emperours ſide were *Cremona*, *Bergamo*, *Parma*, *Reggio*, *Modena*, and *Trenta*: The reſt of the Cities of *Lombardy*, *Romagna*, and the Marquiſate of *Trevizan*, took part according to their intereſt ſometimes with this, ſometimes with the other party. In the time of *Otto* III, one *Ezelino* came into *Italy*, of whoſe Loins there remaining a Son, call'd alſo *Ezelino*, being powerful and rich, he joyn'd himſelf with *Frederick* II, who (as was ſaid before) was become an Enemy to the Pope. By the incouragement and aſſiſtance of this *Ezelino*, *Frederick* came into *Italy*; took *Verona* and *Mantua*, demoliſh'd *Vicenſa*, ſeiz'd upon *Padoua*, defeated the united Forces of thoſe parts, and when he had done, advanc'd towards *Toſcany*, whilſt in the mean time *Ezelino* made himſelf Maſter of the Marquiſate of *Treviſan*. *Ferrara* they could

Celeſtin 3d. Pope.

Honorius 3d. Pope.

The Orders of S. *Dominick*, and S. *Francis*, inſtituted 1218.

The Titles of King of *Naples* and *Jeruſalem* annex'd.

could not take, being defended by *Azone da Esti*, and some Regiments of the Popes in *Lombardy*. Whereupon when the Siege was drawn off, his Holiness gave that City in Fee to *Azone da Esti*, from whom those who are Lords of it at this day are descended. *Frederick* stop'd, and fix'd himself at *Pisa*, being desirous to make himself Master of *Tuscany*, and by the distinctions he made betwixt his Friends and his Foes in that Province, rais'd such animosities, as proved afterwards the destruction of all *Italy*: For both *Guelf*, and *Gibelins* increas'd every day; the first siding with the Church, the other with the Emperour, and were call'd first by those Names, in the City of *Pistoia*. *Frederick* being at length remov'd from *Pisa*, made great devastations, and several inroads into the Territories of the Church; in so much that the Pope having no other remedy, proclaim'd the *Croisada* against him, as his Predecessors had done against the *Saracens*. *Frederick* (lest he should be left in the lurch by his own people, as *Frederick Barbarossa*, and others of his Ancestors had been before,) entertain'd into his Pay great numbers of the *Saracens*, and to oblige them to him, and strengthen his opposition to the Pope, by a party that should not be afraid of his Curses, he gave them *Nocera* in that Kingdom, to the end that having a Retreat in their own hands, they might serve him with more confidence and security. At this time *Innocent* IV. was Pope, who being apprehensive of *Frederick*, remov'd to *Genoa*, and thence into *France*, where he call'd a Counsel at *Lyons*, and *Frederick* design'd to have been there, had he not been retain'd by the Rebellion of *Parma*: Having had ill Fortune in the suppressing of that, he march'd away into *Tuscany*, and from thence into *Sicily*, where he died not long after, leaving his Son *Currado* in *Suevia*, and in *Puglia*, his natural Son *Manfredi*, whom he had made Duke of *Benevento*. *Currado* went to take possession of the Kingdom, died at *Naples*, and left only one little Son behind him in *Germany*, who was call'd *Currado*, by his own Name. By which means, *Manfred* first as Tutor to *Currado*, got into the Government, and afterwards giving out that his Pupil was dead, he made himself King, and forc'd the Pope and *Neapolitans* (who oppos'd it) to consent. Whilst Affairs in that Kingdom were in that posture, many Commotions happen'd in *Lombardy*, betwixt the *Guelfs* and the *Gibilins*. The *Guelfs* were headed by a Legate from the Pope, the *Gibilins* by *Ezelino*, who at that time had in his possession all that part of *Lombardy* on this side the *Poe*. And because while he was entertain'd in this War, the City of *Padoua* rebell'd, he caus'd 12000 of them to be slain, and not long after, before the War was ended, died himself in the thirtyeth year of his age. Upon his death, all those Countreys which had been in his hands, became free. *Manfredi* King of *Naples* continued his malevolence to the Church, as his Ancestors had done before him, holding Pope *Urban* IV. in perpetual anxiety, so that at length he was constrain'd to convoke the *Crociata* against him, and to retire into *Perugia*, till he could get his Forces together: But finding them come in slowly and thin, conceiving that to the overcoming of *Manfred*, greater supplies would be necessary, he address'd himself to the King of *France*, making his Brother *Charles* Duke of *Angio*, King of *Sicily* and *Naples*, and exciting him to come into *Italy*, and take possession of those Kingdoms. Before *Charles* could get to *Rome*, the Pope died, and *Clement* V. succeeded in his place. In the said *Clements* time, *Charles* with 30 Galleys arriv'd at *Ostia*, having Order'd the rest of his Forces to meet him by Land. During his Residence at *Rome*, as a Complement to him, the *Romans* made him a Senator, and the Pope invested him in that Kingdom, with Condition that he should pay 50 thousand Florins yearly to the Church; and publish'd a Decree, that for the future, neither *Charles*, nor any that should succeed him in that Kingdom, should be capable of being Emperours. After which *Charles* advancing against *Manfred*, fought with him, beat him, and kill'd him near *Benevento*, thereby making himself King of *Sicily*, and that Kingdom. *Corradino* (to whom that State devolv'd by his Fathers Testament) gathering what Forces together he could in *Germany*, march'd into *Italy* against *Charles*, and ingaging him at *Tagliacozza*, was presently defeated, and (being afterwards discover'd in his flight) taken and slain. *Italy* continued quiet, till the Papacy of *Adrian* V. who not enduring that *Charles* should continue in *Rome*, and govern all (as he did) by virtue of his Senatorship, he remov'd to *Viterbo*, and solicited *Ridolfus* the Emperour to come into *Italy* against him. In this manner, the Popes sometimes for defence of Religion, sometimes out of their own private ambition, call'd in new Men, and by consequence new Wars into *Italy*. And no sooner had they advanc'd any of them, but they repented of what they had done, and sought immediately to remove him, nor would they suffer any Province, (which by reason of their weakness they were unable themselves to subdue) to be injoy'd quietly by any body else. The Princes were all afraid of them, for whether by fighting, or flying, they commonly overcame, unless circumvented by some Stratagem, as *Boniface* VIII. and some others were by the Emperours, under pretence of Friendship and Amity. *Ridolfus* being retain'd by his War with the King of *Bohemia*, was not at

The House of the *Esti* made Lords of *Ferrara*.

The *Guelfs* side with the Church, the *Gibilins* with the Emperor.

Innocent 4th Pope.

Clement 5th Pope.

Adrian 5th Pope.

Nicholas 3d. of the House of *Ursin.*

at leisure to visit *Italy* before *Adrian* was dead. He which succeeded him was *Nicolas* the III. of the House of *Ursin*, a daring, ambitious man; who resolving to take down the Authority of *Charles*, contriv'd that *Ridolfus* the Emperour, should complain of *Charles* his Governour in *Tuscany*, of his siding with the *Guelfs*, who after the death of *Manfred*, had been receiv'd and protected in that Province. To comply with the Emperour, *Charles* call'd away his Governour, and the Pope sent his Cardinal Nephew to take possession of it for the Emperour; to recompence that Kindness, the Emperour restor'd *Romania* to the Church, which had been usurp'd by his Predecessors, and the Pope made *Bertaldo Orsino* Duke of *Romagnia*: Growing more powerful by degrees, and believing himself strong enough to look *Charles* in the face, he began to expostulate, turn'd him out of his Senatorship, and publish'd a Decree, that no person for the future of Royal Extraction should ever be Senator in *Rome:* Not contented with this, he carry'd his Designs farther, and was in the mind to have droven *Charles* out of *Sicily*; to which end, he held secret intelligence with the King of *Arragon*, who effected it afterwards in the time of his Successor. He design'd likewise to have made two Kings out of his Family, one of *Lombardy*, the other of *Tuscany*, by whose power and assistance, the Church might be defended from the incursions of the *Germans* abroad, and the oppression of the *French* at home. But he died before any thing could be done, was the first Pope that gave so manifest demonstration of Ambition, or that, under pretence of advancing the Church, design'd only to exalt and magnifie his own Family, and though from this time backward no mention is to be found of Nephew, or any other of his Holiness Kindred, yet forward all History is full of them, and as formerly the Popes have endeavour'd to leave them Princes, they would leave them Popes now adayes if they could, and make the Papacy hereditary.

The first introduction of Popes Nephews.

Martin 10th. Pope.

But the Principalities they erected, have been hitherto short liv'd; for the Popes seldom living long, the first gust of wind shakes them, for want of their Authority and Courage to sustain them. This Pope being dead, *Martin* X. succeeded, who being born a *French-man*, was a friend to the *French*, and *Charles* (in the Rebellion of *Romania*) sent an Army to his Assistance, who having besieg'd *Furli*, *Guido Bonatti*, an Astrologer being in the Town, appointed the Garrison a certain time to sally upon them; and following his direction, they did it with such success, the whole *French* Army was either taken or kill'd. About this time, the practises betwixt Pope *Nicholas* and *Peter* King of *Arragon*, were put in execution; the *Sicilians* by that means kill'd all the *French* they found in that Island; and *Peter* made himself Lord of it, upon pretence it belonged to *Constansa*, *Manfreds* Daughter, whom he had married; but *Charles* in his preparation for its recovery, died; left *Charles* II. his Son, at that time a Prisoner in *Sicily*, who for his enlargement, promis'd to surrender himself again, if in three years time he prevail'd not with the Pope to invest the House of *Arragon* with the Kingdom of *Sicily*. *Ridolfus* the Emperour, in stead of coming into *Italy* h mself, to recover the reputation of the Empire, sent an Embassadour thither with full power to enfranchize such Cities as would buy out their Freedom: Upon which, many Cities redeem'd themselves, and chang'd their Laws, with their Liberty. *Adulfus* Duke of *Saxony*, succeeded in the Empire, and in the Popedom, *Piero del Murone*, by the Name of Pope *Celestine*, but having been a Hermit, and exceedingly devout, in six months time he renounced, and *Boniface* VIII. was chosen in his room. The Heavens (foreseeing the time would come *Italy* should be deliver'd both from the *Germans* and *French*, and remain intirely in the hands of its Natives: That the Pope though freed from forreign impediment) might not be able to usurp, and establish himself in the power which he exercised then) rais'd up two great Families in *Rome*, the *Colonni*, and the *Ursini*, that by their Authority and Allyance they might be able to circumscribe his Holiness, and keep him within his bounds. Pope *Boniface* was sensible of them, and apply'd himself very zealously to have extirpated the *Colonni*, excommunicating them first, and then proclaiming the *Crociata* against them; which, though it might be some prejudice to them, was more to the Church; For those Swords which had been drawn in vindication of the Gospel, and done honourable things; when for private ambition they were unsheath'd against Christians, they lost their first sharpness, and would not cut at all; and so it came to pass, their immoderate desire of satiating their Appetite, by degrees lessened the Popes power, and disarm'd them.

Pope *Celestine* resigns to *Boniface* 8th.

Two of that House which were Cardinals, he degraded, *Sciarra* (the chief of them) escaping in disguise, being discover'd, was taken by the *Spanish* Privateers, and clap'd to an Oar; but being known at *Marsellis*, he was rescu'd, and sent away to the King of *France*, who by *Boniface* was Excommunicated thereupon, and depriv'd of his Kingdom. *Philip* King of *France*, considering very well that in all open Wars with the Popes, he had either run some eminent danger, or come home by the loss; began to look about for some Artifice,

and

and at length, pretending great readiness to comply, and counterfeiting a Treaty, he sent *Sciarra* privately into *Italy*, who being arriv'd at *Anagnia* (where at that time the Pope had his Residence) gathering his Friends together in the night, he seiz'd upon his Holiness, who (though inlarg'd afterwards by the people of the Town) died shortly in a Delirium with meer sense and indignation. This *Boniface* was the first Pope which ordain'd Jubilees in the year M. C C C. and decreed they should be celebrated every hundred years. These times produc'd many troubles betwixt the *Guelfs* and the *Guibilin*'s, and *Italy* being forsaken by the Emperours, many Towns recover'd their liberties, and many were usurp'd. Pope *Benedict* restor'd their Caps to the Cardinals of the House of *Colonni*, absolv'd King *Philip*, and gave him his Blessing. *Benedict* was succeeded by *Clement* V. who being a *French-man* remov'd his Court into *France*, *Anno* M C C C V I; During these Transactions *Charles* II. King of *Naples* died, and left the Succession to *Robert* his Son. The Empire was in the mean time fallen to *Arrigo* of *Luxemburg*, who came to *Rome* to be Crown'd, though the Pope was not there; upon whose arrival many commotions followed in *Lombardy*, and all banished persons, whether *Guelfs* or *Gibilins*, being restor'd to their former Habitations, conspiring to supplant one another, they fill'd the whole Province with the Calamities of War, notwithstanding the Emperour imploy'd his utmost power to prevent it. *Arrigo* removing out of *Lombardy* by the way of *Genoua*, return'd to *Pisa*, with design to have driven King *Robert* out of *Tuscany*, but not succeeding in that; he march'd to *Rome*, but continued there a few dayes only, for the *Vrsini* by the help of King *Robert* forc'd him to remove, and he march'd back again to *Pisa*, where, for his more secure warring upon *Tuscany*, and supplanting that King, he caus'd it to be assaulted on the other side by *Frederick* King of *Sicily*. But in the height of his Designs, when he thought himself sure both of *Tuscany* and its King, he died, and the Succession went to *Lodouick* of *Bavaria*. About this time *John* XXII. was created Pope, in whose Papacy, the Emperour ceased not to persecute the *Guelfs* and the Church, but King *Robert* and the *Florentines* interposing in their defence, great Wars ensued in *Lombardy*, under the Conduct of the *Visconti* against the *Guelfs*, and against the *Florentines* in *Tuscany*, by *Castruccio di Lucca*. And because the Family of the *Visconti* were the Original of the Dukedom of *Milan*, one of the five Principalities that govern'd all *Italy* afterwards, I think it not amiss to deduce it a little higher. After the League among the Cities in *Lombardy* (which I have mentioned before) for their mutual defence against *Frederick Barbarossa*, *Milan* being rescued from the ruine that impended; to revenge it self of the injuries it had receiv'd, enter'd into that Confederacy, which put a stop to the Emperours career, and preserv'd the Churches interest in *Lombardy* for a while. In the process of these Wars, the Family of the *Torre* grew very powerful, increasing daily more and more, while the Emperour's Authority was small in those parts. But *Frederick* II. arriving in *Italy*, and the *Ghibilin* Faction (by the assistance of *Ezelino*) prevailing, it began to dilate and spread it self in all the Cities, and particularly in *Milan*, the Family of the *Visconti* siding with that party, drove the Family of the *Torre* out of that Town: But long they were not banish'd, for by an accord made betwixt the Emperour and Pope, they were restor'd. Afterwards when the Pope remov'd with his Court into *France*, and *Arrigo* of *Luxemburg* came to *Rome* to be Crown'd, he was receiv'd into *Milan* by *Maffeo Visconti*, the Head of that House, and *Guido della Torre*, the Chief of the other. Yet how kindly soever they carry'd it outwardly, *Maffeo* had a secret design, by the Emperour's being there, to drive out the *Torri's*, believing the Enterprise the more practicable, because *Guido* was of the Enemies Faction. He took the advantage of the peoples complaints against the behaviour of the *Germans*, incouraging them slily to take Arms, and rescue themselves from their barbarous servitude. Having dispos'd things as he desir'd, he caus'd a tumult to be rais'd by one of his Confidents, upon which the whole Town was to be in Arms, and pretendedly against the *Germans*. The Tumult was no sooner begun, but *Maffeo*, his Sons, Servants, and Partizans were immediately in Arms, and ran to *Arrigo*, assuring him that Tumult was rais'd by the *Torri*, who not content with their private Condition, took that occasion to ruine him as an Enemy to the *Guelfs*, and make themselves Princes of that City. But he desir'd him to be secure, for they and their party would not fail to defend him, when ever he requir'd it. *Arrigo* believ'd all to be true, that *Maffeo* had told him, joyn'd his Forces with the *Visconti*, fell upon the *Torri* (who were disperc'd up and down the City to suppress the Tumult) kill'd those of them which they met, banish'd the rest, and seiz'd their Estates: So that *Maffeo Visconti* made himself Prince. After him, there succeeded *Galeazo*, and *Aza*, and after them *Luchino* and *John*, who was afterwards Arch-Bishop of that City: *Luchino* died before him, and left two Sons, *Barnabo* and *Galeazo*; *Galeazo* dying not long after, left one Son, call'd *Giovan Galezzo*, *conti di vertu*, who after the death of the Arch-Bishop, kill'd his Unkle *Barnabo*, made himself Prince, and was the first that took upon him the Title of Duke of *Milan*. He left

The first Jubilies ordain'd by *Boniface* every 100 years.

Benedict chosen, dies, and is succeeded by *Clement* 5th who remov'd his residence into *France*, 1306.

John 22. Pope.

The *Visconti* a great Family in *Milan*, made Princes of that City by the extirpation of the *Torri*.

The first Duke of *Milan*.

left two Sons only, *Philip*, and *Giovan Maria Angelo*, who being slain by the people of *Milan*, the Government remain'd wholly to *Philip*; He dying without issue Male, the Dukedom was translated from the House of the *Visconti*, to the *Sforza*'s; but of the manner and occasions of that, hereafter. To return therefore, where I left.

The Dukedom of *Milan* falls to the *Flora*'s.

Lewis the Emperour, to give reputation to his party, and to be formally Crown'd, came into *Italy*, and being at *Milan*, to drain the City of its Money, he pretended to set them at Liberty, and clap'd the *Visconti* in *Prison*. Afterwards, by the Mediation of *Castruccio da Lucca*, he releas'd them, march'd to *Rome*, and (that he might more easily disturb the tranquillity of *Italy*,) he made *Piero della Carvaro*, Anti-Pope: by whose reputation, and the interest of the *Visconti*, he presum'd he should be able to keep under both the *Tuscans* and *Lombards*. But *Castruccio* died in the nick, and his death was the Emperour's ruine, for *Pisa* and *Lucca* rebell'd out of hand: The *Pisans* took the Anti-Pope, and sent him Prisoner to the Pope into *France*, so that the Emperour despairing of his Affairs in *Italy*, he left them all as they were, and retir'd into *Germany*. He was scarce gone, before *John* King of *Bohemia*, came into *Italy* with an Army (being invited by the *Ghibilins* in *Brescia*) and possest himself both of that City and *Bergamo*: The Pope (however he dissembled it) was not averse to his coming, and therefore his Legat at *Bologna* favour'd him privately, looking upon him as a good Antidote against the Emperour's return. These under-hand practises chang'd the Condition of *Italy*; for the *Florentines* and King *Robert*, perceiving the Legat a favourer of the *Ghibilin* Faction, turn'd Enemies to all people that profess'd themselves their Friends. In so much as without respect to either *Ghibilins* or *Guelfs*, many Princes associated with them; among the rest were the Families of the *Visconti* & *Scala*, *Philippo di Gonsaga* of the House of *Mantua*, the Families of *Carara* and *Este*, whereupon the Pope excommunicated them all. The King apprehensive of their League, return'd home to reinforce himself, and coming back with more Force into *Italy*; found his Enterprize very difficult notwithstanding; so that growing weary of the business (though much to the dissatisfaction of the *Legat*, he return'd into *Bohemia*, leaving *Garrisons* only in *Modena* and *Reggio*, recommending *Parma* to the Care of *Marsilio*, and *Piero de Rossi*, who were eminent men in that City. As soon as he was departed, *Bologna* enter'd into the Confederacy, and the *Colleagues* divided the four Towns that were remaining to the Church among themselves, *Parma*, to the *Scali*; *Reggio* to the *Gonzagi*; *Modena* to the *Esti*; and *Lucca*, to the *Florentines*: But many differences follow'd upon that division, which for the greatest part were compos'd afterwards by the *Venetians*. And now I speak of the *Venetians*, it may appear indecorous to some people, that among all the occurrences and revolutions in *Italy*, I have deferr'd speaking of them, notwithstanding their Government and Power places them above any other Republick or Principality in that Countrey.

That that Exception may be remov'd, and the occasion appear, it will be necessary to look back for some time, to make their Original conspicuous, and the reasons for which they reserv'd themselves so long from interposing in the Affairs of *Italy*. *Attila* King of the *Hunni*, having besieg'd *Aquilegia*, the Inhabitants after a generous defence, being reduc'd to distress, and despairing of Relief, conveighing their Goods, as well as they could, to certain Rocks in that point of the *Adriatick Sea* which were not inhabited, they escap'd after them themselves. The *Padouans* seeing the fire so near them, concluding when *Aquilegia* was taken, his next visit would be to them, sent away their Goods, Wives, Children, and unserviceable people to a place in the same Sea, call'd *Rivo Alto*, leaving the young men, and such as were able to bear Arms, for the defence of the Town. The Inhabitants of *Montselice*, and the Hills about it, fearing the same destiny, remov'd to the same Islands. *Aquilegia* being taken, and *Padoua*, *Montselice*, *Vicenza*, and *Verona*, overcome and sack'd by *Attila*'s Army; those which remain'd of the *Padouans*, and the most considerable of the rest, setled their Habitations in certain Fenns and Marshes about the aforesaid *Rio Alto*: and all the people about that Province, which was anciently call'd *Venetia*, being driven out of their Countrey by the same Calamities, joyn'd themselves with them; changing (by necessity) their pleasant and plentiful Habitations, for rude and barren places, void of all Commodity and Convenience. But their Number being great, and their Quarter but small, in a short time they made it not only habitable, but delightful; framing such Laws and Orders to themselves, as secur'd them against miseries of their Neighbours, and in a short time made them considerable, both for reputation and force. So that besides their first inhabitants, many people resorting to them from the Cities of *Lombardy*, upon occasion of the Cruelty of *Clefi* King of the *Lombards*, they multiply'd so fast, that when *Pepin* King of *France* at the solicitation of the Pope, undertook to drive the *Lombards* out of *Italy*, in the Treaties betwixt him and the Emperour of *Greece*, it was agreed that the Duke of *Benevento* and the *Venetians*, should be subject neither to the one nor the other,

The Orignal of the *Venetians*.

but

but injoy their Liberty to themselves. Moreover, Necessity having determin'd their Habitations among the Waters, having no Land to supply them, it forc'd them to look about which way they might live, and applying to Navigation, they began to trade about the World, and not only furnish'd themselves with necessary Provisions, but by degrees brought thither such variety of Merchandize, that other people which had need of them came to them to be supply'd. At first, having no thoughts of Dominion, they were wholly intent upon what might facilitate their Trade, and in order thereunto, they acquir'd several Ports, both in *Greece* and *Syria*, and in their passage into *Asia* the *French* making use of their Ships, they gave them (by way of Recompence) the Island of *Candia*. While they lived at this rate, their Name was grown formidable at Sea, and so venerable at Land, that in most Controversies betwixt their Neighbours they were the only Arbitrators: as it happen'd in the difference betwixt the Confederates upon the division of the Towns, where the Cause being referr'd to them, they awarded *Bergamo* and *Brescia* to the *Visconti*. But having afterwards in process of time conquer'd *Padoua*, *Vicenza*, *Trivegi*, and after them *Verona*, *Bergamo* and *Brescia*, besides several Towns in *Romagna* and else where, their power began to be so considerable, that not only the Princes of *Italy*, but the greatest and most remote Kings were afraid to provoke them. Whereupon, entring into a Conspiracy against them, the *Venetians* lost all in one day, that in so many Years, and with so vast Expence they had been gaining; and though in our times they may have recover'd it in part, yet not having regain'd their Reputation and Power, they live at the mercy of other people (as indeed all the Princes of *Italy* do). *Benedict* XII. being Pope, looking upon *Italy* as lost, and fearing that *Lodouic* the Emperour should make himself Master of it, he resolv'd to enter into strict Amity with all those, who held any Lands that belong'd formerly to the Empire, presuming their fear to be dispossess'd, would make them faithful in the defence of *Italy*, and zealous to keep him out: accordingly he publish'd a Decree to confirm all the usurp'd Titles in *Lombardy*, and to continue their Possession. But that Pope died before his Promise could be made good, and *Clement* VI. succeeded him. The Emperour observing with what liberality the Pope had dispos'd of the Lands belonging to the Empire, that he might not be behind him in so generous a point, he gave all Lands that had been usurp'd from the Church, to such persons as had usurp'd them, to hold them of the Empire, as the other of the Pope. By which Donation *Galeotto Malatesti* and his Brothers, became Lords of *Rimini*, *Pesaro*, and *Fano*. *Antonio da Montefeltro* of *la Marca* and *Urbin*. *Gentil da Varano* of *Camerino*. *Giovanni Manfredi* of *Faenza*. *Guido di Polenta* of *Ravenna*. *Sinebaldo Ordelaffi* of *Furli* and *Cesena*. *Lodovico Aledosi* of *Imola*, besides many others in other places: so that of all the Lands which belong'd to the Church, there was scarce any left without an interloper; by which means, till the time of *Alexander* VI. the Church was very weak, but he recover'd its Authority in our daies, with the destruction of most of their Posterity. At the time of this Concession, the Emperour was at *Trento*, where he gave out, his Design was for *Italy*, which was the the occasion of great Wars in *Lombardy*, in which the *Visconti* made themselves Lords of *Parma*. About this time, *Robert* King of *Naples* died, and left two Grand Children by his Son *Charles*, (who died not long before) leaving his eldest Daughter *Giovanna* Heir to the Crown, with injunction to marry *Andrea* Son to the King of *Hungary*, who was his Nephew. But they liv'd not long together, before *Andrea* was poison'd by her, and she married again to *Lodouick* Prince of *Tarente*, her near Kinsman. But *Lewis* King of *Hungary*, Brother to *Andrea*, to revenge his death, came into *Italy* with an Army, and drave *Giovanna* and her Husband out of the Kingdom. About these times there happen'd a very memorable passage in *Rome*, One *Nicholas di Lorenzo* Chancellor in the Capitol, having forc'd the Senate out of *Rome*, under the Title of *Tribune* made himself head of that Commonwealth, reducing it into its ancient form, with so much Justice and Virtue, that not only the neighbouring Provinces, but all *Italy* sent Embassadours to him: The ancient Provinces seeing that City so strangely reviv'd, began to lift up their Heads, and pay it a respect, some out of fear, and some out of hopes. But *Nicholas*, notwithstanding the greatness of his Reputation, not able to comport with so great an Authority, deserted it himself; for being overburthen'd with the weight of it, he left it in the very beginning, and without any constraint, stole privately away to the King of *Bohemia*, who, by the Popes Order in affront to *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, was made Emperour, and to gratifie his Patron, he secur'd *Nicholas*, and clapt him in Prison. Not long after, as it had been in imitation of *Nicholas*, one *Francesco Baroncegli* possest himself of the Tribuneship, and turn'd the Senators out of *Rome*: so that the Pope, as the readiest way to suppress him, was glad to discharge *Nicholas* of his imprisonment, and sent him to *Rome*, to resume his old Office; whereupon, *Nicholas* undertook the Government once more, and caus'd *Francesco* to be executed. But the *Colonnesi* becoming his Enemies by degrees, he himself was put to death

Candia given to the *Venetians* by the *French*.

Benedict 12th. Pope.

Clement 6th Pope.

by them, and the Senate restor'd to the Exercise of its former Authority. In the mean time the King of *Hungary*, having depos'd Queen *Giovanna*, return'd to his own Kingdom: But the Pope desir'd to have the Queen his Neighbour, rather than that King, and order'd things so, that the Kingdom was restor'd, upon Condition her Husband *Lewis*, renouncing the Title of King, should content himself with that of *Taranto*. The Year MCCCL. being come, his Holiness thought fit that the Jubily appointed by Pope *Boniface* VIII. to be kept every hundred years, should be reduc'd to fifty, and, having pass'd a Decree to that purpose, in gratitude for so great a Benefit, the *Romans* were contented he should send four Cardinals to *Rome*, to reform their City, and create what Senators he pleas'd. After which the Pope declar'd *Lodouic* of *Taranto* King of *Naples* again, and *Giovanna*, highly oblig'd by that favour, gave the Church *Avignon*, which was part of her Patrimony. By this time *Luchino Visconti* being dead, *John* Arch-Bishop of *Milan* remain'd sole Lord, and, making several Wars upon *Tuscany* and his Neighbours, became very considerable. After his death, the Government fell to his two Nephews, *Bernarbo* and *Galeazo*, but *Galeazo* dying a while after, he left his Son *John Galeazo* to share with his Unkle in the State. In these dayes, *Charles* King of *Bohemia* was created Emperour, and *Innocent* VI. Pope, who having sent Cardinal *Giles* (a *Spaniard*) into *Italy*, by his Virtue, and the excellence of his Conduct, he recover'd the Reputation of the Church, not only in *Rome* and *Romagna*, but all *Italy* over. He recover'd *Bologna*, that had been usurp'd by the Arch-Bishop of *Milan*. He constrain'd the *Romans* to admit a forreign Senator every year of the Popes nomination. He made an honourable Agreement with the *Visconti*. He fought and took Prisoner *John Aguto* an *English-man*, who with four thousand *English* was entertain'd in *Tuscany*, upon the *Ghibilin* accompt. After these Successes, *Urban* V. being Pope, he resolv'd to visit both *Italy* and *Rome*, where *Charles* the Emperour came to meet him, and having continued together several Months, *Charles* return'd into his Kingdom, and the Pope to *Avignon*. *Urban* died, and *Gregory* XII. succeeded, and because Cardinal *Egidio* was dead, *Italy* relaps'd into its former distractions, occasion'd by the Caballing of the people against the *Visconti*. Whereupon the Pope at first sent a *Legat* into *Italy* with six thousand *Britans*, after whom he follow'd in Person, and re-establish'd his Residence at *Rome*, in the year MCCCLXXVI. after it had been kept in *France*, LXXI. years.

The Jubily reduc'd to 50. years.

Avignon given to the Pope by the Queen of *Naples*.

Innocent 6th Pope.

Urban 5th Pope.

Gregory 12th Pope.

The Pope returns to *Rome*, after 71 years absence in *France*.

After the death of this Pope, *Urban* VI. was created. Not long after at *Fondi*, ten Cardinals quarrelling with his Election, and pretending it was not fair, created *Clement* VII. The *Genoueses* in the mean time (who for several years had lived quietly under the Government of the *Visconti*) rebell'd: Betwixt them and the *Venetian*, there happen'd great Wars about the Island of *Tenedos*; in which War by degreees all *Italy* became concern'd, and there it was that great *Guns* were first us'd, they being a *German* Invention. Though for a while the *Genoueses* were predominant, and held *Venice* blockt up for several Months together; yet in the Conclusion, the *Venetian* had the better, and made an advantagious Peace, by the assistance of the Pope. In the year 1381 (as we have said before) there was a Schism in the Church, and *Giovanna* the Queen favour'd the Anti-Pope. Whereupon, Pope *Urban* practis'd against her, and sent *Carlo Durazzo* (who was of the Royal House of *Naples*) with an Army into her Kingdom, who possest himself of her Countrey, and drove her away into *France*. The King of *France* undertaking her quarrel, sent *Lodouic d'Angio* to repossess the Queen, and force *Urban* out of *Rome*, and set up the Anti-Pope. But *Lodouic* dying in the middle of the Enterprize, his Army broke up, and return'd into *France*. *Urban* thereupon, goes over to *Naples*, and claps nine Cardinals in Prison, for having sided with *France* and the Anti-Pope. After that, he took it ill of the King, that he refus'd to make one of his Nephews Prince of *Capua*, but concealing his disgust, he desir'd *Nocera* of him for his Habitation, which as soon as he was possess'd of, he fortified, and began to cast about which way to deprive him of his Kingdom. The King taking the Alarm, advanc'd against *Nocera* and besieg'd it, but the Pope escap'd to *Genoua*, where he put the Cardinals which were his Prisoners to death. From thence he went to *Rome*, and created 28 new Cardinals. In the mean time *Charles* King of *Naples* went into *Hungary*, was proclaim'd King there, and not long after kill'd. He left the Kingdom of *Naples* to his Wife, and two Children he had by her, one call'd *Ladislao*, and the other *Giovanna*.

Urban 6th Pope: *Clement* 7th Anti-Pope.

Guns first us'd betwixt the *Genoueses* and *Venetians*.

John Galeazzo Visconti in the mean time had kill'd his Unkle *Bernabo*, and possest himself of *Milan*, and not content to have made himself Duke of *Milan*; he attempted upon *Tuscany*, but when he was in a fair way to have conquer'd it, and to have made himself King of all *Italy*, he died. *Urban* VI. died also, and was succeeded by *Boniface* IX. *Clement* VIII. the Anti-Pope died likewise at *Avignon*, and *Benedict* XIII. was created in his room. *Italy* all this while was full of Soldiers of Fortune, *English*, *Dutch*, and *Britans*, some of them Commanded by Princes, which upon several occasions had been invited thither,

Urban and *Clement* succeeded by *Boniface* 9th & *Benedict* 13th.

thither, and some of them which had been sent by the Popes, when their Residence was at *Avignon*; With this medly of Nations the Princes of *Italy* maintain'd their Wars many times, till at length *Lodouico da Conio Romagnuolo* having train'd up a Party of *Italians*, call'd the Soldiers of *Saint George*, by his Valour and Discipline lessen'd the Reputation of the Forreigners, and made them afterwards more useful and considerable in the *Italian* Wars. The Pope upon certain differences which arose betwixt him and the *Romans*, remov'd to *Sceſi*, where he remain'd till the Jubily in the year 1400. at which time, to invite him back again for the benefit of their Citty, the *Romans* condescended that he should have the annual nomination of a forreign Senator, and be permitted to fortifie the Castle of St. *Angelo*; upon which Conditions being return'd, to inrich the Church, he ordain'd, That in every Vacancy, each Benefice should pay an Annat into the Chamber Ecclesiastical. After the death of *John Galeazzo* Duke of *Milan*, though he left two Sons *Giovan-Mari-Angelo*, and *Philip*, the State was divided into many Factions. In the troubles which followed, *Giovan-Mari-Angelo* was slain, and *Philip* for some time kept Prisoner in the Castle of *Pavia*; but by the Valour and Allegeance of the Governour, he escap'd. Among the rest who had seiz'd the Cities which belong'd formerly to *John Galeazzo*, *William della Scala* was one, who having been banish'd, and retiring to *Francesco de Carrara* Lord of *Padua*, by his means he recover'd the State of *Verona*, but he injoy'd it a short time; for *Francesco* caus'd him to be poison'd, and assum'd the Government himself. The *Vicentini* hereupon (having till then liv'd quietly under the protection of the *Visconti*) growing jealous of the greatness of the Lord of *Padua*, submitted themselves to the *Venetians*, who at their instigation made War upon him, and beat him first out of *Verona*, and at length out of *Padua*. By this time Pope *Boniface* died, and *Innocent* VII. was elected in his place. The people of *Rome* made a solemn Address to him for the Restitution of their Liberty and Forts, and being deny'd, they call'd in *Ladislaus* King of *Naples* to their Assistance; but their differences being afterwards compos'd, the Pope return'd to *Rome*, from whence for fear of the people he fled to *Viterbo*, where he had made his Nephew *Lodouic*, *Conte della Marca*; after which he died, and *Gregory* XII. succeeded, upon Condition he should resign when ever the Anti-Pope should be perswaded to do the same. At the intercession of the Cardinals, to try whether it was possible to accomodate their differences, and reunite the Church, *Benedict* the Anti-Pope came to *Porto Veneri*, and *Gregory* to *Lucca*, where many Expedients were propos'd, but nothing concluded; whereupon the Cardinals forsook them both, of one side and the other, *Benedict* retired into *Spain*, and *Gregory* to *Rimini*. The Cardinals by the favour of *Baldassare Cossa*, Cardinal and Legat of *Bologna* call'd a Counsel at *Pisa*, in which they created *Alexander* V. who immediately excommunicated King *Ladislaus*, invested *Luigi d'Angio* with his Kingdom, and by the assistance of the *Florentines*, *Genouese*, *Venetians* and *Baldassare Cossa* the *Legat*, they assaulted *Ladislaus*, and drove him out of *Rome*. But in the heat of the War, *Alexander* died, and *Baldassare Cossa* was created Pope, with the name of *John* XXIII. *John* was created at *Bologna*, but remov'd to *Rome*, where he found *Luigi d'Angio* with the Forces of *Provence*; having joyn'd himself with him, they march'd out against King *Ladislaus*, fought with him, and routed his Army; but for want of good Conduct, not pursuing their Victory, King *Ladislaus* rally'd, recover'd *Rome*, and forc'd the Pope away to *Bologna*, and *Luigi* to *Provence*. The Pope casting about with himself which way he might restrain and lessen the power of King *Ladislaus*, caus'd *Sigismund* King of *Hungary* to be chosen Emperour, invited him into *Italy*, to which purpose they had a Conference at *Mantua*, where it was concluded, a general Counsel should be call'd for uniting the Church; upon the accomplishment of which, it was presum'd they should be better able to defend themselves against the incroachments of their Enemies.

Boniface dies, *Innocent* 7th succeeds him, and *Gregory* the 12th *Innocent*.

Alexander 5th elected, and succeed by *John* 23d.

At this time, there were three Popes in being at once; *Gregory*, *Benedict*, and *John*, which kept the Church very low, both in force and reputation. The place appointed for their Convention was *Constance*, a City in *Germany*, contrary to the intention of Pope *John*; and though by the death of King *Ladislaus*, the great Reason was taken away that mov'd the Pope to that proposition, never the less, things being gone so far, and he under an obligation, he could not handsomly come off, but was forc'd to go to it. Being arriv'd at *Constance*, it was not many months before he found his Error, and endeavoured to have escaped; but being discover'd and taken, he was put in Prison, and compell'd to renounce. *Gregory*, one of the Anti-Popes renounced by Proxy, but *Benedict*, the other Anti-Pope refus'd, & was condemned for a Heretick; at last finding himself abandon'd by all the Cardinals, he renounc'd likewise, and the Counsel created a new Pope, Viz. *Oddo* of the House of *Colonna*, who took the name of *Martin* V. upon which, the Schisms were compos'd, and the Church united, after it had been divided forty years, and several Popes living at one and the same time. As we said before, *Philip Visconti* was at this time in the Castle of

Three Popes at once.

Martin 5th.

Pavia. But upon the death of *Fantino Care* (who in the troubles of *Lombardy* had made himſelf Lord of *Vercelli*, *Alexandria*, *Novara*, and *Tortona*, and contracted great wealth) having no Sons, he bequeath'd his Dominions to his Wife *Beatrix*, injoyning his Friends to uſe their utmoſt endeavour to Marry her to *Philip*; by which Marriage, *Philip* being much ſtrengthen'd, he recover'd *Milan*, and all the whole Province of *Lombardy:* after which, to recompence her great Benefits (according to the Example of other Princes) he accus'd his Wife *Beatrix* of Adultery, and put her to death. Being arriv'd at that height both of Power and Grandeur, he began to contrive againſt *Toſcany*, and perſue the deſigns of his Father *John Galiazzo*. *Ladiſlaus* King of *Naples* at his death, had left to his Siſter *Giovanna* (beſides his Kingdom) a formidable Army Commanded by the chief Captains in *Italy*, and among the reſt, by *Sforza da Contignuolo*, a perſon of particular repute for his Valour in thoſe Wars. The Queen (to clear her ſelf of an aſperſion of too much intimacy with one *Pandolfello* which ſhe had advanc'd) took to her Husband *Giacopa della Marcia*, a *Frenchman*, of Royal Extraction, but upon condition he ſhould content himſelf to be call'd Prince of *Taranto*, and leave the Title and Government of her Kingdom to her. But the Soldiers as ſoon as he was arriv'd in *Naples* call'd him King, which occaſion'd great differences betwixt him and the Queen, ſometimes one prevailing, and ſometimes the other. But at length the Government reſted in the Queen, and ſhe became a ſevere Enemy to the Pope. Whereupon *Sforza* to drive her into a neceſſity, and force her to his own terms, laid down his Commiſſion, and refus'd to ſerve her againſt him; by which means being (as it were) diſarm'd in a moment, having no other remedy ſhe apply'd her ſelf to *Alphonſo* King of *Arragon* and *Sicily*, adopted him her Son, and to Command her Army, ſhe entertain'd *Braccio da Montone*, as Eminent a Soldier as *Sforza*, and an Adverſary of the Popes, upon accompt of certain Towns (as *Perugia* and others) which he had uſurp'd from the Church. After this, a Peace was concluded betwixt her and the Pope; but *Alphonſo* ſuſpecting leaſt ſhe ſhould ſerve him, as ſhe had done her Husband, began privately to contrive how he might poſſeſs himſelf of the Forts: But the Queen was cunning, and prevented him by fortifying her ſelf in the Caſtle of *Naples*. Jealouſies increaſing in this manner, and no-body interpoſing, they came to an Ingagement, and the Queen by the help of *Sforza* (who was return'd to her Service) overcame *Alphonſo*, drove him out of *Naples*, abdicated him, and adopted *Loduic d' Angio* in his place. Hereupon new Wars enſued betwixt *Braccio* (who was of *Alphonſo*'s party) and *Sforza* (who was for the Queen.) In the proceſs of that War *Sforza* paſſing the River *Peſcara*, was by accident drown'd. His death was a great prejudice to the affairs of the Queen, who thereupon would have run great hazard of being droven out of her Kingdom, had not her loſs been ſupply'd by *Philip Viſconti*, Duke of *Milan*, who forc'd *Alphonſo* back again into *Arragon*. But *Braccio*, not at all diſcourag'd at *Alphonſo*'s departure continued War upon the Queen, and belieg'd *Aquila*. The Pope looking upon *Braccio*'s greatneſs, as a diminution to the Church, entertain'd *Franciſco* (the Son of *Sforza*) into his pay, who marching with an Army to the relief of *Aquila*, ingag'd *Braccio*, routed his Army, and ſlew him. Of *Braccio*'s party, there remain'd only *Otho* his Son, from whom the Pope took *Perugia*, but left him the Government of *Montone*. But he alſo was not long after ſlain in *Romania*, in the *Florentine* aſſiſtance; ſo that of all thoſe who fought under the Diſcipline of *Braccio*, *Nicholas Piccinino* was the man now of greateſt reputation. Being come thus near with our Narrative to the times we deſign'd, that which remains being conſiderable in nothing but the Wars which the *Florentines* and the *Venetians* had with *Philip* Duke of *Milan*, (of which, our Relation ſhall be particular when we come to treat of *Florence*,) We ſhall forbear to enlarge any farther, and only in ſhort, reduce it to Memory, in what ſtate and poſture *Italy* then ſtood with its Princes, and Armies. Among the principal States, Queen *Giovanna* held the Kingdom of *Naples*, *La Marca*, the *Patrimony*, and *Romagna*. Part of their Towns belong'd to the Church, part to their particular Governours, or others which had Uſurp'd them: as *Ferrara*, *Modeno*, *Reggio*, to the Family of the *Eſti*, *Faenzi* to the *Manfredi*, *Imola* to the *Alidoſi*, *Furli* to the *Ordelaffi*, *Rimini* and *Peſaro* to the *Malateſti*, and *Camerino* to the Houſe *Varana*. *Lombardy* was divided, part under Duke *Philip*, and part under the *Venetian*. All the reſt who had had any ſoveraignty or principality in thoſe parts, being extinct, except only the Houſe of *Gonzagua*, which govern'd in *Mantua* at that time. Of *Tuſcany* the greateſt part was under the Dominion of the *Florentine*; *Lucca* only, and *Siena* liv'd free under their own Laws: *Lucca* under the *Guinigi*, and *Siena* of it ſelf. The *Genoueſes*, being free ſometimes, ſometimes under the Authority of the *French*, and ſometimes of the *Viſconti*; they lived without any great reputation, and were reckon'd among the meaner and moſt inconſiderable ſtates of that Countrey. Their principal Potentates were not themſelves in Command, but their Armies managed by their Generals. Duke *Philip* confin'd himſelf to his Chamber, and not being

The Queen of *Naples* calls in the K. of *Arragon* to her aſſiſtance, adopts him, and makes *Braccio da Montone* her General.

The State of *Italy*.

to

to be ſeen, his Wars were manag'd by Commiſſioners. The *Venetians* altering their Scene, and making War by Land, they diſbarqued that Army which had made them ſo glorious by Sea; and according to the Cuſtom of their Countrey, gave the Command of it to other people. The Pope, being a Religious perſon, and *Giovanna* Queen of *Naples* a Woman, were not ſo proper to Command in perſon, and therefore did that by neceſſity which others did by indiſcretion. The *Florentines* were under the ſame neceſſity, for their frequent diviſions having exhauſted their Nobility, and the Government of the City remaining in the hands of ſuch as were bred up to Merchandize; in their Wars they were forc'd to follow the fortune and direction of ſtrangers: So that the Armies all *Italy* over, were in the hands of the ſmaller Princes, or ſuch as had no Soveraignty at all. Thoſe ſmaller Princes embracing thoſe Commands, not from any impulſe or ſtimulation of Glory, but to live plentifully and ſafe. The others Education having been ſmall, not knowing what other courſe to take, they took up Arms, hoping thereby to gain either Honour or Eſtate. Among theſe the moſt eminent were *Carmignuola*. *Franciſco Sforza*, *Nicholo Piccinino*, brought up under *Braccio*, *Agnolo della Pergola*, *Lorenzo*, and *Micheletto Attenduli*, *Il Tartaglia*, *Giaccopaccio*, *Ceccolino da Perugia*, *Nicolo da Tolentino*, *Guido Torello*, *Antonio dal Ponte ad Hera*, and many others. With theſe may be reckon'd thoſe Princes which I have mention'd before, to which may be added the Barons of *Rome*, the *Orſini*, *Colonneſi*, and other Lords and Gentlemen of the Kingdom of *Lombardy*, who depending upon the Wars, had ſetled a kind of a League and Intelligence betwixt themſelves, model'd it with that artifice, and temporized ſo exactly, that moſt commonly whoever were Enemies, both ſides were ſure to be loſers. By this means, the Art of War became ſo mean and unſerviceable, every little Officer that had but the leaſt ſpark of Experience could have eaſily corrected it. Of theſe lazy Princes, and their deſpicable Officers ſhall be the ſubject of my enſuing diſcourſe; but before I come to it, it will be neceſſary (according to my promiſe at firſt) to deduce *Florence* from its Original, and give every one a clear proſpect what was the State of that City in thoſe times, and by what means it arriv'd at it, thorough the imbroilments of a thouſand years, in which *Italy* was involv'd.

THE

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

Book II.

AMong the great and admirable orders of former Kingdoms and Common-wealths (though in our times it is discontinued and loſt) it was the Cuſtom upon every occaſion to build new Towns and Cities, and indeed nothing is more worthy and becoming an excellent Prince, a well-diſpoſed Common-wealth, nor more for the intereſt and advantage of a Province, than to erect new Towns, where men may cohabit with more Convenience, both for Agriculture, and Defence. For beſides the Beauty and Ornament which follow'd upon that Cuſtom, it render'd ſuch Provinces as were Conquer'd, more dutiful and ſecure to the Conquerour, planted the void places, and made a commodious diſtribution of the people; upon which, living regularly and in order, they did not only multiply faſter, but were more ready to invade, and more able for defence. But by the negligence and omiſſion of Common-wealths and Principalities, this method being at preſent diſuſed, the Provinces are become weaker, and ſome of them ruin'd. For (as I ſaid before) it is this order alone that ſecures a Country, and ſupplys it with people. The ſecurity conſiſts in this, that in a new Conquer'd Countrey, a Colony placed by Authority, is a Fortreſs and Guard to keep the Natives in obedience; neither without this can a Province continue inhabited, or preſerve a juſt diſtribution of the people, becauſe all places being not equally fertile or healthful, where it is barren, they deſert; where unwholſome, they dye; and unleſs there be ſome way to invite or diſpoſe new men to the one, as well as the other, that Province muſt fail; the abandoning ſome places leaving them deſolate and weak, and the thronging to others making them indigent and poor. And foraſmuch as theſe inconveniencies are not to be remedyed by Nature, Art and Induſtry is to be apply'd; and we ſee many Countreys which are naturally unhealthful, much better'd by the multitude of Inhabitants; the Earth being purify'd by their Tillage, and the Air by their Fires, which Nature alone would never have effected. Of this, *Venice* is inſtance ſufficient; for though ſeated in a ſickly and watriſh place, the concourſe of ſo many people at one time, made it healthful enough. *Piſa* by reaſon of the malignity of the Air, was very ill inhabited, till *Genoa*, and the Inhabitants upon its Rivers, being defeated and diſpoſſeſs'd by the *Saracens*, it follow'd, that being ſupplanted all of them at once, and repairing thither in ſuch Numbers, that Town in a ſhort time became populous and potent. But the Cuſtom of ſending Colonies being laid aſide, new Conqueſts are not ſo eaſily kept, void places not ſo eaſily ſupply'd, nor full and exuberant places ſo eaſily evacuated. Whereupon many places in the world, and particularly in *Italy*, are become deſolate and deſerted in reſpect of what in

The Convenience of Colonies.

in former ages they have been, which is imputable to nothing, but that Princes do not retain their ancient appetite of true glory, nor Common-wealths the laudable Customs they were wont.

In old time, by the virtue and courage of these Colonies, new Cities were many times built, and what were new begun inlarg'd; In which number the City of *Florence* may be reckon'd, which was begun by the Inhabitants of *Fiesole*, and augmented by the Colonies. It is a true Story (if *Dante*, and *John Villani* may be believ'd) that the City of *Fiesole* though plac'd it self on the top of a Mountain, nevertheless, that their Markets might be better frequented, and their Commodities brought to them with greater convenience to the Merchant, they order'd them a place, not on the top of the hill, but in the plain, betwixt the bottom of the Mountain, and the River *Arnus*. The Original of *Florence*.

These Merchants (in my judgment) were the first occasion of building in that place, and what was originally but Store-houses for receipt of their Commodities, became afterwards a Town, and place of Habitation.

After the *Romans* had Conquer'd the *Carthaginians*, and render'd *Italy* safe against Forreign imbroilments, they multiply'd exceedingly; for men will not incommode themselves, but where they are constrain'd by necessity, and though the terrours of War may force them for shelter to fortify'd places and rocks, yet when the danger is over, their profit and convenience calls them back again to their houses, and they prefer Elbow-room, and Ease before any such restraint. The security which follow'd in *Italy* upon the reputation of the *Roman* Common-wealth, might possibly be the occasion that this place (from the aforesaid beginning increasing so vastly) became afterwards a Town, and was call'd at first *Arnina*.

After this there arose Civil Wars in *Rome*, first betwixt *Marius* and *Silla*, then betwixt *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, and afterwards betwixt them that Murder'd *Cæsar*, and those which reveng'd his Death. By *Silla* first, and after that by the three *Roman* Citizens (who revenged the assassination of *Cæsar*, and divided the Empire) Colonies were sent to *Fiesole*; all, or part of which setled in the plain not far from the Town which was already begun. So that by this accession, the place was so repleniſh'd with Houses, Men, and all things necessary for Civil Government, that it might be reckon'd among the Cities of *Italy*. But from whence it assum'd the name of *Florence* is variously conjectur'd: Some would have it call'd *Florence* from *Florino* one of the chief of that Colonie. Some say it was not called *Florentia*, but *Fluentia* in the beginning, in respect of its nearness to the River *Arno*; and they produce *Pliny* as a witness, who has this Expression, That *the Fluentini are near to the Channel of the River* Arnus. But that (in my opinion) is a mistake, because *Pliny* in his Book design'd to tell where the *Florentines* were seated, not what they were call'd. Nor is it unlikely but that word *Fluentini* might be corrupted, because *Frontinus* and *Tacitus* (who writ, and were near contemporary with *Pliny*) call'd the Town *Florentia*, and the people *Florentini*, forasmuch as they were govern'd in the time of *Tiberius*, according to the same Laws and Customs with the rest of the Cities in *Italy*, and *Cornelius Tacitus* relates that Embassadors were sent from the *Florentines* to the Emperour, to desire that the Waters of the River *Chiane* might not be disimbogued, or diverted upon their Countrey; neither is it reasonable to think that City could have two names at one time. My opinion therefore is cleer, that whatever might be the occasion of its Original or Denomination, it was alwayes called *Florentia*; that it was founded under the Empire of the *Romans*, and began to be mention'd in History in the time of the first Emperours; that when that Empire was first afflicted by the *Barbarians*, *Totila*, King of the *Ostrogoti* demolish'd *Florence*; that 250 years after, it was rebuilt by *Carolus Magnus*, from whose time till the year 1215. it follow'd the fortune of the rest of *Italy*, and was subject to those that Commanded; during which it was governed first by the Successors of *Charles*, afterwards by the *Berengarii*, and last of all by the Emperours of *Germany*, as has been shewn in our general discourse. In those dayes it was not in the power of the *Florentines* to extend their bounds, or to perform any memorable action, by reason of their subjection to Forreign Dominion. Nevertheless in the year 1010. on St. *Romulus* day (which was a solemn Festival among the *Fiesolani*) they took, and destroy'd *Fiesole*, either by the connivance of the Emperours, or by the opportunity of an *interregnum* betwixt the Death of one Emperour and the Creation of another, at which times all the Cities were free. But afterwards when the Popes assum'd more Authority, and the Emperours power began to diminish, all the Towns in that Province began to comport themselves with less regard or reverence to their Princes; so that in the year 1080. in the dayes of *Arrigo* 3. though *Italy* was divided betwixt him and the Church, yet till the year 1215. the *Florentines* by submitting to the Conquerours, and designing no farther than their own preservation, kept themselves quiet and intire. But as in the Body of Man, the later they come, the more dangerous and mortal are the Diseases; so *Florence* the longer it The Denomination of *Florence*.

was

was before it fell into the paroxysmes of faction, the more fatally it was afflicted afterwards when it did. The occasion of its first division is considerable, and being mention'd by *Dante* and several other Writers as remarkable, I shall take the liberty to discourse of it briefly.

The first Division of *Florence.*

Among other great and powerful Families in *Florence*, there were the *Buondelmonti*, and *Uberti*, and not long after them the *Amidei*, and *Donati*. In the Family of the *Donati*, there was a Lady (a Widdow) very rich, who had a great beauty to her Daughter. The Lady had resolv'd with her self to Marry her Daughter to *Messr. Buondelmonte*, a Young Gentleman, the head of that Family. This intention of hers (either by negligence, or presuming it safe enough at any time) she had not imparted to any body, so that before she was aware *Messr. Buondelmonte* was to be Married to a Daughter of the House of *Amidei*. The Lady much dissatisfy'd with her omission, hoping nevertheless her Daughters beauty might be able to dissolve the Contract, seeing him pass one day alone towards her House, she took her Daughter along, and went down to accost him, and opening the Gate as he went by, she saluted him, and told him, she could not but congratulate his Marriage, though indeed she had kept her Daughter (presenting her to him) in hopes she should have been the Bride. The young Gentleman beholding the Excellent Beauty of the *Damoiselle*, contemplating her Extraction, and that her fortune was not at all Inferiour to the persons he had chosen, fell immediately into such a passion and desire to Marry her, that not considering the promise he had made, the injustice he should commit, nor the ill consequences that might follow, he reply'd, *Seeing (Madam) you have preserv'd her for me (being not yet too late) it would be ingratitude to refuse her*, and without more adoe, he Married her. The notice of his inconstancy was no sooner divulg'd, but it was taken in great indignity by the Families of the *Amidei* and *Uberti*, who at that time were nearly ally'd. Having consulted among themselves, and several others of their Relations, it was concluded, the affront was insupportable, and not to be expiated but by the death of *Messr. Buondelmonte*; and though some remonstrated the evils which might follow, *Mosche Lamberti* reply'd, That to consider every thing, was to resolve on nothing; super-adding an old Adage, *That a thing once done, is not capable of Remedy:* upon which the Fact being determin'd, the perpetration was committed to the said *Mosche*, *Stiatta Uberti*, *Lambertuccio Amidei*, and *Oderigo Fifanti*. Upon *Easter-day* in the morning, they addres's'd themselves to the work, and being privately convey'd to a House belonging to the *Amidei*, between the *Old Bridge* and St. *Stephans*, *Messr. Buondelmonte* passing the River upon a White Horse, (as if an injury could as easily have been forgotten, as a Marriage have been broken) they set upon him at the foot of the Bridge, and slew him under a Statue of *Mars*, which was placed thereby. This Murder divided the whole City, part of it siding with the *Buondelmonti*, and part with the *Uberti*; and both the Families being powerful in Houses, Castles, and Men, the quarrel continued many years before either could be ejected; yet though the animosity could not be extinguish'd by a firm and stable peace, yet things were palliated and compos'd sometimes for the present, by certain Truces and Cessations, by which means (according to the variety of accidents) they were sometimes at quiet, and sometimes together by the Ears. In this Condition *Florence* continued till the Reign of *Frederick* II. who being King of *Naples*, and desirous to strengthen himself against the Church; to corroborate his interest in *Tuscany*, joyn'd himself to the *Uberti* and their party, by whose assistance the *Buondelmonti* were driven out of *Florence*, and that City (as all *Italy* had done before) began to divide into the Factions of the *Guelfs*, and the *Ghibilins*. Nor will it be amiss to commemorate how each Family was ingag'd. The Families therefore which sided with the *Guelfs* were the *Buondelmonti*, *Nerti*, *Rossi*, *Fresco Baldi*, *Mozzi*, *Baldi*, *Pulchi*, *Gherardini*, *Foraboschi*, *Bagnesi*, *Guidalotti*, *Sacchetti*, *Manieri*, *Lucardesi*, *Chiaramonti*, *Compiobbesi*, *Cavalcanti*, *Giandonati*, *Gianfiliazzi*, *Scali*, *Guallerotti*, *Importuni*, *Bostichi*, *Tornaquinci*, *Vecchietti*, *Fosinghi*, *Arrigucci*, *Agli*, *Silii*, *Adimari*, *Visdomini*, *Donati*, *Pazzi*, *della Bella*, *Ardinghi*, *Theobaldi*, *Cerchi*. With the *Ghibilines* there joyned the *Uberti*, *Manelli*, *Ubriachi*, *Fifanti*, *Amidei*, *Infanganti*, *Malespini*, *Scolari*, *Guidi*, *Galli*, *Capprardi*, *Lamberti*, *Soldanieri*, *Cipriani*, *Toschi*, *Amieri*, *Palermini*, *Migliorelli*, *Pigli*, *Barucci*, *Cattani*, *Agolanti*, *Brunelleschi*, *Caponsachi*, *Elisei*, *Abbati*, *Fedaldini*, *Guiocchi*, *Galigai*; to which Families of the Nobility, many of the populacy joyn'd themselves on each side, as their interest or affections carried them, so that in a manner the whole City was ingag'd either on one side or the other. The *Guelfs* being driven out, retir'd into the Vale upon the River *Arnus* mention'd before, and the greatest part of their Garrisons being there, they defended them as well as they could against the Attacks of their Enemies. But when *Frederick* dyed, those persons who were Neuters, retaining great interest and reputation with the people, thought it more serviceable to the City of *Florence* to reconcile their differences and unite them, than by fomenting them, to destroy it: Whereupon endeavouring a Composure, they prevail'd

The *Guelfs*, & *Ghibilin* Faction in *Florence.*

at

at length that the *Guelfs* should lay aside their indignation, and return, and the *Ghibilines* renounce their suspicion and receive them. Being united in this manner, it was thought seasonable to provide for their liberty, and to contrive some Laws for their defence, before the new Emperour should get the power into his hands. In order thereunto they divided the City into six parts; They chose twelve Citizens (two for each part) which, under the title of *Antiani*, they invested with the Government, but chang'd them every year. To prevent any animosity that might arise from the determination of matters judicial, they constituted two Forreign Judges, (one of them call'd the Captain of the people, and the other the *Podesta*) to decide all Civil and Criminal Causes which should occur. And because Laws are but transient, and of little duration, where there is no power to defend them, they establish'd XX Colours in the City, and 76 in the Territory, under which all the youth was listed, and oblig'd to be ready in their Arms under their respective Colours, as often and whenever the Captain, or *Antiani* should require them. Moreover as their Ensigns were distinct, so were their Arms; some of them consisted of Cross-bows, some of them of Halbards; Their Ensigns were chang'd at every *Pentecost* with great solemnity, and dispos'd to new Men, and new Captains put over their Companies. Besides, to add Majesty to their Army, and provide a refuge for such as were wounded, or disabled in Fight, where they might refresh, and recruit again, to make head against the Enemy, they order'd a large Charriot cover'd with Red, and drawn by two white Oxen, upon which their Standard of White and Red was to be placed. When ever their Army was to be drawn out, this Charriot was to be drawn into the Market-place, and with great formality consign'd to the Captains of the People. For the greater magnificence and ostentation of their Enterprizes, they had moreover, a great Bell (call'd *Martinello*) which Rung continually a month before they march'd with their Army, that the Enemy might have so much time to provide for his Defence. So much Gallantry there was then amongst men, and with so much Magnanimity they behav'd themselves, that whereas now adayes it is reputed policy and wisdom to surprize an Enemy, and fall upon him while he is unprovided, it was then thought treacherous, and ignoble. This Bell when they march'd, was carried along with the Army, and by it the Guards set, and relieved, and other Military Orders deriv'd. By this Discipline in Civil and Martial affairs, the *Florentines* laid the foundation of their liberty: Nor is it to be imagin'd what strength and authority it acquir'd in a short time, for it came not only to be the chief City in *Tuscany*, but to be reckon'd among the Principal of all *Italy*, and indeed there was no grandeur to which it might not have arriv'd, had it not been obstructed by new and frequent dissentions. Ten years together, the *Florentines* liv'd under this Government; in which time they forc'd the *Pistoiesi*, *Aritini*, and *Sanesi* to make peace with them, and returning with their Army from *Siena*, they took *Volterra*, demolish'd several Castles, and brought the Inhabitants to *Florence*. In these Expeditions, the *Guelfs* had the principal Conduct, as being much more popular than the *Ghibilines*, who had carried themselves imperiously during *Federick*'s Raign, and made themselves odious, or else it was because the Church party had more Friends than the Emperours, as being thought more consistent with their liberty. The *Ghibilines* in the mean time, being displeased to see their Authority so sensibly decrease, could not be satisfy'd, but attended all occasions to repossess themselves of the Covernment. When *Manfredi* the Son of *Federick* King of *Naples* was invested in that Kingdom, and had over-power'd the power of the Church, conceiving it a fair opportunity, they practis'd privately with him, to reassume their Government; but they could not mannage it so cunningly, but their practice was discover'd to the *Antiani*, who summoning the *Uberti* thereupon; the *Uberti* not only refus'd to appear, but took Arms, and fortify'd themselves in their houses; at which the People being incens'd, took Arms likewise, and joyning with the *Guelfs*, drove them out of *Florence*, and forc'd the whole *Ghibiline* party to transplant to *Siena*. From thence they desir'd the assistance of *Manfredi* King of *Naples*, who sending them supplies, by the Conduct and Diligence of *Farinata* (of the House of *Uberti*) the *Guelfs* received such a blow upon the River *Arbia*, that those which escaped (supposing their City lost) fled directly to *Lucca*, and left *Florence* to shift for it self. *Manfredi*, had given the Command of the Auxiliaries which he sent to the *Ghibilines*, to the *Conte Giordano*, a Captain of no small reputation in those times. *Giordano*, after this Victory advanced with his *Ghibilines* to *Florence*, reduced the City to the obedience of *Manfredi*; depos'd the Magistrates, and alter'd or abrogated all the Laws, and Customs that might give them the least figure or Commemoration of their liberty: Which injury being done with little discretion, was receiv'd by the people with so much detestation, that whereas before they were scarce Enemies to the *Ghibilines*, they became thereby inveterate and implacable; and that mortal animosity, was in time their utter destruction. Being to return to *Naples* upon affairs of great importance to that Kingdom, the Comte

The Union & Government of the City of *Florence*.

The *Antiani*.

The Captain of the People, and *Podesta*.

Their Militia.

A generous Custome.

Manfredi King of *Naples*, a great Patron of the *Ghibilines*.

Giordano left the Comte *Guido Novello* (Lord of *Caſentino*) in *Florence*, as Deputy for the King. This *Guido Novello* call'd a Councel of *Ghibilines* at *Empoli*, wherein it was unanimouſly concluded, that *Florence* ſhould be razed, being (by reaſon the people were ſo rigid *Guelfs*) the only City capable to reinforce the declining party of the Church.

Ferinato uberti. Upon ſo cruel and barbarous a Sentence againſt ſo Noble a City, there was not one Friend or Citizen oppos'd, beſides *Ferinata delli Uberti*; who publickly and couragiouſly undertook its defence: Declaring, That he had not run ſo many dangers, nor expos'd himſelf to ſo many difficulties, but to live quietly afterwards in his own Countrey; nor would he now reject what he contended for ſo long, nor refuſe that which his good fortune had given him; he was reſolv'd rather to oppoſe himſelf (againſt whoever ſhould deſign otherwiſe) with as much Vigour and Zeal as he had done againſt the *Guelfs*, and if jealouſie and apprehenſion ſhould prompt them to endeavour the deſtruction of their Countrey, they might attempt if they pleas'd; but he hop'd, with the ſame Virtue which drove out the *Guelfs*, he ſhould be able to defend the City. This *Ferinata* was a man of great Courage, excellent Conduct, Head of the *Ghibilines*, and in no ſmall eſteem with *Manfredi* himſelf. Theſe qualifications, and the conſideration of his Authority, put an end to that reſolution, and they began now to take new meaſures, and contrive wayes of preſerving the State. The *Guelfs* who had fled to *Lucca*, being diſmiſs'd by the *Luccheſi*, upon the Counts commination, they withdrew to *Bologna*, from whence being invited by the *Guelfs* of *Parma*, to go againſt the *Ghibilines*, they behav'd themſelves ſo well, that by their Valour, the Adverſary was overcome, and their Poſſeſſions given to them: So that increaſing in Honour and Wealth, and underſtanding that Pope *Clement* had call'd *Carlo d'Angio* into *Italy*, to depoſe *Manfredi* (if poſſible). They ſent Embaſſadours to his Holineſs to tender their aſſiſtance; which the Pope not only accepted, but ſent them his own Standard, which the *Guelfs* carry'd ever after in their Wars, and is us'd in *Florence* to this very day. After this, *Manfredi* was beaten, diſpoyl'd of his Kingdom, and Slain, and the *Guelfs* of *Florence* having performed their ſhare in that Action, their party grew more briſk and couragious; and the *Ghibilines*, more timorous and weak. Whereupon thoſe who with Count *Guido Novello* were at the helm in *Florence*, began to caſt about how they might, by benefit, or otherwiſe, gain and cajole the People, whom before they had exaſperated by all circumſtances of injury: But thoſe remedies (which if us'd in time, before neceſſity requir'd, might poſſibly have prevail'd) being apply'd abruptly, and too late, did not only not contribute to their ſafety, but haſten'd their ruine. To coaks and inſinuate with the people and their party, they thought it would do much if they reſtor'd them to a part of that Honour and Authority which they had loſt. To this purpoſe they choſe XXXVI. Citizens from among the People, and adding to them two Forreign Gentlemen from *Bologna*, they gave them power to reform the State of the City as they pleas'd. As ſoon as they met, the firſt thing they pitch'd upon, was to divide the City into ſeveral Arts (or *Trades*) over each Art, they plac'd a Maſter, who was to adminiſter Juſtice to all under his Ward; and to every Art a Banner was aſſign'd, that under that, each Company might appear in Arms, when ever the ſafety of the City requir'd it. At firſt theſe Arts (or Companies were twelve) ſeven greater, and five leſs; the leſſer increaſing afterwards to fourteen, their whole number advanc'd to XXI, as it remains at this day. The *Reformation* proceeding quietly in this manner, and contriving many things for the common benefit of the people, without interruption; Count *Guido* thinking himſelf under an equal Obligation, to provide for his Soldiers; caus'd a Tax to be laid upon the Citizens, to raiſe Money for their pay; but he found ſuch difficulty in the buſineſs, he durſt never collect it: Whereupon, perceiving all loſt, unleſs ſomething was ſuddainly done; he combin'd with the chief of the *Ghibilines*, and determin'd to take that back again by force from the people, which ſo unadviſedly they had given.

Carlo d'Angio call'd into *Italy* by the Pope.

A new Model in *Florence*.

With which deſign, having aſſembled the ſeveral Companies in their Arms, (and the XXXVI. *Reformatori* with them) cauſing a ſuddain Alarm to be brought in, the *Reformatori* being frighted, and retiring to their Houſes, the Enſigns of the ſeveral faculties were diſplay'd, and ſeveral Armed men behind them immediately; underſtanding that Count *Guido* and his party were at St. *Johns*, they made a ſtand at St. *Trinita*, and choſe *Giovanni Soldanieri* for their Captain. The Count on the other ſide, hearing where they had poſted, advanced againſt them; and the people, not declining, they met in a place which is now call'd *Loggia dei Tornaquinci*, where the Count was worſted, and moſt of his party ſlain. Being off of his mettle, and fearful the Enemy would aſſault him in the night, and cut his Throat; his Men being cow'd, and unable to defend him, without conſidering other remedy, he reſolv'd to preſerve himſelf by flying, rather than by fighting; and accordingly (contrary to the perſwaſion of the Heads of the *Ghibilines*) he retired to *Prato* with what men he had left. When he found himſelf ſafe, and his fear over, he became ſenſible of his

New Commotion.

his Errour, and being desirous to have repair'd it next morning, at break of day he drew out his Men, march'd back to *Florence*, designing to recover that Honourably, which he had so Scandalously lost; but he found himself mistaken, for though it might have cost the people hot water to have expel'd him, they found it no hard matter to keep him out when he was gone; insomuch that being repuls'd, he drew off with great sorrow and shame to *Casentino*, and the *Ghibilines* return'd to their Houses. The people being Conquerours, out of affection to all such as had a love for their Countrey, they resolv'd to reunite the City once more, and call home all their Citizens which were abroad, as well *Ghibilines*, as *Guelfs*. Hereupon the *Guelfs* return'd, after six years banishment, the *Ghibilines* late attempt was pardoned, and they receiv'd back again; but yet they continued odious both to the people, and *Guelfs*, the last not being able to extinguish the memory of their banishment; nor the first to forget their Tyranny and insolence, when the Government was in their hands; so that their animosity was deposited neither on the one side, nor the other.

Whil'st the affairs of *Florence* were in this posture, a report was spread, that *Corradine*, Nephew to *Manfredi* was coming with Forces out of *Germany*, to Conquer the Kingdom of *Naples*; upon which the *Ghibilines* conceiv'd fresh hopes of recovering their Authority: and the *Guelfs* being no less solicitous for their security, begg'd the assistance of King *Charles*, in case *Corradine* should come. *Charles* having comply'd, and his Forces upon their March, the *Guelfs* became so insolent, and the *Ghibilines* so timorous, that two dayes before the *French* Army arriv'd, the *Ghibilines* fled out of the City, without staying to be expell'd. The *Ghibilines* departed; the *Florentines* new Modell'd their City, choosing twelve principal Magistrates, to continue in Authority only for two Moneths, not under the title of *Antiani*, but *Buoni-huomini*. Next to them they constituted a Councel of 80 Citizens, which they call'd *La Credenza*: after which, 180 were chosen out of the people, which with the *Credenza*, and the 12 *Buoni Huomini* were call'd the General-Councel: besides which, they erected another Councel, consisting of 120. both Citizens and Nobles, which Councel was to consummate and ratifye whatever was debated or resolv'd in the rest. Having setled their Government in this manner, and by new Laws, and Election of Magistrates of their own party, fortify'd themselves against the Machinations of the *Ghibilines*, the *Guelfs* confiscated the *Ghibilines* Estates, and having divided them into three parts, one was assign'd to publick uses, another given to their Magistrates and Captains, and the third distributed among the *Guelfs*, to recompence the damage they had receiv'd. The Pope to preserve *Tuscany* to the Faction of the *Guelfs*, made King *Charles Imperial Vicar* of that Province. By this method, the *Florentines* having maintain'd their honour and reputation abroad by their Arms, and at home by their Laws; they remain'd firm and secure; in the mean time the Pope dyed, and after a two years vacancy, and a tedious dispute, *Gregory* X. was elected, who being at the time of his Election (and a long while before) in *Syria*, and (by consequence) ignorant of the humours of the Factions, he carry'd not himself with that caution towards them, as his Predecessors had done. But in his way to *France*, being arriv'd at *Florence*, he thought it the Office of a good Pastor to endeavour to compose their differences, and prevail'd with them to receive Commissioners from the *Ghibilines* to negotiate the manner of their return; but though their Peace was made, and all particulars concluded, the *Ghibilines* were too jealous to accept them, and refus'd to come back. The Pope imputed the fault to the City, and excommunicated it in his passion, under which censure it continued whil'st he lived; but after his death, when *Innocent* V. was created, it was taken off. *Innocent* V. was succeeded by *Nicholas* III. of the House of the *Orsini*; and because the Popes were alwayes jealous of any great power in *Italy* (though rais'd by the favour of the Church) and constantly endeavour'd to depress it; great troubles, and frequent variations ensued; for the fear of a Person grown Potent to any degree, was the advancement of another less powerful than he; who growing powerful by his preferment, as his Predecessor had done, became formidable like him; and that fear was the occasion of his debasement. This was the cause that Kingdom was taken from *Manfredi*, and given to *Charles*. This was the reason that *Charles* became terrible afterwards, and his ruine was conspir'd: for *Nicholas* III. (mov'd by the considerations aforesaid) prevail'd so, that *Charles* by the Emperours means, was remov'd from the Government of *Tuscany*, and *Latino* the Popes Legat) sent thither in his place, by Commission from the Emperour. *Florence* at this time was in no very good condition, for the *Guelfish* Nobility, being grown insolent, and careless of the Magistrates; several Murders and other violencies were daily committed, the Malefactors passing unpunish'd by the favour and protection of the Nobles. To restrain these insolencies, it was thought good by the Heads of the City, to recall those who were banished, which gave opportunity to the Legate to reunite the City; and to the *Ghibilines*, to return: whereupon instead of XII. Governours which they had before, they

A second Model by the *Guelfs*.

The 12 *Buoni Huomini*.

La Credenza.

Gregory X.

Florence under Excommunication.

Innocent 5.

The Jealousie of the Popes.

Nicolas 3.

The *Ghibilines* return.

were increas'd to XIV. (VII. of each party) their Government to be Annual, and their Election by the Pope. Two years *Florence* remain'd under this form, till *Martino* (a *Frenchman*) was created Pope, who restor'd to King *Charles* whatever Authority Pope *Nicholas* had taken from him: So that *Florence* being again in Commotion; the Citizens took up Arms against the Emperours Governour, and to restrain the *Ghibilines*, and correct the insolence of their Nobility, put the City under a new form of Government. It was in the year 1282. when the Corporation of the Arts having been invested with the Magistracy, and Militia, had gain'd great reputation; whereupon by their own Authority they order'd that instead of the XIV. Three Citizens should be created (with the Title of *Priori*) who should govern the Common-wealth for two Moneths, and be chosen indifferently out of Commons or Nobility, provided they were Merchants, or professed any Art. Afterwards the chief Magistracy was reduc'd to six persons (one for each Ward) where it continued to the year 1342. in which the City was reduc'd into quarters, and the *Priori*, to Nine, they having been advanc'd to 12. by some accident in the mean time. This Constitution was the occasion (as shall be shew'd in its place) of the Nobilities ruine, who upon sundry provocations were excluded, and afterwards without any respect, oppress'd by the people. At first the Nobility consented to its Erection, as an expedient to unite, and accommodate all differences; but afterwards incroaching, and interfering for the Government, all of them lost it. There was likewise a Palace assign'd for the constant Residence of this Councel, (in which the Magistrates were formerly accustom'd to confer with the Commissioners of the Church) and Serjeants, and other necessary Officers, for their greater honour, appointed to attend: Which Councel, though at first it had only the Title of *Priori*; yet afterwards for Magnificence sake, it had the addition of *Segnori*.

Martinus Pope

The Government reformed by the Citizens.

The three *Priori* to govern two Moneths, to be chosen out of the City indifferently.

The *Segnori*.

For a while the *Florentines* continued quiet within themselves, though they had Wars abroad with the *Aretines* (who had driven out the *Guelfs*) with whom they ingag'd successfully in *Campaldino*, and overcome them. Upon which, the City increasing both in Wealth, and number of Inhabitants, it was thought good to inlarge their Walls, which they did to its present Circumference; whereas before its Diameter was only from the Old Bridge to *S. Lorenzo*. The Wars abroad, and Peace at home, had almost exterminated both the *Ghibilines*, and *Guelfs* in that City; there remain'd only those sparks of animosity (which are unavoidable in all Cities) betwixt the Nobles and the People; for the one solicitous of their freedom according to their Laws, and the other impatient to Command them, it is not possible they should agree. Whil'st they were apprehensive of the *Ghibilines*, this humour did not show it self in the Nobility; but when the *Ghibilines* were low and depress'd, it began to exert, and the people were injur'd daily, beyond the Vindication either of the Magistrates, or Laws; every Nobleman making good his insolence, by the multitude of his Friends and Relations, both against the *Priori*, and the Captain. The Heads therefore of the *Arts* (by way of remedy against so great inconvenience) provided that in the beginning of its Office, every Councel of the *Priori* should create an Enlign, or *Galfoniere di justicia*, out of the people, assigning him 1000 men in 20 Companies, which were to be ready with their Arms, and their *Gonfalone* to see Justice administer'd whenever the Court, or their Captain requir'd them. The first in this Office, was *Ubaldo Ruffoli*, who drawing out his Bands, demolish'd the Houses of the *Galletti*, because one of that Family had slain one of his Fellow-Citizens in *France*. The establishment of this Order by the Arts was not difficult, by reason of the jealousies and emulations amongst the Nobility, who were not in the least sensible it was intended against them, till they felt the smart of it, when 'twas put in Execution. This Constitution was terrible to them at first, but afterwards they return'd to their old insolence again, for having insinuated themselves into the Councel of the *Priori*, they found means to hinder the *Galfoniere* from executing his Office. Besides, Witness being alwayes requir'd upon any accusation, the Plaintiff could hardly find any body that would give testimony against the Nobility. So that in a short time *Florence* was involv'd in its old distraction, and the people expos'd to their former oppression, Justice being grown delatory and tedious, and Sentence, though given, seldom or never executed. The Populace not knowing what resolution to take in this Case, *Giano della Bella* (a person of Noble extraction, but a Lover of the Liberty of the City) incourag'd the Heads of the *Arts*, to reform the City, and by his perswasion it was Ordain'd that the *Galfoniere* should reside with the *Priori*, and have 4000 men under his Command; they likewise excluded the Nobility out of the Councel of the *Segnori*.

Discord betwixt the Nobility and people.

The *Priori*.
The *Gonfaloniet*.

They made a Law that all Accessaries, or Abettors, should be liable to the same punishment with those who were actually Guilty; and decreed that Common report should be sufficient to convict them. By these Laws (which were called *Ordinamenti della Giustitia*) the people gain'd great reputation: but *Giano della Bella*, being look'd upon as the contriver

of

of their Destruction, became odious to the Nobility; and not to them only, but to the wealthiest of the Populace, who began to suspect his Authority, and not without reason, as appear'd afterwards upon the first occasion was given him to abuse it. It happen'd one of the Commons was kill'd in a fray, where several of the Nobility were present; *Corso Donati* being one amongst the rest, the Murther was laid to his charge, as the most furious and desperate. He was taken into Custody by the Captain, but (however causes went) whether he was innocent of the Crime, or the Captain fearful to condemn him, he was presently discharg'd. The people offended at his discharge, betook themselves to their Arms, ran to the House of *Giano della Bella*, and beg'd of him, that he would be the means that the Laws he had invented might be put in Execution. *Giano* had privately a desire that *Corso* should be punish'd, and therefore advis'd not the people to lay down their Arms, (as many conceived he ought) but incouraged them to address to the *Segnori* with their Complaints, and desire their Vindication. The people full of rage, thinking themselves abus'd by the Captain, and abandon'd by *Giano*, went not to the *Segnori* (as directed) but away they ran to the Captain's Palace, and plunder'd it; which action displeas'd the whole City, and was laid upon *Giano*, by such as meditated his ruine; whereupon some of his Enemies happening afterwards to be of the *Segnori*, he was accus'd to the Captain as an incendiary, and debaucher of the people.

Whil'st his Cause was in agitation, the people took Arms again, flock'd in great numbers to his House, and offer'd to defend him against the *Segnori* his Enemies. *Giano* had no mind to experiment the popular favour, or trust his life in the hands of the Magistrates, as fearing the maligmity of the one, no less than the unconstancy of the other; but to secure himself against the malice of his Enemies, and his Countrey against the commotion of his Friends, he resolv'd to give way to their Envy, and banish himself from that City which he had preserv'd from the Tyrannie of the Nobility by his own danger and charge. The Nobility, after his departure, to recover their dignity, which they conceived lost by the dissentions among them, united, and apply'd themselves by two of their Number, to the Senate or *Segnoria* (which they judg'd to be their friends) to intreat them to mitigate in some measure the acerbity of those Laws which were made against them: which demand was no sooner known, but the, people (fearing the *Signoria* should comply) began immediately to tumultuate, and, betwixt the ambition of the one, and suspicion of the other, they fell soon after to blows. The Nobility stood upon their guards in three places, at St. *John*'s, in the *Mercato nuovo*, and the *Piazza de Mozzi*, under three Commanders, *Forese Adinari*, *Vanni de Mozzi*, and *Geri Spini*. The people were got together under their Ensigns in great Numbers at the Senator's Palace, which at that time was not far from St. *Pruocolo*; and because the people were jealous of the *Signori*, they deputed six Citizens to share with them in the Government. In the mean time while both parties were preparing for the Combat, some both of the Nobility and Commons, with certain Religious persons of good reputation interpos'd themselves, remonstrating to the Nobility, that the Honour they had lost, and the Laws made against them, were occasion'd by their arrogance and ill Government; that now to take Arms, and betake themselves to force, for the recovery of what was lost by their own dissention and ill-management, would be the ruine of their Countrey, and a detriment to themselves. That they should consider in number, riches, and malice, they were much inferiour to the people. That that Nobility they so vainly affected, by which they thought to advance others, when they came to fight would prove but a meer Title and Name, unable to defend them against the advantages which their Enemies had over them. To the people it was represented imprudence to drive things too far, and make their Adversaries desperate; *For he that hopes no good, fears no ill.* That it ought to be consider'd, their Nobility were they which had gain'd so much Honour to their City in its Wars, and were not therefore in justice to be us'd at that rate. That they could be content to have the Supream Magistracy taken from them, and endure it patiently; but they thought unreasonable, and insupportable to be at every bodies mercy (as their new Laws render'd them) and subject to be driven out of their Countrey upon every *Capriccio*. That it would be well to mitigate their fury, and lay down their Arms, rather than to run the hazard of a Battail, by presumption upon their Numbers, which had many times fail'd, and been worsted by the less. The people were divided in their Judgments, some were for ingaging, as a thing some time or other would necessarily be; and better now, than to defer till their Enemies were more powerful: and if it could be imagined the mitigation of the Laws would content them, they should be mitigated accordingly; but their insolence and pride could never be laid by, till by force they were constrain'd to't. To others more moderate and prudent, it appeared that the alteration of the Laws would not signifie much, but to come to a Battel might be of very great importance; and their Opinion prevailing, it was provided

Perswasions to the Nobility to be quiet.

The same to the people.

provided that no accusation should be admitted against a Nobleman without necessary testimony. Though upon these terms both parties laid down their Arms, yet their jealousies of one another were mutually retain'd, and they began again to fortifie on both sides. The People thought fit to re-order the Government, and reduce their *Signori* to a less number, as suspecting some of them to be too great favourers of the Nobility, of whom the *Mancini*, *Magalotti*, *Altoviti*, *Peruzzi*, and *Cerretani* were the chief. Having setled the State in this manner in the year 1298. For the greater Magnificence and security of their *Signori*, they founded their Palace, and made a Piazza before it, where the houses of the *Uberti* stood formerly: About the same time also the Foundation of the Prisons were laid, which in few years after were finished. Never was this City in greater splendor, nor more happy in its condition than then, abounding both in men, riches, and reputation. They had 3000. Citizens in the Town fit to bear Arms, and 70000. more in their Territory. All *Tuscany* was at its devotion, partly as subjects, and partly as friends. And though there were still piques and suspicions betwixt the Nobility and the people, yet they did not break out into any ill effect, but all lived quietly and peaceably together; and had not this tranquility been at length interrupted by dissention within, it had been in no danger from abroad; being in such terms at that time, it neither feared the Empire, nor its Exiles, and could have brought a force into the Field equivalent to all the rest of the States in *Italy*. But that disease from which *ab extra* it was secure, was ingendred in its own bowels. There were two Families in *Florence*, the *Cerchi*, and the *Donati*, equally considerable, both in numbers, riches, and dignity; being Neighbours both in City and Country, there happened some exceptions and disgusts betwixt them, but not so great as to bring them to blows, and perhaps they would never have produc'd any considerable effects, had not their ill humours been agitated and firmented by new occasion. Among the chief Families in *Pistoia*, there was the Family of the *Cancellieri*: It happened that *Lore* the Son of *Gulielmo*, and *Geri* the son of *Bertaccio*, fell out by accident at play, and passing from words to blows, *Geri* received a slight wound. *Gulielmo* was much troubled at the business, and thinking by excess of humility to take off the scandal, he increased it and made it worse. He commanded his Son to go to *Geri's* Fathers house, and demand his pardon; *Lore* obey'd, and went as his Father directed, but that act of humanity did not at all sweeten the acerbity of *Bertaccio*'s mind, who causing *Lore* to be seiz'd by his servants (to aggravate the indignity) he caused him to be led by them into the stable, and his hand cut off upon the Manger, with instruction to return to his Father, and to let him know, *That wounds are not cured so properly by words, as amputation.* *Gulielmo* was so enraged at the cruelty of the fact, as he and his friends immediately took arms to revenge it; and *Bertaccio* and his friends doing as much to defend themselves, the whole City of *Pistoia* was engaged in the quarrel, and divided into two parties. These *Cancellieri* being both of them descended from one of the *Cancellieri* who had two Wives, one of them called *Bianca*: that party which descended from her, called it self *Bianca*; and the other in opposition was called *Nera*. In a short time many conflicts happened betwixt them, many men killed, and many houses destroyed. Not being able to accomodate among themselves, though both sides were weary, they concluded to come to *Florence*, hoping some expedient would be found out there, or else to fortifie their parties by the acquisition of new friends. The *Neri* having had familiarity with the *Donati*, were espoused by *Corso*, the head of that Family. The *Bianchi*, to support themselves against the accession of the *Donati*, fell in with *Veri* the chief of the *Cerchi*, a man not inferiour to *Corso* in any quality whatever. The malignity of this humour being brought hither from *Pistoia*, began to revive the old quarrel betwixt the *Cerchi* and *Donati* in such manner, that the *Priori*, and other principal Citizens began to apprehend they should fall together by the ears, and the whole City come to be divided. Hereupon they applyed themselves to the Pope, desiring he would interpose his Authority to asswage those differences which were too great for their private power to compose. The Pope sent for *Veri*, and prest him earnestly to a reconciliation with the *Donati*. *Veri* seemed to be surprised at his importunity, pretended he had no prejudice to them at all, and because reconciliation presupposed a quarrel, there being nothing of the latter, he thought there was no necessity of the first. So that *Veri* returning from *Rome* without any other conclusion, the Malevolence increas'd, and every little accident (as it happened afterwards) was sufficient to put all in confusion. In the Moneth of *May*, several Holidaies being publickly celebrated in *Florence*, certain young Gentlemen of the *Donati*, with their friends on Horseback, having stopt near St. *Trinity*, to see certain Women that were Dancing, it fell out that some of the *Cerchi* arrived there likewise with some of their friends, and being desirous to see as well as the rest, not knowing the *Donati* were before, they spur'd on their horses, and justled in among them. The *Donati* looking upon it as an affront, drew their Swords; the *Cerchi* were as ready to answer them, and after several cuts and slashes given and received, both

New reformation in *Florence* 1298.

The difference in the Family of the *Cancellieri*, the occasion and consequence.

The *Bianchi* and *Neri*.

both sides retir'd. This accident was the occasion of great mischief; the whole City (as well People as Nobility) divided, and took part with the *Bianchi* and *Neri*, as their inclinations directed them. The chief of the *Bianchi* were the *Cerchi*, to whom the *Adimari*, the *Abbati*, part of the *Josinghi*, the *Bardi*, *Rossi*, *Tresobaldi*, *Nerli*, *Mannilli*, all the *Mozzi*, the *Scali*, *Gerrardini*, *Cavalcanti*, *Matespini*, *Bostichi*, *Giandonati*, *Vecchietti*, and *Arriguelzi*, joyn'd themselves; with these sided several of the populace and all the *Ghibiline* faction in *Florence*; so that in respect of their Numbers, they seem'd to have the whole Government of the City. The *Donati* on the other side were heads of the *Neri*, and follow'd by all the rest of the before mentioned Nobility who were not ingag'd with the *Bianchi*; and beside them all the *Parzi*, *Bisdomini*, *Manieri*, *Bagnesii*, *Tornaquinci*, *Spini*, *Buondelmonti*, *Giansigliazzi*, and *Brunelteschi*; Nor did this humour extend it self only in the City, but infected the whole Country. In so much that the Captains of the *Arts*, and such as favour'd the *Guelfs*, and were Lovers of the Commonwealth, very much apprehended least this new distraction should prove the ruine of the City, and the restauration of the *Ghibilins*, Whereupon they sent to the Pope, beseeching him to think of some remedy, unless he had a mind that City (which had been always a Bulwark to the Church) should be destroy'd, or become subject to the *Ghibilins*. To gratifie their request, the Pope dispatch'd *Matteo d'Aquasparta* (a *Portugal* Cardinal) as his Legate to *Florence*, who finding the party of the *Bianchi* obstinate and untractable, as presuming upon the advantage of their Numbers, he left *Florence* in an anger, and interdicted them; so that the Town remained in more confusion at his departure, then he found it, all parties being at that time very high, and dispos'd to mischief, it happen'd that several of the *Cerchi* and *Donati* meeting at a burial, some words pass'd betwixt them, and from words they proceeded to blows, but no great hurt done, for that time; Both sides being returned to their houses, the *Cerchi* began to deliberate how they might fall upon the *Donati*, and in Conclusion they went in great numbers to attack them; but by the Courage of *Corso* they were repell'd, and several of them Wounded. Hereupon the City fell to their Arms; the Laws and the Magistrates were two weak to contest with the fury of both parties. The wisest and best Citizens were in perpetual fear. The *Donati* and their friends having less force, were more anxious and solicitous of their safety, to provide for it as well as was possible, at a meeting of *Corso* with the heads of the *Neri*, and the Captains of the *Arts* it was concluded that the Pope should be desired to send them some person of the Blood Royal to reform their City, supposing that way the most probable to suppress the *Bianchi*. This Assembly, and their resolution was notify'd to the *Priori*, and aggarvated against the Adverse party as a Conspiracy against their Freedom. Both factions being in Arms, *Dante*, and the rest of the *Signori* taking Courage, with great Wisdom and prudence causing the people to put themselves in Arms, by Conjunction of several out of the Country they forc'd the heads of both parties to lay down their Arms, confin'd *Corso*, *Donati* and several of the faction of the *Neri* to their houses; and that their proceedings might seem impartial, they committed several of the *Bianchi*, who afterwards upon plausible pretences were dismis'd. *Corso* and his accomplices were discharg'd likewise; and supposing his Holiness to be their friend, took a journey to *Rome* to perswade him personally to what by Letters they had begg'd of him before. There happen'd to be at the Popes Court at that time *Charles de Valois* the King of *France* his brother, call'd into *Italy* by the King of *Naples* to pass over into *Sicily*. The Pope (upon the importunity of the *Florentine* Exiles) thought fit to send him to *Florence* to remain there till the season of the year serv'd better for his transportation. *Charles* arrived, and though the *Bianchi* (who had then the Supremacy) were jealous of him, Yet being Patron of the *Guelfs*, and deputed thither by the Pope, they durst not oppose his coming; but on the Contrary to oblige him they gave him full Authority to dispose of the City as he pleased. *Charles* was no sooner invested with this Authority, but he caus'd all his friends and Partizans to Arm; which gave the people so great a jealousie that he would Usurp upon their Liberties, that they also put themselves in Arms, and stood ready every man at his door to resist any such attempt. The *Cerchi* and the chief of the *Bianchi* (having had the Government in their hands, and managed it proudly) were become generally odious, which gave incouragement to *Corso* and the rest of the *Neri* who were banish'd to return to *Florence*, being assur'd that *Charles*, and the Captains of the Companies were their friends. Whilst their suspicion of *Charles* had put the City in Arms, *Corso*, his Comerades, and many of their followers enter'd into *Florence* without any impediment: And although *Veri* de *Cerchi* was perswaded to oppose, he refus'd it, and told them, he would leave their Chastisement to the people of *Florence*, against whose interest *Corso* did come. But he was mistaken in his Measures, for in stead of being punished, he was received

Charles of Valois made Governor of Florence.

ceived very kindly by the people; and *Veri* was forc'd to fly for his safety. For *Corso* having forc'd his entrance at the *Porta Pinti*, drew up, and made a stand at S. *Pietro Maggiori* (a place not far from his Palace) and having united with such of the people, and his friends as desir'd Novelty, and were come thither on purpose; the first thing he did was to discharge all Prisoners whatever, and however committed, whether by private or publick Authority. He forc'd the *Signori* to return privately to their houses, and elected a certain Number (of the faction of the *Neri*) out of the people to supply their places. For five days together they ransack'd and plunder'd the houses of the chief of the *Bianchi*. The *Cerchi* and the heads of that faction, seeing the people for the most part their Enemies, and *Charles* none of their friend, were retir'd out of the City, to such Castles as they had, and whereas before they would not entertain the Counsel of the Pope, they were now glad to implore his assistance, and to let him understand that *Charles* was not come to the advantage, but to the prejudice of the City. Whereupon the Pope sent his Legate *Matteo di Aquasparta* to *Florence* the second time, who not only made a peace betwixt the *Cerchi* and *Donati*, but fortify'd it by several marriages and allyances. Nevertheless insisting to have the *Bianchi* participate of the Chief Offices, and being deny'd by the *Neri* who had them in possession, he left the City as ill satisfy'd as before, and again Excommunicated it for its disobedience. Thus both parties continued discontented. The *Neri*, seeing their Enemies so near, were apprehensive least by their destruction they should recover the Honours and Authority which they had lost; and as if these Fears and Animosities had not been sufficient to do mischief, new affronts and injuries were offered. *Nicholas de Cerchi*, being going with some of his friends to some of his houses, as he pass'd by the *Ponte ad Africo*, was assaulted by *Simon* son of *Corso Donati*. The Conflict was sharp, and on either side deplorable, for *Nicholas* was kill'd upon the place, and *Simon* so wounded that he died the next Morning. This accident disturb'd the whole City afresh, and though the *Neri* were indeed most Culpable, yet they were protected by the Government, and before judgment could be obtain'd, a conspiracy was discover'd between the *Bianchi* and *Piero Terranti*, (one of *Charles* his Barons) with whom they practis'd privately to be restor'd to the Government. The plot was detected by several letters from the *Cerchi* to the said *Piero*, though some immagin'd they were counterfeited by the *Donati*, to divert the infamy they had incurr'd by the assassination of *Nicholas*. The *Cerchi* and all their Clann were at this time Prisoners to the *Donati* (and among the rest *Dante* the Poet) their Estates were Confiscated, and their houses demolish'd. Their party, with several of the *Ghibilines* that had joyn'd themselves with them, were dispers'd up and down in sundry places, attending new troubles to better their Condition; and *Charles* having finish'd what he design'd when he came thither, return'd to the Pope in pursuance of his Expedition into *Sicily*, in which he managed himself with no more prudence then he had done in *Florence*; but losing many of his men, he went back into *France*, with no little dishonor. After *Charles* was departed, for some time *Florence* was quiet, only *Corso* was dissatisfy'd, as not thinking himself in Authority suitable to his deserts: for the Government being in the hands of the people, he believed it managed by such as were much his inferiours: Moved therefore by these provocations, to varnish over a foul design with a fair pretence, he calumniated several Citizens who had had charge of the Publick money, for imbezling of it, and applying it to their private use; giving out that it was fit they should be inquir'd after, and punish'd: several of his mind did the same, and many others by their ignorance and Credulity were perswaded that what *Corso* did was out of pure care and affection to his Country. On the other side the persons accus'd, having the favour of the people, stood upon their justification, and so far these differences proceeded, that after several expostulations, and civil controversies, they came at length to take Arms. On one side there were *Corso*, *Lotieri* Bishop of *Florence*, with many of the Nobility, and some of the Commons. On the other side there were the *Signori*, and the greatest part of the people: so that there was fighting in many places of the City. The *Signori*, perceiving their affairs in some danger, sent to *Lucca* for aid, and immediately all the people in *Lucca* came in to their assistance; by whose supervention things were presently compos'd, the tumults aswag'd, and the people continued in their former Liberty and Government, without any other punishment of the Author of the scandal. The Pope had heard of the tumults at *Florence*, and sent thither *Nicholas da Prato* his Legate to appease them, who, for his quality, learning and behaviour, being a man of great reputation, he quickly obtained such credit with the people, that they gave him Authority to reform, or Model their Government as he pleas'd. Being of the *Ghibiline* faction, he was inclin'd to call home those of that party who were banish'd; But first he thought it convenient to ingratiate with the people by restoring their Ancient Companies, which Act added as much

New troubles occasioned by *Corso Donati*.

strength

ſtrength to their intereſt, as it took away from the Nobleſs. When he had as he thought ſufficiently oblig'd the Multitude, The Legate deſign'd to call home the Exiles, and try'd many ways to effect it, but was ſo far from ſucceeding in any of them, that he render'd himſelf ſuſpected to the Governors, was forc'd out of the City, and leaving all in confuſion, in a great paſſion he excommunicated it at his departure. Nor was this City moleſted with one humour only, but ſeveral, there being at once the factions betwixt the Nobility and the people. The *Guelfs* and the *Ghibilines*, The *Bianchi*, and the *Neri*. At that time all the City was in Arms, and many bickerings happen'd; Many were diſcontented at the Legates departure, being willing the baniſh'd Citizens ſhould return. The Chief of them who rais'd the report were the *Medici* and the *Giugni*, who (with the Legate) were diſcover'd to be favourers of the Rebels; in the interim Skirmiſhes and Rencounters paſs'd in ſeveral places of the Town, and to add to their Calamity, a fire broke out in the *Orto S. Michel* among the houſes of the *Abbati*, from thence it went to the houſes of the *Caponſacchi*, and burn'd them, from thence to the houſes of the *Macci*, *Amieri*, *Toſchi*, *Cipriani*, *Lamberti*, *Cavalcanti*, and all the New Market; from thence it paſs'd to the *Porta S. Maria*, burn'd that, and then wheeling about to the Old-bridge, it conſum'd the palaces of the *Gherardini*, *Pulci*, *Amidei*, *Lucardeſi*, and with them ſo many other houſes, that the number of all that were conſum'd by that fire amounted to more than thirteen hundred. Some were of opinion it began by accident in the height of the Conflict. Others affirm it was done on purpoſe by *Neri Abbati*, Prior of *S. Piero Scharagio* (a diſſolute and miſchievous perſon) who ſeeing every body engaged, thought he might commit a piece of wickedneſs then, which no body ſhould be able to remedy; and to the end it might ſucceed the better, and give leſs ſuſpicion of him, he ſet the houſes of his own party on fire, where he could do it with convenience. Theſe Conflicts, and this Conflagration happen'd in *July* 1304. at which time *Corſo Donati* was the only perſon who did not arm in thoſe tumults; and not without reaſon, for thereby he preſumed (when weary of their fighting they ſhould incline to an agreement) he ſhould more eaſily be choſen Umpire betwixt them; at length all Arms indeed were layd down, but more that they were tyr'd, and weary of their miſeries, than from any relentment or condeſcenſion on either ſide. The whole conſequence of all was, that the Rebels were not ſuffer'd to return, and the party which favour'd them was forc'd to comply. The Legate being come back to *Rome*, and underſtanding the new diſtractions in *Florence*, perſwaded the Pope that if he deſign'd to compoſe them, it would be neceſſary to ſend for twelve of the Principal Malecontents of that City, which being the nouriſhment and fomentors of their miſeries, their miſeries would ceaſe as ſoon as they were remov'd. The Pope took his Counſel, ſent for twelve of the Chief Citizens (who came to *Rome* in obedience to his ſummons) and among them *Corſo Donati* was one. Upon the departure of theſe Citizens the Legate ſignify'd to the Exiles that now was their time (the City being diſtitute of their heads) to return. Whereupon the Citizens which were baniſh'd, getting what force together they were able, they march'd to *Florence*, enter'd where the walls were unfiniſh'd, and paſs'd on as far as the *Piazza* of *S. John*. It was a remarkable paſſage to conſider that thoſe people who fought in their behalf, whilſt humbly and unarm'd they begged to be admitted, ſeeing them come forcibly into the City with their weapons in their hands, turn'd againſt them immediately, and joyning with the people beat them out of the City. This Enterprize was loſt by leaving part of their forces at *Laſtra* and not attending the arrival of *Toloſetto Uberti* who was coming from *Piſtoia* with three hundred horſe, but ſuppoſing Expedition of greater importance to their ſucceſs, than ſtrength, they found (as many had done before) That *delay takes away the opportunity, and celerity the force.* The Rebels repuls'd, *Florence* return'd to its old diviſions. To leſſen the Authority of the *Cavalcanti*, the people aſſaulted and took from them the Caſtle of *Stinche* in the *Val di Greve*, which had belong'd anciently to that family; and becauſe thoſe who were taken in this Caſtle were the firſt which were put in the new built Priſons, that building took its name from the Caſtle from whence they came, was call'd *le Stinche* from thence, and is call'd ſo to this day. After this, thoſe who had the Government in their hands re-eſtabliſh'd the Companies of the people; gave them the Enſigns which had been us'd at firſt under the diſcipline of the *Arts*. The Captains, the *Gonfalonieri* of the Companies and the Colledge of the *Signori* were call'd, and Orders were given that they ſhould aſſiſt the *Signoria* or Senate at all times, in time of Commotion or injury with their Swords, and in time of peace with their Counſels. To the two old Governours they added another call'd *Effecutore*, whoſe Office it was by conjunction with the *Gonfalonieri* to reſtrain and correct the inſolence of tha Grandees. In the mean time the Pope dying, *Corſo* and his fellow Citizens return'd from *Rome*, and

The *Medici* and *Giugni*.

Florence burned, 1304.

might have liv'd quietly, had not the insatiableness of *Corso*'s ambition created new troubles. To gain reputation it was always his Custom to oppose the sentiment of the Nobility in whatever was propos'd; and which way he observed the people to encline, thither he constantly directed his Authority, to work himself into their favour; so that in all Innovations and Controversies he was the head; all persons resorting to him who had any thing extraordinary in delign. Hereupon he became so odious to several considerable Citizens, that the faction of the *Neri* subdivided, and fell into open division among themselves, because *Corso* made use of private Force and Authority, and of such Persons as were enemies to the State. Yet such was the Awe and Majesty of his Person, that every body fear'd him; to deprive him of the peoples favour (which, that way, was easily disingaged) it was given out that he design'd upon the Government, and meant to make himself King; Which from his extravagant way of living was credible enough, and much confirm'd when afterwards he married a daughter of *Vguccione odella Faggivola* chief of the *Bianchi*, and *Ghibilins*, and the most powerful Person in the City. This Alliance was no sooner known among his Enemies, but his adversaries took Arms, and the people for that reason were so far from appearing in his defence, that the greater part of them joyn'd with his Enemies. The Chief of his Enemies (and who were at the head of them) were *Rosso della Tosa*, *Pazzino de Pazzo*, *Geri Spini*, and *Berto Brunelleschi*. They, their followers, and the greatest part of the people, ran with their Swords drawn to the foot of the Palace of the *Signori*, by whose Order an accusation was prefer'd to *Piero Bianca* Captain of the people, against *Corso* as a person who (by the assistance of *Vguccione*) conspired to be King. Upon this impeachment he was summon'd, and refusing to appear, was declared a Rebel for his Contumacy; there having been but two hours time betwixt his accusation and sentence; judgment pronounced, the *Signori*, with the several Companies of the people (their banners display'd) went presently to apprehend him. *Corso* on the other side not at all dismay'd either at the severity of the sentence, the authority of the *Signori*, nor the unconstancy of his friends (who had many of them forsaken him) fell to fortifying his house, hoping to have defended himself there till *Vguccione* (to whom he had sent word of his condition) should come to his rescue. His houses, and Avenues were fortify'd and barricado'd by him, and strengthen'd with such Garrisons of his friends, that though the people were very numerous and press'd hard to have enter'd them, they could not prevail. The Conflict was smart, many kill'd and wounded on both sides, and the people finding there was no entrance that way by force, got into the houses of his Neighbours, and through them they brake unexpectedly into his. *Corso* finding himself environ'd by his Enemies, and no hopes of relief from *Vguccione*, dispairing of Victory, he resolved to try what was possible for his Escape; advancing therefore with *Gherardo Bondini* and several other his most faithful and valiant friends, he charg'd so furiously upon his Enemies, that he brake them, and made his way thorow them (fighting) out of the *Porta alla Croce*: Nevertheless being persued *Gherardo* was slain by *Boccaccio Cavicciulli* upon the *Africa*, and *Corso* was taken Prisoner at *Roncezano* by certain Spanish horsemen belonging to the *Signoria*. But, disdaining the sight of his Victorious Enemies, and to prevent the torments which they would probably inflict, as they were bringing him back towards *Florence*, he threw himself off his horse, and was cut to pieces by one of the Company; his body was gather'd together by the Monks of *S. Salui*, and bury'd, but without any solemnity. This was the sad end of that Magnanimous Person, to whom his Country, and the *Neri*, ow'd much both of their good fortune and ill; and doubtless had his mind been more moderate, his memory would have been more honourable; however, he deserves a place among the best Citizens this City did ever produce, though indeed the turbulency of his Spirit caus'd his Country; and party both to forget their obligations to him, and at length procur'd his death, and many mischiefs to them. *Vguccione* coming to the relief of his Son in Law as far as *Remoli*, and hearing he was taken by the people, presuming he could do him no good, to save his own stake, he return'd back as he came.

Corso Donati.

Condemned.

His death.

1308. *Corso* being dead in the year 1308. all tumults ceas'd, and every body lived quietly till news was brought that *Arrigo* the Emperor was come into *Italy* with all the *Florentine* Exiles in his Company, whom he had promis'd to reinstate in their own Country. To obviate this, and lessen the number of their Enemies, the Magistrates thought fit of themselves to reinvite all those who had been rebels, but some few which were particularly excepted. Those which were excepted, were the greatest part of the *Ghibilines*, and some of the faction of the *Bianchi*, among which were *Dante Aleghieri*, the Sons of *Veri de Cerchi*, and *Giano della Bella*. They sent likewise to desire the Assistance of *Robert* King of *Naples*, but not prevailing in an amicable way without terms, they gave him the Government of their City for five years, upon condition he would defend them as his subjects. The Emperour in his passage

came

came to *Pisa*, and from thence coasting along the shore, he went to *Rome*, where he was Crown'd in the year 1312; after which, addressing himself to the subduction of the *Florentines*, he march'd by the way of *Perugia* and *Arezzo* to *Florence*, and posted himself with his Army at the Monastery of S. *Salui* where he continued fifty days without any considerable exploit. Despairing of success against that City, he remov'd to *Pisa*, confederated with the King of *Sicily* to make an Enterprize upon *Naples*, and marched forward with his Army, but whilst he thought himself sure of Victory, and *Robert* gave himself for lost, the Emperour died at *Buonconvento*, and that Expedition miscarry'd. Not long after it fell out that *Uguccione* became Lord of *Pisa*, and by degrees of *Lucca*, where he joyn'd himself with the *Ghibilines*, and by the assistance of that faction, committed great depredations upon the Neighbours. The *Florentines* to free themselves from his Excursions, desir'd King *Robert* that his Brother *Piero* might have the Command of their Army. In the mean time *Uguccione* was not idle. To increase his numbers, and extend his dominion, partly by force, and partly by stratagem, he had possess'd himself of many strong Castles in the Vallies of *Arno*, and *Nievole*, and having advanc'd so far as to besiege *Monte Catini*, the *Florentines* thought it necessary to relieve it, lest otherwise that Conflagration should consume their whole Country. Having drawn together a great Army, they March'd into the *Valdi Nievole*, gave battel to *Uguccione*, and, after a sharp fight, were defeated. In the battel, they lost 2000. men besides *Piero* the Kings Brother, whose body could never be found. Nor was the Victory on *Uguccione*'s side without some qualification, he having lost one of his Sons, and several Officers of Note. After this disaster, the *Florentines* fortify'd at home as much as they could, and King *Robert* sent them a new General call'd the *Conte di Andrea* with the title of *Conte Novello*. By his deportment (or rather by the Genius of the *Florentines*, whose property it is to increase upon every settlement, and to fall afterwards into factions upon every accident) notwithstanding their present War with *Uguccione*, they divided again, and some were for King *Robert*, and others against him. The chief of his Adversaries were *Simon della Tosa*, the *Magalotti*, and other popular families, who had greatest interest in the Government. These persons sent first i to *France*, and then into *Germany*, to raise men, and invite Officers, that by their assistance they might be able to rid themselves of their New Governour the *Conte*. But their fortune was adverse, and neither could be procur'd. Nevertheless they gave not their Enterprise over; though they had been disappointed both in *Germany* and *France*; they found out an Officer in *Agobbio*; having driven out King *Roberts* Governour, they sent for *Laudo* from *Agobbio*, and made him *Effecutore*, (or indeed Executioner) giving him absolute power over their whole City. *Laudo* being naturally cruel and avaritious, march'd with arm'd men up and down the City, plundring in this place, and killing in that, as those who sent for him gave him directions; and not content with this insolence, he Coyn'd false mony with the *Florentine* stamp, and no man had the power to oppose it, to such grandeur was he arriv'd by the dissention of the Citizens. Miserable certainty, and much to be lamented was the Condition of this City, which, neither the Consequences of their former divisions, their apprehension of *Uguccione*, nor the Authority of a King was sufficient to unite. Abroad they were infested by *Uguccione*; at home they were pillag'd by *Laudo*; and yet no reconciliation. The Kings friends, many of the Nobility, several great men of the *Populace* and all the *Guelfs*, were Enemies to *Laudo* and his party. Nevertheless the adversary having the Authority in his hand, they could not without manifest danger discover themselves; however, that they might not be deficient in what they were able to do towards the freeing themselves of so dishonourable a Tyranny, they writ privately to King *Robert* to intreat that he would make *Conte Guido da Buttifolle* his Lieutenant in *Florence*. The King granted their request, sent the *Conte* to them forthwith, and the adverse party (though the *Signori* also were Enemies to the King) had not the Courage to oppose him. But the *Conte* for all that, had not much Authority confer'd, because the *Segnori*, and *Gonfaloneri* of the Companies were favourers of *Laudo* and his accomplices. During these troubles in *Florence*, the daughter of *Alberto* coming out of *Germany*, pass'd by this City in her way to her husband *Charles* Son to King *Robert*. She was very honourably received by such as were friends to the King, who complaining to her of the sad Condition of their City, and the Tyranny, of *Laudo* and his party, she promis'd her assistance, and by the help of her interposition and such as were sent thither from the King, the Citizens were reconcil'd, *Laudo* depos'd from his Authority, and sent home to *Agobbio* full of treasure and blood. *Laudo* being gone, they fell to Reform, and the *Signoria* was confirm'd by the King for three years longer; and because before there were VII in the Senate of *Laudo*'s party, VI new were chosen of the Kings, and they continu'd XIII. for sometime;

New division.

Laudo di Agobbio.

Castruccio Castracani.

but they were reduced afterwards to VII their old number. About this time *Uguccione* was driven out of *Lucca*, and *Pisa*, and *Castruccio Castracani*, a Citizen of *Lucca*, succeeded him in the Government; and being a brave and Couragious young Gentleman and Fortunate in all his Undertakings, in a short time he made himself Chief of the *Ghibilin* faction in *Tuscany*. For this cause, laying aside their private discords, the *Florentines* for several years made it their business, first to obstruct the growth of *Castruccio's* Power, and afterwards, (in case he should grow powerful against their will) to consider which way they were to defend themselves against him: and that the *Signori* might deliberate with more Counsel, and Execute with more Authority, they Created XII. Citizens (which they call'd *Buonhuomini*, without whose advice and concurrence the *Signori* were not to do any thing of importance. In the mean time the Authority of King *Robert* expir'd; the Goverment divolv'd once more upon the City, which set up the old *Rettori* and Magistrates as formerly, and their fear of *Castruccio*, kept them Friends, and united. *Castruccio* after many brave things performed against the Lord's of *Lunigiana*, sat down before *Prato*: The *Florentines* alarm'd at the news, resolved to relieve it, and shutting up their Shops they got together in a confus'd and tumultuous manner about 20000 Foot and 1500 Horse; and to lessen the force of *Castruccio* and add to their own, Proclamation was made by the *Signori* that what ever Rebel of the *Guelfs* should come in to the relief of *Prato*, should be restor'd afterwards to his Country: upon which Proclamation more than 4000 of the *Guelfs* came in and joyned with them, by which accession, their Army being become formidable, they march'd with all speed towards *Prato*, but *Castruccio*, having no mind to hazard a Battail against so considerable a force, drew off and retreated to *Lucca*. Upon his retreat, great Controversie arose in the Army betwixt the Nobility and the People. The People would have pursued, and fought in hopes to have overcome and destroyed him; the Nobility would return, alledging they had done enough already in exposing *Florence* for the relief of *Prato*. That there being a necessity for that, it was well enough done, but now, no necessity being upon them, little to be gotten, and much to be lost, fortune was not to be tempted, nor the Enimy to be follow'd. Not being able to accord among themselves, the business was referred to the *Signori*, which consisting of Nobility and Commons, they fell into the same difference of opinion, which being known to the City, they assembled in great multitudes in the *Piazza*, threatning the Nobility highly, till at last they condescended. But their resolution coming too late, and many constrain'd to joyn in it against their perswasions, the Enimy had time, and drew safely off to *Lucca*. This difference put the People into such a huff against the Nobility, the *Signori* refus'd to perform the Promise they made to the Rebels which came in upon Proclamation, which the Rebels perceiving, they resolv'd to be before hand if possible, and accordingly presented themselves at the Gates of the City to be admitted before the Army came up; but their design being suspected, miscarryed, and they were beaten back by those who were left in the Town: To try if they could obtain that by treaty, which they could not compass by force, they sent eight *Embassadors* to the *Signori*, to commemorate to them the Faith they had given; the dangers they had run thereupon; and that it could not be unreasonable they should have their promised reward. The Nobility thought themselves oblig'd, having promis'd them particularly as well as the *Signori*, and therefore imploy'd all their interest for the advantage of the Rebels; but the Commons (being inrag'd that the Enterprize against *Castruccio* was not prosecuted as it might have been) would not consent; which turn'd afterwards to the great shame and dishonour of the City. The Nobility being many of them disgusted thereat, endeavoured that by force, which was denyed them upon applications; and agreed with the *Guelfs* that if they would attempt their entrance without, they would take up Arms in their assistance within; but their plot being discover'd the Day before it was to be Executed, when the banish'd *Guelfs* came to make their attack, they found the City in Arms, and all things so well dispos'd to repel them without, and suppress those within, that none of them durst venture, and so the Enterprize was given over without any effort. The Rebels being departed, it was thought fit those Persons should be punish'd who invited them thither, nevertheless though every Body could point at the delinquents, yet no Body durst Name them, much more accuse them. That the truth might impartially be known, it was ordered that the Names of the Offendors should be written down; and deliver'd privatly to the Captain; which being done, the Persons accused were *Amerigo Donati*, *Teghiaio Frescobaldi*, and *Lotteringo Gherardini*, whose Judges being now more favourable, than (perhaps) their crime deserv'd, they were only condemn'd to pay a Sum of Money, and came off.

The tumults in *Florence* upon the alarm by the Rebels, demonstrated clearly that to the Company of the People one Captain was not sufficient; and therefore it was ordered for

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the future, that every Company ſhould have three or four, and every Gonfalonier two or three, join'd to them which ſhould be call'd *Pennonieri*, that, in caſe of neceſſity, where the whole Company could not be drawn out, part of it might appear under one of the ſaid Officers. And as it happens in all Common-wealths, after any great accident, ſome or other of the old Laws are abrogated, and others reviv'd to ſupply them, ſo the *Seguoria* being at firſt but occaſional and temporary, the Senators and *Collegi* then in being (having the Power in their hands) took Authority upon themſelves to make a Council of the *Signori*, which ſhould ſit forty Months for the future, their Names being to be put into a purſe, and drawn out every two Months. But for as much as many of the Citizens were jealous their Names were not in the purſe, there was a new *Imborſation* before the forty Months began. Hence it was, the cuſtom of the purſe had its Original, and was us'd in the Creation of their Magiſtrats, both at home and abroad, whereas formerly they were choſen by a Counſel of the Succeſſors as the tearm of the Office began to expire. At firſt this way of election was call'd *Imborſationi*, and afterwards *Squittini*. And becauſe every three, or at moſt five years this cuſtom was to be us'd, it was thought they had prevented great miſchiefs to the City, occaſion'd by multitude of Competitors, and tumults at every election of Magiſtrats, which tumults being to be corrected no way (in their Judgments) ſo readily, they pitched upon this, not diſcerning the evils which lay conceal'd under ſo ſmall a convenience. It was now in the year 1325. when *Caſtruccio* having ſeiz'd on *Piſtoia*, was grown ſo conſiderable, that the *Florentines* (jealous of his greatneſs, reſolv'd before he had ſetled his new conqueſt, to fall upon him, and recover it (if poſſible) out of his hands. Whereupon of Citizens and their Friends they aſſembled 20000 Foot, and 3000 Horſe, and encamp'd before *Alto Paſcio*, by taking it, to render the relief of *Piſtoia* the more difficult. The *Florentines* took that paſs, and when they had done, they march'd towards *Lucca* forraging and waſting the Country. But by the Imprudence and Treachery of their Commander, little progreſs was made. This Perſon (call'd *Ramondo da Cardona*) obſerving the *Florentines* to have been very liberal of their liberty, and to have confer'd the Goverment ſometimes upon Kings, ſometimes upon Legats, and ſometimes upon more inferiour Perſons; he thought with himſelf that if he could bring them into any exigence, or diſtreſs, it might eaſily fall out that they would make him their Prince; to this purpoſe he frequently deſir'd and preſs'd to have the ſame Authority inveſted in him in the City, as he had in the Army, otherwiſe he could not require nor expect that Obedience which was neceſſary for a General. The *Florentines* not hearing on that Ear, their Captain proceeded but ſlowly, neglecting his time, as much as *Caſtruccio* improv'd it; for *Caſtruccio* having procur'd ſupplies from the *Viſconti*, and other Princes of *Lombardy*, and made himſelf ſtrong, *Ramondo* (who before loſt his opportunity of conquering for want of fidelity) now loſt the poſſibility of preſerving himſelf, for want of diſcreation; for marching up and down lazily with his Army, he was overtaken by *Caſtruccio* near *Alto Paſcio*, aſſaulted, and after a long fight, broken to pieces; in which Action many *Florentines* were taken Priſoners and Kill'd, and their General among the reſt, who received the reward of his infidelity and ill Counſel from Fortune her ſelf, which had been more properly beſtow'd by the hands of the *Florentines*. The calamities which *Caſtruccio* introduced upon the *Florentines* after his Victory; the Depradations, Impriſonments, Ruin's, and Burnings, are not to be expreſs'd; having no Body to oppoſe him, for ſeveral Months together, he went where, and did what he had a mind to, and the *Florentines* thought themſelves happy, (after ſuch a defeat) if they could ſave the City. Nevertheleſs they were not ſo deſperatly low but they made great proviſions of Money, rais'd what Soldiers was poſſible, and ſent to their Friends for aſſiſtance; but no providence was ſufficient againſt ſuch an Enimy, they were forc'd therefore to make choice of *Carlo Duke* of *Calabria* (the Son of King *Robert*) to be their Soveraign; If it would pleaſe him to undertake their defence; for that Family having been us'd to the Supremacy of that City, they promis'd him rather their Obedience, than Friendſhip. But *Carlo* being perſonally imploy'd in the Wars of *Sicily*, he ſent *Gualtieri* (a French Man and) *Duke* of *Athens* to take poſſeſſion in his behalf. He as his Maſters Leiutenant, took poſſeſſion of the Government, and created Magiſtrats as he pleas'd. Notwithſtanding his behaviour was ſo modeſt, and in a manner ſo contrary to his own Nature, every one lov'd him. Having finiſh'd his War in *Sicily*, *Charles* came with a thouſand Horſe to *Florence*, and made his entry in *July* 1326. His arrival gave ſome impediment to *Caſtruccio*, & kept him from rummaging up and down the Country with that freedom and ſecurity which he had formerly done. But what the City gain'd abroad, it loſt at home, and when their Enimies were reſtrain'd, they became expos'd to the inſolence and oppreſſion of their Friends: for the *Signori* acting nothing without the conſent of the *Duke*, in a years time he drain'd the City of four hundred thouſand *Florins*, though in the Articles of agreement

The Council of the *Signori* to ſit forty Monthes, whereas before it was occaſional.

Election of Magiſtrats by *Imborſation*.

Ramondo da Cardona General of the *Florentines*.

The *Duke* of *Athens* Governer of *Florence*.

agreement it was expresly provided he should not exceed 200000. So great were the Impositions which he, or his Father laid upon the Town, and yet as if these were too few, their miseries were increas'd by an accumulation of new jealoulies, and new Enimies. For the *Ghibilines* of *Lombardy* were so fearful of *Carlos* advance into *Tuscany*, that *Galiazzo Visconti*, and the rest of the Princes of *Lombardy* with Money and fair Promises, perswaded *Lewis* of *Baccaria*, (who had been Elected Emperour against the Popes will) to pass into *Italy* with an Army. Being arriv'd in *Lombardy*, he pass'd forward into *Tuscany*, made himself Master of *Pisa* by the Assistance of *Castruccio*, and having received a considerable supply of Money there, he march'd on towards *Rome*: Whereupon *Charles* (being fearful of his Kingdom, and leaving *Philippo da Saginitto* his Lieutenant in *Florence*, went Home with the Force he brought with him. Upon his departure, *Castruccio* seiz'd upon *Pisa*, and the *Florentines* got *Pistoia* by stratagem: *Castruccio* march'd immediatly to recover it, sat down before it, and manag'd his business with so much conduct and resolution, that though the *Florentines* made many attempts to relieve it, both by Insults upon his Army, and incursions into his Country, their Attachs, and their dilligences were all ineffectual, they could not possibly remove him; for so firmly was he resolv'd to chastise the *Pistoians*, and weaken the *Florentines*, that the *Pistoians* were constrain'd to surrender, and receive him once more for their Lord; by which Action as he contracted much Honour and Renown, so he thereby contracted so much Sickness and Infirmity, that he died shortly after upon his return to *Lucca*. And, because one ill or good accident goes seldome alone; *Charles Duke* of *Calabria* and Lord of *Florence* dyed at *Naples* much about the same time, so that in a very small spce the *Florentines* were freed from the oppression of the one, and the apprehension of the other. They were no sooner free, but they fell to reforming, null'd all the Laws and Ordinances of the ancient Councils, and created two new, one of them consisting of three hundred of the Commons, the other of two hundred both Commons and Gentlemen; the first was call'd the Council of the People, and the second the Common Council.

Lod. the Emperour called into *Italy*.

The Death of *Castruccio* and the *Duke* of *Calabria*.

New reformation.

The *Emperour* being arrived at *Rome*, he created an *Anti-Pope*; decreed many things to the prejudice of the Church; and attempted more which he was not able to carry; so that at length he removed (with no little disgrace) from *Rome* to *Pisa*, where, either disdaining his Conduct, or for want of their Pay, eight hundred *German* Horse mutiny'd, fortifi'd themselves at *Monte Ariaro*, and as he was departed from *Pisa* towards *Lombardy*, posses'd themselves of *Lucca* and drave out *Francisco Castracani*, whom the *Emperour* had left Governour of the Town; Being Masters of that City, and their intentions to make what profit of it they could, they offered it to the *Florentines* for twenty thousand *Florins*, but but by the advice of *Simon della Tosa* it was refus'd; this resolution would have been much to the advantage of our City, had the *Florentines* persevered; but changing it afterwards it prov'd much to their detriment, for refusing it at that time when they might have had it so cheap, they bad much more for it afterwards and were denied it; which was the occasion that *Florence* chang'd its Government often, to its great inconvenience. *Lucca*, being refus'd in this manner by the *Florentines*, was purchased for 30000 *Florins* by *Gherardino Spinoli* a Genouese, and (because People are more slow and indifferent in accepting what is offer'd, than in conceiving what is not) as soon as it was known to be bought by *Gherardini*, and at how cheap a rate, the *Florentines* were much troubled they had it not themselves, and blam'd all those who had any way discouraged them; To buy it being too late, they sought to gain it by force, and to that end sent their Army to over-run and spoil the Country about it. About this time the Emperour was return'd out of *Italy*, and the Pope, by Order of the *Pisani*, sent Prisoner into *France*. The *Florentines* upon the Death of *Castruccio* (which follow'd in the year 1328) till the year 1340 continued quiet at Home; Intent only upon their Wars abroad; in *Lombardy* upon the coming of *John* King of *Bohemia*, and in *Tuscany* upon the account of *Lucca*; they adorn'd their City likewise with many new Buildings, and particularly the Tower of S. *Reparata* according to the directions of *Giolto* the most Famous Painter in his time. Moreover, upon an inundation of the River *Arnus* in the year 1333 (in which the Water swelling twelve fathoms high in some places of *Florence* carried away several Bridges, and many Houses were ruin'd) they repair'd all, with great care and expence. But in the year 1340 this tranquillity was disturb'd, and they had new occasion of alteration. The Grandees of the City had two ways to maintain, and increase their Authority. One was by ordering the *Imborsations* so, as the Magistracy should fall always either to them or their Friends. The other was by making themselves chief in the Elections of the *Rettori*, and thereby obliging them to be favourable to them afterwards in all their determinations; And of this second way they were so fond and conceited, that not content with two *Rettori* (as they had formerly)

The *Florentines* quiet at Home.

Their Buildings.

formerly (a while after they ſet up a third, with the Title of the Captain of the Guards, in which Office they plac'd *Jacomo Gabrieli d'Agobbio*, with abſolute Power over the Citizens. *Jacomo* in the light of the Government, committed daily many Injuries, but more ſpecially to *Piero de Bardi*, and *Bardo Treſcobaldi*. Being Nobly deſcended, and by conſequence proud, they could not endure, to have a ſtranger do them wrong, in defiance of their other Magiſtrates. To revenge themſelves of him, and the Government, they enter'd into a Conſpiracy with ſeveral Noble, and Popular Families in the City, who were diſguſted with their Tyranny. The manner concluded upon was, that every one ſhould get as many arm'd Men into his Houſe as he could, and that on All-Saints Day in the Morning when all the People were at Maſs, they ſhould take Arms, kill the Captain, and the chief of their Governours, and afterwards make new Magiſtrates, and new Laws for the State. But becauſe dangerous enterprizes, the more conſidered, are alway the leſs willingly undertaken; it happens that Plots which allow too much time for their Execution, are generally diſcover'd. There being among the Conſpirators a Gentleman call'd *Andrea di Bardi*, whoſe fear of Puniſhment prevailing upon him, beyond his deſire of Revenge, he betray'd all to *Jacomo Alberti*, his Kinſman, *Jacomo* imparted it immediatly to the *Priori*, and the *Priori* to the Governors. And becauſe the deſign was ſo near Execution, All-Saints day being at hand, many of the Citizens aſſembled in the Palace, and judging it unſafe to defer; they would needs perſwade the *Signori* to cauſe the great Bell to be rung, and the People commanded to their Arms; *Taldo Valori* was at that time *Gonfaloniere*, and *Franciſco Salviati* one of the *Signori*. Being Relations of the *Bardi* they diſſwaded the ſounding of the Bell, alledging it was not ſecure to arm the People upon trivial Occaſions, becauſe Authority given to them, without ſome Power reſerv'd to reſtrain them, was never known to produce any good, and that it was much eaſier to raiſe a Tumult, than to ſuppreſs it; They judg'd it better therefore to inquire farther into the verity of the thing, and puniſh it rather civilly (if it appear'd to be true) than in a furious and tumultuous manner to correct it, perhaps with the deſtruction of the whole City. But theſe Arguments ſerv'd not the turn, but with Villanous language, and Inſolent behavior the *Signori* were conſtrain'd to cauſe the Bell to be rung, upon which the People immediatly took Arms, and away to the *Piazza*. The *Bardi*, and *Treſcobaldi* perceiving they were diſcover'd, and reſolving to overcome with Honour or die without Shame, betook themſelves to their Arms, hoping they would be able to defend that part of the City beyond the Bridge where their Houſes were; whereupon they broke down the Bridges, and fortifi'd themſelves, till they ſhould be reliev'd by the Nobility of the Country, and other Perſons their Friends, But that deſign was fruſtrated by the People which lived among them in the ſame part of the City, who took up Arms for the *Signori*; finding themſelves entermixt, and that deſign not like to ſucceed, they abandon'd the Bridges, and retreated to the ſtreet where the *Bardi* dwelt, as ſtronger than the reſt, where they made a moſt valiant defence. *Jacomo d'Agobbio* knew well enough that all this Conſpiracy was againſt him; and having no great inclination to be kill'd, in a terrible fright, with his hair ſtanding right up, he ran to the Palace of the *Signori*, and ſecur'd himſelf among the thickeſt of the Arm'd Men. The other of the *Riſtori*, though not ſo conſcious, were much more couragious, eſpecially the *Podiſta* call'd *Maffeo da Marradi*, who preſenting himſelf where they were fighting, and paſſing the Bridge *Rubaconte:* threw himſelf undauntedly among the Swords of the *Bardi*, and made a ſign for a Party. Upon which, out of reverence to his Perſon, his Courage and good qualities, they let fall their Arms, and ſtood quietly to attend him. In a modeſt and grave harangue he blam'd their proceedings; remonſtrated the danger they were in; if they did not yeild to the indignation of the People; he gave them hopes likewiſe of a fair hearing, and a merciful ſentence, and promis'd his interceſſion for them, then returning to their *Signori* he perſwaded that they would not uſe extremities, and conquer with the loſs of ſo many Citizens lives, nor condemn without hearing. In ſhort, ſo far he obtain'd, that by conſent of the *Signori*, *Baldi*, *Treſcobaldi* and their Friends left the City, and retir'd to their Caſtles without any Impediment. They being gone, and the People diſarm'd, the *Signori* proceeded only againſt ſuch of the Families of the *Baldi* and *Treſcobaldi* as had taken Arms, and to leſſen their Power, they bought the Caſtles of *Mangona*, and *Vernia* of the *Bardi*, and made a Law that no Citizen ſhould for the future poſſeſs any Caſtle whithin twenty miles of *Florence*. Not many months after *Stialta Treſcobaldi* and ſeveral others of that Family were beheaded, having been proclaim'd Rebels before. But it was not ſufficient for theſe Governours to have conquer'd and ſuppreſs'd the *Baldi* and *Treſcobaldi*; like other People (whoſe inſolence for the moſt part increaſes with their Power) they grew imperious as they grew ſtrong. Whereas, before the *Florentines* had only one Captain of the Guards to afflict them, they choſe another now for the Country, inveſting him with great Authority,

A Captain of the Guards.

Maffeo da Marradi.

Authority, that those Persons whom they suspected, might not be suffered to live quietly either within the City or without; and besides this they abus'd and provok'd the Nobility in such manner, that they were ready to Sacrifice, and sell both themselves and City to be reveng'd, and watching for an occasion, they met one, and improv'd it. By the many troubles in *Lombardy*, and *Tuscany*, *Lucca* was fallen under the Dominion of *Mastino della Scala* Lord of *Verona*, who ingaged to deliver it up to the *Florentines*, but did not perform; for being Lord of *Parma* he thought himself able to keep it, and valued not the breach of his Faith. The *Florentines*, in revenge, joyn'd with the *Venetians*, and made such war upon him, he had well nigh lost most of his territory; but the *Florentines* got little by it, more than the satisfaction to have distress'd *Mastino*: for the *Venetian* (according to the practice of all States when enter'd into League with People less powerful than themselves) having taken *Trevigi*, and *Vicenza*; made a peace without any regard to the *Florentines*. A while after, the *Visconti* Lords of *Milan*, having taken *Parma* from *Mastino*, conceiving himself unable to keep *Lucca* any longer, he resolv'd to sell it. The *Florentines* and the *Pisani* were competitors in the purchase, and whilst the bargain was driving, the *Pisani* perceiving the *Florentines* like to carry it, in respect that they were the more wealthy of the two; they betook themselves to force, and joyning with the *Visconti*, they sat down before it. The *Florentines* not at all discourag'd, proceeded in their bargain, and having concluded their terms, they pay'd down part of the Money to *Mastino*, and giving Hostages for the rest, the Town was to be deliver'd, whereupon *Naddo Ruccellai*, *Giovanni di Bernardino de Medici*, and *Rosso di Ricciardo de Ricci*, were sent to take possession, who passing by force into *Lucca*, they were receiv'd by *Mastino*, and the Town deliver'd up into their hands. However, the *Pisani* continued their siege, and endeavour'd by all possible industry to gain it by force. The *Florentines* on the other side were as solicitous to relieve it, but after a long War, with great dishonor, and the loss of their Money they were driven out of it, and the Town became subject to the *Piscans*. The loss of this City (as in such cases doth frequently happen) put the People of *Florence* into a Mutiny against their Governors, so that in all places they upbraided the conduct and administration of their Superiors. At the beginning of the War the management of the Military affairs was committed to XX. Citizens, who made *Maleteſta di Rimini* their General, who having executed his Command with little courage, and less discretion, they apply'd themselves to *Robert* King of *Naples* for assistance. In complyance with their request, King *Robert* sent them supplies under the Command of *Gualtieri* Duke of *Athens*, who (the Heavens ordaining that all things should concur to their future misery) arriv'd at *Florence* at the very time when the enterprize of *Lucca* was utterly lost. The XX. Governors of the Militia, seeing the People inrag'd thought by chooſing a new General, either to inspire them with new hopes, or take away the occasion of their obloquy, and because their fears were still upon them, that the Duke of *Athens* might defend them the better, they first made him Conservator, and afterwards General. The Nobility, upon the reasons above said, being highly discontented, and many of them retaining a correspondence which *Gualtieri* ever since he was Governor of *Florence* in the behalf of *Charles* Duke of *Calabria*, they began to think now was their time to wreck their malice, and to ruine the City, believing there was no way left them to subdue the People who had insulted so long, but by subjecting them to a Prince, who knowing the Generosity of the Nobless, and the insolence of the Commons, might recompence both according to their deserts; besides they presum'd it would be something meritorious, if upon their motion, and by their cooperation he acquir'd the Government. In persuance of this design, they had many privat meetings, in which they prest him to take the Government wholly into his hands, and they would assist him to the utmost. Nor were the Nobility alone in this business, some of the Popular families (as the *Peruzzi*, *Acciaivoli*, *Antellesi*, and *Buonaccorsi*) joyn'd themselves with them; for being much in debt, and unable out of their own Estates to clear themselves, they plotted against other Peoples, and to free themselves of their Creditors, made no scruple of enslaving their Country. These persuasions exasperated the Ambition of the Duke, who, to gain the reputation among the people of being just and exact, persecuted those who had the management of the Wars against *Lucca*, caus'd *Giovan de Medici*; *Naddo Ruccellai*, and *Guilielmo Altoviti* to be put to death, banish'd several others, and others he fined. These executions startled the middle sort of the Citizens, only the Grandees, and the Common People were satisfi'd; the last, out of their natural pleasure in mischief, the first to see themselves so handsomly reveng'd for the insolencies they had receiv'd from the People. Whereupon, whenever the Duke appear'd in the streets, he was persued with acclamations, and applauses of his integrity, every one exhorting him to go on in finding out, and punishing the frauds of their Neighbours. The Authority

Lucca sold to the *Florentines*.

Taken from them by the *Pisans*.

The Duke of *Athens*.

of

of the XX. was much leſſen'd, the Dukes reputation increas'd, and a general fear of him overſpread the whole City; ſo that to ſhow their affections towards him, all People caus'd his Arms to be painted upon their Houſes, and nothing but the bare title was wanting to make him a Prince, being now in a condition (as he thought) of attempting any thing ſecurely, he caus'd it to be ſignifi'd to the Senat, that for the good of the Publick he judg'd it neceſſary they ſhould transfer their Authority upon him, and that (ſeeing the whole City approv'd it) he deſir'd he might have their reſignation. The *Signori*, having long foreſeen the ruine of their Country approaching, were much troubled at the meſſage: They were ſenſible of the danger they were in, yet not to be deficient in any act of duty to their Country, they refus'd him couragiouſly. As a pretence and ſpecimen of his Religion, and humility, the Duke had taken up his quarters in the Monaſtery of St. *Croce*, and being deſirous to give the finiſhing ſtroke to his wicked deſigns, he by Proclamation requir'd all the People to appear before him the next morning in the *Piazza* belonging to that Monaſtery. This proclamation alarmed the *Signori* more than his meſſage, whereupon joyning themſelves with ſuch as were lovers both of their liberty and Country, upon conſideration of the Power of the Duke, and that their force was inſufficient, it was reſov'd they ſhould addreſs themſelves to him in an humble and ſupplicatory way, to try if by their Prayers they might prevail with him to give his enterprize over, or elſe to execute it with more moderation. All things being concluded, part of the *Signori* were ſent to attend him, and one of them accoſted him in this manner. "My Lord we are come hither, mov'd firſt by "your Propoſal, and next by your Proclamation, for aſſembling the People, preſuming "your reſolution is to obtain that by force, to which upon privat application we have not "conſented: it is not our deſign to oppoſe force againſt force, but rather to remonſtrate "the burden and heavineſs of that load you would take upon your ſelf, and the dangers "which will probably occur. And this we do, that you may hereafter remember, and di- "ſtinguiſh betwixt ours, and the Counſel of ſuch as adviſe the contrary, not ſo much out "of reſpect and deference to your advantage, as for the venting their own privat fury and "revenge. Your endeavour is to bring this City into ſervitude, (which has always liv'd free) "becauſe the Goverment has been formerly given by us to the King's of *Naples*, whereas "that was rather an aſſociation, than a ſubjection. Have you conſider'd how important "and dear the Name of Liberty is to us? A thing, no force can extirpate, no time can ex- "tinguiſh, nor no merit preponderate. Think, Sir, I beſeech you, what Power will be ne- "ceſſary to keep ſuch a City in ſubjection. All the ſtrangers you can entertain will not be "ſufficient; thoſe which are Inhabitants you cannot prudently truſt; for though at pre- "ſent they are Friends, and have puſh'd you forward upon this reſolution, yet, as ſoon as "they have glutted themſelves upon their Enimies, their next Plot will be to expel you, "and make themſelves Princes. The People, in whom your greateſt confidence is placed, "will turn, upon every ſlight accident, againſt you, ſo that in a ſhort time you will run a "hazard of having the whole City your Enimies, which will infallibly be the ruine both "of it and your ſelf; becauſe thoſe Princes only can be ſecure, whoſe Enimies are but few, "and they eaſily remov'd either by baniſhment or death; but againſt univerſal hatred there "is no ſecurity, becauſe the ſpring and fountain is not known, and he that fears every Man, "can be ſafe againſt no Man. If yet you perſiſt, and take all poſſible care to preſerve your "ſelf, you do but encumber your ſelf with more danger, by exciting their hatred and making "them more intent and ſerious in their revenge. That time is not able to eradicate our de- "ſire of Liberty, is moſt certain. We could mention many good Cities in which it has "been reaſſum'd by thoſe who never taſted the ſweetneſs of it, yet upon the bare character & "tradition of their Fathers, they have not only valu'd, but fought and contended to re- "cover it, and maintained it afterwards againſt all difficulties and dangers. Nay, ſhould "their Fathers have neglected, or forgot to recommend it, the publick Palaces, the Courts "for the Magiſtrats, the enſigns of their freedom (which are of neceſſity to be known by "all Citizens) would certainly proclaim it. What action of yours can counterpoize a- "gainſt the ſweetneſs of Liberty? For what can you do to expunge the deſire of it out of "the Hearts of the People? Nothing at all, no, though you ſhould add all *Tuſcany* to this "State, and return every day into this City with new victory over your Enimies. The "Honor would be yours, not ours; and the Citizens have gain'd fellow ſervants rather "than ſubjects. Nor is it in the power of your deportment to eſtabliſh you. Let your "Life be never ſo exact, your converſation affable, your judgments juſt, your liberality ne- "ver ſo conſpicuous, all will not do, all will not gain you the affections of the People; if "you think otherwiſe, you deceive your ſelf, for to People that have liv'd free, every link "is a load, and every bond a burthen. And to find a ſtate violently acquir'd, to accord "quietly with its Prince (though never ſo good) is impoſſible; of neceſſity one moſt

The Speech of one of the Senators to the Duke of *Athens*.

" comply and frame it ſelf to the other, or elſe one muſt ruine and deſtroy the other. You " have this therefore to conſider, whether you will hold this City by violence (for which " all the Guards and Citadels within, and all the friends could be made abroad, have been " many times too weak) or be content with the Authority we give you, to which laſt we " do rather adviſe, becauſe no Dominion is ſo durable as that which is voluntary, and the " other (however your ambition may diſguiſe it) will but conduct you to a height, where " being neither able to advance, nor continue, you muſt tumble down of neceſſity, to your " own great detriment as well as ours. But the *Dukes* heart was too hard for ſuch impreſ-
The Dukes Anſwer. ſions as theſe. " He reply'd, that it was not his intention to extirpate, but to eſtabliſh their " Liberty: that Cities divided were the only Cities that were ſervile, and not thoſe that were " united. That if he by his conduct could clear their City of their Schiſms, Ambitions, and " Animoſities, he could not be ſaid to take away, but to reſtore their liberty. That he did " not aſſume that office out of any ambition of his own, but accepted it at the importunity " of ſeveral of the Citizens, and that they would do well to conſent themſelves, as their fel- " lows had done. That as to the dangers he was like to incur, he did not conſider them; " It was the part of an ignoble Perſon to decline doing good, for fear of evil that might " follow; and of a Coward to lay aſide a glorious enterprize, upon the meer doubtfulneſs " of the ſucceſs. That he hop'd ſo to demean himſelf, that they ſhould in a ſhort time " confeſs, they had fear'd him too much, and truſted him too little. The Senat finding by this anſwer no good was to be done, conſented the People ſhould meet next morning, as appointed, and the Government by their Authority to be transfer'd upon the *Duke* for a year with the ſame conditions it had been formerly given to the *Duke* of *Calabria*. On the
1342. 8th. of *September* 1342. The *Duke*, accompany'd by *Giovandella Toſa*, all his Conforts, and many Citizens beſides, coming into the *Piazza*, taking the Senate with him, he mounted upon the *Ringhieria* (which are the Stairs at the foot of the *Palagio de Signori*) and caus'd the Articles of agreement betwixt the Senate and he to be read. When the Perſon who read them came to the place where the Government was mentioned to be given to him for a year, the People cry'd out, *For his Life*, *For his Life*. *Franceſco Ruſticheſi*, one of the *Signori*, roſe up to have ſpoke, and endeavour'd to compoſe the tumult; but he was interrupted, and could not be heard. So that he was choſen Lord by conſent of the People, not
The Duke of *Athens* choſen Prince by the People. for a year but for ever, and afterwards taken and carried thorow the multitude with general acclamation. It is a cuſtom among the *Florentines* that whoever is intruſted with the Guard of their Palace, is to be ſhut up in it in the abſence of the *Signori*. That truſt was at that time in the hands of *Rinieri di Giolto*, who being corrupted by ſome of the Dukes creatures, receiv'd him into the Palace without any conſtraint. The Senate being ſurpriz'd, and much affronted, return'd to their Houſes, left the Palace to be plunderd by the Dukes ſervants, the *Gonfalone dell Populo* to be turn'd out, and the Dukes Stander'd to be ſet up, all which were immediatly done to the ineſtimable trouble of all good Men, but to the joy and ſatisfaction of thoſe who malitiouſly or ignorantly had conſented to his exaltation. The Duke was no ſooner ſetled in his Dominion, but to ſuppreſs their Authority, who were the greateſt propugnators of their liberty, he forbid the *Signori* to meet in the Palace, and con-
The Duke of *Athens* his practice in *Florence* ſign'd them a privat houſe. He took away the enſigns from the *Gonfalonieri* of the companies of the People. He diſcharg'd all Priſoners, he recall'd the *Baldi* and *Treſcobaldi* from baniſhment, prohibited the wearing of arms; and to defend himſelf within, he made what friends he could abroad, to that purpoſe he careſs'd the *Aretini* and all others which depended any way upon the *Florentines* jurisdiction. He made a peace with the *Piſani* (though he was become a Prince) that with the more advantage he might make War with them afterward. He took away their Bills and aſſignments from the Merchants, who had lent the State money in their War with *Lucca*. He increas'd the old Gabells, and impos'd new. He diſolv'd the Authority of the *Signori*, and in their places he ſet up three *Rettori Barglione da Perugia*, *Guglielmo da Sceſi*, and *Cerrettieri Bisdomini*, with whom he conſtantly adviſed. The taxes he laid upon the People were great, his judgments unjuſt, and that humanity and preciſeneſs which he counterfeited at firſt, was now turn'd moſt manifeſtly into cruelty and pride, by which means many Citizens of the more Noble and Wealthy ſort, were Condemn'd, Executed, and ſome times Tortur'd. And that his Government might be as inſupportable abroad as at home, he inſtituted ſix new *Rettori* for the regiment of the Country, who carry'd themſelves with the ſame inſolence and oppreſſion there, as he did in the City. He was jealous of the Nobility; though he had been often oblig'd by them, and ſome of them had been recall'd from their baniſhment by him; yet he could not imagine it compatible with the generoſity of a Noble Spirit to ſubmit and truckle to him. Hence it was, he apply'd himſelf to the People, cajoling them, and ſcru-ing into their favour, by which, and his power abroad, he doubted not to be able to juſtifie

his

his proceedings, how unjuſt and tyrannical ſo ever. The month of *May* being come, in which the People were wont to make merry; he caus'd the inferiour ſort of the People to be diſpos'd into ſeveral companies, gave them enſigns and mony, and honor'd them with ſplendid titles, ſo that half of the City went up and down feaſting and junketting among their Brethren, while the other half was as buſie to entertain them. The fame of his new Dominion being ſpread abroad, many Perſons of *French* extraction repair'd to him, and he prefer'd them all, as the moſt faithful of his friends; ſo that in a ſhort time *Florence* was not only ſubject to the *Frenchmen*, but to the *French* cuſtomes and garb; all People, Men as well as Women, without reſpect of indecency or inconvenience, imitating them in all things; But that which was incomparably the moſt diſpleaſing, was the violence he and his creatures us'd to the Women, without any regret. Upon theſe provocations the Citizens were full of indignation, it troubled them to ſee the Majeſty of their Government proſtitute and ruin'd; It troubl'd them to ſee their Ordinances aboliſh'd; their Laws abrogated; honeſt converſation corrupted; and civil modeſty deſpiſed; for they who had never been accuſtom'd to any regal pomp whatſoever, could not without ſorrow behold the *Duke* environ'd with his Guards both on foot and on horſe-back. But their deſtruction being in his hands, they were neceſſitated to diſſemble, and to court and honor him outwardly whom they hated at their hearts; another inducement was the fear they had conceiv'd upon the frequent executions, and continual taxes with which he impoveriſh'd and exhauſted the City; and the *Duke* underſtood very well both their fear, and their anger. It happen'd that *Matteo di Morrozzo*, to ingratiat with the *Duke*, or to diſintangle himſelf, had diſcover'd to him a certain plot which the houſe of *Medici* and ſome others had contriv'd againſt him. The *Duke* was ſo far from inquiring into the matter, that he caus'd the informer to be put to death, by which act he diſcourag'd ſuch as would otherwiſe have advertis'd him upon occaſion, and animated thoſe who were diſpos'd to deſtroy him. He likewiſe caus'd the tongue of *Betoni Cini* to be pull'd out with ſuch cruelty that he dyed of it, and for no other cauſe but that he had ſpoke againſt the taxes, which he impos'd upon the City. This laſt outrage compleated the reſt; the People grew perfectly mad, and the *Duke* perfectly odious: for that City, which was accuſtomed heretofore to ſpeak of every thing freely, and to do what they liſted, could not poſſibly brook to have their hands tyed, and their mouths ſtop'd up by a ſtranger. Their fury and paſſion increaſing at this rate, not only the *Florentines* (who neither know how to maintain liberty, nor endure ſlaverty) were incens'd, but the moſt ſervile Nation in the World would have been inflam'd to have attempted the recovery of its freedom. Whereupon many Citizens of all qualities and degrees reſolv'd to deſtroy him; and it fell out, that, at the ſame time, three conſpiracies were on foot by three ſorts of People, the Grandees, the People, and artificers. Beſides the General oppreſſion, each party had its peculiar reaſon. The Nobility were not reſtor'd to the Government; the People had loſt it; and the artificers trade was decay'd. The Archbiſhop of *Florence Agnolo Acciaivoli* had in his Sermons highly magnifi'd the qualities of the *Duke*, and procur'd him great favour among the People; but after he was Governor, and his tyranny became notorious, they found how the Archbiſhop had deluded them. To make them amends for the fault he had committed, he thought nothing could be more reaſonable, than that the ſame hand that gave them the wound, ſhould endeavour to cure it, and therefore he made himſelf head of the firſt and moſt conſiderable conſpiracy, in which were ingag'd with him the *Bardi*, *Roſſi*, *Treſcobaldi*, *Scali*, *Altovitti*, *Magolotti*, *Strozzi*, and *Mancini*. The Principals of the ſecond conſpiracy were *Manno* and *Corſo Donati*, and with them the *Pazzi*, *Cavicciulli*, *Cerchi*, and *Albizzi*. Of the third *Anthonio Adimari* was the head, and with him the *Medici*, *Bordini*, *Ruccellai*, and *Aldobrandini*. Their deſign was to have kill'd him in the houſe of the *Albizzi*, whither it was ſuppos'd he would go on Midſommer day to ſee the running of the Horſes; but he went not that day, and that deſign was loſt. The next propoſition was, to kill him as he was walking in the ſtreets, but that was found to be difficult, becauſe he went always well arm'd, and well attended, and his motions being various and uncertain, they could not tell where it was moſt proper to way-lay him. Then it was debated to ſlay him in the Council, but that alſo was not without danger, becauſe though they ſhould kill him, they muſt of neceſſity remain at the mercy of his Guards. Whilſt theſe things were in debate among the conſpirators, *Antonio Adimari*, in hopes of aſſiſtance from them, diſcover'd the Plot to ſome of his Friends in *Siena*, told them the Principal of the Conſpirators, and aſſur'd them the whole City were diſpos'd to redeem themſelves; whereupon one of the Siemreſes communicated the whole buſineſs to *Franceſco Brunelleſchi* (not with intention to have betraid it, but in preſumption he had been privy to it before) and *Franceſco*, out of fear, or malice to ſome that were ingag'd in it, diſcover'd all to the *Duke*. *Pagolo*

Matteo di Morrozzo.

Three Conſpiracies againſt the Duke at one time.

de Mazzecchа, and *Simon de Monterapoli* being immediatly apprehended, they confeſs'd the whole matter, with the number and quality of the Conſpirators, at which the Duke was much ſurpriz'd, and counſel being given him, rather to ſummon the Conſpirators to appear, than to ſecure them abruptly (becauſe if they fled of themſelves, he would be as ſafe without ſcandal) he ſummon'd *Adimari*, who appear'd in confidence of the number of his Accomplices. *Adimari* was arreſted, and the Duke advis'd by *Franceſco Brunelleſchi*, and *Uguccione Buondelmonti*, to betake himſelf to his arms, to go up and down to their houſes, and kill all of them they met; But, his force in the Town was judg'd too ſmall, for that reſolution, and therefore he pitch'd upon another, which (had it ſucceeded) would have ſecured him againſt his Enimies, and provided him with Men. The Duke was wont upon any great Emergencies, to call the chief Citizens together, & to advice with them. Having firſt ſent to prepare what force he was able, he caus'd a liſt of three hundred Citizens to be made, and deliver'd to his Sergeants, to ſummon them to Council by their Names, reſolving when they were met, to kill, or impriſon them as he pleas'd. *Antonio Adimari* being ſecur'd, and ſo many great Citizens ſummon'd (which could not be done without noiſe) many of them, and eſpecially thoſe who were conſcious) began to ſuſpect, and ſome refus'd abſolutely to obey. The Liſt having been brought to them all, and perus'd by every one of them, they began to underſtand, and incourage one another to take Arms, and dye manfully like Men, rather than be driven quietly like ſheep to the ſlaughter: ſo that in few hours all the conſpiracies were known, and the Conſpirators united: holding Counſel among themſelves, it was concluded, that the next day being the 26 of *July* 1343. a tumult ſhould be rais'd in the old Market place, upon which all were to take Arms, and excite the people to liberty. The next day, the Signal being given by ſounding a Bell (as it was agreed before) every Body took Arms, and crying out Liberty, Liberty, the People betook themſelves to their Arms likewiſe, and fell to fortify in their ſeveral Quarters, under their reſpective Enſigns, which was done by the contrivance of the Conſpirators. The chief of all Families, both Nobility, and People met, and took an Oath to live and dye with one another in the deſtruction of the Duke (except only the *Buondelmonti*, the *Cavalienti* and the four Families of the People, which conſented to make him Prince, who, with the Butchers and raſcallity of the City, ran down arm'd to the *Piazza* in defence of the Duke. The Duke, alarm'd at theſe proceedings, fortify'd his Palace, call'd home his Servants, which were lodg'd in ſeveral parts of the Town, and ſallying forth with them on Horſeback towards the Market-place, they were many times aſſaulted by the way, and many of them ſlain, being forced back, and recruited with 300 freſh Horſe, he was in doubt with himſelf, whether he had beſt fall upon them again, or ſtand upon his guard; and in the mean time the *Medici*, *Gavicciali*, *Ruccellai*, and other families that were moſt diſoblig'd by the Duke, were in no leſs fear, that if he ſhould make a ſally, many who had taken arms againſt him in the uproar, would ſhow themſelves his friends; deſirous therefore to keep him from ſallying, and by that means, increaſing his numbers, drawing what force together they were able, they advanc'd towards the Market-place, where ſome of their fellow Citizens had poſted themſelves in defence of the Duke. The Citizens which were there in the front, and had appear'd firſt for their Prince, ſeeing themſelves ſo briskly confronted, chang'd their ſides, left their Duke in the lurch, and joyn'd with their fellow Citizens, all but *Uguccione Buondelmonti*, who retired into the Palace, and *Giannozzo Cavalcanti*, who retreating with ſome of his party into the New-Market, and getting upon a bench made an earneſt ſpeach, exhorting the People to ſtand firm to the Duke, and having got more force to him, to fright them (if his perſwaſion fail'd) he threatned to kill them all, Man, Woman, and Child, if they joyn'd or perſiſted in any deſign againſt him. But ſeeing no body follow him, nor no body near to chaſtiſe him for his inſolence, perceiving he had troubled himſelf hitherto in vain, he reſolv'd to tempt his fortune no farther, and ſo retir'd peaceably to his houſe. The conflict, in the mean time, in the market-place, betwixt the People and the Dukes party was great, and though the Dukes creatures were reinforc'd from the Palace, yet they were beaten, part taken Priſoners, and part leaving their Horſes to their Enimies, got on foot into the Palace. Whilſt the conteſt continu'd in the Market place, *Corſo*, and *Amerigo Donati*, with part of the People broke up the *Stinche*, burn'd the Records of the *Poteſta*, and publick Chamber, ſack'd the Houſes of the *Rettori*, and kill'd all the Dukes Officers they could meet with. The Duke on the other ſide, finding he had loſt the *Piazza*, the whole City was become his Enimy, and no hopes left him of being reliev'd, He reſolv'd to try if by any act of kindneſs or humanity he might work upon the People. Calling his Priſoners (therefore) to him, with fair and gentle language he gave them their liberty, and made *Antonio Adimari* a Knight, (though not at all to his ſatisfaction) he caus'd his Enſign to be taken down, and the Standard

Comotion in *Florence.*

dard of the People to be ſet up upon the Palace. Which things being done unſeaſonably, and by force, they avail'd but little. In this manner he remain'd block'd up in his Palace, not at all delighted with his condition; having coveted too much formerly, he was now like to loſe all, and in a few days was in a danger of being famiſh'd or ſlain. The Citizens, to give ſome form to their Government, aſſembled themſelves in the St. *Reparata*, and created XIV. Citizens (half of the Nobility, and half of the People) who with their Biſhop ſhould have full Power to model and reform the State as they pleas'd. The Authority of the *Poteſta*, they committed to VI Perſons of their own election, which they were to exerciſe till he that was elected ſhould come. There were at that time many ſtrangers reſorted to *Florence*, in aſſiſtance to that City, among the reſt the *Sienneſi* had ſent ſix Embaſſadors (of honorable condition in their own Country) to negotiat a peace betwixt the Duke and the People. The People refus'd any overture, unleſs *Guglielmo da Sceſi*, his Son, and *Cerrettieri Bi Domini* were deliver'd into their hands, which the Duke obſtinatly deny'd, till the threats of thoſe who were ſhut up with him in the Palace conſtrain'd him to conſent. Greater, doubtleſs, is the inſolence and contumacy of the People, and more pernicious the miſchiefs which they do, whilſt they are in purſuit of their Liberty, than when they have acquir'd it. *Guglielmo* and his Son were brought forth, and deliver'd up among thouſands of their Enimies; his Son was a young Gentleman, not yet arriv'd at eighteen years of age; yet neither his youth, his comlineſs, nor innocence were able to preſerve him; thoſe who could not get near enough to do it whilſt he was alive, wounded him when he was dead; and as if their ſwords had been partial, and executed the dictates of their fury with too much moderation, they fell to it with their teeth, and their hands, biting his fleſh, and tearing it to pieces. And that all their ſences might participate in their revenge, having feaſted their ears upon their groans, their eyes upon their wounds, and their touch upon their bowels (which they rent out of their bodies with their hands) their taſte muſt (likewiſe) be treated and regal'd, that their inward parts, as well as their outward, might have a ſhare of the *Ragouſt*. This Barbarous outrage, how fatal ſoever it was to them two, was very lucky to *Cerrettieri*, for the People being tyr'd in the formalities of their execution, forgot they had any more to puniſh, and left him in the Palace, not ſo much as demanded, from whence the next night he was ſafely convey'd by his Relations, and friends. The People having ſatiated themſelves upon the Blood of thoſe two, the peace was concluded; the Duke to depart ſafely himſelf, and all that belong'd to him, for which he was to renounce all his Claim and Authority in *Florence*, and to ratify his renunciation when he came out of the *Florentine* Dominions to *Caſentino*. The articles being agreed, on the VI, of *Auguſt*, attended by a multitude of Citizens, the Duke departed from *Florence*, and arriv'd at *Caſentino*, where he ratify'd the renuntiation, but ſo unwillingly, that had not *Conte Simone* threatn'd to carry him back to *Florence*, it had never been done. This Duke (as his actions demonſtrate) was covetous, cruel, difficult of acceſs, and inſolent in his anſwers. Not being ſo much affected with the kindneſs and benevolence of People, as with their ſervitude and ſervility; he choſe to be fear'd rather than belov'd. Nor was the ſhape and contexture of his Body leſs contemptible, than his manners were odious. He was very little, exceeding black, his beard long and thin, not a part about him, but concurr'd to make him deſpicable. In this manner the exorbitancies of his adminiſtration in ten Months time deptiv'd him of his Dominion, which had been plac'd upon him by the Counſels of ill Men. Theſe accidents happening thus in the City, all the Towns under the jurisdiction of *Florence*, took courage, and began to ſtand up for their liberty; ſo that in a ſhort time *Areſſo*, *Caſtiglione*, *Piſtoia*, *Volterra*, *Colle St. Gimignano* rebell'd, and the whole territory of *Florence* (after the example of its Metropolis) recover'd its freedom. After the Duke and his creatures were removed, the XIV. chief Citizens, and the Biſhop, conſulting together, thought it better to pacify the People with peace, than to provoke them again by War, and therefore pretended to be as well pleas'd with their liberty as their own. They ſent Embaſſadors therefore to *Arrezzo*, to renounce the Authority they had over them, and to enter into an aliance of amity with them, that though they might not hereafter command them as ſubjects, they might (upon occaſion) make uſe of them as friends. With the reſt of the Cities, they made as good terms as they could, retaining amity with them all. This reſolution being prudently taken, ſucceeded very happily; for in a few months *Arrezzo*, and all the other Towns return'd to their Obedience, and it is frequently ſeen, to decline, or renounce things voluntarily, is the way to gain them more readily, and with leſs danger and expence, than to purſue them with all the paſſion and impetuocity in the World. Affairs abroad being compos'd in this manner, they apply'd themſelves to a ſetlement at home, and after ſome debates and alterations betwixt the Nobility and the People, it was concluded the third part of the *Signoria* or Senat ſhould conſiſt of

The Duke expell'd.

His Character.

of the Nobility, and half the other Magistracies to be executed by them. The City (as is said before) was divided into six parts, out of which sixts, six *Signori* were chosen, (one out of every sixt) only by accident now and then their number was increas'd to XII. or XIII. and reduc'd again to six afterwards; at length they resolv'd to reform in that particular, either because the *Sesti* or sixts were ill distributed, or else (designing more Authority to the Nobility) they thought it convenient to increase the number of the Senators. Hereupon they divided the City into Quarters, and in every Quarter, three *Signori* were created, to superinspect it. The *Gonfaloniere della justitia*, and *Gonfalonieri* of the Popular Companies, were laid aside, and instead of them they created XII. *Buon Huomini*, and VIII, *Consiglieri*, four of each sort.

New reformation.

The Common Wealth being setled in this Method, might have continued quiet and happy, had the Grandees been contented to have fram'd themselves to such modesty of Conversation as is requisit in a Civil Government. But their practices were quite contrary; when they were but private Persons, no Body was good enough to be their Companions, and being in Office, scarce any too good to be their Subjects, every day producing new instances of their Arrogance and Pride, insomuch that the People were exceedingly troubl'd, to consider with what impatience and fury they had remov'd one Tyrant to make room for a thousand; In this manner things stood at that time, the insolence of one side, and the indignation of the other fermenting to that degree, that the Chief of the People (complaining of the Enormity of their great Ones, and their haughtiness to the People and to the Bishop) desir'd that he would be an instrument to restrain the Grandees to their share in the other Offices, and effect that the Senat might consist only of the People. The Bishop was naturally a good Man, but easie and unconstant; from that unconstancy of temper it was, that his associats first wrought upon him to favour the Duke of *Athens*, and afterwards perswaded him against him: in the late Reformation he appear'd highly for the Nobility, now upon the instance and solicitation of the Popular Citizens, he was as earnest for the People, and supposing to have found the same irresolution in other People, as was eminent in himself, he fancy'd himself able to prevail with the Nobility to consent. Hereupon convoking the XIV. (who were as yet in possession of their Authority,) with the best language he could use, he exhorted them to resign the dignity of the Senat to the People, if they bare any respect to the tranquility of the City, or their own safety and preservation. But these Words wrought a contrary effect in the minds of the Nobility: *Ridolfo de Bardi* reprehending him very smartly, upbraided the Levity and Treachery of his behaviour with the Duke, and concluded at last, that the Honors and imployments they were in, they had acquir'd with hazard, and would defend them with the same; and in this squable he and his Brethren left the Bishop, and went to the rest of the Nobility to communicate with them. The People were made acquainted with their answer on the otherside, and whilst the Grandees were providing what strength they could for the defence of their Senators, the Commons thought it no time to attend for Orders, but ran immediatly to their Arms and with them to the Palace, calling out to the Nobility to renounce. The Noise and tumult were great; the *Signori* found themselves forsaken; for the Grandees finding the People universally in Arms, durst not appear, but kept themselves close at home as obscurely as they could: whereupon the Popular Senators, endeavouring to pacifie the People, alledg'd that they were honest and good Men, and prevail'd (though with great difficulty) that they might be sent safe to their houses. The Senators of the Nobility being dismis'd, the Office was taken from the four Grand Counsellors, and transfer'd upon XII. of the People, and the eight Popular Senators which remain'd. They restor'd the *Gonfaloniere della Justitia*, and XVI. *Gonfalonieri* of the Companies of the People, and reform'd all Counsels in such manner, that the Government remained entirely in the People. When those exorbitancies happen'd, there was a great scarcity in the City, which occasion'd the discontents both of Nobility and People (the People for want of Victuals, the Nobility for want of Command) and gave incouragement to *Andrea Strozzi* to usurp upon their liberty. *Andrea* selling his Corn at a cheaper rate than his Neighbours, had greater resort of poor People to his House, which he observing, mounted on Horseback one morning, with several of the Rable at his heels, he cry'd out to the rest to take Arms, and in a few hours he got together more than 4000 Men, with whom he march'd to the Palace of the Senat, and demanded to have it open'd: but the Senators partly by threatning, and partly by force, disingag'd themselves of them, and afterward, when they were gone frighted them so with their Proclamations, that by little and little they dissolv'd, and went every Man to his Home, and left *Andrea* alone to escape as he could. Though this accident was rash, and had the common end of such desperate Attempts, yet it gave no little hopes to the Nobility of prevailing against the People, seeing the Refuse and Rascallity of the City had an animosity against them.

The Nobility depos'd.

them. That they might not ſlip ſo fair an occaſion, it was reſolv'd that they ſhould fortify themſelves with their aſſiſtance (if they could gain it) and recover by force, what by injuſtice was taken from them. And ſo bold they grew in their confidence of Victory, that they began to provide Arms publickly, to fortify their Houſes, and ſend to their friends in *Lombardy* for help and ſupplies. The People and their Senators were as buſie on the other ſide, they provided themſelves with what Arms they could get, and ſent to the *Saneſi*, and *Perugini* for relief. The Auxiliaries on both ſides being arriv'd, the whole City was immediatly in Arms. The Nobility had poſted themſelves in three places on this ſide the River *Arnus*, at the Palace of the *Cavicciulli* near St. *Johns*; at the Palaces of the *Pazzi*, and *Donati* near St. *Piero Maggiore*; and at the Palace of the *Cavalcanti* in the New-Market: thoſe of the Nobility who were on the other ſide of the River, had fortify'd the Bridges and Streets which were in the way to their Houſes. The *Nerli* poſſeſs'd themſelves of the *Ponte alla Carraia*; the *Treſcobaldi* and *Mannelli*, of St. *Trinita*; the *Roſſi* and *Bardi* were upon their guard at the old Bridge; and the *Rubaconte*. The People in the mean time form'd themſelves into a poſture under the *Gonfalone della Giuſtitia*, and the Enſigns of the People, and being drawn up in array, it was thought beſt immediately to fall on; the firſt which march'd were the *Medici* and *Rondinelli* who aſſaulted the *Cavicciulli* on that ſide which is towards the *Piazza de* S. *Giovanni*. The ſervice was very hot (great ſtones being tumbled upon them from above, and vollies of Arrows ſent liberally among them from below) and continued three hours compleat, but the numbers of the People increaſing, and no releif like to get near them, the *Cavicciulli* ſubmitted to their multitudes, and ſurrender'd. The People ſav'd the Houſe and the furniture, only they took away their Arms, and Commanded them to diſtribute and diſperſe themſelves into ſuch Popular Houſes as were their acquaintance & friends. The *Cavicciulli* being beaten from their Poſt, the *Pazzi* and *Donati* (being leſs powerful) were ſooner removed. The *Cavalcanti* were only remaining on that ſide of the River, yet more conſiderable than the other, both in reſpect of their numbers & ſituation. But they, ſeeing all the *Gonfalonieri* advancing againſt them, whereas three of them only had overpowr'd the reſt, ſurrenderd like their Neighbours without any remarkable defence: and now three parts of the City were in the Hands of the People, there was but one left in the Power of the Nobility, but more difficult and inacceſſible, by reaſon it was ſo ſecur'd by the River *Arno*, the Bridges and Avenues were of neceſſity to be clear'd before any good could be done, and they (as is ſaid before) were abundantly provided. The firſt of them that was aſſaulted was the old Bridge, which was as bravely defended, and the People repuls'd. Finding their further Attempts there would be but in vain, they try'd what could be done at the *Ponte Rubaconte*; but finding their entertainment no better, they left four *Gonfaloni*, and ſome other Enſigns to block up thoſe Paſſes, and march'd with the reſt to the *Ponte alla Carraia*. The *Nerli* had the defence of that Quarter, and behav'd themſelves Valiantly, yet their Bridge (as having no Towers) being weaker, or elſe overlaid with the Numbers of their Enemies, (which were much increas'd by the acceſſion of the *Capponi* and other Families about them) they were on every ſide oppreſs'd, forc'd from their *Barricadoes*, and conſtrain'd to retire. When they were Defeated, they advanc'd againſt the *Roſſi*, and from them againſt the *Treſcobaldi*, overwhelming them both, the whole Populace beyond the River being come in to their aſſiſtance. The *Bardi* was the only party remaining, but that ſo obſtinatly couragious, neither the fortune of their Comerades; the unanimity of the People againſt them, nor the impoſſibility of releif could prevail with them to ſurrender, but they would rather die fighting, or ſee their Houſes pillag'd or burn'd, than ſubmit themſelves quietly into the hands of their Enemies. And they defended themſelves, for though many times they were aſſaulted, both at the old Bridge, and the *Ponte Rubaconte*, the People were alwaies repuls'd, and with conſiderable loſs. There was in old time a Lane to paſs from the *Via Romana*, betwixt the Palaces of the *Pitti* to the Wall upon S. *Georges-hill*. To this Lane the People ſent ſix *Gonfalonieri* with Orders to fall upon the *Bardi* behind, who purſued them ſo effectually, the *Bardi* were diſheartned, and the People prevail'd; thoſe of the *Bardi* who were appointed for the keeping the Barricadoes, no ſooner hearing that their Houſes were attack'd, but they quitted their Poſts, and ran in in hopes to defend them. By this means the Barracads at the old Bridge were won, and the *Bardi* diſcomfitted, who (as many as could) betook themſelves to their heals, and were received by the *Quarateſi*, *Panzaneſi*, and *Mozzi*. The People (eſpecially the baſer ſort) greedy of Prey, plunder'd their Houſes; demoliſh'd their Caſtles; and when they had done, burn'd them all with ſuch inhumanity, as the greateſt Enemy the City had would have been aſham'd to have committed. The Nobility being gutterly ſubdued, the People took upon them the Government of the State, and becauſe it conſiſted of three ſorts (the more potent, the middle ſort and the baſe) it was ordain'd

The Nobility attempt to recover their Authority.

The People Arm againſt them.

dain'd that the more potent should have the Nomination of two Senators; the midle sort of three, and the meaner of three. The *Gonfaloniere* to be chosen (*Alternatim*) of the one and the other. Besides this, all the Old Laws against the Nobility were reviv'd and put in force, and to weaken them the more, many of them were mingl'd with the Common People. The destruction of the Nobility was so great at this time, and their party so irrecoverably debilitated, that not daring to take Arms again, against the People, they became pusilanimous and abject, which was the Occasion that *Florence* lost not only its Gentry but its Generosity also. From this depression of the Grandees, the City continued quiet to the Year 1353, in which interval happen'd the Famous Pestilence (so Eloquently celebrated by *Giovanni Boccacio*) in which there died in *Florence* above 96000 People. The first War the *Florentines* made, was against the *Visconti*, being provok'd by the Ambition of the Archbishop, who at that time was Prince of *Milan*: which War was no sooner finished, but new factions began in the City; for though the Nobility was so cow'd, and intimidated, there was no danger of them; yet fortune had her ways to create them new troubles by new and different dissentions.

The Nobility utterly depress'd.

THE

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

Book III.

THE great and natural animoſities betwixt the People and the Nobility, ariſing from an ambition in the one to command, and an averſion in the other to obey, are the ſprings and fountains of all the calamities incident to a City: and indeed there is ſcarce any thing dangerous or troubleſome to a Common-wealth, but takes its original and nouriſhment from their diverſity of humour. This was it which kept *Rome* divided. This was it (if it be lawful to compare great things with little) which kept *Florence* divided, though in each City with different effects. For, in *Rome*, the enmity betwixt the people and the Nobility was determined by Expoſtulation and Reaſon; in *Florence*, by the Sword. In *Rome*, thoſe things were ſetled and compos'd by Law, which, in *Florence*, were ſcarce done by the ſlaughter and baniſhment of many of their beſt Citizens. *Rome* increaſed ſtill in its Military Vertue; but that in *Florence* was utterly exhauſt. From a primitive equality of its Citizens, *Rome* was brought to an immenſe inequality: whereas *Florence*, on the contrary, from a vaſt inequality, was reduced to a ſtrange equality. Which diverſity of effects muſt have certainly proceeded from diverſity in their deſigns. The people of *Rome* deſired no more than to ſhare and communicate with the Nobility in the great Offices of the City. The people of *Florence* not only deſired, but fought and contended to have the Government to themſelves, with perfect excluſion to the Nobility: and the deſires of the *Romans* being more reaſonable, their importunity was the more ſupportable by the Nobles, ſo that they condeſcended without coming to blows; and after ſome ſmall controverſy and diſpute, it was concluded a Law ſhould be made, by which the people ſhould be ſatisfied, and their Dignities preſerved to the Nobility.

On the other ſide, the demands of the people of *Florence* were extravagant and unjuſt; upon which ſcore the Nobility preparing for their defence, their differences determined in baniſhment and bloud: and the Laws which enſued were fram'd more to the advantage of the Victor, than the benefit of the Publick. Hence it proceeded, that the ſucceſs of the people in *Rome*, rendred that City more potent and conſiderable; for the people being admitted to the adminiſtration of the Magiſtracy, Armies, and Empire, equally with the Nobles, they became inſpir'd with the ſame Vertue and Magnanimity as they: and as their Vertue increaſed, their Power increaſed with it.

But in *Florence* the people prevailing, deveſted the Nobility of their Authority; and if they had a mind to recover it, it was neceſſary by their converſation and behaviour not only

to be, but to profeſs themſelves like the people. And this was the cauſe of the changing their Arms, the variation of their Titles, and Families, which was frequent in thoſe times among the Nobility, to recommend them to the Commons, and make them paſs amongſt them: ſo that the Eminency of their Arms, and the Generoſity of their minds, (for both which the Nobility was formerly famous) was ſpent and expir'd, and not to be reviv'd in the people, where the leaſt ſpark of it was not to be found; which rendered *Florence* every day more abject and baſe. And whereas *Rome*, tranſported with its own Virtue, grew to that height of Pride, that it could not ſubſiſt longer without a Prince. *Florence* was reduced to that paſs, that a wiſe Legiſlator might have formd the government according to what ſcheme and model he pleaſed. All which, by peruſing of the preceding books, will be obvious to any body. Having ſhewn therefore the foundation of *Florence*; the original of its Liberty; the occaſion of its Diſſention; and how the factions of the Nobility and people concluded with the Tyranny of the Duke of *Athens*, and the deſtruction of the Nobility: it remains now, I ſhould diſcourſe of the Emulations betwixt the people and the multitude, and the ſeveral accidents which they produced.

Emulation betwixt the middle and the meaner ſort of people.

The power of the Nobility being depreſs'd, and the War with the Arch-Biſhop of *Milan* at an end; there appeared no proſpect of future contention in *Florence*: But the ill fate of our City, and the ill conduct of their Affairs, ſuffered a new Emulation to ſpring up (betwixt the Families of the *Albizi* and *Ricci*) which produced as great diviſion in the Town, as was at firſt betwixt the *Buondelmonti* and the *Uberti*, and afterwards betwixt the *Cerchi* and *Donati*. The Popes (who had then their reſidence in *France*) and the Emperors who reſided in *Germany*, to make good their reputation in *Italy*, had many times, upon ſeveral occaſions, ſupplied us with multitudes of Souldiers of all Nations, *Engliſh*, *Dutch*, and *Britains*. The Wars ended, and they out of pay, being Souldiers of Fortune, they were conſtrain'd to make bold ſometimes with one Prince, and ſometimes with another; and force them to contribution. In the year, 1353, it happened one of the Companies came into *Tuſcany*, (under the Command of Monſieur *Reale* of *Provence*) and put the whole Country into a fear: whereupon the *Florentines* not only made publick proviſion of men, but ſeveral private Citizens (and the *Albizi* and *Ricci* among the reſt) furniſhed themſelves with Arms for their proper defence. There was a mortal hatred betwixt theſe two Families, each of them aſpiring at the Government, and conſpiring the deſtruction of the other. However, as yet they were not come to Hoſtility; only they claſh'd, and interfer'd in their Counſels, and in the executions of the Magiſtracy. But upon this occaſion, the City being arm'd, there happen'd a quarrel, by accident, in the old Market-place; to which the people, that were near, flock'd, as they do on all ſuch occaſions. To the *Ricci* it was reported the *Albizi* had fallen upon ſome of their Family. To the *Albizi*, that the *Ricci* were come out in defiance of them. Hereupon the whole City got together; and no ſmall difficulty it was to the Magiſtrate to reſtrain either of the Families, or to put an end to a Conflict which was begun by chance, without the fault or contrivance of either. This accident, though meerly contingent, reviv'd their animoſity, and put them both upon deſigns of increaſing their Parties. And becauſe, by the ruine of the Nobility, the Citizens were reduced to ſuch an equality, that the Magiſtrates were become more venerable than formerly; they reſolved both of them to advance their intereſt rather by ordinary means, than private violence. We have declar'd before, how, after the Victory of *Charles* the Firſt, the *Guelfs* were created Magiſtrates; and great authority given them over the *Ghibilin* Faction: which authority and preheminence, time, accident, and their new diviſions had ſo far enervated, that the *Ghibilins* were grown into the Government, and exerciſed the principal Offices as well as the *Guelfs*. *Uguccione de Ricci* being at that time head of that Family, prevail'd to have the Laws againſt the *Ghibilins* renewed: to which Faction, it was ſuppos'd by many, the *Albizi* were inclin'd; whoſe Original being anciently from *Arezzo*, they tranſplanted from thence, and ſetled in *Florence:* ſo that *Uguccione* deſign'd by the renovation of thoſe Laws, to render that Family incapable of any great Office; providing thereby, that it ſhould be criminal for any perſon deſcended from the *Ghibilins*, to exerciſe the Magiſtracy. This practice of *Uguccione* was diſcovered to *Piero*, Son of *Philippo de gli Albizi*, who reſolved to connive at it; preſuming he ſhould declare himſelf a *Ghibilin*, if he oppoſed it. Theſe Laws, though renewed by the prevalence, and ambition of the *Ricci*, ſubſtracted nothing from the reputation of the *Albizi*, but were the foundation of many miſchiefs. Nor indeed can a Republick make any Law ſo pernicious, as a Law of *retro*-ſpection. *Piero* having rather promoted, than reſiſted thoſe Laws; that which his enemies intended as an impediment, proved a means and occaſion of his preferment: for, being made the chief perſon to *ſuper*-inſpect the execution of thoſe Laws, he exerciſed more authority than before; and became the only favourite of the Faction of the *Guelfs*. And, becauſe

becauſe in theſe Laws there was no definition of a *Ghibilin*, nor no Magiſtrate deputed to diſcover them, they were of little importance; only the Captains were appointed to inquire them out, and to admoniſh them, that they were not to take the Magiſtracy upon them; if they did, they ſhould be liable to a penalty. Whereupon, thoſe who were afterwards incapacitated for the Magiſtracy, were called *Ammoniti*. But, at length, the Captains growing bold and audacious in their office, without any regard whether they were conſcious or not; they admoniſhed who they pleaſed, as their avarice or animoſity directed them. The *Ammoniti*.

So that from the year, 1357, (in which this Law was renewed) to the year, 1366, there were more than 200 Citizens admoniſhed. By which means, the Captains, and the Faction of the *Guelfs* were grown great and conſiderable; eſpecially *Piero de gli Albizi*, *Lapo da Caſtiglionchio*, and *Carlo Strozzi*, for the fear of being admoniſhed, made all people reſpect them. And, though the inſolence of their proceedings diſguſted many more; yet none look'd upon it with ſo much indignation as the Family of the *Ricci*, who had been the occaſion of that diſorder, which was not only like to be the ruine of the Common-wealth, but the promotion and advancement of their Enemies, quite contrary to what they deſign'd. *Vguccione* therefore (being one of the Senate, to put an end to thoſe inconveniences which he by accident had created) obtain'd a new Law; that to the ſix Captains, three more ſhould be added; two of them to be choſen out of the inferior Mechanicks: and prevail'd that the *Ghibilins* ſhould not be convicted but by 24 of the *Guelfs*, deputed particularly to that office. For the time, theſe Laws in ſome meaſure tempered the exorbitance of the Captains, ſo as their admonitions loſt much of their terror; and if any, they were but few that were admoniſhed. Notwithſtanding the emulation betwixt the *Albizi* and *Ricci* continued; their leagues, practices, and conſultations going on with more eagerneſs, as their fury ſuggeſted. In this diſtraction the City continued from the year, 1366, to the year, 1371; at which time the *Guelfs* recovered their power.

In the Family of the *Buondelmonti*, there was a Gentleman called *Benchi*; who, for his Gallantry in the Wars againſt the *Piſans*, was prefer'd to be one of the people; and by that means qualified to be a Senator. But when he expected to be admitted into the Senate, a Decree was made, that no perſon of Noble Extraction, that was become one of the people, ſhould be received into the Senate. This Decree was highly offenſive to *Benchi*, who, upon conſultation with *Piero de gli Albizi*, reſolved with his admonitions to depreſs the meaner ſort of the people, and make themſelves Governors of the City. And indeed, by his influence upon the Nobility, and *Piero*'s upon the wealthieſt of the Citizens, the Faction of the *Guelfs* began to grow more conſiderable: for with their new models and regulations they ordered things ſo, that the Captains and 24 Citizens were wholly at their diſpoſing; their admonitions exerciſed with as much audacity as formerly; and the houſe of the *Albizi* (being head of that Faction) increaſed exceedingly. The *Ricci* in the mean time were not behind hand in uſing all their intereſt and friends to obſtruct their deſigns; ſo that every one lived in great apprehenſion, as fore-ſeeing their deſtruction was approaching. Whereupon, many Citizens, out of affection to their Country, aſſembled in S. *Piero Scheraggio*; and having diſcourſed of their diſorders among themſelves, they went afterwards to the Senate, to whom, one of the moſt eminent among them, made this harangue.

"Moſt Magnificent Lords; we have many of us doubted, whether to aſſemble by private "order, (though upon publick occaſion) might not be offenſive, and render us remarkable "for our preſumption, and puniſhable for our ambition. But when we conſidered, that "daily, without the leaſt caution or regard, many Citizens do meet, and confer; not for "any benefit to the Common-wealth, but in purſuit of their own private deſigns: We "preſum'd, that if they were permitted to meet, and conſpire againſt the peace of their "Country, without diſpleaſure to your Lordſhips; thoſe whoſe deſign was nothing but its "preſervation and proſperity, needed not to fear your reproof. If therefore we have not "incurr'd your Lordſhip's diſfavour, we are not much ſolicitous what others judge of us; "becauſe we find they are as indifferent what we think of them. The love we bear to "our Country, moſt Magnificent Lords, was that which aſſembled us at firſt, and now preſents us before you, to remonſtrate our diſtractions; (which (though too great) encreaſe "daily upon our hands,) and to offer our utmoſt aſſiſtance to remove them. How difficult "ſo-ever the Enterpriſe may appear, we cannot diſpair of ſucceſs; if laying aſide private "reſpects, you would be pleaſed with publick force to exert your authority. The corruption of the other Cities in *Italy*, has vitiated ours: for, ſince *Italy* freed it ſelf from the "yoke of the Empire, all the Towns (wanting their former reſtraint) flew out into extreams, "and ordain'd Laws and Governors, not as free men, but as people divided into Factions. "From this Fountain all our miſeries, all our diſorders do ſpring. In the firſt place, no "friendſhip nor integrity is to be found among the Citizens, unleſs among thoſe whoſe The Citizens Oration to the Senate.

"wickedneſs makes them faithful, having been formerly engaged together in ſome villainous "action, either againſt their Neighbour, or Country. Religion, and the fear of God, is ut- "terly extinguiſhed. Promiſes and Oaths are binding no farther than they are profitable; "and uſed not for a tye, but a ſnare, and as a means to facilitate their cheats, which are al- "waies more honourable, by how much their ſucceſs is leſs difficult and dangerous. Hence "it is, that vitious and miſchievous men are commended for their induſtry; and good "men, which are innocent and quiet, are reckoned for ſots. And certainly, as there is no "ſort of corruption but may be found in *Italy*, ſo there are no ſort of people more unhap- "pily adapted to receive it. The young men are idle, the old men laſcivious; all ſexes, all "ages, all places full of licentious bruitality above the correction of the Laws. Hence "ſprings that avarice among the Citizens; and that ambition, not of true glory, but of "diſhonourable preferment; which, being accompanied with hatred, enmity, ſchiſm, and "diſſention, are commonly followed by executions, baniſhments, affliction of good men, "and exaltation of evil: for good men depending upon their innocence, and not looking "abroad for any thing extraordinary, either to advance, or defend themſelves, do too often "miſcarry without either, and become the ſad objects of the cruelty of Uſurpers. This "creates inclination to parties, and increaſes their power; ill people ſiding for covetouſ- "neſs, ambition, revenge, or ſome other ſiniſter end; and good people for fear: and that "which renders our condition more deplorable, is, to behold the Contrivers and Ring- "leaders of all, (as if a word could make them innocent, and conſecrate the iniquity of "their actions) gilding, or rather decking over their ill deſigns with ſome Illuſtrious Title: "for, being all enemies to liberty, let them pretend as they pleaſe, either to defend an Opti- "macy, or Populacy, the reſult muſt be deſtruction: for the fruit they expect from their "Victory, is not the honour of having delivered their Country, but the ſatisfaction of ha- "ving maſtered their enemies, and uſurped the dominion to themſelves: and being arrived "at that height, what is there ſo unjuſt, what is there ſo cruel, what is there ſo ravenous as "they? Hence-forward Laws are made, not for publick benefit, but their private advan- "tage: hence-forward War, and Peace, and Amity is concluded; not for common honour, "but particular humor. And if the other Cities of *Italy* are repleat with theſe diſorders, "ours is much more: Our Laws, our Statutes, and Civil Ordinances, are made according to "the ambition and capricio of the Conqueror; and not according to the true intereſt of "people that would be free: whence it follows, that one Faction is no ſooner extinguiſhed, "but another ſucceeds: for that City which would maintain it ſelf by Faction rather than "by Law, can never be quiet: when one party prevails, and depreſſes its rival beyond the "power of oppoſition, it ſub-divides of neceſſity, and falls out with it ſelf; and then all "goes to wrack, the people not being able to defend themſelves with thoſe private Laws "which were made at firſt for their preſervation. That theſe things are true, the ancient "and modern diſſentions in our own City can ſadly demonſtrate. When the *Ghibilins* "were deſtroyed, it was every mans judgement the *Guelfs* would have lived honourably and "quietly a long time after: and yet it was not long before they divided into the Factions "of the *Neri*, and *Bianchi*: when the *Bianchi* were over-powred, new parties aroſe, and "new troubles attended them; ſometimes fighting in behalf of the Exiles, and ſometimes "quarrelling betwixt the Nobility and People; and (to give that to others, which either "we could not, or would not poſſeſs quietly our ſelves) committing our liberty ſometimes "to King *Robert*, ſometimes to his Brother, and at laſt to the Duke of *Athens*; never fixing "or repoſing in any Government; as not being agreed to live free, nor contented to be ſer- "vile. Nay, ſo much was our State diſpos'd to diviſion, that rather than acquieſce in the "adminiſtration of a King, it proſtituted it ſelf to the regiment of an *Agobbian*, of mean "and ignominious Extraction. The late Duke of *Athens* cannot be mentioned with any "honour to this City; yet his inſolence and tyranny may make us wiſer for the future. "Being in Arms at his expulſion, we fell to it among our ſelves, and fought with more "fury one againſt another, than we had ever done before; till at length the Nobility was "overcome, and at the mercy of the people: and it was the general opinion, (their inſup- "portable pride and ambition being taken down) there could be no more faction or troubles "in *Florence*: but we have found to our coſt, how falſe and fallacious mans judgment is. "The pride and ambition of the Nobility was not extinct, but tranſmigrated into the "people; who, by degrees, grew as impatient for authority as they; and having no other way "to attain it, but by domeſtick diſſention, they reviv'd the obſolete names of *Guelfs*, and "of *Ghibilins*; which it had been happy for this City never to have known. And, that "nothing which is humane, may be perpetual and ſtable; it is the pleaſure of the Heavens, "that in all States or Governments whatſoever, ſome fatal Families ſhould ſpring up for "their ruine and deſtruction. Of this, our City can afford as many, and as lamentable in-

"ſtances

"ſtances as any of her neighbours; as owing its miſeries not only to one or two, but ſeve-
"ral of thoſe Families: as firſt, the *Buondelmonti* and *Uberti*; next, the *Donati* and the
"*Cerchi*; and now, the *Ricci* and *Albizi*, (a ſhameful and ridiculous thing.) We have not
"enumerated our diviſions, nor deduc'd our ill cuſtoms ſo high, to upbraid or to diſcourage
"you by them; but rather as a memorial of their cauſes, to ſhew that they are in our me-
"mory as well as yours; and to exhort you by their example, not to be diffident or timerous
"in correcting them. For in thoſe daies the power of the Nobility was ſo great, and their
"alliances ſo conſiderable; the Laws and Civil Magiſtrates were too weak to reſtrain them:
"but now the Emperor having no power, the Pope no influence; all *Italy*, and particular-
"ly this City, reduc'd to ſuch a parity, as to be able to govern our ſelves; where is the diffi-
"culty? What impediment remains, why this Common-wealth (in ſpight of all examples
"to the contrary) may not only be united, but reform'd and improv'd by new Laws and
"Conſtitutions, were your Lordſhips diſpoſed to create them. To which good work, we
"do moſt humbly importune you, not out of private paſſion, ſo much as publick compaſſion
"for our Country. Our corruption is great, and 'tis you only can correct the rage, and
"expel the contagion that ſpreads and luxuriates among us. The diſorders of our Ance-
"ſtors are not imputable to the nature of the men, but to the iniquity of thoſe times;
"which being now altered, gives this City fair hopes, by the inſtitution of better Laws, to
"better its fortune; whoſe malignity is eaſily to be overcome, by a prudent reſtraint of am-
"bition; a ſeaſonable inhibition of ſuch cuſtoms as propagate Faction; and a diſcreet
"election and adherence to ſuch things as are compatible with our freedom. And better it
"is you do it now legally of your ſelves, than by deferring it, to divert that office upon the
"people, and make them do it by force.

The *Signori* mov'd then by theſe arguments, (which they had fram'd to themſelves before) and by their authority and encouragement afterwards, commiſſionated 56 Citizens to ſuperintend for the ſafety of the Common-wealth. True it is, many men are more proper to preſerve good Laws, than to make them; and theſe Citizens imployed themſelves more in extirpating the preſent Factions, than providing againſt new; by which means they ſucceeded in neither: for not taking away the occaſion of the new; and one of the preſent Factions being more potent than the other, it could not be done without great danger to the Common-wealth. However, they depriv'd three of the Family of the *Albizi*, and as many of the *Ricci* of all Magiſtracy (unleſs of the *Guelfiſh* party) for three years; in which number, *Piero de gli Albizi*, and *Uguccione de Ricci* were two. They prohibited all Citizens for coming into the Palace, unleſs the Senate was ſitting. They decreed, that in caſe of Battery, or unjuſt interruption in the poſſeſſion of their Eſtates, it ſhould be lawful to accuſe any man (though of the Nobility) to the Council, and to make them anſwer to their Charge. Theſe Laws had greater reflection upon the *Ricci* than the *Albizi*; for though they were equally intended, the *Ricci* ſuffered moſt by them: *Piero* indeed was ſhut out of the Palace of the *Signori*; but at the Palace of the *Guelfs* (where his authority was great) his entrance was free; and though he and his Comrades were forward enough in their admonitions before, they were much forwarder now, and new accidents occur'd to make them yet worſe. *Gregory* XI. was Pope at that time, whoſe reſidence being at *Avignon*, he governed *Italy* by Legates, (as his Predeceſſors had done before him.) Theſe Legates being proud and rapacious, had brought great calamity upon ſeveral of the Cities. One of theſe Legates being at that time in *Bologna*, took the advantage of a ſcarcity which was in *Florence*, and reſolved to make himſelf Lord of *Tuſcany*: to which end, he not only omitted to ſupply the *Florentines* with proviſions, but to deprive them utterly of all other relief, as ſoon as the ſpring appeared, and gave opportunity for his motion, he invaded them with a great Army, hoping they would be eaſily conquered, becauſe they were both famiſhed, and diſarmed: and poſſibly his deſign might have taken, had not his Army been mercenary, and corrupt: for the *Florentines* having no other weapons to defend themſelves, betook themſelves to their bags, and paid his Army 130000 *Florins* to draw off. To begin a War, is in any mans power; but, alas, no body can end one. This War was commenc'd by the ambition of the Legate, but proſecuted by the indignation of the *Florentines*; who entred into an immediate League with Monſieur *Barnabo*, and all the Cities which were at enmity with the Church. To manage it, they created eight Citizens, whom they inveſted with abſolute authority of proceeding without appeal, and diſburſing without account. This War againſt the Pope, though *Uguccione* was dead, reviv'd thoſe who had followed the fortunes of the *Ricci*, who in oppoſition to the *Albizi*, had favoured *Barnarbo*, and appeared againſt the Church; and the rather, becauſe the eight were all enemies to the *Guelfs*: whereupon *Piero de gli Albizi*, *Lapo da Caſtiglionochio*, *Carlo Strozzi*, and others, united to defend themſelves againſt their adverſaries. And while the eight great Citizens were imployed

New Reformation.

Gregory XI. holds his Reſidence at *Avignon*.

New Commiſſion for the management of the War.

ployed in the management of the War, and they in their admonitions; the War continued three years, till that death of the Pope. However, it was carried on with ſo univerſal ſatisfaction, that the Eight were continued yearly in their Office, and got the Title of *Santi*; notwithſtanding they had ſequeſtred the riches of the Churches, forc'd the Clergy to the execution of their Functions, and deſpiſed the cenſures of the Pope. So much did the Citizens at that time prefer the advantage of their Country, before the quiet of their Conſciences: and ſo earneſt were they to make it appear to the Church, that, as when they were friends, they had power to defend it; ſo now being enemies, they were as able to diſtreſs it; having put all *Romagna*, *la Marca*, and *Perugia*, into rebellion. But, though they were able to maintain War, at this rate, againſt the Pope, they could not ſo well defend themſelves againſt their Captains and Factions. The indignation and hatred the *Guelfs* had conceived againſt the Eight, augmented their inſolence; and they affronted them as well as the reſt of the chief of the Citizens. Nor was the arrogance of the Captains inferior to the inſolence of the *Guelfs*; they had made themſelves more formidable than the *Signori*; and men went with more awe and reverence to their Houſes, than to the Senators Palace: inſomuch, that not an Embaſſador was ſent to *Florence*, but he received Audience from, and had particular commiſſion to the Captains. Pope *Gregory* being dead, this City had no more Wars abroad; yet, at home, it was in great confuſion: the imperiouſneſs of the *Guelfs* was grown inſupportable, and no way vilible to ſuppreſs them: it was judged therefore neceſſary to take Arms, and commit the ſuperiority to the deciſion of Fortune. On the *Guelfs* ſide there were all the ancient Nobility, and the greateſt part of the more powerful Citizens; of whom, as (we have ſaid) *Lapo*, *Piero*, and *Carlo* were the chief. On the other ſide, were all the inferior ſort of the people headed by the Eight, and aſſiſted by *Georgio Scali*, *Tomaſo Strozzi*, the *Ricci*, the *Alberti*, and the *Medici*. The reſt of the multitude (as it happens alwaies in ſuch caſes) joyned with the diſcontents. The power of their adverſaries ſeemed very conſiderable to the *Guelfs*; and their danger great, if any Senate ſhould prove their enemies, and go about to deſtroy them: deſirous to prevent it, they aſſembled together; where, examining the ſtate and condition of the City, they found the perſons which had been admoniſhed, were ſo numerous, that they had thereby diſobligʼd moſt of their Citizens, and made them their enemies. They could propoſe no other remedy; but as they had degraded them of their honours, ſo to baniſh them the City, ſeize upon the Senators Palace by force, and conſtrain the whole Town to come over to their ſide, according to the example of the *Guelfs* their Predeceſſors; whoſe quiet and ſecurity was to be attributed wholly to their baniſhing their adverſaries. As to the deſign, all of them agreed; but they differed about the time. It was in the year, 1377, in the month of *May*, when *Lapo* conceiving it unſafe to defer; acquainted them that delaies were dangerous, eſpecially to them; conſidering, that in the next Senate *Salveſtro de Medici* might be choſen *Gonfaloniere*, who was a known enemy to their Sect. *Piero de gli Albizi* was of another ſentiment, and thought it beſt to protract; in reſpect that more force would be neceſſary, which were not to be got together privately; and to raiſe them publickly, was to run themſelves into palpable danger. His judgment therefore was, that they ſhould have patience till St. *John*'s day, which was at hand; at which time, in regard it was one of the greateſt Feaſtivals, and great reſort would come to the City of courſe, they might convey in what numbers they pleaſed, without danger of diſcovery. And to obviate their apprehenſion of *Salveſtro*, he propoſed to have him admoniſhed; and if that would not do, to put the change upon him, by ſome fraud or artifice in the imborſation; and foiſt in ſome other of the Colledg of his quarter, to defeat him ſecurely of that Office. This laſt opinion being approved, it was reſolved to put off; though *Lapo* conſented unwillingly, urging, that delay was uncertain; that no time can, in all circumſtances, be convenient; and that he who expects a perfect opportunity, ſeldom attempts any thing; and when he does, it turns commonly to his own diſadvantage. However, they proceeded to admoniſh him, but could not hinder *Salveſtro*. And, for the change, the Eight had got an inkling of that, and took care to prevent it; ſo that *Salveſtro* was drawn for *Gonfaloniere* by *Alamanno de Medici*. Being of a Noble popular Family, he could not endure that the people ſhould be oppreſſed by the power of a few great perſons; reſolving therefore with himſelf, to put a period to their inſolence: ſeeing he was favoured by the people, and back'd by ſeveral of the principal Citizens; he communicated his deſigns with *Benedetto Alberto*, *Tomaſo Strozzi*, and *Georgio Scali*; all of them concurring in the plot, and ingaging their aſſiſtance. Upon this they form'd a Law privately, whereby the *Ordini della Giuſtitia* againſt the Grandees were reviv'd, the authority of the *Capitani di parte*, retrench'd; and the *Ammoniti* readmitted to the Magiſtracy. And, becauſe it was beſt to propoſe and enact it at one time, if it were poſſible; (for it was firſt to be preſented to the Colledges, and afterwards debated

1377.

A Conſpiracy of the *Guelfs*.

The Conſpiracy defeated.

ted in the Councils,) *Salveſtro* being in his Office, (which, for the time, is, as it were, Prince of the City) he cauſed a Colledg and Council to be called both together in one morning; and coming in perſon to the Colledg, (which were none of his friends) he propoſed the Law to them which he had prepared; but it was rejected as an innovation, and he could not prevail to have it paſs'd. *Salveſtro*, ſeeing himſelf defeated in his firſt practice to obtain it, pretended ſome neceſſity to go forth; and, without being perceived, ſlip'd away to the Council; where, having placed himſelf ſo as he might be heard and ſeen by the whole Aſſembly, he told them as follows:

The Speech of *Salveſtro de Medici.*

"That, being made *Gonfaloniere*, he did not think he had been deſign'd for the Cogni-
"zance and determination of private Cauſes, (which have their peculiar Judges) but to
"ſuperintend the State, to correct the inſolence of the Grandees, and to moderate and rectifie
"ſuch Laws as were found prejudicial, nay, deſtructive to the Common-wealth. That in
"both caſes he had been diligent to the utmoſt; and imployed himſelf with all poſſible in-
"duſtry: but the perverſneſs and malevolence of ſome men was ſo untractable, and con-
"trary to his good deſigns; they did not only hinder him from perpetrating any thing for
"the benefit of the publick; but they denied him their counſel, and refuſed for to hear
"him. Wherefore, finding it was not in his power to be any way beneficial to his Country;
"he knew not for what reaſon, or with what confidence he ſhould continue in an Office
"which either he did not really deſerve, or of which he was thought unworthy by others.
"For this cauſe his intention was to retire, and leave the people to the election of another,
"who might be more virtuous, or more fortunate than he.

And having ſaid, he departed from the Council towards his own houſe. Thoſe of the Council, who were privy to the deſign, and others, deſirous of novelty, raiſed a tumult thereupon; to which, the Senators and Colledges immediately reſorted; and meeting their *Gonfaloniere*, they prevailed with him, partly with their authority, and partly with their intreaty, to return to the Council, which, by that time, was in great confuſion: many of the Noble Citizens had been threatened, and injuriouſly treated; and, among the reſt, *Carlo Strozzi* had been taken by the buttons, by an Artificer, and doubtleſly ſlain, had not the ſtanders-by interpoſed, and, with ſome difficulty, ſav'd him. But he which made the greateſt hubub, and put the City in Arms, was *Benedetto de gli Alberti*, who, from a window of the Palace, cry'd out aloud to the people, to Arm; upon which, the *Piazza* was fill'd with arm'd men immediately; and the Colledges did that out of fear, which they had denied upon requeſt. The Captains of the Parties had, in the mean time, got together what Citizens they could, to adviſe what was to be done againſt this Decree of the Senate. But when they heard of the tumult, and underſtood what had paſſed in Council, they all of them ſlunk back to their houſes. Let no man that contrives any alteration in a City, delude himſelf, or believe that he can either ſtop it when he will, or manage it as he pleaſes. *Salveſtro*'s intention was to have procur'd that Law, and ſetled the City. But it fell out quite otherwiſe; for their humours being ſtirr'd, every man was diſtracted: the ſhops ſhut up; the Citizens aſſaulted in their houſes: ſeveral removed their goods into the Monaſteries and Churches, to ſecure them; all people expecting ſome miſchief at hand. The whole Corporation of the *Arts*, met, and each of them made a *Sindic*. Hereupon the Priori call'd their Colledges, and were in Counſel a whole day together with the *Sindics*, to find out a way to compoſe their diſorders, to the ſatisfaction of all Parties; but, being of different judgments, nothing was agreed. The next day the *Arts* came forth with Enſigns diſplaid; which the Senate underſtanding, and doubting what would follow, they call'd a Counſel to prevent the worſt; which was no ſooner met, but the tumult increaſed, and the Enſigns of the *Arts* marched up into the *Piazza* with Colours flying, and ſtore of arm'd men at their heels. Thereupon to ſatisfie the *Arts*, and the multitude, and (if poſſible) to diſpel that clowd of miſchief which was impending; the Council gave general power (which, in *Florence*, is called *Balia*) to the Senators, Colledges, the Eight, the Captains of the Parties, and the *Sindics* of the *Arts*, to reform the State as they ſhould think moſt advantagious for the publick. Whilſt theſe things were in agitation; ſome of the Enſigns of the *Arts*, joyning themſelves with ſome of the rabble, (being ſtimulated by certain perſons, who were deſirous to revenge themſelves of ſome late injuries which they had received from the *Guelfs*) ſtole away from the reſt; went to the Palace of *Lapo da Caſtiglionchio*, broke into it, plundred it, and burned it. *Lapo*, upon intelligence of what the Senate had done, in contradiction to the orders of the *Guelfs*, and ſeeing the people in Arms, having no variety of choice, but either to hid, or to fly; he abſconded firſt in S. *Croce*, but afterwards fled away to *Caſentino*, in the diſguiſe of a Frier; where he was often heard to complain of himſelf, for having conſented to *Piero de gli Albizi*: and of *Piero*, for having protracted their attempt upon the Government till St. *John*'s day. *Piero* and *Carlo Strozzi*, upon the

The *Balia.*

firſt

first noise of the tumult, hid themselves only, presuming (when it was over) they had relations and friends enough to secure their residence in *Florence*. The Palace of *Lapo* being burn'd, (mischiefs being more easily propagated, than begun,) several other houses ran the same fate, either out of publick malice, or private revenge: and that the greedines and rapacity of their companions might, if possible, out-do theirs; they broke up the Goals, and set the prisoners at liberty: and, after this, they sack'd the Monastery of *Agnoli*, and the Convent *di S. Spirito*, to which, many Citizens had conveyed much of their goods. Nor had the publick Chamber escap'd their violence, had not the awe and reverence of one of the *Signori* defended it; who being on horse-back, with some persons in Arms attending him, opposed himself, in the best manner he could, against the fury of the people; which being appeased in some measure, either by the authority of the *Signori*, or the approach of the night, the next day the *Balia* indemnified the *Ammoniti*, with proviso, that for three years, they should not exercise any Magistracy in that City. They rescinded those Laws which were made in prejudice to the *Guelfs*. They proclaimed *Lapo da Castiglionochio*, and his accomplices, Rebels: after which, new Senators were chosen, and of them, *Luigi Guicciardini* was made *Gonfaloniere*. Being all look'd upon as peaceable men, and lovers of their Country, great hopes were conceived the tumult would have ceased: notwithstanding, the shops were not opened; the people stood to their Arms, and great Guards kept all over the City: so that the *Signori* entred not upon the Magistracy abroad, with the usual pomp, but privately within doors, and without any ceremony at all. These Senators concluded, nothing was so necessary nor profitable for the publick, at the beginning of their Office, as to pacifie the tumult: whereupon, by proclamation, they requir'd all Arms to be laid down; all shops to be opened; and all persons, who had been call'd out of the Country, to the assistance of any Citizen, to depart. They disposed Guards in several places of the Town; and ordered things so, that if the *Ammoniti* could have been contented, the whole City would have been quiet. But they not being satisfied to attend three years before they should be capable of Office, the *Arts*, in favour to them, got together again; and demanded of the Senate, that, for the future, no Citizen might be admonished as a *Ghibilin*, by either the Senate, the Colledge, the Captains of the Parties, the Consuls, or *Sindic's* of any *Art* whatsoever: requiring likewise, that new imborsation might be made of the *Guelfs*, and the old one be burn'd. Their demands were presently accepted, both by the Senate, and Counsels; supposing thereupon, their new tumult would have ceased. But those that are covetous, and impatient for revenge, are not to be satisfied with bare restitution. Such as desired disorder, to inrich and wreck themselves upon their enemies, perswaded the Artificers they could never be safe, unless many of their adversaries were banished, or destroyed. Which practices being remonstrated to the Senate, they caused the Magistrates of the *Arts*, and the *Sindic's*, to appear before them, to whom *Luigi Guicciardini* the *Gonfaloniere* spake in this manner:

Reformation again.

Luigi Guicciardini's Oration.

"If these Lords, and my self, had not long since understood the fortune of this City; "and observed, that its Wars abroad were no sooner determined, but it was infested with "new troubles at home; we should have more admired, and more resented the tumults "which have happened: but things that are familiar, carrying less terror along with them, "we have born the late passages with more patience; especially, considering we were not "at all conscious to their beginning; and had reason to hope they would have the same "end as former tumults have had, upon our condescention to their great, and their numerous "demands. But finding (to our sorrow) you are so far from composing your thoughts, or "acquiescing in what has been granted, that you are rather exasperated, and conspire new in-"jury against your fellow Citizens, and endeavour to banish them; we must needs say, the ig-"nobleness of your proceedings provokes us to displeasure. And certainly, had we imagin'd, "that in the time of our Magistracy, our City should have been ruin'd, either in siding with, "or against you, we should have declin'd that honour, and freed our selves from it, either "by banishment, or flight. But, supposing we had to do with people not utterly destitute "of humanity, and void of all affection to their Country; we willingly accepted of the "preferment, as hoping, by the gentleness of our deportment, to be too hard for your am-"bition and violence. But we see now, by unhappy experience, the mildness of our beha-"viour, and the readiness of our condescentions, do but inhanse and elate you, and spur "you on to more dishonourable demands. We say not this to disgust, but to inform you; "let others represent to you what will please; it shall be our way to remonstrate what is "profitable. Tell me (upon your words) what is there more that you can justly desire of "of us? You proposed to have the Captains of the Parties devested of their authority; it "is done. You mov'd, the old imborsations might be burn'd, and new ones decreed to "supply them; we consented. You had a mind the *Ammoniti* should be re-admitted to

"places

"places of honour and truſt; we granted it: Upon your interceſſion, we pardoned thoſe "who had burn'd houſes, and rob'd Churches; and, to ſatisfie you, have ſent ſeveral of our "principal Citizens into Exile. To gratifie you, the Grandees are circumſcrib'd with new "Laws; and all things done that might ſatisfie you: what end therefore will there be of "your demands? Or, how long will you abuſe the liberty you injoy? Do you not perceive, "that we can be overcome with more patience, than you can ſubdue us? What will be the "concluſion; or, whither will your diſſentions hurry this poor City? Can you have for-"got how *Caſtruccio*, (an inconſiderable Citizen of *Lucca*) taking advantage of the divi-"ſions, poſſeſſed himſelf of it? Do not you ſtill remember, that the Duke of *Athens*, from "a private perſon, became your Lord and your Sovereign; and all from our own differen-"ces at home? Whereas, when we were united, the Arch-Biſhop of *Milan*, nor the Pope "himſelf, were able to hurt us; but were glad (after ſeveral years War) to lay down "with diſhonour. Why then will you ſuffer your own diſcords (in time of Peace too) to "bring a City into ſlavery, which ſo many potent enemies, in time of War, were not able "to captivate? What can you expect from your diviſions, but ſervitude? What from the "goods you have, or ſhall hereafter take violently from your neighbour, but poverty? The "perſons you plunder, are they, who, by our care and appointment, ſupply the City "with all things; and if it be defeated of them, what can we do to ſuſtain it? What-ever "you gain, (being unjuſtly acquir'd) you can hardly preſerve: from whence, famine and "poverty muſt neceſſarily follow. Theſe Lords therefore, and my ſelf do command, and (if "if it be conſiſtent with our Dignity) intreat, and beſeech you, that you would compoſe "your ſelves for this once, and be content with our paſs'd condeſcentions; or, if they be "too little, and there remains ſtill ſomething to be granted; that you would deſire it ci-"villy, and not with the force and clamor of a tumult; and if your requeſt be juſt, you will "not only be gratified, but occaſion taken away from wicked men, to ruine your Country, "under your ſhelter and pretence.

Theſe words being true, had great influence upon the people, inſomuch, as they return'd their thanks to the *Gonfaloniere*; acknowledged he had behav'd himſelf like a good Lord to them, and a good Citizen to the City, and promiſed their obedience to what-ever he commanded. To break the ice, the *Signori* deputed two Citizens for each of the chiefeſt Offices, to conſult with the *Sindic's* of the *Arts*, what, in order to the publick good, was moſt fit to be reformed; and to report it to the Senate. But, whilſt theſe things were tranſacting, a new tumult broke out, which put the City to more trouble than the former. The greateſt part of the robbery, and late miſchief, was committed by the rabble, and raſcallity of the people; and of them, thoſe who had been moſt eminently miſchievous, apprehended, when the greater differences were reconcil'd, they might be queſtioned, puniſhed for the crimes they had committed, and (as it alwaies happens) be deſerted by thoſe very perſons who inſtigated them at firſt: to which was added, a certain hatred the inferior ſort of the people had taken againſt the richer Citizens, and the Principals of the *Arts*, upon pretence that they were not rewarded for the ſervice they had done, with proportion to their deſerts. For when, as in the time of *Charles* the Firſt, the City was divided into *Arts*, every *Art* had its proper Head and Governor, to whoſe juriſdiction, (in Civil caſes) every perſon, in the ſeveral *Arts*, were to be ſubject. Theſe *Arts* (as we ſaid before) were originally but XII, afterwards they increaſed to XXI, and grew to that power and authority, that, in a few years, they ingroſſed the whole Government of the City: and becauſe, among them, ſome were more conſiderable, and ſome leſs; they came, by degrees, to be diſtinguiſhed, and VII of them were call'd *Maggiori*, and XIV, *Minori*. From this diviſion, and the other reaſons aforeſaid, proceeded the arrogance of the Captains of the Parties; for thoſe Citizens who had anciently been *Guelfs*, (under whoſe Government thoſe Offices were alwaies preſerved) did ever indulge the chief and better ſort of the *Arts*; and diſcountenance the more inferior, and all that took their parts: hence it was, all the before-mentioned troubles and tumults were derived. But becauſe, in the ordinary Companies and Corporations of the *Arts*, there were many Trades (in which the meaner ſort of people were imployed) of no diſtinct and peculiar Company, but were incorporated with other Trades, as the quality of their imployments made them fit; it fell out, that when they were not ſatisfied with their work, or any other waies injured by their Maſters; they had no perſon to repair to for redreſs, but to the Magiſtrate of that Company of which they were ſworn; from whom, they conceived, they had not received that juſtice which ought to have been done them. Of all the Companies of the City, the Company of Clothiers was the greateſt, and had moſt of theſe ſort of people depending upon it; inſomuch, that being the firſt in wealth and authority, by the induſtry of its members, it maintain'd (and does ſtill) the greateſt part of the multitude. The baſer ſort of people therefore (both of this Company, and the reſt) were highly incenſed upon the foreſaid occaſi-

New troubles.

ons; and being excited, by fear of correction, for the pillaging and firing of the Palaces, they met many times in the night, to diſcourſe of what was paſs'd; and to admoniſh one another of the danger they were in; and to animate and unite them, one of the moſt daring, and moſt experienced among them, made this Speech:

The Speech of a Plebean.

"Were it now to be conſidered, whether we were immediately to take Arms; to burn, "and plunder the houſes of our fellow Citizens, and rob the Churches; I ſhould be one of "thoſe who ſhould think it worthy of further debate, and perhaps, prefer harmleſs poverty "before hazardous gain. But, ſince Arms are taken, many miſchiefs have been done; and "much prize has been got; it is (in my judgment) moſt natural, to adviſe which way our "gains are to be preſerved; and how we may beſt ſecure our ſelves againſt the ills we have "committed. I am certainly of opinion, if no man ſhould do you that ſervice, your own "neceſſity would adviſe you. You ſee the whole City full of complaints, and indignation "againſt us; the Citizens, frequent in their meetings; and the Senators perpetually with "the Magiſtrate. Be confident, 'tis to deſign againſt us; to contrive new waies, and to "contract new Forces to deſtroy us. It remains therefore upon us, to do two things; one "is, to provide, that we be not puniſhed for our paſs'd offences: the other, that we may "live with more liberty and ſatisfaction for the future. To juſtifie therefore our former "miſdeeds, in my thoughts, it is convenient to increaſe them with new; and by the artifice "of redoubling our miſchiefs, our conflagrations, and robberies, to allure and ingage more "companions to our Party. For, where many are guilty, none are puniſhed; though ſmall "faults are revenged, great ones are generally rewarded; and where the diſeaſe is epide-"mical, few people complain; an univerſal calamity being alwaies more ſupportable than a "private. So then, to multiply our miſdeeds, is the readieſt way of obtaining our pardon, "and prevailing for thoſe things which we believe conducive to our liberty: nor is there "any difficulty to diſcourage us; it ſeems to me, the enterpriſe is not only eaſie, but cer-"tain; becauſe thoſe who ſhould oppoſe us, are divided, and rich: their diviſions will give "us the Victory; and their riches (when we have got them) ſhall maintain it. Let not "the antiquity of their blood diſmay you, (though objected ſo inſolently.) All men having "the ſame original, are equally ancient; and nature has made no difference in their contex-"ture; ſtrip them naked, you are as well as they: dreſs them in your rags, and your ſelves "in their robes, and you will doubtleſs be the Nobles; for 'tis nothing but poverty and "riches that diſcriminates betwixt you. It troubles me, to think, there are many of you "unquiet in your conſciences, for what you have done; and reſolved to be guilty of no "more: if it be ſo, I was miſtaken in my judgment, and you are not the perſons I thought "you. Neither conſcience, nor diſgrace, ought at all to deter you; they that overcome, "(let the means be what they will) are never troubled with the diſhonour: and, for con-"ſcience, you ought not to be concern'd. Where the fear of famine, and death, and pri-"ſons, are ſo pregnant, there is no room for apprehenſions of Hell. Obſerve the waies "and progreſs of the World; you will find the rich, the great, and the potent, arrive at "all that wealth, and grandeur, and authority, by violence or fraud; and when once they "are poſſeſſed, you will ſee with what confidence and ſecurity they gild over the bruitality "of their uſurpations, with the unjuſt (but glorious) title of acqueſts. Obſerve, on the "other ſide, thoſe whoſe puſillanimity or ſottiſhneſs affrights them from thoſe courſes, what "becomes of them? they are choak'd up and conſumed in ſervitude and poverty: honeſt "ſervants, are perpetual ſervants: good men are alwaies badly provided for; the bold and un-"ſcrupulous, do ſooneſt free themſelves from bondage; and the moſt fraudulent and rapa-"cious, from indigence and diſtreſs. God and Nature have laid every mans fortune before "him; and we ſee men more naturally diſpos'd to rapine, than induſtry; to bad actions, "than good. Hence it is, we devour one another; and he that can do leaſt, goes alwaies "by the worſt. Force, therefore, is to be uſed, when occaſion is given; and, what fairer "opportunity can be offered by Fortune? The Citizens are divided; the Senate irreſolute; "the Magiſtrate frighted; ſo that before they can unite, and come to any reſolution, our "work will be done, and we be either abſolute Princes of the City, or Maſters of ſuch "Cantons, as will not only pardon us for what is paſs'd, but inable us to awe our enemies "for the future. I confeſs, this reſolution is dangerous, and bold; but where neceſſity ur-"ges, boldneſs is prudence; and danger in great things, was never conſidered by men of "the leaſt courage and gallantry. Thoſe enterpriſes which begin with danger, do end with "reward; and men never free themſelves from one peril, but by adventuring a greater. "Again, having priſons, and tortures, and death before our eyes, (as we have) it cannot "but be more hazardous to ſtand ſtill, than to look out for ſecurity: in the firſt, our deſtru-"ction is certain; in the other, contingent. How often have I heard you complain of "the avarice of your ſuperiors; and the injuſtice of your Magiſtrates? Now, in your "time,

"time, not only to free, but to advance your selves into a capacity of retaliating, and giving "them as much occasion of fearing you, as you have had of them. Time has wings, op- "portunity flies away; and when once pass'd, is never to be reclaim'd. You see our "enemies are preparing, let us prevent their preparation: who-ever begins first, is sure to "prevail, to the ruine of their enemies, and exaltation of themselves. Go on therefore "with courage, 'tis an enterprise will yield honour to many of us, but security to us "all.

Though their own propensity was too much, this speech push'd the people forward, with more impetuosity, to mischief; so that after they had drawn together what company they were able, they concluded to take Arms, and oblig'd themselves, by oath, to relieve one another, when any of them should fall under the correction of the Magistrate. Whilst they were in this manner conspiring against the Government, the Senators had notice of it from one, and having caused one *Simone* to be apprehended, he confessed the whole plot, and that the next day was intended for a tumult. Whereupon, fore-seeing the danger they were in, they assembled the Colledges, and such Citizens as sided with the *Sindic's* of the *Arts*, and laboured the preservation of the City. Before they could be got together, it was night; and the *Signori* were advised to consult with the *Consoli dell' Arti*, who agreed unanimously, that the whole City should Arm; and the *Gonfalonieri del Populo*, draw all the Companies, the next morning, into the *Piazza*. At the time when the Citizens met, and *Simone* was upon the Rack, one *Nicolada Friano* being in the Palace, to do something about the clock, returned with all speed to his house, put the whole neighbourhood into an uproar, and brought above a thousand arm'd men together into the *Piazza di Santo Spirito* in a moment. The alar'm increasing, came to the rest of the Conspirators, who immediately took Arms; and, in a short space, *San Piero maggiore*, and *San Lorenza*, (as they had appointed before) were full of arm'd men. The day being arriv'd, which was the 21 *th.* of *July*, in favour of the Senate, there were not above 80 men appeared in their Arms, and none of the *Gonfalonieri*; for they, having intelligence the whole City was in Arms, were affraid to stir out of their houses. The first party of the people which advanced to the *Piazza*, was that which had met at *San Piero maggior*; but the Forces which were drawn there before, did not remove. Not long after them, appeared the rest of the multitude, who, finding no resistance, with hideous noise, demanded their prisoners of the *Signori*; and not succeeding by threats, to gain them by force, they set fire to the Palace of *Luigi Guicciardini*, and burned it to the ground; whereupon, for fear of worse mischief, their prisoners were ordered to be delivered. When they had recovered their prisoners, they took the Standard *della Giustitia* from the *Essecutore*, burned many houses under it, and persecuted all people that they were angry with, whether upon publick, or private account; many Citizens, upon particular quarrels, conducting the tumult to the houses of their adversaries; it being sufficient, to cry out in the multitude, *To such an house, to such a man*; or for him that carried the Standard, to direct it to such a place. They burned the accounts and books of the Company of the Clothing Trade; and after they had done mischief good store, that they might accompany their exorbitance with some laudable action, they made *Salvestro de Medici*, a Knight, and as many more of their Partners, as the whole number amounted to 64, among which, there were *Benedetto*, and *Antonio de gli Alberti*; *Tomazo Strozzi*, and several others; some of which, received their honour much against their wills. In which accident, one thing is more than ordinarily remarkable; that those persons, some of them, whose houses were burned; were, the same day, knighted by the same persons which had burned them; so unconstant are the people, and so small the distance betwixt their kindness, and revenge; an experiment of which, was seen in their behaviour to *Luigi Guicciardini*, the *Gonfalonieri della Giustitia*. The Senators finding themselves abandoned by their Guards, by the chief of the *Arts*, and their *Gonfalonieri* themselves, were very much perplexed, no-body coming in to their assistance, as they were commanded; and, of the 16 *Gonfaloni*, there was only the Company of the Golden Lion, and two more, which appeared, and they staid not long in the *Piazza*; for, not finding themselves followed by their Brethren, they also returned to their houses: the Citizens, on the other side, seeing the fury of the multitude uncontroulable, and the Palace of the *Signori* deserted, some of them kept close in their houses; others thrust themselves into the crowd, thereby to secure their own houses, and their friends; by which means, the numbers of the people were much increased, and the power of the Senate extremely diminished. The tumult continued in this violence all day long; and, at night, there were above 6000 men together at the Palace of *Stephano*, behind the Church of S. *Barnaby*. Before day, they constrained the several *Arts* to send for their Ensigns; and having got them in the morning, they march'd with their Colours before them, to the Palace of the *Podesta*, who refusing

The people rise again.

fuſing to ſurrender; they fell upon it, and forced it. The Senate deſirous to compoſe things another way, perceiving nothing was to be done by force, called three Members of their Colledges, and ſent them to the Palace of the *Podeſta*, who found, that the heads of the people had been already in conſultation with the *Sindic's* of the *Arts*, and ſome other conſiderable Citizens, to reſolve what was fit to be demanded of the Senate: ſo that they returned in a ſhort time to the Senate, with four Deputies from the people, and theſe following propoſals. That the Clothing Trade might not, for the future, be ſubject to the Government of a forreigner; That three new Companies, or Corporations, ſhould be erected; one, to conſiſt of Carders, and Diers; another, of Barbers, Taylers, Shoomakers, and ſuch other Mechanicks; and the third, of the more inferior Trades, out of which Companies, two ſhould be choſen to ſit in the Senate; and three to ſit among the 14, which had the Government of the *Arti minori*, or inferior Trades. That the Senate ſhould provide Halls for theſe new Companies, where they might meet, and conſult about their affairs. That no perſon, of any of theſe Companies, ſhould be conſtrained to pay any debt under fifty Duckets, for the ſpace of two years. That no intereſt ſhould be paid out of the Banks, and only the principal to be reſtor'd. That all priſoners, and condemn'd perſons, ſhould be diſcharged. That all the *Ammoniti* ſhould be re-admitted to all honours. Many other things were demanded in behalf of their friends; and, on the contrary, as to their enemies, they inſiſted, that ſeveral of them might be impriſoned, and ſeveral admoniſhed. To give perfection to all, it was neceſſary they ſhould be ratified in the Counſel of the Commons; which was deferred till the next, becauſe two Counſels were not to be held in one day. In the mean time, the *Arts* ſeemed all of them to be content, and the people to be ſatisfied; having promiſed, as ſoon as their Laws and demands were confirmed, they would retire to their houſes. The next morning being come, and the Counſel of the Commons deliberating upon their demands; the voluble and impatient multitude were got together, and marching, with Enſigns diſplaid, into the *Piazza*, with ſo obſtreperous and dreadful a noiſe, as affrighted both the Counſel, and Senate: whereupon, *Guerriante Marignouli*, one of the *Signori*, (induced more by fear, than any private exception) went down, under pretence to ſecure the Gate below, and march'd off to his houſe. He could not, however, convey himſelf ſo privately away, but the Rabble diſcovered him, yet without any violence to him, only crying out, as he paſſed, that all the Senators ſhould leave the Palace; if not, they would burn their houſes, and knock their children on the head. By this time, the Law they urg'd, was concluded; the Senators returned to their Chambers; and the Counſel gone down, (not daring to go forth) were walking up and down the Court and the Cloyſters, diſpairing of the ſafety of the City, by reaſon of the bruitiſhneſs, and barbarity of the multitude, and the croſsneſs or puſillanimity of thoſe who might have either bridled or ſuppreſſed them. The *Signori* were likewiſe in no leſs doubt and confuſion, ſeeing themſelves not only forſaken by one of their own Members, but relieved by no-body, neither with intelligence, nor ſupplies. Whilſt they were in this heſitation, uncertain what they ought, or what they were able to do, *Tomazzo Strozzi*, and *Benedetto Alberti*, (prompted by private ambition, of being themſelves the laſt of the Senators which ſhould remain in the Palace, or elſe, becauſe it was really their judgment) perſwaded them to give way, to yield to the fury of the people, and retire privately, every man to his own houſe. This counſel being given by perſons who had been heads of the people, (though others ſeemed to approve it) diſpleaſed *Alamanno Acciaivoli*, and *Nicolo de Bene*, exceedingly, who (recollecting their courage) made anſwer; That, if others of the Senate had a mind to depart, they would not hinder them; but, for their parts, till the expiration of their authority permitted them, they were reſolved not to leave the Palace, but with the loſs of their lives. This difference redoubled the horror of the Senate, and the rage of the people: inſomuch, that the *Gonfaloniere*, chooſing to reſign his Office with ſhame, rather than retain it with danger, recommended himſelf to *Tomazzo Strozzi*'s protection, who took him out of the Palace, and conducted him to his houſe: in like manner, the reſt of the *Signori* departed one after another; and *Alamanno*, and *Nicolo*, (who were ſo magnanimous before, leſt they ſhould be thought more valiant than wiſe, got out alſo, and returned like the reſt; ſo that the Palace, remained in the hands of the people, and the eight Officers for the adminiſtrations of War, who had not as yet laid down their Commands. When the people made their entrance into the Palace, the Enſigns of the *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia*, was carried by one *Michaele di Lando*, a Carder of Wooll. This *Michaele* (without ſhooes on his feet, and ſcarce clothes on his back) being followed by a great rout, ran up to the top of the ſtairs, and being got within hearing of the place where the Senators ſate, he turned himſelf about to the multitude, and ſaid; *You ſee, Gentlemen, this Palace, and this City, is yours; how ſhall they be diſpoſed of, or, what is your pleaſure ſhall be done?*

The demands of the people.

Michaele di Lando.

To

To which, they universally replyed, it was their pleasure he should be *Gonfaloniere*, and govern the City as he thought best. *Michaele* accepted the Office, being a prudent and sagacious man, more obliged to Nature than Fortune; and the first thing he resolved, was, to compose the tumults, and settle the City. To hold the people imployed, and gain time for the digestion of his designs, he commanded them abroad, in search of one *Ser Nuto*; (who had been intended for Provost Marshal, by *Lapo da Castiglionochio*, and most of those who were about him, went away in his pursuit. To begin (then) his dominion with justice, as he had acquired it by Grace, he caused Proclamation to be made, that no man should dare to burn, or steal any thing for the future; and, to terrifie the more, he caused a Gallows to be set up in the *Piazza*: proceeding next to the reformation of the City, he turned out the *Sindic*'s of the *Arts*, and put new in their places; He deprived the *Signori*, and the Colledges, of their authority, and burned the bags of their Office. By this time the people had found *Ser Nuto*, brought him to the Palace, tied him up to the Gallows by one of his legs, and every one that was about him, having torn off a piece, in a moments time, there was nothing of him to be seen, but one of his feet. On the other side, the *Otto della Guerra*, (supposing the Government in them, upon the departure of the *Signori*) had designed new Senators to succeed them. But *Michaele* understanding it, sent to them to be gone out of the Palace, and to let them know, it should appear to all people, that he could govern *Florence*, without their counsel or assistance. After this, he assembled the *Sindic*'s of the *Arts*; and created four new Senators out of the inferior sort of people; two for the better, and two for the worser Trades. Moreover, he divided the State into three parts; one of them to relate to the new *Arts*; another to the less; and the third to the greater. He gave to *Salvestro de Medici*, the revenue of the shops upon the old Bridge; to himself, the *Podestaria* of *Empoli*; besides many other acts of beneficence to several Citizens, and friends of the people, not so much for their own sakes, but that they might be alwaies willing, and able to defend him. The people however, began to suspect, that *Michaele* was partial to the better sort; and to discern that they had not so much interest in the Government, as would be necessary for their safety. Whereupon, push'd forward by their accustomed insolence, they took Arms again, and came marching, with their Colours flying, to the *Piazza*, in a bravado, requiring the Senators to come down to the *Ringheria*, and deliberate upon certain new things they had to propose for their security, and good. *Michaele* was sensible of their insolence, but (not to provoke them any farther, before he knew what they would have) he only blamed their manner of address; desired them to lay down their Arms, and, that then, by fair means, they should obtain that, which did not stand with the Dignity of the Government to grant by constraint: with which answer, the people being highly incensed, they drew up at new S. *Maries*, against the Palace, and created eight Commissioners, with their Ministers and dependants, to gain themselves reverence and reputation: so, as at that time, the City had two Tribunals; and were governed by two distinct Administrations. Among the Commissioners it was resolv'd, that eight persons, to be chosen by the body of the *Arts*, should be alwaies resident in the Palace, with the Senators, to give Sanction to what-ever the *Signori* resolved upon. They took from *Salvestro de Medici*, and *Michaele di Lando*, what-ever in their former Counsels they had conferred upon them; assigning several Offices, and pensions, to many of their friends, to support the Dignity of their imployments. Having concluded, in this manner, among themselves, to make all the more valid, they sent two of their Members to the Senate, to demand their confirmation; otherwise, to let them know, that what they could not obtain by civil application, they were able to do by force. These two Commissioners delivered their message to the Senate, with great confidence and presumption; upbraiding the *Gonfaloniere* by his Office, and other honours which he had received from them; and that, in return, he had most ungratefully behav'd himself towards them and coming, at the end of their objurgation, to threaten him; *Michaele*, unable to indure so great insolence, (more suitably to the Majesty of his Place, than the meanes of his Birth) resolved, by some extraordinary way, to correct such extraordinary impudence, and drawing his sword, he cut them very much, and caused them afterwards, to be manacled and imprisoned.

This action of the *Gonfaloniere* was no sooner known, but it put all the multitude in a flame: and believing they should be able to gain that by violence, which they could not compass without, they immediately to their Arms, and march'd round about the Palace, to find where, with most advantage, they might fall on. *Michaele*, on the other side, suspecting the worst, resolved to be before-hand, as judging it more honourable to fall upon them abroad, than to expect them within the walls, till they fell upon him, and forced him out of the Palace (as they had done his Predecessors) with great shame and dishonour. Gathering therefore together a great number of Citizens, who (having found their error)

were

were resorted to him; he marched out as strong as he could, on horse-back, and advanced to fight them as far as new S. *Maries*.

The people (as I said before) were as forward as he; and marching about towards the Palace, to take their advantage, it happened, *Michaele* made his sally at the same time, and they missed one another. *Michaele* returning, found the people had possessed themselves of the *Piazza*, and were storming the Palace; whereupon, he charged them so smartly on the rear, that he brake them immediately; some of them he chased out of the City; and forced the rest to throw down their Arms, and hide themselves. This Victory being obtained, the tumult dissolved, and the City became quiet, and all by the single valour of the *Gonfaloniere*; who, for Courage, Generosity, and Prudence, was superior to any Citizen of his time, and deserves to be numbred among the few Benefactors to their Country: for, had he been ambitious, or ill-disposed, the City had lost its liberty, and relapsed into greater tyranny than that in the time of the Duke of *Athens*. But, his goodness would not admit a thought against the good of the publick; and his prudence managed things so, that many submitted to him, and the rest he was able to subdue.

Michaele overcomes the multitude.

These passages amazed the common people, and put the better sort of Artificers into an admiration of their own stupidity, who could not endure the grandeur of the Nobility, were now forced to truckle to the very skum of the people. When *Michaele* had this good fortune against the people, at the same time, new Senators were drawn, two of which were of so vile and abject condition, every body desired to quit themselves of so infamous a Magistracy. Whereupon, the first day of *September*, when the *Signori* made the first entrance upon their Office, the people being so thick, that the *Palaci* was full of arm'd men; there was a cry sent forth from among them, that no Senator should be made out of the meaner sort of people; and, in satisfaction to them, the Senate degraded the other two, (one of which was called *Tira*, and the other *Boraccio*) and, in their places, *Georgio Scali*, and *Francesco di Michaele*, were elected.

Afterwards, they dissolved the Corporations of the meaner Trades, and of all their dependants; only *Michaele di Lando*, *Ludovico di Puccio*, and some few others were excepted. They divided the Magistracy into two parts; one for the greater, the other for the lesser sort of *Arts*. Only it was concluded, the Senate should contain five of the lesser *Arts*, and four of the greater; the *Gonfaloniere* to be chosen sometimes out of one, and sometimes out of the other. This Constitution and Establishment, setled the City for a while: and, although the Government was taken out of the hands of the people; yet, the Artificers of the meanest quality, had more power than the popular Nobility, who were forced to comply, to satisfie the *Arts*, and divide them from the baser sort of people. This was much approved by those who desired the Faction of the *Guelfs* (which had handled several of the Citizens with so great violence) might be depressed; among the rest which were advanced by this new model, *Giorgio Scali*, *Benedetto Alberti*, *Salvestro de Medici*, and *Tomaso Strozzi* were made, as it were, Princes of the City. These proceedings exasperated the jealousies betwixt the popular Nobility, and the meaner sort of people, by the instigation of the *Ricci*, and *Albizi*, of which two parties, because we shall have frequent occasion to discourse (many sad and great actions happening afterwards betwixt them) we shall, for better distinction, call one of them the Popular, and the other the Plebean Party, for the future.

The popular Faction distinguished from the plebean.

This Government continued three years, with frequent examples both of banishment and death: for those who were at the helm, knowing there were many male-contents both within the City, and without, lived in perpetual fear. They who were discontented within, attempted, or conspired every day something or other against the State. Those without, (having no restraint upon them) by means sometimes of this Prince, sometimes of this Common-wealth, raised several scandals both of the one side and the other. At that time, *Giannozzo da Salerno*, General for *Carlo Durazzo*, who was descended from the Kings of *Naples*, happened to be at *Bologna*, attending a design, which, they said, *Durazzo* had undertaken against Queen *Giovanna*, at the instigation of the Pope, who was her mortal enemy. There were in *Bologna*, at the same time, several Exiles from *Florence*, who held strict intelligence both with Pope *Urban* and *Carlo*: which was the cause, that those who governed in *Florence*, living in great jealousie, gave credit easily to the calumniations of all those Citizens that were suspected. During this general apprehension, news was brought to the Magistrate, that *Giannozza da Salerno*, with the assistance of all those who were banished, was to march down with his Army against *Florence*; and that several in the City had ingaged to take Arms in his behalf, and to deliver up the Town. Upon this information, many were accused; in the first place, *Piero de gli Albizi*, and *Carlo Strozzi* were named; and after them, *Capriano Mangioni*, *Jacopo Sacchetti*, *Donato*

nato Barbadori, *Philippo Strozzi*, and *Giovanni Anſelmi*; all which were ſecured, except *Carlo Strozzi*, who eſcaped; and (that no-body might dare to take Arms for their reſcue) the Senate deputed *Tomaſo Strozzi*, and *Benedetto Alberti*, with a competent number of Souldiers, to ſecure the City. The Priſoners being examined, and their charge, and anſwer compared, they were found, not guilty, and the Captain refuſed to condemn them; hereupon, thoſe who were their enemies, incenſed the people ſo highly againſt them, that, in a great fury, they forced the Captain to condemn them. Neither could *Piero de gli Albizi* be excuſed, either for the greatneſs of his Family, or the antiquity of his Reputation; he having a long time been the moſt feared, and the moſt reverenced Citizen in *Florence*. Whereupon, either ſome of his true friends, (to teach him moderation in the time of his greatneſs,) or ſome of his enemies, (to check, and alar'm him with the unconſtancy of fortune) at a great Treat which he had made for ſeveral of the Citizens, ſent him a ſalver of Comfits; among which a nail was privately conveyed; which being diſcovered in the diſh, and viewed by the whole Table, it was interpreted as an admoniſhment to him, to fix the wheel of his fortune; for being now at the height, if its rotation continued, he muſt of neceſſity fall to the ground; which interpretation was verified firſt by his fall, and then by his death. After this execution the City remained full of confuſion, both Conquerors and Conquered being affraid: but the ſaddeſt effects proceeded from the jealouſie of the Governors, every little accident provoking them to new injuries againſt the Citizens, by condemning, admoniſhing, or baniſhing them the Town; to which may be added, the many new Laws and Ordinances which they made to fortifie their authority; which were executed with great prejudice to all ſuch as were ſuſpected by their party: for, by them, *66* were commiſſioned, with the aſſiſtance of the Senate, to purge the Common-wealth of ſuch people as they thought dangerous to the State. Theſe Commiſſioners admoniſhed *39* Citizens; ſeveral of the Populace; and debaſed many of the Nobles; and, to oppoſe themſelves more effectually againſt foreign invaſions, they entertained into their pay an Engliſh man, called *John A Guto*, an excellent Officer, and one who had commanded in *Italy* for the Pope, and other Princes, a long time. Their alarms from abroad were cauſed by intelligence, that *Carlo Durazzo* was raiſing ſeveral Companies for the invaſion of the Kingdom of *Naples*; and the *Florentine* Exiles joyned with him in the Expedition; but to obviate that danger, they provided not only what force, but what mony was poſſible; and when *Carlo* came with his Army to *Arezzo*, the *Florentines* being ready with forty thouſand Florines to receive him, he promiſed he would not moleſt them. After he had received their mony, he proceeded in his enterpriſe againſt *Naples*; and having taken the Queen, he ſent her priſoner into *Hungary*. His Victory there ſuggeſted new jealouſie into the Governors of *Florence*: they could not imagine their mony could have greater influence upon the King, than the friendſhip his Family had long maintained with the Faction of the *Guelfs*, who were undone by him. Apprehenſions increaſing at this rate, enormities increaſed with them, which were ſo far from extinguiſhing their fears, they were exceedingly multiplied; and the greater part of the City were in great diſcontent. To make things worſe, the inſolence of *Giorgio Scali*, and *Tomaſo Strozzi* was added, who being grown more powerful than the Magiſtrate, every one feared, leſt, by their conjunction with the Plebeans, they ſhould be ruined.

Nor did this Government ſeem violent and tyrannical to good men only, but to the ſeditious, and debauched: for this arrogance of *Giorgio*'s being ſome time or other, of neceſſity, to have an end; it happened, that *Giovanni di Cambio* was accuſed by one of his acquaintance, for practiſing againſt the State; but, open examination, *Cambio* was found innocent by the Captain; and the Judge gave ſentence, that the Informer ſhould ſuffer the ſame puniſhment which ſhould have been inflicted on the other, had his charge been made good. *Giorgio* interpoſed, with his intreaties and authority to preſerve him; but, not prevailing, he, and *Tomaſo Strozzi*, with a number of arm'd men, reſcued him by force, plundered the Captains Palace, and forced him to hide himſelf. This action made the whole City deteſt him; put his enemies upon contriving his deſtruction, and plotting which way they might redeem the City out of his hands, and the Plebeans, (who, for three years together, had had the command of it.)

To this deſign, the Captain gave great opportunity; for the tumult being appeaſed, he went to the Senate, and told them;

"That he had chearfully accepted the Office, to which they had elected him, preſuming "he had ſerved perſons of Honour and Equity, who would have taken Arms, to have pro- "moted and vindicated Juſtice, rather than to have obſtructed it: but ſince his obſervation "and experience had acquainted him with the Governors of the City, and their manner "of converſation; that dignity which ſo willingly he had taken up for the benefit of his Country,

" Country, to avert the danger and detriment impending, he was as ready to lay down.

The Captain was ſweetned by the Senate, and much confirmed by a promiſe made to him of reparation for what he had ſuffered already, and ſecurity for the future: Hereupon, ſeveral of them conſulting with ſuch of the Citizens as they thought greateſt lovers of their Country, and leaſt ſuſpicious to the ſtate; it was concluded that they had now a fair opportunity to redeem the City out of the clutches of *Giorgio* and his Plebeans; (moſt people having alienated their affections from him, upon his laſt inſolence) and the beſt way would be to improve it, before they had time to reconcile; for they knew the favour of the people was to be loſt and gained by the leaſt accident in the World.

For the better conduct of their affairs, it was thought neceſſary that *Benedetto Alberti* ſhould be drawn into the plot; without whoſe concurrence, the enterprize would be dangerous. This *Benedetto* was a very rich man, courteous, ſober, a true lover of his Country, and one infinitely diſſatisfied with the irregularity of their ways; ſo that it was no hard matter to perſwade him to any thing that might contribute to the ruine of *Giorgio*; for that which had made him before an enemy to the popular Nobility, and the faction of the *Guelfs*, was the inſolence of the one, and the tyranny of the other; and afterwards finding the heads of the multitude no better than they, he forſook them likewiſe, and all the miſdemeanors and impieties which were committed after that, were done without his approbation or conſent; ſo that the ſame reaſons which inclined him to the people at firſt, the ſame reaſons impelled him now to deſert them.

Having brought *Benedetto* and the heads of the *Arts* to their Lure in this manner, and furniſhed themſelves with Arms, they ſeized upon *Giorgio*, but *Tomaſo* eſcaped. The next day after he was apprehended, *Giorgio* was beheaded, with ſo great terror and conſternation to his party, that they were ſo far from endeavouring his reſcue, that all of them crowded in to behold his execution. Being brought to die before thoſe people who had ſo lately adored him, he complained of the iniquity of his fortune, and the malignity of thoſe Citizens, who, by their injury and injuſtice had conſtrained him to ſide with a multitude which was not capable either of gratitude or fidelity; and diſcovering *Benedetto* in the midſt of the Guards, he ſaid; And can you, *Benedetto*, conſent that this wrong ſhould be done to me? Were you in my place, I aſſure you, I would not ſuffer it: but let me tell you, this day is the laſt of my misfortunes, and the firſt of yours. After which, lamenting his unhappineſs in having committed his fortunes and life to the conſtancy of the people, which is ſhaken by every rumor, or accident, or conceit, he laid down his head, and it was cut off in the midſt of his armed and inſulting enemies: after him ſeveral of his confederates were executed, and their bodies dragged about the ſtreets by the people. His death put the whole City into commotion; for, at his execution, many Citizens had put themſelves into Arms in favour of the Senators and the Captain of the people, and ſome upon the dictates of their own private ambition and revenge. The City being full of various humors, every one had his private deſign, which all deſired to compaſs before they laid down their arms. The ancient Nobility called *Grandi*, could not brook that they were deprived of publick imployments, and therefore ſet all their wits upon the tenters, to recover what they had loſt; and arm'd, upon pretence of re-inveſting the Captains of the *Arts* with their original authority. The popular Nobility and the greater *Arts* were diſguſted, that the Government ſhould be communicated to the inferior *Arts*, and the loweſt ſort of the people. On the other ſide, the inferior *Arts* were diſpoſed to augment, not detract from their authority; and the meaner ſort of people were as tender and jealous of loſing their Colledges: which diſtractions cauſed the City to tumultuate ſeveral times in one year; ſometimes the Nobility; ſometimes the better Trades; ſometimes the leſſer; ſometimes the common people; and ſometimes altogether betaking to their Arms in ſeveral parts of the Town; upon which, many skirmiſhes and rencounters happened betwixt them and the Guards of the Palace; the Senators contending ſometimes, and ſometimes complying, as they judged moſt likely to remedy thoſe inconveniences: ſo that after two Treaties, and ſeveral *Balia*'s created for the reformation of the City; after many miſchiefs, and troubles, and dangers, they came to an agreement, That all who had been impriſoned after *Salveſtro de Medici* was made *Gonfaloniere*, ſhould be diſcharged. That all dignities and penſions conferred by the *Balia* of Lxxviii ſhould be taken away. That their honours ſhould be
Reformation. reſtored to the *Guelfs*. That the two new *Arts* ſhould be deprived of their Incorporation and Governors, and all their members and dependants diſpoſed into the old Companies as formerly. That the *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia* ſhould not be elected by the leſſer *Arts*; and whereas before they had the diſpoſition of half, they ſhould hereafter be capable but of a third part of the Offices of the City, and the beſt of them too to be put out of their power: ſo that the popular Nobility and the *Guelfs* reaſſumed the whole Government,

and

and the Commons were absolutely dispossessed, after they had held it from the year 1378 to 1381. Nor was this Magistracy less injurious towards the Citizens, nor less grievous in its principles, than the Government of the people; Many of the popular Nobility, who had been eminent defenders of the peoples interest, being clap'd in prison, with great numbers of the chief of the Plebeans: Among which *Michaele Lando* was one; nor could the many good Offices which he had done in the time of his authority, protect him from the rage of that party, when the licentious and unrestrained multitude ruined the City: so little was his Country thankful for all his great actions. Into which error, because many Princes and Common-wealths do frequently fall, it happens, that men terrified by such examples, before they can be made sensible of their Princes ingratitude, do fall into their displeasure. These slaughters and these exilements had alwaies, and did then displease *Benedetto Alberti*; and he both publickly and privately condemn'd them. Whereupon, the Government were fearful of him, as believing him one of the Plebeans principal friends, and one who had consented to the death of *Giorgio Scali*, not out of any disapprobation of his conduct, but that he might remain alone in authority after him. By degrees, his words and demeanor came to be suspicious, and the party that was uppermost watch'd him very narrowly, to find out some occasion to send him after *Giorgio*. Things being in this posture at home, no great action happened abroad; that little which did happen, was occasioned more by fear of what they might, than from any prejudice that was actually sustain'd; *Lodovico d'Angio* coming into *Italy* about that time, to drive *Carlo Durazzo* out of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and repossess the Queen *Giovanna*. The passage of this Prince put the *Florentines* into no little distraction; *Carlo*, upon the old score of amity, desired their assistance; *Lodovico* (like those who seek new friendships) demanded their neutrality. The *Florentines*, (that they might please both parties, if possible) to comply with *Lodovico*, and and supply *Carlo*, discharged *Aguto* from their service, and recommended him to Pope *Urban*, who was a professed enemy to *Carlo*; which artifice was easily discovered by *Lodovico*, and he thought himself much injured thereby. While the War continued in *Puglia* betwixt *Lodovic* and *Charles*, supplies were sent out of *France* to reinforce *Lodovico*: which Forces (being arrived in *Tuscany*) were conducted to *Arezzo* by those who were banished out of that Town, where they removed all those who were of *Charles* his Party; and just as they design'd the same measures against *Florence*, as they had taken against *Arezzo*, *Lodovic* died, and the affairs of *Puglia* and *Tuscany* followed his fate, for *Charles* secur'd himself of his Kingdom, which he thought he had lost; and the *Florentines*, who were not sure to defend their own, bought *Arezzo* of those who had kept it for *Lodovic*. *Charles* having secured himself of *Puglia*, departed for *Hungaria*, (which Kingdom was, by inheritance, descended to him) leaving his Wife behind him in *Puglia*, with *Ladislao* and *Giovanna*, (two of his children,) as shall be shewn more fully.

The Commons expell'd from the Government. 1381.

Michaele Lando imprisoned.

Lodovic's death.

Carlo possessed himself of *Hungary*, but died shortly after; however, his Conquest of that Country was so grateful an exploit to the *Florentines*, that never greater expressions of joy were made for any victory of their own, as appeared as well by publick as private magnificence; many Families keeping open houses, and feasting exceedingly, but none with that pomp and extravagance as the Family of the *Alberti*; the provision and ostentation of whose entertainments, were fitter for the condition of a Prince, than for a private person. Which extravagance gained him much envy, and that, being seconded by a jealousie in the Government that *Benedetto* had designs against it, was the occasion of its destruction: for they could not be safe, whilst they thought it might fall out every day, that he (reconciling himself with the people) might turn them out of the City as he pleased. Things being at this uncertainty, it happened that he being *Gonfaloniere delle Compagnie*, his Son in Law *Philippo Magalotti* was made *Gonfaloniere di Giustitia*, which accident redoubled the apprehension of the Governors, as thinking *Benedetto* grew upon them so fast, their authority must of necessity decline: but desirous to remedy it what they could, and, if possible, without a tumult, they encouraged *Bese Magalotte* (his enemy and competitor) to acquaint the Senate, that *Philippo* not being of age for the execution of that Office, he could not, nor ought not enjoy it: and the cause being heard in the Senate, *Philippo* was adjudged incapable of that Dignity, and *Bardo Mancini* succeeded in his place; a person fiercely against the faction of the people, and a perfect enemy to *Benedetto*. Having entred upon his Office, he called a *Balia* for reformation of the State; which *Balia* imprisoned *Benedetto Alberti*, and banished all the rest of his Family, only *Antonio* was excepted. Before he was carried away, *Benedetto* called all his friends together, to take his leave of them; and finding them sad, and the tears in their eyes, he spake to them as follows:

Carlo d'Angio's death.

Magnificence envied.

"You see (Gentlemen) in what manner fortune has ruin'd me, and threatned you: I do "not wonder at it, nor indeed ought it to be strange to you: seeing it so happens alwaies to "them

Benedetto's Speech.

"them, who, among ill men, are ſtudious of being good, or ſollicitous of ſuſtaining that "which all people are deſirous to pull down. The love to my Country aſſociated me firſt "with *Salveſtro de Medici*; and the ſame love divided me afterwards from *Giorgio Scali*: it "it is nothing but that, and the injuſtice of their proceedings, which have made me hate "thoſe who are now at the Stern; who, as they have had no-body that could puniſh them, "ſo they are deſirous to leave no-body to reprehend them. I am content with my baniſh-"ment, to free them of the fear they have conceived not only of me, but of all that are "ſenſible of their tyranny and injuſtice. For my ſelf I am not ſo much concerned; the ho-"nours conferred upon me when my Country was free, I can quietly relinquiſh whilſt it is "in ſervitude and bondage; and the memory of my paſt condition will give me more plea-"ſure, than the infelicity of my preſent can give me regret. My greateſt affliction will be, "to conſider, my Country is become a prey to particular men, and expoſed to their inſo-"lence and rapine: it troubles me likewiſe for you, leſt thoſe evils which this day are con-"conſummated in me, and but commencing in you, ſhould prove greater detriment to you "than they have done to me; however, comfort your ſelves, bear up againſt any misfortune, "and carry your ſelves ſo; that if things happen adverſly, (as doubtleſs they will) it may "appear to all people that you were innocent, and that they ſucceeded without the leaſt "fault or contribution of yours.

Benedetto dies at *Rhodes*.

Afterwards, to give as great teſtimony of his virtue abroad, as he had done at home, he went to the Sepulchre of our Saviour, and, in his return back, died at *Rhodes*. His bones were brought back to *Florence*, and buried with great ſolemnity by thoſe very people who purſued him, whilſt he was living, with all the calumny and injuſtice imaginable: nor were the *Alberti* the only ſufferers in theſe diſtractions, many Families beſide that, were admoniſhed, and impriſoned. Among the reſt there were *Piero Benini*, *Matteo Alderotti*, *Giovanni e Franceſco del Bene*, *Giovanni Benchi*, *Andrea Adimari*, and with them ſeveral of the leſſer Artificers. Among them which were admoniſhed, were the *Covoni*, the *Benini*, the *Rinucoi*, the *Formiconi*, the *Corbizi*, the *Manelli*, and the *Alderotti*. The *Balia* was by cuſtom created for a preciſe time; and being now in the execution of theſe Citizens, who were fairly elected; having done what they could for the ſatisfaction of the State, they deſired to lay down, though their time was not critically expir'd; which the people underſtanding, many of them ran with their Arms to the Palace, crying out there were ſeveral more to be admoniſhed, and ſeveral more to be impriſoned before they renounced. The Senate was much diſpleaſed, but entertained them with fair promiſes, till they had fortified themſelves ſo, as they were able to make them lay by thoſe Arms, for fear, which in their rage they had taken up: nevertheleſs, to comply in ſome proportion with the fierceneſs of the humour, and leſſen the authority of the Plebean Artificers; it was ordered, that whereas the third part of the Offices of the City were in their hands before, they ſhould now be reduced to a fourth part only: and (that there might alwaies be two of the moſt truſty and faithful perſons to the State, in the Senate) authority was given to the *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia*, and four other Citizens, to put a certain number of ſelect mens names into a purſe, out of which, at every meeting of the Senate, two were to be drawn.

1381. Affairs thus ſetled in the year 1381, the City continued quiet within till 1393; in which year *Giovan Galeazzo Viſconti* (called the *Comte di Vertu*) took his Uncle *Barnabo* priſoner, and made himſelf, by that, Maſter of all *Lombardy*. This *Comte di Vertu* had an opinion he could make himſelf King of *Italy* by force, as eaſily as he had made himſelf Duke of *Milan* by fraud; ſo that in the year 1390 he began a War upon the *Florentines*, which, though proſecuted with variety of fortune on both ſides, yet the Duke was many times in danger to have ruined *Florence*; and doubtleſs had ruined it, had not it been prevented by his death. However, their defence was couragious, as might be expected from a Republick; and the end of the War leſs unhappy, than the courſe of it had been dreadful; for when the Duke had taken *Bologna*, *Piſa*, *Perugia* and *Siena*, and prepared a Crown, to be crowned King of *Italy* in *Florence*, he died in the nick, and his death permitted him not to taſte the pleaſures of his paſt Victories, nor the *Florentines* to feel the calamities which would have followed their loſſes. Whilſt this War with the Duke was on foot, *Maſo de gli Albizi* was made *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia*, who, upon *Piero*'s death, was become a great enemy to the *Alberti*: and (becauſe in all Factions, the humour and animoſity does ſtill ferment and increaſe) *Maſo* (though *Benedetto* was dead in his baniſhment) had an itching deſire, before he laid down his Office, to be revenged of that Family, and he took his opportunity upon the examination of a certain perſon who impeach'd *Alberto*, and *Andrea de gli Alberti* of intelligence with the Rebels. Upon this accuſation they were immediately taken into cuſtody, and the whole frame of the City altered. The Senate took Arms, aſſembled the people, created a *Balia*, by authority of which many Citizens were confined, and new

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imborſation of Officers made: moſt of the *Alberti* were confined; many Artificers admoniſhed, and put to death. Upon which provocation, the *Arts* and inferior ſort of people took Arms, in as much heat as if their lifes or reputation had been taken from them. Part of them ran to the *Piazza*, and part to the houſe of *Veri de Medici*, who, after the death of *Salveſtro*, was become the head of that Family. To cajole thoſe who were in the Market-place, the Senate ſent *Rinaldo Gianſigliazzi*, and *Donato Acciaivoli* (as perſons more acceptable to the people than any elſe) to command them, and ſent with them the Enſign of the *Guelfs*, and the people. Thoſe who went to the houſe of *Veri*, begg'd of him to take the Government upon him, and free them from the tyranny of thoſe Citizens who were enemies to every thing that was good. All thoſe who have left any memorials of the paſſages of thoſe times, do agree in this; That, had not *Veri* been more virtuous than ambitious, he might have made himſelf Prince of the City, without any impediment: for the great damages juſtly and unjuſtly ſuſtained by the *Arts* and their friends, had ſo incenſed them, that there wanted nothing but an head, to ſatiate their revenge. Nor was *Veri* without thoſe that minded him of his advantage; for *Antonio de Medici* (who had long time born him a grudge) perſwaded him very earneſtly to take the Government upon him; to whom *Veri* returned this Anſwer;

"As your threats, when you were mine enemy, did never affright me; ſo your Counſels, "now you are my friend, ſhall never delude me.

And, turning about to the multitude, he bid them be couragious, for he would ſecure them, if they would follow his direction. Then, marching in the midſt of them into the *Piazza*, he went up to the Senate, and told them;

Veri de Medici's Speech to the Senate.

"That he could not be ſorry his converſation had been ſuch, as had procured him the love "of the people; but yet he was much troubled they had made a wrong judgment of him, "not at all ſuitable to what his converſation had deſerved: for, never having given the leaſt "example of ambition, or faction, he could not but wonder from whence they ſhould de-"duce their opinion; that, as a turbulent perſon, he would be the maintainer of their fa-"ctions, and, as an ambitious man, the Governor of their State. He begg'd of their Lord-"ſhips, that the error of the multitude might not be imputed to him; for, what-ever was "in his power, he ſubmitted to them, with the firſt opportunity; he recommended it to "them to uſe their fortune temperately, and content themſelves quietly with an imperfect "victory, rather than to make it intire by the deſtruction of the whole City.

Veri was much applauded by the Senate; they deſired that he would be a means that all Arms might be laid down, and that afterwards they would not fail to do what he and the other Citizens ſhould adviſe. After his harangue in the Senate, *Veri* returned into the *Piazza*, and having joyned his Brigade with thoſe under the Command of *Rinaldo* and *Donato*, he gave this account to them all; That he found the *Signori* very well diſpoſed towards them: that many things had been propoſed, but the ſhortneſs of the time, and the abſence of the Magiſtrates had prevented any concluſion: wherefore he made it his requeſt to them, that they would lay aſide their Arms, and give obedience to the Senate, aſſuring them, that with the Senate, gentleneſs would prevail farther than inſolence, and intreaty than threatning; and that they ſhould want neither ſecurity nor preferment, if they would be directed by him: upon which aſſurance they all returned to their houſes. Arms being in this manner laid down, the Senate ſecured the Palace with their Guards; then they liſted 2000 Citizens which were beſt affected to the State, and divided them equally by Companies, with orders to be ready to relieve them when-ever they were called: the reſt which were not liſted, were not ſuffered to bear Arms. Theſe preparations being made, they impriſoned many of the Artificers, and put ſeveral of them to death who had been moſt pragmatical in the late commotions; and, to add more majeſty and reputation to the *Gonfaloniere della Giuſtitia*, it was provided, that no perſon ſhould be capable of that Office under 45 years of age: to ſecure their Government, they made ſeveral other Laws and Ordinances which were inſupportable, not only to the perſons againſt whom they were made, but even to thoſe who were honeſt, and of their own party; for they could not believe a State well grounded, or ſafe, that was to be defended with ſo much violence and ſeverity. Nor were the *Alberti* which remained in the City, the only perſons diſſatisfied with theſe proceedings; nor the *Medici*, (who look'd upon the people as meerly over-reach'd) many others were with this extravagant ſeverity exceedingly diſguſted. The firſt man that oppoſed them, was *Donato* the ſon of *Acciaivoli*. This *Donato*, though he was one of the Grandees of the City, and rather ſuperior, than equal to *Maſo de gli Albizi*, (who, for ſervice done in his *Gonfalonierſhip*, was become, as it were, Maſter of the City) yet, among ſo many malecontents, it was impoſſible he ſhould be pleaſed, nor prefer (as many people do) private advantage before publick convenience: and therefore his firſt project was, to try if he could re-

call those who were banished, or at least restore the *Ammoniti* to their old Offices and Commands. To this purpose he insinuated with several Citizens, whispering it into the ears first of one, and then of another; that there could be no other way to quiet the people, or stop the dissention of the parties; concluding, that he attended only till he was of the Senate, and then he would make it his business to bring it to pass. And because, in all humane actions, delay breeds weariness, and haste danger; to avoid the one, he ran himself upon the other. Among the Senators, there was *Michaele Acciaivoli* his confederate, and *Nicolo Ricoveri* his friend. *Donato* judged this too fair an opportunity to be slip'd; and therefore desired them, that they would move to the Counsels for a Law for the restoration of the Citizens. Being over-perswaded by him, they proposed it to their brethren, who were all of opinion, that innovations are not to be attempted where the success is doubtful, and the danger inevitable. Whereupon *Donato*, having tryed all waies in vain, in his passion caused it to to be told them, that seeing they would not permit the City to be reformed by fair means, it should be done by foul: which words being highly resented, the Senate communicated the whole business with the principal Governors, cited *Donato*, who, upon his appearance, being confronted, and convicted by the person to whom he delivered his message, he was committed to custody, and confined to *Barletta*. With him were imprisoned *Alamanno*, and *Antonio de Medici*, with all which were descended of *Alamanno*'s Family, and several others of the more inferior *Arts*, that were in reputation with the people. All these things happened within two years after *Maso* had reassumed the Government. The City remaining in this posture, many discontents at home, and many exiles abroad; there chanc'd to be at *Bologna* among the banished men, *Picchio Cavicciulli*, *Tomaso de Ricci*, *Antonio de Medici*, *Benedetto de gli Spini*, *Antonio Girolami Christofano di Carlone*, with two more of inferior condition, all of them young, brisk, and disposed to encounter any difficulty that hindred their return to their Country. To these it was privately signified by *Piggiello*, and *Baroccio Cavicciulli*, (who, at the same time, were admonished in *Florence*) that if they would come into the Town, they would convey them into an house, from whence they might kill *Maso de gli Albizi*, and call the people to Arms; who being discontented, would be easily provoked; and the rather, because they would be headed by the *Ricci*, *Adimari*, *Medici*, *Manelli*, and several other considerable Families. Allured by these hopes, on the fourth of *August*, 1397, they arrived privately in *Florence*; and (being disposed of according to agreement) they sent out to observe the motions of *Maso*, by whose death they presumed they should raise a tumult among the people. *Maso* was gone out, and (by accident) in an Apothecary's shop not far from *San Piero Maggiore*; the messenger that was to set him, seeing of him there, repaired immediately to his Camrades to give them information; who, taking their swords, ran directly to the place, but he was gone. Not at all discouraged with their first miscarriage, they turned towards the old Market, where they killed one of their adversaries. Upon which, a great noise being raised, and a clamor of the people crying out, *Arm*, *Liberty*, *Arm*; *let the Tyrants die*; they marched towards the new Market, where near the *Calimara* they slew another; and so going forward with the same shout and out-cry, no-body taking Arms, they stopped in the *Loggia della Nighittosi*: and mounting there upon the highest place they could find, the multitude being round about them, (but come rather to stare than assist) they exhorted them to take Arms, and free themselves from a bondage which so highly they abhorr'd; they assured them, the complaints and lamentations of such as were oppressed in the City, had moved them to endeavour their liberty, and not any private injury to themselves: that they were sensible they had the prayers of many good people, that God would give opportunity to their designs. Had they had an Head to have commanded them, it was believed they would have succeeded at any time; but now occasion was offered, and they had Captains enough to conduct them, they stood gaping upon one another, expecting like sots, till those persons who endeavoured their freedom, were knock'd on the head, and their slavery redoubled. They could not likewise but marvel, that they, who, upon the least injury, were heretofore ready to take Arms, should not stir now upon so great and numerous provocations; but suffer so many of their Citizens to be banished, and admonished, when it was in their power to restore the one to their Country, and the other to their Offices. These words (how true soever) moved not the multitude in the least, either because they were affraid, or else because the death of the two persons which were killed, had made the murderers odious: so that the founders of the tumult perceiving that neither words nor actions would work any thing, understanding too late, how dangerous it is to enterprize the liberty of a people that are resolved to be slaves; and despairing of success, they retreated into the Church of S. *Reparata*, not to secure their lives, but to protract their deaths. Upon the first noise of this tumult, the Senate had arm'd, and caused the Palace to be shut up; but when they heard

Donato Acciaivoli confin'd.

1397.

A new Conspiracy defeated.

heard what the buſineſs was, who were the Authors, and what was become of them; they took courage, and commanded the Captain, with what Forces he could get, to go and apprehend them; which was no hard matter to perform; for the Church-doors being broken open, and part of them ſlain, the reſt were taken priſoners; who, upon examination, confeſſed nothing, but that *Baroccio* and *Piggiello Cavicciulli* were the only incendiaries, and they were both of them killed.

The Duke of *Milan* practiſes againſt the City.

After this accident, there happened another of greater importance. About this time (as we ſaid before) the City had Wars with the Duke of *Milan*, who finding open force was not like to prevail, applyed himſelf to artifice; and, by the help of the *Florentine* exiles, (of which *Lombardy* was full) he procured a treaty with ſeveral in the Town, in which it was concluded, that at a certain day, from the neareſt places to *Florence* they could contrive, the greateſt part of the Exiles which were able to bear Arms, ſhould paſs by the river *Arnus* into the City; and then joyning ſuddenly with their friends within, ſhould run to the Palace of the Senate, and other houſes of the chief Officers, and having ſlain them, model, and reform afterwards as they pleaſed. Among the Conſpirators in the Town, there was one of the *Ricci* called *Samminiato*, who (as it falls out in moſt plots, where few are not ſufficient, and many not ſecure) ſeeking for a companion, found an informer; for imparting the buſineſs to *Salveſtro Cavicciulli*, (whoſe own injuries, as well as his relations, might have made him more faithful) he poſt-poning his future hopes to his preſent fear, diſcovered all to the Senate. Whereupon *Samminiato* being ſeized, they extorted the whole proceſs of the Conſpiracy, but of his accomplices no-body was taken, but one *Tomaſo Daviſi*; who coming from *Bologna*, not knowing what was happened in *Florence*, was apprehended by the way, before he got thither; all the reſt, upon the impriſonment of *Samminiato*, fled away in great fear, and diſperſed. *Samminiato* and *Tomaſo* being puniſhed according to the quality of their offence, a new *Balia* was made of ſeveral Citizens; and authority given them to inquire farther after delinquents, and to ſecure the State. This *Balia* proclaimed Rebels, 6 of the Family of the *Ricci*, 6 of the *Alberti*, 2 of the *Medici*, 3 of the *Scali*, 2 of the *Strozzi*, *Bindo Altoviti*, *Bernardo Adimari*, and ſeveral others of meaner condition. They admoniſhed, beſides, the whole Family of the *Alberti*, *Ricci*, and *Medici* for ten years, except only ſome few. Among thoſe of the *Alberti* which were not admoniſhed, *Antonio* was one, being eſteemed a quiet and a peaceable man. Their jealouſy of this plot being not yet out of their heads, a Monk happened to be apprehended, who had been obſerved, whilſt the conſpiracy was on foot, to have paſſed many times betwixt *Bologna* and *Florence*; and he confeſſed he had frequently brought Letters to *Antonio*; *Antonio* being taken into cuſtody, denied it obſtinately at firſt; but being confronted by the Monk, and the charge juſtified againſt him; he was fined in a ſum of mony, and baniſhed three hundred miles diſtance from the City; and that they might not alwaies be in danger of the *Alberti*, they decreed, that none of that Family above 15 years of age, ſhould be ſuffered to continue in the Town. Theſe things happened in the year 1400, two years after *Giovan Galezo* Duke of *Milan*, died: whoſe death, (as we have ſaid before) put an end to a War that had been proſecuted for twelve years. After which, the Government having extended its authority, and at things at quiet both abroad and at home, they undertook the enterprize of *Piſa*, which ſucceeded ſo well: they took the Town very honourably, and injoyed that and the reſt very peaceably, till the year 1433. Only in the year 1412, the *Alberti* having tranſgreſs'd againſt the terms of their baniſhment, a new *Balia* was erected, new proviſions made for the ſecurity of the State, and new impoſitions inflicted upon that Family.

Several Families baniſhed.

1400.

The King of *Naples* dies.

About this time, the *Florentines* had War likewiſe againſt *Ladiſlaus* King of *Naples*, which ended in the year 1416, upon the death of that King. During the time of the War, finding himſelf too weak, he had given the City of *Cortona* to the *Florentines*, of which he was Lord; but afterwards recovering more ſtrength, he renewed his War with them, and managed it ſo, that it was much more dangerous than the former; and had not his death determined it, (as the other was by the death of the Duke of *Milan*) doubtleſs he had brought *Florence* into as great exigence as the Duke of *Milan* would have done; and endangered, if not ruined its liberty. Nor did their War with this King conclude with leſs good fortune than the other; for when he had taken *Rome*, *Siena*, *la Marca*, and *Romagna*; and nothing remained but *Florence*, to hinder his paſſage with his whole force into *Lombardy*, he died: ſo that death was alwaies a true friend to the *Florentines*, and did more to preſerve them, than all their own conduct or courage could do. From the death of this King, this City remained at peace (both abroad and at home) eight years: at the end of that term, their Wars with *Philip* Duke of *Milan* reviv'd their factions, which could never

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be ſuppreſſed, but with the ſubverſion of the State, which had governed from the year 1371, to 1434, with much honour, and maintained many Wars with much advantage, having added to their Dominion, *Arezzo*, *Piſa*, *Cortona*, *Livorno*, and *Monte Pulciano*, and doubtleſs would have extended it farther, had the City been unanimous, and the old humours not been rubb'd up, and reviv'd, as in the next book ſhall be more particularly related.

THE

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

Book IV.

ALL Cities (eſpecially ſuch as are not well conſtituted under the Titles of Common Wealths) do ſome time or other alter their Government, yet not (as many think) by means of Liberty and Subjection; but by occaſion of ſervitude, and licentiouſneſs: for only the name of Liberty is pretended by popular Perſons, ſuch as are the inſtruments of licentiouſneſs; and ſervitude is ſought for by thoſe that are Noble, neither of them both deſiring to be reſtrain'd either by Laws or any thing elſe. Nevertheleſs when it does happen, (as it happens but ſeldom) that a City has the good fortune to produce, and advance ſome Wiſe, Honeſt, and Potent Citizen, by whom the Laws may be ſo order'd, that the humors and emulations betwixt the Nobility and the People, if not perfectly compos'd, may be yet ſo well circumſcrib'd and corrected, that they may be check'd from breaking forth to its prejudice; Then it is that City may be call'd free, and that State pronounce it ſelf durable; for being founded upon good Laws and Orders at firſt, it has not that neceſſity of good Men to maintain it. Of ſuch Laws and Principles many Common Wealths were antiently conſtituted; and continued a long time. Others have wanted, and do ſtill want them; which has frequently occaſion'd the variation of the Government, from Tyranny; to licentiouſneſs; and from licentiouſneſs to Tyranny: for by reaſon of the powerful animoſities in all of them, it is not, nor can be poſſible they ſhould be of any duration, one diſguſting the good, and the other, the Wiſe. One doing miſchief with eaſe, the other good with difficulty; in this the inſolent have too much Authority; in another the ſots; and therefore it is convenient that both one and the other, be ſupported and maintained by the fortune and Valour of ſome Eminent Man, though he may be taken from them by Death, or made unſerviceable by misfortune. I ſay therefore that Government which flouriſhed in *Florence* from the death of *Giorgio Scali*, which fell out in the year 1381 was ſupported firſt by the conduct of *Maſo de gli Albizi*, and afterwards by *Nicolo Uzano*.

This City from the year 1414 till the end of the 22, remain'd quiet, King *Ladiſlaus* being dead, and *Lombardy* divided into ſeveral Cantons; ſo that neither abroad nor at home had they the leaſt cauſe of apprehenſion. The next Citizens in Authority to *Nicolo Uzano*, were *Bartolmeo Valori*, *Nerone de Nigi*, *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, *Neri di Gino*, and *Lapo Nicolini*. The factions which ſprung from the animoſity betwixt the *Albizi*, and the *Ricci* (which were with ſo much miſchief reviv'd afterward by *Salveſtro de Medici*) could never be extinguiſh'd, and although that which was moſt generally ſuccour'd, prevail'd but three years;

years, and was afterwards depreſs'd, yet the greateſt part of the City had imbib'd ſo much of their humor, as could never be wrought out. True it is, the frequent exprobrations, and conſtant perſecutions of the heads of that party from the year 1381 to 1400. had almoſt brought them to nothing. The firſt Families which were perſecuted, as the chief of that faction, were the *Alberti*, *Ricci*, and *Medici*, who were rob'd of their Men, as well as their Mony, and if any of them continued in the City, their imployments and dignities were moſt certainly taken from them; which uſage had indeed debas'd that party, and almoſt conſum'd it. However the memory of the injuries receiv'd, and a ſecret deſire of being reveng'd lay cloſe in the Hearts of many of them; and having no opportunity to ſhow it, they kept it privat to themſelves. Thoſe of the Popular Nobility who govern'd the City ſo quietly, committed two errours which were the ruine of their Government. One was in their inſolence, upon the long time of their Government; The other, that by reaſon of emulations among themſelves, contracted by long poſſeſſion of the State, they had not preſerv'd that inſpection which they ought to have done, over thoſe who were able to diſturb them. Whereby (daily running themſelves deeper in the diſpleaſure of the People, and either not regarding new Plots, becauſe they did not apprehend them, or elſe encouraging them, to ſupplant one another) the houſe of *Medici* recover'd its Authority. The firſt of them which began to riſe, was *Giovanni* the Son of *Ricci*, who, being grown very wealthy, of a benign and courteous nature, by conceſſion of thoſe who Govern'd, was made Supream Magiſtrate; and his advancement celebrated with ſo univerſal ſatisfaction and joy (the People believing they had now got a Protector) that the graver ſort began to ſuſpect it, as obſerving all the old humors reviving again. And *Nicolo Uzano* fail'd not to advertiſe the other Citizens, and to remonſtrate how dangerous it was to promote one of ſo general a reputation; that diſorders were eaſily ſuppreſs'd in the beginning; but when grown to any height, they were hardly to be remedy'd: and that he knew *Giovanni* to be a Man in parts much ſuperiour to *Salveſtro*. But *Nicolo* was not regarded by his Brethren, who envy'd his reputation, and deſir'd more company to take him down. *Florence* being in this manner infeſted with theſe humours, which began privatly to ferment, *Philippo Viſconti*, ſecond Son to *John Galeazo*, becoming Lord of *Lombardy* by the death of his Brother, ſuppoſing himſelf in a condition for ſome great enterprize, was very ambitious to recover the Soveraignty of *Genoua*, which was then free, under the adminiſtration and conduct of *Tomaſo da Campo Tregoſo*; but he durſt not be too confident of ſucceſs either in that, or any other deſign, till he had enter'd into an alliance with the *Florentines*, the reputation of which, he concluded would carry him thorow all. To that purpoſe he ſent two Embaſſadors to *Florence*, to propoſe it. Many Citizens advis'd to the contrary, though they were contented the amity which had been betwixt them for many years ſhould be continu'd, yet they had no mind to a League, as knowing what reputation, and advantage would accrue to him thereby; and how unprofitable it would be to their City. Others were for the League, by virtue of which they might put ſuch termes upon him, as (if he tranſgreſs'd) ſhould diſcover his ill intentions to the World, and juſtify any War they ſhould make upon him for the breach of his agreement: after great debate, a Peace was concluded, and *Philip* oblig'd himſelf not to meddle with any thing on this ſide the Rivers *Magra* and *Panaro*. Having ſettled his alliance, *Philip* fell upon *Breſcia*, and took it; and after that upon *Genoua*; and took that contrary to the opinion of *Florence*, who had promoted the peace, they having been confident that *Breſcia*, by the help of the *Venetian*, and *Genoua* by its own proper ſtrength, would have been able to have held out. And becauſe, in his Treaty with the *Doge* of *Genoa*, *Philip* had reſerv'd *Serezana* and other Towns on this ſide the *Magra*, with condition when ever he would part with them, that the *Genoeſes* ſhould have the refuſal (having brake his Promiſe) the whole League was violated; Beſides, he had made an agreement with the *Legat* of *Bologna*. All which things conſider'd together, alter'd the affections of the *Florentines* towards him, and being jealous of new troubles, made them look out for new remedies. *Philip* having intelligence of their apprehenſions; to juſtifie himſelf, and feel the inclinations of the Citizens, or elſe to lull and delude them; he ſent Embaſſadors to *Florence* to let them know he was much ſurpriz'd at the ſuſpicion he underſtood they had conceiv'd againſt him, and was ready to renounce any thing that might give them the leaſt occaſion of diſpleaſure. The effect this Embaſſy produc'd in the City, was only to divide it; part (and that the moſt conſiderable in the Government) was of opinion they ſhould Arm, and put themſelves into a Poſture againſt the deſigns of their Enemies. If preparations were made, and *Philip* was quiet, no War would enſue, and they might contribute to a Peace. Others out of envy to the Government, or apprehenſion of the War, concluded it no Wiſdom to be ſuſpicious of a Friend without great provocation; and that what he had done was not worthy

Uzano adviſes againſt the *Medici*.

Philippo Viſconti Lord of *Lombardi*.

Peace betwixt *Florence*, and *Milan*.

Worthy (in their judgments) of such rigid proceeding. They knew well enough to create the *Ten*, and to raise Men, was the same thing as declaring of War, which if done with so Potent a Prince, would be certain ruine to the City, without any prospect of advantage; for if they prosper'd, and got the Victory, they could not make themselves Masters of any thing considerable, *Romagna* being betwixt, nor could they attempt any thing against *Romagna* by reason of its vicinity to the Church. However their opinion prevail'd who were for preparations; they created the *Ten*: they rais'd Souldiers, and laid new Taxes upon the People; which lying more heavily upon the Common, than the better sort of Citizens, fill'd the City with complaints, all People crying out of the oppression of the great People, who to satiate their Ambition, and inlarge their Authority, had ingag'd them in an expensive and unnecessary War: they were not yet come to an absolute rupture with the Duke, but all things were full of suspicion; For *Philip*, at the request of the Legat of *Bologna* (who was fearful of *Antonio Bentivogli*, a banish'd Man, and at that time in the Castle *Bolognese*) had sent new forces into that City to secure it, which forces being near the Dominions of *Florence*, created no little jealousie in that State. But that which gave the strongest alarm to all People, and made the greatest discovery of the War, was the Dukes practices at *Furli*. The Lord of *Furli* at that time, was *Giorgio Ordelaffi*, who dying, left his Son *Tibaldo* to the Tutelage of *Philip*. The Mother suspecting the integrity of his Tutor, would have sent him to her Father *Lodovico Alidossi* Lord of *Imola*, but the People of *Furli* constrain'd her to deliver him up to *Philip*, in pursuance of the Testament of *Ordelaffi*. *Philip*, to disguise his designs, and give less occasion of jealousie, order'd the Marquess of *Ferrara*, to send *Guido Torelli* with certain Souldiers to take possession of *Furli* in his Name, and as his Lieutenant, and so that Town fell into the hands of *Philip*. Which intelligence coming to *Florence* at the same time with the news of the arrival of forces at *Bologna*, facilitated the resolution for War, though before there had been strong opposition, and *Giovanni de Medici* did publickly disswade it; alledging that though they were certain enough of the Dukes inclinations, yet it was better to expect him, and receive his attack, than to prevent it by advancing against him; for it was the beginning of the War, must justifie the prosecution; the agressor would be in the fault, and the other excusable to all the Princes of *Italy*; Neither could they demand the assistance of their Neighbours with so much confidence, to invade other People, as to defend themselves; nor would any Body fight so chearfully to gain from others, as to secure their own. To this it was answer'd, that the Enemy was not to be expected at home; that fortune is oftner a friend to the Invador, than to the invaded; and that (though it may be possibly more expence) yet there is less damage and detriment in making War in an enimies Country, than in ones own. These arguments carried it; and orders were given to the *Ten* to try all ways, and turn every stone for the recovery of *Furli*, out of the hands of the Duke. The Duke, observing how serious and busie the *Florentines* were in retrieving a place he had undertaken to secure, sent *Agnolo della Pergola* with a considerable force, to *Imola*; That the Prince having his hands full at home, might not be at leisure to think of the defence of his *Grandson*. *Agnola* advanc'd with his Army, near *Imola*, and (though the *Florentines* lay at *Modigliana*) took the Town one night by the benefit of a great frost which had frozen the Ditches, and sent *Lodovico* Prisoner to *Milan*. The *Florentines* seeing *Imola* lost, and the War publickly owned; commanded their Army to march and beseige *Furli*, which being accordingly perform'd, that Town was immediatly beleagured, and to hinder the conjunction of the Dukes forces to relieve it, they hired the Comte *Alberigo* with his Squadron from *Zagonara*, to keep them in perpetual alarm, and to make daily in-roads to the very walls of *Imola*. *Agnolo* perceiv'd by the strong entrenchment of our Army, that *Furli* could not without great difficulty be reliev'd, so he resolv'd to set down before *Zagonara* presuming the *Florentines* would not lose that place; and that if they came to relieve it, they must not only raise their Siege before *Furli*; but fight his Army upon great disadvantage. Hereupon the Duke *Alberigo's* forces were constrain'd to a Parley, in which it was agreed the Town should be surrender'd, if in fifteen days time it was not reliev'd by the *Florentines*. Their condition being known in the *Florentine* Camp, begot great disorders there, as well as in the City, and every Body desiring to wrest so great a prize out of the hands of the Enemy, their Host hasten'd the loss of it; from marching from *Furli* to the relief of *Lagonaria*, they came to an engagement and were utterly defeated, not so much by the Valour of their Enemies, as the badness of the weather; for our Men having march'd several hours thorow deep ways in perpetual rain, finding the Enemy fresh and drawn up with advantage, it was no hard matter to overcome them. Nevertheless in a Victory so famous all over *Italy*, it was strange, and yet true, that there died no Body of any eminence but *Lodovico Albizi*, and two of his Sons, who falling from their Horses, were stifled in the dirt. The

Imola taken by the Duke *Philip*.

The *Florentines* overthrown.

news of this defeat put the whole City of *Florence* into a dumps, especially the Grandees who had perswaded the War; they saw the Enemy strong and couragious; themselves without force or friends; the People incens'd, railing up and down the Streets; upbraiding them with the great Taxes, and the impertinence of the War; girding, and scoffing at them with most contumelious expostulations, are these they which created the *Ten* to terrifie the Enimy? Are these they who have reliev'd *Furli*, and rescued it out of the hands of the Duke? See how strangely their Counsels are discover'd, and the ends to which they inclin'd, not to defend our Liberty (which is an Enemy to them) but to increase their Power, which God in his Wisdom has most justly diminished. Nor is this the only enterprize they have pull'd upon the City, but several others, and particularly that against *Ladislao* which was parallel exactly. To whom will they now address for supplies? To *Pope Martin*? *Braccio* can be witness how they us'd him before: To Queen *Giovanna*? She was forc'd formerly to desert them, and throw her self into the Protection of the King of *Aragon*? Such language as this, and what ever could be invented by an inraged People, was the Common dialect in the streets. To prevent inconveniencies, the *Senate* thought good to assemble several Citizens, who with gentle words should endeavour to quiet those humours, which were stirr'd in the People. *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, was one of them, who (being eldest Son to *Maso*, and by means of his own Virtue, and the reputation of his Father, arriv'd at considerable esteem in the City) spake to them at large. "He told them that it was "neither justice nor prudence to judge things by success, seeing many times good Counsels "miscarry, and ill ones do prosper. That to commend ill Counsels upon their good success "was to incourage Errour, rather than Virtue, which would turn to the great prejudice of "the publick, because they are not alwaies unfortunate. On the other side, to condemn "wise Counsels for the unhappiness of their event, is as blamable as that; seeing thereby "honest Citizens are discouraged and deter'd from speaking their judgments, though the "exigence be never so great. Then he demonstrated the necessity of the War, and how "(if it had not been carry'd into *Romagna*) it would have broke out in *Tuscany*. He told "them, it had pleas'd God their Army should be beaten; yet their loss was not so great "as it would be, if the design should be abandon'd, but if still they would bear up against "their misfortune, and put themselves forward to the utmost of their Power, they should "not need to be much sensible of their loss, nor the Duke of his Victory. That they ought pre-"not to be discourag'd at their expences and Taxes, it being necessary to increase them at "sent, as a way to lessen them hereafter. He told them that greater supplies are more necessa-"ry in an offensive, than a defensive War, and in conclusion he exhorted them to the imi-"tation of their fore-fathers, who by the Manliness of their behaviour in all their distresses, "did alwaies defend themselves against any Adversary what ever.

Albizi's exhortation to be quiet.

Incouraged by his Authority, the Citizens entertain'd the Conte *de Oddo* Son to *Braccio*, into their pay; committing him to the instruction of *Nicolo Piccinino* who had been brought up under *Braccio*, and was reputed the best of his Officers; to whom they joyn'd other Commanders of their own, and certain Horse Officers, which were remaining of the late defeat. For the raising of more Monies, they created XX. Commissioners out of the Citizens; who finding the chief Citizens low, and depress'd upon the late overthrow, overlaid them with Taxes, and oppress'd them exceedingly. These impositions disgusted them much; yet at first in the point of honor they thought it beneath them to complain of their own private usage; only they blam'd the Taxes in general, and press'd to have them abated; being publickly known, it was publickly oppos'd; and so far neglected in the Councils, that to make them sensible how difficult a matter they had undertaken, and to render them odious to the People, order was given that the Taxes should be collected with all strictness and severity; and in case of opposition, it should be lawful for any Man to kill him who resisted an Officer. Whereupon many sad accidents ensued among the Citizens; many being wounded, and not a few slain: so that it was believ'd the Parties would have proceeded to Blood; and every sober Man apprehended some mischief at hand. The Grandees having been accustomed to be favour'd, could not endure that strictness, and the others thought it but just to have all taxed proportionably. In these confusions, several of the Prime Citizens met, and concluded to take the Government upon themselves, because their backwardness and remissness had given the multitude confidence to reprehend actions of the State, and reincourag'd such as were wont to be the heads of the People. After many Cabals, and frequent discourses among themselves, it was propos'd to meet altogether at a time, which they did above LXX. of them in the Church of St. *Stephano*, by the connivance of *Lorenzo Ridolfi de Fidi*, and *Francesco Gianfigliazzi*, two of the *Senate*. *Giovanni de Medici* was not at the meeting, either not being call'd (as a Person in whom they could put no confidence) or refusing to come, being contrary to his judgment. *Rinaldo*

naldo de gli Albizi, made a Speech to them all. "He remonſtrated to them the condition "of the City; how by their negligence the Authority was relaps'd to the People, which in "the year 1381. their Fathers had taken out of their hands. He repreſented the iniquity "of the Government from 1377. to the year 1380. and remember'd them how in that Inte- "rim, many there preſent had had their Fathers and Relations killed. That now the dan- "gers were the ſame, and the diſorders no better. That the multitude had already im- "pos'd a Tax as they pleas'd; and would doubtleſs by degrees (unleſs greater force, or "better order was taken to prevent them) creat Magiſtrates at their pleaſure. Which if "they ſhould do, they would uſurp their places, and ruine a ſtate which for 42 years toge- "ther had flouriſh'd with much honor and reputation to the City; and *Florence* fall under "the Government of the multitude, (one half living in perpetual luxury, and the other in "fear) or elſe under the Tyranny of ſome ſingle Perſon that ſhould uſurp. Wherefore "he aſſured himſelf that who ever was a lover of Honor or his Country, would think him- "ſelf oblig'd to reſent it, and be put in mind of the Virtue of *Bardo Mancini*, who with "the deſtruction of the *Alberti* reſcued the City from the ſame dangers; and as the occaſi- "on of that boldneſs and incroachment of the multitude proceeded from negligence and re- "miſneſs in the Magiſtrate, the Palace of the *Senat* being full of new and inferiour Men, he "concluded, the beſt way to remedy it, would be to do as they did then; to reſtore the "the Government to the Grandees, to clip the wings of the inferiour Trades, by reducing "them from XIV. to VII. By which means their Authority in the Councils would be re- "trenched, both by the diminution of their number, and the reſtoration of the Nobility, "who upon the old ſcore of animoſity would be ſure to keep them under; adding that "it was great Wiſdom to make uſe of all People, opportunity, and according to the conve- "nience of their time: for if their fore-fathers had done prudently to make uſe of the mul- "titude to correct the inſolence of the Grandees; it would be no leſs diſcretion, now the "People were grown inſolent, and the Nobility under hatches, to make uſe of the Nobi- "lity to reduce them to their ballance; which might be two ways effected, either by ar- "tifice, or force: for ſome of them being in the Commiſſion of Ten, it was in their power "to bring what numbers they thought good into the City, and to diſpoſe them as they pleas'd "without any obſervation.

Rinaldo di gli Albizi.

"*Rinaldo* was much applauded, his Counſel by every Body approv'd; and *Urano* a- "mong the reſt, return'd this Anſwer. *That indeed all that* had been ſaid by *Rinaldo* was "true, his remedies good and ſecure, when applyable without manifeſt diviſion of the Ci- "ty; and that might be done exactly, if *Giovanni de Medici* could be drawn to their party; "if he were ſeparated from them, the People might riſe, but could do nothing for want of "a head; but whilſt he was firm to them, nothing was to be done without force, and if "they ſhould betake themſelves to that, he could not but foreſee a double danger, either of "not gaining the Victory; or not injoying it when it was got. He modeſtly remember'd "them of his former advices, and how they had neglected to prevent theſe difficulties in "time, which might eaſily have been done; But that now he thought it unpracticable, un- "leſs ſome way could be found to gain *Giovanni* to their party.

Nicolo Urano.

Hereupon *Rinaldo* was deputed to attend *Giovanni*, and try what might be done. He waited upon him, and preſs'd him with all the arguments he could uſe to joyn with them, and that he would not, by favouring and indulging the People, make them inſolent and ſawcy to the ruine both of the City and Government. To which *Giovanni* re- ply'd,

"That it was the Office of a Wiſe and good Citizen (at leaſt in his judgment) to pre- "ſerve the antient Laws and cuſtoms of a City; nothing being more injurious than thoſe "alterations; that many being offended, it muſt neceſſarily follow many muſt be diſcon- "tented, and where many are ſo, ſome ill accident or other is daily to be expected. That "in his opinion this reſolution of their's would be ſubject to two moſt pernitious effects. "The firſt by confering honors upon them, who having born none of them before, would "underſtand leſs how to value them, and by conſequence complain leſs for the want of them. "The other, in taking them away from thoſe who have been accuſtomed to them, and "would aſſuredly never be quiet till they be reſtor'd to them again. So that the injury to "one party will be greater than the benefit to the other; the author of the change gains few- "er Friends than Enemies; and the later be much more induſtrious to do him a miſchief, "than the former to defend him. Men being naturally more prone to revenge, than gra- "titude; loſs (for the moſt part) being in the one, but profit or pleaſure always in the "other. Then, turning about to *Rinaldo*, he ſaid. *And you, Sir, if you* would recollect "what has paſs'd, and with what cunning, and ſubtilty things have been formerly tranſact- "ed in this City, you would be cooler and leſs haſty in this reſolution; for who ever ad-

Giovanni de Medici's reply to *Rinaldo.*

"vi'sd it, as soon as with your power he has divested the People of their Authority, he "will usurp upon you, and become your Enemy by the same means you intend to oblige "him. Nor will it fall out better to you, than it did to *Benedetto Alberto*, who by the "perswasions of those who did not love him, consented to the ruine of *Giorgio Scali* and "*Tomaso Strozzi*, and not long after was himself banish'd by the same Persons which in-"veigled him: he advis'd him therefore to consider more seriously of the business, and ra-"ther than to proceed, to follow the example of his Father, who to ingratiate with the "People, abated the Excise upon Salt; procur'd, that whosoevers Taxes was half a Flo-"rin or under, should pay it if they pleas'd, otherwise it should never be levyed. Pre-"vail'd that the day the Councils assembled, should be priviledg'd; and all Persons for "that time protected from their Creditors; and at last concluded that for his own part he "was resolv'd to acquiesce in the Government as it stood then, and to leave the City as he "found it.

These transactions being talk'd of a broad, procur'd much reputation to *Giovanni*, but more hatred to the other Citizens, whose conversation he declin'd what he could, to give the less incouragement to those who designed new troubles, under his familiarity and favour: declaring to every Body he discours'd withal about it, that in his judgment, factions were rather to be extinguish'd, than fomented at that time; and that as to himself, he desir'd nothing more cordially, than love and unanimity in the City, though several of his own party were dissatisfi'd with him, and had advis'd him to be more stirring and active in the business. Among the rest *Alamanno de Medici* was one, who being naturally furious, egg'd him on to take this opportunity of revenging himself upon his Enemies, and obliging his friends; reproaching him by the coldness of his proceedings, which (as he told him) gave his Enemies occasion to practise against him, without fear or respect; which practices (it was to be doubted) would succeed one time or other, and be the destruction both of his family and friends. *Cosimo*, his Son, importun'd him to the same, but *Giovanni*, neither for what had been reveal'd, nor prognosticated, could be mov'd from his resolution; however, the faction appear'd plain enough, and the whole City was most manifestly divided. There were at that time attending the *Senate* in the Palace, two Chancellors, *Martino*, and *Pagolo*. The latter was a favourer of *Uzano*, the former of the *Medici*. *Rinaldo*, finding *Giovanni* in exorable, and not to be wrought over to them, contrived to turn *Martino* out of his office, presuming after that the *Senat* would be more inclinable to them. Which design being smelt by the Adversary, *Martino* was not only continued in his Place, but *Pagolo* turn'd out, to the great detriment and dissatisfaction of his party; and doubtless the effects would have been dreadful, had not the War lien so heavy upon them, and the late defeat at *Zagonara*, put the City into such confusion. For whilst these things were agitated in *Florence*, *Agnolo della Pergola* with the Dukes Troops had taken all the Towns which the *Florentines* held in *Romagna*, (except *Castracaro*, and *Modigliana*) some for want of due fortification, and some for want of courage or fidelity in the Garrisons. In the acquisition of these Towns, two things happen'd, which demonstrate how grateful valour is even to an Enemy, and how much cowardize and pusilanimity is despis'd. *Biagio del Milano* was Captain of the Castle call'd *Montepetroso*, which being not only beseig'd, but set on fire by the Enemy, looking over the walls, and finding no way to escape, or preserve the Castle, he caus'd straw and bedding, and what other cloaths he had, to be thrown over the walls, where he saw the fire was not yet come, and then letting down two of his Children upon them, he cry'd out to the Enemy, *Here take such moveables as God and my fortune have given me; 'tis in your power to force them, and not in mine to preserve them; but for the treasure of my mind, in which my glory, and honor consists, you cannot ravish that from me, and I will never surrender it.* The Enemy (amaz'd at his Gallantry) ran presently to save the Children, and presented him ropes and ladders to have preserv'd himself; but he refus'd them, and chose rather to dye in the flames, than to be sav'd by the Enemies of his Country. An example worthy of the Commendation of Antiquity, and the more remarkable, by how much few of them are to be found. The Children were restor'd to what ever could be preserv'd and sent home by the Enemy (with singular generosity) to their Relations, who receiv'd them not with more joy, than they were entertain'd by the State, which for their Fathers and their own sakes, kept them at the publick charge during their lives.

The factions of *Uzano*, and the *Medici*.

The great courage of *Biagio del Milano*.

The other happen'd in *Galeata*, where *Zenobi del Pino* was *Podesta*, who without any defence at all, deliver'd up his Castle to the Enemy, and afterwards perswaded *Agnolo* to quit the *Alps* in *Romagna*, and betake himself to the hills in *Tuscany*, where he might spin out the War with more advantage, and less danger to himself. *Agnola* not able to brook such meanness and baseness of his Spirit, deliver'd him over to his Servants to dispose of him as they

The cowardize of *Zenobi del Pino*.

they pleas'd, who after mielions of affronts, and deriſions allow'd him nothing but painted cards for his dyet, declaring they intended of a *Guelf* to make him a *Ghibilin* that way, but what ever they intended, in a ſhort time he was ſtarv'd to Death.

In the mean time *Conte Oddo*, with *Nicolo Piccinino* were enter'd into the *Valdi Lamona*, to ſee if they could reduce the ſtate of *Faenza* to an amity with the *Florentines*; or at the leaſt hinder *Agnola della Pergola* from making his incurſions ſo freely into the territory of *Romagna*. But the vale being very ſtrong: and the inhabitants martial, *Conte Oddo* was ſlain, and *Piccinino* carried priſoner to *Faenza*. However as it fell out, the *Florentines* obtain'd by this loſs, what they would have hardly gain'd by the victory; for *Nicolo Piccinino* tranſacted ſo well with the Governour of *Faenza*, and his Mother, that by his perſwaſion, they became friends to the *Florentines*, and enter'd into a League with them, by which he was releas'd. But *Piccinino* follow'd not that Counſel which he had given to others: for either being debauch'd by the Towns he paſs'd thorow; or looking upon the condition of the *Florentines* to be but low, and his own to be better'd in another place; he departed abruptly from *Arezzo*, where his poſt was, and ſtealing away into *Lombardy*, he took up Arms under that Duke. The *Florentines* weaken'd by theſe accidents; and diſheartned by the expence of the War; concluded they were unable to carry it on, upon their own privat account; hereupon they ſent Embaſſadors to the *Venetians*, to deſire their aſſiſtance (which they might eaſily and effectually grant) againſt the growing greatneſs of a Perſon, who if let alone, would be as dangerous and deſtructive to them, as to the *Florentines*. *Franceſco Carmignuola* perſwaded them likewiſe to the ſame enterprize, who was an excellent Souldier as any in thoſe times; had ſerv'd formerly under the Duke, but then he was revolted from him, and come over to the *Venetian*. The *Venetian* was uncertain what to determine, not daring to be too confident of *Carmignuolo*, becauſe not ſecure whether his animoſity to the Duke, was real or pretended. Whilſt they remain'd in this ſuſpence, the Duke found a way, by corrupting one of his Servants, to cauſe him to be poiſon'd, but the poiſon being too weak did not kill him out-right, but brought him to great extremity. The *Venetian* having notice of this, laid their ſuſpition aſide; and the *Florentines* continuing their ſolicitations, they enterd into League with them, by which it was agreed the War ſhould be proſecuted by both parties, at the common expence; that what ever ſhould be taken in *Lombardy*, ſhould be deliver'd to the *Venetians*; and what ever in *Romagna* and *Tuſcany*, ſhould be put into the hands of the *Florentine*: and *Carmignuolo* was made General of the League. By means of this alliance the War was transfer'd into *Lombardy*, where it was manag'd by *Carmignuola* with that diſcretion and courage, that in a few months time he took ſeveral Towns from the Duke, and *Breſcia* among the reſt; which laſt in thoſe times, and according to the method of thoſe Warrs, was accounted a miracle. This War continued five years, and the Citizens of *Florence* were much impoveriſh'd by the Taxes which had been continued as long. Hereupon a regulation was agreed upon, and (that all People might be charg'd according to their Eſtates) it was propos'd the Perſonal Eſtate ſhould be chargeable as well as the real; and that who ever had to the value of a hundred Florins in goods, ſhould pay half a proportion. But there being Law and Authority to leavy this Tax, but not Men enough to compel them, the Grandees were diſguſted, and oppos'd it, before it was perfectly concluded: only *Giovanni de Medici* promoted it ſo vigorouſly, that he carried it againſt them all. And becauſe in the Books of aſſeſsment, every Man's goods were rated (which the *Florentines* call *Accataſtare*) this impoſition was call'd *Cataſto*. Moreover this Law reſtrain'd the Tyrannie of the Nobles, not permitting them to ſtrike, or terrifie ſuch as were inferior to them, in the Counſels, as formerly they had preſum'd. This Tax therefore though accepted chearfully enough by the Commons, went much againſt the minds of the Nobility. But it being in the Nature of Man, never to be ſatisfi'd, and as ſoon as poſſeſs'd of what with great vehemence he deſir'd, to wiſh as fiercely for another. The People not content with the proportions ſet them by the Law, demanded a retroſpection, and that it might be conſider'd how much the Nobility had paid leſs in times paſt, than was now allotted them by the *Cataſto*, and that they might be forc'd to pay it for the reinburſement of ſuch as had ſold their Eſtates to enable them to pay their Taxes before. This propoſition affrighted the Grandees much more than the *Cataſto*: ſo that to defend themſelves againſt both, they decry'd the *Cataſto* as unjuſt and unequal, in laying a Duty upon goods and houſhold-ſtuff (which are here to day, and loſt to morrow) and exempting mony, which many People kept privatly in their hands, ſo as the *Cataſto* could not diſcover it. To which they added, that it was but reaſonable thoſe Perſons who relinquiſh'd, or neglected their own privat affairs for the better management of the publick, ſhould be favour'd in the Taxes; for devoting their whole labour to the benefit of the State, there was no juſtice nor equity in the World, that the City ſhould have the profits of

Piccinino revolts.

Carmignuola General of the League.

Cataſto.

of their Industry, and Estate, and from others receive only the contribution of their Estates. Those who were for the *Catasto*, reply'd that as their goods varied, the Taxes might be varied too; and to any inconvenience from that, a remedy might be found. As to the mony conceal'd, that was not to be consider'd, for making no profit of it, there was no reason it should be paid for; and whenever they imploy'd it, it would be sure to be discover'd. For the pains they took, and their solicitude for their Country, if it were troublesom to them, they might have liberty to retire, for there was no doubt but some well affected Citizens would be found, who would not repine to serve the City both with their Counsel and Estates: and that there were so many honors, and other perquisits attending those great offices, as might suffice any reasonable Persons, without abatement of their Taxes. But their great discontent was from another cause; the Nobility were offended that they could not make War at other Peoples charge, as they were us'd to do formerly, but were oblig'd to bear their share as well as their Neighbours. Had this way been found out before, there would have been no War with King *Ladislao*, then; nor with Duke *Philip* now; both which Wars were undertaken to fill the Coffers of some particular Citizens, more than for any general necessity; but this commotion of humours, was appeas'd by *Giovanni de Medici*, who convinc'd the People, it was not convenient to look backward. That their business now was to provide carefully for the future, and if the former impositions had been unequal and injust, they were to thank God a way was found to relieve them, and not make that a means to divide, which was intended to unite the City; as it would certainly do, if the old assessments, and the new were adjusted, for it was better to be contented with half a victory than to venture all for an absolute; many instances making it out, that where more has been striv'd for, all has been lost. With these and such like discourses, he pacified the People, and the design of retrospection was quite laid aside.

However the War with the Duke being carried on for a while, a peace at length was concluded at *Ferrara* by the mediation of a Legat from the *Pope*. But the Duke not observing the conditions at first, the League took Arms again, and coming to an engagement with his Army at *Maclovio*, they defeated him quite, and forc'd the Duke to new propositions, which were accepted by the League: by the *Florentines*, because they were grown jealous of the *Venetian*, and sensible, that the vast charge which their City was at, was to make others more powerful than themselves. By the *Venetians*, because they observ'd *Carmignuola*, after the Duke was overthrown, to advance but slowly, and make little or no advantage of his victory, so as they could not place any farther confidence in him. In this manner the peace was concluded in the year 1428, by which the *Florentines* were restor'd to what they had lost in *Romagna*; the *Venetians* had *Brescia*, and the Duke gave them *Bergamo*, and the Territory belonging to it, over and above. This War cost the *Florentines* 3 millions and five thousand Duckats; the success of which, was Grandeur and Authority to the *Venetian*, but poverty and dissention to themselves. Peace being concluded abroad, the War was transplanted, and broke out at home. The *Grandees* of the City could not digest the *Catasto*; and not seeing any way of suppressing it, they contriv'd ways of incensing the People against it, that they might have more companions to oppose it. They remonstrated therefore to the Officers for collection, that they were to search, and Catastat the goods of the Neighbouring Towns, lest any of the *Florentine* goods should be conveyed thither. Whereupon all that were Subjects to that City, were requir'd to bring in Inventories of their goods within a certain time. But the *Volterrani* complaining to the *Senate*, incensed the Officers so highly, they put eighteen of them in Prison. This action provok'd the *Volterrani* exceedingly, but the regard they had for their Prisoners, kept them at present from any commotion.

Peace betwixt the league and the Duke.

1428.

About this time *Giovanni de Medici* fell Sick, and finding his Sickness to be mortal, he call'd his Sons *Cosimo* and *Lorenzo* to him, and said;

Giovanni de Medici's Speech to his Sons at his Death.

"I suppose the time that God, and Nature alloted me at my Birth, is now expir'd. I "die contented, leaving you rich, and healthful, and honorable, (if you follow my foot- "steps and instruction) and indeed nothing makes my Death so ealie and quiet to me, as "the thought that I have been so far from injuring or disobliging any Person, that I have "done them all the good offices I was able; and the same course I recommend to you. For "matter of office and Government (if you would live happy and secure) my advice is, you ac- "cept what the Laws and the People confer upon you; that will creat you neither envy "nor danger, for 'tis not what is given that makes Men Odious, but what is usurp'd; and "you shall always find greater number of those who encroaching upon other Peoples inte- "rest, ruine their own at last, and in the mean time live in perpetual disquiet. With these "arts, among so many factions and Enemies, I have not only preserv'd but augmented my "reputa-

"reputation in this City, if you follow my example, you may maintain and increase yours. "But if neither my example nor perswasion can keep you from other wayes, your ends will "be no happier than several others who in my memory have destroy'd both themselves and "their Families.

Not long after he dyed, and was infinitly lamented by the greatest part of the City, as indeed his good qualities deserv'd: for he was charitable to the height; not only relieving such as he ask'd, but preventing the modesty of such as he thought poor, and supplying them without it. He loved all People: the good he commended; the bad he commiserated. He sought no Office, and went thorough them all. He never went to the Palace, but invited. He was a lover of Peace, and an enemy to War. He reliev'd those who were in adversity, and those who were in prosperity he assisted. He was no friend to publick extortion, and yet a great augmenter of the Common Stock. Courteous in all his imployments; not very eloquent, but solid, and judicious. His complexion appear'd melancholy, but in company he was pleasant and facetious. He died rich, espicially in Love and Reputation; and the inheritance of all descended upon his Son *Cosimo*.

Cosimo heir to his Father.

The *Volterrani* were weary of their Imprisonment, and to recover their liberties, promis'd to condescend to what was requir'd. Being discharg'd, and return'd to *Volterra*, the time for the new *Priori's* entrance into the Magistracy arriv'd, and one *Giusto* (a Plebean, but a Man of good interest among them) was chosen in the place. Having been one of those who were imprison'd at *Florence* he had conceiv'd a mortal hatred against the *Florentines*, and it was much increas'd by the instigation of one *Giovanni* (a Person of Noble extraction) who being in Authority with him at the same time perswaded him that by the authority of the *Priori*, and his own interest, he would stir up the People to rescue themselves from their dependance upon *Florence*, and afterwards make himself Prince: upon this incouragement *Guisto* took Arms; possess'd himself of the Town; imprison'd the *Florentine* Governor, and, by consent of the People, made himself Lord. The news of these revolutions in *Volterra*, was not at all pleasing to the *Florentines*; But their peace being made with the Duke, and their Articles sign'd, they thought they had leisure enough to recover that Town; and to lose no time, they made *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, and *Palla Strozzi* Commissioners, and sent them thither out of hand. *Guisto* suspecting the *Florentines* would assault him, sent to *Sienna*, and *Lucca* for relief. The *Sienneſi* refus'd him, alledging they were in League with the *Florentine*: and *Pagolo Guinigi* (who was then Lord of *Lucca*) to reingratiat with the People of *Florence* (whose favour he had lost in their Wars with the Duke) not only deny'd his assistance to *Giusto*, but sent his Embassador Prisoner to *Florence*. The Commissioners to surprize the *Volterrani*, before they were aware, assembled what strength they had of their own, rais'd what foot they could in the lower *Val d'Arno*, and the territory of *Pisa*: and march'd towards *Volterra*. *Giusto* discourag'd neither by the desertion of his Neighbours, nor the approach of the Enemy, rely'd upon the situation, and strength of the Town; and prepar'd for his defence. There was at that time in *Volterra*, one *Arcolano* (a Brother of that *Giovanni* who had perswaded *Giusto* to take the Government upon him) a Person of good credit among the Nobility. This *Arcolano* having got several of his Confidents together, he remonstrated to them, how God Almighty by this accident had reliev'd the necessities of their City; for if they would take Arms with him; remove *Giusto* from the Government, and deliver all up to the *Florentines*, they should not only have their old priviledges confirm'd, but be themselves made the chief Officers of the Town. Having consented to the design; they repair'd immediatly to the Palace where *Giusto* resided; and leaving the rest below, *Arcolano* with three more went up into the dining-room, where they found him with other Citizens; they pretended to speak with him, about business of importance, and having (in the variety of their discourse) drill'd him to another Chamber, *Arcolano* and his accomplices fell upon him with their Swords: but they were not so nimble but *Giusto* had the opportunity to draw his, and wound two of them, before he fell himself, yet his destiny being unavoidable, he was kill'd, and thrown out into the Palace yard. Whereupon those who were confederat with *Arcolana* taking Arms, they deliver'd up the Town to the *Florentine* Commissioners, who were not far off with their Army. The Commissioners march'd directly into the Town, without any Capitulation, so that then the condition of the *Volterrani* was worse than before; for among other things, a great part of their Country was dismembred; and the Town it self reduc'd to a *Vicariata*. *Volterra* being in this manner lost, and recover'd at the same time, there had been no danger of new War, had not the ambition of some Men pull'd it down upon their heads. There was a Person who for a long time had serv'd the *Florentines* in their Wars against the Duke: his name was *Nicolo Fortebraccio*, Son of a Sister of *Braccio da Perugia*. This *Nicolo* was disbanded upon the Peace; and at the time of these

Volterra revolts.

Giusto slain.

these accidents at *Volterra* had his quarters at *Fucecchio*, so that the Commissioners made use of him, and his Souldiers in that enterprize. It was believ'd, that whilst *Rinaldo* was engag'd with him in that War, he had perswaded *Nicolo* upon some pretended quarrel, to fall upon the *Lucchesi*; assuring him that if he did, he would order things so in *Florence*, that an Army should be sent against *Lucca*, and he have the command of it. *Volterra* being reduc'd, and *Nicolo* return'd to his old Post at *Fucecchio*; either upon *Rinaldo's* instigation, or his own private inclination, in *Novem.* 1429. with 300 Horse and 300 Foot, he surpriz'd *Ruoti*, and *Compito*, two Castles belonging to the *Lucchesi*; and afterwards falling down into the plain, he made great depredation. The news being brought to *Florence*, the whole Town was in uproar, and the greatest part was for an expedition against *Lucca*. Of the chief Citizens which favour'd the enteprize, there were all the *Medici*, and *Rinaldo*, who was prompted thereto either out of an opinion it would be for the advantage of that Common Wealth, or out of an ambition to be made head of it himself. Those who oppos'd it were *Nicolo da Uzano*, and his party. And it seems an incredible thing, that in one City, upon one occasion, there should be such contrariety of Judgments. For the same People who after ten years peace, oppos'd the War against Duke *Philip*, (which was undertaken in defence of their liberties) the same Persons now, after such vast expence, and so many Calamities as their City had undergone, press'd and importun'd for a War with the *Lucchesi*, to disturb the Liberties of other People. And on the other side, those who were for the War then, resisted it now. So strangely does time alter the Judgments of Men; so much more prone are People to invade their Neighbours, than to secure themselves, and so much more ready are they to conceive hopes of gaining upon others, than to apprehend any danger of losing their own. For dangers are not believ'd till they be over their heads; but hopes are entertain'd though at never so great distance. The People of *Florence* were full of hopes upon intelligence of what *Nicolo Fartebraccio* had done and did still do, and upon certain letters which they receiv'd from their *Rettori* upon the confines of *Lucca*. For their deputies in *Pescia*, and *Vico*, writ them word that if they might have liberty to receive such Castles and Towns as would be deliver'd up to them, they should be Masters of the greatest part of the Territory of *Lucca:* and it contributed not a little to their encouragement, that at the same time, they received a Embassie from the *Senate* of *Lucca*, to complain of *Nicolo's* invasion, and to beg of the *Senate* that they would not make War upon a Neighbour City, which had preserv'd a constant amity with them. The Embassador's name was *Jacopo Vicciani*; who had been Prisoner not long before to *Pagolo Guinigi* Lord of *Lucca*, for a Conspiracy against him; and (though found guilty) had been pardon'd for his Life. Supposing he would have as easily have forgiven his imprisonment, as *Pagolo* had done his offence, he imploy'd him in this Embassy, and sent him to *Florence*. But *Jacopo* being more mindful of the danger he had escap'd, than the benefit he had receiv'd; encouraged the *Florentines* to the enterprize; which encouragement added to the hopes they had conceiv'd before, and caus'd them to call a General Counsel (in which 498. Citizens appear'd) before whom the whole project was more particularly abated.

Rinaldo perswades the War.

"Among the Principal promoters of the expedition (as I said before) *Rinaldo* was one, "who represented to them, the great advantage that would accrue to them by the taking "of that Town. He insisted upon the convenience of the time, as being abandon'd by "the *Venetian*, and the Duke; and not capable of relief from the *Pope*, who had his "hands full another way. To which he added the easiness of the enterprize, the Govern- "ment having been usurp'd by one of its own Citizens, and by that means lost much of "its natural vigor, and ancient disposition to defend its liberties; so that it was more than "probable, either the People would deliver it up, in opposition to the Tyrant, or the Ty- "rant surrender for fear of the People. He exaggerated the injuries that Governor had "done to their state; the ill inclination he still retain'd towards them; and the dangers "which would ensue if the *Pope* or Duke should make War upon it; concluding that no "enterprize was ever undertaken by the State of *Florence* more easie, more profitable, or "more just.

Uzano opposes it.

"In opposition to this, it was urg'd by *Uzano* that the City of *Florence* never under- "took any War with more injustice, or hazard, nor any that was more like to produce sad "and pernicious effects. That first, they were to invade a City of the *Guelfish* faction, "which had been always a friend to the City of *Florence*; and to its own danger and pre- "judice many times receiv'd the *Guelfs* into its bosom, when they were banish'd, or unsafe "in their own Country. That in all the Chronicles of our affairs, it was not to be found, "that City had ever offended *Florence*, whilst it was free; and if at any time since its sub- "jection, it had transgress'd, (as indeed it had during the Government of *Castruccio*, and "under

"under this preſent Lord) it was but reaſonable to lay the ſadle upon the right Horſe; "and to impute the fault rather to their Tyrants, than Town. If War could be made a- "gainſt the Tyrant, without detriment to the City, well and good; the injuſtice would "be the leſs. But that being impoſſible, he could never conſent that a City of ſo antient "amity and allyance, ſhould be ruin'd for nothing. However becauſe Men liv'd then at "ſuch a rate, that no account was made of what was juſt and unjuſt, he would wave ſo "trifling an argument, and proceed to the profit and emolument of that War, which "was the thing now adays moſt ſeriouſly conſidered: did believe thoſe things were moſt "properly call'd profitable, which carried leaſt damage along with them; but how that "expedition could with any equity be call'd profitable, he could not underſtand; ſeeing "the damage was certain, and the benefit but contingent. The certainty of the damage "conſiſted, in the vaſtneſs of the expence, which muſt of neceſſity be great enough to diſ- "courage a City that was quiet and at peace, much more one that had been already har- "raſs'd out with a tedious and a chargeable War as their City had been. The advantages "propos'd were the taking of *Lucca*, which he confeſs'd would be conſiderable. Yet the "accidents and impediments with which they might meet were ſo far from being to be "ſlighted, that to him they ſeem'd numerous and inſuperable, and the whole enterprize "impoſſible. Nor ought they to preſume that either the *Venetian* or the Duke would be "content that they ſhould conquer it; for though the *Venetian* ſeem'd to comply, it "was but in gratitude to the *Florentines* at whoſe charges they had ſo largely extended their "Empire, and the other was only cautious of ingaging in a new War, and new expence, and "attended till they were tired and exhauſted, that he might fall upon them with advan- "tage. He minded them likewiſe, that in the middle of their enterprize, and in the "higheſt hopes of their Victory, the Duke would not want means to relieve the *Luccheſi*, "either by ſupplying them with mony under hand, or if that would not do, by disbanding "his Men, and ſending them as Souldiers of Fortune, to take pay under them. Upon theſe "reaſons he perſwaded them to give over that deſign, and to live ſo with that Uſurper, as "to create him what Enemies they could, for he knew no way ſo ready to ſubdue the Town, "as to leave it to his Tyranny, and let him alone to afflict and weaken it as he pleas'd. So "that if the buſineſs was manag'd as it ſhould be, that City might quickly be brought to ſuch "tearms, that the Uſurper, not knowing how to hold it, and the City as unable to Go- "vern it ſelf, would be conſtrain'd to throw it ſelf voluntarily under their protection. Ne- "vertheleſs ſeeing their eagerneſs was ſuch that his reaſons could not be heard, he would "undertake to prognoſticate; that the War which they were about ſhould coſt them much "mony; expoſe them to many dangers at home, and in ſtead of taking *Lucca*, and "keeping it to themſelves, they ſhould deliver it from an Uſurper, and of a poor, ſer- "vile, but friendly City, make it free, and malicious, and ſuch as in time would grow to "be a great obſtacle to the greatneſs of *Florence*.

This enterprize being thus canvaſſed on both ſides, it came (privatly and according to cuſtom) to the votes of the whole Convention, and of the whole number, only 98 were againſt it. Reſolution being taken, and the ten Men created for the carrying on of the War, they rais'd Men with all ſpeed both infantry and Horſe. For Commiſſaries, they deputed *Aſtorre Gianni*, and *Rinaldo de gli Albizzi*, and made an agreement with *Nicolo Fortebaccio* that he ſhould deliver what Towns he had taken, into their hands, and take pay under them. The Commiſſaries being arriv'd with their Army in the Country of *Lucca*, they divided, *Aſtorre* extending himſelf upon the plain towards *Camaggiore*, and *Pietra Santa*; and *Rinaldo* with his Squadron marching towards the Mountains, preſuming that if they cut off its entercourſe with the Country, it would be no hard matter to become Maſters of the Town. But both their deſigns were unhappy; not but that they took ſeveral Caſtles and Towns, but becauſe of ſundry imprudencies committed in the management of the War, both by the one and the other. *Aſtorre Gianni* gave particular evidence of his indiſcretion in the paſſage which follows. Not far from *Pietra Santa* there is a vale call'd *Seravezza*, rich, full of Inhabitants; who underſtanding the approach of that Commiſſary, went out to meet him, and to deſire that he would receive and protect them as faithful ſervants to the People of *Florence*. *Aſtorre* pretended to accept their offer, but afterwards he caus'd his Souldiers to ſeize upon all the ſtrong places, and paſſes in the vale; and aſſembling all the Inhabitants in their Principal Church; he kept them Priſoners and commanded his Men to plunder and deſtroy the whole Country; after a moſt cruel and barbarous way, prophaning the Churches and Religious Houſes, and abuſing the Women, as well Virgins as others. Theſe paſſages being known in *Florence*, offended not only the Magiſtrats, but the whole City. Some of the *Seravezi*, who had eſcap'd the hands of the Commiſſary, fled directly to *Florence*, telling the ſadneſs of their condition to all Perſons they met with, and being in-

The Cruelty of *Aſtorre*.

couraged by several who were desirous to have *Astorre* punish'd, either as an evil Man, or as an adversary to their faction; they address'd themselves to the *Ten*, and desir'd to be heard; and being introduc'd, one of them step'd forth and spake to this purpose.

The *Saravezesi* complain.

"We are assured (most magnificent Lords) our words would not only find belief, but "compassion among you, did you but know in what manner your Comissary first seiz'd "upon our Country, and afterwards upon us. Our Vale (as 'tis likely your Chronicles may "remember you) was always of the *Guelfish* party; and many times a faithful receptacle "for such of your Citizens as by the persecution of the *Ghibilins*, were not suffer'd at home. "Our Ancestors and we have always ador'd the very name of this Illustrious Republick; and "esteem'd it as the head and principal member of that party. Whilst *Lucca* was *Guelfish*, "we submitted very quietly to their Commands; but since it fell under the dominion of an "Usurper, who has relinquished its old friends, and joyn'd himself with the *Ghibilins*, we "have obey'd him, 'tis true, but rather by force, than by consent: and God knows how of- "ten we have beg'd for an opportunity to express our affection to our old friends. But "how blind and deceitful are the desires of Man; That which we prayed for, as our only "felicity, is become our destruction. As soon as we heard your ensigns were marching "toward us, supposing them not our Enemies, but our antient Lords, and friends, we went "immediatly to wait upon your Commissary, and committed our valley, our fortunes, "and our selves into his hands, relying wholly upon his Generosity, and presuming he had "had the Soul (if not of a *Florentine*) at least of a Man. Pardon (I beseech you) my "freedom, we have suffer'd so much already, nothing can be worse, and that gives me this "confidence.

"Your General has nothing of a Man but his Person, nor of a *Florentine* but his Name. "He is a mortal Disease, a savage Beast, and as horrid a Monster as ever any Author ever "describ'd. For having wheedled us together into our Cathedral under pretence of dis- "coursing some things with us, he made us his Prisoners: ruin'd and burn'd our valley; "rob'd, and spoiled, and sacked, and beat, and murdered the inhabitants; the Women he "ravish'd, the Virgins he forced, tearing them out of the arms of their Parents, and throw- "ing them as a prey to his Souldiers. Had we provok'd him by any injury either to his "Country or himself; we should have been so far from complaining, we should have con- "demn'd our selves; and esteem'd it no more than what our own insolence and unworthi- "ness had pull'd upon our heads. But having put our selves freely into his power; with- "out Arms or any other capacity of resistance; to be then rob'd, and abus'd, with so much "injury and insolence, is beyond humane patience, and we cannot but resent it. And "though we might make all *Lombardy* ring with the sadness of our complanits; and with "imputation, and scandal to this City, diffuse the Story of our sufferings all over *Italy*, we "have waved and declin'd it, thinking it unjust to asperse so Noble, so Charitable a Com- "mon Wealth, with the cruelty and dishonour of a Barbarous Citizen, whose insatiable "avarice had we known, or could have but suspected, before we had try'd it; we would "have strain'd and forc'd our selves to have gorg'd it (though indeed it has neither bounds "nor bottom) and by that means (if possible) preserv'd part of our Estates, by sacrifi- "cing the rest. But that being too late, we have address'd our selves most humbly to your "Lordships, begging that ye would releive the infelicity of your Subjects; that other "People may not (by our president) be terrifi'd or discourag'd from committing them- "selves under your Empire and Dominion. If the infinite and unsupportable injuries we "have suffer'd, be too weak or few to procure your compassion; yet let the fear of God's "displeasure prevail, whose Temples have been plunder'd and burn'd, and his People be- "traid in the very bowels of his Churches.

And having said thus, they threw themselves before them upon the ground, yelling, and imploring that they might be repossess'd of their Estates and their Country; and that their Lordships would take care (seeing their reputation was irrecoverable) that at least the Wifes might be restored to their Husbands, and the Children to their Parents. The cruelty and inhumanity of his behaviour having been understood before; and now particularly related by the sufferers themselves; wrought so highly upon the Magistrates, that immediatly they Commanded *Astorre* back from the *Army*, cashier'd him, and made him afterwards incapable of any Command. They caus'd inquisition likewise to be made after the goods of the *Saravezesi*: such as were found, were restor'd, what could be found, was repriz'd afterwards by the City, as opportunity was offer'd.

Rinaldo accus'd.

Rinaldo degli Albizi was accus'd on the other side for managing the War, not so much for the publick profit of his Country, as for his own; it was objected against him, that from the very hour of his Commission, he laid aside all thoughts of reducing *Lucca*, and design'd no farther than to plunder the Country, to fill his own pastures with other Peoples cattel,

Cattel, and furnish his own houses with other Peoples goods. That his own Bokty and his Officers being too little to satisfie him, he barter'd, and bought the plunder of his common Soldiers, and, of a General, made himself a Merchant. These calumnations being come to his ears, netled his honest, but haughty mind, more perhaps than a Wise Man would have suffer'd them to do. However they disturb'd him so, that in a rage both against Magistrate and City, without expecting, or so much as desiring leave, he return'd upon the spur to *Florence*, presented himself before the *Ten*, and told them;

His Speech to the *Ten*.

"That he now found how difficult and dangerous it was to serve an unconstant People, "and a divided City; the one entertain'd all reports and believ'd them: The other pu- "nish'd what was amiss, condemn'd what was uncertain, but rewarded nothing that was "done well. So that if you overcome, no body thanks you; if you mistake every body "blames you; if you miscarry every body reproaches you; either your friends persecute "you for emulation, or your Enemies for Malice. However for his part he had never, for "fear of Scandal or imputation, omitted any thing which he judg'd might be of certain ad- "vantage to his Country. But that now indeed the baseness of the calumnies under which "at present he lay, had master'd his patience, and chang'd his whole Nature. Where- "fore he beg'd the Magistrates would for the future be more ready to justifie their officers, "that they might act with more alacrity for the good of their Country. And that seeing "in *Florence* no Triumph was to be expected, that they at least would concern themselves "so far, as to secure them from obloquy. He admonish'd them likewise to reflect, that "they themselves were officers of the same City, and by consequence every hour lyable to "such slanders as may give them to understand how great trouble and disquiet honest "Men conceive at such false accusations.

The ten endeavour'd to pacifie him as much as the time would allow, but transfer'd his command upon *Neri di Gino*, and *Alamanno Salviati*, who instead of rambling, and harrasing the Country, advanced with their Army, and block'd up the Town. The season being cold, the Army was lodg'd at *Capanole*, the new Generals, thinking the time long, had a mind to be nearer and encamp before the Town, but the Souldiers objected the ill weather, and would not consent, though the *Ten* sent them positive orders to that purpose, and would not hear of excuse.

There was at that time resident in *Florence*, a most excellent Architect call'd *Philip*, the the Son of *Bruneleſco*, of whose Workmanship this City is so full, that after his Death he deserv'd to have his statue set up in Marble in the principal Church of the Town, with an inscription under it, to testifie his great excellence to the Reader. This *Philip* upon consideration of the banks of the River *Serchio*, and the situation of the Town, had found out a way to drown it. This invention he imparted to the *Ten*, and so convinc'd them, that by their order, experiment was to be made, which was done, but it turn'd more to the prejudice of our camp, than to the detriment of the Town. For the *Lucchesi* perceiving the design, heighten'd and strengthned their banks on that part where the river was to overflow, and afterwards taking their opportunity one night, they brake down the sluice which was made to turn the water upon them; so that their banks being firm and high, and the banks towards the plain open, it overflowed their Camp, and forc'd them to remove. This design miscarrying, the *Ten* call'd home their Commissioners, and sent *Giovanni Guiccardini* to command the Army in their stead; who clap'd down before the Town, and straiten'd it immediatly. Finding himself distress'd, the Governor of the Town, upon the incouragement of *Antonio dell Rosso*, a *Sienese* (who was with him as resident from the Town of *Sienna*) sent *Salvestro Trenta* and *Lodovico Bonvisi* to the Duke of *Milan*, to desire he would relieve him. Finding him cold in the business, they intreated him privatly that he would at least send them supplies, and promis'd him (from the People) that as soon as they were arrivd, they would deliver both Lord and Town into their hands; assuring him that if this resolution were not suddenly taken, their Lord would surrender it to the *Florentines*, who had tempted him with several fair proffers. The fear of that, made the Duke lay aside all other respects, wherefore he caus'd the *Conte Francesco Sforza* his General, publickly to desire leave to march with his forces into the Kingdom of *Naples*; and having obtain'd it, he went with his Troops to *Lucca*, notwithstanding the *Florentines*, upon notice of his transaction, sent to the *Conte Boccaccino Alamanni*, their friend to prevent it. *Francesco* having forc'd his passage into the Town, the *Florentines* drew of to *Librafatta*, and the Conte march'd out, and sat down before *Pescia*, where *Pagolo da Diaccetto* was Governor, and in great fear ran away to *Pistoia*. Had not the Town been better defended by *Giovanni Malavolti*, than by him, it had been most dishonourably lost. The Conte, not able to carry it at the first assault, drew off to *Buggiano*, took that and *Stilano* a Castle not far off and burn'd both of them to the ground. The *Florentines* displeas'd with this devastation, apply'd themselves to a remedy which had often preserv'd

them; and knowing that Souldiers of Fortune are easier corrupted than beaten, they caus'd a considerable sum to be proffer'd to the Conte, not only to depart, but to deliver them the Town. The Conte perceiving no Man was to be squeez'd out of that City, accepted the proposition in part; but not thinking it convenient in point of honor to put them in possession of the Town, he articled to draw away his Army upon the payment of 50000 Ducats. This agreement being made, that the People of *Lucca* might excuse him to the Duke, he seiz'd upon their Governor, which they had promis'd to depose. *Antonio dell Rosso* (the *Siena* Embassador) was at that time in *Lucca*, as we said before. This *Antonio* by the Authority of the *Conte*, meditated the destruction of *Pagolo*. The heads of the Conspiracy were *Pietro Cennami*, and *Giovanni da Chivizano*.

The Conte was quartered out of the Town, upon the Banks of the *Serchio*, and with him the Governor's Son. The Conspirators, about 40 in number, went in the night to find out *Pagolo*, who hearing of their intention, came forth in great fear to meet them, and inquire the occasion. To whom *Cennami* made answer; That they had been too long Govern'd by him: that the Enemy was now about their Walls, and they brought into a necessity of dying either by Famine or the Sword; That for the future they were resolv'd to take the Government into their own hands, and therefore they demanded that the Treasure, and the Keys of the City might be deliver'd to them. *Pagolo* reply'd, that the Treasure was consum'd; but both the Keys and himself were at their service, only he had one request to make to them, that as his Government had begun, and continued without Blood, so there might be none spilt at its conclusion. Hereupon *Sagolo* and his Son were deliver'd up to the *Conte Francesco*, who presented them to the Duke, and both of them dyed afterwards in prison.

Pagolo Lord of *Lucca* depos'd.

This departure of the Conte, having freed the *Lucchesi* from the Tyranny of their Governor, and the *Florentine* from the fear of his Army; both sides fell again to their preparations; the one to beleaguer, and the other to defend. The *Florentines* made the *Conte Orbino* their General, who begirt the Town so close, the *Lucchesi* were constrain'd once more to desire the assistance of the Duke, who under the same pretence as he had formerly sent the *Conte*, sent *Nicolo Piccinino* to relieve them. *Piccinino* advancing with his Troops to enter the Town, the *Florentines* opposing his passage over the River, the *Florentines* were defeated after a sharp ingagement, and the General with very few of his Forces, preserv'd themselves at *Pisa*. This dissaster put the whole City into great consternation; and because the enterprize had been undertaken upon the Peoples account, not knowing where else to direct their complaints, they laid the fault upon the Officers and managers, seeing they could not fix it upon the contrivers of the War; and reviv'd their old Articles against *Rinaldo*. But the greatest part of their indignation fell upon *Giovanni Guiecardini*; charging him that it was in his Power to have put an end to the War, after Conte *Francesco* was departed; but that he had been corrupted by their mony; part of which had been remitted to his own house by bills of exchange; and part he had receiv'd himself, and carryed it with him. These reports and rumors went so high, that the Captain of the People, moved by them, and the opportunity of the contrary party, summon'd him before him; *Giovanni* appear'd, but full of indignation, whereupon his relations interpos'd, and to their great honor, prevail'd so far with the Captain, that the process was laid aside. The *Lucchesi* upon this Victory, not only recover'd their own Towns, but over-run, and possess'd themselves of the whole Territory of *Pisa*, except *Biantina*, *Calcinaia*, *Liccorno*, and *Librafatta*; and (had not a conspiracy been accidentally discover'd in *Pisa*) that City had been lost among the rest. The *Florentines* however recruited their Army, and sent it out under the Command of *Micheletto*, who had been bred up a Soldier under *Sforza*.

The *Florentines* defeated.

The Duke having obtain'd the Victory, to overlay the *Florentines*, with multitude of Enemies, procured a League betwixt the *Genouesi*, *Sanisi*, and the Lord of *Piombino*, for the defence of *Lucca*; and that *Piccinino* should be their General, which thing alone was the discovery of the Plot. Hereupon the *Venetians* and *Florentines* renew their League. Open Hostilities are committed both in *Lombardy* and *Tuscany*; and many Skirmishes and Rencounters happen with various fortune on both sides; till at length every Body being tyr'd, a General Peace was concluded betwixt all parties in the month of *May* 1433. by which it was agreed that the *Florentines*, *Siennesi*, *Lucchesi* and who ever else during that War had taken any Towns or Castles from their Enemies, should restore them, and all things return to the possession of the owners. During the time of this War abroad, the malignant and factious humors began to Work again and ferment at home; and *Cosimo de Medici* after the Death of his Father, began to manage the publick business with greater intention and magnanimity; and converse with his Friends with greater freedom than his Father had done. Insomuch that those who before were glad at the death of *Giovanni*,

1433.

Peace betwixt the *Florentines* and *Lucchesi*.

Giovanni, were much ſurpriz'd and confounded, to ſee him ſo far out-done by his Son. *Coſimo* was a wiſe and ſagacious Gentleman, grave, but grateful in his preſence; liberal, and courteous to the higheſt; never attempted any thing againſt any party, nor the State, but watch'd all opportunities of doing good to every Body, and obliging all People with his continual benefcence. So that indeed the excellency of his Converſation, was no little diſtraction and diſadvantage to thoſe who were at the helm. However, by that way he preſum'd he ſhould be lyable to live as freely, and with as much Authority, in *Florence*, as other People: or elſe being driven to any ſtrait by the malice of his Adverſaries, it would be in his Power to deal with them, by the aſſiſtance of his friends. The great inſtruments for the Propagation of his intereſt were *Averardo de Medici*, and *Puccio Pucci*; *Averardo* with his prudence procuring him much favour and reputation. This *Puccio* was a Perſon ſo eminent for his judgment, and ſo well known to the People, that he denominated the faction, which was not call'd *Coſimo's*, but *Puccio's* Party. The City was divided in this manner at that time, when the enterprize was taken againſt *Lucca*; during which the ill humors, were rather provok'd, and incens'd than extinguiſh'd. And although *Puccio's* Party were the great promoters of it at firſt, yet afterwards in the proſecution of it, many of the contrary party were imploy'd, as Men of more reputation in the State. Which being above the Power of *Averardo de Medici*, and his camerades to prevent, he ſet himſelf with all poſſible Art to calumniat thoſe Officers; and upon any misfortune (and no great thing can be managed without it) all was imputed rather to their imprudence and ill conduct, than to the Virtue of their Enemies. He it was that aggravated his Enormities ſo ſtrongly againſt *Aſtorre Gianni*. He it was diſguſted *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, and caus'd him to deſert his Command without leave. He it was which caus'd the Captain of the People to cite *Guiccardini* before him. From him it was, all the other aſperſions which were laid upon the Magiſtrates and the Generals, did proceed. He aggravated what was true; he invented what was falſe; and what was true, and what was falſe were readily beleiv'd by thoſe who hated them before.

Theſe unjuſt and irregular ways of proceeding were well known to *Nicolo Uzano*, and other heads of that Party. They had many times conſulted how they might remedy them, but could never pitch upon a way. To ſuffer them to increaſe, they were ſenſible would be dangerous; and to endeavour to ſuppreſs them, they knew would be difficult. *Nicolo da Uzano* was the firſt Man that expos'd his diſguſt; but obſerving the War to be continued without, and the diſtractions increaſing at home; *Nicolo Barbadori*, deſirous of *Uzano's* concurrence to the deſtruction of *Coſimo*, went to ſeek him at his houſe, and finding him alone very penſive in his ſtudy, he perſwaded him with the beſt arguments he could uſe, to joyn with *Rinaldo* in the expulſion of *Coſimo*, to whom *Niccolo da Uzano* reply'd in theſe Words. *Nicolo da Uzano's anſwer to Barbadori.*

"It were better for your ſelf, for your Family and the whole Common Wealth, if both "you and your whole party, had their beards (as they ſay you have) rather of Silver than "Gold. Their Counſels then, proceeding from Heads that were gray, and repleat with "experience, would be fuller of Wiſdom, and advantage to the Publick. Thoſe who de"ſign to drive *Coſimo* out of *Florence*, ought firſt to conſider his intereſt with their own. "Our Party you have chriſten'd the party of the Nobility, and the contrary faction, is "call'd the faction of the People. Did the truth of the matter correſpond with the Name, "yet in all adventures the victory would be doubtful, and we ought in diſcretion rather to "fear than preſume, when we remember the Condition of the Antient Nobility of this Ci"ty, which have not only been depreſs'd, but extinguiſh'd by the People. But we are un"der greater diſcouragments than that, our Party is divided, theirs is entire. In the firſt "place *Neri de Gino*, and *Neyone de Nigi* (two of the Principal of our City) have not "declar'd themſelves as yet; ſo that it remains uncertain which ſide they will take. There "are ſeveral houſes and families divided among themſelves. Many out of a pique to "their Brothers, or ſome other of their Relations, have abandon'd us, and betaken "to them. I ſhall inſtance in ſome of the chief, and leave the reſt to your privat con"ſideration. Of the Sons of *Maſo de gli Albizi*; *Lucca*, out of animoſity to *Rinal*"*do*, has ingag'd himſelf on the other ſide: in the Family of the *Guiccardini*, among "the Sons of *Luigi*, *Piero* is an Enemy to his Brother *Giovanni*, and ſides with our ad"verſaries. *Tomaſo* and *Nicolo Soderini*, in oppoſition to *Franceſco*, their Unckle, are ma"nifeſtly defected. So that if it be ſeriouſly deliberated, who are on their ſide, and who "are on ours, I know no reaſon why ours ſhould be call'd the faction of the Nobility more "than theirs. And if it be alledg'd, that the People are all on their ſide; ſo much is "ours the worſe; for when ever we come to blows, we ſhall not be able to oppoſe them. "If we inſiſt upon our dignity, it was given us at firſt, and has been continued to us

"for

" for fifty years by this State; and if now we ſhould diſcover our weakneſs, we ſhould " certainly loſe it. If you pretend the juſtice of our cauſe, and that that will give us repu- " tation, and detract from our Enemies;

" I anſwer, it is fit that Juſtice ſhould be known and believ'd by other People, as well " as our ſelves; which is quite contrary, the whole cauſe of our preſent Commotion be- " ing founded upon a bare ſuſpition, that *Coſimo* would uſurp, and make himſelf Soveraign " of our City. Though this ſuſpicion paſſes among us, it does not with other People, " who accuſes us, even for our accuſation of him. Examine the crimes upon which we " ground our ſuſpicion; what are they, but that he diſtributes his mony freely, according " to every Mans neceſſity; and that not only upon a private, but publick account, not on- " ly to the *Florentines*, but to the foreign Commanders: that he favours this or that Citi- " zen which deſires to be a Magiſtrate; that by the general reputation he has among all " People, he advances this, or that, of his friends to imployments as he ſees occaſion: ſo " that the whole weight and ſtrength of his impeachment, lyes in this; that he is charitable, " liberal; ready to his friend; and belov'd by all People. Tell me I beſeech you what " Law is it that prohibits, that blames, and condemns beneficence, or love? 'Tis true, " theſe are ways by which Men aſpire and do many times arrive at the Supremacy; but " they are not thought ſo by other People; nor are we ſufficient to obtrude them; becauſe " our own ways have defam'd us; and the City (having lived always in faction) is be- " come corrupt and partial, and will never regard our accuſations. But admit you ſucceed " and ſhould prevail ſo far as to baniſh him (which truly if the Senate concur might be " done without difficulty) how can you think among ſo many of his friends as will be left " behind, and labour inceſſantly for his return, to obviate or prevent it? Certainly it will " be impoſſible, his intereſt is ſo great, and himſelf ſo univerſally belov'd, you can never " ſecure him. If you go about to to baniſh the chief of thoſe who diſcover themſelves to be his " friends, you do but multiply your adverſaries, and create more Enemies to your ſelf: re- " turn he will, in a very ſhort time, and then you have gain'd only this point, to have ba- " niſh'd a good Man, and readmitted a bad: for you muſt expect he will be exaſperated, " his Nature debauch'd by thoſe who call him back; and being oblig'd to them ſo highly, " it will be no prudence in him to reject them. If your deſign be to put him to Death for- " mally, by the cooperation of the Magiſtrate; that is not to be done; his wealth, and your " corruption will preſerve him. But admit he ſhould dye, or being baniſh'd never return, " I do not ſee what advantage will accrue to our ſtate. If it de deliver'd from *Coſimo*, it " will be in the ſame danger of *Rinaldo*; and I am of their number who would have no " Citizen exceed another in Authority. If either of them prevail (as one of them muſt) " I know not what obligation I have to favour *Rinaldo* more than *Coſimo*. I will ſay no " more, than God deliver this City from private uſurpation, and (when our ſins do de- " ſerve it) particularly from his. Do not therefore perſwade to a thing that is every way " ſo dangerous; do not fancy that by the aſſiſtance of a few, you can oppoſe againſt a mul- " titude: all the Citizens you converſe with, partly by ignorance, and partly by malice, are " diſpos'd to ſell their Country; and fortune is ſo favourable as to have preſented them a " Chapman. Manage your ſelf therefore by my Counſel for once; live quietly, and obſerve, " and (as to your liberty) you will have as much reaſon to be jealous of your own party, " as the adverſe. When troubles do happen, let me advice you to be a Neuter; by it you " will ſtand fair with both ſides, and preſerve your ſelf, without prejudice to your " Country.

Theſe words rebated the edge of *Barbadoro*'s fury; and all things remain'd peaceable during the War with *Lucca*. But peace being concluded, and *Uzano* deceaſed, the City was left without Wars abroad, or Government at home; every Man driving on his own pernicious deſigns; and *Rinaldo* (looking upon himſelf was now as Chief of the Party) preſs'd and importun'd all ſuch Citizens as he thought capable of being *Gonfalonieri*, to take Arms, and wreſt their Country out of the jaws of a Perſon, who by the malice of a few, and the ignorance of the multitude, would otherwiſe inevitably enſlave it. Theſe Plots and counter-plots, on *Rinaldo's* ſide, and his Adverſaries kept the City in a perpetual jealouſie; Inſomuch that at the creation of every Magiſtrate it was publickly declar'd how every Man ſtood affected both to the one faction and the other; and at the Election of Senators, the whole City was in an uproar: every thing that was brought before the Magiſtrate (how inconſiderable and trifling ſo ever) created a mutiny: all ſecrets were diſcover'd: nothing was ſo good, or ſo evil, but it had its favourers and oppoſers; the good as well as the bad were equally traduc'd, and no one Magiſtrate, did execute his Office.

Florence remaining in this confuſion; and *Rinaldo* impatient to depreſs the Authority of *Coſimo*: conſidering with himſelf that *Bernardo Guadagni* (were it not for his arrears to the

the Publick) was a fit Perſon to be choſen *Gonfaloniere*; to qualifie him for that Office, he diſcharg'd them himſelf. And coming afterwards to a *Scrutiny*, it fell out, that Fortune (which has been always a friend to our diſorders) made *Bernardo Gonfaloniere* for the Months of *September* and *October*. *Rinaldo* viſited him forthwith, and told him that the Nobility, and all People that deſir'd to live happily, were much rejoyc'd at his preferment; and that it was now his buſineſs to carry himſelf ſo as they might never repent it: he laid before him the danger of dividing among themſelves; and how nothing could contribute ſo much to their Union, as the depreſſion of *Coſimo*; for he was the Man, and no other, who kept them down, by the immenſity of his treaſure, and rais'd up himſelf ſo high, that without timely prevention he would make himſelf Soveraign. That (as he was a good Citizen) it was his Office to provide againſt it, by aſſembling the People in the *Piazza*; taking the State into his protection; and reſtoring its liberty to its Country: he put him in mind that *Salveſtro de Medici* could (though unjuſtly) curb and correct the Authority of the *Guelfs*, to whom (if for no other reaſon but for the Blood which their Anceſtors loſt in that quarrel) the Government belong'd; and what he did unjuſtly againſt ſo many, *Bernardo* might do juſtly, and therefore ſafely againſt one. He incourag'd him not to fear: for his friends would be ready to aſſiſt him, with their Arms in their hands. The People that were his creatures, were not to be regarded, for no more aſſiſtance was to be expected by *Coſimo* from them, than they had formerly yeilded to *Giorgio Scali*. His riches was not to be dreaded; for, when ſeiz'd by the *Senate*, his wealth would be theirs, and for concluſion he told him, that in doing thus, he would unite, and ſecure the Commonwealth, and make himſelf glorious. *Bernardo* reply'd in ſhort, that he believ'd what he ſaid to be not only true, but neceſſary: and that time being now fitter for action than diſcourſe, he ſhould go and provide what force he could, that it might appear he had companions in his Enterprize. As ſoon as he was in poſſeſſion of his Office; had diſpos'd his Companies, and ſetled all things with *Rinaldo*, he cited *Coſimo*, who (though diſſwaded by moſt of his friends) appear'd, preſuming more upon his own innocence, than the Mercy of his Judges. *Coſimo* was no ſooner enter'd into the Palace, and ſecur'd; but *Rinaldo* with all his Servants in Arms, and his whole party at his heels, came into the *Piazza*, where the *Senators* cauſing the People to be call'd, 200 Citizens were ſelected to conſtitute a *Balia* for reformation of the State. This *Balia* was no ſooner in force, but the firſt thing they fell upon in order to their reformation, was the proceſs againſt *Coſimo*; many would have him baniſh'd; many executed; and many were ſilent, either out of compaſſion for him, or apprehenſion of other People; by means of which non-concurrence, nothing was concluded. In one of the Towers of the Palace (call'd *Alberghettino*) *Coſimo* was a Priſoner in the Coſtody of *Federigo Malavolti*. From this place *Coſimo* could hear and underſtand what was ſaid; and hearing the clutter of Arms, and frequent calling out to the *Balia*, he began to be fearful of his Life, but more, leſt he ſhould be aſſaſſinated by his particular Enemies. In this terror he abſtein'd from his meat, and eat nothing in four days but a morſel of Bread. Which being told to *Federigo*, he accoſted him thus.

Federigo's ſpeech to Coſimo his Priſoner.

"You are affraid to be poiſon'd, and you kill your ſelf with hunger. You have but ſmall "eſteem for me, to believe I would have a hand in any ſuch wickedneſs: I do not think "your Life is in danger, your friends are too numerous both within the Palace, and with-"out: if there be any ſuch deſigns, aſſure your ſelf they muſt take new meaſures; I will "never be their inſtrument, nor imbrue my hands in the Blood of any Man, much leſs of "yours, who has never offended me: courage then; feed as you did formerly, and keep "your ſelf alive for the good of your Country and friends, and that you may feed with "more confidence, I my ſelf will be your Taſter.

Theſe words reviv'd *Coſimo* exceedingly; who with tears in his Eyes kiſſing and embraceing *Federigo*, in moſt pathetical and paſſionate terms he thank'd him for his humanity; and promis'd him reward, if ever his fortune gave him opportunity: *Coſimo* being by this means in ſome kind of repoſe; and his buſineſs and condition in deſpute among the Citizens; to entertain *Coſimo Federigo* brought home with him one night to Supper, a Servant of the *Gonfaloniere's* call'd *Fargannaccio*, a pleaſant Man, and very good company. Supper being almoſt done, *Coſimo* (hoping to make advantage by his being there, having known him before very well) made a ſign to *Federigo* to go out; who apprehending his meaning, pretended to give order for ſomething that was wanting, and went forth. After ſome few preliminary words when they were alone, *Coſimo* gave *Fargannaccio* a token to the Maſter of the Hoſpital of S. *Maria Nuova* for 1100 Ducats, a thouſand of them to be deliver'd to the *Gonfaloniere*, and the odd hundred for himſelf. *Fargannaccio* undertook to deliver them; the Money was paid; and the *Gonfaloniere* was deſir'd to take ſome opportunity of viſiting *Coſimo* himſelf. Upon the receipt of this ſum, *Bernardo* became more moderat,

moderate, and *Cosimo* was only confin'd to *Padoua*, though *Rinaldo* design'd againſt his Life. Beſides *Cosimo Averardo*, and ſeveral others of the *Medici* were impriſon'd; and among the reſt *Puccio*, and *Giovanni Pucci*. For greater terrour to ſuch as were diſſatisfied with the Baniſhment of *Cosimo*, the *Balia* was reduc'd to the eight of the Guards, and the Captain of the People. Upon which reſolution, *Cosimo* being conven'd before the *Senate* the 3 of *October* 1433, recieved the ſentence of Baniſhment; with exhortation to ſubmit, unleſs he intended they ſhould proceed more ſeverely both againſt his Perſon and Eſtate. *Cosimo* received his ſentence very chearfully. He aſſur'd them, that honorable convention could not order him to any place, to which he would not willingly repair. He deſir'd of them, that ſince they had not thought fit to take away his Life, they would vouchſafe to ſecure it, for he underſtood there were many in the *Piazza* who attended to kill him; and at length he proteſted that in what ever place or condition he ſhould be, himſelf and his Eſtate ſhould be always at the ſervice of that City, *Senate*, and People. The *Gonfaloniere*, bad him be ſatisfied; kept him in the Palace till night; convey'd him then to his own houſe; and having ſupped with him delivered him to a guard to be conducted ſafely to the Frontiers. Whereever he paſs'd, *Cosimo* was honorably receiv'd; viſited publickly by the *Venetians*; and treated by them more like a Soveraign than a Priſoner. *Florence* being in this manner depriv'd of a Citizen ſo univerſally belov'd, every Body was diſmay'd, as well they who prevail'd, as they who were over power'd. Whereupon *Rinaldo*, foreſeeing his Fate, that he might not be deficient to himſelf, or his party, call'd his Friends together, and told them.

Cosimo baniſh-

1433.

Rinaldo's ſpeech to his Friends.

"That he now ſaw very evidently their deſtruction was at hand; that they had "ſuffer'd themſelves to be overcome by the intreaties, and tears, and bribes of their E-"nemies, not conſidering that ere long it would be their turns to weep, and implore, "when their Prayers would not be heard, nor their tears find any compaſſion; and for the "mony they had received, not only the principal would be required, but intereſt extorted "with all poſſible cruelty. That they had much better have died themſelves, than *Cosi-*"*mo* ſhould have eſcap'd with his Life, and his friends be continued in *Florence*. Great "Men ſhould never be provok'd: when they are, there is no going back. That now there "appear'd no remedy to him, but to fortifie in the City; which our Enemies oppoſing (as "doubtleſs they will) we may take our advantage and baniſh them by force, ſince we can-"not by Law. That the reſult of all this would be no more (than what he had inculca-"ted before) the reſtauration of the Nobility; the reſtitution of their honors and Officers "in the City; and the corroberation of their party with them, as the adverſary had ſtren-"gthned his with the People. And that by this means, their party would be made more "ſtrong by aſſuming more courage and Vigor, and by acquiring more credit and reputati-"on. At laſt ſuperadding, that if theſe remedies were not apply'd in time, he could not ſee "which way, amidſt ſo many Enemies, the State was to be preſerv'd, and he could not "but foreſee the City and their whole party would be deſtroy'd.

To this, *Mariotto Boldovinetti* oppos'd himſelf, alledging the haughtineſs of the Nobility, and their inſupportable Pride; and that it was not prudence in them to run themſelves under a certain Tyranny, to avoid the uncertain dangers of the People. *Rinaldo* perceiving his Counſel not likely to take, complain'd of his misfortune, and the misfortune of his party; imputing all to the malignity of their ſtars, rather than to the blindneſs and inexperience of the Men. Whilſt things were in this ſuſpence, and no neceſſary proviſion made, a letter was diſcover'd from *Agnalo Accinivoli* to *Cosimo*, importing the affections of the City towards him, and adviſing him to ſtir up ſome War or other, and make *Neri de Gino* his friend, for he did preſage the City would want Mony, and no Body being found to ſupply them, it might put the Citizens in mind of him, and perhaps prevail with them to ſolicite his return: and if *Neri* ſhould be taken off from *Rinaldo*, his party would be left too weak to defend him. This letter coming into the hands of the *Senate*, was the occaſion that *Agnolo* was ſecur'd, examin'd, and ſent into baniſhment; and yet his example could not at all deter ſuch as were *Cosimo*'s friends. The year was almoſt come about ſince *Cosimo* was baniſhed; and about the latter end of *Auguſt* 1434, *Nicolo di Croco* was drawn *Gonfaloniere* for the next two months, and with him eight new *Senators* choſen of *Cosimo*'s Party.

So that that election frighted *Rinaldo* and all his friends. And becauſe by Cuſtom it was three days after their election before the *Senators* were admitted to the execution of their office, *Rinaldo* addreſs'd himſelf again to the heads of his Party, and remonſtrated to them the danger that was hanging over their heads: that the only remedy left them was immediatly to take Arms, to cauſe *Donati Velluti* (who was *Gonfaloniere* at that time)

to

to erect a new *Balia*: to degrade the new *Senators*; to creat others (for their turns) in their places: to burn the old, and fill up the next imborsation with the names of their friends: this resolution was by some People held necessary and good, but by others it was thought too violent, and that which would draw very ill consequences after it. Among the number of dissenters *Palla Strozzi* was one; who being a quiet, gentle, and courteous Person, apter for study, than the restraining of factions, or opposing civil dissentions, reply'd, that all enterprizes that are contriv'd with the least shadow of Wisdom, or Courage, seem good at first, but prove difficult in the execution, and destructive in the end. That he had thought (the Dukes Army being upon their frontiers in *Romagna*) the apprehension of new War abroad, would have imploy'd the thoughts of the *Senate*, better than the differences at home. That if it should appear they design'd an alteration of the Government (which could hardly be conceal'd) the People would always have time enough to get to their Arms, and perform what was necessary for their Common defence; which being done of necessity, would not carry with it either so much wonder or reproach.

Upon these considerations it was resolv'd, that the new *Senators* should be permitted to enter; but such an eye to be had to their proceedings, that upon the least injury, or reflection upon their party, they should unanimously take Arms, and rendezvous at the *Piazza* of S. *Pulinare*, from whence (being not far from the Palace) they might dispose of themselves as their advantage directed. This being the result of that meeting, the new *Senators* entred upon their Office; and the *Gonfaloniere*, to give himself a reputation, and to render himself formidable to his Enemies, caus'd his predecessor *Donato Velluti* to be clap'd in Prison, as a Person who had embezled the publick treasure: after this, he felt, and sounded his Brethren about *Cosimo's* return; and finding them dispos'd, he communicated with such as he thought the heads of the *Medici*'s party, who incouraging him likewise, he cited *Rinaldo Ridolfo Peruzzi*, and *Nicolo Barbadori*, as the principals of the contrary faction. Upon this citation, *Rinaldo* concluding it no time longer to protract, issued forth from his house with a considerable number of arm'd Men, and joyn'd himself with *Ridolfo Peruzzi* and *Nicolo Barbadori*, immediatly: there were among them several other Citizens, besides a good number of Souldiers (which being out of pay were at that time in *Florence*) and all drew up (as was before agreed) at the *Piazza di* S. *Pulinare*. *Palla Strozzi*, though he had got good store of People together, stir'd not out of his House, and *Giovanni Guiccardini* did the same; whereupon *Rinaldo* sent to remember them of their ingagement, and to reprehend their delay: *Giovanni* reply'd, that he should do disservice enough to the Enemy, if by keeping his house, he prevented his Brother *Piero*'s going forth to the relief of the *Senate*. *Palla*, after much solicitation, and several messages, came on Horseback to S. *Pulinare*, but unarm'd and with only two footmen at his heels. *Rinaldo* percieving him, advanc'd to meet him; upbraided him with his negligence, and told him, that his not joyning with the rest, proceeded from the want of fidelity or courage; either of which was unworthy a person of his quality or rank. That if he thought by not doing his duty against the other faction, he should save his own stake, and escape with his liberty and Life; he would find himself mistaken. That for his own part, if things happen'd adversly he should have this consolation, that he was not backward with his advice before the danger; nor in it with his Power: Whereas he and his Camerads could not without horror remember that this was the third time they had betraid their Country. First when they preserv'd *Cosimo*; the next, when they rejected his Counsels; and the third then, in not assisting with their supplies; to which *Palla* made no answer that the standers by could understand, but muttering to himself, he faced about with his Horse, and return'd from whence he came.

The *Senate* perceiving *Rinaldo* and his Party in Arms, and themselves utterly deserted, they caus'd the Gates of the Palace to be barracado'd up, as not knowing what else was to be done. But *Rinaldo* neglecting his opportunity of marching into the *Piazza*; by attending supplies which never came to him, depriv'd himself of his advantage; gave them courage to provide for their defence, and to several other Citizens to repair to them, both with their Persons, and advice. In the mean time, some friends of the *Senators* which were least suspected went to *Rinaldo* and acquainted him, that the *Senate* could not imagine the reason of this commotion: that if it was about the Business of *Cosimo*, they had no thoughts of recalling him. That they never had any inclination to offend him; if these were the grounds of their jealousie, they might

assure themselves if they pleas'd; come into the Palace, be civilly received, and readily gratified in their demands. But fair Words would not down with *Rinaldo*, who told them that the way he had prepos'd to assure himself, was by reducing the *Senators* to their private Condition; and reforming the City to the benefit of all People. But it seldom happens that any thing is well done where there is equality in Power, and difference in judgment.

Ridolfo Peruzzi (moved with what the Citizens had said) told them that for his part he ask'd no more but that *Cosimo* might be kept out: that if that were granted, he had his designs: that he would not fill the City with Blood, nor impose upon the *Senate*; that he was ready to obey them if they pleas'd, and accordingly he marched with all his followers into the Palace, and was joyfully received. *Rinaldo*'s staying at S. *Pulinare*; the pusilanimity of *Palla*, and *Ridolfo*'s revolt, defeated *Rinaldo* of his victory, and rebated much of the first edge and vigor of his Party: with all which, the Popes authority concur'd. Pope *Eugenius*, being driven out of *Rome* by the People, was at that time resident in *Florence*; who understanding the tumult; and judging it incumbent upon his office (if possible) to appease it, he sent *Giovanni Vitelleschi* (a Patriarch) and great friend of *Rinaldo*'s) to desire he might speak with him, for he had authority and interest enough with the *Senate* to secure and content him, without blood shed, or other detriment of the Citizens: upon the perswasion of his friend *Rinaldo* with all his Squadron march'd to S. *Maria Novella*, where the Pope lay. *Eugenius* let him know the promise the *Senate* had made him to commit all differences to his determination; and that (when their Arms were laid down all things should be ordered, as he pleas'd to award. *Rinaldo* observing the coldness of *Palla*; and the inconstancy of *Peruzzi*, and having no more cards to play, cast himself into his Holiness his Arms, not doubting but his interest was sufficient to protect him.

Eugenius the Pope, labours a peace.

Hereupon by the Popes direction, notice was given to *Nicolo Barbadori* and the rest which attended *Rinaldo* without, that they should go home and lay down their arms, for *Rinaldo* was in treaty with him about a peace with the *Senate*; upon which news they all disbanded, and laid down their Arms. The *Senate* continued their Treaty by the mediation of the Pope; but in the mean time sent privately into the Mountains of *Pistoia* to raise foot, and causing them to joyn with their own forces, and march into *Florence* in the night, they possess'd themselves of all the posts in the City; call'd the People together into the Palace; erected a new *Balia*; which the first time they met, recall'd *Cosimo*, and all that were banish'd with him. And on the contrary faction, they banish'd *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, *Ridolfo Peruzzi*, *Niccolo Barbadori*, *Palla Strozzi*, and so great a number of other Citizens, that there was a scarce a Town in *Italy* but had some of their exiles, besides several which were banish'd into forcign Countries. So that by this and such accidents as these, *Florence* was impoverish'd in its wealth and industry, as well as inhabitants. The Pope beholding the destruction of those Men, who by his intercession had laid down their Arms, was much troubled, complained heavily to *Rinaldo* of their violence, exhorted him to patience, and to expect submissively till his fortune should turn. To whom *Rinaldo* made this answer.

Cosimo recal'd.

"The small confidence they had in me, who ought to have beleiv'd me, and the "too great confidence I had in you, has been the ruine of me and my party. But "I hold my self more culpable than any Body, for believing that you who had been "driven out of your own Country, could keep me in mine. Of the vicissitudes, and "uncertainty of fortune, I have had experience enough. I have never presum'd in "its prosperity, and its adversity shall never deject me; knowing that when she plea-"ses, she can tack about and indulge me: if she continues her severity, and never "smiles upon me more, I shall not much value it, esteeming it no great happiness to "live in a City where the Laws are of less authority, than the passions of particu-"lar Men. For might I have my choice, that should be my Country where I may "securely enjoy my fortune and friends; not that where the first is easily sequester'd, "and the latter to preserve his own Estate, will forsake me in my greatest necessity. "To wise and good Men 'tis always less ungratful to hear at a distance, than to be "a spectator of the miseries of his Country; and more honorable they think to be "an honest rebel, than a servile Citizen.

Rinaldo's answer to the Pope.

Having said thus, he took his leave of the Pope, and complaining often to himself of his own Counsels, and the cowardice of his friends, in great indignation he left the City,

City, and went into baniſhment. On the otherſide, *Coſimo* having notice of his reſtauration, return'd to *Florence*, where he was received with no leſs oſtentation and triumph, than if he had obtain'd ſome extraordinary Victory; ſo great was the concourſe of People, and ſo high the demonſtration of their joy, that by an unanimous and univerſal concurrence he was ſaluted, *The Benefactor of the People, and the Father of their Country.*

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

Book V.

GOvernments in the variations which moſt commonly happen to them, do proceed from order to confuſion, and that confuſion afterwards turns to order again. For Nature having fixed no ſublunary things, as ſoon as they arrive at their achme and perfection, being capable of no farther aſſent, of neceſſity they decline. So, on the other ſide, when they are reduced to the loweſt pitch of diſorder, having no farther to deſcend, they recoil again to their former perfection: good Laws degenerating into bad cuſtoms, and bad cuſtoms ingendring good Laws. For, virtue begets peace; peace begets idleneſs; idleneſs, mutiny; and mutiny, deſtruction: and then, *vice verſa*; that ruine begets laws; thoſe laws, virtue; and virtue begets honour and good ſucceſs. Hence it is, as wiſe men have obſerved, that Learning is not ſo ancient as Arms; and that in all Provinces as well as Cities, there were Captains before Philoſophers, and Souldiers before Scholars. For good and well conducted Arms having gotten the victory at firſt, and that victory, quiet. The courage and magnanimity of the Souldier could not be depraved with a more honourable ſort of idleneſs, than the deſire of Learning; nor could idleneſs be introduced into any well-governed City by a more bewitching and inſinuating way. This was manifeſt to *Cato*, (when *Diogenes* and *Carneades* the Philoſophers were ſent Embaſſadors, from *Athens*, to the Senate) who obſerving the *Roman* youth to be much taken with their doctrin, and following them up and down with great admiration; foreſeeing the ill conſequences that honeſt lazineſs would bring upon his Country: he obtain'd a Law, that no Philoſopher ſhould be admitted into *Rome*. All Governments therefore do, by theſe means, ſome time or other come to decay; and when once at the loweſt, and mens ſufferings have made them wiſer, they rebound again, and return to their firſt order, unleſs they be ſuppreſt, and kept under by ſome extraordinary force.

Theſe viciſſitudes and revolutions (firſt by means of the *Tuſcans*, and then of the *Romans*) kept *Italy* unſetled, and rendered it ſometimes happy, and ſometimes miſerable: and although nothing was afterwards erected out of the *Roman* ruines, comparable to what was before, (which nevertheleſs might have been done with great glory under a virtuous Prince:) yet, in ſome of the new Cities and Governments, ſuch ſprouts of *Roman* virtue ſprung up; that though they did not uſurp upon one another, yet they lived ſo amicably and orderly together, that they not only defended themſelves, but repelled the *Barbarians*.

Among theſe Governments was the *Florentine*, though perhaps inferior in circumference of

of territory, yet in power and authority equal to any of them: for being ſeated in the heart of *Italy*, rich, and ready upon all occaſions, they defended themſelves bravely when ever they were invaded, or brought the victory to their allies where-ever they ſided.

If therefore, by reaſon of the courage of thoſe new Principalities, the times were not altogether quiet; yet the ſeverity of the War did not make them inſupportable. For that cannot be called Peace, where the Governments claſh, and invade one another; nor that War, in which no Men are ſlain, no Towns pillaged, nor no Governments deſtroyed. The wars of thoſe times were begun without fear; carried on without danger; and concluded without detriment. Inſomuch, that that virtue which uſed to extinguiſh in other Provinces, by means of a long peace, was ſpent and exhauſted in *Italy* by the faintneſs of the war, as will be more conſpicuous by our deſcription of the occurrences betwixt 1434 and 1494. In which it will appear how, at length, a new way was opened to the excurſions of the *Barbarians*; and *Italy* relapſed into its old ſervitude and bondage. And if the actions of our Governors, both at home and abroad, be not to be read (as the actions of our Anceſtors) with ſo much wonder and admiration of their courage and grandeur. Yet, in other reſpects, they may ſeem as conſiderable, ſeeing how many Noble and great people have been reſtrained, and kept under by their Arms, how weak and ill managed ſoever. And though, in our deſcription, we make no mention of the fortitude of the Souldier, the conduct of the Captains, nor the love of the Citizen towards his Country; yet we ſhall diſcover what cheats, what cunning, and what arts were uſed by both Princes, Souldiers, and Citizens, to preſerve a reputation which they never deſerved. And this perhaps may be as worthy our knowledg, as the wiſdom and conduct of old; for if the examples of Antiquity do teach us what to follow, our more modern tranſactions will tell us what to avoid.

Italy, by thoſe who commanded it, was reduced into ſuch a condition, that when, by agreement of the Princes, a Peace was made up, it was preſently interrupted by thoſe who had Arms in their hands; ſo that they neither gained honour by their Wars, nor quiet by their Peace. A Peace being concluded betwixt the Duke of *Milan* and the League in the year 1433, the Souldiers unwilling to disband, turned the War upon the Church. Theſe Souldiers were at that time of two Factions, the *Braccheſcan*, and the *Sforzeſcan* Faction. Of this latter, *Conte Franceſco*, the ſon of *Sforza*, was Captain; the firſt was commanded by *Nicolo Piccinino*, and *Nicolo Forte Braccio*. To theſe two parties all the reſt of the Souldiers in *Italy* joyned themſelves. Of the two, *Sforza*'s party was moſt conſiderable, as well for the courage of their *Conte*, as for a promiſe the Duke of *Milan* had made him, to give him in Marriage a natural daughter of his called *Madona Bianca*; the probability of which alliance gained him great reputation. After the Peace of *Lombardy* was concluded; both theſe parties, upon ſeveral pretended occaſions, turned their Arms againſt *Eugenius* the Pope. *Nicolo Forte Braccio* was moved by an old animoſity *Braccio* had alwaies retained to the Church. The *Conte* was ſpurr'd on by his ambition. *Nicolo* aſſaulted *Rome*, and the *Conte* poſſeſſed himſelf of *la Marca*; whereupon, the *Romans* (to evade the War) turned *Eugenius* out of *Rome*, who fled to *Florence*, though with no little danger and difficulty. Being arrived there, upon conſideration of the danger he was in, and that he was deſerted by all the Princes, who refuſed, upon his ſcore, to take up thoſe Arms again, which ſo lately, and ſo willingly they laid down; he made his peace with the *Conte*, and gave him the *Signorie* of *la Marca*, though the *Conte* had added inſolence to his uſurpation, and, in his Letters to his Agents, dated them in Latin (as they do frequently in *Italy*) *Ex Girifalco noſtro Firmiano, invito Petro & Paulo.* But not contented with the Grant of that Country, he would needs be created *Gonfaloniere* of the Church, and the Pope condeſcended; ſo much did his Holineſs prefer an ignominious Peace before a dangerous War. The *Conte*, upon theſe terms, became a friend to the Pope, and converted his Arms againſt *Nicolo Forte Braccio*; betwixt whom, for many months together, ſeveral accidents happened in the territory of the Church; ſo that which ſide ſoever prevailed, the Pope and his ſubjects ſuffered more than thoſe that managed the War. At length, by the mediation of the Duke of *Milan*, an agreement (in the nature of a Truce) was concluded betwixt them, by which both of them remained Maſters of ſeveral Towns in the Patrimony of the Church. The War was in this manner extinguiſhed in *Rome*, but it brake out again preſently in *Romagna*, by the means of *Battiſta da Canneto*, who had cauſed certain of the Family of the *Griſoni* in *Bologna* to be aſſaſſinated; and droven out the Pope's Governor, and many others which he ſuſpected to be his enemies; to keep by force, what he had got by ſurprize, he addreſs'd himſelf to *Philippo* for aid: and the Pope, to countermine him, and revenge the injuries he had received, applied to the *Venetian* and *Florentine*. Both parties being ſupplyed, there were two great Armies in *Romagna* of a ſudden. *Philip*'s

1433. The Souldiers in *Italy* diſtinguiſhed into two parties.

The Duke of *Milan* promiſes his daughter to *Conte Fran. Sforza.*

The Pope invaded, makes Peace with *Fran. Sforza.*

Wars in *Romagna.*

Auxiliaries

Auxiliaries were commanded by *Nicolo Piccinino*. The *Venetian* and *Florentine*, by *Gattamelata*, and *Nicolo da Tolentino*. Not far from *Imola* they came to a *Battel*, in which the *Venetians* and *Florentines* were defeated; and *Nicolo da Tolentino* sent prisoner to the Duke, where he died in a few daies either by poison or grief. The Duke being either impoverished by the War, or apprehending this Victory would quiet the League, followed not his advantage, but gave the Pope and his Confederates opportunity to recruit; who choosing the *Conte Francisco* for their General, they sent him to drive *Forte Braccio* out of the Lands of the Church; and to try if they could put an end to that War which they had begun in favour of the Pope. The *Romans* seeing his Holiness in the field again, and his Army considerable; they desired to be reconciled; and, having concluded the terms, they received a Governor from him. Among other Towns, *Nicolo Forte Braccio* had possessed himself of *Fiboli*, *Montefiasconi*, the City of *Castello*, and *Asceſi*: not being able to keep the field, *Nicolo* was retreated into this latter Town, and besieged by the *Conte*. The siege proving long; by the braveness of *Nicolo*'s defence, the Duke began to cast about, and consider, he must either hinder the League from carrying the Town, or look to himself as soon as it was taken. To give the *Conte* therefore diversion, he commanded *Nicolo Piccinino*, by the way to *Romagna*, to pass into *Tuscany*: whereupon, the League judging the defence of *Tuscany* of more importance than the reducing of *Asceſi*, they sent to the *Count* to stop *Piccinino*'s passage, who was at that time with his Army at *Furli*. Upon these orders the *Count* raised his siege, and marched with his Forces to *Cesena*, having left the war of *la Marca*, and the care of his own affairs to the management of his Brother *Lione*. Whilst *Piccinino* was labouring to pass, and *Francesco* to obstruct him, *Nicolo Forte Braccio* fell upon *Lione*, and with great honour to himself, took him prisoner, plundered his people, and following his blow, took several Towns in *la Marca* at the same excursion. This news was very unwelcome to the *Count*, who gave all his own Country for lost; nevertheless, leaving part of his Army to confront *Piccinino*, he marched himself against *Forte Braccio* with the rest, forc'd him to an engagement, and beat him. In which defeat *Forte Braccio* was hurt, taken prisoner, and died of his wounds.

Fran. Sforza General of the Pope's League.

This Victory recovered all that *Nicolo Forte Braccio* had taken from him; and forced the Duke of *Milan* to desire a peace, which he obtained by the mediation of *Nicolo da Esti*, Marquess of *Ferrara*, by which it was agreed, that the Towns which the Duke had got in *Romagna* should be restored; and his Forces withdrawn into *Lombardy*; and *Battista da Canetо* (as it happens to those who owe their dominion to the courage or power of other people) as soon as the Duke's Forces were drawn off, dispairing to remain in *Bologna* upon his own legs; quitted the Town, and left it to re-admit its old Governor *Antonio Bentivogli*, who was chief of the contrary party.

Peace betwixt the League and the Duke.

All these things succeeded, during the banishment of *Cosimo*; upon whose return, those persons who were active in his restoration, and those who had suffered more than ordinarily before, concluded (without regard to any body else) to secure themselves of all the Offices in the State. The Senate which succeeded for the months of *November* and *December*, not satisfied with what their predecessors had done in favour of their party; they lengthned the time, changed the places of several which were banished, and sent many new ones into banishment after them. The Citizens were questioned and molested, not only for their inclinations to the parties, but for their wealth, their relations, and private correspondencies. And, had this proscription proceeded to blood, it had been as bad as *Octaviano*'s, or *Silla*'s: nor was it altogether without; for *Antonio di Bernardo* was beheaded, and four other Citizens, (of which *Zanobi Bel Fratelli*, and *Cosimo Barbadori* were two) who having escaped out of their Dominions, and being gotten to *Venice*; the *Venetians* (valuing *Cosimo*'s friendship before their own honour and reputation,) caused them to be secured, sent them prisoners home; where they were most unworthily put to death. However, that example gave great advantage to *Cosimo*'s party, and great terror to the adverse; when it was considered that so potent a Republick should sell its liberty to the *Florentines*, which was supposed to be done not so much in kindness to *Cosimo*, as to revive and incense the factions in *Florence*; and by ingaging them in blood, to render the animosities in that City irreconcilable, the *Venetians* being jealous of no other obstruction to their greatness, but the union of those parties. Having pillaged and banished all such as were enemies, or suspected to be so to the State, they applied themselves to chares and oblige new persons to corroborate their party; restored the Family of the *Alberti*, and who-ever else had been proclaimed Rebel to his Country. All the Grandees (except some few) were reduced into the popular rank; the Estates of the Rebels they sold to one another for a song. After which, they fortified themselves with new Laws, new Magistrates, and new Elections, pulling out such as they thought their enemies, and filling the purses with the names of their friends. But, admonished by the

New Ordinances in *Florence*.

the ruine of their friends; and thinking it not enough for the ſecurity of their Government, to make the imborſation as they pleaſed; they contrived, that all Officers of life and death ſhould be created out of the chief of their party; and that the perſons who were to overſee the imborſations, and the new *Squittini*, ſhould (with the old Senators) have power to create them. To the Eight of the Guards, they gave authority of life and death. They decreed, that the baniſhed perſons ſhould not return (though the time of their baniſhment was expired) till leave given them by four and thirty of the Senate and the Colledges, when their whole number amounted but to thirty and ſeven. They made it criminal to write, or receive Letters from them: every word, every ſign, every motion that was unpleaſing to the Governors, was puniſhed ſeverely; and if any one remained ſuſpected who had eſcaped theſe injuries, they loaded him with new duties and impoſitions, till, in a ſhort time, they had cleared the City of their enemies, and ſecured the Government to themſelves. However, that they might want no aſſiſtance from abroad, and intercept it from ſuch as ſhould deſign againſt them; they entred into a League with the Pope, the *Venetians*, and the Duke of *Milan*.

Things being in this poſture in *Florence*, *Giovanna* Queen of *Naples* died, and, by Will, made *Rinieri d'Angio* her heir. *Alphonſo*, King of *Aragon*, was at that time in *Sicily*, and having good intereſt with many of the Nobility of that Kingdom, he prepared to poſſeſs it. The *Neapolitans* and ſeveral others of the Lords were favourers of *Rinieri*. The Pope had no mind that either the one or the other ſhould have it, but would willingly have governed it by a Deputy of his own. In the mean time *Alphonſo* arrived out of *Sicily*, and was received by the Duke of *Seſſa*; where he entertained certain Princes into his pay, with deſign (having *Capua* in his poſſeſſion, which was governed at that time, in his name, by the Prince of *Taranto*) to force the *Neapolitans* to his will. Wherefore he ſent his Army againſt *Gaietta*, which was defended by a Garriſon of *Neapolitans*. Upon this invaſion, the *Neapolitans* demanded aſſiſtance of *Philip*; who recommended the Enterprize to the people of *Genoa*; the *Genoeſes* not only to gratify the Duke, who was their Prince, but to preſerve the goods and effects which they had at that time both in *Naples* and *Gaieta*, rigg'd out a ſtrong fleet immediately. *Alphonſo* having news of their preparations, reinforc'd himſelf, went in perſon againſt the *Genoeſes*, and coming to an ingagement with them of the Iſland of *Ponzus*, he was beaten, taken priſoner, (with ſeveral other Princes) and preſented by the *Genoeſes* into the hands of Duke *Philip*. This Victory aſtoniſhed all the Princes of *Italy*, who had any apprehenſion of the power of *Philip*, believing it would give him opportunity to make himſelf Maſter of all: but he (ſo different are the judgments of men) took his meaſures quite contrary. *Alphonſo* was a wiſe and prudent Prince, and as ſoon as he had convenience of diſcourſing with *Philip*, remonſtrated to him how much he was miſtaken in ſiding with *Rinieri*; for that aſſuredly, having made himſelf King of *Naples*, he would endeavour, with all his power, to bring *Milan* in ſubjection to the *French*, that his aſſiſtance might be near him, and that upon any diſtreſs, he might not be put to it to force a way for his ſupplies; nor was there any way to do it ſo effectually, as by ruining him, and introducing the *French*. That the contrary would happen by making *Alphonſo* Prince; for then, having no-body to fear but the *French*, he ſhould be obliged to love and chareſs the Duke above any body, in whoſe power it would be to give his enemies a paſſage; by which means *Alphonſo* ſhould have the title, but the power and authority would remain in Duke *Philip*: inſomuch, that it imported the Duke much more than himſelf, to conſider the dangers of one ſide, with the advantages of the other, unleſs he deſired more to ſatisfie his paſſion than to ſecure his ſtate. For, as by that way he would continue free and independant; by the other, (lying betwixt two powerful Princes) he would loſe his ſtate quite, or living in perpetual apprehenſion, be a ſlave to them both. Theſe words wrought ſo much upon the Duke, that, changing his deſigns, he ſet *Alphonſo* at liberty, ſent him back to *Genoa*, and from thence into the Kingdom of *Naples*, where he landed at *Gaieta*, which, upon the news of his enlargement, had been ſeized by ſome Lords of his party. The *Genoeſes* (underſtanding how, without any regard to them, the Duke had diſcharged the King; and, conſidering with themſelves, that of all their danger and expence, he had ingroſſed the honour, impropriated the thanks of the Kings inlargement, and left them nothing but his regret and indignation for having defeated and taken him priſoner) were highly diſſatisfied with the Duke.

Alphonſo brought priſoner to Duke *Philip*.

In the City of *Genoa*, when it has the free exerciſe of its liberty by the free ſuffrages of the people, a chief is choſen, which they call their *Doge*; not with the abſolute power of a Prince, to determine arbitrarily of any thing; but to propoſe and recommend what is to be debated and reſolved upon by the Magiſtrates in the Council. In the ſame City there are many Noble Families ſo mighty and potent, they are not without difficulty to be brought

The *Doge* and his authority in *Genoa*.

to

to any obedience to the Magistrate. Of all those Families, the *Tregosi* and *Adorni* are most powerful and wealthy; and from them spring all the divisions of the City, and all the contempt of the Laws; for differing perpetually among themselves, and pretending both to the *Dogeship*; they are not contented to have it fairly decided, but came many times to blows; by which, as one is set up, the other is alwaies depressed; and sometimes it falls out, that that party which is over-powred, and unable to carry that Office otherwise, calls in foreign assistance, and prostitute that Government, which they cannot enjoy themselves, to the dominion of a stranger

By this means it comes often to pass, that they who have the Government in *Lombardy*, have the Command of *Genoa* likewise; as it happened at the time when *Alphonso* was taken prisoner. Among the principal Citizens of *Genoa*, who caused that City to be delivered into the hands of the Duke, *Francisco Spinola* was one; who not long after he had been very active to inslave his Country, became suspected to the Duke, (as it often happens in those cases) *Francisco* being highly dissatisfied, left the Town; and, by a kind of voluntary exile, had his residence at *Gaieta*; being there at that time when the ingagement was with *Alphonso*, and having behaved himself very well in it; he presumed he had again merited so much favour from the Duke, as to be permitted to live quietly in *Genoa*: but finding the Duke's jealousie to continue, (as not believing he, that had betrayed his Country, could ever be true to him) he resolved to try a new experiment, to restore his Country to its liberty, and himself to his honour and security at once; believing no remedy could be administred so properly to his fellow Citizens, as by the same hand which gave them their wound. Observing therefore the general indignation against the Duke for having delivered the King; he concluded it a convenient time to put his designs in execution; and accordingly he communicated his resolutions with certain persons which he had some confidence were of the same opinion, and incouraged them to follow him. It happened to be St. *John Baptist*'s day (which is a great Festival in that City) when *Arismino*, a new Governor, sent them from the Duke, made his entry into *Genoa*. Being entred into the Town in the Company of *Opicino* (his predecessor in the Government) and other considerable Citizens, *Francisco Spinola* thought it no time to protract; but running forth armed into the streets, with such as were before privy to his design, he drew them up in the *Piazza* before his house, and cryed out *Liberty, Liberty*. 'Tis not to be imagined with what alacrity the people and Citizens ran to him at that very name; insomuch, that if any out of interest or other consideration, retain'd an affection for the Duke, they were so far from having time to arm, and make defence, they had scarce leisure to escape. *Arismino*, with some of the *Genoeses* of his party, fled into the Castle which was kept for the Duke. *Opicino* presuming he might get thither, fled towards the Palace, where he had 2000 men at his command, with which he supposed he might not only be able to secure himself, but to animate the people to a defence; but he reckoned without his Host; for, before he could reach it, he was knock'd on the head, torn in pieces by the multitude, and his members dragg'd about the streets.

Francisco Spinola.

After this, the *Genoeses* having put themselves under new Magistrates and Officers of their own, the Castle and all other posts which were kept for the Duke, were reduced, and the City perfectly freed from its dependance on the Duke. These things thus managed, though at first they gave the Princes of *Italy* occasion to apprehend the growing greatness of the Duke, yet, now observing their conclusion, they did not dispair of being able to curb him; and therefore, notwithstanding their late League with him, the *Florentines*, *Venetians* and *Genoeses* made a new one among themselves. Whereupon *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, and the other chief *Florentine* Exiles seeing the face of affairs altered, and all things tending to confusion, they conceived hopes of perswading the Duke to a war against *Florence*, and going upon that design to *Milan*, *Rinaldo* accosted the Duke as followeth:

Genoa recovers its liberty.

Rinaldo's Oration to the Duke of *Milan.*

"If we, who have been formerly your enemies, do now with confidence supplicate your "assistance for our return into our own Country; neither your Highness, nor any body "else, (who considers the progress of humane affairs, and the volubility of fortune) ought at "all to be surprized, seeing both of our pass'd and present actions, of what we have done "formerly to your self, and of what we intend now to our Country, we can give a clear "and a reasonable account. No good man will reproach another for defending his Country, "which way soever he defends it. Nor was it ever our thoughts to injure you, but to pre-"serve our Country; which will be evident, if you consider how in the greatest stream of "our victories and success, we no sooner found your Highness dispos'd to a peace, but we "readily embraced it, and pursued it with more eagerness than your self: so that as yet we "are not conscious to our selves of any thing that may make us doubt of your favour. "Neither can our Country, in justice, complain, that we are now pressing and importuning

"your

" your Highneſs to imploy thoſe Arms againſt it, when we have ſo obſtinately oppos'd them " before in its defence: for that Country ought equally to be beloved by all, which is equally " indulgent to all; and not that which diſpiſing the reſt, advances and admires only a few. " No-body maintains it unlawful in all caſes to bear Arms againſt ones Country. Cities are " mix'd bodies, yet have they their reſemblance with natural bodies; and, as in theſe, many " diſeaſes grow which are not to be cur'd without violence; ſo, in the other, many times " ſuch inconveniences ariſe, that a charitable and good Citizen would be more criminal to " leave it infirm, than to cure it, though with amputation, and the loſs of ſome of its " members. What greater diſtemper can befall a politick body, than ſervitude? And what " properer remedy can be applyed, than that which will certainly remove it? Wars are " juſt, when they are neceſſary; and Arms are charitable, when there is no other hopes left " to obtain juſtice. I know not what neceſſity can be greater than ours; nor what act of " charity more commendable, than to wreſt our Country out of the jaws of ſlavery. Our " cauſe then being both juſt and charitable, ought not to be ſlighted either by us or your " Highneſs, though it were only in compaſſion. But your Highneſs has your particular " provocation beſides; the *Florentines* having had the confidence, after a peace ſolemnly " concluded with you, to enter into a new League with the *Genoeſes* your rebels: ſo that " if our prayers and condition ſhould be unable, your own juſt indignation and reſentment " ſhould move you, eſpecially ſeeing the enterprize ſo eaſy. Let not their paſs'd carriage " diſcourage you, you have ſeen their power and reſolution to defend themſelves formerly; " and both of them were reaſonably to be apprehended, were they the ſame now as they " have been. But you will find them quite contrary; for, what ſtrength, what wealth can " be expected in a City which has lately exploded the greateſt part of its rich and induſtrious " men? What obſtinacy or reſolution can be apprehended in a people which are divided, " and at enmity among themſelves? Which enmity is the cauſe that that very treaſure which " is left, cannot now be imployed ſo well as it formerly was; for men do chearfully disburſe, " when they ſee it is for the honour and ſecurity of their Country; hoping that peace may " reprize, what the war has devour'd. But when in war and peace they find themſelves " equally oppreſſed; and under a neceſſity in the one, of induring the outrages of their " enemies; and in the other, of truckling to the inſolencies of their friends; no-body will " ſupply or advance one farthing towards its relief: and the people ſuffer more many times " by the avarice of their friends, than by the rapacity of their enemies; for in this laſt caſe " they have hopes ſome time or other to ſee an end of it; but in the other they are deſperate. " In your laſt War you took up Arms againſt an intire and united City; in this you have " to do only with a remnant. Then you attempted upon the liberty of the City; now " you will endeavour to reſtore it: and it is not to be feared, that in ſuch diſparity of " cauſes, the effects ſhould be the ſame. Nay rather your Victory is certain; and what ad- " vantage and corroboration that will be to your own ſtate, is eaſily judged; having *Tuſcany* " obliged to you thereby, and readier to ſerve you in any of your deſigns, than *Milan* it ſelf. " So that, though formerly this acquiſt would have been look'd upon as uſurpation and vio- " lence; it will be now eſteemed an high piece of juſtice and charity. Suffer not therefore " this opportunity to paſs, and be ſure, if your other enterprizes againſt this City have pro- " duced nothing but expence, difficulty, and diſhonour; this will make you amends, and " with great eaſe, turn to your great honour and advantage.

The Duke needed not many words to excite him againſt the *Florentines*; he had an hereditary quarrel to them, which (beſides the blindneſs of his ambition) did always provoke him, and now more than ordinarily, upon occaſion of their new League with the *Genoeſes*. However, the expences and dangers he had formerly paſs'd, the memory of his late defeat, and the vanity and ill-grounded hopes of the exiles, diſcouraged him quite. The Duke, upon the firſt news of the Rebellion in *Genoa*, ſent *Nicolo Piccinino*, with what Forces he had and could get together towards that City, to recover it, if poſſible, before the Citizens ſhould have compos'd themſelves, or put the Government into order; preſuming much upon the Caſtle which ſtood out for him. And though *Nicolo* drove the *Genoeſes* up into the Mountains, and took from them the Vale of *Pozivori*, where they had fortified themſelves; yet he found ſo much difficulty afterwards, (though he had beat them into the Town) that he was forc'd to draw off. Whereupon, at the inſtigation of the exiles, he received orders from the Duke, that he ſhould attack them on the Eaſt-ſide of the River, and make what devaſtations he could in their Country towards *Piſa*; ſuppoſing, that by the ſucceſs of this expedition, he ſhould be able to judge from time to time what courſe he was to ſteer. Upon the receit of theſe orders, *Nicolo* aſſaulted *Serezana*, and took it, and then, having done much miſchief in thoſe parts, to alarm the *Florentines*, he marched towards

Lucca, giving out he would pass that way into the Kingdom of *Naples*, to assist the King of *Aragon*. Pope *Eugenius*, upon these new accidents, departed from *Florence* to *Bologna*, where he proposed and negotiated an accommodation betwixt the Duke and the League; representing to the Duke, that if he would not comply, he should be forc'd to part with the *Conte Francesco* to the League; for *Francesco* being his confederate, was at that time under his pay. But, though his Holiness took much pains in the business, that treaty came to nothing; for the Duke would not consent, unless *Genoa* were restored; and the League were as obstinate to have it remain free; so that all parties growing diffident of the peace, each of them began to make provision for war. *Nicolo Piccinino* being arrived at *Lucca*, the *Florentines* began to apprehend new troubles, caused *Neri di Gino* to march with all speed into the Country of *Pisa*, and obtained of the Pope that *Conte Francesco* might joyn with him, and with their united Forces take their post before S. *Gonda*: *Piccinino* being at *Lucca*, desired a passport to go into the Kingdom of *Naples*, and being denied, he threatned to force it. The Armies and Officers were of equal number and eminence; so that neither side being over-forward to run the hazard of a Battel, by reason of the extraordinary coldness of the weather, (it being in *December*) they lay by one another several days without any action at all. The first that moved was *Nicolo Piccinino*; who was inform'd, that if in the night he assaulted *Vico Pisano*, he should easily carry it. *Nicolo* attempted it; but failing of his design, he plundred the Country about it, and burn'd the Town of S. *Giovanni alla Vena*.

This enterprize (though for the most part ineffectual) encouraged *Nicolo* to proceed nevertheless; especially, observing that the *Conte* and *Neri* stirr'd not to molest him: thereupon he assaulted S. *Maria* in *Castello* and *Filetto*, and took them both: nor did the *Florentine* Army move for all that: not that the *Count* was affraid to come forth, but because the Magistrates in *Florence* (out of respect to the Pope, who was mediating a peace) had not as yet resolved upon the war: and that which was but prudence in the *Florentines*, being interpreted fear by the enemy, they took courage, and with all the Forces they could make, sate down before *Barga*. The news of that siege caused the *Florentines* to lay aside all compliments and respect; and to resolve not only to relieve *Barga*, but to invade the Country of the *Lucchesi*. Whereupon the *Conte* marching directly against *Nicolo*, and giving him Battel to force him from the Siege, he worsted his Army, and made him draw off: the *Venetians* in the mean time perceiving the Duke had broke the League, sent *Giovan Francesco da Gonzague* their General, with an Army as far as *Chiaradadda*, who spoyling the Duke's Country, constrained him to call back *Nicolo Piccinino* out of *Tuscany*. Which revocation, with the Victory they had lately obtained against *Nicolo*, encouraged the *Florentines* to an expedition against *Lucca*, and gave them great hopes of success: in which they carried themselves without either fear or respect, seeing the Duke (who was the only person they apprehended) imployed by the *Venetians*; and the *Lucchesi*, by having, as it were, received their enemies into their houses, and given them cause to invade them, had left themselves no grounds to complain.

1437. In *April* therefore, in the year 1437, the *Conte* march'd with his Army; and before he would fall upon any thing of the enemies, he addressed himself to the recovery of what had been lost, and accordingly he reduced S. *Maria de Castello*, and what-ever else had been taken by *Piccinino*. Then advancing against the *Lucchesi*, he sate down before *Camajore*; whose Garrison and inhabitants (though well enough affected to their Lord) being more influenced by the terror of an enemy at hand, than their fidelity to their friends affaroff, surrendered immediately; after which, he took *Massa* and *Serazan* with the same dexterity and reputation; and then turning his Army towards *Lucca* in the month of *May*; he destroyed their Corn, burn'd their Villages, stubb'd up their Vines, and their Fruit-trees, drove away their Cattel, and omitted nothing of outrage and hospitality that is or can be committed by Souldiers. The *Lucchesi* seeing themselves abandoned by the Duke, and unable to defend their Country, retired into the Town, where they intrench'd and fortified so well, that they did not doubt (by reason of their numbers within) but to be able to make it good for some time, as they had formerly done. Their only fear was of the inconstancy of the people, who being weary of the siege, would probably consider their own private danger before the liberty of their Country, and force them to some ignominious accord. Whereupon, to encourage them to a vigorous defence, they were called together into the Market-place, and one of the wisest and gravest of the Citizens spake to them as followeth.

The Speech of a Citizen of *Lucca* to the people.

"You have often heard, and must needs understand, that things done of necessity, are "neither to be praised nor condemned. If therefore you accuse us of having drawn this "war upon you, by entertaining the Duke's Forces, and suffering them to assault you; you "are

"are highly miſtaken. You cannot be ignorant of the ancient and inveterate hatred the "*Florentines* bear you; ſo that 'tis not any injury in you, nor any reſentment in them, but "your weakneſs and their ambition which has provoked them; the firſt giving them hopes, "the other impatience to oppreſs you. Do not think that any kindneſs of yours can di-"vert them from that deſire; nor any injury of yours provoke them to be worſe? 'Tis "their buſineſs therefore to rob you of your liberty; 'tis yours to defend it: and what "either of you do in purſuance of thoſe ends, may be lamented, but cannot be wondred at "by any body: we may be ſorry our Country is invaded, our City beſieged, our Houſes "burn'd; but who of us all is ſo weak as to admire it? Seeing, if our power were as "great, we would do the ſame to them, and, if poſſible, worſe. If they pretend this war "was occaſioned by our admitting of *Nicolo*; had not he been received, they would have "pretended another; and, perhaps, had this invaſion been deferred, it might have proved "more fatal and pernicious; ſo that 'tis not his coming is to be blamed, but our ill fortune, "and the ambition of their nature; for we could not refuſe the Duke's Forces; and when "they were come, it was not in our power to keep them from doing acts of hoſtility: you "know very well, that without the aſſiſtance of ſome conſiderable Prince, we had not been "able to defend our ſelves; nor was any more proper to relieve us, both in reſpect of his "fidelity and power, than the Duke. He reſtored us to our liberty, and 'twas but reaſona-"ble he ſhould ſecure it. He was always an enemy to thoſe who would never be our "friends; if therefore we have provoked the Duke, rather than we would diſoblige the "*Florentines*, we have loſt a true friend, and made our enemy more able and more ready to "offend us: ſo that it is much better for us to have this war, with the friendſhip of the "Duke; than to have peace, with his diſpleaſure: and we have reaſon to hope he will re-"ſcue us from theſe dangers to which he has expoſed us, if we be not wanting to our ſelves. "You cannot forget with what fury the *Florentines* have many times aſſaulted us; and with "what honour and reputation we have repelled them, even when we have had no hopes but "in God and in time, and how both of them have preſerved us. If we defended our "ſelves then; what reaſon now is there to diſpair? Then we were deſerted by all *Italy*, and left "as a prey to the enemy; now we have the Duke on our ſide, and 'tis not improbable the "*Venetians* will be but ſlow in their motions againſt us; ſeeing it can be no pleaſure to them "to ſee the power of the *Florentines* increaſe. Then the *Florentines* were more free and "unengaged, had more hopes of aſſiſtance, and were ſtronger of themſelves, and we every "way weaker; for then we defended a Tyrant, now we fight for our ſelves; then the ho-"nour went to other people, now it returns upon us; then they were united and entire, "now they are divided, and all *Italy* full of their Rebels. But if we had none of theſe "reaſons, nor none of theſe hopes to excite us, extreme neceſſity would be ſufficient to ani-"mate us to our defence. Every enemy ought in reaſon to be apprehended by us, becauſe "all of them ſeek their own glory, and our deſtruction; but, above all, the *Florentines* "ought to be moſt dreadful, who are not to be ſatisfied with our obedience, tribute, nor the "government of our City; but they muſt have our perſons and wealths, to ſatiate their "cruelty with our blood, and their avarice with our eſtates; ſo that there is no perſon nor "condition among us ſo mean, but ought juſtly to fear them. Let no-body therefore be "diſmaid to ſee our Country waſted, our Villages burn'd, and our Lands poſſeſſed by the "enemy: if we preſerve our City, they of courſe will revert: if we loſe our City, to what "purpoſe will they be kept? maintaining our liberty, the enemy can hardly injoy them; "but loſing our liberty, what comfort would it be to retain them? Take arms therefore "with courage, and when you are ingaged with your enemy, remember the reward of your "Victory is not only the ſafety of your Country, but the preſervation and ſecurity of your "children and eſtates.

Theſe laſt words were received by the people with ſuch warmth and vigor of mind, that unanimouſly they promiſed to dye rather than to deſert their City, or entertain any treaty that might intrench upon their liberty; ſo that immediately order was taken for all things neceſſary for the defence of the City. In the mean time the *Florentine* Army was not idle, after many miſchiefs and depredations in the Country, they took *Monte-Carlo* upon conditions; after which they incamp'd at *Uzano*, that the *Lucchesi* being ſtraitned on all ſides, and made deſperate of relief, might be conſtrained to ſurrender. The Caſtle was ſtrong, and furniſhed with a good Garriſon; ſo that was not ſo eaſily to be carried as the reſt. The *Lucchesi* (as was but reaſon) ſeeing themſelves diſtreſſed, had recourſe to the Duke, and recommended their caſe to him with all manner of expreſſion; ſometimes they commemorated the ſervices they had done him; ſometimes they remonſtrated the cruelty of the *Florentines*: what courage it would give the reſt of his friends to ſee him interpoſe in their defence; and what terror it would infuſe to ſee them expos'd: for if they loſt their liberty

and their lives, he would lose his honor, and his friends, and the fidelity of all those who had ever expos'd themselves to any danger for his sake: which words were deliver'd with tears, that if his obligations should fail, his compassion might move him to assist them. Insomuch that the Duke, adding to his old animosity to the *Florentines*, his late ingagements to the *Lucchesi*, but above all being jealous of the greatness of the *Florentines*, which of necessity would follow so important an acquest; he resolved to send a great Army into *Tuscany*, or else to fall so furiously upon the *Venetians*, that the *Florentines* should be constrain'd to quit that enterprize to relieve them: he had no sooner taken this resolution but they had news at *Florence* that the Duke was sending forces into *Tuscany*; which made them suspicious of their designs, and therefore, to find the Duke imployment at home, they solicited the *Venetian* very earnestly that they would attack him in *Lombardy* with all the power they could make: but they were not only weaken'd, but disheartened by the departure of the Marques of *Mantua*, who had left their service, and taken arms under the Duke. Whereupon they return'd this answer, that they were so far from being able to ingross the War, they could not assist in it, unless they sent *Conte Francesco* to command their Army; and oblig'd him by Articles to pass the *Po* with them in person (seeing by the old agreement he was not to go so far) for without a General they would undertake no War; nor could they have confidence in any but the Count; nor in him neither, unless he oblig'd himself to pursue the War in all places alike.

The *Florentines* were of opinion the War was to be carried on briskly in *Lombardy*; yet on the otherside to remove the *Conte*, was to destroy their designs against *Lucca*, and they were very sensible that demand was made, not so much out of any necessity they had of the *Count*, as to defeat that enterprize. The *Conte*, for his part, was by contract oblig'd to go into *Lombardy* whenever he should be requir'd by the League; but now he was unwilling to forfeit his hopes of that allyance which the Duke had promis'd him, by marrying him to one of his relations. So that betwixt the desire of conquering *Lucca*, and the fear of having Wars with the Duke, the *Florentines* were in no little distraction. But their fear (as it always happens) was the stronger passion of the two, insomuch as they were content (as soon as *Uzano* was taken) the *Count* should pass into *Lombardy*. But there was still a difficulty behind, which not being in their power to dissolve, gave the *Florentines* more trouble and jealousie, than any thing else; and that was that the *Count* would not be oblig'd to pass the *Po*; and without it, the *Venetians* would not entertain him: there being no way to accomodate this difference, but of necessity one of them must submit; the *Florentines* perswaded the *Count*, that in a letter to the *Senate* of *Florence*, he should oblige himself to pass that river, alledging that a private promise not being sufficient to dissolve a publick stipulation, he might do afterwards as he pleas'd; and which way so ever he acted, this convenience would certainly follow, that the *Venetians* having begun the War, would be compelled to pursue it; and that humor be inevitably diverted, which was so much to be fear'd.

To the *Venetians* they intimated on the other side, that that letter, though private, was sufficient to bind him, and that they ought to be satisfied there with: that whilst it might be done securely it would be best to conceal it, and indulge his respects to his Father-in-Law; for it would be neither for his, nor their advantage to have it discovered, without manifest necessity: and in this manner the *Florentines* concluded upon the *Conte's* passage into *Lombardy*; and the *Count* having taken in *Uzano*, cast up certain new works about *Lucca* to keep from sallying, & recommended the War to the Commissioners which succeeded; he pass'd the *Alpes*, and went to *Reggio*, where the *Venetians* (being jealous of his proceedings) to discover his inclinations, put him at first dash upon passing the *Po*, and joyning the rest of their Army; which the *Count* peremptorily refus'd, and many ill words passed betwixt him and *Andrea Mauroceno* who was sent about it from the *Venetians*: upbraiding one another by their pride and infidelity; and after several protestations on both sides; on the one, that he was not oblig'd to it; on the other that he should not be paid without it, the *Count* returned into *Tuscancy*, and his adversary to *Venice*. The *Count* was quarter'd by the *Florentines* in the Country of *Pisa*; and they were not without hopes of prevailing with him to reassume his command against the *Lucchesi*; but they found him not dispos'd; for the Duke understanding he had refus'd to pass the *Po*, in compliment to him (fancying by his means he might preserve *Lucca*) he desired him that he would be an instrument to make peace betwixt *Lucchesi* and the *Florentines*, and if he could, to comprehend him also, insinuating by the by, that in convenient time he should marry his Daughter. This match had a great influence upon the *Count*, who perswaded himself the Duke having no heirs Males, he might thereby in time come to the Government of *Milan*. Upon which grounds he discouraged the *Florentines* from prosecuting the war, affirming

Jealousie betwixt the *Venetian* and the *Count*.

affirming that for his own part he would not ſtir, unleſs the *Venetians* paid him his arreers, and performed the reſt of their Covenants; for his pay alone would not do his buſineſs, wherefore it concern'd him to ſecure his own ſtate, and therefore he was to look out for other allies, and not depend only upon the friendſhip of the *Florentines*: that ſeeing he was abandon'd by the *Venetians* he was obliged to a ſtricter regard to his own affairs; and threatned very ſlily to make an agreement with the Duke. Theſe tricks and expoſtulations were not at all to the *Florentines* ſatisfaction. They found their deſign upon *Lucca* loſt, and their own ſtate in danger whenever the Duke and the *Count* united. To prevail with the *Venetians* to make good their termes, *Coſimo de Medici* was diſpatched to them, (ſuppoſing his reputation might have ſome influence upon them) and in a long ſpeech to their *Senate*, he repreſented the poſture of affairs in *Italy*; the power and conduct of the Duke; and concluded, that if the count and he joyned, the *Venetians* would be confin'd to the Sea, and the *Florentines* in no ſmall danger of their liberty: to which it was anſwer'd by the *Venetian* that they had well conſidered the condition of *Italy*, and their own; and did believe they were every way able to defend themſelves; however it was not their cuſtom to pay any Body for doing other People ſervice. It belonged therefore to the *Florentines* to ſee the *Count* ſatisfied, ſeeing it was they had had the benefit of his ſervice, or rather (if they had a mind to preſerve themſelves in ſecurity for the future) to correct and rebate his inſolence than to pay him; for Men put no bounds to their ambition; and if he ſhould then be paid without doing any ſervice, his next demand, in all liklyhood, would be more inſolent and dangerous: in their judgment therefore it was high time to put a ſtop to his carreer, and not let him run on, till he became incorrigible; but if out of fear, or any other conſiderrtion they had a mind to continue him their friend; their beſt way would be to pay him: with which anſwer *Coſimo* return'd, and nothing was concluded.

The *Venetians* untractable.

The *Florentines* nevertheleſs interceded very earneſtly with the *Count* that he would not forſake the League; who had no great inclination to it himſelf; but his deſire to conſummate the marriage with the Dukes Daughter, kept him in ſuch ſuſpence, that upon every little accident he was ready to leave them. The *Count* had left his Towns in *la Marca*, to be ſecured by *Furlano*, one of his principal officers: this *Furlano* was ſo earneſtly ſolicited by the Duke, that he left the *Counts* ſervice, and joyned himſelf to him. Whereupon laying aſide all other reſpects, to ſave his own ſtake, the *Count* came to an agreement likewiſe with the Duke, and among the reſt of the Articles, this was one, that for the future the *Count* ſhould not intermedle in the affairs either of *Romagna* or *Tuſcany*. After he had made this peace with the Duke, the *Count* was very importunate with the *Florentines* to come to an agreement with the *Lucchеſi*; and he perſwaded them ſo far, that finding no other remedy, they came to a compoſition with them in the month of *April* 1438, by which Capitulation the *Lucchеſi* were to have their liberties preſerved; and the *Florentines* to keep poſſeſſion of *Monti Carlo*, and ſome other Caſtles which they had taken before: after which they writ many ſad letters up and down *Italy*, lamenting that ſeeing God and Man were unwilling that the *Lucchеſi* ſhould fall under their Dominion, they had been conſtrained to a peace with them: and ſo much were they concerned for their diſappointment in that enterprize, that ſeldom has any Body been known to loſe their own Eſtates with more impatience and regrete, than the *Florentines* expreſs'd, for not gaining other Peoples. However though the *Florentines* at that time had ſo many irons in the fire; they forgot not their alliances with their Neighbours, nor the decoration of their City. *Nicolo Fortebraccio* (who had married a Daughter of the *Conte di Poppi*) being dead, *Poppi* had the command of the *Borgo ſan Sepulcro*, the Caſtle, and all other its appendixes, which he kept in behalf of his Son-in-Law, whilſt his Son-in-Law lived; refuſing afterwards to ſurrender them to the Pope who demanded them as uſurped from the Church: upon which refuſal the Pope ſent the *Patriarch* with an Army to recover them by force. The *Count di Poppi* finding himſelf unable to defend them, offered them to the *Florentines*, who would not accept them: however upon the Popes return to *Florence*, they interpoſed, and laboured an agreemen t betwixt his Holineſs and the *Count*.

Con'e di Poppi.

But finding the Treaty difficult and dilatory; the *Patriarch* fell upon *Caſentino*, took *Prato Vecchio*, and *Romena*, and proffered them likewiſe to the *Florentines*; but they could not be accepted, unleſs the Pope would conſent they ſhould reſtore them to the *Count*, which after much argumentation he did, upon condition the *Florentines* ſhould uſe their intereſt with *Count Poppi* to reſtore *Borgo* to him. The mind of his Holineſs being at quiet by this means, the *Florentines* (the Cathedral Church of their City, call'd *Santa Reparata*, having been out of repair, long ſince begun to be mended, and now brought to that perfection, Divine ſervice might be celebrated in it) intreated his Holineſs that he would oblige them

them so far, as to consecrate it himself: to which he willingly condescended; and for the greater magnificence of the Church and City, and the ostentation and honor of the *Pope*, a Gallery was built from *Santa Maria Novella* (where the Pope held his Court to the Church which was to be consecrated) four fathoms wide, and two high, covered over with very rich Cloths, under which, only his Holiness, his Court, and such Magistrats of the City as were appointed to attend him, were to pass, all the rest of the Citizens and People, having dispos'd themselves in the street, the Church, and atop of their Houses to behold so glorious a spectacle. The Ceremony being pass'd with the usual solemnity; his Holiness, as a token of more than ordinary respect, confer'd the honor of Knighthood upon *Guiliano de Avanzati*, at that time *Gonfaloniere de Giustitia*, but always a very eminent Citizen; to whom the *Senate* (that they might not seem behind hand with the Pope in any point of Beneficence) gave the Government of the *Pisa* for a year.

Controversies betwixt the *Greek* and *Roman* Churches.

About this time certain differences arising betwixt the *Greek* and the *Roman* Churches, they could not agree in all particulars about the Divine Worship: and for as much as in the last Council of *Basil*, much had been said upon that subject by the Prelats of the Church, it was resolved that all diligence should be us'd to bring the Emperour, and the Prelats of the *Greek* Church together to the Council of *Basil*, to try if there was any way to accomodate them with the *Romans*. Though it was derogatory to the Majesty of the Emperour, and contrary to the pride of his Prelats, to yeild in any thing to the *Romans*, yet the Turk lying heavy upon them, and fearing that of themselves they should not be able to resist him; that they might with the more confidence and security desire relief from other People, they resolv'd to comply, and accordingly, as was directed by the Council of *Basil*, the Emperour, the *Patriarch*, and several other Prelats and Barons of *Greece*, arrived at *Venice*; but being frighted from thence by the Plague, it was resolved they should remove to *Florence*, and all their differences be discussed and determined in that City: being assembled, and for many days together both *Roman* and *Greek* Prelats, all of them in the Cathedral; after many and long disputations, the *Grecians* condescended, and complyed with the Church and Bishop of *Rome*.

Determined at *Florence*, by the submission of the *Greek*.

The peace betwixt the *Lucchesi*, and the *Florentines*, and betwixt the Duke and the Count, being concluded; it was thought no hard matter to put an end to the Wars of *Italy*, especially in *Lombardy* in *Tuscany*; for the War in the Kingdom of *Naples* betwixt *Rinato di Angio*, and *Alphonso d'Aragona*, was hardly to be compos'd but by the ruine of one of them: and though the Pope was discontented for the loss of so many Towns; and the ambition both of the Duke and *Venetian* was sufficiently known; yet it was suppos'd necessity would force the one to lay down, and wearines the other: but they were out in their conjectures; for neither Duke nor *Venetian* could be perswaded to be quiet; but on the contrary they took arms afresh, and *Lombardy* and *Tuscany* was filled again with their Hostilities. The ambitious and haughty mind of the Duke could not brook that the *Venetians* should keep *Bergamo*, and *Brescia*; and the rather becaufe he observ'd them always in arms; perpetually making incursions all over his Country; in which, he thought he should not only restrain them, but recover all he had lost, when ever the Pope, the *Florentines*, and the Count should desert them: he designed therefore to take *Romagna* from the Pope, supposing when he had gained that, it would not be in his Holiness Power to offend him; and the *Florentines* seeing the fire at their own doors, would not stir for fear of themselves; or if they did, they could not assault him conveniently. The Duke understood likewise how angry the *Florentines* were with the *Venetians*, about the business of *Lucca*; and upon that score concluded them the less likely to take up arms for the *Venetians*: and as to Count *Francesco*, he did not doubt his new amity, and the hopes of his marriage, would keep him quiet and safe.

To prevent Scandal, and give less occasion to any Body to stir (having oblig'd himself by his Articles with the *Count* not to meddle with *Romagna*) he caus'd *Nicolo Piccinino* to take that enterprize upon himself, and fall upon it, as of his own ambition and avarice. *Nicolo*, at the time of the treaty betwixt the Duke and the Count, was in *Romagna*, and (by the Dukes direction) shew'd himself much dissatisfied at his agreement with his implacable adversary, the Count. Whereupon here tired with his Army (in great discontent as was pretended) to *Camurata* (a Town betwixt *Furli*, and *Ravenna*, and fortified himself, as if he designed to make good that Quarter, till he could find some better entertainment: and the report of his disgust being spread all over *Italy*, *Nicolo* took order to have his services, and the Dukes ingratitude, remonstrated to the Pope; and that though by the interest of two of the principal Generals, he had got all the forces of *Italy* under his command, yet if his Holiness would say the word, he could contrive things so, that one of them should become his Enemy, and the other unserviceable; for if he would provide him with monies,

and

and supply him with Men, he would fall upon the Towns which the *Count* had usurped from the Church, and by giving the *Count* imployment for the preservation of his own Countries, render him incapable of being subservient to the ambition of the Duke. The Pope believing what he said to be rational and true, sent him 5000 Ducats, besides large promises of privision for himself and his Children, and though many times he was admonished to have a care of being deceived, yet he would never suspect, nor admit one word to the contrary.

The City of *Ravenna* was at that time commanded for the Church by *Ostasio da Polenta*. *Nicolo* conceiving it no time to protract (his Son *Francesco* having plunder'd and sack'd *Spoleto* to the great satisfaction of the Pope) resolved to attack *Ravenna*, either thinking the enterprize easie in it self, or else holding private intelligence with *Ostasio* the Governour; which soever it was, he had not invested it many days, before it was surrendered upon articles; and that being taken, *Bologna*, *Imola*, and *Furli*, followed in a short time; and that which was most strange, was, that of twenty strong holds which in those parts were garison'd by the Pope, there was not any one but submitted to *Nicolo*; and not contented with these affronts to his Holiness, he added contumly to his injustice; and writ the Pope word that he had us'd him according to his deserts: for having impudently endeavoured to interrupt the old friendship betwixt him and the Duke; and fill'd all *Italy* with letters that he abandoned the Duke; and sided with the *Venetian*. Having possess'd himself of *Romagna*, he left it to the Government of his Son *Francesco*; and passing himself with the greatest part of his Army into *Lombardy*, he joyned the rest of the Dukes forces; assaulted the Country of *Brescia*; and in a short time brought it under subjection, and when he had done so, laid siege to the City: the Duke desirous that the *Venetians* might be exposed, excused himself to the Pope, the *Florentines*, and the *Count*, pretending that what was done by *Nicolo* in *Romagna*, if it were contrary to their capitulations, was no less contrary to his inclination; suggesting privatly, that when time and opportunity contributed, he would make him sensible of his disobedience: the *Florentines*, and the *Count* gave no great credit to what he said; believing (as was true) that it was nothing but artifice to keep them in suspence, till he conquered the *Venetians*, who supposing themselves able alone to contend with the Duke, were too proud to desire assistance of any body, but with their Captain *Gattamelata*, would wage War with him by themselves. The Count *Francesco* desired, by permission of the *Florentines*, that he might have gone to the relief of King *Rinato* (had not the accidents in *Romagna* and *Lombardy* diverted him) and the *Florentines* for the old friendship betwixt them and *France*, would have willingly consented and the Duke would have assisted *Alfonso*, for the kindness he had expressed to him in his former distress: but both the one and the other had too much employment at home, to concern themselves in any differences abroad: the *Florentines* seeing *Romagna* overrun, and the *Venetians* baffled by the Duke (apprehending their own, by the calamity of their Neighbours) desired the *Count* to come into *Tuscany*, that they might consider of some way to obstruct the Dukes forces, which were then much stronger than ever they had been; adding withal, that if their insolence was not suddainly restrained, there was no state in *Italy* but would feel the inconvenience.

The Pope deluded and his Country invaded by Piccining.

The *Count* knew well enough the apprehension of the *Florentines* was but reasonable; yet his desire that his marriage with the Dukes daughter might proceed, kept him in suspence: and the Duke perceiving his mind, kept him up with reiterated hopes, (if he stir'd not against him) for the young Lady was now of Age to have it consummated, and many times, the Treaty was so far advanced, that all convenient preparations were made for the Wedding, when of a suddain some new scruple or cavil was found to protract it: however to make the *Count* more secure, he added some deeds to his promises; and sent him thirty thousand *Florins*, to which the Duke had engaged himself by the articles of marriage. But this transaction hindered not the proceeding of the War in *Lombardy*. Every day the *Venetian* lost some Town or other; the Boats they sent to secure the Rivers, were sunk and dispers'd by the Dukes forces; the Country of *Bressia* and *Verona* harrassed and possess'd; and those Cities both of them so straightly block'd up, the common opinion was, they could not hold out: the *Marquess* of *Mantua*, who for many years had been their General, left them; and went over to the Duke; so what their pride would not suffer them to do in the beginning; in the process of the War, they were driven to by their fear; for finding now they had no remedy but in the friendship of the *Count*, and the *Florentines*, they demanded it of themselves; but not without much diffidence and suspition, least the *Florentines* should make them the same answer, which in the enterprize of *Lucca*, they had received from them about the affairs of the *Count*: but they found them more tractable than they expected, and indeed more than their carriage toward them had deserved. So much more prevalent in the

the *Florentines* was their old quarrel to their Enemies, than their new pique and exceptions to their friends. And having long before presaged the distress into which the *Venetians* of necessity would fall; they had represented to the *Count* how inseperable his ruine would be from theirs; and that he would find himself deceiv'd, if he expected the Duke would esteem him more in his good, than his adverse fortune; for it was fear of him (whilst his affairs were uncertain) and nothing else had moved him to that treaty about his Daughter; and forasmuch as the same thing which necessity constrains People to promise, it constrains them to perform; it was necessary to continue the Duke in the same distress; which could not be done, but by preserving the Grandeur of the *Venetians*. He ought therefore to consider, that if the *Venetians* should be forced to quit their territory upon the land; he would not only be deprived of the conveniences he might have from them, but of all that he might reasonably expect from other People who were afraid of them; and if he reflected upon other states of *Italy*, he would find some of them poor; and some of them Enemies; and alone (as they had often inculcated) the *Florentines* were not able to maintain him; so that in all respects it was his interest to sustain the Dominion of the *Venetians* upon the *Terra firma*. These perswasions, added to the hatred the Count had conceived against the Duke, for his jugling about his Daughter, dispos'd him to the agreement; yet not so as to oblige himself to pass the *Po*.

The Count, earnestly perswaded not to desert the Venetians.

1438. The Articles were agreed in *February* 1438, in which the *Venetians* ingag'd to defray two thirds of the charge of the War, & the *Florentines* one; each of them obliging themselves at their own expences to defend the *Counts* lands in *La Marca* in the mean time. Nor was the League contented with these forces and allies; for they joyned to them the Lord of *Faenza*, the Sons of *Pandolfo Malatesta da Kimino* and *Piero Giampagolo Ursino*; they tryed the Marques of *Mantoua* likewise, but they could not remove him from the Duke; to whom the Lord of *Faenza* revolted (upon better conditions) though he had enter'd the League; which put them into great fear they should not be able to execute their designs in *Romagna* so readily as they propos'd: at this time *Lombardy* was in such distress, that *Brescia* was besieged by the Dukes forces, and reduced into such a condition, it was daily expected when by famine it should be constrained to surrender. *Verona* was in the same condition, and if either of them was taken, it was concluded all farther opposition would be in vain, and all their expences hitherto lost: against this there was no visible remedy, but to send the *Count* into *Lombardy*, and in that there were three difficulties. One was to perswade the *Count* to pass the *Po*, and carry on the War in all places: the second was that the *Florentines* seemed to be exposed thereby, and left to the discretion of the Duke, who retiring into his own fastnesses, might divide his forces, and facing the *Count* with one party, joyn with their rebels with the other, and march into *Tuscany*; which was a course they were not a little afraid of. The third was to resolve which way the *Count* might pass most securely into the Country of *Padoua* to the *Venetian* Army. Of these three difficulties, the second relating to the *Florentines*, took up the greatest debate; but knowing the necessity, and tired with the *Venetians* (who press'd for the *Count* with all imaginable opportunity, and protested that without him they would give over all) they prefer'd the necessity of their associats before any danger of their own.

However the difficulty of the way was refer'd to be secured by the *Venetians*; and because, for the managing of this Treaty, and inclining the *Count* to pass into *Lombardy*, it was thought fit that *Neri* the Son of *Gino Capponi* should be dispatched to him; the *Senate* concluded to send for him to *Venice*, to make the imployment the more grateful, and instruct him the more commodiously about the way the *Count* was to march. Upon this invitation, *Neri* departed from *Cesena*, and came by water to *Venice*, where never any Prince was received with more honor and acclamation, than he was by the *Senate*; for upon his coming, and the resolutions which thereupon they were to take, they believed the whole happiness and safety of their Government did depend: *Neri* being introduced into the *Senate*, spake to them in this manner.

Most Serene Prince,

Neri's speech to the Venetian Senate.

"MY Masters were always of Opinion, that the greatness of the Duke would be the de-
"struction of your Commonwealth and their own; and that if any thing prevent-
"ed it, it must be the Grandeur and prosperity of both. Had this been credited in time by
"your Lordships our condition had been better than it is; and your state secure from
"many dangers wherewith it is now infested; but you not having given us either assistance
"or credit when our necessities required, we could not make such haste to your relief; nor
"you desire it so readily as you might have done, had you known us better either in pros-
"perity or adversity; or understood that where we love once, our love is inextin-
"guishable,

" guiſhable, and where we hate once, our hatred is immortal: the love and reſpect we have al-
" ways retained to this illuſtrious *Senate*, you your ſelves do know; having many times
" ſeen *Lombardy* full of our forces which was ſent in to your relief: our animoſity to *Philip* is
" known to all the World, and we ſhall continue it to his family; for 'tis impoſſible old
" love, or inveterate hatred can ever be expung'd, let the new injuries, or endearments be
" as many as they will: we are and have been aſſured that in this War we might have ſtood
" neuter, with great favour from the Duke, and no danger to our ſelves: for though by
" your expulſion he had made himſelf Maſter of *Lombardy*; yet there would be enough left
" in *Italy* to ſecure us; ſeeing envy is always concomitant with power; one increaſes with
" the other; and where envy is, War and diſtraction muſt follow. We were not inſen-
" ſible likewiſe (by declining this War) how great charges, and danger we ſhould have
" avoided, and how eaſily, by our ſtirrings we may tranſplant into *Tuſcany*: but all theſe
" diſcouragements have been overrul'd by our affection of the ſtate, and we reſolved to aſ-
" ſiſt you with the ſame vigor, as we would defend our ſelves: to this end (moſt Noble
" Lords) my Maſters judging it neceſſary above all things to relieve *Verona* and *Breſcia*;
" and imagining that impoſſible, but by the conduct of the *Count*; they ſent me firſt to him
" to perſwade his paſſing into *Lombardy*, (to which your Lordſhip knows he would never be
" oblig'd) and to try the ſame arguments with him, as wrought upon us: as he is invin-
" cible in Arms, ſo he is not to be outdone in courteſie; and that frankneſs and Generoſity
" which he ſaw us practiſe towards you, he has endeavoured to exceed: he underſtood ve-
" ry well how much he ſhould leave *Tuſcany* expos'd by his departure, but obſerving how we
" poſtponed our own ſafety to yours, he very generouſly has promiſed to do the ſame, and
" prefers your intereſt before his own. My buſineſs here is to proffer you the *Count* at the
" head of 7000 Horſe, and 2000 Foot, ready to receive your Orders, and ſeek out the E-
" nemy as you pleaſe to direct. My requeſt therefore is (and it is the requeſt of my Ma-
" ſters, and his own) that as he has exceeded the number which he was obligd to bring in
" to your ſervice, ſo you would enlarge your reward; that neither he may repent of his en-
" terprize, nor we be ſorry we perſwaded him.

Theſe words of *Neri*'s were heard with as much attention by the *Senate*, as if they had been delivered from an Oracle, and ſo much was the auditory revived thereby, they had not patience to let their Duke reply according to cuſtom; but riſing all of them upon their feet, with their hands lifted up, and tears in their eyes, they gave the *Florentines* thanks for the good office they had done them, and him for the diligence and dexterity of his diſpatch; promiſing that no time ſhould ever obliterate it, not only in their own hearts, but in the hearts of their poſterity; and that their Country and themſelves would always be at the ſervice of the *Florentines*. But the tranſport being over they fell into ſerious debate about the way the *Count* was to take, that bridges, and all other conveniences might be provided: four ways there were before them. One from *Ravenna*, along the ſhore; but that lying moſt upon the Sea, and the Fens, was not approved: the next was the direct way, but obſtructed by a Caſtle called the *Ucellino* which was garriſon'd by the Duke, and to be taken, before they could paſs; and that could not be done in a ſhort time without great difficulty, and to be long about it would fruſtrate their relief in another place, which required all poſſible expedition. The third way was by the foreſt of *Lugo*, but the *Po* being overflown, that was unpaſſable. The fourth was thorow the Country of *Bologna*, over the bridges at *Puledrano*, *Cento*, and *Picue*, and ſo by *Finale* and *Bondeno* to *Ferrara*, from whence partly by water and partly by land they might paſs into the Country of *Padua*, and joyn with the *Venetian* Army: this way alſo had its difficulties, and they were liable to be impeded by the Enemies Army; yet being choſen as the beſt; notice was given to the *Count*, who departing with all imaginable ſpeed, arrived in the Country of *Padoua* on the 20th. of *June*; the arrival of ſo great a Captain in *Lombardy*, revived the whole Government of *Venice*; and whereas before they were almoſt deſperate of their ſafety; they began now to take courage, and expect new conqueſts upon the Enemy. The firſt thing the *Count* attempted, was the relief of *Verona*, to prevent which, *Nicolo* marched with his Army to *Soave* (a Caſtle betwixt the Country, of *Vicenſa*, and *Verona*) where he intrenched; throwing up a ditch from *Soave* to the marches of *Adice*.

The *Count* finding himſelf obſtructed thorow the plain; reſolv'd to march over the mountains to *Verona*; preſuming that *Nicolo* would either believe he could not paſs that way, by reaſon of its ſteepneſs and cragginess; or let him paſs ſo before he believed it, that it would be too late to interrupt him. Wherefore, taking eight days proviſion along with him, he march'd his Army over the Mountains, and at *Soave* came down into the plains. And though *Nicolo* had thrown up ſome works to incomode him, yet they were too weak to give him a ſtop. *Nicolo* finding the Enemy paſs'd beyond his imagination; and fearing

to be forced to an engagement upon ſome diſadvantage; he drew off to the other ſide of the *Aldice*, and the Count, without farther obſtacle, marched into *Verona*. Having overcome the firſt difficulty, and relieved *Verona*; the next thing the Count was to attempt, was to ſuccour *Breſcia*. That City is ſeated ſo near the Lake *di Garda*, that though it was blocked up by land, yet the Lake was open, and they could ſupply themſelves with proviſions. Upon that conſideration, the Duke had put what force he could upon the Lake, and in the beginning of his deſigns, had ſecured all the Towns which were capable of ſupplying them by the benefit of the Lake.

The *Venetians* had Gallies likewiſe upon the Lake; but they were not ſtrong enough to encounter the Dukes. The *Count* thought it neceſſary with his Army at Land, to give the *Venetian* Gallies ſome advantage upon the Water; and therefore he concluded to attempt ſome of thoſe Towns which lay conveniently for the famiſhing of *Breſcia*, he clap'd down therefore with his Army before *Bandolino* (a Caſtle ſtanding upon the Lake) hoping if he took that, the reſt would ſurrender. But in that enterprize, his fortune deceived him; for moſt of his Men falling ſick, he was forced to raiſe the ſeige and remove his Army to *Zemo*, a Caſtle belonging to the *Veroneſi*, where the air was more healthful, and the Country more plentiful. The Count retired, *Nicolo*, not to ſlip the opportunity of making himſelf Maſter of the Lake, left his Camp at *Vegaſio*, and with a ſelect party went to the Lake, where joining with the reſt, he fell ſo furiouſly upon the *Venetian* Squadron, that he broke it quite, and took moſt of them Priſoners. Upon this Victory, moſt of the Caſtles upon the Lake, ſurrender'd to the Duke. The *Venetians*, ſtartled at this defeat, and fearing leſt the *Breſcians* ſhould yield thereupon, they ſolicited the Count very earneſtly, both by letters, and Meſſages, that he would attempt to relieve them. The Count, perceiving his hopes of doing it by the Lake, abſolutely defeated, and his way by the fields impoſſible, by reaſon of the Trenches, and Bulwarks, which were ſo numerous and ſtrong, and an Army to make them good, ſo that to venture among them would be inevitable deſtruction, the way by the Mountains having been ſucceſful to him at *Verona*, he reſolved to try it once more for the relief of *Breſcia*. Having pitched upon his way, the Count departed from *Zeno*, and by the *Val d'Acri*, marching to the Lake of S. *Andrea*, he paſs'd to *Forboli*, and *Penda* upon the Lake *di Garda*, from whence he advanced to *Tenna*, and ſat down before it; it being neceſſary that Caſtle ſhould be taken before he could get into *Breſcia*.

Nicolo Piccinino defeated by the *Count*.

Nicolo having intelligence of his deſign, marched his Army to *Piſchiera*, and from thence (joyning with the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*, and a commanded party of his beſt-men) he proceeded to engage the *Count*, who giving him battle, *Nicolo* was beaten; his Army diſperſed; many of them taken Priſoners; and thoſe which eſcaped many of them fled to their Camp, and many of them to the Fleet. *Nicolo* got off himſelf into *Tenna*, and night being come, concluding if he ſtayed till morning he could never get farther, to avoid a certain danger, he expoſed himſelf to a doubtful. Of all his retinue, *Nicolo* had only one ſervant with him, a luſty ſtrong *German*, and one that had always been very faithful to him.

Eſcapes to *Tenna* and from thence very ſtrangely to his Army.

Nicolo perſwaded his *German*, that if he would put him into a ſack, he might carry him off to ſome ſecure place upon his ſhoulders, as ſome luggage of his Maſters. The Enemy lay round before the Caſtle, but (tranſported and ſecure upon their Victory the day before) without any Order, or guards: by which means the *German* found no great difficulty in the buſineſs, for putting himſelf into the habit of a freebooter, and mounting his Maſter upon his ſhoulder, he paſſed thorow their whole Camp, and brought him ſafe to his party. This Victory had it been improved as happily as it was gained, might have given more relief to *Breſcia*, and more felicity to the *Venetians*: but being ill managed, they had little reaſon to exſult, and *Breſcia* remained in the ſame neceſſity as before; for *Nicolo* was no ſooner returned to the forces which he had left behind, but he ſet all his wits to work which way he might exploit ſome new thing to attone for his loſs; and obſtruct the relief of the Town: he knew himſelf the ſituation of the Citadel of *Verona*, and had learned from the Priſoners taken in that War, not only that it was ill guarded, but the way how it might eaſily be ſurprized: he believed therefore that fortune had preſented him with an opportunity of recovering his honor, and converting his Enemies joy, into ſadneſs and ſorrow. *Verona* is in *Lombardy*, ſeated at the foot of thoſe Mountains which divide *Italy* from *Germany*; ſo that it ſtands partly upon the Hill, and partly upon the plain: the River *Adice* riſes in the vally *di Trento* and running into *Italy*, does not extend himſelf immediatly thorow the plains; but banding to the left hand among the Mountains, it comes at length to the City; and paſſes thorow the midſt of it: yet not ſo as to divide it into equal parts, for towards the plain it is much greater, than towards the Mountains: upon the riſing part of the City, there are two Caſtles, one of them called *San Piero*, and the other *San Felice*, which appear ſtronger in their ſituation, than their Walls; and do by it command the whole Town. In

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the plain on this side the *Adice*, behind the wall of the City, there are two Fortresses, about a thousand paces distant one from the other; of which one is called the old Citadel, and the other the new. On the inside of one of them, there passes a wall to the other, and is (in respect of the other walls which fetch a compass) as the string to a bow. All the space betwixt these two walls, is full of Inhabitants and called the Borg of *San Zeno*. These two Castles and the Burg, *Nicolo* designed to surprize, believing it would be no difficult matter, both because of the former negligence of the Guards (which he presumed after the late Victory would be much greater) and of an opinion he had, that no enterprize was so feasible as that which the Enemy believed was impossible to be done. Having drawn out a party of choice Men in order to his design, he joyned with the Marques of *Mantoua*, and marching in the night to *Verona*, he scaled the new Citadel, and took it without being perceived, and then, forcing upon the *Port di S. Antoine*, the signal was given to his Horse, and they marched all of them into the Town. Those of the old Citadel who were upon the Guard, hearing the noise when the Sentinels in the other Citadel were knock'd on the head, and when the Gate of S. *Antoine* was broken up, believing it was the Enemy, cryed out to the People to Arm; and fell a ringing their Bells. The Citizens taking the alarm, came together in great Confusion! those of them who had most courage, got to their Arms, and retreated with them to the Palace of the *Rettori*: in the mean time *Nicolo*'s Souldiers had plundered the Borgo *di* S. *Zeno*, and advancing towards the Town, the Citizens, perceiving the Dukes forces was entered, and no way left to defend themselves, advised the *Venetian Rettori* to retire into the fortresses, and preserve themselves and their goods, for (as they said) it would be much better to do so, and attend better fortune; than by endeavouring to avoid the present danger, to be knock'd on the Head, and the whole City pillaged: hereupon the *Rettori*, and all the *Venetians* betook themselves to the Castle of S. *Felice*; and several of the principal Citizens went to meet *Nicolo* and the Marques of *Mantoua* to beg of them that they would rather possess that City rich, and with honor, than poor to their disgrace; especially seeing they had not by an obstinate defence deserved preferment from their old Masters, or hatred from their new. The Marques and *Nicolo* having encouraged them what they could, they protected them from plunder as much as was possible; and because they were confident the Count would immediatly address himself to the recovery of the Town, they contrived with all imaginable industry to get the Forts into their hands; but what they could not take, they block'd up with ditches and trenches cut about to obstruct the Enemy from relieving them.

Verona surprized by *Nicolo*.

The Count *Francesco* was with his Army at *Tenna*, where upon the first report of this surprize, he believed it but vain; afterwards understanding the truth, he resolved by a more than ordinary speed to recompence his former negligence, and expiate its disgrace. And though all the chief Officers of his Army advis'd him to give over his enterprize of *Brescia*, and *Verona*, and retire to *Vicenza*, lest otherwise the Enemy should encompass him where he was, yet he would not consent; but resolved to try his fortune for the recovery of *Verona*, and turning about to the *Venetian Proveditori*, and *Barnardetto de Medici* (who assisted as Commissioner for the *Florentines*) he encouraged them in their doubts and assured them he would retake it if any of the Castles held out for him. Having put all things in order, and drawn out his Men, he marched towards *Verona* with all expedition: at first sight, *Nicolo* imagined he was marching to *Vicenza*, as he had been counselled by his officers; But observing him to march on, and direct his forces towards the Castle of S. *Felice*, he thought it time to provide for his defence: but all was too late, the trenches, and embarrasments were not finished; the Souldiers separated, and plundering, and could not be got together time enough to hinder the Count from getting into the Citadel, and from thence into the City, to the great disparagement of *Nicolo*, and detriment of his party, who with the Marques of *Mantua*, retreated first into the Citadel which they had taken, and from thence escaped to the City of *Mantua*, where rallying the remainder of their forces, they joyned themselves with the Army before *Brescia*: so that in four days time *Verona* was won and lost by the Dukes forces. Being Winter time, and the weather very cold the *Count* having after his Victory, put in some supplies of victual into *Brescia*, though with very great difficulty, he removed his quarters to *Verona*, having given order for the building certain Gallies to *Forboli* that Winter, to be ready against the Spring, that then he might be so strong both by Land and by Water, as to give *Brescia* an effectual and total relief.

Recovered by the *Count*.

The Duke seeing the War at a stand for a time, and his hopes of being Master of *Verona* and *Brescia*, at an end; all which he attributed to the Counsel and supplies of the *Florentines*, whose affection could not be alienated, by all the provocations the *Venetians* had given them; nor gained over to his side, by all the promises which he had made them; that they

might be ſenſible of their own overſight, and feel the inconveniences they had pulled upon themſelves, he reſolved to invade *Tuſcany*, to which he was much encouraged by *Nicolo*, and the *Florentine* exiles. *Nicolo*'s deſign was upon the poſſeſſions of *Braccio*, and to drive the Count out of *La Marca*: the other had an itching after their own Country, and a mind to be at home, ſo that both parties animated the Duke with ſuch arguments as were moſt ſuitable to their particular deſigns: *Nicolo* told him he might ſend him with an Army into *Tuſcany*, and leave *Breſcia* beſeiged; for he was Maſter of the Lake; was well entrenched about the Town; had ſeveral ſtrong Caſtles in the Country; and good Officers and Souldiers enough to reſiſt the *Count*, if he ſhould make any attempt in another place; which was not to be imagined till he had reelived *Breſcia*, and that was impoſſible: ſo that if he pleaſed he might make War in *Tuſcany*, and not quite his enterprize in *Lombardy*; he remonſtrated beſides that the *Florentines* would be conſtrained, as ſoon as they ſaw him in *Tuſcany*, to call back the *Count* or be ruined; and whichſoever of the two happened, his Victory would be certain.

The Duke encouraged in his expedition into *Tuſcany* by *Nicolo* and the *Florentine* exiles.

The exiles, inculcated, that if *Nicolo* came near *Florence* with his Army, it was impoſſible, but the People, tired out with their Taxes and the inſolence of the Grandees, would take arms and revolt; as to his paſſage to *Florence*, they promiſed it ſhould be eaſie, and *Caſentino* open to them, by the intereſt and correſpondence which *Rinaldo* held with that Governor: ſo that the Duke, inclinable of himſelf, was much fortified and encouraged by their perſwaſions: the *Venetians* on the other ſide (though the Winter was very ſharp) preſs'd the *Count* to the relief of *Breſcia* with his whole Army; but he refuſed, alledging it was not to be done at that time; that better weather was to be expected, and that in the interim their Fleet ſhould be got ready, and then it might be attempted both by Land and by Water: which anſwer giving no ſatisfaction, the *Venetians* became ſlow, and remiſs in ſending them proviſions, ſo that in their Army many People died. The *Florentines* having advertiſement of all theſe paſſages, were greatly diſmaid; ſeeing the War brought home to them in *Tuſcany*, and that in *Lombardy*, not turn'd to account: nor were they leſs fearful of the forces of the Church; not that the Pope was their Enemy, but that they found that Army at the devotion of the Patriarch who was their implacable adverſary: *Giovanni Vitelleſchi Cornetano*, was firſt Apoſtolical *Notarie*, then Biſhop of *Ricanati*, after that Patriarch of *Alexandria*, and being at laſt created Cardinal, was called the Cardinal of *Florence*; This Cardinal was a cunning and couragious Perſon, ſo capable of buſineſs that the Pope had a ſtrong affection for him, gave him command of the forces of the Church, and in all the Popes enterprizes in *Tuſcany*, *Romagna*, *Naples*, and *Rome*, he was conſtantly his General; ſo that by degrees he gained ſo great Authority both over the Army, and the Pope, that the Pope began to be afraid to command him, and the Army to refuſe their obedience to any body but he. The Cardinal being at that time in *Rome*, when the news arrived that *Nicolo* was marching into *Tuſcany*.

The Patriarch of *Alexandria* General for the Pope.

The fear of the *Florentines* was highly increaſed, becauſe from the time of *Rinaldo*'s expulſion, that Cardinal had been an Enemy to their ſtate, for the Articles of agreement which were, by his mediation, procured in *Florence*, were not made good, but rather managed to the prejudice of *Rinaldo*, he haveing been the occaſion of his laying down his Arms, & that, the occaſion of his baniſhment; ſo that the Government of *Florence* began to fear the time was come for the reſtauration of *Rinaldo*, if he joyned with *Nicolo* in his expedition into *Tuſcany* and their apprehenſions were augmented by the ſuddain departure of *Nicolo*, who ſeemed to them to leave an enterprize which he had almoſt compleated, to embark himſelf in another that was more dangerous and doubtful: which they preſumed he would never have done, without ſome private intelligence, or unknown invitation: theſe their apprehenſions they had infuſed into the Pope, who was grown ſenſible of his error in having transfered ſo much Authority upon other People. But whilſt the *Florentines* were in this ſuſpence, fortune preſented them a way, to ſecure themſelves of the Patriarch: that State had ſcouts abroad to intercept, and peruſe all letters, to ſee if they could meet with any correſpondence to the prejudice of the State,; at *Monte Pulciano* it happened a pacquet was taken which the Patriarch had written to *Nicolo Piccinino* without the knowledge or conſent of the Pope. Though the Character was ſtrange, and the ſence ſo implicite and abſtruſe, that nothing could be made out of it, yet that obſcurity, conſidered with its directions to an Enemy, alarmed his Holineſs ſo, as he reſolved to ſecure him. The care of his apprenſion he committed to *Antonio Rido da Padoua*, whom he had made Governor of the Caſtle of *Rome*. *Antonio* as ſoon as he had his orders, was ready to execute them, and expected an opportunity. The Patriarch had reſolved to paſs into *Tuſcany* and having fixed upon the next day for his departure from *Rome*, he ſent to the Governor that he would be upon the bridge next morning at a preciſe hour, for he had ſomething to diſcourſe with him: *Antonio*

The Patriarch a friend to *Rinaldo*.

The Pope diſcovers intelligence betwixt the Patriarch and *Nicolo*, and reſolves to ſecure him.

thought

thought now his opportunity was come, ordered his People as he thought convenient, and at the time appointed was ready expecting the Patriarch upon the Bridge, which was to be drawn up, or let down, as occaſion required. The Patriarch was punctual, and came exactly at his time, and *Antonio* entertaining him a while upon the bridge, gave a ſign, and on a ſuddain the bridge was pulled up, and the Patriarch in the Caſtle; ſo that of the General of an Army, he became a Priſoner in a moment. The People which were with him, began to ſwagger at firſt, but underſtanding afterwards it was his Holineſſes direction, they were pacified and quiet: and the Governor of the Caſtle comforting him with fair words, and giving him hopes of a better condition, the Patriarch replyed, that great Perſons were not ſecured, to be diſcharged again; that thoſe who deſerved to be ſeized, did not deſerve to be diſmiſſed, and it was his own caſe, for he died in Priſon not long after, and *Lodvico* Patriarch of *Aquileia* was made General of the Pope's Army in his place; who though before he could not be engaged in the Wars betwixt the Duke and the League, yet then he was perſwaded; and promiſed to be ready for the defence of *Tuſcany*, with 4000 Horſe and 2000 Foot. The Patriarch ſecured and dyes

Being delivered from this danger, there was another of no leſs importance, and that was their fear of *Nicolo* upon the confuſion of a affairs in *Lombardy*, and the differences betwixt the *Venetians* and the Count: for better information, the *Florentines* ſent *Neri* the Son of *Gino Capponi*, and *Guiliano d'Anazenti* to *Venice*, as alſo to ſettle the proſecution of the War for the next year, commanding *Neri*, upon the reſolution of the *Venetians*, to repair to the Count, to ſound his, and exhort him to ſuch courſes as ſhould be neceſſary for the ſecurity of the League: theſe Embaſſadors were ſcarce got onward on their way, as far as *Ferrara*, before they had the news that *Piccinino* had paſſed the *Po* with 6000 Horſe. Thereupon they made what haſte was poſſible, and being come to *Venice*, they found that *Senate* very poſitive to have *Breſcia* relieved at that very time, not being (as they ſaid) able to attend any better, nor their ſtate to put out any Fleet, ſo that without preſent ſupply, they would be forced to ſurrender, which would conpleat the Dukes ſucceſſes, and be the loſs of all their Territories by Land: finding them ſo perverſe, *Neri* went to *Verona*, to hear what arguments the *Count* could produce to the contrary, who with good reaſons made it out to him, that to endeavour the relief of *Breſcia* in that juncture, would be not only ineffectual at preſent, but much to their prejudice afterwards; for conſidering the ſeaſon of the year, and ſituation of the Town, nothing could be done, he ſhould only harraſs and diſorder his Men ſo, as when a proper time for action ſhould come, he ſhould beforced to draw off to *Verona* to ſupply himſelf with what the Winter had conſumed, and what was neceſſary for their future ſupport; ſo that all the time that was fit for action, would be ſpent in marching backward and forward. To adjuſt theſe things, *Orſalto Juſtiniani*, and *Giovan Piſani* were ſent to *Verona* to the Count, by whom it was concluded (after much diſpute) that the *Venetians* for the enſuing year ſhould give the Count 80000. Ducats, and 40. a piece to the reſt of his Army. That he ſhould march forth with his whole Army, and fall upon the Duke, endeavouring by ſome ſmart impreſſion upon his Country to make him recal *Nicolo* out of *Lombardy*. After which concluſion, they returned to *Venice*, but the *Venetians* (the ſum being thought very great) went on but ſlowly with their preparations. *Nicolo Piccinino* proceeded however, was got already into the Country of *Romagna*, and tampered ſo ſucceſsfully with the Sons of *Pandolfo Malateſta*, that they deſerted the *Venetians* and took up Arms under the Duke: this news was unpleaſing at *Venice*, but at *Florence* much more; becauſe that way they thought to have given *Nicolo* a ſtop. But the *Malateſti* being in Rebellion, the *Florentines* were not a little diſmaid, eſpecially fearing that their General *Piero Giampagolo Orſino* (who was then in the territories of the *Malateſti*) might be defeated, and they by conſequence diſarmed: theſe tidings, were alſo no ſmall trouble to the *Count*, who began to apprehend if *Nicolo* paſſed into *Tuſcany*, he might be in danger of loſing *La Marca*, and (diſpoſed to ſecure his own Country if he could) he came to *Venice*, and being introduced to the Duke, he declared to him, that his paſſage into *Tuſcany* would be convenient for the League, for the War was to be carried on where the General, and Army of the Enemy was, and not among their private and particular Towns, and Garriſons: becauſe their Army once beat, there is an end of the War; but though their Garriſons be taken, and their Towns reduced, if their Army be intire, they ſhould be never the nearer, but the War (as it does many times happen) would break out more ſeverely. Aſſuring them that *La Marca* and all *Tuſcany* would be loſt if *Nicolo* was not briskly oppoſed; which being loſt, no remedy could be expected in *Lombardy*; but if it might, he did not underſtand how he could with any excuſe abandon his own Subjects and friends; for coming into *Lombardy* a Prince, he ſhould be loth to leave it as a private Captain. To this the Duke of *Venice* replied, that it was manifeſt, and nothing more certain, that if he left *Lombardy*, and

Commiſſioners to the Count from the *Venetians*.

The Count deſirous to follow *Nicolo*.

Diſſwaded by the Duke of *Venice.*

and paſſed the *Po* with his Army all their territories upon Land would be loſt; and that it would be to no purpoſe to conſume more Mony in defending it. For he can be no wiſe Man who endeavours to defend that which he is ſure to loſe, and he no fool who chuſes to loſe his Country alone rather, than his Country and his Mony too, and if the loſs of their affairs ſhould follow, it would then be clear enough how much it imported the reputation of the *Venetians*, to protect *Romagna* and *Tuſcany*. But the whole *Senate* was againſt his opinion, believing if he ſucceeded in *Lombardy*, he ſhould be ſure every where elſe, and that could be no hard task; that State, upon *Nicolo*'s departure, being left weak and infirm, ſo that that might be ruined, before *Nicolo* could be called back, or any other ſufficient remedy provided. That if things were curiouſly examined, it would be found that *Nicolo* was ſent into *Tuſcany* upon no other errand, but to divert the *Count* from his enterprize in *Lombardy*, and remove the War from his own Country by carrying it into another: ſo that if the Count ſhould purſue him without irreſiſtable neceſſity, he would rather accompliſh his deſigns, and do as he would have him: but if they continued their Army in *Lombardy*, and ſhifted in *Tuſcany* as well as they could; they would be ſenſible of their ill reſolution when it was too late, and find that they had loſt all in *Lombardy* irrecoverably, without any equivalence or repriſal in *Tuſcany*.

They come to a reſolution.

In this manner every Man having ſpoken, and replyed, as his judgment directed him; it was concluded to be quiet for ſome days to ſee what the agreement betwixt *Nicolo* and the *Malateſti* would produce: whether the *Florentines* might rely upon *Piero Giam Pagolo*; and whether the Pope proceeded fairly with the League as he had promiſed he would. This reſolution being taken, not long after, they had intelligence; that *Piero Gian Pagolo* was marched towards *Tuſcany* with his Army; and that the Pope was better inclined to the League at that time, than before; with which advertiſements the *Count* being confirmed; he was content to remain in *Lombardy* himſelf; that *Neri* ſhould be diſpatched thither with a 1000 of his Horſe, and five hundred others, and if things ſhould proceed ſo, as that his preſence ſhould be neceſſary in *Tuſcany*; upon the leaſt ſummons from *Neri* the Count engaged to repair to him without any delay. Accordingly *Neri* marched away, arrived with his forces at *Florence* in *April*, and the ſame day *Giam Pagolo* arrived there alſo; in the mean time *Nicolo Piccinino* having ſetled the affairs of *Romagna*, was deſigning for *Tuſcany*; and being inclined to have marched by the way of the *Alps* of S. *Benedetto*, and the vale of *Montone*, he found that paſſage ſo well defended by the conduct of *Nicolo da Piſa*, that he believed his whole Army would not be able to force it: and becauſe of the ſuddainneſs of this irruption the *Florentines* were but indifferently provided either with Souldiers, or Officers, they committed the paſſes of the other *Alps* to the guard of certain of their Citizens, with ſome new raiſed Companies of Foot, among which Citizens *Bartholomeo Orlandini* had the command, and more particularly the keeping of the Caſtle of *Marradi*, and the paſs that was by it. *Niccolo Piccinino* ſuppoſing the paſs of S. *Benedetto* inſuperable by reaſon of the courage and vigilance of the Comander; choſe rather to attempt the other way where the cowardice and inexperience of the chief Officer was not like to give him ſo great oppoſition. *Marradi* is a Caſtle built at the foot of thoſe *Alps* which divide *Tuſcany* and *Romagna*; but on the ſide of *Romagna*, at the entrance into the *Vale di Lamona* though it has no Walls, yet the River, the Mountains and the Inhabitants make it ſtrong. For the Men are martial and faithful, and the River has worn away the banks, and made ſuch Grotes and hollows therein, that it is impoſſible from the valley to approach it, if a little Bridge which lies over the River be defended: and on the mountain ſide the Rocks and the Cliffs are ſo ſteep, it is almoſt impregnable: but the puſilanimity of *Bartolomeo* debas'd the courage of his Men, and rendered the ſituation of his Caſtle of no importance: for no ſooner did he hear the report of the Enemies approach, but leaving all in Confuſion, away he ran with his Party, and never ſtopped till he came at *Borgo a San. Lorenzo*. *Nicolo* (having poſſeſs'd himſelf of that paſs, ſtrangely ſurprized to conſider how poorly it had been defended; and as much pleaſed that now it was his own) marched down into *Mugello*, and having taken ſeveral Caſtles, he ſtaid at *Puliciano* to refreſh; from whence he made his excurſions as far as *Monte Fieſole*, and was ſo bold to paſs the River *Arno*, ſcouring, forraging, and plundering the Country within three miles of *Florence*. The *Florentines* however were not at all diſmaid, but the firſt thing they did was to ſecure the Government, of which they were not much afraid both for the intereſt which *Coſimo* had with the People; and the method they had taken to reduce the chief Officers of the City into the hands of a few of the moſt potent Citizens, who with their vigilance and ſeverity kept under all ſuch as were diſcontented, or ſtudious of new things, beſides they had news of the reſolutions in *Lombardy*: of *Neri*'s approach; with the number of his forces, and that the Pope had promiſed to ſupply them with more: which hopes were ſufficient to ſupport them till *Neri*'s arrival. But *Neri*

finding

finding the City in some disorders, resolved to take the field, and restrain *Nicolo* from foraging so freely: and therefore drawing together what Infantry he could out of the People, he joyned them with his Horse, marched into the field, and took *Remole*, which the Enemy had possess'd. After the taking of that Town, he encamped his Army there; obstructed the exursions of *Nicolo*; and gave the City great hopes of sending him farther off. *Nicolo* observing though the *Florentines* had lost many of their Men, it procured no commotion; and understanding they were all quiet and secure in the Town, he concluded it vain to lose time any longer, wherefore he changed his designs, and resolved to do something which might cause the *Florentines* to provoke him to a Battle, in which he doubted not to overcome, and then all things would follow; as he expected, of course. There was at that time in *Nicolo*'s Army, *Francesco Conte di Poppi* who (when the Enemy was in *Mugello*) revolted from the *Florentines*, with whom he was in League: the *Florentines* had a jealousie of him before, and endeavoured to continue him their friend, by enlarging his pay, and making him their Deputy over all the Towns which were near him: but nothing could do, so strongly did his affection encline him to the other party, that no fear, nor act of kindness what ever was sufficient to divide him from *Rinaldo*, and the rest of the Brethren, who had had the Government formerly: so that he no sooner heard of *Nicolo's* approach, but he went in to him immediatly, and solicited him with all imaginable importunity to advance towards the City, and march into *Casentino*; discovering to him the whole strength of the Country, and with what ease and security he might straiten the Enemy. *Nicolo* took his Counsel, and marching into *Casentino*, he possess'd himself of *Romena*, and *Bibiena*, and afterwards encamped before *Castle San Nicolo*. That Castle is placed at the foot of those *Alps* which divide *Casentino* from the vale of *Arno*; and by reason it stood high, and had a strong Garrison in it, it was no easie matter to take it, though *Nicolo* ply'd it continually with his Cannon.

The Count *Poppi* revolts from the *Florentine*.

This seige continued twentydays, during which time the *Florentines* had got together what force they could, and had already under several Officers about 3000 foot at *Feggbine*, commanded by *Piero Giam Pagolo* as General, *Neri Capponi*, and *Bernardo de Medici* as Commissioners. The Castle of *San. Nicolo* had sent out four Persons to give them notice of their Condition, and press them for relief: whereupon the Commissioners examining the situation of the place, found it was not to be relieved but by the *Alps* which came down from the *Vale of Arno*, the tops of which might easily be possess'd by the Enemy, before they could come at them, in respect they had a shorter cut to them, and the *Florentines* could not stir, but they must of necessity be seen: so that to attempt a thing which was not like to succeed, was to expose and cast away their Men without doing any good: upon these considerations the Commissioners having commended their courage pass'd, advised them to continue it whilst they were able, and when they found they could hold it no longer, to surrender upon as good termes as they could: hereupon after 32 days seige *Nicolo* became Master of the Castle, but the losing so much time upon so inconsiderable a place, was (in great part) the miscarriage of that enterprize: for had he invested *Florence*, or but kept it blocked up at a distance, the Governor of that City would havee been constrained to raise Mony, and Men, and must have supplied it with provisions, with much more difficulty, having the Enemy so near them, besides many would have been pressing for peace, seeing the War so likely to continue: but the desire the *Count di Poppi* had to be revenged of that Garrison (which had been his Enemy a long time) caused him to give that Counsel, and *Nicolo* to oblige him consented to it, which was the destruction of both: and indeed it seldom happens, but private animosity, proves a prejudice to the interest of the publick. *Nicolo*, pursuing his Victory, took *Passina* and *Chiusi*, and the *Count di Poppi* perswaded him to continue in those parts, alledging that he might extend his Quarters betwixt *Chiusi*, and *Pieve* as he pleased, and making himself Master of the *Alps*, he might as he saw occasion, return to the old post in *Casentino* and the Vale of *Arno*, or falling down into *Vale di Chiana* and the *Vale de Fevere*, be ready upon the least motion of the Enemy. But *Nicolo* reflecting upon the rockiness of those places, only he replied his Horses could swallow no stones, and removed to *Borgo a S. Sepulcro* where he was received with all demonstration of kindness, from whence he endeavoured to debauch the Citizens of *Castello*, but they were too firm to the *Florentines* to entertain any such motion. Being desirous to have *Perugia* (where he was born) at his devotion, he went thither with 40 Horse to make them a visit, and was honorably treated, but in a few days he rendred himself suspected, having been wheedling with the Legate and several of the Citizens, and made many proposals to them, but none of them succeeded; so that receiving 8000 Ducats of them, he returned to his Army.

Nicolo ill advised by Coum: *Poppi*.

After this he got intelligence in *Cortona*, and was very busie in seducing it from the *Florentines*,

rentines, but being discovered before it was ripe, that also came to nothing. Among the principal of that City there was one *Bartolomeo di Senso*, who going the Rounds one night by the Captains order, was told by a Country Man his friend, that if he had no mind to be killed, he should have a care, and go back. *Bartolomeo* pressing to know his reason; he found the whole series of the Plot, and went immediatly to the Governor, and acquainted him: who seizing upon the Conspirators, and doubling his Guards thereupon, expected the coming of *Nicolo* according to agreement, who came indeed punctually at his time, but finding himself discovered, returned to his quarters. Whilst things were carried on in *Tuscany* at this rate, with little advantage to the forces of the Duke, his affairs in *Lombardy* were as unquiet, but with more detriment and loss: for Count *Francesco* as soon as the season gave leave, took the field with his Army, and the *Venetians* having repaired their fleet in the Lake, he thought it best in the first place to make himself Master of that, and to drive the Duke out; supposing when he had done that, the rest would be easie. Whereupon he caused the *Venetian* Fleet to set upon the Dukes; which they did, and defeated them; after which he took all the Castles which they had in their possession, so that the Enemy which beseiged *Brescia* by land, understanding the destiny of their Camarades, drew off from the seige; and left the Town free, after it had been straitned three years. Having finished his business there, and obtained so important a Victory, the *Count* thought fit to seek out the Enemy, who was retired to *Socino*, a Castle upon the River of *Oglio*, and dislodging them there, they retreated to *Cremona*: where the Duke made a head, and resolved to defend that part of his Country. But the Count advancing daily against him; being fearful he should lose all, or a great part of his Territory, he began to lament the resolution of sending *Nicolo* into *Tuscany*; and to redress his error, he writ word to *Nicolo* of the condition he was in, pressing him with all speed to come back to his relief. The *Florentines* in the mean time had joyned their forces with the Popes, and made a halt at *Anghiari* a Castle at the foot of the mountains which part *Val di Tevere*, from *Valdichiana*, four miles distant from *San Sepulcro*; betwixt which places the way was plain, the Country champian, fit for Horse, and proper for a Battle. Having heard of the Counts Victory, and that *Nicolo* was recalled, they thought the Victory might be obtained without more hazard or labour, and therefore orders was dispatched in all haste to the Comissaries to avoid an engagement by all means; for *Nicolo* could not stay in *Tuscany* many days. These orders coming to *Nicolo*'s ear, finding that of necessity he must part; that he might have left nothing untryed, he resolved to provoke them to a Battle, believing he should take them unprovided, seeing (according to their intelligence) they could have no reason to expect any such thing; and to this he was much encouraged by *Rinaldo*, the *Conte di Poppi*, and all the *Florentine* exiles, who knew well enough they were undone if *Nicolo* departed; but if they could bring them to a fight, there was a possibility of prevailing, and if they did lose the Victory, they should lose it with honor.

Nicolo practises to surprize *Crotona*.

Brescia relieved.

This resolution being taken, the Army moved; and being advanced as far as *Borgo* before the *Florentines* perceived it, he commanded 2000 Men out of that City, who, (relying much upon the conduct of their General, and the promises he made them, being also desirous of plunder) followed him chearfully. Marching on from thence directly toward *Anghiari* in *Battalia*, *Nicolo* arrived with his whole Army within two miles, when *Micheletto Attendulo* perceiving a great dust, and suspecting it to be the Enemy, cryed out to have all People stand to their Arms. The tumult in the *Florentine* Camp was not small; for that Army encamped ordinarily without any Discipline, and being negligent besides, in presumption the Enemy were further off, they were fitter to fly than to fight; all of them being disarm'd, and straggled from their quarters into such places as the shade, or their recreations had carried them. Nevertheless so much diligence was used by the Commissaries, and the General, that before the Enemy could get up, they were on Horseback, and in order to receive them; and as *Micheletto* was the first that discovered them, so he was the first that engaged them; running with his Troop to secure the Bridge which crossed the way not far from *Anghiari*. *Micheletto* having posted himself at the Bridge, *Simomino* an Officer of the Popes, and his Legat placed themselves on the right hand, and the *Florentine* Commissaries, and General on the left; having planted the foot as thick as possible upon the banks; there was only one way for the Enemy to attack them and that was by the bridge; nor had the *Florentines* any where to defend themselves but there; only they ordered their foot, that if the Enemies foot, should leave the high way, and fall upon the flanks of their Horse; they should let fly at them with their Crossbows, and give their Cavalry a secure passage over the Bridge.

The Battle of *Anghiari*.

The first that appeared, were gallantly received by *Micheletto*, and repulsed; but *Astorre*, and *Francesco Piccinino* coming in with a commanded party, to their relief, they charged

ged him so briskly, that *Micheletto* was not only beat back over the Bridge, but pursued to the very end of the Town, and they which pursued them being charged again in the Flank, were repulsed over the Bridge, and all things as at first. This skirmish continued two hours compleat; sometimes *Nicolo*, and sometimes the *Florentines* being Masters of the Bridge, and though the fight upon the Bridg was equal to both, yet on this side and the other, *Nicolo* had much the disadvantage. For *Nicolo*'s men passing the Bridg were received by a gross of the Enemy, which being drawn up with advantage by reason of the ground, could charge, or wheel, or releive those that were distressed as they saw occasion. But when the *Florentines* passed over, *Nicolo* had no place to relieve his Men for the ditches and banks in the way, as it appeared in the conflict; for though *Nicolo*'s forces gained the Bridge several times, yet by the fresh supplies of the Enemy they were still forced to give back: but when the *Florentines* prevailed, and passed over the Bridge, *Nicolo* had not time, by reason of the briskness of their charge, and the incomodity of the ground to reinforce his Men, but those which were behind were forced to mix with those that were before, one disordered the other, and the whole Army was constrained to fly, and every Man got to *Borgo* as well as he could. The *Florentines* let them go, as having more inclination to the plunder, which in Horses, Arms, and other things afforded them a plentiful prey; for with *Nicolo* there escaped not above 1000 Horse, most of the rest being taken Prisoners: the Citizens of *Borgo* who had followed *Nicolo* for prize, became prize themselves, and were most of them taken; with all their carriages and colours: this victory was not so much prejudicial to the Duke, as it was advantagious to *Tuscany*, for had the *Florentines* lost the Day, that Province had been his; but he losing it, lost nothing but his Arms and his Horses, which a little Mony would recruit. Never was there any War made in an Enemies Country with less execution than in this, for in so great a rout, and so sharp an engagement, which lasted four hours, there was but one Man slain, and he not by any wound or honorable exploit, but falling from his Horse, he was trodden to Death: with such security did they fight then; for all of them being cuirassiers on Horseback, and compleatly armed, they could not presently be killed, and if they found there was no likelyhood of getting off themselves, or being rescued by their friends, they surrendered before they could come at them to slay them: this Battle both in it self and consequences, was a great instance of the unhappiness of that War; for the Enemy being beaten, and *Nicolo* fled to *Borgo*, the Commissioners would have pursued, and beseiged him in that place, to have made their Victory entire: But some of the Officers and Souldiers would not obey; pretending they would dispose of their plunder, and cure themselves of their wounds, and which is more remarkable, the next day about noon, without any regard to, or leave from their superior Officers, they went to *Arezzo*; deposited their prey; and returned to *Anghiari* when they had done.

Piccinino defeated.

A thing so contrary to all order and military discipline, that the reliques and remainder of any well governed Army would easily have rob'd them of the Victory, which so undeservedly they had obtained. And besides this, the Commissioners giving order that all prisoners should be kept (to prevent their rallying, or getting together again) in spight of their Orders, they dismiss'd them all. A thing most justly to be admir'd, that an Army so constituted, should be able to get the Victory, and that the Enemy should be so poor spirited as to be beaten by them. Whilst the *Florentines* therefore were marching to *Arezzo*, and returning again, *Nicolo* had opportunity to quit *Borgo*, and draw off all his Men towards *Romagna*, and with him the *Florentine* exiles, who seeing their hopes desperate of returning to *Florence*; they dispersed themselves into all parts of *Italy*, and some of them into other Countries, as their conveniences prompted them, of these *Rinaldo* chose *Ancona* for his residence, and afterwards (to obtain a mansion in Heaven, for that which he had lost upon Earth) he went to visit the Sepulchre of our Saviour; from whence being returned, as he was sitting at the Table very merry at the Wedding of one of his Daughters, he fell down on a suddain, and died. His fortune being favourable so far, as to take him away in one of the most pleasant days of his Life; a Man truly honorable in all conditions, but would have been much more, had his stars brought him forth in a City that had been united; for *Florence* being factious, the same things disgusted there, which would have been rewarded in another place. The Commissaries, when their Men were come back from *Arezzo*, and *Nicolo* departed, presented themselves before *Borgo*; whereupon the Townsmen would have surrendered to the *Florentines*, but could not be accepted: in this Treaty and negotiation, the Commissaries became jealous of the Popes Legate, lest he had a design for seizing it for the Church; so that they came to ill language, and doubtless some ill accident would have happened, had those proposals proceeded: but the Popes Legate being gratified in his desires: that controversy fell to the ground. Whilst they were so

solicitous for the enterprize of *Borgo*, news came that *Nicolo Piccinino* was marched towards *Rome*; but others said towards *La Marca*, wherefore the *Legat*, and many of the rest, gave their opinions to march towards *Perugia*, to be ready to defend either *Rome* or *La Marca*, whither *Nicolo* was fled with *Bernardo de Medici*; and *Neri*, with the *Florentines*, were to march for *Casentino*: this being determined, *Neri* departed with his forces to *Kassina*; took it, and *Bibiena*, *Prato Vecchio*, and *Romeni*; from thence he marched to *Poppi*, and beseiged it on two sides; one towards the plain of *Certomondo*; and the other upon the mountain which goes along to *Fronzoli*. Count *Poppi* seeing himself forsaken both by God and Man, had shut himself up in *Poppi*, not with any hopes of relief, but to make his conditions so much the better; and *Neri* coming before it, and forming his seige; he desired a parly, and had as good terms offered, as in his state could be expected, which were to go away himself, and his Children, with what ever they could carry with them, for which the Town and its Territory was to be delivered to the *Florentines*; whilst the Treaty was managing, he came down to the Bridge over the *Arno* which is at the end of the Town, and calling to *Neri*, in great sorrow and affliction he said to him,

Poppi beseiged.

Poppi's speech to the *Florentine* Comissaries.

"Had I considered my own ill fortune, and your power as I should have done, I had "been now as a friend congratulating your victory, and not supplicating your Mercy as an "Enemy. Fortune at present is favourable and propitious to you: to me it is rigid and "severe; I had Horses and Arms, and Subjects, and Estate, and who can wonder if I "part with them unwillingly? but if you please (as you may) to command all *Tuscany*, "we must of necessity obey: I have this only to comfort me, that had not I committed "this error such would not have been that exercise nor demonstration of your Generosity, "for if now you shall think fit to preserve me, you will leave to the World an indelible in-"stance, and example of Clemency: let therefore your compassion exceed my offence, and "permit at least that this single residence may continue to those from whom your prede-"cessors have received formerly many obligations.

Neri's answer.

Neri replyed, "That he had unhappily placed his hopes upon People which could do him "no good. That he had transgressed so highly against the Republick of *Florence*, that as "things then stood, there was a necessity of yielding up all, and that he must abandon those "places, as he was an Enemy to *Florence*, which as a friend he had refused to preserve; for "he had given so ill a Testimony and example of himself, That he could not be continu-"ed; and in every change of fortune had been so unconstant and various, that they could not "have any confidence but that still he would be working to the prejudice of their state, and "yet it was not so much him, as his interest they were affraid of. But if he would with-"draw into *Germany*, the Government of *Florence* would intercede, that he might reside "there as a Prince; and be a friend to him, for the obligations he said they had received "from his Ancestors. To which the Count answered in great passion, that he would be "farther off of the *Florentines* than so, and laying aside all further capitulation (seeing no re-"medy) the Count delivered up the Town, and all his other concerns to the *Florentines*; "only his goods, his Wife and Children departed with him, very disconsolate, for having lost a Dominion which his predecessors had enjoyed above 400 years. These successes being known in *Florence*, were received with great joy and acclamation, both by the Magistrates and People. And because *Barnardetto de Medici*, found that *Nicolo*'s marching towards *Rome* or *La Marca* would be of little importance, he returned with his forces to *Neri*, and both of them coming back to *Florence*, it was resolved that they should be entertained with the highest honors which could be conferred by that City, upon their victorious members, and accordingly they were received in a Triumphant manner, by the *Senate*, the Captains of the Parties, and the whole City beside.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF

FLORENCE.

Book VI.

IT always was (and 'tis reaſonable it be) the deſign and end of all thoſe who make war, to enrich themſelves, and impoveriſh the Enemy; nor is conqueſt and victory deſired upon any other ſcore, but to magnifie the one, and to depreſs the other: hence it is, that when ever victory impoveriſhes or debilitates you, you have either tranſgreſſed, or fallen ſhort of what you aimed at in the War. That Prince, or Commonwealth is enriched by Victory, when he extirpateth his Enemy, and impropriats the ſpoil. On the otherſide, his victory impoveriſhes him, when (though he overcomes his Enemy) he cannot utterly extinguiſh him, and the ſpoil and prey is left to the Souldiers. This Prince, this Commonwealth is unhappy in its loſſes, but more in its victories; for being defeated, it is lyable to the injuries of its Enemies; and being victorious, to the contumely of its friends, which as they are leſs reaſonable, are leſs ſupportable, ſeeing it is again neceſſitated to oppreſs and diſguſt its ſubjects by new impoſitions and taxes: and if there be the leaſt humanity in Government, it cannot rejoice or exſult in a victory, which makes all its ſubjects ſad. The well governed Commonwealths of old, were wont to fill their Bags with Gold and Silver; deſtribute donatives; remit ſubſidies and tribute to the People; and ſolemnize their Victories with merriment and feaſting; but thoſe of whom we write, drained their Exchequer, impoveriſhed the People; and never ſecured themſelves of their Enemies; which proceeded from the diſorders in the management of the War; for having beaten, and pillaged the Enemy, they neither kept them Priſoners, nor killed them; ſo that (being incenſed) they forbare revenging themſelves upon the Conqueror no longer than he which commanded them could recruit them with Horſes and Arms: and the plunder and ranſoms falling to the Souldier, the Conquerours made no advantage of the ſpoils of the Enemy, but were forced to tear their ſupplies out of the bowels of their Subjects; nothing of benefit accruing to the People, they were rendered more imperious, and cruel in their taxes: and thoſe Souldiers had brought things to that paſs, that both the Conqueror and conquered (if they intented to preſerve their authority over their Men) were in neceſſity of more mony; for the one ſide was to be recruited, the other to be rewarded; and as the one could not fight, unleſs he was newly equipped; ſo the other would not engage him, without recompence for what was paſſed; from whence it happened that one ſide had no great joy of its victory; and the other no great ſence of its loſs; for the conquered had time to recruit, and the Conqueror had none to purſue. This diſorder and perverſeneſs in

the Souldier was the reason that *Nicolo* was recruited, and on Horse back again, before his defeat was known thorow *Italy*; and sharper war he made upon his Enemies afterwards, than he had ever done before. This it was that after his rout before *Brescia* enabled him to surprize *Verona*: this it was, that after he was worsted at *Verona*, gave him opportunity to invade *Tuscany*; this it was, that after his loss at *Anghiari*, recruited him again, and made him stronger in the field (ere he got to *Romagna*) than he was before, which gave the Duke new hopes of defending *Lombardy*, though by means of his absence he had looked upon it as lost: for whilst *Nicolo* was giving the Enemy an alarm at *Tuscany*, the Duke of *Milan* was reduced to a condition of hazarding all, and therefore apprehending he might be undone, before *Nicolo* (who was sent for) would come to his rescue, to stop the Career of the Count, and temper his fortune by industry, which he could not do by force; he had recourse to those remedies which in the like case he had many times used, and sent *Nicolo da Esti* Prince of *Ferrara*, to *Peschiera* to the *Count*, to perswade him in his name to a Peace; and to remonstrate to him that the prosecution of the War could not turn to his advantage; for if the Duke should be distressed, and unable to maintain his reputation, the *Count* would be the first which would suffer by it; by reason the *Venetians* and *Florentines* would have no farther occasion, and by consequence no farther esteem for him: and as a testimony of the sincerity of his proposal, the Duke offered to consummate his Marriage, and send his Daughter to *Ferrara* to be delivered to him as soon as the peace was concluded, to which the Count replied, that if the Duke did truly desire peace, he might easily have it; for the *Venetians* and *Florentines* were as much inclined to it as he, but the difficulty would be to perswade them he was in earnest; as knowing he would never have proposed any such thing, had not some necessity constrained him; and as soon as that should be removed, he would make War upon them again.

The Duke proposeth a peace.

As to the business of his Marriage, he could not repose any confidence in his promise, having been so often baffled by him before: nevertheless if every thing else were agreed, he should proceed in it as his friends should advise. The *Venetians*, who are jealous of their Souldiers, where they have no reason to be so, had reason enough to be suspicious here, which the *Count* being desirous to remove, prosecuted the War with all diligence imaginable; but his mind was so inflamed with ambition, and the *Venetians* so slack, and intepidated with jealousie, little more was done that Summer: so that when *Nicolo Piccinino* returned into *Lombardy* Winter came on, and the Armies were sent to their Winter quarters. The *Count* to *Verona*; the Duke to *Cremona*: the *Florentines* into *Tuscany*, and the Popes Army to *Romagna*; which after the Battle of *Anghiari*, assaulted *Furli* and *Bologna* in hopes to have taken them from *Francesco Piccinino*, who kept them from his Father, and defended them so well, they could not get them out of his hands; nevertheless their coming into those parts so terrified the People of *Ravenna* that to avoid the domination of the Church, by consent of *Ostasio di Potenta* their Lord, they submitted to the *Venetian*, who (in recompence of his kindness, that he might never recover by force, what he had given them with so little discretion) sent *Ostasio* with his only Son to spend their days in *Candia*, where they died: in which expedition his Holiness wanting Mony, (notwithstanding the Victory at *Anghiari*) he was glad to sell the Castle of *Borgo a San Sepulcro* to the *Florentines* for 25000 Ducats.

The ingratitude of the *Venetians*.

Things being in this posture, and all sides thinking themselves safe as long as it was Winter; all thoughts of peace were laid aside, especially by the Duke, who thought himself doubly safe, both in the season of the year, and the arrival of *Nicolo*; had therefore broke of his Treaty with the *Count* a little abruptly; and in great haste rigged out *Nicolo* again with all provisions and accoutrements that were necessary for the War: the Count having notice of his preparations, went to *Venice* to consult the *Senate* how affairs were to be ordered the next Summer. When *Nicolo* was ready (perceiving the Enemy out of order) he never staid for the Spring, but in the coldest of the Winter he passed the *Adda*, and *Acri*, surprized 2000 Horse, and took most of them Prisoners: but that which touched the *Count* nearest, and startled the *Venetians*, was the defection of *Ciarpellone* one of his principal officers, who went over to the Duke: the *Count* had no sooner the news, but he left *Venice*; and coming with all possible speed to *Brescia*, he found *Nicolo* retired, and gone back to his former station: the *Count* had no mind, finding the Enemy gone, to follow him at that time; but chose rather to defer, till some advantage should tempt him, and give him opportunity to revenge himself: he prevailed therefore with the *Venetians* to recall the forces they had in the *Florentine* service in *Tuscany*; and to confer the command of them upon *Micheletto Attendulo*, *Gattamelata* being dead. The spring being come, *Nicolo Piccinino* was first in the field, and beseiged *Cignano*, a Castle some twelve miles distant from *Brescia*: to the relief of which, the *Count* addressed himself; and betwixt these two Generals

Micheletto General for the League.

rals the War was managed as formerly. The *Count* being fearful of *Bergamo*, went with his Army and encamped before *Martinengo*, a Caſtle which (if taken) lay very convenient for the ſuccouring of *Bergamo* (which City was by *Nicolo* greatly diſtreſſed) who finding he could not eaſily be diſturbed, but by the way of *Martinengo*, had ſupplied it plentifully with all things, ſo as the *Count* was forced to beſeige it with all his Army; whereupon *Nicolo* marched with his forces where he might moſt conveniently incommode him, and intrenched himſelf ſo ſtrangely, the *Count* could not (without manifeſt danger) aſſail him, ſo that thereby he brought things to that paſs, that the beſeiger was in more diſtreſs, than the beſeiged; and the *Count* than the Caſtle. For the *Count* could neither keep the ſeige for want of proviſions, nor riſe, for fear of *Nicolo*'s Army; and every body expected victory for the Duke, and deſtruction for his Enemy: but fortune, (which never wants ways of favouring her friends, and diſobliging her Enemies) brought it about, that *Nicolo* in confidence of his Victory was grown ſo inſolently haughty, that without reſpect to the Duke, or himſelf, he ſent him word that he had ſerved him a long time, and as yet not gained ſo much ground as would bury him when he died; he deſired therefore to know what recompence he was to expect for all his dangers, and fatigues; for it being now in his power to make him abſolute Maſter of *Lombardy*, and to put all his Enemies into his hands, he thought it but reaſonable, as he was certain of his Victory, to be ſecured of his reward; and therefore he did propoſe he might have the City of *Piacenza* made over to him, that when he had tired and worn himſelf out in his wars, he might have that Town for his receſs; and at the laſt he took the boldneſs to threaten the Duke with the quitting his enterprize, if he was not gratified in his demands. This contumelious and inſolent way of capitulation, was ſo offenſive, and deteſtable to the Duke, that he reſolved to loſe all, rather than comply; ſo that this arrogance in *Nicolo* wrought an effect upon him, to which the Arms nor the minaces of the Enemy could never reduce him; and that was to make peace with the *Count*, to whom he ſent *Guido Buone da Fortona* with propoſals of peace; and the proffer of his Daughter; which was embraced with both Arms by the *Count* and his Collegues.

Nicolo's inſolence to the Duke.

Peace betwixt the Duke and the *Count*.

All being privatly agreed among themſelves; the Duke ſent a meſſage to *Nicolo* to require him to make a Truce with the *Count* for a twelve month; pretending his treaſure was low, and had been ſo exhauſted with the War, that he could not but prefer a certain Peace, before a Victory that was doubtful. *Nicolo* admired his reſolution, as not able to imagine what ſhould make him reject ſo glorious a Victory; not in the leaſt ſuſpecting, that he bogled at the remuneration of his friends, and choſe rather to let his Enemies eſcape; ſo that not obeying him readily, the Duke was conſtrained to threaten, that without immediate compliance, he would deliver him up as a prey to his own Souldiers, and his Enemy. Whereupon *Nicolo* ſubmitted but with the ſame alacrity as one that is forced to forſake both his Country and friends; complaining, and lamenting his unhappineſs, whoſe victory over his Enemies was always interrupted either by his fortune, or the Duke. The truce being made, the Marriage betwixt *Madona Bianca* and the *Count* was conſummated, and the City of *Cremona* given to her in *Dower*: after which, the peace was concluded in *November* 1441, at which for the *Venetians Franceſco Barbadico*, and *Pagolo Frono*, for the *Florentines Agnolo Acciailo* were preſent; the *Venetians* got by this peace *Peſchiera*, *Aſola*, and *Leonata* a Caſtle belonging to the Marqueſs of *Mantua*. 1441.

The Wars in *Lombardy* being ended, the only part of *Italy* where there was any Hoſtility, was in the Kingdom of *Naples*, which not being able to be compoſed, was the occaſion of new troubles in *Lombardy*. During the Wars in thoſe parts, *Alfonſo* of *Aragon* had overrun the whole Kingdom of *Naples*, and left the King *Rinato* nothing at all but the Country about the Metropolis. Whereupon *Alfonſo* conceiving the victory already in his hands, reſolved whilſt he beſeiged *Naples*, to ſeize upon *Benevento*, and the reſt of the Towns which were yet remaining to the *Count* in thoſe Countries, ſuppoſing it might be done without much danger, the Count himſelf being imployed in *Lombardy*; and his deſign ſucceeded as eaſily as he imagined; for he took all his Towns with little or no oppoſition. But the news arriving of the peace in *Lombardy*, *Alfonſo* began to apprehend leſt the *Count* (to recover what he had loſt) ſhould joyn with *Rinato*, and *Rinato* being of the ſame opinion, ſent to invite, and ſolicite the *Count*, that he would come, and revenge himſelf of his Enemy, by releiving his friend. On the otherſide *Alfonſo* was as earneſt with the Duke, that in reſpect of the friendſhip which was betwixt them, he would give the *Count* ſome diverſion, and by imploying him in greater affairs, enforce him from undertaking of this. *Philippo* entertained the motion very readily; not conſidering it intrenched upon that peace, which not long before he had concluded with ſo much prejudice to himſelf: he cauſed therefore to be ſignified to the Pope *Engenius*, that then was the time to recover the

Towns

Towns which the Country had taken from the Churches, and for his easier success, he proffered him *Nicolo Piccinino* (who was in his pay) during the War, but discharged upon the peace, and was at that time in *Romagna* with his forces: the Pope received the proposition very joyfully upon a double account, both as he hated *Francesco*, and desired his own, and though he had been cheated by *Nicolo* once before, yet now the Duke interposing, he could not suspect him in the least; joyning his forces therefore with *Nicolo*'s, he marched into *La Marca*: the *Count* being much alarm'd at the news, got what strength together he could, and went to encounter them.

Naples taken by *Alfonso*.

In the mean time *Alfonso* took *Naples*; and all that Kingdom fell into his hands except *Castelnuovo*: *Rinato* a having left strong Garrison in *Castelnuovo*, went away himself for *Florence*, where he was most honorably received, but finding he was not able to continue the War, he stayed there but some certain days, and away he passed to *Marsilia*; during which time *Alfonso* had taken *Castelnuovo*, and the *Count* was got in to *La Marca*, but not so strong as the Pope and *Nicolo*: wherefore he addressed himself to the *Venetian*, and *Florentine* for assistance both of Men and mony; representing to them that unless they now looked about them, and did something to restrain the Pope and *Alfonso*, whilst he was in being, afterwards they would have enough to do to secure themselves, for they might joyn with Duke *Philip*, and divide all *Italy* betwixt them: for some time both *Venetian* and *Florentine* suspended their answer, either because they were unwilling to make his Holiness, and *Alfonso* their Enemies; or else because their hands were already full in *Bologna*. *Hannibal Bentivoglio* had driven *Francesco Piccinino* out of that City, and to enable himself to defend it against the Duke (who was a favourer of *Francesco*) he had desired the assistance of the *Venetians* and *Florentines*; and they not denied it. Whilst the affairs in *Bologna* were in this manner uncertain, they could not resolve to give the Count their assistance; but *Hannibal* defeating *Francesco* afterwards, so that all things there seemed to be composed, they then concluded to supply him. Yet first to secure themselves against the Duke, they renewed the League with him, to which the Duke was not averse, for though he had consented to the War against the *Count*, whilst *Rinato* was in the field; yet now *Rinato* was routed, and his whole Kingdom taken from him, he had no mind the *Count* should be destroyed likewise: and to that end he not only consented to the aid which they desired, but he writ to *Alfonso* to draw his forces back again into *Naples*, and not to prosecute the War there any longer; to which, although *Alfonso* was very unwilling, yet in respect of his obligations to the Duke, he quietly consented, and drew of his Army to the other side of *Trento*.

Whilst things were in this posture in *Romagna*, the *Florentines* were not unanimous at home: among the Citizens of chiefest reputation and authority in that Government, *Neri* the Son of *Gino Capponi* was one, of whose intereſt *Cosimo de Medici* was most particularly jealous, in respect of the great vogue he had both in the City, and Army: for having a long time had the Command of the *Florentine* forces, he had gained them exceedingly by his courage and deportment: besides the many great services performed by him and his father (the Father having taken *Pisa*, and the Son defeated *Nicolo* at the Battle of *Anghiari*) were fresh upon the memory, and caused him to be beloved by most People, but dreaded by such as were fearful of more Companions in their Government. Amongst other of their principal Officers, there was one *Baldaccio d'Anghiari*, an excellent Souldier; not to be surpassed, either for courage or conduct in all *Italy* at that time: having always commanded their foot, he had gained so great influence upon them, that it was generally believed, with him they would undertake any enterprize what ever, when ever he desired them. This *Baldaccio* was a great lover of *Neri*, of whose bravery and prudence he had all along been a witness, which to the rest of the Grandees, gave great occasion of suspicion; and thinking with themselves that to let him a lone would be dangerous, but to imprison him much more; they resolved to make him away, and fortune effected it. *Bartolomeo Orlandini* was at that time *Gonfaloniere di Giustitia*, who having been sent to keep the pass at *Marradi* (as was said before) when *Nicolo Piccinino* made his inroad into *Tuscany*, had most basely deserted it, and exposed a Country which was almost inaccessible of it self. *Baldaccio* was so much provoked, or rather ashamed at his cowardice, that he spake slightly of him, and writ several letters expressing his contempt; which *Bartolomeo* resenting highly, and being conscious it was true; he resolved to be revenged, and expiate his own fault with the death of his accuser: his resolution being known to other of his Enemies, they encouraged him to proceed, and at one blow to revenge himself for the injury he had received; and deliver the state from a person they could neither retain without danger, nor dismiss without ruine. Having fixed upon his way, *Bartolomeo* shut up several armed Men one day in the Chamber; and *Baldaccio* being come to the *Piazza* (as he constantly did) to discourse with the Magistrats, and require orders for his conduct, the *Gonfaloniere* sent to speak

Baldaccio General of the *Florentine* foot.

with

ſpeak with him, and he preſently obeyed: ſeeing him coming, the *Gonfaloniere* went to meet him, and entertained him about his affairs three or four turns in the *Senators* Chamber; but at length having drilled him near the Chamber where his ambuſh was laid, he gave the Signal, and all of them ruſhing upon him (who was alone, and without arms) they killed him, and threw him out of the Palace window which looks towards the *Dogana*; and then cutting off his Head, and carrying his trunk into the *Piazzo*, they left it there all day as a ſpectacle for the People: he had only one Son by his Wife *Annalena*; which living not long after him, *Annalena* deprived both of Husband and Child, and reſolving to have no farther converſation with Man, ſhe made a Monaſtery of her houſe, and ſhutting her ſelf up with ſeveral other Noble Perſons, which came to her to that purpoſe; ſhe ſpent the remainder of her days there in great piety and devotion; calling the Monaſtery by her own Name, and immortalizing her memory, both by the one and the other. This action was no ſmall diminution to *Neri*; and took away a conſiderable part of his reputation and friends; yet it did not ſatisfie the contrivers, for having been more than ten years at the helm, the authority of the *Balia* expired, and every body began to talk and act with more freedom than they thought convenient, they judged it neceſſary to revive that Court, for the encouragement of their friends, and the depreſſion of their Enemies; Hereupon, in the Year 1444, the Counſels, created a new *Balia*, which re-eſtabliſhed the Offices; contracted the number of the Officers which were to chuſe the *Senators*, renewed the *Chancery* of reformation; removing *Philippo Peruzzi* out of the *Chancellorſhip*, and putting one into his place who they believed would be governed by them. They prolonged the baniſhment of thoſe that were refractory; impriſoned *Giovanni*, the Son of *Simone Veſpucci*; degraded the *Accoppiatori* as Enemies to the State, and with them the Sons of *Piero Baroncelli*; all the *Seragli*, *Bartolomeo Fortini*, *Franceſco Caſtellani*, and ſeveral others; by which means they procured great reputation, and authority to themſelves, and no little prejudice, and diſparagement to their Enemies; and having ſetled themſelves at home in the Government, they began to look about, and enquire how things were managed abroad. 1444. *Florence* reformed.

Nicolo Piccinino (as we ſaid before) being abandoned by *Alfonſo*; and the Count, by aſſiſtance of the *Florentines*, become formidably powerful, he aſſaulted *Nicolo* not far from *Fermo*, and gave him ſo great a defeat, that *Nicolo* was glad to fly (almoſt alone) to *Montecchio*, where he fortified himſelf ſo well, and defended himſelf ſo bravely, that in a ſhort time his whole Army repaired to him again, and put him into a condition of ſupporting eaſily againſt the Count, and the rather, becauſe Winter being come, both of them were conſtrained to ſend their Armies into quarters. All Winter long *Nicolo* was imployed in increaſing his Army, which was much farthered by the aſſiſtance of the Pope, and *Alfonſo*; inſomuch that when the ſpring appeared, and both Armies took the field, the Count was much too weak for *Nicolo*, and indeed brought to that extremity of want, that he muſt of neceſſity have been ruined, had not the Duke fruſtrated the advantage which *Nicolo* had got over him. *Philip* ſent to *Nicolo* to deſire he would come preſently to him, for he muſt needs ſpeak perſonally with him about buſineſs of very great importance: and *Nicolo* being greedy to know it, left his command to his Son *Franceſco*, and went to *Milan* to the Duke; relinquiſhing a certain victory, for an uncertain reward, which being perceived by the *Count* he thought that occaſion of engaging the Son in his Fathers abſence, was not to be ſlipped, and coming to a fight with him near the Caſtle *di Monteloro*, he overthrew *Franceſco*, and took him Priſoner.

Nicolo arriving at *Milan*, finding himſelf deluded by the Duke, and underſtanding the defeat, and impriſonment of his Son, he took it to heart, and dyed with ſorrow 1445 in the 64 year of his age, a more brave, than fortunate General. He left only two Sons, *Franceſco*, and *Giacopo*, whoſe conduct was leſs, and fortune worſe than their Fathers; ſo that the Diſciples of *Bracio* were almoſt extinct, whilſt the *Sforzeſchan* being more ſucceſful, became more glorious. The Pope underſtanding *Nicolo* was dead, and his Army overthrown (not daring to rely much upon the King of *Aragons* ſupplies) deſired a peace of the Count, and obtained it by the mediation of the *Florentines*, by which the Pope was to have in *La Marca*, *Oſimo*, *Fabriano*, and *Ricanato* reſtored, and all the reſt were to remain to the Count. After this accomodation in *La Marca*, all *Italy* had been quiet, had not the *Bologneſi* diſturbed it. There were two ſuper-eminent families in *Bologna*, the *Canneſchi*, and the *Bentivogli*; *Hannibal* was the head of the latter, and *Battiſta* of the firſt. To beget the greater confidence betwixt them, many matches had been made; but among Men that aſpire to the ſame degree of greatneſs, an allyance is ſooner made, than a friendſhip. *Bologna* was in League with the *Venetians*, and *Florentines*, which League was made by *Hannibal Bentivoglio*'s means after *Franceſco Piccinino* was expelled. *Battiſta*, underſtanding how earneſtly the Duke deſired the friendſhip of that City, contrived how he might *Nicolo* dyes. 1445. Troubles in *Bologna*.

might kill *Hannibal*, and deliver that City to the Duke; and having concluded the circumſtances, on the 24th, of *June* 1445, *Battiſta* and his accomplices ſet upon *Hannibal*, and ſlew him, and when they had done, declared themſelves for the Duke. The *Venetian* and *Florentine* commiſſaries were at the ſame time in the Town; and at the firſt report of the tumult, returned privatly to their houſes, but finding the People thronging in great numbers in the Market place, complaining, and exclaiming againſt the Murderers of *Hannibal*; they took courage; joyned themſelves with them, and putting them into a poſture, they fell upon the *Canneſchi*, and, in half an hours time, routed them, killed part of them, and drove the reſt out of the City. *Battiſta* not having opportunity to get away, nor his Enemies to kill him, betook himſelf to his houſe, where hiding himſelf in a cheſt, or Bing to keep Corn in, they ſearched for him a whole day, and could not diſcover him: keing aſſured he was not gone out of Town, they came back again and threatned his Servants ſo, that one of his Lacqueys betraid him, and carried them to him, then drawing him out of his hole in armour as he was, they killed him, and then dragged him about the Streets, and burned him: ſo that the Victory of the Duke was ſufficient to encourage that enterprize, but his expedition in releiving it, was not great enough to make it good. By the death of *Battiſta*, and the expulſion of the *Canneſchi* their tumults were compoſed; but the *Bologneſi* remained in no little confuſion, there being none of the family of the *Bentivoglio's* left to govern them; for *Hannibal* had only one Son, of about ſix years old called *Giovanni*; and it was feared leſt ſome difference and diviſion might ariſe betwixt the friends of *Bentivoglo* (in whoſe power it was reſtore the *Canneſchi*) to the deſtruction of their party, and Country.

Whilſt they were in this ſuſpence, the *Conte di Poppi* being by accident in *Bologna*, ſent word to the principal of the City, that if they would be governed by one of *Hannibals* blood, he could direct them where they might have one; for about twenty years ſince, *Hercules*, a Couſin-German of *Hannibals* being at *Poppi*, had the enjoyment of a young Maid in that Town, who was brought to bed afterwards of a Son called *Santi*; which *Hercules* affirmed to him many times was his, nor was it to be denied, for who ever knew them both, muſt needs owne a more than ordinary reſemblance. The Citizens giving credit to what he ſaid, deſpatched ſome of their Citizens to *Florence* immediatly, to ſee the Youth, and to deſire *Neri*, and *Coſimo* that he might be delivered to them: the reputed father of *Santi* was dead, and the Son lived with an Unckle called *Antonio da Caſceſe*, a rich Man, without Children of his own, and a great friend of *Neri's*: *Neri* out of reſpect to his Uncle, thinking the buſineſs not to be deſpiſed, nor on the ot herſide, raſhly accepted, propoſed that *Santi* might be ſent for; and that in the preſence of *Coſimo* and the *Bolognian* Embaſſadors, they might hear what he could ſay for himſelf; he was ſent for accordingly, and behaved himſelf ſo well, the *Bologneſi* were ready to worſhip him; ſo ſtrangely prevalent ſometimes is the love of a faction; yet there was nothing concluded at this meeting, only *Coſimo* took *Santi* a ſide and told him.

Santi Bentivoglio.

Coſimo's ſpeech to *Santi.*

"No Body can counſel you better in this caſe, than your ſelf; becauſe you may follow "your own inclination. If you be the Son of *Hercules Bentivogli*, you will apply your ſelf "to ſuch things as are worthy and ſuitable to the honor of that houſe: But if you be the "Son of *Agnolo da Caſceſe*; you will continue in *Florence*, and ſpend the reſt of your days "baſely in the ordering of Wool.

This ſpeech netled the young Man, and whereas before he ſeemed to be irreſolute, he now declared he would refer himſelf wholly to *Coſimo*, and *Neri*, and do as they directed him; and (it being agreed with the Embaſſadors) Cloaths and Horſes were bought, and equipage provided, and a while after being honorably conducted to *Bolonia*, he was made Governor both of *Hannibals* Son, and the City, which office he executed ſo well, that whereas all his predeceſſors were killed by their Enemies; he lived quietly all his time, and dyed lamented at laſt.

After the death of *Nicolo*, and the peace concluded in *La Marca*; *Philip* wanting a new General to command his Army, made private overtures to *Ciarpellone* one of the moſt experienced officers in the Counts Army; and at laſt coming to an agreement, *Ciarpellone* deſired leave of the *Count* to go to *Milan*, and take poſſeſſion of certain Caſtles which *Philip* had given him in the late Wars. The Count ſuſpecting the buſineſs (to diſappoint the Duke, and prevent his ſerving againſt him) he cauſed him firſt to be ſtopped, and afterwards to be killed, pretending to have found him engaged in Conſpiracy againſt him, at which manner of proceeding the Duke was highly incenſed; but the *Venetians* and the *Florentines* were pleaſed well enough, as apprehending the leaſt amity betwixt the Count and the Duke; however this indignity ſet all *La Marca* in an uproar, and was the occaſion of new War there. *Giſmondo Malateſti* was Lord of *Rimino*; and being Son-in-Law to the

Count,

Count, he expected to have had the Government of *Pesaro*; but the Count having reduced it, gave the Command of it to his Brother, which *Gismondo* took very ill; and to make it the worse, his mortal Enemy *Federico di Monte Feltro*, by the *Counts* means, had usurped the Dominion of *Urbino*: upon these provocations *Gismondo* joyned himself with the Duke, and solicited the Pope and the King of *Naples* to make War upon the *Count*; who to give his Son-in-Law a relish of the War to which he had such a mind, he resolved to begin, and to fall first upon him; whereupon the Countries of *Romagna* and *La Marca* were in a tumult immediatly; for *Philip*, the King of *Naples*, and the Pope sent all of them assistance to *Gismondo*, and the *Venetians* and *Florentines* (though they sent him no Men) supplied the *Count* with what monies he wanted. *Philip*, not content to make War against him in *Romagna* only, designed to deprive him of *Cremona* and *Pontremoli*, but *Pontremoli* was defended for him by the *Florentines*, and *Cremona* by the *Venetians*; so that the War was revived again in *Lombardy*; and many troubles ensued in the Country of *Cremona*, among which the Dukes General *Francesco Piccinino* was overthrown at *Casale* by *Micheletto* & the *Venetian* Army; and the *Venetians* conceiving hopes thereupon of deposing the Duke, sent their Commissary to *Cremona*, assaulted *Ghiaradadda*, and took all that Country, except *Cremona* it self; and then passing the *Adda*, they made their excursions to the very walls of *Milan*: the Duke not satisfied with his condition, applied himself to *Alfonso* King of *Aragon* for succour; representing the ill consequences which would follow upon his Dominions in *Naples*, if *Lombardy* should fall into the hands of the *Venetians*: *Alfonso* promised to send him supplies, but their passage would be difficult without the permission of the *Count*, upon which consideration, Duke *Philip* addressed himself to the *Count*, and begged of him that he would not abandon the Father-in-Law who was both aged and blind. The *Count* was much offended with the Duke, for having pulled those Wars upon him; and on the otherside the greatness of the *Venetians* did not please him at all; besides his mony was gone, and the League supplied him but coldly; for the *Florentines* were now freed from their apprehensions of the Duke, which was the great cause of their caressing the *Count*, and the *Venetians* desired his ruine, as the only person capable of carrying the whole state of *Lombardy* from them.

New war in *Lombardy*.

The Count courted by all Parties.

Nevertheless, whilst *Philip* was seducing him to his side, and promised him the Command of all his forces, upon a condition he would leave the *Venetians*, and restore *La Marca* to the Pope; they sent Embassadors to him, promising him *Milan*, when it was taken, and the Generalship of their Army *in perpetuum*, so he would prosecute the War in *La Marca*, and obstruct the supplies which were sending by *Alfonso* into *Lombardy*. The *Venetian* proffers were great, and his obligations to them considerable, they having made that War on purpose to secure *Cremona* to the Count; again the Dukes injuries were fresh, and his promises not to be trusted. Yet the *Count* remained doubtful which he should accept; his obligation to the League, his Faith given, the late good offices which they had done him, and their many promises for the future, were great arguments on one side, yet he was loth on the other side to deny the importunities of his Father-in-Law; but that which swayed with him most of all, was the poison which he suspected was hid under the promises of the *Venetians*, to whose discretion he must leave himself (if he succeeded in their Wars) both for their performance, and his own preservation; which no wise Prince would ever do, till necessity compelled him. But this suspence and difficulty of resolution in the Count, was taken away by the *Venetians*; who having a design by some practices and intelligences in the Town, to get it for themselves, upon some other pretence they caused their forces to march into those parts, but their plot was discovered by him that governed there for the Count, and instead of gaining *Cremona*, they lost the Count, who laid aside all respects, and joyned with the Duke.

Pope *Eugenius* was dead, *Niolo V.* created his successor, and the Count advanced with his whole Army to *Cotegnola* in order to his passage into *Lombardy*, when news was brought to him that Duke *Philip* was dead, which happened in the year 1447, on the last of *August*. These tidings much troubled the *Count*, whose Army could not be in good order because they had not had their full pay. The *Venetians* he feared, as being in arms, and his professed Enemies, now upon his revolt to the Duke. *Alfonso* had been always his Enemy, and he was fearful of him; he could have no confidence in either the Pope or the *Florentines*, for the *Florentines* were in League with the *Venetians*; and he was in possession of several Towns which he had taken from the Pope: however he resolved to bear up bravely; look his fortune in the face; and comport himself according to the accidents which should occur: for many times secrets are discovered in action, which dejection and despondency would have concealed for ever. It was no little support to him to beleive, that if the *Milanesi* were oppressed; or that jealous of the ambition of the *Venetian*, no Man was so pro-

Duke *Philip* died. 1447.

per for them to apply to, for protection, as himself. So that taking courage thereupon, he marched into the Country of *Bologna*, and from thence passing by *Modena* and *Reggio*, he encamped upon the *Lenza*, and sent to the *Milanesi* to offer them his service: the *Milanesi*, after the Dukes death, were divided into factions; part of them had a mind to be free, and part of them to live under a Prince; and of those which were for a Prince, part were for the Count, and part for *Alfonso*: but they which were for a Commonwealth, being more unanimous prevailed, and erected a republick according to their own model, to which many of the Cities in that Dukedom refused to conform, supposing they might make themselves free as well as *Milan* if they pleased; and those who were not inclined to that Government, would not submit to it in them. *Lodi* and *Piacenza* therefore surrendered to the *Venetian*; *Pavia* and *Parma* made themselves free: upon which confusions, the Count removed to *Cremona*, where certain deputies of his to that purpose, met with certain Commissioners from *Milan*, and came to an agreement, by which it was agreed that he should be General of their forces, and all conditions performed to him which were concluded in his last treaty with the Duke; to which was superadded that *Brescia* should be put into the *Counts* hands, till he should be possess'd of *Verona*, and that then keeping the last, the first should be restored.

The *Count* made General for the *Milanesi*.

Before the death of the Duke, Pope *Nicolo* upon his assumption to that Chair endeavoured to make a general peace, betwixt all the Princes of *Italy*; and to that purpose he negotiated with the *Florentine* Embassadors which were sent to his creation, for a Diet to be held at *Ferrara*, to treat either of a long cessation, or a firm peace; and accordingly the Popes Legate was met there by Commissioners from the *Venetians*, the Duke, and the *Florentines*. *Alfonso* sent none, for he was at *Tiboli* with a great Army in favour of the Duke, and believed (as soon as the *Count* could be debauched from them) he should have a fair opportunity to fall upon both the *Venetian*, and *Florentine*. In the mean time the *Count* lay still in *Lombardy*, attending the consummation of the Peace, to which *Alfonso* would not send, but promised to ratifie what should be agreed by the Duke. This peace was a long time in debate, but at length it was concluded, it should either be a cessation for five years, or a perpetual Peace, as the Duke of *Milan* should chuse; the Dukes Commissioners, returning to know his resolution, they found him dead, however the *Milanesi* were willing to stand to their agreement, but the *Venetians* would not condescend, fancying great hopes to themselves of overrunning that State, because *Lodi* and *Piacenza* had submitted to them soon after the death of the Duke; and believing either by treaty or force they should be able to reduce the rest, before any Body could come in to their relief; and this they fancied the rather, because the *Florentines* were engaged in a War with *Alfonso*. *Alfonso* was at this time at *Tiboli*, and being impatient to pursue his designs upon *Tuscany* (according to agreement betwixt him and the Duke) conceiving the War already commenced in *Lombardy*, would give him convenience, he had a great mind to have some footing in the state of *Florence*, before the War should apparently break out; to that purpose he entred into correspondence with some persons in the Castle of *Cennina*, in the upper *Val d' Arno*, and took it: the *Florentines* were much surprized at so unexpected an accident, and seeing that King in motion against them, they listed Men, created a new Council of Ten, and provided themselves for War, with as much industry as any of their predecessors. The King was marched already with his Army into the Country of *Siena*, and had used his utmost endeavours to get that City into his clutches; but it continued firm to the *Florentines*; refused to admit him, and all the rest of the Towns, under its jurisdiction, did the same. Yet they furnished him with provisions, their weakness and the Kings great strength excusing it.

The *Venetians* ambition of the Dutchy of *Milan*.

Alfonso invades the *Florentins*.

The Kings resolution was changed of invading the *Florentines* by the way of the *Vale d' Arno*, either because *Cennina* was taken from him again, or that the *Florentines* were too well furnished with Souldiers in those parts; wherefore he turned towards *Volterra*, and surprized many Castles in the Country belonging thereto. From thence he passed into the Country of *Pisa*, where by the assistance of *Arrigo*, and *Fatio* (Counts of *Gherardesca*) he took some posts, and then assaulted *Campiglia*, which being defended by the *Florentines*; he was not able to carry; so that the King leaving Garrisons in the places he had taken; and certain Troops to make excursions upon the Enemy; with the rest of his Army retired and took his quarters in the Country of *Siena*. The *Florentines* in the mean time being secured by the season of the year, provided themselves with Souldiers with all possible care, and gave the command of them to *Federigo* Lord of *Urbino*, and *Gismondo Malatesta da Rimino*, betwixt whom there was some precedent difference, yet it was so prudently composed by *Neri di Gino*, and *Barnardetto de Medici* their Commissaries, that they took the field together before the Winter was over; recovered the places lost in the Country of *Pisa*; and the

the *Pomerancie* in the *Volterran*; curbing and reſtraining his excurſions of thoſe who were left by *Alfonſo* upon the Coaſts, ſo, as they were ſcarce able to ſecure their Garriſons. As ſoon as the Spring was come, the Commiſſaries had a Rendezvous of all their Army (which conſiſted of about 5000 Horſe, and 2000 Foot, at *Spedalletto*; and the King had another, of about 15000, ſome three miles from *Campiglia*: and when it was ſuppoſed he would have fallen upon that Town, he turned about to *Piombino*, believing it would be no hard matter to gain it, in reſpect that it was but indifferently provided; and if he did, it would be no little prejudice to the *Florentines*, ſeeing from thence he could harraſs them with a tedious War, and by ſending forces there by Sea, infeſt the whole Country of *Piſa*. This Policy of *Alfonſo*'s ſtartled the *Florentines*, and conſulting what was to be done, it was concluded that if they could lye with their Army upon the coaſts of *Campiglia*, he would run a hazard of being beaten, or be forced to draw off with no little diſgrace. To this purpoſe they rigg'd out four *Galliaſſes* which they had at *Ligorn*, and ſent three thouſand foot in them to reinforce *Piombino*, & then poſted themſelves at *Caldane* a place of no eaſie acceſs; for to lye upon the coaſts in the plain, they judged it more dangerous, and more ſubject to attacks: the *Florentines* were to be ſupplied from the neighbouring Towns, which being thin, and but ill inhabited, they were but indifferently furniſhed, ſo that the Army was much incommoded, eſpecially for Wine, for none growing there, and coming with great difficulty from other parts, it was not poſſible to provide for them all. But the King (though ſtraitned by the *Florentines*) had plenty of all things by the way of the Sea. The *Florentines* perceiving it, had a mind to try experiment, whether their forces could not be ſupplied by Sea likewiſe, whereupon they cauſed their *Galliaſſes* to be brought, loaded them with victuals, and having diſpatched them accordingly, they were ſet upon by ſeven of *Alfonſo*'s Gallies, and two of them taken, and the other two fled. This diſaſter cut off all hopes of relieving that way: ſo that 200 of the looſer ſort of Souldiers ran away to the Kings Camp for want of Wine, and the reſt mutiny'd, grumling that they ſhould be confin'd to ſo hot places where there was no Wine, and the Water very bad: hereupon the Commiſſaries took it into debate, and it was concluded that they ſhould leave that Poſt, and addreſs themſelves to the recovery of certain Caſtles which remained in the hands of the King.

On the other ſide the King, though he wanted no proviſion, and was more numerous in Men; found himſelf no leſs diſtreſſed, for his Army was full of the diſeaſes which thoſe maritime Countries do produce, they were grown ſo general and fierce, that many Men died, and moſt of them were ſick. Upon this conſideration, a Peace was propoſed, and the King inſiſted upon 50000 *Florins*, and that *Piombino* might be left to his diſcretion. Which demands being deliberated at *Florence*, many who deſired peace, were earneſt to have them accepted; affirming they could not expect ſucceſs in a War, which required ſo vaſt an expence to maintain it: but *Neri Capponi* going to *Florence*, gave them ſuch pregnant reaſons to the contrary, that the whole City agreed to refuſe them, and the Governor of *Piombino* was well entertained, and promiſed to be relieved both in time of War and Peace, if he would defend it couragiouſly as he had hitherto done. The King having notice of their reſolution, and perceiving his Army too ſickly and infirm to take the place, he brake abruptly from his ſeige; left above 2000 of his Men dead behind him; retreated with the reſt of his Army thorow the Country of *Siena*, and from thence into the Kingdom of *Naples*, highly diſſatisfied with the *Florentines*, and threatning them with a new War when occaſion offered. *Alfonſo retreats out of Tuſcany.*

Whilſt theſe things paſſed in *Tuſcany*, the Count *Franceſco* being made General for the *Milaneſi*, thought fit before any thing elſe, to reconcile himſelf with *Franceſco Piccinino*, (who had a command likewiſe under him) that he might aſſiſt him in his enterprizes, or at leſt oppoſe them with more circumſtances of reſpect: after which, he took the field with his Army, and the Citizens of *Pania*, ſuſpecting their own ability to defend themſelves againſt ſo formidable a force, and yet unwilling to bring themſelves under the yoke of the *Milaneſi*, they offered to ſurrender to him, upon condition they might not fall under their domination. The *Count* had a great mind to that City, and looked upon it as a fine initiation, and pretence, to the reſt of his deſigns. Nor was it fear, or the imputation of breaking his Faith, that reſtrained him from taking it, for great Men think it diſhonorable for to loſe, but none to gain, though with fraud and injuſtice. His great doubt was leſt in taking it, he ſhould diſoblige the *Milaneſi* ſo, as they ſhould give themſelves to the *Venetian*; and in not taking it, he was jealous they ſhould ſurrender to the Duke of *Savoy*, to which he ſaw too many of the Citizens inclin'd, in either of which caſes, his authority in *Lombardy* would be loſt. At length judging it leſs danger to take that City himſelf, than to let another Man get it; he reſolved to accept it, perſwading himſelf it would ſatisfie the

Milaneſi, to let them know, how fatal it might have been for him to have refuſed it, ſeeing thoſe Citizens would certainly have delivered it to the *Venetian*, or the Duke of *Savoy*; either of which ways their State had been undone; and that it was better in his poſſeſſion who was their friend, than in either of theirs, both of them being too potent, and both of them their Enemies. The *Milaneſi*, for all his compliments, were much unſatisfied with the buſineſs, as plainly diſcovering the ambition and ends of the Man; but they thought beſt at preſent to conceal it, not knowing whither they were to betake themſelves (upon a rupture with the *Count*) but to the *Venetians*, whoſe pride, and arrogant terms, they dreaded and abhorred: ſo that they concluded not to break with the *Count*, but to obviate their preſent miſeries, with his aſſiſtance, hoping when they were freed from the former; ſome propitious opportunity might happen to quit them of him; for they were not only infeſted by the *Venetians*; but by the *Genoneſes*, and the Duke of *Savoy* in the name of *Charles* of *Orleans*, deſcended from a Siſter of *Philips*; but the Count defended all againſt them without any trouble. Their greateſt adverſary was the *Venetian*, who was come near with a powerful Army to ſeize upon their ſtate, and had *Lodi* and *Piacenza* already in their poſſeſſion, which laſt, the *Count* beleagured, and after a long ſeige, took it, and ſack'd it: after he had recovered that City, Winter coming on, he drew his Army into quarters, and went himſelf to *Cremona*, where all that Winter he entertained himſelf with his Wife: but as ſoon as the Spring appeared, the *Venetian*, and *Milaneſi* were both in the field: the *Milaneſi* had a great deſire to retake *Lodi*, and afterwards to come an agreement with the *Venetian*: for the expence of the War was increaſed; and the fidelity of the Count ſuſpected. In order to this, it was reſolved their Army ſhould march to *Caravaggio* and beſeige it; ſuppoſing that upon the taking of that Caſtle, *Lodi* would ſurrender. The Count obeyed their Orders, though his own inclination was to have paſſed the *Adda*, and invaded the Country of *Breſcia*. Being ſet down before *Caravaggio*, he intrenched and fortified his Army ſo well with Ditches and Ramparts, that the *Venetians* could not attempt to releive it without great diſadvantage.

However the *Venetians* advanc'd with their Army, under the Command of their General *Michelletto*, within two flights ſhot of the Counts campe; continued there ſeveral days, and had many skirmiſhes with them. Notwithſtanding the Count perſiſted in his ſeige, and preſt them ſo hard, they muſt of neceſſity ſurrender. The *Venetians*, believing the loſs of that Caſtle would be the loſs of their whole enterprize, were much diſſatisfied with the news, and calling a Counſel, after many diſputes it was concluded, there was no way but to attack the Count in his trenches, which was not to be done without great diſadvantage; but the *Senate* of *Venice*, though naturally timerous, and not apt to any ſuddain or dangerous reſolutions, was in this caſe ſo much tranſported as rather to venture all than loſs that, though the loſs of that would be the ruine of all. It was concluded therefore to fall upon the *Count*, & ſtanding to their Arms one morning very early, they aſſaulted that part of the camp which was the weakeſt guarded, and (as it uſually happens in ſuch ſurprizes as that) at the very firſt onſlaught they put the whole *Sforeſcan* Army into diſorder. But the Count ſo rallied them again, that after many attempts, and irruptions upon their Works, they were not only repulſed, but ſo ſhattered and diſperſed, that of their whole Army (in which there were more than 12000 Horſe, there were not above 1900 eſcaped, and their whole baggage and train of Artillery taken; ſo that never till that day had the *Venetians* received ſo conſiderable a defeat.

The *Venetians* totally defeated.

Among the reſt of the prey and Priſoners there was found a *Venetian Proveditore* who before the Battle had ſpoken opprobrious words of the *Count*, calling him Baſtard and Coward: this *Proveditore* finding himſelf in the hands of his Enemies, being conſcious of his offence; and expecting no otherwiſe but that his reward would be ſuitable; according to the Nature of baſe Spirits, (who are always inſolent in proſperity, and poor & abject in adverſity) throwing himſelf with tears at the feet of the Count, he acknowledged his fault, and beſeech'd his pardon. The Count took him up by the arm, and bad him be of good courage: but afterwards he told him he could not but wonder a Perſon of prudence and that gravity as he deſir'd to be thought, ſhould commit ſo great an error, & indecorum, as to ſpeak reproachfully of thoſe who did not deſerve it. As to Baſtardy he accuſed him of, he knew not the paſſages betwixt *Sforza* his Father, and *Madona Lucia* his Mother, for not being then preſent, he was not able to order them better, and therefore he did hope nothing which they did could be imputable to him. But this he knew, that ſince he had been capable of any thing himſelf, he had carried himſelf ſo, as no body could reprehend him, to which both he and his *Senate* could give freſh and irrefragable teſtimony; at laſt he admoniſh'd him to be more modeſt for the future; to have more caution in all his enterprizes, and then he diſmiſs'd him. After this Victory, the *Count* march'd his Army into the

Country

Country of *Breſcia*, poſſeſs'd himſelf of all wherever he came; and then encamped within two miles of the City. The *Venetians* upon their overthrow, ſuſpecting (as it happened) that *Breſcia* would be the firſt thing the *Count* would attempt, reinforc'd it as much as in ſo ſhort a time they were able; got what forces they could together with all imaginable diligence; and ſent to the *Florentines* to deſire their aſſiſtance by vertue of their League: who being freed from their War with *Alfonſo*, ſupplied them with a 1000 foot and 2000 Horſe; with which forces having got an Army together, the *Venetians* began to think they were in a condition to treat; and for a long time it had been the cuſtom and fate of the *Venetians* to recover twice as much by peace, as they loſt by the War. They underſtood very well, the *Milaneſi* were jealous of the *Count*; whoſe deſign was not ſo much to be their General, as their Prince; they knew it was in their own power to make peace with which of them they pleaſed; for both of them deſired it; one out of ambition, the other for fear. They concluded at laſt to compoſe with the *Count*, and to proffer him their aſſiſtance for the ſubduction of *Milan*; preſuming that the *Milaneſi* finding themſelves betraid by the *Count*, in their fury would ſubmit to any dominion but his; and then they being moſt capable of defending them, were the moſt likely to be the Perſons they would chuſe for their protection.

Upon this reſolution, they ſent to try the *Count*, and found him very inclinable to a peace, as deſiring the victory at *Caravaggio* might be appropriated to him, and not to the *Milaneſes*. A peace therefore was ſtruck up, and the *Venetians* obliged themſelves to pay to the Count, (till *Milan* ſhould be taken) 13000 *Florins* a month, and maintain in his ſervice 4000 Horſe, and 2000 Foot during the War. The *Count* on the other ſide engaged to reſtore to them, all the Towns, Priſoners, and what ever elſe had been taken in that War by him; reſerving to himſelf only ſuch Towns as were in Duke *Philips* poſſeſſion when he dyed. The news of this agreement, diſquieted the *Milaneſi* much more than their Victory had rejoyced them. The Magiſtrats ſtorm'd; the People complain'd; the Women and Children lamented; all of them in one chorus pronouncing the *Count* a Traitor and an infidel. And though they did not expect to reclaim him from his ingratitude, by any prayers or promiſes they could make him, nevertheleſs they thought fit to ſend Embaſſadors to him, to ſee with what confidence, and expreſſions he could receive them after ſuch barbarous diſloyalty, and being brought into his preſence, one of them ſpake to him to this Effect.

Peace betwixt the *Venetians* and the Count excluding the *Milaneſi*.

"Thoſe who deſire to obtain any thing of other People, are wont to accoſt them with "prayers, or promiſes, or threats; that either their compaſſion, or profit, or poverty "might move them to condeſcend: but in Men that are cruel, and covetous, and prepoſeſt with their own greatneſs and authority, there being no room for either of the three, "'tis in vain for any Man to think to mitigate them with prayers, to oblige them with promiſes, or to fright them with threats. We therefore, underſtanding (though too late) "your cruelty, your ambition, and your inſolence; are come hither, not to beg any thing "of you (for if we did, we are ſenſible it would not be granted) but to commemorate "and charge you with the benefits you have received from the People of *Milan*; and to re"monſtrate with what ingratitude you have requited them; that among the many miſeries "which you have brought upon us, we may have at leaſt the pleaſure to reprehend you for "them. You ought to remember your condition after the death of the Duke; you were "at hoſtility with the Pope, and King *Alfonſo*; you were diſcarded by the *Venetians*, and "the *Florentines*, who, upon ſome juſt and late provocation; or elſe finding you uſeleſs, "were become (as it were) your Enemies: you were tired and weary of the War you "had maintained againſt the Church, you were left without Men, without mony, without "friends, deſperate of preſerving your own, much more of gaining from others; under "which exigencies, of neceſſity you muſt have ſunk, had not our innocence, and plain "heartedneſs ſupported you. We, we were they who received you into our Arms, moved "by the reverence we retained for the memory of our Duke; with whom you had enter'd "into ſo near and ſo late an allyance; preſuming (and as we thought) with reaſon, that "the love you profeſt to him, would have been extended to his People; and that our re"wards being added to his, the amity betwixt us, would not only have been firm, but in"diſſolvable, and for that cauſe to your old articles with the Duke, we threw in *Verona* "and *Breſcia*. What could we give, or promiſe you more? and you, what could you "have (or indeed ask) more of us, or any Body elſe at that time? You received from us a "kindneſs you could not look for; and we, in recompence, have received a miſchief we "never deſerved: nor was this the firſt inſtance of your falſhood; for no ſooner were you "in poſſeſſion of the command of our Army, but againſt all juſtice & obligation, you received "*Pavia* into your hands; which, indeed, gave us the firſt hint of what was to be expected

The Oration of one of the *Milan* Embaſſadors to the *Count*.

"from

"from your friendship; however he swallowed that injury, in hopes such an acquest as that "might have satiated your ambition. But alas! those who must have all, will not be sa- "tisfied with a part. You promised that all your conquests afterwards should be ours, be- "cause you knew, what you should give us at several times, you could take from us at once; "this is verified since your victory at *Caravaggio*, which though won with the expence of "our treasure and blood, is by your baseness perverted to our ruine. Oh! unhappy are those "Cities who are constrained to defend their liberty against such as invade them, but much "more unhappy are they who in their defence are inforced to imploy such mercenary and "such treacherous instruments as you. May we be example to posterity, though *Thebes* "and the King of *Macedon* could be no warning to us, who having beaten their Enemies, "was made their General by them, and their Prince afterwards by himself. We are not, there- "fore, to be condemned for any thing; but our confidence in you; whose passed life, and in- "satiable appetite of dominion ought to have taught us better than to have trusted a person "which betraid the Prince of *Lucca*; squeez'd the *Florentines* and the *Venetians*, disrespe- "cted the Duke; despised a King; and committed several injuries (above all) both a- "gainst God and the Church. And indeed we had no reason to believe that so many Prin- "ces and Potentates should be of less authority with *Francesco Sforza*, than the *Milanesi*, or "that he would be just in his engagements to us, when he had broke them with every body "else. But our indiscretion cannot excuse your treachery, nor clear you of that infamy, "which our just and deplorable complaints will fix upon you all the World over. Nor "can any thing secure you against the stings and compunctions of your own Conscience; for "inverting those Arms which we had provided for our defence, against our own liberty "and freedom; you cannot think any thing so proper for you, as the reward of a Parricide. "And if yet your incontroulable ambition should blind you; the evidence the whole World "will give of your impiety, will open your eyes, and God himself will open them, if "either perjury, or falshood, or treason, do offend him; or if in his divine providence, for "some occult good, he sees it fit to forbear it, and to show himself to us a favourer of ill "Men. Do not therefore delude your self with the assurance of victory; the just anger of "God will oppose you; and we are resolved to lose lives and liberties together: and if it "so fall out that we should be constrained to submit, there is no Prince in *Italy* but we will "choose before you; and if our sins be so great, as to pull down the greatest misery in the "World upon our heads, and force us into your hands, be assured, that dominion which "you begin with infamy and fraud, will end in the destruction of you or your Chil- "dren.

The *Count* was netled by every part of the speech, yet without any extraordinary commotion in either gesture or words, he made them this answer;

The *Counts* answer. "That being injured so highly as they thought themselves, he would bear with the in- "discretion of their language; though to persons capable of judging betwixt them, there "was nothing that they had charged him with, which he could not easily resel. He could "make it appear, that he had not injured the *Milanesi*, but secured himself only against their "intelligence and designs. That if they reflected upon their carriage after the Battle of *Ca- "ravaggio*, they would find that in stead of rewarding him with *Verona* and *Brescia*, as they "had contracted, they were underhand negotiating a peace with the *Venetians*; that the "burden and scandal of the War might be left upon his shoulders, whilst they ran away "with the profits of it, and the honor of the peace: so that if they looked impartially into "the matter, they would find, he had done nothing but what they had endeavoured be- "fore; and that if he had defer'd to do it so long, the more they were oblig'd to him; and "with the more justice he might retort ingratitude upon them. That as to the truth, or "falsity of what was on either side alledg'd, the end of the War would make it appear, in "which, that God which they had so solemnly invoked to revenge them, would demon- "strate which of the two was most tender of displeasing him, and which with most equity "he opposed.

The Embassadors being departed, the *Count* prepared to invade them; and the *Milanesi* for their defence; to which purpose they joyned themselves with *Francesco* and *Giacopo Pic- cinino*, who upon the score of the old animosity betwixt the *Bracceschi* and the *Sforzeschi*, had been faithful to the *Milanesi*: hoping by their means to preserve their liberties, till they should have opportunity to divide betwixt the *Venetians* and the *Count*, which amity they did not think would be of any long continuance. The *Count* was of the same opinion, and thought it his best way to bind them by rewards, seeing they were tickliſh in their pro- mises. In the distribution therefore of the War, he was contented the *Venetians* should attack *Cremona*; whilst he with the remainder of the Army, assaulted the rest of that State: this article being proposed to the *Venetians* was so grateful, that upon that very reason they con-

nued their friendſhip to the *Count*, till he had overrun moſt of the Country of *Milan*, and ſo ſtraitned that City, that no proviſions could come at it. So that diſpairing of other relief, they ſent Embaſſadors to *Venice*, to intreat, that they would commiſerate their caſe, and (according to the practice of all Commonwealths) rather ſupport thoſe who ſtood for their liberty, than a Tyrant; who if he ſhould gain their City, would be too ſtrong afterwards for them. Nor ought they to believe he would be content with the terms of their capitulation, who had violated his League with that ſtate. The *Venetians* were not yet Maſters of *Crema*; and being loth to diſcover themſelves till that were in their poſſeſſion, they anſwered them in publick, that their alliance with the *Count* would not ſuffer them to aſſiſt them; but privatly they entertain'd them ſo, as they might give their Maſters aſſured hopes of their friendſhip. The *Count* was got already ſo near *Milan*, that he had taken ſome part of the ſuburbs; and the *Venetians* having reduc'd *Crema*, they thought it time to publiſh their amity with *Milan*, with whom they were ſecretly agreed; and the firſt article they agreed to, was the conſervation of their liberty. This League being ratified, the *Venetians* commanded ſuch forces as they had with the *Count*, to march back to their Army, they ſignified likewiſe to the *Count*, the peace which they had concluded; and gave him twenty days time to accept it himſelf. The *Count* was not at all ſurprized at the inconſtancy of the *Venetians*; he had forſeen it long before, and expected it ſhould happen every day. Yet he could not but regret it as much, as the *Milaneſi* had been moleſted at his: he deſired two days to give in his anſwer to the Embaſſadors, which time he reſolv'd to detain the *Venetians* who were in his ſervice, and go on with his enterprize. He gave out publickly he would accept of the peace; and ſent Embaſſadors to *Venice*, with full power to ratifie it; but they had private inſtructions to the contrary, to ſpin out and protract the concluſion by all the cavils and ſubtleties they could invent: and that the *Venetian* might give the more credit to his pretences, he made a truce with the *Milaneſi* for a month, drew off his Army, and diſpers'd it into ſuch places as he had taken in that Country: this ſtratagem of his was the occaſion of his victory afterwards, and the ruine of the *Milaneſi*; for the *Venetians* preſuming upon the peace, were ſlower and more remiſs in their preparations for War.

And the *Milaneſi*, ſeeing the ceſſation confirmed; the Enemy removed, and the *Venetian* their friend; believed for certain the *Count* would trouble them no more: which opinion was pernicious to them two ſeveral ways, in making them more negligent for their defence; and in ſowing their land, which devour'd much of their corn, and was the reaſon they were ſooner diſtreſſed. On the other ſide, nothing was hurtful to them, but was beneficial to the *Count*, and gave him time to reſpire, and look abroad for allies. During this War in *Lombardy*, the *Florentines* had not declar'd of either ſide: nor ſhown any favour to the *Count* when he took part with the *Milaneſi*, nor afterwards; for the Count having no great need of them, had not ſought their aſſiſtance; only after the defeat at *Caravaggio*, (as they were oblig'd by the League) they ſent aid to the *Venetians*. But now the Count was alone, and had no body elſe to reſort to, he was inforced to preſs their aſſiſtance, publickly to the ſtate, and privatly to his friends, but eſpecially to *Coſimo de Medici*, who in all his undertakings had counſel'd him faithfully, and freely ſupplied him: nor did he deſert him now in his diſtreſs; but furniſh'd him with what could privatly be convey'd, encouraged him to go on in his deſign; he propos'd likewiſe that the City would publickly owne him; but he found difficulty, in that *Neri* the Son of *Capponi* was the moſt potent Man in *Florence*, and to him it appeared more for the intereſt of that City, that the Count ſhould accept of the peace, than proſecute the War. His firſt apprehenſion was leaſt out of indignation to the *Count*, the *Milaneſi* ſhould give themſelves up to the dominion of the *Venetian*, which would be the ruine of them all: then, if the Count ſhould ſucceed, and *Milan* come into his hands, ſo great an Army, with ſo great a territory added to it, muſt needs (in his judgment at leaſt) become dangerous, and formidable; for if he were troubleſom whilſt but a *Count*, when a Duke he would be inſupportable. For theſe reaſons he affirmed it would be better for the republick of *Florence*, and for all *Italy* beſides that the *Count* ſhould remain as he was, with his reputation in the Army; and *Lombardy* be divided into two Commonwealths, which were never like to joyn to the ruine of their Neighbours; and ſingly, and by themſelves, they were not able to do hurt; to compaſs which he ſaw no way ſo probable, as by preſerving their old amity with the *Venetians*, and diſclaiming the *Count*.

Coſimo de Medici a friend to *Franceſco*.

Neri Capponi againſt him.

Theſe arguments were not approved by *Coſimo's* friends; believing they were not ſo much *Neri's* judgment, as jealouſie; leſt the *Count* being made a Duke, *Coſimo* ſhould grow too powerful by being his friend. *Coſimo* on the other hand perſwaded that their alliance with the *Count* would be for the advantage both of *Florence*, and all *Italy*; for it was madneſs to imagine

imagine *Milan* could continue a Commonwealth, seeing the humour of the Citizens; their manner of Life; and the old factions and differences among them, were not capable of any form or system of civil Goverment; so that of necessity the *Count* must be Duke of it, or the *Venetians* Lords: and in that case no body could be so weak, but to prefer a single Neighbour, competently powerful, before an Enemy that was remote, but more great and incontroulable. Neither could he believe the *Milanesi* would give themselves up to the *Venetians*, for the *Count* had the bigger party in the Town, and when ever they found themselves unable to defend their liberties any longer; they would more probably surrender to the *Count* than the *Venetian*. These varieties of opinions kept the City a long time in suspence; but at length it was agreed that Embassadors should be dispatch'd to the *Count*, to treat about their alliance; if they found him so strong, that there was likelyhood he should prevail, then they should conclude; but if otherwise, they were to cavil, and protract. By the time these Embassadors had got to *Reggio*, they had news the *Count* was become Master of *Milan*. For the *Count* as soon as his truce was expired, had clapped down again before it with his Army, hoping to carry it in a short time, in despight of the *Venetians*, for they could not come to relieve it, but by the river *Adda*, which was easie to be hinder'd; being Winter, he could not fear they would remove him with their whole Army, and before the Spring he doubted not to carry it, especially seeing *Francesco Piccinino* was dead, and *Giacopo* his Brother remained sole Captain of their forces. The *Venetian* had sent an Embassador to *Milan* to encourage them to defend themselves, and to assure them of speedy and effectual relief; and so far they were as good as their words, that during the Winter many skirmishes and conflicts passed betwixt the *Venetians* and the *Count*; till when the weather began to be open, they came down with their Army (under the command of *Pandolfo Malatesta*) and encamped upon the river of *Adda*: where it being debated in Counsel whether they should fall upon the *Count*, and run the hazard of a Battle, it was opposed by *Pandolfo*, (upon his experience both of the *Count* and his Army) who advis'd, the Town might be relieved without any such danger, the *Count* being distressed already both for forrage and Corn. Wherefore his opinion was, that they should block him up where he was, and intercept his provisions, which would keep up the Spirits of the *Milanesi* and divert them from surrendring to him.

The *Venetians* assist the *Milanesi*.

This resolution was most plausible to the *Venetians*, because they thought it safe in it self, and did hope by keeping the Town in constant necessity, it would be forc'd at last to deliver up to them; for considering how the *Count* had provok'd them, they could not imagine they would surrender to him. In the mean time the *Milanesi* were reduced to extream misery, for being a populous City, the poor People fell down dead in the Streets for want of Bread; and this scarcity begetting murmurs and complaints in several places, the Magistrats were affraid of some tumult or other, and us'd all possible diligence to prevent their assembling. The multitude is not suddainly to be engaged in any mischief; but when once they are dispos'd, the least accident imaginable sets them on work. It happen'd that two persons of indifferent condition being in discourse near the *Porta Nuova* about the calamities of the City, and what ways were left to preserve it; People got about them by degrees, so as in a short time they were in a considerable number; upon which a rumour was spread in the Town, that they were in Arms against the Magistrats at *Porta Nuova*: hereupon, the whole multitude (who expected some occasion) put themselves in Arms, made *Gasparre da Vico Mercato*, their leader, and marching up to the place where the Magistrats were in Council, they fell upon them with such fury, that all which could not escape, were slain; among the rest *Lionardo Veneto* the *Venetian* Embassador, who had laugh'd at their miseries, and was judg'd the principal occasion of their wants: having made themselves Masters of the City, they deliberated which way to relieve themselves out of their distresses, and it was unanimously resolv'd (seeing their liberty was not to be preserved) that they should throw themselves under the protection of some Prince which should be able to defend them, but they were divided about the Person; some were for King *Alfonso*, some for the Duke of *Savoy*, some the King of *France*, not one word all the while of the *Count*; so great and implacable was the indignation of the People against him; yet at last, not agreeing in the rest, *Gasparre da Vico Mercato* mentioned the Count, and display'd gravely before them, that if their design was to rid themselves of the War, the *Count* was the only person to be chosen; for the People of *Milan* were in necessity of a certain and present peace, not of a tedious and only possible supply.

Gasparre Vico Mercato his advice.

Then he fell with great words to mitigate the proceedings of the *Count*; he accus'd the *Venetians*: he accus'd all the Princes of *Italy*, (who some for ambition, and some for avarice) would not permit them to live free. And now since their liberty was lost; and they must yield to some Body or other, his opinion was, they should do it to one that knew them:

them; and was able to defend them; that they might be ſure of peace for their ſervitude, and not be engaged in greater, and more pernicious Wars. The People heard him with great attention, and when he had done, they cryed out with one voice that the *Count* ſhould be the Man; and *Gaſparre* their Embaſſador to invite him; who carrying him the joyful news, was kindly entertain'd, and the *Count* enter'd into *Milan* 26 of *February* 1450, and was received with great acclamation, even by thoſe Perſons which not long before had ſo highly traduced him. The news of this conqueſt arriving at *Florence*, they diſpatched orders immediatly to their Embaſſadors who were upon the way, that inſtead of treating an agreement with him as *Count* (which was their inſtruction before) their buſineſs ſhould now be to congratulate him as Duke. Theſe Embaſſadors were honorably entertain'd, and bountifully preſented by the Duke; who knew againſt the Power of the *Venetian*, he could not have in all *Italy* more faithful nor more potent allies, than the Citizens of *Florence*, who though freed from their apprehenſions of the Houſe of the *Viſconti*, were nevertheleſs obnoxious to the forces of the King of *Arragon*, and the *Venetians*; for they knew the Kings of *Aragon* would be their Enemies, for the amity and correſpondence they had always maintain'd with the *French*; and the *Venetians* knew their old fears of the *Viſconti* were occaſioned by them, and remembring with-what eagerneſs the *Viſconti* were perſecuted, and that if they came into their power, they were like to fare no better, they were bent wholly upon their ruine. For theſe reaſons the new Duke embrac'd an agreement with the *Florentines*, very willingly, and the *Venetians* and the King of *Arragon* confederated againſt them; the King of *Aragon* undertaking the *Florentines*, and the *Venetians* the Duke; who being new, and ſcarce ſetled in his Government, they ſuppos'd would not be able to confront them with all his own forces, not all the friends he could make. But becauſe the League betwixt the *Florentines* and the *Venetians*, was not yet fully expir'd; and the King of *Aragon* upon concluſion of the War at *Piombino*, had made an accord with them, it did not ſeem convenient to break the peace abruptly, but rather to attend ſome accident that might give them pretence to invade them. Whereupon they ſent Embaſſadors to *Florence* (each of them, apart) to let the *Florentines* know, that the Leagues which had paſſed betwixt them were not made to offend any body, but to defend one another. Then the *Venetians* complained that the *Florentines* had ſuffer'd *Alexander* the Dukes Brother to paſs with his forces into *Lombardy* by the way of *Lunigiana*: and beſides, had been the authors and Counſellors of the agreement betwixt the Duke, and the Marqueſs of *Mantua*; all which they affirmed was done to the prejudice of their ſtate, and contrary to the amity betwixt them; inſinuating as friends, that who ever injures another perſon wrongfully, gives him a right to revenge himſelf: and who ever breaks peace, muſt prepare for War. The anſwer to theſe Embaſſies was committed to *Coſimo*, who in a wiſe and eloquent oration, recapitulated the benefits the republick of *Venice* had receiv'd from that ſtate; declaring what empire and dominion they had gain'd with that treaſure, and forces, and advice of the *Florentines*; and remonſtrating that as the amity betwixt them was propos'd by the *Florentines*; they would not be the firſt which ſhould break it. For having been always lovers of peace, they were well ſatisfied with their friendſhip; and would always endeavour to preſerve it. The truth was, all People wonder'd at their complaints, & that ſo grave and judicious a *Senate*, ſhould concern themſelves for things ſo trivial and vain; but ſeeing they thought them worthy of their conſideration, they could not but declare, that their Country was free and open to any body; and that the Duke was a perſon of ſuch qualifications, that he needed not the advice, or favour of any in the choice of his *Allies*; and therefore he was affraid there was ſomething more at the bottom, than they had hitherto diſcovered; which if hereafter it ſhould appear, the *Florentines* doubted not but to manifeſt it eaſily to the World, that as their friendſhip had been profitable, their enmity could be dangerous. However things were ſmoothed over pretty handſomly for that time; and the Embaſſadors ſeemed to go away well enough content: yet the alliance the King of *Aragon* & the *Venetians* had made, and the manner of their deportment, gave the Duke, and *Florentines* both, more reaſon to prepare for a War, than to rely upon their peace: upon which the *Florentines* confederating with the Duke, the *Venetians* diſcover'd themſelves, made a League with *Sienna*, and baniſh'd all the *Florentines*, and their ſubjects, out of *Venice* and its dominions: and not long after, *Alfonſo* did the ſame, without any reſpect to the League he had made with them the year before; and without any juſt, or ſo much as pretended occaſion. The *Venetians* were deſirous to get *Bologna* into their hands, and to that end furniſhing certain of their exiles with a proportionable force, they marched thither in the night, and by the common ſhore got into the Town ſo privatly, their entrance was not perceived, till they gave the alarm themſelves; upon which *Santi Bentivogli*, leaping out of his bed, was inform'd the whole City was in the poſſeſſion of the Enemy. *Santi* was adviſed by many

Franceſco enter'd *Milan*, and made Duke of it. 1450.

The Duke of *Milan* and the *Florentines* confederate.

The King of *Aragon* and the *Venetians*.

Embaſſadors from them to *Florence*.

The *Florentines* anſwer.

ny which were about him, to fly, and preſerve himſelf that way, ſeeing there was not any left to ſecure the ſtate. However he reſolv'd to try his fortune, and taking arms, and encouraging his ſervants to follow him, he went forth, and having joyn'd them to ſome of his friends, he charg'd a party of the Enemy, beat them, kill'd ſeveral, and forc'd all of them out of the Town; by which action he was thought to have given ample teſtimony of his extraction from the houſe of the *Bentivogli*. Theſe paſſages made it clear to the *Florentines* that a War was intended; and therefore they betook themſelves to their antient methods of defence. They created a Council of Ten. They entertain'd new officers. They ſent Embaſſadors to *Rome*, *Naples*, *Venice*, *Sienna*, and *Milan*, to deſire aid of their friends; to diſcover ſuch as were ſuſpitious; to gain ſuch as were irreſolute; and to prie into the Counſels of their Enemies. From the Pope, they could obtain nothing but general words, civility, and exhortations to peace. From the King of *Aragon* nothing but idle excuſes for having diſmiſs'd the *Florentines*; offering his paſsport to any which demanded it: and although he endeavoured by all means to conceal his preparations for war, yet the Embaſſadors found him a juggler, and perceived ſeveral of his practices againſt their State. With the Duke therefore they renewed their League; procured an amity with the *Genoueſes*; compos'd the differences about the repriſal, and many other things which had formerly obſtructed it: they tried always to fruſtrate, or break the Treaty; and they went ſo far as to ſupplicate the great Turk, to baniſh all *Florentines* out of his Country; but that Emperour would not hearken. The *Florentine* Embaſſadors were prohibited entrance into the dominions of the *Venetian*, becauſe (forſooth) they were in League with the King of *Aragon*, and could not ſend any Embaſſies without his participation. The *Sienneſi* received their Ambaſſadors, treated them well, leſt they ſhould be overrun, before the League could relieve them; and therefore they thought it beſt to collogue, and lull thoſe Arms aſleep, which they were not able to reſiſt. It was conjectured then, that the *Venetian* and King both, ſent Embaſſadors to juſtifie the War; but the *Venetian* Embaſſador being refus'd likewiſe to be admitted into the territories of *Florence*, the King's denied to do that office alone, and the whole Embaſſy came to nothing: by which the *Venetians* found themſelves us'd with the ſame rudeneſs and contempt, which not many months before they had exercis'd upon the *Florentines*.

Preparations for War in *Florence*.

In the midſt of theſe apprehenſions, the Emperour *Federigo* 3 paſs'd into *Italy* to be crown'd, and on the 30th of *January* 1451, enter'd into *Florence* with an equipage of 1400 Horſe. He was honorably entertain'd there by the *Senate*; and continued with them to the 6 of *February*, upon which day he departed for *Rome*, in order to his coronation; where having performed that ceremony, and celebrated his nuptials with the Empreſs, (which was come thither by Sea) he departed again for *Germany*; returned by *Florence*, (were all the old honors were reiterated) and having been oblig'd in his paſſage by the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*, he gave him a grant of *Modena* and *Reggio* as a reward. But the *Florentines* were not by all theſe ſolemnities diverted from their preparations; for their own reputation, and the terror of their Enemies, the Duke and they had enter'd into a League with *France*, which with great joy, and oſtentation they publiſh'd all over *Italy*.

Federigo the Emperor enters into *Florence*.

In the month of *May* 1452 the *Venetians*, not thinking it fit to diſſemble any longer, invaded the territories of the Duke of *Milan*, by the way of *Lodi* with 16000 Horſe, and 6000 Foot; whilſt at the ſame time the Marqueſs of *Monferrat* (upon ſome deſigns of his own, or the ſtimulation of the *Venetians*) aſſaulted him on the other ſide by the way of *Aleſſandria*. The Duke had got an Army together of 18000 Horſe, and 3000 Foot, with which (after he had furniſh'd *Aleſſandria*, and *Lodi*, with ſtrong Garriſons, and fortified all places where the Enemy might offend him) he fell into the Country of *Breſcia*, where he did great miſchief to the *Venetians*, both parties plundring the Countries, and burning ſuch Towns as were not able to defend themſelves: but the Marqueſs of *Monferrat*, being defeated not long after by the Garriſon at *Aleſſandria*, the Duke was at more leiſure to infeſt, and make his inroads into the Countries of the *Venetian*. Whilſt the War was carried on in *Lombardy* in this manner, with various, but inconſiderable accidents, the War in *Tuſcanny* was commenced betwixt the King of *Aragon* and the *Florentines*, and manag'd with as little ardor, and ſucceſs as the other. *Ferrando* (a natural Son of *Alfonſo*'s) march'd into *Tuſcany* with 12000 Men, under the command of *Federigo*, Lord of *Urbin*. His firſt enterprize was to aſſault *Foiano* in *Valdiſciana* (for the *Sienneſi* being their friends, they enter'd that way into the *Florentine* dominions) the Caſtle was weak; the walls but indifferent; the Garriſon but ſmall; yet thoſe they had within it were valiant and faithful; the whole number which were ſent for the ſecurity of that place, not exceeding 200. Before this Caſtle *Ferrando* encamped, and either their courage was ſo little without, or theirs

Tuſcany invaded by the King of *Aragons* forces.

ſo

ſo great within) that it took him up 36 days before he could maſter it. Which time gave the *Florentines* great convenience of providing other places of higher importance, and drawing their forces together and diſpoſing them into better order, than otherwiſe they could have done.

This Caſtle being taken, the Enemy march'd into *Chianti*, where they attempted two little Towns which were held by a few private Citizens, and were repuls'd. Leaving them, they remov'd to *Caſtellina* (a little Caſtle upon the confines of *Chianti*) and ſat down before it. This Caſtle was about ten miles from *Sienna*; weak in its works, but weaker in its ſituation; yet in neither ſo weak, as the courage of the Aſſailants; for after 44 days ſeige, and all the art, and force they could uſe, they were glad to draw off, and leave the Caſtle as they found it. So little formidable were the Armies in thoſe days, and ſo inconſiderable the Wars, that thoſe places which are now deſerted as impoſſible to be kept, were then defended as if they had been impoſſible to have been taken. Whilſt *Ferrando* was with his Army in *Chianti*, he made many incurſions into the Country of *Florence*, running up with his parties within ſix miles of the Town, to the great terror and detriment of their ſubjects, who, having got together about 8000 Souldiers, under the Command of *Aſtorre de Fienza*, and *Giſmondo Malateſta*, held off from the Enemy towards the Caſtle of *Colle*, being unwilling to come to a Battle, becauſe they knew if they loſt not their Army, there was no danger of the War; for the little Caſtles which ſhould be taken, would be reſtored upon the peace; and the great Towns were ſecure. The King had likewiſe a Fleet of about twenty Veſſels (Gallies and Foiſts) in the Sea of *Piſa*, which Fleet (whilſt *La Caſtellina* was aſſaulted by Land) was imploy'd by the King to batter the Caſtle of *Vada* that ſtood upon the Sea; and they did it ſo effectually, that in a ſhort time by the inadvertency of the Governor, they got it into their hands: from whence afterwards they ran over the whole Country thereabouts, but thoſe excurſions were preſently reſtrain'd by certain *Florentine* Souldiers which were ſent to *Campiglia*. The Pope in the mean time concerned himſelf no farther, than to mediate an accord. But though he was ſo tender in engaging abroad in any action of War, he found himſelf at home in no little danger. There was at that time in *Rome* a perſon call'd *Stephano Porcari*, a Citizen born, of good extraction, and learning, but moſt eminent for the Generoſity of his mind, This *Stephano* was ambitious (as moſt are which are deſirous of Glory) to perform, or at leaſt attempt ſome thing that might make him memorable to poſterity. And nothing occur'd ſo honourably to his thoughts, as to deliver his Country from the inſolence of the Prelats, and reduce it to its primitive liberty; hoping if he effected it, he ſhould be call'd either the *Father* or the *Reſtorer* of his Country. His great hopes and encouragement in this enterprize was deduc'd from the iniquity and ill lives of the Prelats; which were highly diſpleaſing both to the Barons and People of *Rome*. But his greateſt confidence was grounded upon certain verſes of *Petrarch*'s in that *Canto* which begins, *Spirito Gentile* &c. The verſes are theſe. *Stephano Porcari.*

Sopra ill monte Tarpeio Canzon vedrai,
Un Cavalier ch Italia tutta honora,
Penſoſo piu d'altrui che di ſe ſteſſo.

Stephano was of opinion that Poets were many times inſpir'd, and had perfect and divine inflations from above. So that he concluded what *Petrarch* had propheſied in that *Canto* would certainly come to paſs, and he did not know any man fitter than himſelf to accompliſh it, in reſpect of his eloquence and learning and favour, and friends. Having taken up this fancy, he could not contain himſelf, but his words, geſture, and manner of living diſcover'd him, and render'd him ſuſpicious to the Pope; who to ſecure himſelf againſt his plots, confin'd him to *Bologna*, and ſent inſtructions to the Governor to have an eye over him every day. But *Stephano* was not to be diſcouraged by one diſaſter; it rather animated him in his deſign; inſomuch that with the greateſt caution he could, he continued his practices with his friends, and now and then would ſteal to *Rome* and back again with ſuch expedition, as he would be ſure to preſent himſelf before the Governor at that time he was to appear. But afterwards, having drawn in as many as he thought neceſſary for his work, he reſolved to proceed to action, without farther delay; and ſent to his correſpondents in *Rome*, that at a prefix'd time, a ſplendid ſupper ſhould be prepar'd; all the conſpirators to be invited to it; and each of them have private orders to bring his Confident along with him, and he promiſed to be there himſelf preciſely at the time. All things were order'd exactly to his directions; and he himſelf was punctually with them; for as ſoon as ſupper was ready, and ſerv'd up to the Table, he preſented himſelf amongſt them, in a Robe of cloth of Gold; his collar and other ornaments about him, to give him Majeſty and reputation (and having

having embrac'd all the Conſpirators) in a long oration he exhorted them to be couragious, and diſpoſe themſelves chearfully in ſo glorious an enterprize. Then he appointed the way, ordering one of them to ſeize the Popes Palace the next morning; and the other to run about the ſtreets, and excite the People to Arm. But his Conſpiracy coming to the ear of the Pope (ſome ſay by the treachery of his confederats, others by his being ſeen in the Town) which way ſoever it was, the Pope caus'd him and the greateſt part of his Camerads to be apprehended the very ſame night after ſupper, and put to death, as they deſerv'd. This was the end of that enterprize, and though among ſome People perhaps his intention might be commended, yet his judgment muſt neceſſarily be blam'd; for ſuch attempts may have ſome ſhadow of glory in the contrivance, but their execution is certain deſtruction.

Stephano and his confederats put to Death.

1453. The War in *Tuſcany* had continued about a year, and in the ſpring 1453 both Armies had taken the field, when in relief of the *Florentines Aleſſandro Sforza* the Dukes Brother arriv'd with a ſupply of 2000 Horſe, by which the *Florentine* Army being much increas'd, and the Kings Army become inferiour in number, the *Florentines* thought fit to recover what they had loſt, and with little labour took ſome of their Towns again: after which they encamp'd at *Foiano*, which by the careleſneſs of the Commiſſaries was ſack'd; ſo that the inhabitants being diſpers'd, they were hardly got to inhabite there again; and when they did come, it was not without great exemptions and reward. The Caſtle of *Vada* alſo was retaken; for the Enemy perceiving they could not hold it, they ſet it on fire, and departed. Whilſt the *Florentine* Army was imploy'd in this manner, the King of *Aragons* Army, not having the courage to come near them, were retreated towards *Sienna*, from whence they made frequent excurſions into the Country about *Florence*, where they made great hubbubs; committed many outrages, and brought great terror upon the People. Nor was the King defective in contriving other ways of aſſaulting his Enemies, dividing their forces, or detracting from their reputation. *Gherardo Gambatorti* was at that time Lord of *Valdibagno*. This *Gherardo* and his Anceſtors, had always been in the *Florentine* ſervice, either as hired, or recommended. *Alfonſo* was tampering with this *Gherardo* to deliver up his territory to him, and he promis'd to give him an equivalence in the Kingdom of *Naples*. This tranſaction was not ſo private, but they had news of it in *Florence*, and an Embaſſador was diſpatch'd to remember him of his own and his predeceſſors obligations to that State; and to admoniſh him to perſevere in his amity with them, as they had conſtantly done. *Gherardo* pretended to be ſurpriz'd at what the Embaſſador told him; ſwore a thouſand oaths that never any ſuch wickedneſs enter'd into his thoughts; proffer'd to have gone in perſon to *Florence*, and reſided there, to ſecure them of his fidelity; but being unhappily indiſpos'd himſelf, his Son ſhould go along with him, and remain there as a perpetual Hoſtage. His proffers, and his imprecations together made the *Florentines* believe that *Gherardo* was honeſt, and his accuſor the Knave, in which opinion they acquieſced. But *Gherardo* went on with the King, and rather with more eagerneſs than before; and when all was agreed, *Alfonſo* ſent Friar *Puccio* (a Knight of *Jeruſalem*) to take poſſeſſion of the Caſtles and Towns which belong'd to *Gherardo*.

The vale of *Bagno* revolts. But *Bagno* retaining its affection to *Florence*, promis'd obedience to the Kings Commiſſary, with no little regret: *Puccio* was in poſſeſſion of almoſt all that ſtate, only the Caſtle of *Corzano* was behind, which was likewiſe to be deliver'd. When *Gherardo* made this ſurrender, among the reſt of his own creatures about him, there was one *Antonio Gualandi*, a *Piſan*, a young Gentleman and brave, and one that highly deteſted this treachery in *Gherardo*. Pondering with himſelf the ſituation of the place, the number of the Garriſon; the diſſatisfaction he obſerved both in their geſtures and looks, and finding *Gherardo* at the Gate ready to introduce the Enemy; he convey'd himſelf betwixt the Caſtle and *Gherardo*, and taking his opportunity with both his hands thruſt him away; and then cauſing the wicket to be ſhut, he exhorted the guards to ſtand faithfully to the *Florentines* againſt ſo falſe and ſo flagitious a Man: the report of this action arriving at *Bagno*, and the Towns which were about it, they unanimouſly took Arms againſt their new Maſters; and ſetting up the *Florentine* colours upon the walls, they drove them all out of that Country: this news coming to *Florence*, they immediatly clap'd their young Hoſtage into priſon, and diſpatch'd ſupplies to *Bagno* and thoſe parts, to ſecure them, and made that Country dependant upon themſelves. *Gherardo* (a Traitor in the mean time, both to his friends and his Son) had much ado to eſcape; leaving his Wife, Family, and fortune in the hands of his Enemies. This accident was lookt upon as a great deliverance in *Florence*: for had the King made himſelf Maſter of thoſe parts, he might with little expence have overrun all as far as *Valdi Tevere*, and *Caſentino*, and brought ſuch diſtraction upon their affairs, that the *Florentines* muſt have divided their Army, and been diſabled thereby from attending the

Arrago-

Arragonian forces about *Sienna*, with their Army entire. Besides the provisions which the *Florentines* had made in *Italy* to oppose the confederacy of their Enemies; they sent *Agriolo Acciaivoli* their Ambassador into *France*, to negotiate with that King for the sending King *Rinato d' Angio* into *Italy*, in the behalf of the Duke and themselves; and to represent to him, that coming thither for the defence of his friends, when he was once entred, and had settled them, he might set up his own claim to the Kingdom of *Naples*, and they would be engag'd to assist him; and so whilst in *Lombardy* and *Tuscany* the War was carried on (as we have related) in *France*, the Treaty was concluded, and *Rinato* oblig'd in *June* to come into *Italy* with 2400 Horse; and the League on the other side obliged at his arrival at *Alexandria*, to pay him 30000 Florins, and 10000 *per men.* afterwards whilst the War should continue: But being ready (upon this stipulation) to pass into *Italy*, he was obstructed by the Duke of *Savoy* and the Marquess of *Monferrat*, who were friends to the *Venetians*, and would not suffer him to pass. Hereupon *Rinato* was desired by the *Florentine* Ambassador to march with his Forces into *Provence*, and for the encouragement and reputation of his friends, to pass himself and part of them into *Italy* by Sea, leaving the rest in *Provence*, till the King of *France* should prevail with the Duke of *Savoy* that they might march through his Country: and as the Ambassador advised, it was done; for *Rinato* went by Sea, and the rest at the King of *France*'s mediation, were permitted to pass into *Italy*, through the Dominions of the Duke of *Savoy*. King *Rinato* was received by the Duke of *Milan* with all the demonstrations of kindness imaginable; and having joyned their Forces, they assaulted the *Venetians* with such terror, that in a little time, all the Towns they had taken about *Cremona* were recovered; and not contented with them, they took almost all the Country of *Bressia*; for the *Vinetian* Army, not thinking it self secure in the field, was retreated under the very walls of that City. Winter coming on, and the Duke at *Verona*, he thought fit for the refreshment of his men, to put them into quarters, and consigned *Piazenza* for the quarters of *Rinato*; where having remained all that Winter in the year 1453, without any action considerable; when the Spring was come, and the Duke resolved to draw into the field, and drive the *Venetians* out of all they had upon the *terra firma*, *Rinato* signified to the Duke, that of necessity he must return into *France*. This resolution of *Rinato*'s was unexpected to the Duke, and gave him no little anxiety. He went to him immediately himself, and endeavoured with all possible importunity to dissuade him; but neither prayers nor promises could prevail with him any farther, than to leave part of his forces with them, and to engage himself to send his Son *Giovanni*, who in his room should continue in the service of the League. How unwelcome so ever it was to the Duke, *Rinato*'s departure was not at all displeasing to the *Florentines*; for having recover'd what they had lost themselves, and being grown fearless of *Alfonso*, they had no maw, that the Duke should get more than his own Towns in *Lombardy*. *Rinato* continuing his resolution, departed for *France*, and (as he had promis'd) sent his Son *Giovanni* into *Italy*; who staid not in *Lombardy*, but remov'd presently to *Florence*, where he was honorably entertain'd. This departure of *Rinato*, dispos'd Duke *Francesco* to peace; the *Venetians*, the *Florentines*, and *Alfonso*, were all weary of the War, and ready to embrace it; and the Pope desir'd it above all, by reason that that very year *Mahomet* the great Turk had taken *Constantinople*, and made himself Master of all *Greece*: which alarm'd all *Christendom*, but especially the *Venetians* and the Pope, who imagined already they felt his Talons in *Italy*. The Pope therefore desired all the Potentates of *Italy* that they would send their several Plenepotentiaries to him, to negotiat a general peace. His motion being accepted, and the Embassadors met; when they came to the matter, so much difficulty arose, as there was but smal hopes of accomodation. 1453.

Alfonso required that the *Florentines* should reimburse him for all the charges he had been at in that War: and the *Florentines* expected the same. The *Venetians* demanded *Cremona* of the Duke; and the Duke *Bergamo*, *Brescia*, and *Crema* of them. So that these difficulties seem'd impossible to be remov'd. Nevertheless, what was so desperate at *Rome*, among so many, was easily concluded betwixt two of them, at *Milan*, and *Venice*; for whilst the peace was negotiating at *Rome*, and proceeded thus slowly; on the ninth of *April* 1454 it was determined betwixt the Duke and the *Venetians*, that each of them should be restor'd to what they were possess'd of before the War. That the Duke should have liberty to recover what the Marquess of *Monferrat*, and the Duke of *Savoy* had taken from him; and that three months time should be allow'd to the rest of the Princes of *Italy* to come in. The Pope, the *Florentines*, the *Siennesi*, and other little Potentates came in within the time prefix'd, and ratifi'd it; and the *Venetians*, *Florentines* and Duke, made a peace betwixt them three for 25 years. *Alfonso* was the only Prince of *Italy* who seem'd to be refractory; Peace betwixt the Duke and the *Venetians*.

fractory; conceiving he could not concur without diminution, in respect he was to be admitted rather as an auxiliary, than a principal: upon which score he continued irresolute a good while, and would not declare; at length upon several Embassies from the Pope and other Princes, he suffered himself to be prevailed upon, and he and his Son entred into the League for 30 years. After which the King and the Duke made several alliances and cross-matches together; marrying their Sons and Daughters reciprocally into one anothers families. Yet, that *Italy* might not be left without seed or foundation for a new War, *Alfonso* would not enter into the League, till he had leave by consent of the colleagues to make War upon the *Genoueses*; and *Gismondo Malatesta*; and *Astorre* Prince of *Faenza*: Peace being concluded upon those terms, *Ferrando Alfonso*'s Son, who had been at *Sienna*, returned into *Naples*, having done nothing considerable in *Tuscany*, but lost many of his Men.

Alfonso enters into the League.

This Peace being made, and most of the Princes comprehended, the only fear that remained, was, lest the differences betwixt *Alfonso* and the *Genoueses* might disturb it. But it prov'd otherwise, for *Alfonso* did nothing openly to molest it; it was the ambition and avarice of the mercinary Souldier which interrupted it; the *Venetians* (as their custom is upon the conclusion of peace) disbanding their Army, *Giacopo Piccinino* one of their Generals, with several other considerable officers (without leave) departed into *Romagna*, and from thence to *Sienna*, where he began new Hostilities, and took several Towns. In the beginning of these troubles, and of the year 1455 Pope *Nicolo* died, and *Calisto* 3 was chosen to succeed. This Pope, to repress these new and approaching Wars, rais'd what forces he could, under the command of his General *Giovanni Ventimiglia*, and joyning them with the forces of the *Florentines* and the Duke (who were likewise got together to suppress those commotions) they march'd together in a Body against *Giacopo*, and coming to an engagement with him near *Bolsena*, notwithstanding *Ventimiglia* was taken Prisoner, *Giacopo* was worsted, and got off in disorder to *Castiglione della Pescaia*; where, had he not been supplied with monies by *Alfonso*, he had been utterly ruin'd. Which relief made all People believe that that enterprize was undertaken, and prosecuted by *Alfonso*'s order, and direction: and *Alfonso* perceiving he was discover'd, to reconcile himself to the Colleagues, (whom he had disoblig'd with that pitiful War) he brought it about that *Giacopo* should restore all that he had taken in the territory of *Sienna*, upon the payment of 20000 *Florins*; after which conclusion, he receiv'd *Giacopo* and his forces into the Kingdom of *Naples*. In these times, though the Pope was very intent upon the curbing of *Piccinino*, yet not so but he had an eye still upon the interest of *Christendom*, which was then much overlaid by the Turk.

New troubles by *Giacopo Piccinino* encourag'd privatly by *Alfonso*.

To this end he sent Embassadors, and preachers into all the Provinces of Europe, to perswade them to arm against the common Enemy of their Religion; and with their persons and purses to give what assistance they were able: so that in *Florence* great store of alms were collected; and several People wore the red cross, to intimate that they were ready in their Persons to engage in that War. Besides which, several solemn processions were made; nor was there any thing in publick or private wanting, to show them among the fowardest of the Christians in that enterprize, either for Counsel, or Mony, or Men. But the edge of this *Croisad* was taken off, by a late intelligence they receiv'd, that the Turk having beseig'd *Belgrad*, a Town in *Hungary*, not far from the *Danube*; was beaten off by the *Hungarians*, and himself wounded: so that the terrour which all Christendom conceiv'd upon the taking of *Constantinople*, being abated, they went on but cooly in their preparations for War; and in *Hungary* likewise upon the Death of the Way-wod their General, their Victory was prosecuted but faintly. But to return to the affairs in *Italy*. The troubles commenced by *Giacopo Piccinino*, being compos'd in the year 1456, and all humane contention in appearance at an end; it pleased God to begin a new War of his own, and to send such a storm and tempest of wind in *Tuscany*, as produc'd most strange and memorable effects, above the records of time past, or the credit of time to come. Upon the 24 of *August*, about an hour before day near the upper Sea towards *Anconia*, a thick dark cloud, of about two miles wide, was seen crossing over *Italy*, and pointing towards *Pisa*; which cloud being driven by an extraordinary impulse (whether natural or supernatural I cannot say) was divided into several parts; sometimes hurried up to the sky; sometimes as furiously towards the Earth; sometimes twisting round like a Cilender, knocking and dashing one against the other with unconceivable violence, with great lightnings and flashes of fire before them; which concussions made a noise more dreadful and loud than ever any thunder or Earthquake was known to have done. The terror of this tempest was so great, every one believed the World was at an end; and that the Heavens, the Earth, the Waters, and the rest of the Elements, were resolving into their first chaos and confusion: nor were the effects less formidable where it pass'd, especially about the Castle of S. *Cassiana*. This Castle

Calisto 3 solicits a War against the *Turks*.

A prodigious tempest.

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is about eight miles from *Florence*, ſituate upon the mountain which parts the vales of *Piſa* and *Grieve*; betwixt this Caſtle, and the Town of S. *Andrea* (upon the ſame mountain) this whirlwind paſſing, reach'd not to the Town; and of the Caſtle it carried away only the battlements and chimnies; but betwixt the ſaid places it laid ſeveral houſes flat with the ground; tore up the Churches from their foundations, and carried the Roofs of the Churches of *San. Martino a Bagnuolo*, and of *Santa Maria della pace*, whole and intire, above the diſtance of a mile. A Meſſenger and his mules were hurried out of the way, into the neighbouring valley, and found dead the next day. The ſturdieſt Oaks and the ſtrongeſt trees, were not only blown down, but carried an incredible diſtance from the place where they grew. Inſomuch that when day appeared, and the tempeſt was over, the people remained ſtupid, and in ſtrange conſternation. The Country was deſolate, and waſted; The ruines of the houſes and Churches terrible; The lamentation of thoſe whoſe houſes were ſubverted, and their cattle, ſervants, or friends found dead in their ruines, was not to be ſeen nor heard without great horror and compaſſion. But God ſure intended rather to affright, than chaſtiſe the *Tuſcans*; for had this tempeſt happened in any of their Cities where the houſes were thick, and the inhabitants numerous, as it fell upon the hills where the oaks and trees and houſes were thin; doubtleſs the miſchief and deſolation had been greater than the mind of man can comprehend. But God Almighty was pleaſed to content himſelf with this eſſay, to make mankind more ſenſible of his power, if they perſiſted to offend him.

But to return where I left. *Alfonſo*, as I ſaid before, was not at all ſatisfied with the peace: and ſeeing the war which he had cauſed *Giacopo Piccinino* to make, upon the *Sienneſi* (without any reaſonable occaſion) had produced no conſiderable effect; he had a mind to try what that would come to, which by the League he was permitted to undertake: So that in the year 1456. (deſiring to fix that Government in the family of the *Adorni*, and to ſupplant the *Tregoſi* who were then in poſſeſſion) he reſolved to invade the *Genoeſi* both by Sea and by Land. To this end, he cauſed *Giacopo Piccinino* to paſs *Tronto* with his Forces, and fall upon *Giſmondo Malateſta*, (by way of diverſion) who having ſecured his Towns, was not much terrified at his approach, ſo that his enterprize on that ſide turn'd to little account: but his invaſion of *Genoa* created him and his Kingdom more troubles, than he ever deſir'd: *Piero Fregoſa* was at that time Duke of *Genoa*. This *Piero*, finding himſelf unable to bear up againſt ſo powerful a King; upon conſideration of his own weakneſs, reſolv'd at leſt to ſurrender that State to one that ſhould be able to defend it, and perhaps ſometime or other give him a reaſonable reward; he ſent Embaſſadors therefore to *Charles* 7 of *France* to deſire his protection, and tender him the Government. *Charles* accepted the offer, and to take poſſeſſion of the City, he ſent *Giovanni d' Angio* (King *Rinato*'s Son) who not long before was returned from *Florence* into *France*; for *Charles* was perſwaded that *Giovanni* being acquainted with the humors, and cuſtoms of the *Italians*, was properer for that Government, than any Man he could ſend: beſides from thence he believ'd he might proſecute his deſigns againſt *Naples* with more eaſe and convenience; his Father *Rinato*, having been expel'd that Kingdom by *Alfonſo* of *Aragon*. Hereupon *Giovanni* departed for *Genoua*, was receiv'd honorably by the Town, and inveſted with the whole power both of the City, and State.

The *Genoeſe* aſſaulted by *Alfonſo*.

Genoa delivered to the *French*.

This accident was not at all pleaſing to *Alfonſo*; he found now he had pull'd an old houſe over his head; however he carried it bravely, went on with his enterprize and was advanc'd with his Fleet under *Villa Marina* at *Porto Fino*, when ſurpriz'd with a ſuddain diſtemper, he died. The death of *Alfonſo*, put an end to the Wars againſt *Giovanni*, and the *Genoueſes*: and *Ferrando* ſucceeded his Father *Alfonſo* in the Kingdom, was in no little trouble, having an Enemy upon his hands of ſuch reputation in *Italy*; and a jealouſie of ſeveral of his Barons, who being inclin'd to new changes, he was affraid might ſide with the *French*: beſides he was acquainted with the ambition of the Pope, and being ſcarce ſetled in his Kingdom, was fearful leſt he ſhould attempt ſomething to ſupplant him: his only hopes were in the Duke of *Milan*, who was no leſs ſolicitous for the affairs of that Kingdom, than himſelf; apprehending that if ever the *French* came to be Maſters of *Naples*, their next enterprize of courſe would be againſt him; for he knew they might pretend to *Milan* as an appendix to that Crown. For theſe reaſons, as ſoon as *Alfonſo* was dead, *Franceſco* ſent letters and Men to *Ferrando*; the firſt to keep up his heart, the other his reputation. Upon the death of *Alfonſo* the Pope deſigned to give his Nephew *Piero Lodovico Borgia*, the Government of that Kingdom; and to gloſs over the buſineſs, and make it more plauſible to the Princes of *Italy*, he gave out that that Kingdom belonging formerly to the Church, his intention was only to reduce it to that condition, and therefore he deſired the Duke of *Milan* would not give any aſſiſtance to *Ferrando*; and offer'd him ſuch Towns as he had poſſeſs'd

Alfonſo dyes.

Calisto 3 dyes and *Pius* 2 chosen in his chair.

poſſeſs'd formetly in that Kingdom. But in the midſt of his contrivances *Caliſto* died, and *Pius* 2 ſucceeded him, who was a *Siemeſe* of the Family of the *Piccol Huomini*, and his Name *Æneas*.

This Pope imploying his thoughts wholly for the benefit of *Chriſtendom*, and the Honour of the Church, and laying aſide all private paſſion, and advantage, at the intreaty of the Duke of *Milan*, crown'd *Ferrando* King of *Naples*: judging it a readier and ſafer way to compoſe the differences of *Italy* by confirming him that was already in poſſeſſion, than by aſſiſting the pretences of the *French*; or ſetting up (as *Caliſto* did) for himſelf. However *Ferrando* took it for a favour, and to requite it he made *Antonio* the Popes Nephew Prince of *Malfi*; married him to his natural Daughter; and beſides this, reſtor'd *Benevento* and *Ferracina* to the Church. And now all the Arms in *Italy* were viſibly laid down, and *Pius* (as *Caliſto* had begun before) was moving all Chriſtendom againſt the Turk; when a new quarrel ſprung up betwixt the *Fregoſi*, and *Giovanni* the Lord of *Genoa*, which produc'd a greater, and more important War than the laſt: *Petrino Fregoſi* was retir'd to a Caſtle of his in *Riveria*; much diſcontented, that *Giovanni d'Angio* having been prefer'd to his dignity in *Genoa* by him and his Family, had not gratified them as they deſerved: ſo that by degrees it was come to a feud. *Ferrando* was very well pleas'd with the difference; as being the only way to ſecure him in his Kingdom, and therefore he ſent *Pietrino* ſupplies both of Men and Mony, hoping thereby *Giovanni* might be expuls'd out of the State of *Genoa*. *Giovanni* having notice of their intelligence, ſent for relief into *France*, which having received, he marched out againſt *Pietrino*; but *Pietrino* by the acceſs of more ſupplies from ſundry places, being grown too ſtrong, *Giovanni* retreated, and applyed himſelf to ſecuring the City; which he did not do ſo carefully, but *Pietrino* in one night ſurprized ſeveral Poſts in it, but was beaten the next morning, himſelf and moſt of his Men ſlain. This Victory elated *Giovanni* ſo far, that he reſolv'd to attempt upon *Ferrando*; and departing from *Genoa* in October 1459 with a great Fleet, he ſail'd to *Baia*, and from thence to *Seſſa*, where he was honorably received by that Duke.

The *Genoeſi* revot from the *French*.

1459.

There had joyn'd themſelves with *Giovanni*, the Prince of *Taranto*; and the Citizens of *Aquila*; beſides ſeveral other Princes and Cities; ſo that already that Kingdom was more than half loſt. Upon which *Ferrando* deſir'd aid of the Pope, and the Duke of *Milan*, and to leſſen the number of his Enemies, made peace with *Giſmando Malateſti*, which peace diſguſted *Giacopo Piccinino* ſo highly (*Giſmondo* being his natural Enemy) that he deſerted *Ferrando*, and took up Arms under *Giovanni*. *Ferrando* ſent mony likewiſe to *Federigo* Lord of *Urbin*, and as ſoon as could be expected, got together a conſiderable Army (according to to thoſe times) with which he marched againſt the Enemy, and finding them upon the River *Sarni*, he engaged them, but was defeated and his moſt conſiderable officers taken; after this victory, moſt of the Towns & Caſtles ſurrender'd to *Giovanni*, only *Naples* & ſome few neighbouring Towns and Princes, adher'd ſtill to *Ferrando*. *Giacopo Piccinino* advis'd to march directly for *Naples*, and make himſelf Maſter of the chief City, but *Giovanni* replyed he would firſt ruine the Country, and then the City would come with more eaſe; but his rejecting the counſel of *Piccinino*, was the loſs of that deſign; for he did not know that the members follow the head more naturally, than the head the members: *Ferrando* was fled into *Naples*, and there reſorted to him diverſe of his Subjects who were driven from their Homes, whom he receiv'd, and having with all poſſible gentleneſs, gained ſome monies of the Citizens, he got a ſmall body of an Army together; he ſent new Embaſſies to the Pope and Duke for ſupplies, and was reliev'd with more plenty and ſpeed than before; for they were both of them afraid, that the loſs of that Kingdom would turn to their prejudice. Much ſtrengthned by their ſupplies, *Ferrando* march'd out of *Naples*; and having recover'd his reputation, in part, he recover'd ſome of his Towns: But whilſt the War was carried on in that Kingdom with ſuch variety, an accident happen'd which rob'd *Giovanni* of his opportunity of compleating that enterprize. The *Genoeſi* were extreamly diſſatisfied with the inſolent Government of the *French*; had taken Arms againſt the Governor, and forc'd him into the Caſtle; in this action the *Fregoſi* and *Adorni* concur'd; and the Duke of *Milan*, ſupplyed them both with mony and Men: King *Rinato* paſſed that way with a fleet towards the relief of his ſon, imagining by the help of the Caſtle he might recover the Town; and landing his Men in order thereunto, he was beaten in ſuch ſort, that he was forc'd back into *Provence*. This news diſmaid *Giovanni* not a little: however he gave not his enterprize over, but continued the War by the help of ſuch Barons whoſe revolt from *Ferrando* had render'd them deſperate of pardon: at length after many occurrencies, both Armies came to a Battle near *Troia*, in which *Giovanni* was routed, but his defeat troubled him not ſo much, as the loſs of *Piccinino*, who left his ſide, and went back again to *Ferrando*. His

The Kingdom of *Naples* invaded by *Giovanni d'Angio*:

Ferrando diſcomfited.

Army

Army being broke, he got off into *Istria* and from thence into *France*. This War continued 4 years, and miscarried by the negligence of the General, when the Souldiers had many times overcome. In this War however the *Florentines* were not publickly concern'd. The truth is upon the death of *Alfonso*, his Son *John* of *Aragon* being come to that Crown, sent his Embassadors to desire their assistance for his Nephew *Ferrando*, according to their obligation by their late League with *Alfonso*; but the *Florentines* returned, that they did not think themselves oblig'd to assist the Son in a quarrel commenced by the Father; and as it was begun without their consent or knowledg, so without any assistance from them it might be continued or ended. Whereupon, in behalf of their King, the Embassadors protested them guilty of the breach of the League, and responsible for all the losses which should follow; and having done that, in a great huff they departed. During the revolutions in this War, the *Florentines* were at quiet abroad, but at home it was otherwise, as shall be shown more particularly, in the following Book.

Giovanni defeated.

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

Book VII.

IN the reading of the last Book, it may appear (possibly) impertinent, and a digression, for a Writer of the *Florentine* History to have broke out, and expatiated upon the affairs of *Lombardy* and *Naples*. Yet I have done it; and shall do it for the future; for though I never profess'd to write the transactions of *Italy*; yet I never bound my self up from giving a relation of such important and memorable passages as would make our History more grateful and intelligible; especially seeing from the actions of other Princes and States, wars and troubles did many times arise, in which the *Florentines* were of necessity involved: for example, the War betwixt *Giovanni d'Angio*, and King *Ferrando* proclaimed in them so great a hatred and animosity one towards the other, that it was continued afterwards betwixt *Ferrando* and the *Florentines*, and more particularly the House of *Medici*. For King *Ferrando* complaining, not only that they had refus'd him their assistance, but given it to his Enemies; that resentment of his, was the occasion of much mischief, as will be shown in our narration.

And because in my description of our foreign affairs, I am advanc'd to the year 1463 (being return'd to our domestick) it will be necessary to look back for several years. But first by way of introduction (as my custom is) I shall say, that they who imagine a Commonwealth may be continued united, are egregiously mistaken. True it is, dissention does many times hurt; but sometimes it advantages a State. It hurts when it is accompanied with parties, and faction; it helps, when it has none. Seeing there-

fore, it is impoſſible for any Legiſlator or founder of a republick, to provide there ſhould be no piques, nor unkindneſſes betwixt Men; it is his buſineſs what he can to ſecure them againſt growing into parties and *Clans*. It is then to be conſider'd, that there are two ways for Citizens to advance themſelves to reputation among their Neighbours; and they are either publickly or privatly. The Publick way is, by gaining ſome battle, ſurprizing and diſtreſſing ſome Town; performing ſome Embaſſy carefully and prudently; or counſeling their State wiſely and with ſucceſs; the private way is, by being kind to their fellow Citizens; by defending them from the Magiſtrats; ſupplying them with mony; promoting them to honors; and with plays and publick exhibitions to ingratiat with the People. This laſt way produces parties and factions, and as the reputation acquir'd that way is dangerous and fatal, ſo the other way it is beneficial (if it ſides with no party) as extending to the publick. And although among Citizens of ſuch qualification, there muſt needs be emulations and jealouſies, yet wanting partiſans, and People which for their advantage will follow them, they are rather a convenience than otherwiſe to a Government; for to make themſelves more eminent and conſpicuous than their Competitors, they imploy all their faculties for its advancement, prying and obſerving one anothers actions ſo ſtrictly, that neither dares venture to tranſgreſs.

Coſimo de Medici and *Neri Capponi* the two great Citizens in *Florence*.

The emulations in *Florence* were always with faction; and for that reaſon always were dangerous; nor was any party unanimous any longer than it had an adverſe party in being; for that being overcome, and the predominant party having no fear, nor order to reſtrain it, ſubdivided on courſe: *Coſimo de Medicis* party prevail'd in the year 1434; but (the depreſs'd party being great, and many powerful Men amongſt them) for a while they continued unanimous and ſupportable, committing no exorbitance among themſelves, nor injuſtice to the People, which might beget them their hatred. Inſomuch as when ever they had uſe of the People for their readvancement to any place of authority, they found them always ready to confer it upon the chief of that party, whether it was the *Balia* or any other power which they deſir'd: and ſo from the year 1434 to 55 (which was 21 years) they were ſix times created of the *Balia* by the Counſels of the People.

There were in *Florence* (as we have many times hinted) two principal Citizens, *Coſimo de Medici*, and *Neri Capponi*. *Neri* had gain'd his reputation in the publick way, and had many friends, but few partiſans: *Coſimo* on the other ſide had advanc'd himſelf both ways, and had friends and partiſans both, and theſe two continuing friends, whilſt they lived together, they could ask nothing of the People; but it was readily granted, becauſe unanimity went along with the Power. But *Neri* dying in the year 1455, and the adverſe party being extinct, the Government found great difficulty to recover its authority, and *Coſimo*'s great friends were the cauſe of it, who were willing to detract from his authority, now his adverſaries were ſuppreſs'd. This was the beginning of the diviſions in 1466, in which year, in a ſolemn counſel, where the publick adminiſtration was debated, thoſe to whom the Government at that time belonged adviſed that there ſhould be no *Balia* for the future: that the way of imborſation ſhould be laid aſide; and the Magiſtrats be choſen by lots, as in the former *Squittini's* or elections. To obviate this humour, *Coſimo* had two ways, either to poſſeſs himſelf forcibly of the Government by the power of his party, and depoſe his Enemies; or to let things go which way they would, and attend till time ſhould make his friends diſcern, that they did not take the Government, and authority ſo much from him, as from themſelves. Of the two he made choice of the laſt; knowing that according to that conſtitution, the purſes being full of his friends he could without any danger reaſſume his Authority when he pleas'd. The City being thus reduc'd to its old way of creation of Magiſtrats by lots, they thought they had perfectly recover'd their liberty, and that for the future elections were to be made not according to the influence of the Nobility, but the inclination of the People. So that ſometimes the friend of one Grandee was rejected, and ſometimes of another, and thoſe whoſe houſes were formerly full of Clients and their preſents, had now ſcarce houſholdſtuff left, or ſervant to attend them: thoſe who were formerly their inferiors, were now become their equals, and their equals advanced to be their Superiours: they were not regarded nor reſpected, but rather derided and abus'd; all People taking the freedom to talk of them and their Government as they pleas'd, even in the ſtreets and highways, without any contradiction; ſo that it was not long after they diſcovered that as he had told them it was not ſo much *Coſimo*, as themſelves which were degraded.

However *Coſimo* took no notice, but in all propoſitions that would pleaſe the People, he was the firſt who concurr'd. But that which was moſt terrible to the Nobility, and made *Coſimo* look about him, was the receiving of the *Cataſtro* of the year 1427 by which the impoſitions were to be laid by order of Law, and not by the capriccio's of particular Men.

This

This Law being reviv'd, and Magistrats already chosen to put it in execution, the Nobility assembled, and went to *Cosimo* to beg of him that he would be a means to rescue them out of the jaws of the People; and restore the State to a condition that might make him powerful, and them honorable. To which *Cosimo* replyed he would do it with all his heart, provided it might be done legally by the consent of the People, and without any force, of which he would not endure to hear. Then they endeavoured in the Counsels to prevail for a new *Balia*, but they could not obtain it: whereupon they returned to *Cosimo*, and press'd him with all expressions of humility that he would consent to a Parliament; but *Cosimo* (resolved to make them fully sensible of their error) absolutely refused it, and because *Donati Cochi* (being *Gonfaloniere di justitia* at that time) presum'd to call a Parliament without his consent, *Cosimo* made him so ridiculous and contemptible in the *Senate*, he was not able to continue there, but as a distracted Man, was sent home again to his house: Nevertheless, lest things should run too far to be recovered, *Luca Pitti* (a bold and tenacious Man) being made *Gonfaloniere di Giustitia*, he thought it a convenient time to have the Government to him, that if any thing miscarried in that enterprize, it might be imputed to *Luca*. And acordingly *Luca* in the very beginning of his office, urged the People many times to the restauration of the *Balia*, threatning those of the Counsels with opprobrious and insolent language; and not long after he executed what he had threatned; for in *August* 1453 in the vigil of *San. Lowrzo*, having filled the Palace with armed Men, he called the People together into the *Piazza*, and constrained them by force to consent, to what they had voluntarily refused. Having repossess'd themselves of the State, created a new *Balia*, and changed the Magistrats according to the pleasure of a few; that the beginning of their Government might be as terrible, as it was forcible, they confin'd *Girolamo Machiavelli* and some others, and deprived many of their honors. *Girolamo* not being exact in observing his bounds, was proscrib'd, and wandring up and down *Italy* to excite the several Princes against his own Country, by the Treachery of one of the *Senators* in *Lunigiana*, he was apprehended, brought back to *Florence*, and executed in Prison. This Government (which lasted eight years) was very violent, and insupportable: for *Cosimo* being grown old, weary of business, and infirm in his Body; could not be so sedulous as formerly, so that the City was become a prey to a few particular Citizens; who in requital of his good service to the State, made *Luca Pitti* a Knight, and he (in return of their kindness) appointed, that whereas before they were called *Priori dell Arti*, now (that they might at least retain the Title, though they had lost the possession) they should be called *Priori della liberta*. He ordered likewise that whereas formerly the *Gonfalonieri* sat on the right hand of the *Rettori*, they should sit in the midst of them hereafter: and (that God might have his share in the revolution) he caused solemn services, and processions to be performed, by way of thanks for the honors to which they were restored.

Luca Pitti.

Giarolomo Machiavelli.

Luca was richly presented both by *Cosimo* and the *Senate*; after whom the whole City came in flocks, so that it was believed he had given him that day to the value of 20000 Ducats by which means he grew into such reputation, that not *Cosimo* but he was looked upon as the Governor of the City; and he arrived at that point of vanity, to begin two stately and magnificent houses one in *Florence*, & the other at *Rucina*, not above 4 miles distance from the City: but that in *Florence* was greater, and more splendid, than the House of any other private Citizen whatsoever; for the finishing of which he baulk'd no extraordinary way; for not only the Citizens and better sort, presented him, and furnish'd him with what was necessary about it; but the Common People gave him all of them their assistance: besides all that were banish'd, or guilty of Murder, Felony or any other thing which expos'd them to publick punishment, had Sanctuary at that House provided they would give him their labour. The rest of his Brethren, though they built not such Houses, they were no less rapacious than he, so that though *Florence* had no Wars abroad to destroy it, it had Citizens at home, in its own bowels, which would not suffer it to prosper. In the mean time, as we have said before, the Wars happen'd in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and the Pope had difference with the *Malatesti* in *Romagna*, concerning *Rimino* and *Cesana*, which they had taken from him, and he desired to recover: so that betwixt the thoughts of that, and the enterprize against the *Turks*, the time of *Pius* his whole Papacy was consum'd. But *Florence* fell again into its old factions and dissentions. The divisions in *Cosimo*'s party began in 55 upon the occasions aforesaid, and by his Wisdom (as is said before) they were restrained. But in 64 *Cosimo* fell sick, and dyed, generally lamented, both by his friends and his Enemies, for they, who lov'd him not whilst at the Helm, seeing their fellow Citizens so rapacious whilst he was living, (the reverence they bore to his Person making them less insupportable than otherwise they would be) could not but fear now he was dead, and his influence lost, they should be utterly ruined, and in his Son *Piero* they could repose little confidence; for

Cosimo dies.

though he was of himself a good Man, yet being infirm, and but young in the State, they supposed he would be constrained to comply with them, and they become more head-strong and incontroulable in their wickednes: so that *Cosimo* died universally lamented, and certainly he deserved it; for he was the most famous and memorable Citizen (of a Person that was no Souldier) that ever *Florence* or any other City produc'd: he exceeded all his contemporaries, not only in Authority and Estate, but in liberality and prudence; which qualities made him a Prince in his Country, and beloved by all People: his munificence was more eminent after his death, than before, for when his Son *Piero* came to look over his writings, and to enquire into the particulars of his Estate, he found there was scarce a Man of any quality in the City, to whom *Cosimo* had not lent a considerable sum; and many times when he heard of the exigencies of any Person of quality, he supply'd them unasked. His magnificence appear'd in the multitude of his buildings; for in *Florence* he built the Convents of S. *Marco*, and S. *Lorenzo*, and the Monastery of S. *Verdiano*: in the *Monti di Fiesoli*, S. *Giralomo*, and the Abbey in *Mugello*, he not only repaired a Church of the *Minor's*, but he took it down, and rebuilt it from the ground: besides this in S. *Croce*, in *Servi* in *Agnoli*, in S. *Mineato*, he erected altars, and most sumptuous Chappels, all which besides the building, he adorn'd with all the utensels and decorations required in so sacred a place. Besides his religious houses, he built several private houses for himself, one in the City suitable to his quality; four without, at *Careggio*, *Fiesole*, *Cafaggivolo*, and *Trebi*, all of them fitter for Princes, than private Men: and as if his buildings in *Italy* were too few to make him famous, he built an Hospital in *Jerusalem*, for the reception and releif of poor and infirm pilgrims brought thither by their devotion; in which fabrick, he laid out a vast sum of Mony: and albeit in his actions and buildings he behaved himself like a King, and was the only Prince in *Florence*, yet he was so moderate, and untransported in all things, that in his conversation, his *Parades*, his allyances, and his whole manner of life, he retained the modesty of a Citizen; for he was sensible that ostentation and Pomp in that which is every day to be seen, contracts more envy, than moderation, and gravity. Being to seek for matches for his Sons, he did not endeavour for the alliance of Princes, but married his Son *Giovanni* to *Cornelia Alessandri*, and *Piero*, to *Lucretia Tornabuoni*, and contracted his Grand-children by *Piero*, *Bianca* to *Gulielmo di Pazzi*, and *Nannina* to *Bernardo Rucellai*. Among all the States, Princes, and civil Governments of his time; no person came near him for sagacity and intelligence. Hence it was that in all the variety of his fortunes, when the City was so uncertain, and the people so voluble; He kept his Authority 31 years, for being a wise man and of great prospect, he foresaw any mischief at a distance, and was ready to prevent it, before it proceeded too far; or to frustrate the effects of it, if it did. Whereby he did not only subdue all domestick and private ambition at home, but restrained it so happily in several Princes, that whoever confederated with him and his Country, came off upon equal terms, if not worsted their enemies; and whoever oppos'd him, either lost their mony, their time, or their State: and of this the *Venetians* can give ample testimony, who whilst in League with him against Duke *Philip*, were always victorious; but that League was no sooner broken, but they were beaten both by *Philip*, and *Francesco*: and when they joyned with *Alfonso* against the Republick of *Florence*, *Cosimo* with his own credit drained *Naples* and *Venice* so dry, that they were glad to accept what terms of peace he would allow. Of all the difficulties therefore which *Cosimo* encountred both within the City and without, the conclusion was still honorable for him, and destructive for his enemies; so that the civil discords gain'd him authority at home, and his foreign Wars, power and reputation abroad; insomuch that to the territory and Dominion of his Country, he added the City of *Borgo a Sepulcro*, *Montedoglio*, *Casentino*, and *Val di Bagno*, and by his virtue and fortune, suppres'd his Enemies, and exalted his friends. He was born 1389. on S, *Cosimo*, and *Damiano*'s day. The first part of his life was full of troubles, witness his banishment, his imprisonment, and his dangers in being killed. From the Counsel of *Constance*, after Pope *John* was ruin'd (whom he had attended thither) he was forced to fly in disguise, or otherwise he had been slain: but after the fortieth year of his age it was more pleasant and happy; not only such as were employ'd with him in publick affairs, but the managers also of his private treasure in foreign parts, participating of his felicity. From him many Families in *Florence* may derive their great estates: particularly the *Fornabuoni*, the *Benci*, the *Portinari*, the *Sapetti*, and in short all that had dependance either upon his counsel or fortune.

Though his disbursements were vast in building his Houses and Temples, and in his distributions to the poor, yet he would complain sometimes among his friends, that he had not laid out so much to the honour of God, as he was oblig'd; and that if he had done much more, he must confess himself his debtor. His stature was ordinary, his complexion worthy, his

presence

preſence venerable: his learning was not great, but his eloquence admirable; he was naturally prudent, courteous to his friends, merciful to the poor, profitable in his converſe, cautious in his counſels; ſpeedy in his executions, and in his ſayings and replies, both ſolid and facetious. When he went firſt into Baniſhment, *Rinaldo de gli Albizi* (drolling upon his exilement) ſent him word, *The hen was hatching*, to which *Coſimo* returned, *that ſhe would have but ill hatching ſo far from her neſt.* To ſome of his Rebels who in a threatning way ſent him word. *They were not aſleep*, he reply'd, *he believ'd it, for he had ſpoil'd their ſleeping.* when Pope *Pius* was encouraging & preſſing all Chriſtian Princes againſt the Turk, *Coſimo* ſaid *the Pope was an old Man, but he had begun an enterprize as if he had been a Boy.* To the *Venetian* Embaſſadors, who came to *Florence* with the Embaſſadors of *Alfonſo*, to complain of that Commonwealth, putting his hat off to them, he demanded the colour of his hair, they told him it was gray; he replyed, in time *your Senators will be of the ſame colour.* Not many hours before his death, his Wife ſeeing him ſhut his eyes, enquired why he did ſo, and he told her *to reſt them.* Some Citizens after his return complaining to him that the City would be depopulated, and God Almighty offended, if he baniſhed ſo many wealthy and Religious Men; he told them, *the City had better be depopulated than deſtroyed. That two yards of Cloth were enough to keep a Man from the cold; and that States were not to be preſerved by the beads a Man carried in his hand.* Theſe laſt expreſſions gave his Enemies occaſion to calumniate him, as a perſon that was a greater lover of himſelf than his Country; and one that took more care of this World than the next. Many other of his wiſe ſayings might be inſerted, but being unneceſſary, they are omitted. *Coſimo* was likewiſe a great lover and advancer of learned Men; upon which ſcore he entertained in *Florence Argiropolo* a Grecian as learned as any in his time, that by him the youth of *Florence* might be inſtructed in the Greek tongue, and in ſeveral of his Tenets. He entertained likewiſe in his Houſe *Marcileo Ficino*, a great Patron of the Platonick Philoſophy, whom he loved ſo entirely; and that he might follow his ſtudies with more convenience, he gave him a houſe near his own Palace at *Carraggi*. So that his prudence, his beneficence, his ſucceſs, and his way of living made him be belov'd, and feared among the Citizens, and much eſteemed by all Princes of Europe. Whereby he left ſuch a foundation to his poſterity, that by their virtue they might equal him, by their fortune tranſcend him, and obtain as much honor as he had in *Florence*, in all the Cities and Countries of Chriſtendom. Nevertheleſs towards the latter end of his days, he had ſeveral afflictions, he had but two Sons, *Piero* and *Giovanni*, of which *Giovanni* (the moſt hopeful) dyed, and *Piero* who ſurvived, was infirm, and by the weakneſs of his body unfit either for publick or private buſineſs; ſo that after the death of his Son, cauſing himſelf to be carried about his houſe, he ſighed and ſaid, *this houſe is too big for ſo ſmall a Family.*

It troubled him alſo that he had not (in his judgment) enlarged the dominion of the *Florentine* ſtate, nor added to its empire, any conſiderable acqueſt: and it troubled him the more, for that he found himſelf cheated by *Franceſco*, who when he was but Count, had promis'd him, as ſoon as he had made himſelf Maſter of *Milan*, to employ his Arms againſt *Lucca* in the behalf of the *Florentines*; but his mind chang'd with his fortune, and having got to be the Duke of *Milan*, had a deſire to enjoy in peace, what he had obtained by War, ſo that after his elevation, he never medled in foreign concerns, nor made any more Wars, than were neceſſary for his own defence: which was a great diſturbance to *Coſimo*, who now diſcerned he had been at great pains and expence to advance a Man who was both falſe and ingrateful. He perceived likewiſe that in reſpect of his age, and the infirmities of his body, he was not able to apply himſelf to publick or private buſineſs as he was wont; and he ſaw both the one and the other decline, the City going to wrack by the diſſentions of the Citizens; and his fortune by his Miniſters and Sons. Theſe conſiderations gave him no little diſquiet towards his end; yet he died full of Glory and renown; all the Cities and Princes of Chriſtendom ſent their compliments of condolency to his Son *Piero*, the whole City attended his Corps with great ſolemnity to the Grave, and by publick decree it was inſcrib'd upon his Tomb *Padre della Patria.*

If in my deſcription and character of *Coſimo*, I have rather followed the example of thoſe who have written the lives of Princes, than of an Hiſtorian, it is not to be admir'd. He was a perſon extraordinary in our City, and I thought my ſelf obliged to give him a more than ordinary commendation: during the time that *Italy* and *Florence* were in the condition aforeſaid; *Lewis* King of *France* was infeſted with a furious War, which his Barons (at the inſtigation of *Francis* Duke of *Britan*, and *Charles* Duke of *Burgandy*) had rais'd. This War lay ſo heavy upon him, he could not aſſiſt *Giovanni* in his deſigns upon *Genoa* and *Naples*, but believing he had need enough of all the ſupplies he could get, he call'd back his forces; and *Savona* being at that time in the hands of the *French*, he ordered it to be deli-

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vered to the *Count*, and left him if he pleas'd to purſue the enterprize againſt *Genoa*: the *Count* was eaſily perſwaded to a thing ſo much to his advantage; ſo that by the reputation of his amity with the *French King*, and the aſſiſtance given him by the *Adorni*, he poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Genoa*, and in gratitude to the *French King*, ſent him a ſupply of 1500 Horſe into *France*, under the Command of his eldeſt Son *Galeazzo*: by this means *Ferrando* of *Aragon*, and *Franceſco Sforza* remain'd at quiet; the one Duke of *Lombardy*, and Lord of *Genoa*; the other King of the whole Kingdom of *Naples*, and having contracted alliances together, and married their Children the one to the other; they began to conſider how they might ſecure their ſtates to themſelves whilſt they lived, and to their heirs when they were dead.

In order to this, it was thought neceſſary the King ſhould make ſure of ſuch of his Barons as had ſided againſt him in his Wars with *Giovanni d'Angio*, & the Duke ſhould endeavour to extirpate all that had been favourers of the *Bracci*, who were mortal Enemies to the ſaid Duke, and at that time in great reputation, under the conduct of *Giacopo Piccinino*. For *Giacopo* being the greateſt Captain in *Italy*, and having no Soveraignty of his own; it concerned all who had any to have an eye over him, and more eſpecially the Duke, who thought he could not enjoy his Dominion ſafely himſelf, nor leave it to his Sons, whilſt *Giacopo* was living. Hereupon the King with all induſtry endeavoured an accord with his Barons, uſed all poſſible art to reconcile himſelf to them; and he ſucceeded without much difficulty; for they found that whilſt they were in Wars with the King, they muſt certainly be ruined; but by accomodation of their differences, and truſting themſelves to him, there was only a hazard; and becauſe Men do always avoid thoſe evils with more readineſs, which are moſt certain, Princes do eaſily deceive; ſuch as are not able to contend. The Barons ſeeing nothing before them but deſtruction, if they continued the War, accepted his conditions, and threw themſelves into his Arms; but not long after, ſundry pretences were taken againſt them, and they were all of them extinguiſhed. Which news, was ſo terrible to *Giacopo Piccinino* (who was then with his forces at *Solmona*) that by the mediation of his friends he immediatly practiſed his reconciliation with the Duke: and the Duke having offered him honorable terms, *Giacopo* reſolv'd to accept them, and come in; and accordingly he went to *Milan* to preſent himſelf to him, attended by 100 Horſe. *Giacopo* had ſerved under his Father, and with his Brother a long time; firſt for Duke *Philip* and then for the People of *Milan*; ſo that by long converſation in thoſe parts he had got a good intereſt, and was generally belov'd, and the preſent condition of affairs, had much increas'd it; for the proſperity, and Grandeur of the *Sforzeſchi* had created them envy; and *Giacopo*'s adverſity and long abſence had gain'd him compaſſion among the People, and a great deſire to ſee him advanced: all which kindneſs diſcovered it ſelf at his arrival; there being ſcarce any of the Nobility but went out to meet him; the ſtreets were full of People to behold him; and no talk in the whole City but of him, and his family. But their extravagant acclamations were his ruine; for as they increas'd the Dukes jealouſy, ſo they confirm'd his reſolution to remove him, and that it might be done the more plauſibly, and with leſs danger of detection, he ordered that his marriage with *Druſiana* his natural daughter (to whom he had been contracted long before) ſhould be conſummate. After which he practis'd with *Ferrando* to entertain him as General of his Army, and to give him 100000 *Florins* by way of advance; upon concluſion of theſe Articles, *Giacopo* and his Wife accompanied an Ambaſſador from the Duke to *Naples*: where they were all very well received, and for ſeveral days enter tained with all imaginable affluence and diverſion; but deſiring leave to paſs to his Army at *Salmona*, he was invited by the King into the Caſtle, and after ſupper both he and his Son *Franceſco* were apprehended, and clapped up into Priſon, where not long after they were murdered.

Giacopo Piccinino murdered.

Thus were the Princes of *Italy* jealous of that virtue, which they had not in themſelves; and not enduring it in other People, they expoſed that Country to calamities which not long after afflicted and deſtroyed it.

Pope *Pius*, having in the mean time accommodated the differences in *Romagna*, and finding an univerſal peace all over Europe; thought it a convenient time to ſolicite the Chriſtians againſt the Turks, and reaſſumed the whole methods which his predeceſſors had taken, by which all the Princes of Chriſtendom were prevailed withal to aſſiſt either with mony, or Men: *Matheo* King of *Hungary*, and *Charles* Duke of *Burgondy* engaged to go in Perſon, & were made Generals of that enterprize by the Pope, who was ſo well pleas'd with what he had done, that he went from *Rome* to *Ancona* to be at the Rendezvous of the Army, which was to meet there, and (by Ships which the *Venetians* had promis'd to furniſh) be tranſported into *Sclavonia*. After the arrival of his Holineſs, there was ſo great a throng and confluence of People, that in a few days all their proviſion was devoured; and the neighbouring

bouring Towns not being able to ſupply, every Body was ready to ſtarve for hunger: beſides which they neither had mony to pay the Souldier, nor weapons to Arm them; there was neither Duke of *Burgundy*, nor King of *Hungary* there; the *Venetians* indeed had ſent a few Gallies under one of their Captains, but it was rather to ſhow their Pomp, than to perform their promiſe; ſo far were they unfit for the tranſportation of an Army. So that in the midſt of theſe diſaſters, by reaſon of his great age and infirmities, the Pope died; the whole Army disbanded and returned to their own homes. Pope *Pius* dying in the year 1465, *Paul* 2 (by birth a *Venetian*) was elected in his place. And as moſt of the Principalities in *Italy* had changed their Governors about that time, ſo *Franceſco Sforza* Duke of *Milan* died, after he had enjoyed that Dukedom ſixteen years, and *Galeazzo* his Son was declared his ſucceſſor. *Franceſco Sforza* died.

The Death of this Prince was the occaſion that the diviſions in *Florence* increaſed, & broke out much ſooner than otherwiſe they would have done. *Coſimo* being dead, *Piero* his Son ſucceeded both to his authority and Eſtate; & having call'd to him *Diotiſalvi Neroni* as honorable & great a Man as moſt in the City, by whom, *Coſimo* upon his death bed had commanded his Son *Piero* to be governed in all his affairs) he let him know the great confidence his Father had repos'd in him; & that being deſirous to obey him after his Death, as he had done whilſt he was living, he did intreat his advice not only in his private & domeſtick affairs, but in his publick adminiſtration of the Government: & that he might begin firſt with his own particular buſineſs, he would ſhow him the accounts and Books of his Eſtate, that he might underſtand how things ſtood; and direct him afterwards as he pleas'd. *Diotiſalvi* promiſed to be ready, and faithful; but the accounts being produced and examined, were found very diſorderly and imperfect: *Diotiſalvi* (as a Perſon which reſpected his own intereſt, more than his profeſſions to *Piero*, or his obligations to his Father, ſuppoſing it eaſie to rob him of his reputation, and diveſt him of the Authority which *Coſimo* had left him as hereditary) came to him therefore with Counſel very fair and reaſonable in appearance, but inwardly deſtructive and pernitious. He repreſented to him the diſorder of his accounts; and what ſums of mony would be neceſſary to have by him, if he meant to keep up his credit, or preſerve his preferment in the State: he told him that thoſe diſorders were not any way ſo readily to be redreſs'd; nor his Coffers ſo naturally ſupplied, as by calling in ſuch ſums as were owing to his Father both abroad and at home. For *Coſimo* (to gain himſelf an intereſt) had been very ready to accommodate any body that wanted; and the monies he had lent amounted to an incredible ſum. *Piero* was well ſatisfied with his advice, and thinking it but juſt, he called in his mony. But no ſooner had he done it, but the Citizens cryed out upon him; declaimed againſt him as ingrateful and covetous, and uſed him as opprobriouſly, as if he had robbed them, and not demanded his own. *Diotiſalvi* finding his deſign ſucceeded, and that *Piero* was fallen into diſgrace with the People, he conſulted with *Luca Pitti*, *Agnolo Acciaivoli*, and *Nicolo Soderini*, how they might depoſe him: they were all of them ready to embrace the deſign; but upon ſeveral grounds and provocations; *Luca* deſired to ſucceed *Piero* in his command, for he was grown ſo great, he diſdained to obey him: *Diotiſalvi*, knew *Luca* was not fit to be chief in the Government, and therefore he thought, if *Piero* was removed, in a ſhort time that authority would devolve upon him: *Nicolo Sodoreni* had a mind the City ſhould be more free, & governed by direction of the chief Magiſtrats: *Agnolo*, had a private quarrel to the *Medici* for ſeveral reaſons, and particularly theſe. *Raffaello* his Son had long before married *Aleſſandra de Bardi*, and had a great fortune with her: this Lady, either for his own defects, or other Peoples, was ill treated by both Father-in-Law, and husband. *Lorenzo d' Ilarione* a young Gentleman her relation, pitying her condition, went with certain of his Camerads one night well Armed, and took her by force out of the houſe of *Agnolo*. The *Acciaivoli* complained heavily of the outrage, and the cauſe being refer'd to *Coſimo*, he awarded that the *Accaivoili* ſhould refund her portion, and that then it ſhould be left to the Ladies election whether ſhe would return to her Husband or no. *Agnolo* did not think *Coſimo* in this determination, had dealt with him as a friend, and not being able to revenge it upon him, he reſolv'd to do it upon his Son. Yet though their reaſons and ends were diverſe, the Conſpirators agreed all in their pretence, that the City ſhould not be govened by a peculiar Council, but by the Magiſtrats. The hatred of the People, and their occaſions to revile him, were much exaggerated by the failing of ſeveral Merchants about that time, which was objected to *Piero* as a great prejudice to the City, as if the calling in of his mony had broke them. To this aſpertion it was added that he was negotiating a match for his eldeſt Son *Lorenzo*, with *Clarice* a Daughter of the *Orſini*, which they took in great dudgeon, and upbraided him by it, declaring that it was now apparent what he drove at; and that thinking his Son too good for any alliance in *Florence*, it was manifeſt he did not now look upon himſelf as a Citizen, but was caſting about how he might make himſelf Soveraign: for he was too proud to have the Citizens to his kindred, had a deſire to make them his ſubjects; and therefore he did not

deſerve

deſerve to have them his friends. Theſe Conſpirators believed they had all ſure in their hands, for the greater part of the Citizens being deluded with the name of liberty, (with which the Conſpirators had guilded and embelliſhed their deſigns) had profeſs'd themſelves on their ſide. There being a general ebullition of theſe ſort of humors at that time in the City; it was thought convenient by ſome that were not at all taken with them, ſeeing they could not be abſolutely depreſs'd, to find out a way to diſcuſs and divert them; for whilſt the People are idle, they are proper inſtruments for any commotion: to employ them therefore, and remove their thoughts from contriving againſt the Government (it being a compleat year ſince *Coſimo* died) for the entertainment and recreation of the City, they took occaſion to make two publick and ſolemn *Feaſts*, or ſhows (which are uſual there) one of them repreſented the three Wiſemen who were conducted by the Star to the place where our Saviour was born, and this was performed with ſo much Pomp and magnificence, that for ſeveral months together the whole City was employed about the Pageants and preparation. The other was called a Tornament (which is a kind of skirmiſhing on Horſeback) in which the young Gentlemen of the City had challenged the moſt eminent Knights of *Italy*; and among theſe young Gentlemen, *Lorenzo* the eldeſt Son of *Piero* carried the applauſe, not by favour or partiality, but by his own valour and dexterity. But theſe ſports and divertiſements were no ſooner over, but the Citizens returned to their old jealouſies, and every one purſued his own fancy with more eagerneſs than before; which occaſioned great feuds, and they were augmented much by two unfortunate accidents. The one was, that the authority of the *Balia* was expired; the other that *Franceſco* Duke of *Milan* was dead; upon whoſe death, the new Duke *Galeazzo*, ſent Embaſſadors to *Florence* to confirm the capitulations which his Father *Franceſco* had made with that City; one of the articles obliging them to pay *Franceſco* an annual ſum of mony: the chief of the adverſe party, thinking this a fair opportunity, oppoſed the *Medici* in the ratification; alledging that the agreement was made with *Franceſco*, not with his Son; and that *Franceſco* being dead, the obligation was void; for *Geleazzo* was not ſo great and conſiderable as his Father, and therefore his amity unlikely to be ſo profitable; ſo that though indeed there was not much gain'd by *Franceſco*, there was leſs to be expected from his Son; and if any Citizen, to maintain his own private intereſt would pay him his annuity, it would be againſt the freedom and the ſafety of the City.

To this *Piero* replyed, that ſo important an alliance, was not ſo careleſly to be loſt that nothing was more advantagious and neceſſary (as well for all *Italy* as *Florence*) than their alliance with the Duke; for thereby the *Venetians* would be diſcouraged from attempting upon that Dutchy, either by counterfeit friendſhip, or manifeſt War. But ſhould this alliance be diſſolv'd, no ſooner would it be known to the *Venetians*, but they would fall immediatly upon the Duke; and finding him young, without friends, and ſcarce warm in the State; they would eaſily carry it from him, either by fallacy or force; and in either of thoſe caſes, the Commonwealth of *Florence* muſt be deſtroyed. But his reaſons could not be accepted; the ſedition began to break out openly: the adverſe party aſſembled in ſeveral Companies in the night, the greateſt part of them in *La Piſta*, and the friends of the *Medici* in the *Crocetta*: the Conſpirators being impatient to have *Piero* deſtroyed, had gotten the ſubſcription of ſeveral Citizens as favourers of their deſigns: but being got together, one night above the reſt, after a ſolemn debate in Counſel which way they were to proceed; it was unanimouſly agreed that the power of the *Medici* ſhould be rebated; but they were divided in the way; the moſt moderate part propoſed that ſeeing the *Balia* was extinct, they ſhould only take care it ſhould not be revived; for if the Government fell into the hands of the Counſels and Magiſtrats (as it would do of courſe) in a ſmall time *Piero*'s authority would evaporate; and with that, his intereſt among the Merchants; for his affairs were now in ſuch a poſture, that unleſs he could relieve himſelf by the publick Treaſure, he would be certainly ruined: and when that ſhould happen, there would be no farther danger of him, their liberty would be recovered without baniſhment or blood, which all good Citizens ought to deſire; but if force was applyed, infinite hazards might occur. If one be falling of himſelf, no body thruſts him; if any one thruſts him, every body ſuſtains him. Beſides if nothing extraordinary be acted againſt him, he will have no occaſion to Arm, or ſtrengthen his party; and if he ſhould, it muſt be with great charge, and diſadvantage; for every one would ſuſpect him, which would facilitate and haſten his ruine. Others were not ſatisfied with this delay; affirming that time would be more for his benefit, than theirs; and if they would proceed by cold and delatory gradations, *Piero* would run no hazard, but they ſhould run many. For the Magiſtrats (though they were his Enemies) ſuffering him to enjoy the priviledges of the City; his friends would make him Prince (as had happened in 58) to their utter deſtruction: and that though that Counſel was honeſt and peaceable,

yet

yet this was wiser and more secure, and therefore to be executed, whilst the minds of the People were incensed: the way they proposed was to arm at home, and to entertain the Marques of *Ferrara* into their pay abroad; and when a *Senate* of their friends happened to meet, then to rise, and secure themselves as well as they could. The result of all was, that they should attend such a *Senate*, and then make the best of their time. *Nicolo Fedini* (who was employed as Chancellor) was one of this Council; who being tempted by greater, and more practicable hopes, discovered the whole plot to *Piero*, and gave him a list of the Conspirators, and a Catalogue of the subscriptions. *Piero* was astonished at the number and quality of his adversaries; and upon consultation with his friends, it was concluded, that he also should take subscriptions, and having committed the care of them to some of his confidents, he found the Citizens so fickle and unstable, that many of them who had subscribed to the Enemy came over, and obliged themselves to him. Whilst things were in this distraction, the time came about in which the supream Magistracy was to be renewed; to which *Nicolo Soderini* was advanced by the *Gonfaloniere de Giustitia*. It was a wonder to see the concourse not only of the better sort of Citizens, but of the common People which attended him to the Palace, and put on an Olive Garland upon his head by the way, (to signifie that he was the Person upon whom the safety, and the liberty of their City did depend.) By this, and many examples of the same nature it is evident how inconvenient it is to enter upon the Magistracy, or Government with more than ordinary acclamation; for not being able to perform as is expected (and for the most part more is required) the People abate of their esteem, and come by degrees to dispise you. *Thomaso* and *Nicoli Soderini* were Brothers, *Nicolo* was a person of greater Spirit, but *Thomaso* the more prudent. *Thomaso* being a friend to *Piero* and knowing the humor of his Brother; that he desired the liberty of the City, and that the Government might be preserved without offence to any body, he encouraged him to a new *Squittini*, by which means the *Borsi* might be filled with the names of such Citizens as were lovers of liberty, and the Government continued without violence, as he desired. *Nicolo* was easily perswaded by his Brother, and suffered the time of his Magistracy to expire in the vanity of that opinion, and his friends which were of the Conspiracy were well enough contented, as being already emulous of him, and not desiring the reformation should fall out during his authority; presuming they could effect it when they pleas'd, though another was *Gonfaloniere*. Whereupon his office expired, with less honor than he entred upon it; by reason he had begun many good things, but perfected nothing.

This accident fortified the party of *Piero* exceedingly; confirmed his friends, and brought over such as were neuter: so that though all things were ready on all sides, they were delaid for several months, and not the least tumult appeared. Nevertheless *Piero*'s party increasing, his Enemies began to resent it, and met together, to perform that by force, which they might more easily have done before by means of the Magistrates; in order to which they concluded to kill *Piero* (who was at that same time sick at *Correggi*) and cause the Marques of *Ferrara* to advance towards the City; for when *Piero* was dead, they resolved to come armed to the Palace and force the *Senate* to settle the Government as they should direct: for though all of them were not their friends, yet they doubted not but to fright them into a concurrence. *Diotisalvi*, to disguise his designs visited *Piero* very often; discoursed with him about uniting the factions, and advised him very frankly. But *Piero* was informed of the whole conspiracy, and besides *Domenico Martegli* had given him notice that *Francesco Neroni* the Brother of *Diotisalvi* had been tempting him to their party, assuring him of success: Hereupon *Piero* resolved to be first in arms, and took occasion from their practices with the Marques of *Ferrara*. He pretended he had received a Letter from *Giovanni Bentivogli* Prince of *Bologna*, importing that the Marques of *Ferrara* was with certain forces upon the River *Albo*, and that it was given out, his design was for *Florence*; upon which intelligence, *Piero* pretended to arm, and (attended by a great number of armed men) he came to the City. At his arrival his whole party took arms, and the adversary did the same, yet not in so good order as *Piero*, for his men were prepared, and the other surprised. *Diotisalvi*'s Palace being not far from *Piero*'s, *Diotisalvi* judged himself insecure at home, and therefore went up and down, sometimes exhorting the *Senate* to cause *Piero* to lay down his Arms; sometimes seeking out *Luca* and encouraging him to be constant; but the briskest and most couragious of them all was *Nicolo Soderini*, who taking Arms immediatly, and being followed by most of the Populace of his quarter, went to *Luca*'s house, intreated him to mount, and march with him to the Palace for the security of the *Senate*, who (he assured him) were of his side; by doing of which, the Victory would be certain; but if he remained in his house, he would run the hazard of being slain by those who were armed, or abused by those who were not; and then he would repent him when too late,

Nicolo Soderini perswades *Luca* to take Arms against *Piero*.

whereas now it was in his power by force of Arms to ruine *Piero* if he pleaſed: or if he deſired peace, it was more honorable to give conditions, than to receive them. But all his Rhetorick could not work upon *Luca*; he had altered his mind, and received new promiſes of Alliances and rewards from *Piero*; and already married one of his Neices to *Giovanni Tornabuoni*; ſo that inſtead of being perſwaded by him, he admoniſhed *Nicolo* to lay down, and return quietly to his houſe; for he ought to be ſatisfied that the City ſhould be governed by its Magiſtrats: for whether he was ſatisfied or not, it would be ſo; all People would lay down their Arms; and the *Senate* having the ſtronger party, would be Judges of their quarrel. There being no remedy, and *Nicolo* having no where elſe to diſpoſe himſelf, went back to his houſe; but before he departed he told him thus.

"I cannot alone do this City any ſervice, but I can prognoſticate its miſeries. The reſo-
"lution you have taken, will deprive your Country of its liberty; your ſelf of your autho-
"rity; me of my Eſtate; and others of their Country.

At the firſt news of this tumult, the *Senate* had cauſed their Palace to be ſhut up, where they kept themſelves cloſe with the Magiſtrats, without appearing for either ſide: the Citizens (eſpecially thoſe who had followed *Luca* (ſeeing the Party of *Piero* armed, and the other diſarmed) began to contrive how they might ſhow themſelves his friends, not how they might expreſs themſelves his Enemies. Whereupon the principal Citizens, and the heads of the factions met in the Palace before the *Senators*, where many things were debated relating to the Government of the City in that juncture, and the ways of reconciliation: but becauſe *Piero* could not be there in reſpect of his indiſpoſition, all agreed to go to him to his houſe, except *Nicolo Soderini*, who (having recommended his Children and family to the protection of *Tomaſo*) was retired to his Country houſe, to attend there the concluſion of theſe troubles, which he expected would be unhappy to him, and fatal to his Country.

The *Senate* and chief Citizens attend *Piero* at his houſe.

The reſt being arrived at *Piero's* Palace, one of them being deputed, complained to him of the condition of the City by reaſon of the tumults; declared that they who took Arms firſt, were moſt conſcious of them; that underſtanding *Piero* was the Man, and his deſign unknown, they were come to him to be informed from himſelf, and if it appeared to be for the advantage of the City, they promiſed to comply. To which *Piero* replyed, that he who takes Arms firſt is not in the fault, but he who gives the occaſion: that if they conſidered more ſeriouſly of their behaviour towards him, they would not wonder at what he had done for his own preſervation: for they would find it was their conventions in the night; their ſubſcriptions, and practices to defeat him both of his Authority and life, which had forced him to his Arms, yet having extended them no farther than his own houſe, he conceived it was good evidence his intentions were innocent, and rather to defend himſelf, than injure any body elſe: that he deſired nothing, but his own ſecurity, and had never given them occaſion to ſuſpect him of other: that when the Authority of the *Balia* expired, he never attempted to revive it in any extraordinary way; but was willing (if they were ſo themſelves) that the Magiſtrats ſhould have the Government of the City; that *Coſimo* and his Sons knew how to live honorably in *Florence*, either with or without the *Balia*; and that in 58 it was for their intereſt, not his, that it was reſtored. But this was not ſufficient, he found them of opinion, that whilſt he was in *Florence*, there would be no ſafety, no tranquillity for them: a thing truly ſo far from his belief, he could never have imagined or thought upon it, that his own friends and his Fathers ſhould not endure to live with him in the ſame City, ſeeing no action of his had ever expreſs'd him otherwiſe, than a quiet and peaceable Man.

Then turning about to *Diotiſalvi* and his Brothers who were all preſent, he reproached them ſeverely by the favours they had received from *Coſimo*; by the confidence he had placed in them; and the great ingratitude which they had returned (which reprimende was delivered with ſo much zeal and efficacy, that, had not *Piero* himſelf reſtrained them, ſome there preſent were ſo much enraged at their deportment towards him, they would certainly have killed him) and at laſt he concluded, that what ever they and the *Senate* determined, he would conſent to, for he deſired nothing of them but to live quiet and in peace. Hereupon many things were propoſed but nothing concluded; only in general it was thought neceſſary the City ſhould be reformed, and new Laws created. The then *Gonfaloniere de Giuſtitia* was *Bernardo Lotti*, a perſon in whom *Piero* had no confidence; and ſo reſolved not to do any thing whilſt he was in office, which he conceived would be no great prejudice to his affairs, becauſe his time was almoſt expir'd. But at the Election of *Senators* in *September* and *October* following, 1466. *Roberto Lioni* was choſen *Gonfaloniere*, who was no ſooner ſettled in his office, but (all other things being prepared to his hand) he called the People together into the *Piazza*, and created a new *Balia*, all of *Piero's* creatures, who fell preſently upon the creation of new Magiſtrats, and choſe them as *Piero* directed. Which manner

manner of proceeding so terrified the heads of the adverse party, that they fled out of the City most of them; *Agnolo Acciaivoli* to *Naples*, *Diotisalvi Neroni*, and *Nicolo Soderini* to *Venice*. But *Luca Pitti* remained behind, presuming upon his late alliance, and the promises which he had received from *Piero*: *Giovanni* the Son of *Neroni*, at that time Archbishop of *Florence* (to prevent the worst) banished himself voluntarily to *Rome*. All the fugitives were proclaimed rebells; and the family of the *Neroni* dispersed. Many other Citizens were banished likewise, and confined to particular places; nor was this all; a solemn processions was ordered, to give God thanks for the preservation of the State, and the unity of the City: in the time of which solemnity, certain Citizens were apprehended, tortured, and then part of them put to death, and part of them banished. But in all the inconstancy and variations of fortune, nothing was so remarkable as the fall of *Luca Pitti*. He quickly learned the difference betwixt victory and misfortune; betwixt honor, and disgrace. His house (which was formerly thronged with the visits and attendancies of the better sort of Citizens) was now grown solitary and unfrequented. When he appeared abroad in the streets, his friends and relations were not only affraid to accompany him, but to owne or salute him; some of them having lost their honors for doing it, some of them their Estates, and all of them threatned. The noble structures which he had begun, were given over by the workmen; the good deeds which he had done were requited with contumely, and the honors he had confer'd, with infamy and disgrace. So that many persons, who in his authority had presented him largely, in his distress required it again, pretending it was lent, and no more, and these very People who before commended him to the skies, cried him down again as fast, for his ingratitude and violence: so that now when it was too late, he began to repent himself that he had not taken *Nicolo's* advice, and died honorably seeing he could not live so. Nevertheless *Agnolo Acciaivoli* being then at *Naples*, before he attempted any thing of innovation, he resolved to try *Piero*, and see if there was no hopes of reconciliation; to which purpose he writ to him this following letter.

The Enemies of the *Medici* depress'd.

Luca Pitti deserted.

"I cannot but smile to observe the wantonness of fortune, and what sport she makes her "self in turning friends into Enemies, and Enemies into friends, according to her own humor and capriccio; you may remember how at the banishment of your Father (resenting "the injury done to him above any danger of my own) I lost my Country, and escaped "narrowly with my life. In *Cosimo's* days I refused no opportunity of honoring your family; and since he died, I have entertained none to offend it. True it is the weakness of your complexion, and the minority of your Sons, gave some kind of disquiet, and "I was willing our Country might be put in such a posture, as to subsist after your Death; "what ever I have done, was only to that end; not against you so much, as for the benefit of my Country: if that was an errour, I am sorry for it, and do hope the innocence "of my intention, and the service of my former actions may attone it: nor can I fear but "I shall find mercy in a Family which has had so long experience of my fidelity; or that "one single fault will be able to extinguish so many obligations. *Piero* having received "this Letter, by the same hand returned him this answer.

Agnolo's letter to *Piero de Medici*.

"Your smiling at that distance, is the reason I weep not where I am: were you so merry in *Florence*, I should be more melancholy at *Naples*. I grant you have been a well "wisher to my Father, and you confess he gratified you for it; so that if there be obligation on any side, 'tis on yours, because deeds are more valuable than words; and if you have "been already rewarded for your good actions, 'tis but reasonable you should be punished "for your evil: your pretence of love to your Country cannot excuse you, for no body "but will believe the *Medici* as great lovers and propagators of their Country, as the *Acciaivoli*. Live therefore where you are, in dishonor, since you had not the discretion to "live honorably here.

Piero's answer.

Agnolo upon the receipt of this letter, dispairing of Pardon, removed his quarters to *Rome*; where associating with the Archbishop, and the rest of the exiles; they consulted what was the best way of lessening the reputation of the *Medici*; which at that time was tottering in *Rome*, and gave *Piero* no small trouble to sustain it; but by the assistance of his friends, they failed of their design. *Diotisalvi*, and *Nicolo Soderini* on the other side, used all possible diligence to provoke the *Venetian Senate* against their Country: supposing its Government being new, and ungrateful to many People, the first invasion would shake it, and that it would not be able to stand. There was at that time in *Ferrara*, *Giovan Francesco*, the Son of *Palla Strozzi*, who in the revolutions in 34 was banished with his Father out of *Florence*: this *Giovanni* was a Man of great credit, and reputed as rich a Merchant as any in the City. These new Rebels insinuating with him, perswaded him how easy it would be to recover their Country when ever the *Venetians* would undertake it; and they doubted not but they would undertake it, if part of the charge could be defrayed; other-

wise it was not to be expected: *Giovanni* was willing to revenge the injuries he had received; beleived what they said, and promised to assist with all the Mony he could make; upon which *Diotisalvi*, and *Soderini* addressed themselves to the *Doge*,

"Complained to him of their Banishment, which they pretended was for no other cause, "but that they were desirous their Country might be governed by the Laws; and the Magi- "strats (not a few of the Grandees) have the power to put them in execution. Upon "this account it was that *Piero de Medici* and his followers, having been used to a tyranni- "cal way, had taken arms by an artifice, disarmed them by a cheat, and banished them by "a fallacy, and as if this were not enough, God Almighty must be brought in, and made "an accessary to their cruelty, whilst in a solemn Procession, and the sacred exercise of their "devotion, many Citizens who (upon faith given that they should be safe) had remai- "ned behind, were seized, secured, tortured, and executed: a thing of most execrable "and nefarious example. To revenge the inhumanity of those actions, and avert the "judgments which they would otherwise pull down upon their Country, they knew not "where to apply themselves with more hopes than to that illustrious *Senate*, which having "done so much for the preservation of their own liberty, must need have some compassion "for such as have lost theirs. They beseeched them therefore as free-men, to assist them "against their Tyrants; as merciful, against the mercilesse; and remembred them how the "Family of the *Medici* had defeated them of *Lombardy*, when *Cosimo* (contrary to the in- "clinations of all the rest of the City) assisted *Francesco* against them: so that if the equi- "ty of their cause did not move them, the justice of their own indignation might provoke "them.

These last words prevailed so far upon the *Senate*, that they resolved *Bartolomeo Coligni* (their General) should fall upon the Dominion of the *Florentines*, and to that purpose their army being drawn together with all possible speed, and *Hercules da Esti* being sent by *Borso* Duke of *Ferrara*, joyned himself with them. Their first enterprize was upon the Town of *Doadola* which (the *Florentines* being in no order) they burned, and did some mischief in the Country about it. But the *Florentines* (as soon as *Piero* had banished the adverse party) had entred into a new League with *Galeazzo* Duke of *Milan*, and *Ferrando* King of *Naples*; and entertained *Federigo* Count of *Urbin* for their Generals: so that being fortified by such friends, they did not much value their Enemies: for *Ferrando* sent his Son *Alfonso*; and *Galeazzo* came in person (both of them with considerable forces) to their relief; and all of them together made a head at *Castracaro*, a Castle belonging to the *Florentines* at the bottom of the *Alps* which descend out of *Tuscany* into *Romagna*. In the mean time, the Enemy was retired towards *Imola*; so that betwixt the one and the other, according to the custom of those times, there happened several light skirmishes, but no besieging nor storming of Towns, nor no provocation to a battle on either side, both parties keeping their tents, and staring upon one another, with extraordinary cowardize. This manner of proceeding was not at all pleasing to the *Florentines*, who found themselves engaged in a War, which was like to be expensive, and no profit to be expected: insomuch that the Magistrats complained of it to those Citizens which they had deputed as Commissaries for that expedition; who replyed, That *Galeazzo* was wholly in the fault; and that having more Authority than experience, he knew not how to make any advantagious resolution; nor would he believe them which were able to instruct him, and that therefore it was impossible (whilst he was in the Army) that any great action should be atchieved. Hereupon the *Florentines* addressed themselves to the Duke, and let him know,

The *Florentines* invaded by the *Venetians*.

"That he had done them a great honor (and it had been much for their advantage) in "coming personally to their assistance; for his very name and reputation had made their "Enemies retire: Nevertheless they could not but prefer his safety and the good of his "State, before their own; because whilst he was safe, they could not be capable of fear; "and if lost, they should be incapable of comfort. They could not therefore discharge "themselves, nor express the respect they had for him better, than by remembring him, "that (besides the danger where he was) it could not be secure for him to be any longer "at that distance from *Milan*; for being but young in the Government, and his Enemies "powerful and industrious; who knew what mischief they might meditate? and how ea- "sily execute it when they had done? so that they made it their request to him for the safe- "ty of his own person, and the preservation of his State, that he would leave only part of his "forces with them, and return himself with the rest.

Galeazzo was as well pleased with their Counsel, as they were to give it; and without more ado returned from whence he came. The *Florentine* Generals (being rid of this incumbrance, and that it might appear to the World who was the impediment before) advanced against the Enemy, so that they came presently to a battle, which continued half a

day

day without any disadvantage; for there was not one Man killed, a few Horses hurt, and but a few Men taken prisoners. When Winter was come, and the time that their Armies were accustomed to go into quarters, *Bartolomeo* retreated towards *Ravenna*; the *Florentines* into *Tuscany*; and the forces of the King and the Duke into their several Countries: but finding no tumult nor commotion in *Florence*, as they were promised by the Rebels; and the Souldiers which were hired not being punctually payed; the *Venetians* thought fit to treat, and in a short time a peace was concluded: this peace having deprived the rebels of all hopes, they divided, and went to several parts: *Diotisalvi* went to *Ferrara*, where he was entertained and relieved by the Marquess *Borso*: *Nicolo Soderini* removed to *Ravenna*, where he lived long with a small pension from the *Venetians*, and at last died: this *Nicolo* was accounted a just and couragious Man, but slow, and irresolute: which was the cause that he slipped an opportunity when he was *Gonfaloniere*, that he could never afterwards retrieve. Grown insolent upon their success, those of the *Florentines* who were in power (as if they fansied they had not prevailed, unless their cruelty did testify it,) plagued and tormented not only their Enemies, but who ever else they thought good to suspect; and obtained of *Bardo Altovili* to divest several Citizens of their honors, and that others should be banished; which was so great a strengthening to that party, and depression to the other; that they exercised the power which they had usurped, as if God and fortune had given them that City for a prey.

Peace between the *Florentines* and the *Venetians*.

These practices *Piero* understood not; and if he had, his ilness would not have permitted him to redress them: for he was so stiff, and contracted with the Gout, he had the use of nothing but his tongue, with which he could only admonish and advise them to live civilly, and enjoy their Country in peace, and not be accessary to its destruction. To please and entertain the People, he resolved to celebrate the Marriage of his Son *Lorenzo*, to whom he had contracted *Claricia* a Daughter of the house of *Ursina*; which wedding was performed with a Pomp and magnificence answerable to the Persons by whom, and for whom it was made; several days were spent in Balls, in Banquets, and Shows; and to demonstrate the Grandeur of the House of the *Medici*, two martial spectacles were exhibited; one representing Horse and Men charging as in a field fight; the other the seige and expugnation of a Town; both of them contrived, and discharged with the greatest glory and gallantry imaginable. Whilst affairs were in this posture in *Florence*, all *Italy* was at peace; but under great apprehensions of the Turk, who advancing in his designs, had taken *Negropont*, to the great scandal and detriment of all Christendom: *Borgo* Marquess of *Ferrara* died about this time, and was succeeded by his Brother *Hercules*. *Gismondo da Rimini* died (a perpetual Enemy to the Church) and left the Dominions to his Son *Roberto*, who was reckoned afterwards among the best Commanders of that age. Pope *Paul* died likewise, in whose place was created likewise *Sextus* called first *Francesco da Savona*, a Person of mean or rather base extraction, but for his courage made General of the order of S. *Francis*; and after that, Cardinal: This Pope was the first which showed to the World what the Papacy could do: and that many things called errors before, might not only be excused, but hid and obtected by the Papal Authority. He had in his Family two Persons (*Piero* and *Girolamo*) who (as was generally believed) were his natural Sons, though they passed under more spacious and honorable appellations. *Piero* being a Frier, was by degrees promoted to the Cardinalship, with the Title of *San Sesto*. To *Girolamo* he gave the Government of *Furli*, which he had taken by violence from *Antonio Ordelaffi* whose predecessors had a long time been Princes of that City: this secular and ambitious way of proceeding, procured his Holiness great estimation among the Princes of *Italy*; insomuch as all of them desiring his friendship, the Duke of *Milan* gave to *Girolamo*, his natural Daughter *Catharine* in Marriage, and in Dower with her, he gave him the City of *Imola*, which by the like violence he had taken from *Taddeo Alidossi*. Betwixt this Duke and *Ferrando* the King, a new alliance was contracted; for *Elizabeth* the Daughter of *Alfonso*, (the Kings eldest Son) was married to *Giovan Geleazzo* eldest Son to the Duke. In the mean time *Italy* was full of tranquility; no care incumbant upon those Princes, but to pay their respects one to the other, and by mutual matches, new obligations, and leagues, to fortifie and secure one another. Yet in the midst of this Peace, *Florence* was not without its convulsions; the ambition and dissention of the Citizens distracting their affairs; and *Piero* being interrupted by his own distempers, could not apply any remedy to theirs. However to discharge his Conscience, endeavour what he was able, and try whether he could shame them into a reformation, he called them all to his House, and saluted them in this manner.

Piero's speech to the *Florentines*.

"I never imagined the time could come in which the carriage of my friends should "have made me inclinable to my Enemies; or the consequences of my Victory, have made "me

"me wiſh I had been beaten. I thought my party had conſiſted of Men whoſe appetites "might have been bounded and circumſcribed, and ſuch as would have been ſatisfied to "have lived quietly and honorably in their own Country, eſpecially after their Enemies were "expelled. But I find now, I was miſtaken; ignorant of the natural ambition of the "World; and more particularly yours. It is not enough (it ſeems) for you to be chief "and Principal in ſo illuſtrious a City, and (though but a few) to have the honors, and "offices, and emoluments, with which heretofore a much greater number was ſatisfied. It "is not enough, to have the forfitures and confiſcations of your Enemies divided among "you; it is not enough that (exempting your ſelves) you load, and oppreſs the reſt "with taxes; and appropriate them to your own private uſes when they come in; but you "muſt abuſe and afflict your neighbours with all the circumſtances of injury: you rob "them of their Eſtates; you ſell them juſtice; you abhor the Laws; you oppreſs the "peaceable, and exalt the inſolent: I did not think there had been ſuch examples of ra-"pine and violence in all *Italy*, as I find in this City. Has this City given us the authori-"ty, to ſubvert it? Has it given us preheminence to deſtroy it? Has it honored us, to "afflict it? I do profeſs by the Faith of an honeſt Man, and declare here publickly to you "all, that if you perſiſt in theſe courſes, and force me to repent of my victory, I will or-"der things ſo, that you ſhall have but little comfort in abuſing it.

The Citizens replyed modeſtly at that time, but not a jot of reformation; whereupon *Piero* ſent privatly to *Agnolo Acciaivoli* to meet him at *Cafaggiolo*, where they had long diſcourſe about the condition of the City; and it is not doubted but if he had lived, he would have recalled his Enemies to have reſtrained the exorbitances of his friends; but death would not ſuffer it, for after great conflicts both in his body and mind, in the 53 year of his age, he died: his virtue, and his bounty could not be perfectly conſpicuous to his Country, being eclipſed by his Father, who died not long before him; and theſe few years he ſurvived, were wholly taken up either by his own ſicknes, or the diſſention of his friends. He was interred in the Temple of *San. Lorenzo* near his Father, and his exequies performed with a Pomp proportionable to his quality, and deſerts. He left behind him two Sons *Lorenzo* and *Guiliano*; pregnant, and hopeful enough of themſelves, but the tenderneſs of their age was that which made every body apprehenſive. Among (or rather above, the principal of that Government was *Tomaſo Soderini*, whoſe prudence and authority was not only eminent in *Florence*, but in the Courts of all the Princes of *Italy*: after the death of *Piero*, *Tomaſo* had the reſpect of the whole City, moſt of the Citizens flocking to his Houſe, as their Chief; and many Princes directed their correſpondencies to him: but he being wiſe, and ſenſible of his own fortune and the fortunes of his Family, refuſed their correſpondence; received none of their letters, and let the Citizens know, it was not upon him, but the *Medici* they were obliged to attend; and that his actions might quadrate with his exhortations, having called all the chief families together in the Convent of S. *Antonio*, he brought in *Lorenzo* and *Guiliano de Medici* amongſt them, where after a long and ſollid diſcourſe about the condition of that City, *Italy*, and the ſeveral principalities within it; he concluded that if ever they would live happily and in peace; ſecure againſt foreign invaſion, and diſſention at home; it was neceſſary to continue their obſervance to the family of the *Medici*, and to give thoſe young Gentlemen the Authority of their predeceſſors; for Men are not troubled at the promotion of antient families; but upſtarts, as they are ſuddenly advanced, are ſuddenly forſaken; and it has been always found more eaſie to preſerve a family in power (where time has worn out its Enemies) than to raiſe a new one which will unavoidably be ſubject to new emulations: after *Tomaſo* had ſpoke, *Lorenzo* began, and (though but young) delivered himſelf with ſo much gravity and compoſedneſs; that he gave them great hopes of his future abilities; and before they parted both of them were perfectly adopted. Not long after, they were inſtalled in the dignities of their Father; entertained as Princes of the Government; and *Tomaſo* appointed their chief Miniſter; by which means they lived quietly for a while both abroad and at home, without the leaſt proſpect or apprehenſion of troubles; but on a ſudden, a new tumult unexpectedly aroſe to diſturb them, and give them a hint of their following miſeries.

Piero de Medici dies.

Tomaſo Soderini in great favour with the *Florentines*, declines it diſcreetly.

Lorenzo and *Guiliano de Medici* made Princes of the City.

Among the Families which ſuffered with *Luca Pitti*, and his party, was the Family of the *Nardi*; *Salveſtro* and his Brothers (the chief of that houſe) were firſt baniſhed, and then (upon the War with *Bartolomeo Coglione*) proclaimed rebels. Among the Brothers, there was one of them called *Bernardo*, a brisk and couragious youth, who (not being able to ſubſiſt abroad by reaſon of his poverty, and having no hopes of returning by reaſon of the peace) reſolved to attempt ſomething that might be an occaſion of reviving the War: a ſlight and inconſiderable beginning, producing great effects many times, becauſe People are generally more prone to aſſiſt and improve a commotion, than to contrive and begin it.

Ber-

Bernardo had good acquaintance in *Prato*, and in the Country about *Piſtoia*, but more eſpecially with the *Palandre*, which (though a Country family) was numerous, and brought up, like the reſt of the *Piſtoleſi*, in arms and in blood. He knew they were highly diſcontented, as having been ill uſed in the time of the Wars by the Magiſtrats in *Florence*: he knew likewiſe the diſguſts of the *Pratiſi*; the pride and rapacity of their Government, and ſome body had told him how ready they were for any practice againſt the State: ſo that from all theſe circumſtances he conceived hopes (by debauching of *Prato*) of kindling ſuch a fire in *Tuſcany*, as by ſupplying it by fewel, they ſhould not be able to extinguiſh: he communicated his deſign with *Diotiſalvi*; and inquired of him, in caſe *Prato* ſhould be ſurprized, what aſſiſtance he could procure him from the Princes of *Italy*. *Diotiſalvi* looked upon the buſineſs as deſperate and almoſt impoſſible; however ſeeing the part he was to bear in it, was ſecure enough; and that the experiment was to be made at another Mans coſt; he encouraged him to go on, and promiſed him aſſiſtance from *Bologna* and *Ferrara*, if he could but ſecure the Town for a fortnight. *Bernardo* (tickled with his promiſes, and perſwading himſelf his ſucceſs would be good) conveyed himſelf privatly to *Prato*, and imparting his deſigns to ſome perſons, he found them readily diſpoſed: the ſame compliance and alacrity he found in the *Palandre*, and having agreed with them both of the time, and the place, he ſent the news immediatly to *Diotiſalvi*. The *Poteſta* or Governor of *Prato* at that time was *Ceſare Pretucci*; who being put in by them, preſerved it for the *Florentines*. The Governors of ſuch Towns had a cuſtom to keep the keys of the Caſtle themſelves; yet (eſpecially where there was no jealouſie) if any of the Town deſired to go in or out in the night, they were ſo civil, as to ſuffer them: *Bernardo* underſtanding the cuſtom, came himſelf, and the *Pelandræ* with about a hundred armed Men, and lay cloſe near the gate which goes towards *Piſtoia*, whilſt thoſe in the Town who were privy to the Conſpiracy, armed likewiſe, and ſent one of their number to the Governor to beg the favour of the keys, pretending there was a Citizen which deſired to enter. The Governor ſuſpecting nothing, ſent one of the ſervants with the Keys, who being gone a convenient diſtance from the Palace, was knocked down, his charge taken from him; and the Gate being opened, *Bernardo* and his party were let in. Having entered, and diſcourſed a little while with their friends in the Town, they divided into two bodies; one of them under the conduct of *Salveſtro* a *Prateſe*, ſurprized the Caſtle; the other commanded by *Bernardo*, poſſeſs'd themſelves of the Palace, took the Governor and his whole Family Priſoners, and committed them to the cuſtody of ſome of his Men: which done, they ſet up a great cry for liberty in the Streets, and upon it many of the People reſorted to the Market place: It being now day, and the Magiſtrats informed that the Caſtle and Palace were ſurprized, and the Governor and all his Family in Priſon, they could not imagine from whence this accident ſhould proceed. The eight (who in that City were ſupream) met together in the Palace to conſult what was to be done. But *Bernardo* and his accomplices, having run ſome time about the ſtreets, and found few or no body come in; upon information that the eight were aſſembled, they went directly to them, and *Bernardo* took occaſion to let them know, that their deſign was only to deliver their Town from ſervitude; and that if they would take Arms, and joyn with them in it, they would create immortal honor to themſelves, perpetual peace to the People; then he remembred them of their antient Liberty, and compared it with their preſent condition; and promiſed them ſuch aſſiſtance in a few days, as the *Florentines* ſhould not be able to contend withal: beſides he aſſured them he had intelligence in *Florence*, and they would ſhow themſelves as ſoon as they underſtood their ſucceſs in this Town: but the eight were not to be moved with bare words, and anſwered that they knew not whether *Florence* was in liberty or bondage, nor did it belong to them to inquire; this they knew that for their parts they deſired no farther liberty, than to continue under the ſame Magiſtrats which had then the Government of *Florence*, from whoſe hands they had never received any injury that might provoke them to take Arms againſt them: they admoniſhed him therefore to releaſe the Governor, leave the Town as he found it; and withdraw in time from an enterprize which he had ſo raſhly begun. But *Bernardo* was not to be diſcouraged ſo eaſily; for ſeeing intreaties and fair means had no better ſucceſs, he reſolved to try how far terror would work; and as a taſte of what was to be expected, concluded to put the Governor to Death; having cauſed him to be haled out of Priſon, he gave orders he ſhould be hanged out of one of the Windows in the Palace: *Petrucci* was brought almoſt to the Window with the rop about his neck, when he ſpied *Bernardo* attending to ſee him executed; and turning to him, he ſaid,

A Conſpiracy of the *Nardi*.

"*Bernardo* you think by cutting me off, to make the *Prateſi* follow you; but the effect "will be quite contrary. The veneration they bear to the Governors which are ſent "hither from *Florence*, is ſo great, it will incenſe them to ſee me deſtroyed, and your cru-

"elty

"elty to me, will turn to your ruine; so that 'tis my life, not my death must do your bu-
"sines; if I command them what you think fit to direct, they will obey me before you,
"and I following your directions, your design will be fulfilled.

Bernardo (who was no conjurer) thought his Counsel was good, and therefore ordered him (out of a back window which looked into the Market-place) to require the obedience of the People, which as soon as he had done, he was carried back from whence he came. The weakness of the Conspirators was by this time discovered; and several of the inhabitants were got together, and *Giorgio Ginori* (a Knight of *Rhodes*) among the rest. This *Giorgio* being the first who took Arms, advanced against *Bernardo* who was riding up and down the Streets, sometimes perswading, and sometimes threatning the City. Having found him and charged him with a considerable number that followed, *Bernardo* was wounded, and taken prisoner, after which it was not hard to release the Governor, and over-power the rest; for being but few, and divided into several parties, they were most of them either taken or killed.

Bernardo defeated and taken.

In the mean time the news of this accident arrived at *Florence*, and was represented much greater than the truth. The first report was that *Prato* was surprized; the Governor and his whole Family slain; the Town full of the Enemies forces; *Pistoia* in Arms; and several Citizens of that City engaged in the Plot: so that of a sudden the Palace was full of Citizens, expecting orders from the *Senate* for what was to be done. There was in *Florence* at that time an eminent Captain called *Roberto San Severino*; it was resolved to send what forces they could get together of a sudden under his command towards *Prato*; that he should advance as near it as he could, give them particular notice of all passages, and act as he in his discretion should see occasion. *Roberto* was presently dispatched, and marched with his party as far as the *Castello di Campi*, when he was met by a messenger from *Petrucci* with the news that *Bernardo* was taken, his party defeated, and all things in quiet; so that he marched back again to *Florence*, and not long after *Bernardo* was brought thither to be examined by the Magistrats. Being questioned upon several things, and particularly what induced him to that enterprize, he replyed, that chosing rather to die in *Florence*, than to live any longer in exile, he determined to do something which might make him memorable when he was dead. This tumult being composed almost as soon as begun, the Citizens began to return to their old way of security, thinking (without any regard or consideration) to enjoy the profits of a Government which they had so lately reestablished and confirmed: from whence all those inconveniencies ensued, which are too often the followers of peace; the youth being more vain and extravagant than formerly, squandred away vast sums, in Cloaths, and Treats, and all manner of Luxury; and having nothing to do, spent their whole time and Estates among dancing Masters, and Women: their whole study and ambition was to be thought glorious in their habit; and smart and poinant in their discourse, for he that could retort or bite the most readily, was thought the greatest wit, and had the greatest applause: and yet these effeminacies were much increased, by the arrival of the Duke of *Milan*, who with his Lady and whole Court was come to *Florence* (to fulfil a pretended vow) where he was entertained with magnificence suitable to his quality, and the alliance betwixt them. Then was the first time it ever was seen in that City that in Lent when all flesh was forbidden by the Church, it was eaten publickly, without dispensation, or respect to the Laws of God or of Man. Among the rest of the Shows which were made to entertain him, the Holy Ghosts descending upon the Apostles, being represented and exposed in the Church *di S. Spirito*, so many candles were used in the solemnity, that some of them took fire, and burned the Church to the Ground, which was looked upon as a judgment, and a manifest expression of Gods anger towards us: if then the Duke found the City of *Florence* full of niceness, and delicacy, and exorbitance in their manners, he left them much worse when he went away; so that the soberer sort of the Citizens thought it necessary for sumptuary Laws, and edicts of restraint for the regulation of expences in Cloaths, Funerals, and Feastings, to confine them within the compass of frugality and discretion.

The Duke of *Milan* in *Florence*.

In the midst of this peace, there happend a new and unexpected tumult in *Tuscany*. About this Town of *Volterra*, it was the fortune of some of those Citizens to find a mine of Alum, who knowing the usefulness of it, and the advantage which might accrew, that they might be the better supplied with monies, and justified by better authority, they applied themselves to some of the considerable Citizens of *Florence*, and made them sharers in the profits. The business at first (as all things of that nature are) was little regarded by the *Volterans*, but after when they grew sensible of their gains, they strove too late, to do what at first might have been easily prevented. They began to examine and argue it in the Councils, alledging there was no reason a commodity found in the publick lands, should be converted to particular

Tumults in *Volterra*.

particular use: hereupon Embassadors were sent to *Florence*, and the cause referred to a Comittee of Citizens, who, being either bribed, or convinced, reported that the desires of the People of *Volterra*, (were in their judgment) unjust. That they could not find any reason why the defendants should be deprived of what by their own labour and industry they had acquired; and that therefore the mine was in all equity to be continued to them: though if they pleased they might command them to pay an annual sum of mony, as a fee and acknowlegment of their Superiority. This being reported it rather increased than lessened the mutiny of the *Volterrans*; nothing was discoursed of in the whole City, but this affair: the People pressed hard for what they thought themselves robb'd of: The Partizans were as zealous to keep what they had got, and upon reference to the *Florentines* it was confirmed to them; so that in the dispute, there was one eminent Citizen called *Picorino* slain, and after him several more of his party, and their houses plundered and burned; in the heat of their rage, they had much ado to forbear the same violence to the *Florentine* Magistrats: the fierceness of their fury being over, they sent Embassadors to *Florence* to represent to that *Senate* that if they would preserve to them their old priviledges, they would continue their subjection, and maintain the City in its antient dependance. But there was great argument about the answer: *Tomaso Soderini* was of opinion the *Volterrans* were to be received upon any terms, as thinking it dangerous at that time to kindle a fire so near their own Houses: for he was fearful of the disaffection of the Pope, and the Power of the King; nor durst he depend upon the amity either of the Duke or the *Venetian*, as not being certain of the courage of the one, or the fidelity of the other; harping still upon an old adage, *that a lean Peace was better than a fat Victory*. *Lorenzo*, on the other side, thinking this a fair opportunity to demonstrate his Wisdom, and his magnanimity together; and the rather because encouraged by such as envy'd *Tomaso*, he declared against the tumult; resolved to punish them by force, and affirmed that if these were not corrected, *in terrorem*, upon the least trivial and impertinent occasion, the rest of the Territories would do the same, without any fear or reverence in the World. The result of all being that they should be corrected; answer was returned to the Embassadors, that the *Volterrans* were not to expect the continuation of their priviledges, having broken them themselves, and that therefore they were either to submit to the *Senate* without any Capitulation, or to expect the consequences of War. The *Volterran* Embassadors being returned with this answer; they prepared for their defence; fortified their Town; and sent for supplies to all the Princes of *Italy*; but none of them gave them any encouragement, but the *Siennesi*, and the Governor of *Piombino*.

The *Florentine*, on the other side, placing much of their success in their speed, dispatched away 10000 foot and 2000 Horse under the Command of *Federigo* Lord of *Urbin*, who falling upon the Country of *Volterra*, did easily subdue it; after which he sat down before the City; but that standing high, and the hill being steep, it was not to be assaulted but on that side where the Church of S. *Alessandro* stood. The *Volterrans* for their better defence had hired about 1000 Souldiers, who observing the *Florentines* resolution to carry it, and that they were very strong in their Leaguer, believing it untenable, they began to be remiss and careless in their duties; but in any thing of mischief to their Masters, they were vigorous enough: so that the poor Citizens being assaulted without, and abused within, began to encline to a Peace; but not being admitted to conditions, they were glad to throw themselves into the arms of their Enemies; who having caused them to open the Gates, the greatest part of the Army marched in, & advancing to the Palace where their *Priori* were assembled, they commanded them to return to their houses, but by the way one of them was unluckily pillaged and reviled by a Souldier, and from that action (the disposition of Mankind prompting him more naturally to mischief than good) proceeded the destruction of that City, which for a whole day together was robb'd, and rummaged by the Souldiers; neither Women, nor Children, nor Churches, nor any place being exempt from the rapacity as well of their Mercenaries, as Enemies. The news of this Victory was entertained in *Florence* with extraordinary joy, and being *Lorenzo*'s own enterprize, it turned highly to his reputation: and one of his most intimate friends upbraided *Tomaso Soderini* by his Counsel to the contrary; what think you now, Sir (said he to him) *Volterra* is won? To whom *Tomaso* replyed, I think it rather lost; for had you received it upon terms, it might have been serviceable, and contributed to the security of this City, but being to be kept by force, it will be a trouble and weakness to you in time of War, and an expence and inconvenience in time of Peace.

Volterra surrendred and sacked.

In those days, the Pope, being desirous to keep the Lands of the Church in their natural obedience, had caused *Spoliro* to be sacked, which Town by instigation of the factions within it, had been in rebellion; and the City of *Castello* having been in the same contuma-

cy, was afterwards beſeiged. In that Town *Nicolo Vitelli* was Prince, who retaining a great correſpondence and friendſhip with *Lorenzo de Medici*, had ſupplies ſent him from *Florence*, though not enough to defend *Nicolo*, yet ſufficient to ſow the ſeeds of ſuch enmity betwixt the Pope and the *Medici*, as produced moſt pernitious effects. Nor had it been long before they had diſcovered themſelves, had not the Death of *Piero* Cardinal *di S. Siſto* intervened. For that Cardinal (having travelled thorow all *Italy*, and ſpent ſome time both at *Venice* and *Milan*, in honor (as he pretended) to the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*'s wedding) had ſifted the Princes to ſee how they ſtood inclined to a difference with the *Florentines*: but being returned to *Rome*, he died, not without ſuſpition of being poiſoned by the *Venetians*, out of an apprehenſion of his power, when ever he ſhould have opportunity to exert it; for though his humor and extraction were mean, and his education retired, in a Covent, yet upon his promotion to the Cardinalſhip, he diſcovered more pride and ambition, than was becoming not only a Cardinal, but a Pope. For he had the vanity to make a feaſt at *Rome* which coſt him above 20000 *Florins*, and would have been thought an extravagance in the greateſt King of his time. Pope *Sixtus* having loſt his Miniſter, proceeded more coolly in his deſigns; nevertheleſs the *Florentines*, the Duke, and the *Venetians* entred into a League; *Sixtus* and the King of *Naples* entred into another, and left room for ſeveral other Princes to come in if they pleaſed. By this means all *Italy* was divided into two factions, every day producing ſomething or other which augmented the feuds; and particularly a diſpute about the Iſle of *Ciprus*, to which *Ferrando* pretended but the *Venetian* had got the poſſeſſion; upon which the Pope and *Ferrando* confederated more ſtrictly: the great Captain of thoſe times, and the moſt eminent for conduct was *Federigo* Prince of *Urbin*, who had ſerved under the *Florentines* a long time: that their League might not have the advantage of ſuch a General, the Pope and *Ferrando* reſolved, if poſſible, to debauch him from them, and to that end both of them invited him to *Naples*. *Federigo* obeyed, with great aſtoniſhment, and diſpleaſure to the *Florentines*, concluding he would run the ſame fate which *Giacopo Piccinino* had done before him; but they were utterly miſtaken; for *Federigo* returned with great honor from *Naples* and *Rome*, and was made General of their League. In the mean time the Pope and the King were not idle, but ſtill feeling and tempting the *Senats*, of *Romagna*, and *Sienna*, to make them their friends, and enable themſelves thereby to be revenged on the *Florentines*; of which the *Florentines* having advertiſement, they provided ſuch remedy againſt their ambition, as would conſiſt with their time; and having loſt *Federigo*, they entertained *Roberto da Pimino* into their pay: they renewed their Leagues with the Citizens of *Perugia*, and the *Senate* of *Faenza*.

Italy in two factions.

The Pope and the King pretended that the grounds of their diſſatisfaction was, for that they had ſeduced the *Venetians* from their League, and aſſociated with them themſelves; and the Pope did not think that he could preſerve the honor and reputation of the Church, nor Count *Girolamo* his Soveraignty in *Romagna*, whilſt the *Venetian* and *Florentine* were united. The *Florentines* on the other ſide feared that they did not deſire to ſeparate them from the *Venetians* ſo much, to make them their friends, as to enable themſelves more eaſily to injure them; ſo that for two years together *Italy* remained under theſe jealouſies, and diverſity of humors, before any tumult broke out. The firſt which happened (and that was no great one) was in *Tuſcany*. *Braccio* of *Perugia* (a Perſon as we have ſaid before, of great reputation in the Wars) left two Sons *Oddo*, and *Carlo*, whilſt the laſt was very young, his Brother was ſlain unhappily in a tumult in the *Val di Lamona*. And *Carlo* (when capable for his age) was preferred by the *Venetians* to a command in their Army, out of reſpect to the memory of the Father and the hopefulneſs of the Son. The time of his Commiſſion expired about that time, and *Carlo* would not ſuffer it to be renewed by the *Senate*; being reſolved to ſee whether his own reputation, or his Fathers, could bring him back again to *Perugia*. To which the *Venetians* readily conſented, as People which added ſomething to their Empire, by every commotion: *Carlo* therefore, marched into *Tuſcany*, but finding the *Perugians* in League with the *Florentines*, and his enterprize by conſequence more uneaſie than he expected, that nevertheleſs he might do ſomething worthy to be talked of, he aſſaulted the *Sienneſi* (pretending an old debenture to his Father for ſervice he had done them) and fell upon them with ſuch fury, that their whole Country was overrun. The *Sienneſi* ſeeing themſelves ſo fiercely invaded (and being naturally jealous of the *Florentines*) perſwaded themſelves, it was done by their conſent, and made their complaints to the *Pope* and the King: they ſent Embaſſadors likewiſe to *Florence*, who complained of the injuries they had received; and remonſtrated, that without their privacy and connivance, *Carlo* could never have aſſaulted them ſo ſecurely. The *Florentines* excuſed themſelves, aſſuring them they would employ their greateſt intereſt that

Troubles in *Tuſcany*.

Carlo

Carlo should not injure them any farther; and that in what way so ever their Embassadors should propose, they would require him to desist: of which proceedings *Carlo* complained as much on the other side, declaring that for not having supplied him, the *Florentines* had robb'd themselves of a considerable acquist, and him of great honor, and reputation; for he promised them the possession of that City in a short time; so much cowardize he had observed in the People, and so much disorder in their defence: whereupon *Carlo* drew off, and retired to his old Masters the *Venetians*: and the *Siennesi* (though delivered by the *Florentines* means) remained full of disgust, as not thinking it an obligation to rescue them from a calamity they had brought upon their heads. Whilst the affairs in *Tuscany* were carried on in this manner; by the Pope and the King, there fell out an accident in *Lombardy* of greater importance, and threatned greater destruction. There was a person called *Cola* (of *Mantua*) who taught the Latine tongue to several young Gentlemen in *Milan*; this *Cola*, being a learned, but ambitious Man, out of pique to the Dukes conversation, or some private exceptions of his own, took occasion in all his discourse, whereever he came, to declaim against subjection to an ill Prince; and to magnifie their felicity whose fortune it was to be born, and brought up in a Commonwealth; affirming that all famous Men, had their education, not under Princes, but Republicks; the latter preferring them as virtuous, the other destroying them as dangerous. The Gentlemen with whom he had entred into more particular familiarity were *Giovanandrea Lampognano*, *Carlo Visconti*, and *Girolamo Olgiato*, and to these he had many times inculcated the excellence of the one Government, and the pernitiousness of the other, and by degrees he became so confident both of their courage and inclination, that he perswaded them to a solemn oath, that as soon as their age would give them leave, they should imploy all their faculties to redeem their Country from the Tyranny of their Prince.

The young Gentlemen, full of his documents, and a desire of observing their oaths: detesting the courses of the Duke, and resenting some particular injuries of their own, were impatient to put his directions in execution. *Galeazzo* was in his carriage both cruel and lascivious (each of which good qualities were sufficient to make him odious) it was not enough for him to debauch and vitiate the noblest Ladies of the City, but he took delight to publish it; no Man (in his judgment) was handsomly punished who was not executed with some unusual circumstance of cruelty. He was suspected likewise to have murdered his Mother, for not fancying himself Prince enough, whilst she was in the way, he behaved himself so towards her, that she desired to retire to *Cremona* (which was the place of her dower) in which journy she was surprized with a sudden fit of sickness, and died, and her death, by many People, imputed to her Son. By tampering with, or reflecting upon some Ladies of their relations, *Galeazzo* had highly disobliged both *Carlo* and *Girolamo*: and to *Giovanandrea* he had refused to give the possession of the Abbey of *Miramando*, which was granted to his predecessors by the Pope: these private injuries, egg'd on the young Gentlemen to revenge themselves, and deliver their Country; presuming if they could kill him, not only the Nobility, but the whole body of the People would follow them: resolved therefore upon the fact, they met many times to consult of the way, and their old familiarity rendered them unsuspected. Whilst they were contriving their business, to make themselves more dexterous and couragious when they came to it, their way was to strike and stab one another with the sheaths of those daggers which they had prepared to do the work, sometimes upon the arms, and sometimes upon the breasts of one another. At length they came to consider of the time and the place: in the Castle it was thought unsafe; a hunting, dangerous and uncertain; a walking, difficult, and unpracticable; in the conventions impossible; at length it was concluded he should be assassinated at some show or publick festivity, to which he would certainly come, at which time upon sundry pretences they might have opportunity to assemble their friends. They concluded likewise, that if any of them, upon any occasion whatever should be absent, or apprehended the rest should proceed, and kill him upon the place.

Conspiracy against the Duke of *Milan*.

In the year 1476 Christmas coming on, and the Duke accustomed on S. *Stephens* day with great solemnity to visit the Church of that Martyr, they pitched upon that for the time and the place. The Morning arriving, they caused some of their principal friends and servants to arm, pretending they were to assist *Giovanandrea*, who (contrary to the inclinations of some of his Enemies) was to bring certain pipes of water into his grounds for his greater convenience: being armed according to directions, they conducted them to the Church, alledging that they would get leave of the Prince to justify what might happen: they caused several others likewise of their friends and allies to meet there, upon several pretences, presuming when the stroke was struck, and the business done to their hand, they would fall in then without any difficulty or scruple. Their resolution was, as soon as the Duke

was killed, to get all those armed Men at their heels, and to march into that part of the Town where they thought they could raise the People with most ease, and perswade them to arm against the Dutchess, and the Ministers of the State, not doubting but the People would readily follow them, being much distressed for want of provisions, and promised (as they intended) the houses of *Cecco Simonetta*, *Giovanni Botti*, *Francesco Lucani*, and all the rest of the Governors, to plunder. Having laid their design thus, and encouraged one another to execute it bravely, *Giovanandrea* with his accomplices, went to Church betimes, and heard Mass together, after which *Giovanandrea* turning towards the image of San. *Ambrogio*, he said, *Most venerable Patron of our City, thou knowest our intention, and for what end we expose our selves to so many dangers; be I beseech you kind and propitious to our enterprize, and by favouring of justice, let the World see how much injustice displeases you.* To the Duke on the other side, before he came to Church, many things happened which seemed to presage his Death. When he dressed himself that morning, he put on a Coat of mail which he usually wore, but on a sudden thinking it unhandsom or troublesom, he caused it to be pulled off and laid by. He had a mind to hear Mass in his own Chappel, but his Chaplain was gone to Saint Stephens Church, and carried all the implements along with him; having news of that, he ordered the *Bishop of Como*, should officiate for him, but he excused himself upon very reasonable impediments: so that he was necessitated (as it were) to go to the Church: before he went he caused *Giovan Galeazzo* and *Hermes*, his Sons to be brought to him, and when they came, he kissed and embraced them, as if he was never to see them again; at length (and very loath) being parted from them, he resolved to go to Church, and marching out of the Castle betwixt the Embassadors of *Ferrara* and *Mantua*, he went towards S. *Stephens*. The conspirators in the mean time, to give the less suspition, and avoid the cold, which at that time was very great, were got up into a Chamber belonging to the Arch-priest, who was of their acquaintance; but hearing the Duke was coming they went down and placed themselves in the Porch, *Giovanandrea* and *Girolamo* on the right hand, and *Charles* on the left. Those who marched before the Duke were already entred, then came the Duke himself encompassed with a great multitude of People. as is usual in such pompous solemnities. The first which addressed themselves to their work was *Giovanandrea*, and *Girolamo*, who pretending to make room, pressed up to the Duke, and with short daggers which they had ready drawn in their sleeves, they stab'd him. *Giovanandrea* gave him two wounds, one in the belly, the other in the throat: *Girolamo* struck him in the throat likewise, and in the belly: *Carlo Visconti* being placed nearer the door, the Duke was past him before he was assaulted, and therefore he could not strike him before he was dead, however he must do his share, and with a schine gave him two deep wounds upon his shoulders; his blows were so sudden and thick, he was cut down and dead, before almost any body perceived it. Nor had he time to do or say more than to call upon the name of our Lady, (and that but once) as he fell. The Duke being slain, a great hubub was rais'd, many swords drawn, and (as it happens frequently in such cases) many People ran in great confusion about the streets, without any certain knowledg of what had passed. However those who were about the Duke, had seen him killed, and knew who they were that did it, pressed hard upon them to revenge it.

The Duke of *Milan* slain.

Giovanandrea being willing to have disengaged himself, got out of the Church, thrust himself among the Women who were there in great numbers upon their knees, but being intangled, and stopped by their coats, a Moor (who was one of the Dukes foot-men) got up to him, and killed him: *Carlo* was slain also by those who were by; but *Girolamo Olgiato* got out of the Church among the crowd; for seeing his companions dead, and not knowing whither to betake himself, he went to his own house, but was refused by his Father and his Brothers: his Mother having more commiseration recommended him to a Priest who had been an antient friend of that family, which Priest changed habits with him, and conveyed him to his house, where he remained two days in hopes some tumult or other would fall out, and he might have opportunity to save himself. But finding he was mistaken in that, and fearing to be found out where he was, he diguised himself, and endeavoured to get off, but was discover'd, secur'd, and delivered up to the Magistrate, to whom he confessed the whole process of the Conspiracy. This *Girolamo* was about twenty three years old, no less couragious and resolute at his death, than at the perpetration of the fact. Being strip'd and the Executioner with his knife in his hand ready to give the stroke, he spake these words in Latine *Mors acerba, fama perpetua, stabit vetus memoria facti.* This Plot was carried on with strange secrecy, and executed with prodigious courage by these unhappy young Gentlemen: but being neither follow'd nor defended by those whom they expected, they miscarried, and were slain. Let Princes by this example live so as to make themselves honor'd and belov'd, that no body may hope to kill them and escape; and let other People have a care of relying upon the multitude too far,

far, how discontented soever; for in their distress they will be sure to forsake them. This accident put all *Italy* into an amaze, but much more what happen'd in *Florence* not long after; for that brake the Peace of all *Italy* which had continued for 12 year, as shall be shown in the next Book, whose end will be no less sad and deplorable, than the beginning is bloody and terrible.

THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE.

Book VIII.

THe beginning of this eight Book falling betwixt two Conspiracies, the one Executed at *Milan*, and already described; the other at *Florence*, and remaining to be related; it would have been convenient (according to my custom) to have said something of the quality and importance of Conspiracies, and I should willingly have undertaken it, had it not been done in another place, and the subject too copious to be passed over with brevity. Waving therefore a matter which would require so much consideration, and is else where amply discoursed; I shall tell, how the Family of the *Medici* (having subdued the adversaries which openly opposed them) to make themselves absolute in the City, and reduce the rest to a civil submission, were necessitated to disable those who were privatly their Enemies. For whilst the *Medici* were but equal in authority, and as it were but in competition with other great Families; the Citizens which emulated their greatness, might oppose them publickly without danger, because the Magistrats being free and independant, neither party was affraid, till one of them was suppress'd. But after the Victory in 66 the Government devolving wholly upon the *Medici*, they exercised it with so much rigor that those who were discontended were forced to comport themselves patiently under it, or by private and clandestine machinations to endeavour to remove it; which seldom and with great difficulty succeeding, they most commonly ruined the Conspirators, and augmented their Grandeur, against whom they were contrived. So that a Prince, according to that method to be deposed, if he be not killed dead, (as the Duke of *Milan*) which happens but rarely, he breaks forth into greater authority; and how good so ever before, becomes bad and tyrannical. For the practices of those Men, give him occasion to fear; fear, to secure himself; security, to be insolent; and from thence springs such aversions and hatred, as is commonly his ruine; so that in conclusion treason does usually destroy the contrivers, and ruine them in time against whom they conspired.

Italy

Italy (as we said before) was divided into two factions; the Pope and the King of *Naples* made one; the *Venetians*, the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines* made the other; and though betwixt them War was not solemnly declared, yet daily provocations were given on both sides, and the Pope very busie in his designs against *Florence*. *Philippo de i Medici* the Archbishop of *Pisa* being dead, in crosnes to that Family, his holiness invested *Francesco Salviati* in that Bishoprick as knowing him to be their Enemy; and the *Senate* of *Florence* refusing him possession, new quarrels arose which created much trouble. Hereupon the family of the *Pazzi* was encouraged at *Rome*, and the Family of the *Medici*, affronted in every thing. The Family of the *Pazzi*, for quality and estate, was the most illustrious in *Florence*. The chief of them was *Messer Giacopo*, who for his wealth and Nobility was made a Knight by the People: this *Giacopo* had only one natural Daughter living, but several Nephews by *Piero*, and *Antonio* his Brothers: the chief of them, were *Guilielmo*, *Francesco*, *Rinato*, *Giovanni*, and (after them) *Andrea*, *Galeotto*, and *Nicolo*. *Cosimo de i Medici* observing the Grandeur of that Family, had married *Bianca* his Neice, to the eldest, *Guilielmo*, in hopes by that alliance to remove the jealousie and animosity which was then betwixt the families. But (so uncertain and fallacious are all humane designs) it proved quite contrary. For those who were of *Lorenzo*'s cabal, perswaded him it was dangerous, and a diminution to his authority, to advance such Citizens as were wealthy and potent; whereupon *Giacopo* and his Nephews were not preferred to those dignities which (in the opinion of other People) they deserved. This gave occasion of disgust to the *Pazzi*, and apprehension to the *Medici*; and the increase of the one, gave matter for the augmentation of the other. So that in all things where other Citizens were entertained, the *Pazzi* were rejected by the Magistrats. The Counsel of eight (upon a trivial occasion, without the respect and difference usually shown to persons of his quality) recalled *Francesco de Pazzi* from *Rome*, and required his residence in *Florence*. Hereupon the *Pazzi* complained highly of the Government, and spake bitterly of them wherever they came, which produced more suspition in the Government, and more injury to themselves. *Giovanni de Pazzi* was married to the Daughter of *Giovanni Boromei* a very rich Man, who being dead without other Children, his Estate descended to his Daughter. Nothwithstanding, *Carlo* his Nephew got possession of part, and refused to surrender. The controversy coming to a hearing, it was decreed that *Carlo* should keep his possession, and the Daughter was defeated: which injustice, the *Pazzi* imputed wholly to the malevolence of the *Medici*; of which *Giuliano* complained many times to his Brother *Lorenzo*, admonishing him to have a care lest grasping at too much, he robb'd himself of all. But *Lorenzo* being young, and elated with his power, would have a hand in every thing, and all must be acknowledged from him. The *Pazzi* being too noble and opulent, to swallow so many affronts, began to cast about how they might revenge themselves. The first who brake the ice, was *Francesco*, who being more sensible, and couragious than the rest, determined to recover what was his right, or to lose what he had.

Animosity betwixt the *Pazzi* and the *Medici*.

Retaining an implacable hatred to the Government at *Florence*, he lived most commonly at *Rome*, where he imployed great sums of Mony, as other *Florentine* Merchants did usually do. Having an intimate acquaintance with Count *Girolamo*, they complained to one another oftentimes of the inhumanity of the *Medici*, at length they came to a solemn debate, and it was concluded that for the one's recovery of his Estate, and the others living freely in that City, it was necessary the present Government in *Florence* should be subverted, which could not be done, but by killing *Giuliano*, and *Lorenzo*. They were confident (having first convinced them of the easiness of the fact) the Pope and the King of *Naples*, would give their consents. Having entertained these thoughts betwixt themselves, they thought fit to communicate with the new Archbishop of *Pisa*; who being naturally ambitious, and lately disobliged, most readily embraced it: consulting themselves what measures were to be taken, it was resolved that *Giacopo de Pazzi* should be drawn in, without whose concurrence, the design was like to be more difficult. To this purpose it was concluded that *Francesco de Pazzi* should repair immediatly to *Florence*; and the Count and Archbishop continue at *Rome* to be near the Pope when things should be fit to be imparted. *Francesco* finding *Giacopo* more formal and untractable than he desired, and signifying it to *Rome*, it was resolved to apply greater authority to dispose him, whereupon the Archbishop and the Count communicated the whole affair with *Giovan Baptista* one of his Holiness his Generals.

Conspiracy against *Lorenzo* and *Giulian de i Medici*.

This *Giovanni* was a Man of great reputation in War; and particularly obliged both by the Count, and the Pope. Nevertheless he objected the great danger and difficulties of the enter-

enterprize, which the Archbiſhop endeavoured to refel by urging the aſſiſtance they were to expect both from the Pope, and the King of *Naples*. The hatred the Citizens of *Florence* bare to the *Medici*: the number of relations and friends which would follow the *Salviati*, and the *Pazzi*; the eaſineſs to kill them, by reaſon of their frequent walking alone about the City without either guards or ſuſpition: and (after they were dead) the ſmal or no oppoſition to be expected in the change of the Government: which allegations *Giovanni Battiſta* could not abſolutely believe, becauſe he had been aſſured the contrary by ſeveral conſiderable Citizens. Whilſt theſe things were in this ſuſpence, it happened that *Carlo* Lord of *Faenza* fell ſick, and was given over for dead. Hereupon the Count and Arch-Biſhop conceived they had a fair opportunity to deſpatch *Battiſta* to *Florence*, and thence into *Romagna*, under pretence of recovering certain Towns which *Carlo* of *Faenza* had taken from them. The Count therefore commiſſioned *Battiſta* to wait upon *Lorenzo*, and in his Name to deſire his advice how he was to behave himſelf in *Romagna*: after which he was to viſit *Franceſco di Pazzi*, and *Giacopo di Pazzi*, and ſee if he could engage them in the deſign: and that he might carry the Popes authority along with him, they appointed him before he departed to receive his Holineſs his Commands, who promiſed what could be imagined for the promotion of the enterprize: *Battiſta* departing ſpeedily from *Rome*, arrived at *Florence*; conſulted *Lorenzo* according to his inſtructions, was very civilly received, and ſo wiſely and amicably anſwered in all his demands, that *Battiſta* was ſurprized, and began to look upon him as courteous, diſcreet, a friend to the *Count*, and one that had been maliciouſly miſrepreſented. However, he was to purſue his orders, and viſit *Franceſco*; he being at *Luca*; he went directly to *Giacopo*, and upon the firſt motion found him very averſe. But before he went away the Popes recommendation ſweetned him ſo that he told *Battiſta* he might proceed in his journy to *Romagna*, and by that time he came back, *Franceſco* would be in *Florence*, and they would talk farther of the buſineſs: *Battiſta* went to *Romagna* and returned; purſued his pretended tranſactions with *Lorenzo*; when he had done with him, went to the *Pazzi*, and ordered things ſo that *Giacopo* was drawn in upon ſerious conſultation of the way. *Giacopo* was of opinion their deſign was impoſſible whilſt both the Brothers were together in *Florence*; That they had better attend till *Lorenzo* went to *Rome*, which by report would be certain, and in a very ſhort time. *Franceſco* was willing enough to have had *Lorenzo* at *Rome*, but if the worſt came to the worſt, and he did not go thither, they might be ſure to kill them both together at ſome wedding, ſome ſhow, or ſome act of devotion: as to their foreign aſſiſtance, it was thought convenient that the Pope ſhould ſend his forces againſt *Caſtello de Montone*, having juſt occaſion of invading the Count *Carlo*, for the troubles and tumults he had raiſed in the Country of *Perugia* and *Siena*; Notwithſtanding they came to no poſitive reſolution at that time; only they agreed that *Franceſco di Pazzi*, and *Giovan Battiſta* ſhould return to *Rome*, and there determine of all things with his Holineſs, and the Count. The whole matter being redebated ſolemnly at *Rome*, they came to this concluſion, (the enterprize againſt *Montone* being confirmed) that *Giovan Franceſco da Tolentino* (an officer of the Popes) ſhould go into *Romagna*; and *Lorenzo da Caſtello* into his Country; each of them get together what forces they were able, and keep them ready to be diſpoſed of, as the Archbiſhop *Salviati*, and *Franceſco dei Pazzi* ſhould order; who being come to *Florence* with *Giovan Battiſta*, they prepared all that was neceſſary; and King *Ferrando's* Embaſſador aſſured them of his Maſters utmoſt aſſiſtance. The Archbiſhop, and *Franceſco* being arrived at *Florence*, they perſwaded into their party *Giacopo* the Son of *Poggio*, a learned youth, but ambitious, and ſtudious of new things. They drew in likewiſe two *Giacopo Salviati's*, one of them a Brother, the other a Kinſman of the Archbiſhop's. They hired *Barnardo Bandini*, and *Napoleone*, two valiant young French Gentlemen, who had been much obliged to the Family of the *Pazzi*. Of Foreigners, beſides them two, they entertained *Antonio da Volterra*, and one *Stefano* a Prieſt, who taught the Latine tongue to *Giacopo's* Daughter, and lived in his houſe.

Rinato dei Pazzi (a wiſe and ſtudent Man, and one who very well underſtood the conſequences of ſuch plots) conſented not to it, but rather deteſted it, and by all plauſible ways endeavoured to diſſwade it. The Pope had maintained at *Piſa* to ſtudy the Canon Law, *Raffaello di Riario* nephew to the Count *Girolomo*, from which place he was recalled by his Holineſs, and promoted to a Cardinalſhip. It was judged commodious by the Conſpiracy, that this Cardinal ſhould come to *Florence* for the better concealment of their deſign, ſeeing that in his equipage all ſuch of their confederats as were neceſſary, might be conveyed into the Town, which would much facilitate the Work. Accordingly the Cardinal arrived, and was lodged by *Giacopo dei Pazzi* at a Country houſe of his at *Montughi*, not far from *Florence*. They deſired by his means that *Lorenzo*, and *Guiliano* might be brought

Rinato dei Pazzi diſwades from the enterprize, but in vain.

brought together, and it was resolved that the first opportunity they should be killed. It was contrived then to make an entertainment for the Cardinal at *Fiesole*, but by accident, or on purpose, it fell out that *Guiliano* was not there; so that that design being defeated, their next was to invite the Cardinal to *Florence*, and thither they made no question but both the Brothers would come: the 26 of *April* 1478 was appointed to be the day. The night before, they met all together, and prepared and disposed all things for execution the next morning; but the day being come, news was brought to *Francesco*, that *Guiliano* was not there: upon that, the chief of them met together again, and concluded the business was no longer to be delayed, for being communicated to so many, it was not possible to conceal it: so that they determined without more ado, to assassinate him in the Church of *Santa Riparata*, when (the Cardinal being present) both the Brothers they presumed would be of course. They appointed *Giovanni Battista* to attack *Lorenzo*, and *Francesco dei Pazzi*, and *Bernardo Bandini*, to do as much to *Guiliano*. But *Giovan Battista* excused himself; the former familiarity he had had with *Lorenzo*, or some other accident having mollified his heart: he pretended his courage would not serve him to commit such an act in the Church, as would add sacrilledge to his treason, and his denial was the first step to the destruction of them all; for being straitned in time, they were forced to depute *Antonio da Volterra*, and *Stefano* the Priest, to that office, two persons very unapt for such an action both in respect of their nature, and education; for certainly if in any thing a resolute, and great mind (accustomed by long experience, to cruelty and blood) be necessary, it is in this case where Princes are to be killed. Having concluded of their time, and other circumstances, there was nothing behind but the signal when they were to begin; which was when the Priest which celebrated the Principal Mass, should receive the Sacrament himself: at which time the Archbishop of *Salviati* with his own followers, *Giacopo di Poggio* with his, should possess themselves of the Palace of the *Senate*, that, either by perswasion or force the *Senate* might be brought over to their side, as soon as the Brothers were slain. Upon this resolution they went to the Church where the Cardinal and *Lorenzo* were already in their seats. The Church was thronged with People, and Divine Service begun, when it was observed that *Guiliano* was not there, whereupon *Francesco de Pazzi* and *Bernardo* who were designed to murder him; went to him to his house, and with intreaties and other artifice, got him along with them to the Church. It is very remarkable, and not often to be matched, that with so horrid, and detestable a design at their hearts, they could carry themselves with that tranquility and composedness, for all the way as they passed they entertained him with youthful and pleasant discourse; and such was the security of *Francesco* that under pretence of caressing and embracing, he felt about his Body to see whether he was armed. *Guiliano* and *Lorenzo* both, knew well enough that the *Pazzi* bore them no good will, and that with all their hearts they would depose them if they could; but they believed when ever they attempted against them it would be legally, and without any violence upon their persons, and therefore suspecting nothing of danger in that kind, they dissembled as much kindness to the *Pazzi*, as the *Pazzi* did to them. The assaffines being ready, (those who were to kill *Lorenzo*, by the help of the crowd being got up to him without any suspition, on that side, and *Guiliano*'s on the other) the sign was given, and *Bernardo Bandini*, with a short dagger provided on purpose, stabbed *Guiliano* into the breast, who passing a step or two forward, fell down upon the ground, *Francesco de Pazzi* threw himself upon him, stabbed him all over, and struck with such fury, that he hit his own leg, and made a desperate wound: *Antonio* and *Stefano* in the mean time attempted upon *Lorenzo*, and making several strokes at him, they wounded him slightly in the throat and no where else; for either by their own faint heartedness, or his courage in defending himself, or the interposition of those who were by, all of them were put off, and their whole enterprize miscarried: Whereupon they fled in great terror, and hid themselves as well as they could; but being found they were shamefully put to death, and their bodies dragged about the City. *Lorenzo* on the other side, joyning with those friends he had about him, betook himself to the vestry, and stood upon his guard. *Bernardo Bandini* seeing *Guiliano* dead, having an old quarrel to *Francesco Nori*, a great friend to the *Medici*, he killed him into the bargain; and not satisfied with two murders, he crowded up to *Lorenzo* with his courage and alacrity to supply what the slackness and cowardice of his accomplices had left unfinished: But finding him barricado'd in the vestry, he could not come at him. In the midst of this great tumult, (which was so dreadful, it was thought the Church would have been pulled down upon their heads) the Cardinal got up close to the Altar, where by the labour of the Priests he was preserved, till the tumult was appeased, and the *Senate* sent to conduct him to his own Palace, where he remained in great fear till the time he was dismissed. There were at

that

that time in *Florence*, certain *Perugians* who had been baniſhed from their Houſes in the time of their factions; theſe *Perugians* the *Pazzi* had drawn to their party, by promiſes of reſtitution. So that the Archbiſhop of *Salviati*, marching with *Giacopo di Poggio* and their followers to ſecure themſelves of the Palace, took them along with him; and being come to the Palace, he left ſome of his company below, with orders upon the firſt noiſe above ſtairs that they ſhould ſeize upon the Gate, whilſt he and the reſt of the *Perugians* went up into the Caſtle. Finding the *Senate* was riſen (by reaſon it was late) after a ſhort time he was met by *Ceſare Petrucci* the *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia*, ſo that entring further with him, and ſome few of his crew, he left the reſt without, who walking into the Chancery, by accident ſhut themſelves in, for the lock was ſo contriv'd, that without the key, it was not eaſily to be opened either within or without. The Arch-Biſhop being entred with the *Gonfaloniere*, pretending to impart ſome great matter to him from the Pope, he accoſted him in ſo confuſed and diſtracted a way, the *Gonfaloniere* from the diſorder both of his looks and expreſſions, began to ſuſpect, ſprung from him out of the Chamber with a great cry, and finding *Giacopo di Poggio*, he caught him by the hair of the head, and delivered him to one of the Sergeants. The noiſe running immediately to the *Senators*, with ſuch arms as they had about them, they ſet upon the Conſpirators, and all them who went up with the Archbiſhop (part being ſhut up, and part unable to defend themſelves) were either kill'd, or thrown alive out of the windows. Of this number, the Archbiſhop, the two other *Salviati*, and *Giacopo di Poggio* were hang'd. Thoſe who were left below, had forc'd the Guards, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the Gate; inſomuch that the Citizens which upon the firſt alarm had run into the Caſtle, were not able to aſſiſt the *Senate* either with their counſel or Arms. *Franceſco de Pazzi* in the mean time, and *Bernardo Bandini* ſeeing *Lorenzo* eſcaped, and one of themſelves (upon whom the hopes of that enterprize did principally depend) moſt grievouſly wounded, they were much diſmaid; *Bernardo*, concluding all loſt, thinking to provide for his ſafety with the ſame courage, as he had injured the *Medici*, he made his eſcape. *Franceſco* being returned to his houſe, tried if he could get on Horſeback (for orders were, as ſoon as the fact was committed to gallop about the Town, and excite the People to liberty, and arms) but finding he could not ride by reaſon of the deepneſs of his wound, and the great quantity of blood which he had loſt, he deſired *Giacopo* to do that office for him, and then ſtripping, he threw himſelf upon the bed. *Giacopo*, though an ancient Man, and not verſed in ſuch kind of tumults, to try the laſt experiment of his fortune, he got on Horſe back, and with about an hundred Horſe well armed, and formerly prepared, he marched towards the Palace, crying out *Liberty*, *liberty*, to the People as he went along; but ſome of them being deafned by their obligations to the *Medici*, and the reſt not deſirous of any change in the Government, none of them came in. The *Senators* who were on the top of the Palace and had ſecured themſelves as well as they could, threw down ſtones upon their heads, and frighted them with threats as much as poſſible. *Giacopo* was in great confuſion, and knew not what to do, when his couſin *Giovanni Sariſtori* coming to him, and reproaching him by what was done already, adviſed him to go home to his houſe, and be quiet, aſſuring him there were other Citizens who would be as careful of the People, and their liberties as he. Being therefore utterly deſtitute of all hopes, *Lorenzo* alive, *Franceſco* wounded, and no body appearing for him, he reſolved to ſave himſelf if he could, and marched out of *Florence* with his Party at his heels, and went towards *Romagna*. In the mean time the whole City was in Arms, and *Lorenzo*, ſurrounded by a ſtrong Party of armed men, was reconveyed to his Palace. The *Senats* Palace was recovered, and all thoſe who had poſſeſs'd it were either taken or killed. The name of the *Medici* was with great acclamation cryed about the City, and the members of thoſe who were ſlain were either dragged or carried upon the point of their ſwords about the ſtreet; every body with great anger and cruelty perſecuting the *Pazzi*. Their houſes were all broken up by the People; *Franceſco*, naked as they found him in his bed, was hurried out of his houſe to the Palace, and hanged up by the Biſhop and his Brethren. Yet with all their contumely by the way, and all their affronts when he came there, they could not provoke him to give them one word; only he looked grim, and fixed his eyes upon every one that abuſed him, and without any other complaint, he ſilently expired. *Guglielmo de Pazzi* Brother-in-Law to *Lorenzo*, was preſerved in his houſe, both out of reſpect to his innocence, and the interceſſion of *Bianca* his Wife. There was not a Citizen in all the City, but went either armed or diſarmed to *Lorenzo* in this exigence, and proffered him both themſelves and their fortunes; ſo great was the kindneſs and intereſt which that family by their prudence and liberality had gained in the People. Whilſt this buſineſs happened, *Rinato di Pazzi* was retired to his Country houſe, intending to diſguiſe himſelf, and eſcape if he could, but he was diſcovered, apprehended by the way, and brought back again to *Flo-*

The Conſpiracy miſcarries.

rence, *Giacopo* was taken likewise passing the *Alps*, for the *Alpigines* hearing what happened in *Florence*, seeing him pass that way, they pursued, took him, and returned him to *Florence*; nor could he prevail with them (though several times he made it his earnest request) to kill him by the way. Four days after this accident, *Giacopo* and *Rinato* were condemned, and put to Death, but among all who were executed (and they were so many that the streets, and high ways were full of their limbs) none was so much lamented as *Rinato*; for he was always esteemed an honest good Man, not guilty of that pride and arrogance which was observed in the rest of his family. And that this story might not pass without an extraordinary instance of the fury of the People, *Giacopo* who was buried at first in the Sepulchre of his Fathers, afterwards was torn from thence as an excommunicated Person, dragged out of the walls of the City, and thrown into a hole; and being taken up again his body was drawn (in the same halter with which he was hanged) naked about the streets, and having no place allowed it to be quiet at land, was at last thrown into the *Arnus*. A great example of the inconstancy of fortune, to see a person of his wealth and authority, pulled so ignominiously in pieces, and ruined with so many circumstances of contempt. They speak indeed of his vices, and of a strange propensity in him to swearing and play, above the degree of the most profligate person; but those infirmities were abundantly recompensed in his charity and beneficence; for he was a great reliever of the poor, and endow'd several places of devotion. The Sunday before this plot was to be executed, that no Man might be a sufferer by any ill fortune of his, he paid all his debts; and all the effects in his Ware houses or custody which belonged to other Persons, he consigned to their several owners with an unimaginable care, after a long examination, *Giovan Batista Montesecco* was at last condemned, and his head struck off. *Guglielmo de Pazzi*, was banished, and his kinsmen which were left alive, imprisoned in a dungeon in the Castle of *Volterra*. When the tumult was over, and the Conspirators executed, *Guiliano*'s funeral was celebrated with the universal condolement of the City, he having been a person of as much goodness and humanity as could be desired in one of his quality and extraction. He had only one Son, born some months after his death, who was christned *Giulio*, who proved so remarkable for his virtue and fortune, that the whole World rings of his reputation at this day; and if God gives me life, I shall speak largely of when I come to the description of his times.

The forces which were got together under *Lorenzo da Castello* in the vale *di Tivero*, under *Giovan Francesco Tolentino* in *Romagna*, in behalf of the *Pazzi*, were in their march towards *Florence*: but hearing of the miscarriage of their affairs, they returned from whence they came. Nevertheless the Pope and the King of *Naples* (though their Conspiracy had failed, and not produced those mutations which they hoped for in *Florence*) resolved to attempt that by open War, which could not otherwise be effected, and both the one and the other caused their forces to advance towards that City, with all possible diligence, declaring as they went, that all the design of their march, and all their desire of the Citizens, was not removing but the removal of *Lorenzo*, who was the only Enemy he had in the Town. The King's Army had already passed the *Tronto*, and the Popes was in the Country of *Perugia*; and lest his temporal power should be too little, he let loose his spiritual maledictions, and excommunications against him. Whereupon the *Florentines* seeing themselves invaded with such formidable numbers, addressed themselves to their defence, with all possible care. *Lorenzo de Medici* (because the War was pretended only against him) prest very earnestly that all the chief Citizens might be invited to the Palace before the *Senate*; and above 300 of them appearing, he spake to them in this manner.

The Pope and King of *Naples* make War upon the *Florentines*.

Most noble Lord's, *and you most magnificent Citizens*,

Lorenzo's speech to the *Florentines*.

"I do not well know whether I am to congratulate, or condole with you this day for the "things which are passed; and truly when I consider with what malice and collusion, "I was assaulted, and my Brother slain, I cannot but condole, and my whole heart and "Soul is overwhelmed with the affliction; when after that I revolve with what promptitude, "with what zeal, with what love, with what unanimity, and universal consent of the "whole City, his death was revenged, and mine prevented; I cannot but rejoyce, nay "even triumph and exsult. For as experience has now taught me that I had more Ene"mies in this City, than I suspected; it has convinced me on the other side, I had more "true friends than I could have hoped for: so that I am to congratulate your goodness, and "to condole the injury and iniquity of other People, which is the more deplorable, be"cause rare, and undeserved. Think, I beseech you, most noble Citizens, to what point "of infelicity fortune hath brought our family, when even among our friends, our relati-

"ons,

"ons, and in the very Church we are in danger. Thoſe who are in diſtreſs, or apprehen-
"ſion of death, are wont to fly to their friends, and relations for ſhelter; we found ours
"not only diſpoſed, but armed, and prepared, and impatient to deſtroy us. Thoſe who
"are under any publick or private perſecution, have uſually their refuge and Sanctuary in
"the Church: where others are protected, we are aſſaulted: where Parracides and Murderers
"are ſecured, the *Medici* are murdered themſelves. But God (who has not hitherto de-
"ſerted our Family) has preſerved us, and undertaken our defence. What injury have
"we done to any body, that could deſerve ſuch vehement revenge? Sure we our ſelves ne-
"ver offended thoſe perſons who have been ſo furious againſt us; if we had, we ſhould not
"have left them in that capacity to revenge themſelves; if it be publick cenſure, or injury
"which provoked them (and of that too I know nothing) 'tis you, not we are offended;
"This Palace, this *Senate*, and the Majeſty of this Government, is aſperſed with unde-
"ſerved decrees againſt the Citizens, in partiality to us, which to my own knowledge is
"far from being true. We would not have injured them if we had been able, and you
"would not have ſuffered us, had we been willing: who ever traces the truth to the bot-
"tom, will find our Family was not exalted by this Government for nothing, if I may ſpeak
"it modeſtly, it was their humanity, their bounty, their munificence which conſtrained
"you to it: if then we have been beneficial to ſtrangers, how came our relations to be diſ-
"guſted? If their appetite of dominion prompted them to what they have done, (and the
"ſeeing of this Palace, and filling the *Piazza* with armed Men, is an evident demonſtra-
"tion it was nothing elſe) the deſign is ſufficient conviction, and ſhows their brutality
"and ambition. If it were hatred and deteſtation of our authority, it was you that gave
"it us, and it is you were injured. But certainly, if any power or authority deſerves to
"be regreted, 'tis that which is uſurped, not that which is acquired by a continued ſtream
"of kindneſs and liberality. I appeal to you, moſt Illuſtrious *Senators*, whether any of
"my predeceſſors arrived at their Grandeur any way but by the unanimous conſent, and
"promotion of this Court. My Grandfather *Coſimo* returned not from his baniſhment by
"violence, and force of Arms, but by your invitation. My antient and infirm Father,
"was too weak to have ſupported his authority againſt ſo many Enemies; it was your
"bounty, it was your authority which defended it. When my Father was dead, and I
"(though but a Child) was left to ſucceed him, Alas! how could I have maintained the
"honor and dignity of the Family without your favour and inſtruction. Our houſe never
"was, nor ever will be able to govern this State, without your cooperation, and
"aſſiſtance. I cannot imagine therefore what quarrel they ſhould have had againſt us,
"or what juſt reaſon for their envy; they ſhould rather have turned their indignation upon
"their own anceſtors, who with their inſolence and avarice defeated them of that honor,
"which ours have gained by their generoſity and goodneſs. But, let us gratifie them ſo
"far as to grant we had injured them, and that their combinations againſt us, were but
"reaſonable and juſt; Why muſt they conſpire againſt this Palace? Why muſt they confe-
"derate with the Pope, and King of *Naples*, againſt the innocence and liberty of this
"Commonwealth? Why muſt all *Italy* be involved in a War? For this they can have no
"excuſe: if any Man had offended them, they might have offended him again, and not
"blended and confounded private injury with publick revenge. This is it which revives
"our calamities, though the Authors are extinct. That is it which has brought
"the Pope and King of *Naples* upon us with their Armies, though their declaration be on-
"ly againſt me and my family. I wiſh to God it were true, and that their deſign was no
"farther: the remedy would be eaſie, and your deliverance at hand; I ſhould not be ſo ill
"a Citizen as to poſtpone the publick, to my private ſecurity; no I would willingly quench
"your flames, though with my own blood and deſtruction: but becauſe the injuries of
"great perſons are alway cloathed with ſome plauſible pretence, they have choſen this, to
"exaſperate you againſt me: if you think I deſerve it, I am now in your hands, to be
"continued or rejected as you pleaſe: you are my Fathers, you are my Patrons, what e-
"ver you command, I will endeavour to do; and not refuſe with my own blood to finiſh
"this War, which is begun with my Brothers.

The Citizens could not contain from teats, whilſt *Lorenzo* was ſpeaking, and with the ſame pity as they had heard him, he was anſwered by one deputed by the reſt. *That the whole City did acknowledge the merits both of his anceſtors and himſelf.* "That he ſhould be of
"good cheer, for with the ſame readineſs and devotion as they had revenged his Brothers
"death, and prevented his, they would preſerve his perſon and reputation, and expoſe
"their whole Country rather than deſert him; that their actions might be commenſurate,
they appointed him a guard, to ſecure him againſt domeſtick deſigns, and payed them out of the publick treaſure: after which they addreſſed themſelves to the War, and raiſed what

Men and mony they were able. They ſent for aid to the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Venetians* according to the league; and the Pope more like a Wolf than a Shepheard, being ready to devour them, they tried all ways to juſtify themſelves that they could think of, poſſeſs'd all *Italy* with his treachery againſt their ſtate, remonſtrated his impieties to all the World; and that he exerciſed his Papacy with as much injuſtice, as he gained it: for he had ſent thoſe (whom he had advanced to the higheſt degree of Prelacy) in the company of Traitors and Murderers to commit treaſon in the Church, in the time of divine ſervice, and the Celebration of the Sacrament; and after that (having been unable to kill all the Citizens, alter the Government, and ſack the City) he interdicted it with his Pontifical maledictions, and threatned to deſtroy it. But if God were juſt, and the violences of Men offenſive to him; he muſt needs be diſpleaſed at the proceedings of his Vicar, and permit that Men (having no other refuge) might reſort unto him. For which reaſon the *Florentines* not only refuſed his interdiction, but forced their Prieſts to celebrate divine ſervice as before. They called a Counſel in *Florence*, of all the *Tuſcan* Prelats within their juriſdiction, and appealed to them concerning their differences with the Pope; againſt which in juſtification of his cauſe, it was alledged, that it belonged properly to the Pope to ſupplant Tyrants, to ſuppreſs ill Men, and to advance good; all which he was to remedy, as opportunity was offered. But that ſecular Princes had no right to impriſon Cardinals; to execute Biſhops; to kill, or diſmember, or drag about the ſtreets the bodies of the Prieſts; and to uſe the innocent and the nocent without any difference or diſtinction. Nevertheleſs the *Florentines* not at all refuſing his quarrels and complaints, diſmiſſed the Cardinal which was in their power, and ſent him back to the Pope; yet the Pope without any regard to that civility, cauſed them to be invaded with all his forces, and the Kings; both their Armies (under the Command of *Alfonſo* Duke of *Calabria Ferrando's* eldeſt Son, and *Federigo Conte d' Urbino*) entred *Chianti*, and by means of the *Sienneſi*, who were of the Enemies party, took *Radda*; ſeveral other Caſtles; and plundered the whole Country. Next they encamped before *Caſtellina*: the *Florentines* ſeeing themſelves thus fiercely attacked, were in great fear, as having but few Men of their own, and the aſſiſtance of their friends coming in very ſlowly; for though the Duke indeed, had ſent them ſupplies, yet the *Venetians* refuſed it, as not thinking themſelves obliged to relieve them in their particular quarrels; for as, they pretended, private animoſities were not in reaſon to be defended, at a publick expence. So that the *Florentines*, to diſpoſe the *Venetian* to better things, ſent *Tomaſo Soderini* Embaſſador to that State, whilſt in the mean time, they raiſed what Men they could, and made *Hercules* Marqueſs of *Ferrara* their General. Whilſt in this manner they were employed in their preparations, the Enemy had brought *Caſtellina* to ſuch diſtreſs that, diſpairing of releif, the Garriſon ſurrendered, after forty days ſeige. From hence, the Enemy advanced towards *Arezzo*, and ſat down before *Monte S. Senino*. The *Florentine* Army was by this time drawn out, and being marched towards the Enemy, had poſted it ſelf within three miles of them, and incommoded them ſo, that *Federigo* ſent to *Urbino* to deſire a truce for ſome few days; which was granted, but with ſo much diſadvantage to the *Florentines*, that thoſe who requeſted it were amazed when they had obtained it; for without it they muſt have drawn off with diſgrace. But having thoſe days allowed to recollect themſelves, when the time was expired they went on with their ſeige, and took the Town under the very noſe of our Army. By this time Winter being come, to provide themſelves good quarters, the Enemy drew his Army into the Country of *Sienna*, the *Florentines* where they thought moſt convenient; and the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* (having done little good to himſelf or other People) returned from whence he came. About this time *Genoa* was in rebellion againſt the State of *Milan*, and upon this occaſion, *Galeazzo* being dead, and his Son *Giovan Galeazzo* a minor, and unfit for the Government, difference aroſe betwixt *Sforza*, *Lodovico*, *Ottaniano*, *Aſcanio*, his Unckles, and *Madona Bona* his Mother; each of them pretending to the tuition of the Child. In which competition *Madona Bona* the Dutcheſs Dowager prevailed, by the Counſels of *Tomaſo Soderini* (the *Florentine* Embaſſador in that Court, at that time) and *Cecco Simonetto* who had been ſecretary to the late *Galeazzo*; whereupon *Sforzi* flying from *Milan*, *Ottaniano* was drowned, as he was paſſing the *Adda*, and the reſt diſperſed into ſeveral places, *Roberto de ſan Severino* ran the ſame fortune, and fled, having forſaken the Dutcheſs in thoſe diſputes, and joyned himſelf with the Unckles. The troubles falling out, not long after in *Tuſcany*, thoſe Princes hoping from new accidents, for new ſucceſs, every one of them attempted what he thought likely to reſtore him to his Country. King *Ferrando* obſerving the only refuge the *Florentines* had in their neceſſities, was to the State of *Milan*, determined to give the Dutcheſs ſo much imployment of her own, that ſhe ſhould not be at leaſure to ſend them any relief; and by means of *Proſpero Adorno*, the *Signore Roberto*,

The Pope and King invade the territories of the *Florentines*.

Genoa rebels againſt the State of *Milan*.

Roberto, and the *Sforzi* which were baniſhed, he wrought ſo that *Genoua* rebelled; nevertheleſs the little Caſtle remained firm to the young Duke, and the Dutcheſs ſent forces to them to recover the Town, but they were overthrown; whereupon conſidering with her ſelf the dangers which might accrew both to her Son, and her ſelf, if the War ſhould be continued, all *Tuſcany* being imbroiled, and the *Florentines* in diſtreſs, ſhe reſolved, ſeeing ſhe could not retain *Genoua* as a Subject, that ſhe would have it as a Friend; and agreed with *Battiſtino Fregoſi* (a great Enemy to *Proſpero Adorno*) to deliver him the Caſtle, and make him Prince of *Genoua*, upon condition he would drive out *Proſpero*, and give the *Sforzi* no aſſiſtance nor protection. After all was concluded betwixt them, the Caſtle was ſurrendered, and by the help of that, and his party, *Battiſtino* reduced *Genoua*, and according to their cuſtom, made himſelf *Dogue*; the *Sforzi* and *Signore Roberto* being forced out of the Town, they paſſed with their followers into *Lunigiana*. The Pope and the King ſeeing the troubles in *Lombardy* compoſed, took occaſion to infeſt *Tuſcany* on that ſide towards *Piſa*, with thoſe Perſons which were driven out of *Genoua*; ſuppoſing by dividing, and diverting their forces, to weaken the *Florentines*; whereupon the Summer approaching, they prevailed with the *Signore Roberto* to march with his Squadron from *Lunigiana*, into the Country of *Piſa*: *Roberto* put the whole Country into confuſion; took ſeveral Caſtles from the *Piſans*, and plundered them, and made his excurſions to the very walls of *Piſa* it ſelf. About this time Embaſſadors arrived at *Florence*, from the Emperour, the King of *France*, and the King of *Hungary*, who from their ſeveral Princes being ſent to the Pope, perſwaded the *Florentines* to ſend Embaſſadors alſo, and promiſed their utmoſt endeavour with him, to conclude all their differences with an honorable peace. The *Florentines* conſented as well to excuſe themſelves to the World, as that they were really deſirous of it. Having ſent therefore their Embaſſadors, they returned as they went, without any accommodation: and the *Florentines* finding themſelves abuſed or abandoned by the *Italians*, reſolved to try if they could gain themſelves any reputation by an alliance with *France*, to which purpoſe they ſent as their Embaſſador *Donato Acciaivoli*, a perſon well skill'd both in the Greek and Latine tongues, whoſe Anceſtors had always born great office in that State; but being arrived at *Milan* in his journy he died; and *Florence*, in honor to his memory, and remuneration to his Children, buried him magnificently at the publick charge; gave his Sons conſiderable exemptions; and his Daughters ſuch portions as would marry them like themſelves; and ſent *Giud' Antonio Veſpucci* (a Man well verſed in the imperial and Pontifical Laws) to the King of *France* in his place. The inroad *Signore Roberto* had made into the Country of *Piſa*, (as all ſudden and unexpected things do) gave the *Florentines* no little diſtraction. For the War lying heavy upon them in the Country of *Siena*, they could not ſee how they ſhould be able to defend themſelves on the other ſide; however they ſent officers and all other proviſions to reinforce the City of *Piſa*; and that they might keep the *Lucchefi* from aſſiſting the Enemy, with mony or any thing elſe, they ſent *Gino Capponi* as their Embaſſador to them; but he was received ſo ill, out of an antient Enmity to the People of *Florence*, (upon former injuries received, and a conſtant apprehenſion of them) that he was many times in danger of being killed by the multitude. So that this journey produced new quarrels, rather than new quiet; and thereupon the *Florentines* called back the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*, entertained the Marqueſs of *Mantoua* into their pay; and with great importunity, deſired of the *Venetians* Count *Carlo* the Son of *Braccio*, and *Deifebo* the Son of *Count Giacopo*, who (after ſeveral ſcruples and demurs) were ſent to them; for having made peace with the Turk, and no pretence left to excuſe themſelves, they were aſhamed to break faith with the League. *Carlo* therefore, and *Deifebo* being come, with a conſiderable number of Horſe, and joyned to what forces they could conveniently draw out of the Marqueſs of *Ferrara's* Army, (which attended the Duke of *Calabria*) they marched towards *Piſa*, in queſt of *Signore Roberto*, who was poſted with his Army near the river *Serchio*; and though at firſt he made a ſhow of expecting our Army, yet upon ſecond thoughts he removed, and retired into the Country of *Lunigiana*, to the ſame quarters where he lay before his expedition to *Piſa*. Upon his departure, *Count Carlo* repoſſeſs'd himſelf of all the Enemy had taken in that Country; and the *Florentines* being clear on that ſide; drew all their forces into one body betwixt *Colle* and *Santo Giminiano*; but upon *Carlo*'s conjunction there being ſeveral of the *Sforzeſchi*, and the *Bracceſchi* in the Army, the old feud began to revive, and it was believed, had they ſtayed longer together, they had fallen together by the ears: to prevent theſe inconveniences, it was reſolved to divide the Army, that Count *Carlo* ſhould march with his forces into the Country of *Perugia*, and the reſt fortifie and intrench themſelves at *Poggibonzi*, to obſtruct the Enemy from entring into the Country of *Florence*. By this diviſion they ſuppoſed likewiſe the Enemy would be forced to divide, for they thought that either *Count Carlo*

The gratitude of the *Florentines*.

Carlo would take *Perugia* (where he had a great party as they believed) or that the Pope would be conſtrained to ſend a good body of Men to defend it; and to drive his Holineſs into greater neceſſity, they ordered *Nicolo Vitelli* (who had left *Caſtello*, where *Lorenzo* his Enemy was predominant) with what force he could make to approach the Town, to drive out his adverſary if he could, and keep it againſt the Pope.

At firſt, fortune ſeemed to encline to the *Florentines*, Count *Carlo* advanced ſtrangely in the Country of *Perugia*; *Nicolo Vitelli*, though he could not get into the Town of *Caſtello*, yet he was Maſter of the field, and plundered round about it without any contradiction; and thoſe forces which were encamped at *Poggibonzi* made their excurſions to the very walls of *Sienna*. But at laſt all their hopes came to nothing, for firſt Count *Carlo* died in the very height of their expectations, whoſe death had nevertheleſs much bettered the condition of the *Florentines*, had they known how to have improved the victory which it produced; for no ſooner was the death of Count *Carlo* known, but the Popes Army (being all together in *Perugia*) conceiving great hopes of overpowring the *Florentines*, took the field, and encamped upon the Lake within three miles of the Enemy: on the other ſide *Giacopo Guicciardini*, (at that time Commiſſary of the Army) by the advice of *Roberto da Rimino*, (who ſince the death of Count *Carlo*, was the chief, and beſt reputed officer among them) knowing what it was that ſet the Enemy agog, they reſolved to attend him; and coming to a Battle not far from the Lake (in the very place where *Hannibal* gave the *Romans* that memorable defeat) the Popes Army was routed. The news of this victory was extreamly welcome in *Florence*, both to the Magiſtrats, and People; and it would have been great honor and advantage to that enterprize, had not diſorders in the Army at *Poggibonzi* ſpoiled all, and the victory over the one Camp, been interrupted by a mutiny in the other; for that Army having got much plunder in the Country of *Siena*, when they came to divide, there fell out great difference betwixt the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*, and the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*, ſo that they came to blows, and did one another what miſchief they were able.

The Popes Army defeated.

The *Florentines* finding no good was to be expected from them together, conſented that the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* with his forces might march home; by which means the Army being weakned, without a head, and very diſorderly, the Duke of *Calabria* being with his Army not far from *Sienna*, took a reſolution of falling upon them; but the *Florentines* hearing of his advance, not truſting to their Arms, their numbers (which was much greater than the Enemy) nor the ſituation of their Camp (which was very ſtrong) without expecting their coming, or ſeeing ſo much as the face of their Enemy, as ſoon as they perceived the duſt, they fled, and left their Amunition, and Carriages, and Artillery behind them; and ſo cowardly and poor ſpirited that Army was become, that the turning of a horſes head or tail, gave either victory or defeat. This Rout filled the King's Souldiers with prize, and the *Florentines* with fear; for that City was not only afflicted with War, but with ſo violent a peſtilence, that moſt of the inhabitants were forced to leave the Town, and betake themſelves to the Country. This overthrow was rendred the more terrible by ſickneſs, for thoſe Citizens who had Eſtates in the *Valdi Piſa*, and the *Val Delſa*, being driven thither, and ſecure; were forced (upon this rout) to hurry back again to *Florence* as well as they could, and that not only with their goods and their Children, but with all their families and dependants, for every hour they were affraid the Enemy would have preſented himſelf before the Town. They who had the adminiſtration of the War, being ſenſible of theſe diſorders, commanded their Army (which was victorious in *Perugia*) that leaving their deſigns there, they ſhould march into the *Val Delſa*, and oppoſe themſelves againſt the Enemy, who, ſince their laſt victory, over-run that whole Country. And though that Army had ſo ſtraitned *Perugia*, it was every hour expected to ſurrender, yet the *Florentines* choſe rather to defend themſelves, than to gain upon any body elſe; and raiſing their ſiege they were conducted to S. *Caſſiano*, a Caſtle about eight miles from *Florence*, as the only place where they might lie ſecure, till the other Army was rallied, and brought to them. The Enemy on the other ſide, being at liberty in *Perugia*, upon the withdrawing of the *Florentines*, took heart, and made their inroads daily into the Countries of *Arezzo* and *Cortona*; and the other Army, which under the command of the Duke of *Calabria*, had routed them at *Poggibonzi*, took *Poggibonzi*, and *Vico*, pillaged *Certaldo*, made great ſpoil, and got great prize in that Country, afterwards they ſat down before *Colle* which) in thoſe times) was looked upon as extraordinary ſtrong, and being well maned, and provided with all things, it was hoped it might entertain the Enemy, till their Armies could be united.

The *Florentines* having joyned all their forces at S. *Caſſiano*, and the Enemy proceeding very fiercely in their leaguer; they reſolved to march towards them, and poſt themſelves

ſelves as near them as they could, ſuppoſing they ſhould thereby, not only encourage the Garriſon to defend themſelves, but make the Enemy more cautious in all his attacks: Hereupon they removed from S. *Caſtiano*, and encamped at S. *Giminiano* about five miles from *Colle*, from whence with their Horſe, and the lighteſt of their foot, they daily moleſted the Dukes Camp: but this was not enough for the Garriſon in *Colle*, for wanting all things that were neceſſary, they ſurrendered the 13 of *November*, to the great diſpleaſure of the *Florentines*, but the great joy of the Enemy, eſpecially the *Sienneſi*, who beſides their common hatred to *Florence*, had a particular quarrel againſt this Town.

Winter was now at the height; the ſeaſon unfit for War; and the Pope and King (to give them hopes of peace, or to enjoy their Victory quietly themſelves) offered a truce for three Months to the *Florentines*, and allowed them ten days for an anſwer; which proffer was accepted; but as a wound is more painful when cold, than when 'tis firſt given, this ſmall repoſe, gave the *Florentines* greater ſence of the miſeries which they had endured, inſomuch as they began to talk freely, and upbraid one another by the miſcarriages in the War, charging one another with the greatneſs of the expence, and the inequality of their taxes; and theſe exprobrations were not only in the ſtreets, and among the ordinary ſort of People, but even in their conventions, and publick Counſels, in which, one of them took the confidence to tell *Lorenzo* to his face, that the City was weary, and would have no more War, and that therefore he ſhould bethink himſelf of Peace; upon which, *Lorenzo*, diſcerning the neceſſity, adviſed with ſuch of his friends as he judged moſt faithful and able, and it was concluded by all (that ſeeing the *Venetians* were cold and uncertain; the Duke young, and imbroiled in new troubles at home) their beſt way would be to ſeek out for new alliance, and try what that would contribute to their ſucceſs. Their great ſcruple was, into whoſe arms they ſhould caſt themſelves, whether into the Popes, or the King's of *Naples*; and upon ſerious debate, it was reſolved into the King's, as a perſon of more ſtability, and likely to yeild them better protection, in regard of the ſhortneſs of the Popes lives, and the changes upon their ſucceſſions. For the ſmall fear the Church has of any Prince, and the ſmall regard it has of any body elſe in all its reſolutions, cauſes that no ſecular Prince can repoſe any intire confidence, or communicate freely in his affairs, with any of the Popes; for he that aſſociats with him in War, and in dangers, may perhaps have a companion and a ſharer in his victories; but in his diſtreſs he ſhall be ſure to be alone, his Holineſs being ſtill brought off by his ſpiritual influence and authority. It being therefore determined more profitable to reconcile with the King, there could be no way thought of ſo likely, as by *Lorenzo* himſelf, for by how much the more that King had taſted of his liberality, by ſo much the more they thought it probable he might ſucceed. *Lorenzo* embracing the motion, and having prepared for his journy, committed the City and Government to *Tomaſo Soderini* (at that time *Gonfaloniere di Giuſtitia*) and left *Florence* in the beginning of *December*. Being arrived at *Piſa* in his way, he writ to the *Senate*, and gave them an account of his deſign, and the *Senate* in honor to him, and that he might treat with more reputation, made him Embaſſador for the People of *Florence*, and gave him authority to conclude with him, according to his own judgment, and diſcretion. About this time *Signore Roberto da Santo Severino*, joyning with *Lodovico* and *Aſcanio* (for their brother *Sforza* was dead) they invaded the State of *Milan*, in hopes to have reinveſted themſelves; having poſſeſs'd themſelves of *Tortona*, and *Milan*, and the whole State being in Arms, the Dutcheſs was adviſed (to compoſe her civil diſſentions) to reſtore the *Sforzi*, and receive them into the Government again. Her great Counſellor in this, was *Antonio Taſſino* a *Ferrareſe*, who, though meanly extracted, being come to *Milan*, was preferred to be Chamberlain both to the Duke and the Dutcheſs; this *Antonio*, for the comlineſs of his perſon, or ſome other ſecret excellence, after the Dukes death, grew into great favour with the Dutcheſs, and in a manner governed the whole State; which was very unpleaſing to *Cecco*, a Man of great prudence, and long experience in publick affairs, inſomuch that he uſed all his intereſt both with the Dutcheſs, and the reſt of the Governors to clip the wings of his authority, and remove him. *Antonio* having notice of his deſign, to countermine him, and have ſome body near which might be able to defend him, he advis'd the Dutcheſs to reſtore the *Sforzi*, and the Dutcheſs following his perſwaſion, invited them back again without communicating with *Cecco*: upon which he is reported to have told her *that ſhe had done a thing which would coſt him his life, and deprive her of the Government.* And ſo afterwards it fell out, for *Cecco* was put to death by *Lorenzo*, and *Taſſino* turned out of *Milan*, which the Dutcheſs took in ſuch dudgeon, that ſhe forſook the Town, and left the Government of her Son to his uncle *Lodovico*, which act of her's in leaving that whole Dutchy to the Government of *Lodovico*, was the ruine of *Italy*, as ſhall be ſhown in its place. *Lorenzo de Medici* was in his journy towards *Naples*, and the truce betwixt the Parties,

Antonio Taſſino a favorite of the Dutcheſs.

Lodovico Sforza Governor of *Milan*.

parties, in a very fair way, when on a ſudden, beyond all expectation *Lodovico Fregoſo*, having intelligence in *Serezana*, ſurprized the Town, and made all priſoners whom he found any ways affected to the *Florentines*. This accident was highly reſented by the Governors of *Florence*, for they imagined it done by the order of *Ferrando*, and therefore complained heavily to the Duke of *Calabria* (who was with his Army at *Sienna*) that whilſt they were in Treaty, they ſhould be aſſaulted ſo treacherouſly; but the Duke aſſured them by Letters, and an Embaſſy on purpoſe, that what had paſſed was done without either his conſent, or his Fathers. However, the affairs of the *Florentines* were judged in a very ill condition; their treaſure being exhauſted; their Prince, in the hands of the King; an old War on Foot with the Pope and the King, a new War commenced with the *Genoueſi*, and no friends to ſupport them, for they had no hopes of the *Venetian*, and of the State of *Milan* they had more reaſon to be affraid, it was ſo various and unſtable: the only hope remaining to the *Florentines*, was in *Lorenzo*'s addreſs to the King.

Lorenzo de Medici arrives at *Naples*.

Lorenzo arrived at *Naples* by Sea, was honorably received both by the King, and the whole City; and though the War was begun for no other end but to ruine him, yet the greatneſs of his Enemies, did but add to his Grandeur; for being brought to his audience, he delivered himſelf ſo handſomly, and diſcourſed ſo well of the condition of *Italy*, of the humors of all the Princes, and People therein, and gave ſo good an account of what was to be dreaded by War, and what was to be hoped for by peace, that the King admired the greatneſs of his mind, the dexterity of his wit, the ſolidity of his judgment, more now, than he had wondered before how he could alone ſuſtain ſo great an invaſion, inſomuch that he doubled his reſpects towards him, and began to think it his intereſt much more to make him his friend, than to continue him his Enemy. Nevertheleſs upon ſundry pretences and fetches, he kept him in diſpence from *December* to *March*, not only to ſatisfy himſelf in a farther experience of *Lorenzo*, but to inform himſelf of the infidelity of *Florence*, for that City was not without thoſe who would have been glad the King would have kept him, and handled him as *Giacopo Piccinino* was handled. Theſe People began to complain, and ſpeak ill of him, all over the Town, to oppoſe themſelves publickly in the Councils againſt any thing that was moved in favour to *Lorenzo*; and gave out generally where ever they came, that if the King kept him much longer at *Naples*, they would alter the Government; ſo that the King forbore to diſpatch him for ſome time, in expectation of a tumult. But finding all quiet, and no likelyhood of any ſuch thing, on the 6 of *March* 1479, he diſmiſſed him, having firſt preſented him ſo nobly, and treated him ſo honorably, that they had made a perpetual League, and obliged themſelves mutually for the preſervation of one anothers Dominions.

If therefore *Lorenzo* was great when he went from *Florence*, he was much greater when he returned; and was received with a joy, and acclamation in the City, ſuitable to his quality, and the recency of his deſerts, who had ventred his own life ſo frankly, to procure peace to his Country. Two days after his arrival, the Articles of Peace were publiſhed, by which both the State of *Florence* and King had particularly obliged themſelves to a common defence; that ſuch Towns as were taken from the *Florentines* during the War (if in the King's power) ſhould be reſtored: that the *Pazzi* which were Priſoners at *Volterra*, ſhould be diſcharged, and a certain ſum of mony payed to the Duke of *Calabria*, for a prefixed time. This Peace was no ſooner publiſhed, but the Pope, and the *Venetians* were infinitly offended, the Pope thinking himſelf neglected by the King, and the *Venetians* by the *Florentines*, for both one and the other having been partners in the War, they took it unkindly to be left out in the Peace. Their diſpleaſure being reported and believed at *Florence*, it was preſently apprehended that the effect of this peace, would be a greater War.

New conſtitutions.

Hereupon the Governors of the State, began to think of contracting the Government, and reducing it into a leſſer number of Miniſters, appointing a Council of 70 Citizens to tranſact ſuch affairs as were of principal importance. This new Conſtitution ſetled the minds of thoſe who were deſirous of innovation, and to give it a reputation, the firſt thing they did was to ratifie the peace which *Lorenzo* had made with the King; and they appointed *Antonio Ridolfi*, and *Piero Naſi*, Embaſſadors to the Pope. Notwithſtanding this Peace, the Duke of *Calabria* departed not from the Country of *Siena* with his Army, pretending he was retained by the diſſentions of that City, which were ſo great, that being quartered not far off, he was invited into the Town, and their differences referred to his arbitration. The Duke accepted the overture, fin'd ſeveral of the Citizens; impriſoned ſeveral; baniſhed ſome, and ſome he put to death; ſo that he became ſuſpitious, not only to the *Sieneſi*, but to the *Florentines* alſo; that his deſign was to make himſelf Prince of that City; nor could they deviſe any remedy, ſeeing they had entred into a League with the

the King, and thereby made both Pope, and *Venetians* their Enemies. And this ſuſpition was not only got into the brains of the multitude in *Florence* (a ſubtile interpreter of affairs,) but into the minds alſo of the Governors; ſo that it was generally concluded, the liberty of that City was never in more danger: but God who has always had a particular care of it in all its extremities, averted that evil, and by an unexpected accident, gave the King, the Pope, and the *Venetians* a diverſion which imported them more, than their advantages in *Tuſcany*.

The Iſle of *Rhodes* aſſaulted by the Turks.

Mahomet the great Turk, was with a great Army, encamped before *Rhodes*, and had lyen before it ſeveral months: though his forces were numerous, and his diligence great, yet the valour of the beſeiged was not to be maſtered, for they defended themſelves ſo bravely, he was forced to draw off, and quit the ſeige, with a great deal of diſhonor. Having left *Rhodes*, he ſent part of his Fleet, under the command of *Giacometto Baſcia* towards *Velona*, and (either upon conſideration of the eaſineſs of the enterprize; or expreſs command from the Grand *Signore* to that purpoſe) coaſting about *Italy*, on a ſudden he landed 6000 Men, aſſaulted the City of *Otranto*, took it, plundered it, killed all the Inhabitants, and when he had done, fortified both the Town and the harbour as much as poſſibly he could, and with a good party of Horſe, ſcowred the whole Country about it. The King being much alarmed at this invaſion, as knowing how great a Monarch he had to deal with, ſent his Embaſſadors about to every Body, to let them know his condition, and to beg their aſſiſtance, againſt the common Enemy; beſides which he preſſed the Duke of *Calabria* with all imaginable importunity, to leave his deſigns at *Siena*, and come back with all his forces: this invaſion though it was very dreadful to the Duke, and all the reſt of *Italy*, yet it was welcome to *Florence* and *Siena*, the one thinking its liberty moſt miraculouſly preſerved, and the other themſelves as ſtrangely delivered from thoſe dangers which would of neceſſity have deſtroyed them. Which opinion was much increaſed by the unwillingneſs wherewith the Duke departed from *Siena*; complaining and curſing his fortune, which by ſo unreaſonable and an unexpected an accident, had defeated him of the Dominion of *Tuſcany*. The ſame thing, changed the Counſels of the Pope, and whereas before he would never admit any Embaſſador from *Florence*, he was grown now ſo meek, he would hear any body ſpeak of a general Peace; and word was ſent to the *Florentines* that when ever they found themſelves enclined ask pardon of the Pope, they would be ſure to have it. The *Florentines* thought not fit to ſlip ſo fair an occaſion; and therefore ſent 12 Embaſſadors to the Pope, who entertained them with diverſe practices after they were arrived at *Rome*, before he admitted them to audience: yet at length it was adjuſted how all Parties ſhould comport for the future, and what every one ſhould contribute, in time of Peace, as well as in War; after which the Embaſſadors were admitted to the feet of the Pope, who was placed in great Pomp, with his Cardinals about him.

The Embaſſadors to the Pope.

The Embaſſadors, to extenuate what had paſſed, laid the fault ſometimes upon their own neceſſities; ſometimes upon the malignity of other People: ſometimes upon the popular fury; ſometimes upon their own juſt indignation; as being ſo unhappy to be forced either to fight, or to die; and becauſe death is the moſt terrible of all things, and all things will be tried, before that will be embraced, they had endured the War, the excommunications and all the ill conſequences which followed; rather than ſuffer their liberty (which is the life of a commonwealth) to be taken from them, and extinguiſhed: nevertheleſs, if their neceſſity had run them upon the rocks, and forced them to do any thing which was diſpleaſing to him, they were ready to make him ſatisfaction, and did hope, according to the example of their gracious Redeemer, he would be as ready to receive them into his moſt merciful Arms. To which excuſes his Holineſs replyed with great heat and indignation, reproaching them by all the miſchiefs which they had done to the Church; nevertheleſs, to preſerve the Commandments of God, he was contented to grant them their pardon as they deſired; but intimated withall, that they were to be more obedient for the future, and if again they tranſgreſſed; that liberty which now they were only like to have loſt ſhould be then taken wholly, and that juſtly, away, becauſe they who deſerved to be free, were ſuch as practiſed good things, and not bad; and liberty abuſed, was deſtructive both to themſelves, and other People; for to neglect their duty either to God or his Church, was not the office of good Men, but of ſuch as were diſſolute and lewd; the correction of which belongeth not only to Princes, but to all that are Chriſtians; ſo that for what was to be paſſed, they were to lay the fault upon themſelves; who by their ill deeds had given occaſion of the War, and continued it by their worſe; but now that was at an end, yet it was attributed more to the goodneſs of other People, than any merit in them; after which he gave them his benediction and the form of the agreement to which he hadadded (beſides what had been debated, and concluded on in Counſel,) that if the *Florentines* expected any

The Pope replies.

fruit from his blessing, they should furnish out fifteen Gallies and keep them in their pay till the Turk was beaten out of *Italy*. The Embassadors complained grievously to have an article of that weight superadded to what was concluded in the Treaty; but by all the friends they could make, and all the arts they could use, they could not prevail to have it expunged; whereupon returning to *Florence*, that *Senate*, to perfect the Peace, sent *Guid Antonio Vespucci* (who not long before was returned from *France*) their Embassador to his Holiness, and by his prudence, he brought the terms to be tollerable, and as a greater sign of his reconciliation, received several other marks of his Holiness favour. The *Florentines* having put an end to all their differences with the Pope. *Siena* being free, they delivered from their apprehensions of the King, by the Duke of *Calabria* drawing away with his Army out of *Tuscany*, and the War continuing with the Turks, they pressed the King so hard to the restitution of such places as the Duke of *Calabria* at his departure had committed to the keeping of the *Sanesi*; that he began to fear the *Florentines* might desert him, and by making War upon the *Sanesi*, hinder the assistance which he expected from the Pope, and the rest of the Princes of *Italy*; whereupon he caused them all to be delivered, and by several new favours, reobliged the *Florentines* to him; from whence we may observe, that it is interest and necessity, not their hands or their words, which make Princes keep their promises. These Castles being restored, and the new League confirmed, *Lorenzo de Medici* gained greater reputation than the War first, and after, the peace (when they were jealous of the King) had taken from him. For at that time there wanted not those who calumniated him openly, as one who to preserve himself, had sold his Country, and as by the War they had lost their Towns, by the peace they should lose their liberty. But when the Towns were restored; an honorable peace concluded with the King; and the City returned to its antient reputation, the People (who are generally greedy to talk, and judg of things more by the success, than the Counsel) changed their note presently, and cryed up *Lorenzo* to the skies, as one who had gained more by his management in that peace, than their ill fortune had got them by the War; and that his prudence and judgment had done what all the Armies and power of their Enemies could not.

This descent of the Turks defer'd the War, which the Pope and the *Venetians* upon provocation of that peace, had designed against them, but as the beginning of the Turkish invasion was unexpected, and produced much good; so the end of it was unlooked for, and the occasion of much mischief; for *Mahomet* the Grand *Signore* dyed suddenly, and difference arising betwixt his Sons, those who were landed in *Puglia*, being abandoned by their Lord, came to an agreement with the King of *Naples*, and delivered up *Otranto* into his hands. This fear therefore being removed, which kept the Pope, and the *Venetians* quiet; every one began to be apprehensive of new troubles. On the one side the Pope and the *Venetian* were in League, and with them *Genouesi*, *Sanesi*, and other lesser Potentates. On the other side, were the *Florentines*, the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and with them the *Bolognesi*, and several other little States. The *Venetian* had a design upon *Ferrara*; they thought they had reason enough to attempt it, and hopes enough to carry it. The reason was, because the Marquess had declared himself obliged no longer to receive either their *Visdomine*, or their salt; for by compact after 70 years, that City was to be exempt both from the one and the other: to which the *Venetians* replyed that so long as he retained the *Polesine*; so long he was, to receive the *Visdomine* and the Salt; but the Marquess refusing, they thought they had just occasion to take Arms, and their opportunity was convenient, seeing the Pope, in such indignation, both against the *Florentines*, and King: to oblige him the more, Count *Girolamo* being by accident at *Venice*, was honorably treated, made a Gentleman of that City, and had all the priviledges and immunities of a Citizen confered upon him; which is a particular favour, and shows always the great esteem they bear to the Person which receives it. In preparation for this War, they laid new taxes upon their subjects; and for their General, they had chosen *Roberto da San Severino*, who upon some difference betwixt him, and *Lodovick* Duke of *Milan*, fled to *Tortona*, and having made some tumults there, he got off to *Genoua*, from whence he was invited by the *Venetians*, and made General of their Army. The news of these preparations coming to the ears of the League, they prepared themselves accordingly. The Duke of *Milan* chose *Federigo* Lord of *Urbin*, for his General. The *Florentines Costanzo di Pesaro*; and to sound the Pope, and discover whether these proceedings of the *Venetians* were by his consent, King *Ferrando* sent the Duke of *Calabria* with his Army to quarter upon the *Tronto*, and desired leave of his Holiness that they might pass thorow his territortes, from thence into *Lombardy* to the relief of the Marquess; which being absolutely denied, the *Florentines* and King thinking that a sufficient declaration of his mind, resolved to attempt it by

by force, and try if that way they could make him their friend, or at leaſt give him ſuch impediments as ſhould hinder his ſupplying of the *Venetians*, who had already taken the field; invaded the Marqueſs; overrun moſt of the Country, and clap'd down with their Army before *Figarolo*, a Caſtle of great importance to the affairs of that Prince. The King and the *Florentines* having in the mean time concluded to fall upon the Pope, *Alfonſo* Duke of *Calabria* marched his Army towards *Rome*, and by the help of the *Collenneſi* (who were joyned with him, in oppoſition to the *Orſini* who ſided with the Pope) he committed great ſpoils all over that Country. On the other ſide, the *Florentines* under the command of *Nicolo Vitelli* aſſaulted the City of *Caſtello*; took it, turned out *Lorenzo* who had kept it for the Pope, and gave it to *Nicolo* as Prince: the Pope was at this time in very great anxiety. *Rome* was full of factions within, and the Enemy in the Country without. Nevertheleſs, (like a couragious Prince, reſolved to overcome, not to yeild to his Enemies) he entertained for his General *Roberto da Rimino*, and inviting him to *Rome*, where he had aſſembled all the forces he could make, he repreſented how great an honor it would be to him, if he could reſcue the Church from the calamities which were upon it; and that not only himſelf and his ſucceſſors, but God Almighty would reward him. *Roberto* having taken a view of his Army, and all the Magazins, he perſwaded the Pope to raiſe him what foot he could more, which was done with great dilligence and expedition. The Duke of *Calabria* was all this while forraging about that Country, and making his inroads to the very walls of the City; which netled and provoked the Citizens ſo, as many of them came freely, and offered their ſervice to remove them, which *Roberto* with many thanks, and great expreſſions of kindneſs accepted.

The Duke, underſtanding their preparations, thought fit to draw farther off from the City, ſuppoſing that *Roberto* would not venture to follow him at any diſtance from the Town; beſides he had ſome expectation of his Brother *Federigo* who was to come to him with freſh ſupplies from his Father. *Roberto* finding himſelf equal in Horſe, and ſuperior in foot, drew his Army out of the Town, and directing towards the Enemy, he encamped within two miles of him. The Duke finding the Enemy upon his back, quite contrary to his expectation; perceived there was no remedy but he muſt fight, or run away; ſo that forced, and conſtrained, leſt otherwiſe he ſhould do a thing unworthy of a King's Son, he reſolved to fight, turned upon the Enemy, and each of them having put their Army into order, according to the diſcipline of thoſe times, they fell to it, and the battle continued from morning to noon, and was fought with more courage than any in *Italy* for fifty years before; there dying on the one ſide and the other above a thouſand Men: the end of which fight was very honorable for the Church; for their infantry being numerous, ſo galled the Dukes Horſe, that they were forced to turn tail, and the Duke had been taken, had he not been reſcued by ſome Turks, which upon the delivery of *Otronto* took pay under him. *Roberto* having gained ſo abſolute a Victory, returned triumphantly to *Rome*; but he injoyed the pleaſure of it but little, for in the heat of the battle having drunk a great quantity of cold water, he put himſelf into a flux, and died not many days after; his body being intered by his Holineſs with all imaginable ceremony. The Pope having gained this Victory, he ſent the Count towards *Caſtello* to try if he could recover it for *Lorenzo*, and what he could do upon *Rimina*; for after the death of *Robert*, there being only one Child left in the tuition of his Lady, he thought it might be no hard matter to get into that Town; and doubtleſs he had ſucceeded, had not that Lady been aſſiſted by the *Florentines*, who oppoſed him ſo happily, that he could do nothing againſt *Rimino*, nor *Caſtello*. Whilſt theſe things were in agitation in *Romagna*, and *Rome*, the *Venetians* had taken *Figarolo*, and paſſed the *Po* with their Army; the Duke of *Milan*'s, and the Marqueſs his Army (being in no ſmall diſorder, upon the death of the Count *d' Urbino*) who falling ill was removed to *Bologna*; and died there; ſo that the Marqueſſes affairs began to decline, and the *Venetians* had great hopes of becoming Maſters of *Ferrara*. On the other ſide the *Florentines* and King of *Naples*, uſed all poſſible art to bring the Pope over to their party, but not being able to do it by force; they threatned him with a Counſel, which the Emperour had pronounced already ſhould be held at *Baſil*. Whereupon, by perſwaſion of his Embaſſadors at *Rome* and the chief of the Cardinals (who were very deſirous of peace) the Pope was conſtrained, and began to hearken to the peace, and tranquility of *Italy*; and for fear the Grandeur of the *Venetians* ſhould be the ruine of that Country, he became inclinable to the League, and ſent his *Nuntii* to *Naples*, where a peace was concluded for five years betwixt the Pope, King of *Naples*, and *Florentines*, reſerving a certain time for the *Venetians*, if they pleaſed to come in. Which being done, the Pope ſent to the *Venetians* to deliſt in their War againſt *Ferrara*, but the *Venetians* were ſo far from complying, they reinforced their Army, and purſued it with more eagerneſs than before; for having

The Duke of *Calabria* defeated.

Anew League.

defeated the Dukes forces, and the Marqueſſes at *Argenta*, they had advanced in ſuch manner againſt the City, that their Army was encamped in the Marqueſſes Park. So that the League, thinking it no dallying any longer, reſolved to aſſault them with all the forces they could make, and accordingly the Duke of *Calabria* had orders to march thither with their Army. The *Florentines* likewiſe ſent what Men they could ſpare; and for the better adminiſtration of the War, a Diet was appointed to be held at *Cremona*, where there met the Popes Legat, *Count Girolamo*, the Duke of *Calabria*, the *Signore Lodovico*, and *Lorenzo de Medici*, with many other Princes of *Italy*, in which Council the Method of the future War was debated, and having concluded that *Ferrara* could not any way be releived more effectually, than by a brisk diverſion, they deſired *Lodovico*'s permiſſion to attack the *Venetians* thorow the Country of *Milan*; but *Lodovico* would not be perſwaded, as fearing to pull a War upon his back, which he could not be rid off when he pleaſed: whereupon it was determined that they ſhould march with their whole ſtrength for *Ferrara*, and having muſtered 4000 Horſe and 8000 Foot, they advanced againſt the *Venetians*, who were 2200 Horſe, and 6000 Foot. But the firſt thing the League thought fit to attempt, was a Fleet which the *Venetians* had upon the *Po*: and they aſſaulted it ſo ſmartly that they broke it at *Bondino*, deſtroyed 200 of their Veſſels, and took *Antonio Juſtiniano* (the Proveditor of their Navy) Priſoner.

The *Venetians* ſeeing all *Italy* combined againſt them; to give themſelves greater reputation, they entertained the Duke of *Reno* into their pay with 200 good Horſe: and upon news of the defeat of their Fleet, they ſent him with part of the Army to face the enemy, whilſt *Roberto da San Severino* paſſed the *Adda* with the reſt, and approaching to *Milan*, proclaimed the Duke and Madam *Bona* his Mother; hoping that *Lodovico* and his Government had been ſo odious in that City, that the very name of the other would have begot ſome commotion. This inroad at firſt produced ſome kind of terror: but the concluſion was quite contrary to what the *Venetians* had deſigned, for this compelled *Lodovico* to do, what he could not be brought to before; and therefore leaving the Marqueſs of *Ferrara* to the defence of his own Country, with 4000 Horſe, and 2000 Foot, the Duke of *Calabria* with 12000 Horſe, and 5000 Foot, marched into the Countries of *Bergona*, *Breſcia*, and *Verona*, plundering and ſpoiling all about them, before the *Venetians* could ſend them any releif, for *Roberto* and his Army had much ado to ſecure that City: on the other ſide, the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*, had recovered a great part of his loſſes; for the Duke of *Reno* (who was ſent to confront him) having but 2000 Horſe and 1000 Foot was not able to oppoſe him: ſo that all that year 1483, things went on proſperouſly for the League. The next Spring (the Winter having paſſed without any conſiderable action) both Armies took the field. The League, for greater expedition in their deſigns againſt the *Venetians*, had drawn their whole Army together; and (had the War been managed as wiſely as the year before) had eaſily carried what ever the *Venetians* were poſſeſs'd of in *Lombardy*; for they were reduced to 6000 Horſe, and 5000 Foot (whilſt the Enemy conſiſted of 13000 Horſe, and 6000 Foot) for the Duke of *Reno*, being entertained only for a year, when his time was out, was retired. But (as it many times happens where many are in equal authority) diſſention among the Grandees, gives the Victory to the Enemy; for *Federigo Gonzagua* Marqueſs of *Mantua* being dead (who whilſt he was living, kept the Duke of *Calabria*, and *Signore Lodovico* in good correſpondence) there grew exceptions betwixt them, and jealouſies by degrees: for *Giovan Galeazzo* being of age, become capable of the Government, and married to the Daughter of the Duke of *Calabria*, he had a mind his Son-in-Law, and not *Lodovico* ſhould exerciſe the Government. *Lodovico*, ſmelling his deſign, reſolved if poſſible, to prevent him. This inclination of *Lodovico's*, being known to the *Venetians*, they thought it a fair opportunity to gain (as they had done before) by peace, what by War they had loſt; and making private overtures to him, in *Auguſt* 1484 they came to an agreement, which was no ſooner divulged but the other Confederats were higly diſpleaſed, eſpecially ſeeing all they had taken from the *Venetians* would be reſtored; the *Venetians* left in the poſſeſſion of *Rovigo* and *Poliſine* (which they had taken from the Marqueſs of *Ferrara*) and inveſted with all the Prerogatives and preheminences which they had exerciſed over that City before: for every Man judged they had made a chargable War; gained ſome honor indeed in the proſecution of it; but in the concluſion, they had come off with diſgrace; for the Towns which they had taken were reſtored, but the Towns they had loſt were kept by the Enemy: yet the confederats were glad to accept the Peace, being weary of the War, and unwilling to tempt their fortune any further with the defects and ambition of other People.

Caſtello beſieged by the Army of the Pope.

Whilſt in *Lombardy* things were managed at this rate, the Pope, by the mediation of *Lorenzo*, preſſed hard upon the City of *Caſtello* to turn out *Nicolo Vitelli*, who (to bring over

over the Pope to their party) was deserted by the League. Whilst they were intrenched before the Town, those of the Garrison who were friends to *Vitelli*, sallyed out upon the Enemy, and beat them from the siege; hereupon the Pope recalled *Girolamo* from *Lombardy*; caused him to come to *Rome* to recruit his Army, and then sent him to pursue his designs against *Castello*: but judging it better upon second thoughts to reduce *Nicolo* by fair means than foul, he made peace with him, and reconciled him, as much as in him lay, to his adversary *Lorenzo*: and to this he was constrained more out of apprehension of new troubles, than any desire to peace; for he saw ill humors remaining betwixt the *Colonnesi*, and the *Ursini*.

In the War betwixt the Pope and the King of *Naples*, the King of *Naples* had taken from the *Ursini* the Country of *Pagliacozzo*, and given it to the *Colonnesi* who followed his party. When Peace was afterwards made betwixt the Pope and the King, the *Ursini* demanded restitution by virtue of that treaty. The Pope many times required the *Colonnesi* to deliver it, but neither the prayers of the one, nor the threats of the other being able to prevail, they fell upon the *Ursini* with their old way of depredation and plunder. The Pope not enduring that insolence, drew all his forces together, and joyning them with the *Ursini*, they sacked the Houses of all the *Colonni* in *Rome*; killed those who resisted, and destroyed most of the Castles which they had in those parts: so that those tumults were ended, not by peace, but by the destruction of one of the parties.

The *Colonni* provoked the Pope, and are ruin'd in *Rome*.

In the mean time, the affairs in *Genoua* and *Tuscany* were in no better condition; for the *Florentines* kept *Antonio da Marciano*, with his forces upon the frontiers of *Serezana*, and with excursions and skirmishes, kept the *Serezani* in perpetual alarm. In *Genoa Battistino Fregoso* Doge of that City, reposing too much confidence in *Paulo Fregoso* the Arch-Bishop, was himself, his Wife and Children, seized by him, and the Archbishop made himself Prince. The *Venetian* fleet had at that time assaulted the King of *Naples*; possess'd themselves of *Galipoli*; and alarmed all the Towns about it; but upon the peace in *Lombardy*, all the differences were composed, except those in *Tuscany*, and *Rome*: for the Pope died five days after the Peace was proclaimed, either his time being then come, or else his indignation at the Peace (against which he was most obstinatly averse) having killed him. However he left all *Italy* quiet when he died, though whilst he lived, he kept it constantly imbroiled. Upon his death, *Rome* was immediatly in Arms: Count *Girolamo* with his forces retired to the Castle: the *Ursini* were fearful the *Colonni* would revenge the injuries they had so lately received: the *Colonni* demanded their Houses and Castles to be made good; so that in a few days, Murders, Roberies, and burning of Houses, was to be seen in several parts of the City; but the Cardinals having perswaded *Girolamo* to deliver up the Castle into the hands of their Colledge, to retire to his own Government, and free the City from his forces; hoping thereby to make the next Pope his friend, he readily obeyed, delivered up the Castle to the Colledge, and drew off his forces to *Imola*. So that the Cardinals being rid of that fear, and the Barons of the assistance they expected from *Girolamo*, they proceeded to the Election of a new Pope, and after some little disputes, they made choise of *Giovan Battista Cibo* Cardinal *di Malfetta*, a *Genoueſe*, with the name of *Innocent* the 8, who by the easiness of his Nature (being a Man of peace) prevailed with them to lay down their Arms, and once more made all quiet at *Rome*.

Notwithstanding this Peace, the *Florentines* could not be prevailed with to be quiet; it appearing to them dishonorable, and insufferable that a private Gentleman should have taken, and keep from them the Castle of *Serazana*; and because it was an article in the Peace, that not only all that had been lost might be demanded again, but that War might be waged against any that obstructed it, they prepared Men and mony to go on with that enterprize: whereupon *Agostino Fregoso*, who had surprized *Serazana*, finding himself unable with his private force, to sustain such a War, he religned it to S. *George*. And seeing we shall many times have occasion to mention S. *George*, and the *Genoueſi*, it will not be inconvenient to describe the orders and methods of that City, which is one of the principal in *Italy*.

The Company of S. *Giorgio*.

When the *Genoeſi* had made peace with the *Venetians*, after the greatest War in which they had ever been engaged, not being able to satisfie certain Citizens who had advanced great sums of mony for the service of the publick, they made over to them the profits of the *Dogana*, appointing that every Man should share of them, according to the proportion of his principal sum, till his whole debt should be wrought out; and for their convenience of meeting, and better disposing of their affairs, they consigned the Palace to them which was over the Custom-house. These Creditors erected a kind of Government among themselves, created a Counsel of 100 to deliberate and order all publick matters, and another of eight Citizens, to put them in execution: their debts were divided into several parts, which they

they called *Luoghi*, and their whole body was called San *Giorgia*. Having eſtabliſhed their Government in this manner, new exigences ariſing every day to the Commonwealth, they had recourſe to San *Giorgio* for ſupplies; which being rich, and well managed was able always to releive them: but the Magiſtrats and community of the City (having granted them their cuſtoms before) were forced now when they borrowed any mony, to make over their lands to them, and they had done it ſo frequently, that the neceſſities of the one, and the ſupplies of the other had brought things to that paſs, that the greateſt part of the Town's and Cities under the juriſdiction of *Genoua*, were fallen into their hands, and they Governed and diſpoſed of them as they pleaſed, chuſing annually their *Rettori* or Governors by publick ſuffrage, without the leaſt interpoſition or concernment of the Commonwealth. From hence it happened that the affection of the People was removed from the government of the Commonwealth (which they looked upon as tyrannical) to the Government of San *Giorgio*, (which waswell, and impartially adminiſtred) and from hence the eaſie and often changes, of the State did proceed; which ſubmitted it ſelf ſometimes to this Citizen, ſometimes to that ſtranger, as occaſion invited; and the reaſon was, becauſe it was not *San Giorgio*, but the Magiſtrats which altered the Government. Therefore when the contention was betwixt the *Fregoſi*, and *Adorni* for Soveraignty of the City; becauſe the controverſie was only among the Governors of the Commonwealth; the greateſt part of the Citizens withdrew, and left the State to him that could catch it; the office of San. *George* concerning it ſelf no farther, than to ſwear the perſon advanced, to the conſervation of their Laws, which have not been altered to this very day; for having Arms, and mony, and conduct, they cannot be ſubverted without danger of a deſtructive Rebellion. A rare and incomparable example, not to be followed in all the viſible, or immaginary Commonwealths of the Philoſophers; to behold in the ſame Circle, among the ſame Citizens, liberty, and tyranny, civility, and corruption, juſtice, and rapine to be exerciſed at the ſame time; for that order alone preſerved that City in its antient and venerable cuſtoms. And had it fallen out (as in time doubtleſs it will) that the Government of the Commonwealth had fallen to the management of San. *Giorgio*, no queſtion but before this it would have been greater, and more formidable than the republick of *Venice*. To this San. *Giorgio*, therefore *Agoſtino Fregoſa* (not being able to keep it himſelf) delivered *Serezana*: San *Giorgio* accepted it readily, undertook to defend it; put out a Fleet immediatly to Sea; and ſent forces to *Pietra Santa* to intercept any that ſhould go to the *Florentines*, who were already encamped before *Serezana*. The *Florentines* on the other ſide had a months mind to *Pietra Santa*, as a Town which, by reaſon of its ſcituation betwixt *Piſa* and that, would make *Serezana* inconſiderable, though they ſhould take it; and in the mean time interrupt them in their Leaguer, as often as that Garriſon ſhould think it fit to come forth. To bring this about, the *Florentines* ſent a conſiderable quantity of proviſions and amunition, with a ſmall party to convey them from *Piſa* to their Camp. Suppoſing that the Garriſon of *Pietra Santa* would be tempted to take them, both from the weakneſs of the convoy, and the greatneſs of the prize: and their artifice ſucceeded, for the Garriſon could not ſee ſuch a booty, and ſuffer it to paſs. This was as the *Florentines* deſired, and gave them juſt pretence of hoſtility; whereupon, riſing from *Serazana*, they marched to *Pietra Santa*, and encamped before it, which being well man'd, defended it ſelf ſtoutly. The *Florentines* having diſpoſed their artillery in the plain, they raiſed a new battery upon the mountain, intending likewiſe to batter it from thence. *Giacopo Guicardini* was their Commiſſary at that time, and whilſt they were employed at *Pietra Santa* in this manner, the *Genoua* fleet took and burned the *Rocca di Vada*, and landing ſome Men, overran all the Country there abouts. Againſt theſe forces *Bongianni Gianfigliazza* was diſpatched with a party of Horſe and foot, who reſtrained their extravagance, ſo as they did not make their excurſions as formerly. However the Fleet continued to moleſt the *Florentines*, and accordingly removed to *Ligorne*, where with bridges, and other military engines, having got cloſe to the New Tower, they battered it ſmartly for ſeveral days together, but finding it to no purpoſe, they went off again with ſhame. In the mean time the ſiege at *Pietra Santa* went on very ſlowly; inſomuch that the Enemy was encouraged, to attempt upon their battery, and ſallying out when they ſaw their advantage, they carried it, much to their own reputation, and to the diſcouragement of their Enemy, who immediatly drew off to about four miles diſtance, and the officers conſidering it was *October*, and the Winter far on, were of opinion to put their Army into their quarters, and reſerve the proſecution of their ſeige, till a better ſeaſon.

Theſe diſorders being known at *Florence*, filled all the chief officers with great indignation; upon which to recruit their Camp, and recover their reputation, they elected *Antonio Pucci*, and *Bernardo del Nero* for their new Comiſſaries; who being ſent with a conſiderable

ſiderable ſupply of mony to the Camp, remonſtrated to the chief officers, the diſpleaſure of the *Senate*, the State and the whole City; their commands to return their Leaguer with the Army; the ſcandal and infamy it would be, if ſo many great officers, with ſo great an Army, having nothing to oppoſe them but a pitiful Garriſon, ſhould not be able to carry ſo weak, and ſo contemptible a Town. They repreſented likewiſe, the preſent and future advantage which they might expect if it were taken; ſo that they were all encouraged to return, and the firſt thing to be attacked, they reſolved ſhould be the Baſtion, out of which they had been forced: in which action, it was manifeſt, what courteſie, affability, kind uſage, and good words could produce in the Souldiers, for *Antonio Pucci*, perſwading this, promiſing that, aſſiſting a third with his hand, and embracing the fourth, incited them to the aſſault with ſuch fury, that they regained the Baſtion in a moment; but they did not take it without loſs, for the Count *Antonio da Marciano* was ſlain from one of their great Guns. This ſucceſs brought ſuch a terror upon the Garriſon, that they began to think of ſurrendring. That things might be tranſacted with greater reputation, *Lorenzo de Medici* thought good to repair in perſon to the Camp, where he was no ſooner arrived, but in a few days the Caſtle ſurrendered. Winter being come, it did not appear to thoſe Officers convenient to proſecute the War, but to attend better weather; for the ſeaſon of the year, by the malignity of the air had infected the Army extreamly, and many of their chief Officers were ſick; and among the reſt, *Antonio Pucci*, and *Bongianni Gianfigliazzi*, were not only ſick, but died, to the great regret of all People, ſo much honor and eſtimation had *Antonio*, acquired by his conduct at *Pietra Santa*. The *Florentine* had no ſooner taken, and ſetled themſelves in *Pietra Santa*, but Embaſſadors came to them from the *Lucchefi* to demand it, as an appendix to their Commonwealth; alledging that among the reſt, there was an expreſs article that what ever ſhould be taken either of the one ſide or the other, ſhould be reſtored to the firſt owners. The *Florentines* did not deny the agreement, but anſwered that they could not tell whether in the Peace they were then negotiating with the *Genoueſes*, they might not be obliged to reſtore it, and therefore they could give them no poſitive reſolution, till that was determined; and if it ſhould happen that they ſhould not be obliged, it would be neceſſary for the *Sieneſi* to think of ſome way to ſatisfy for the expence they had been at, and the damage they had received by the loſs of ſo many conſiderable Citizens, and when they did ſo, they might be confident they ſhould have it. This whole Winter was conſumed, in negotiations of Peace, betwixt the *Florentines* and the *Genoueſi*, which were tranſacted at *Rome* by the mediation of the Pope: but nothing being concluded, the *Florentines* would have fallen upon *Serezana* in the ſpring had they not been prevented by *Lorenzo*'s indiſpoſition, and a new War betwixt *Ferrando* and the Pope. For *Lorenzo* was not only troubled with the Gout (which was his hereditary diſeaſe) but he had ſo great pains and affliction at his ſtomach, that he was forced to go to the baths to be cured. But the chiefeſt occaſion was the War, which was originaly from hence. The City of *Aquila* was ſubject to the Kingdom of *Naples*, but ſo, as in a manner it was free. In that City, the *Count de Mortorio* was a Man of more than ordinary reputation. The Duke of *Calabria* lying with his Horſe not far from *Tronto*, pretending a deſire to compoſe certain tumults which had happened betwixt the Peaſants in thoſe parts (but being really ambitious to reduce that City to a more intire ſubjection to his Father) ſent to the Count to let him know he deſired to ſpeak with him, and take his advice in the regulation of thoſe affairs. The *Count*, not having the leaſt jealouſie, repaired to him immediatly, but he was ſeized, as ſoon as he arrived, and ſent Priſoner to *Naples*.

Pietra Santa taken by *Lorenzo*.

This accident being known in *Aquila*, altered the affections of the whole City, inſomuch that the People taking Arms, *Antonio Concinello* (the King's Commiſſary) was ſlain, and with him, ſuch of the Citizens as were known to be affected to the Neapolitan intereſt: and that they might have friends to defend them in their Rebellion, they ſet up the Banner of the Church, and ſent Embaſſadors to the Pope, to tender him the poſſeſſion of their City, and implore his protection againſt the Tyranny of the King. The Pope was eaſily perſwaded to their defence, as a Perſon that hated the King, both upon publick, and private accounts; whereupon being informed that *Roberto da San Severino* (a great Enemy to the State of *Milan*) was out of imployment, he ſent for him to *Rome* with all ſpeed, made him his General, and ſolicited all the friends and relations of the Count *de Mortorio* to riſe in his behalf; ſo that the Princes of *Altemura*, *Salerno*, and *Biſignano* took up Arms againſt the King. The King ſeeing himſelf engaged ſo unexpectedly in a War, ſent to the *Florentines*, and Duke of *Milan* for their aid; the *Florentines* were very irreſolute what was to be done; they thought it unreaſonable, to leave their own deſigns, for the promotion of other Peoples, beſides that the taking up Arms again ſo ſuddenly againſt the Church, muſt needs be very dangerous; nevertheleſs being in League, and under an obli-

Aquila rebels againſt the King of *Naples*.

The Pope undertakes its protection.

gation,

gation, they prefer'd their faith before either interest, or danger; took the *Orsini* into their pay, and sent their whole force (under the *Count de Pitigliano*) towards *Rome*, in assistance of the King. By this means the King had two Camps, that under the Duke of *Calabria*, he sent towards *Rome*, in conjunction with the *Florentines*, to attend the motion of the Army of the Church; the other he kept at home, to secure his own Country against any commotion by the Barons, and in both places things occurred with variety of success: but at length the King remaining in all places superior, by the mediation of Embassadors from *Spain*, in *August* 1486 a Peace was concluded, to which the Pope (being depress'd, and discouraged with his ill fortune) consented, and all the Princes of *Italy* with him, only the *Genoueſi* were excepted, as Rebels to the State of *Milan*, and usurpers upon the territories of *Florence*. The Peace being concluded, *Roberto da San Severino*, having been neither faithful to the Pope, nor terrible to the Enemy, was turned out of *Rome* in disgrace, and being pursued by the forces of the *Florentines* and the Duke; when he was past *Cesenna*, finding they gained upon him, and would be presently upon his back, he betook himself to his heels; and with about 100 Horse fled away to *Ravenna*, leaving the rest of his party either to be entertained by the Duke, or destroyed by the Country. The King having signed the Peace, and reconciled himself with his Barons, he caused *Giovanni Coppola*, and *Antonello d' Anversa* and their Sons, to be put to Death, as Persons who had betrayed his secrets to the Pope in the time of the War. By the experiment of this War, the Pope having observed with what diligence and alacrity the *Florentines* preserve their alliance, though he hated them before for their affection to the *Genoueſi*, and their assistance to the King, he began now to caress them, and show greater favour to their Embassadors, than formerly he had done: which inclination being intimated to *Lorenzo*, he improved it with all possible industry, as knowing it would gain him great reputation, if to his friendship with the King, he could add the amity of the Pope. This Pope had a Son called *Franceſco*, and being desirous to advance him both in fortune and friends (which when he was dead might support him) he could not find a Person in all *Italy*, with whom he might more safely ally him, than with *Lorenzo de Medici*; and therefore he ordered things so that he married him to a daughter of *Lorenzo*'s. This alliance being finished, his Holiness had a desire that the *Genoueſi* by agreement should deliver up *Serezana* to the *Florentines*, and declared to them that they could not in justice retain what *Agostino* had sold them; nor could *Agostino* convey that to San *Giorgio* which was none of his own; but with all his arguments he could never prevail; so that whilst these things were in agitation in *Rome*, the *Genoueſi* went on with their preparations, and rigging out many of their Ships, before they could have any news of it at *Florence*, they landed 3000 Men, and assaulted the Castle of *Serezanello*, which stands upon the *Serezana*, and was garrisoned by the *Florentines*, and having sacked, and burned the Town (which lyes on one side of it) they advanced against the Castle, and having planted their Guns, they battered it exceedingly. This attack was new, and unexpected to the *Florentines*, insomuch that they drew what force they were able together, under the command of *Virginio Ursino*, at *Pisa*, and made their complaints to the Pope, that whilst he was in treaty with them for peace, the *Genoueſes* had invaded them; after which they sent *Piero Corsini* to *Lucca*, to preserve that City in its allegiance: they sent likewise *Pagocantonio Soderini* their Embassador to *Venice*, to try the minds of that Commonwealth. They desired aid likewise of the King of *Naples*, and *Signor Lodovico*, but neither of them supplied them, the King pretending apprehension of the Turkish fleet; and *Lodovico* with other shifts delayed to releive them; so that the *Florentines* (as they usually are) were left alone in their necessity, finding no body so well disposed to assist them, as they were to assist other People. Nevertheless (being not strange to them) they were not at all discouraged, but raising a great Army under the command of *Giacopo Guicciardini*, and *Pietro Vettori*, they sent them against the Enemy, who had lodged himself upon the River *Magra*. In the mean time *Serazanello* was closely beseiged, and what with mines, and batteries, brought to great danger of being taken. Whereupon a Counsel being called, it was resolved to leave it, and the Enemy not at all declining, they came to an engagement, in which the *Genoeſi* were defeated, *Lodovico dal Fieſco*, and several of their principal officers taken Prisoners: yet this Victory could not encline the *Serezaneſi* to surrender, they rather prepared more obstinatly for their defence; and the *Florentine* Commissaries being as diligent on their side, it was couragiously both assaulted and defended. This Leaguer proving longer than was expected, *Lorenzo de Medici* thought it expedient to go himself to the Camp, where his arrival animated his own Souldiers, and discouraged the adversary; for upon observation of the vigour of the *Florentines*, and the coldness of their supplies from *Genoa*, freely, without any capitulation, they threw themselves into the arms of *Lorenzo*, and (except some few who were more eminently active

Peace concluded.

The *Genoeſes* overthrown.

active in the Rebellion) they were all courteously treated by the *Florentines*. During this seige, *Signor Lodovico*, had sent his Horse to *Pontremoli*, in appearance, in our favour; but holding a correspondence in *Genoa*, a party mutinied against the Government, and by the help of those forces, secured the Town for the Duke of *Milan*. About this time, the *Germans* made War upon the *Venetians*, and *Boccelino d' Osimo Nella Marca*, had caused *Osino* to revolt from the Pope, and made himself Lord of it. This *Boccelino*, after many accidents was contented upon the perswasion of *Lorenzo de Medici*) to deliver up that Town again to the Pope; which he did, and coming to *Florence*, he lived there (under *Lorenzo*'s protection) very honorably, a considerable time; but afterwards removing to *Milan*, and not finding the same faith as he had done at *Florence*, he was put to death by *Lodovico*'s command. The *Venetians*, being set upon by the *Germans* near the City of *Trento* were utterly defeated, and *Signor Roberto da San Severino* their General was slain. After the loss of this Victory according to their usual fortune, the *Venetians* made a peace with the *Germans*, but upon terms as exceedingly honorable, as if they had been the Conquerors. The *Venetians* defeated.

About the same time great troubles arose likewise in *Romagna*: *Francesco d' Orso* of *Furli* was a Man of great authority in that City, and falling under the suspition of the *Count Girolamo*, he was many times threatned by him: so that *Francesco* living in perpetual fear he was advised by his friends and relations, to be before hand with the Count, and seeing his intention was manifestly to take away his life, he should strike the first blow and make sure of the *Count*, and so by the death of another person, secure himself. This Counsel being given, and as resolutely undertaken, they appointed the time to be at the Fair at *Furli*; for several of their friends in the Country coming to the Town on course that day, they thought they should have enough of them present, without the danger of inviting them. It was in the month of *May*, in which the greatest part of the *Italians* have a custom of supping by day light. The Conspirators thought their best time to kill him would be after he had supped, when the servants were gone down to their own, and left him as it were alone in his Chamber. Having agreed upon the time, *Francesco* went to the *Count*'s Palace, and having left his accomplices below, and told one of his Servants that he desired to speak with the *Count*, he was admitted, and finding him alone, after some previous and pretended discourse, he took his opportunity and killed him; then calling up his Companions, the Servant was slain likewise; and then the Captain of the Castle coming in by accident with some few in his company to speak with the *Count*, they fell upon him, and murdered him with the rest. Having finished their work, and raised a great hubub in the House, the *Count*'s body was thrown out of the window, a great cry made of *Liberty* and the *Church*, and the People exhorted to Arm, who abominating the cruelty and the avarice of the *Count*, fell upon his Houses, plundered them, and made the Countess *Catherina* (his Lady) and her Family Prisoners: and this was done with so little opposition, that there was nothing but the Castle which hindered the accomplishment of their designs: but that Captain being obstinate, and not to be wrought upon by them to surrender, they desired the Countess to try if she could perswade him, which she promised to endeavour, if they would let her go to him into the Castle; and as Hostage for her fidelity, she would leave them her Children. The Conspirators believed her, and gave her leave to go to him; but she was no sooner in the Castle, but she began to swagger, and threaten them with death in revenge of her husbands; and when they told her they would kill all her Children, she bid them do their worst, for she knew how to have more. The Conspirators were not a little dismaid at this accident; they saw the Pope sent them no succours, and hearing that *Lodovico* the Countesses Uncle was sending forces to her relief, they packed up what they could, and away they went to *Castello*; so that the Countess being restored, she revenged the death of her husband with all possible cruelty. The *Florentines* had news of what happened to the *Count*, and immediatly took occasion to attempt the Castle of *Piancaldoli* which had been formerly taken from them by the said *Count*; and accordingly sending their forces thither, they retook it, but with the death of *Ciecco*, a most excellent Architect. Abut the same time that this tumult happened in the City, another of no less importance, fell out in the Country of *Romagna*. *Galeotto* Lord of *Faenza*, was married to the Daughter of *Giovanni Bentivogli* Prince of *Bologna*: this Lady being jealous, or upon some other ill usage from her Husband; or else ill natur'd of her self, had her Husband in such contempt, that she contrived to take away both his Authority and Life; and one day counterfeiting her self sick, she laid her self upon the bed, and having hid some of her Camarads in her Chamber, she ordered when *Galeotto* came to visit her, they should rush upon him, and kill him. This Lady had communicated her design to her Father, who was well enough contented, hoping when his Son-in-Law was dead, he might set up for himself. Count *Girolamo* murdered. The Countess revenges the Death of her Husband.

Galeotto Lord of *Faenza* murdered by his Wife.

ſelf. The time agreed upon for the execution being come, *Galeotto* (as he was accuſtomed) came to ſee his Wife, and having diſcourſed with her a while, the Conſpirators ruſhed forth, and killed him before he could make any defence. Upon his death a great tumult was raiſed, and the Lady with one of her little Children called *Aſtorre* was forced to betake herſelf to the Caſtle. The People took arms; *Giovan Bentivogli* (with a *Bergameſe* who had been an officer under the Duke of *Milan*) having got ſome forces together, marched into *Faenza* where *Antonio Boſcoli* the Commiſſary of *Florence* was reſident at that time, and having aſſembled all the chief of that party, they were in great argument about the Government of the Town; when the inhabitants of the *Val di Lamona*, had taken the alarm, and being got together in a throng, they fell upon *Giovani*, and the *Bergameſe*, they cut one of them to pieces, and took the other priſoner, and calling out upon *Aſtorre*, and the *Florentines*, they delivered the City to the conduct of the Commiſſary. This accident being known in *Florence*, was highly diſpleaſing to every Body; nevertheleſs they cauſed *Giovanni* and his Daughter to be ſet at liberty, and took upon themſelves the care of *Aſtorre* and the City, by univerſal conſent of the whole People. After the Wars betwixt the greater Princes were compoſed; beſides theſe, there happened many tumults in *Romagna la Marca*, and *Siena*, which being of no great moment, I think it ſuperfluous to recount them. True it is, troubles in *Siena* (after the end of the War, and the Duke of *Calabria*'s leaving thoſe parts, in the year 1488) were more frequent than elſe where, and after ſeveral variations (ſometimes the People, ſometimes the Nobility having the predominance) at length the Nobility prevail'd, and of them, the perſons of greateſt authority were *Pandolfo*, and *Giacopo Petrucci*, who, one of them for his conduct and the other for his courage, were made as it were Princes of that City? But the *Florentines*, from the end of the War againſt *Serazana* to the year 1492 (in which *Lorenzo* died) lived in great felicity. For *Lorenzo* having by his great intereſt and prudence, procured peace all over *Italy*, he applied himſelf to enlarging the grandeur of the City, and of his own Family; and firſt he married his eldeſt Son *Piero*, to *Alfonſina* the Daughter of *Cavaliere Orſino*: his ſecond Son *Giovanni* he advanced to be a Cardinal, which having no preſident, was the more remarkable; for he was but 13 years old, at the time of his promotion: for his third Son *Giuliano* (who was very young) he could make no extraordinary proviſion, becauſe he lived not long after: but his Daughters were diſpoſed of very well: one of them was married to *Giacopo Salvati*, another to *Franceſco Cibo*, a third to *Piero Ridolfi*, the fourth (which he had married to *Giovanni de Medici* to keep his Family united) died. In his private affairs, eſpecially in merchandizing, he was very unfortunate, for by reaſon of the exorbitance of his officers (who all of them lived like Princes) much of his fortune was waſted and ſquandered, inſomuch that he was conſtrained to be beholding to the ſtate for great ſums of mony. That he might be no longer lyable to the malignity of fortune, he left his trading, and fell a purchaſing land, as a ſurer, and more durable way. In the Countries of *Prato*, *Piſa*, and the vale, he bought ſuch poſſeſſions, as for the revenue, and magnificence of the Houſes, were fitter for a King than a private Perſon. After this he beautified and enlarged the City, and becauſe there were many places uninhabitated, he appointed new ſtreets, and cauſed new houſes to be erected to fill them; which was not only an augmentation, but a great Ornament to the City. That he might live quietly at home, and in time of War, keep his Enemies at a diſtance, he fortified the Caſtle of *Firezuolo*, which ſtands towards *Bologna* in the middle of the *Alps*. Towards *Siena*, he began to repair *Poggio* Imperial, and make it very ſtrong: towards *Genoa*, he ſecured that paſſage, by the reducation of *Pietra Santa*, and *Serezana*; with good ſtipends and Penſions he confirmed his friends, the *Baglioni* in *Perugia*, the *Vitelli* in the City of *Caſtello*: in *Faenza* he had a particular Government, all which were as ſo many Bulwarks to keep the Enemy from *Florence*. In times of peace he careſſed the City with feaſting, and plays, and tournaments, and repreſentations of antient triumphs, to delight and entertain the People: his only deſign being to ſee them pleaſed, the City ſupplied, and the Nobles reſpected: he was a great lover of Artiſts, and favourer of learned Men, of which *Agnola da Montepulciano*, *Chriſtofano Landini*, and *Demetrius* the Greek can give ample teſtimony: the Count *Giovanni della Mirandola* (a perſon almoſt deified for his literature) left all the other parts of Europe which he he had travelled, and (moved by *Lorenzo*'s magnificence) fixt his reſidence at *Florence*. In Architecture, Muſick, and Poeſy, he delighted exceedingly. Many poetical compoſitions, with ſeveral of his comments upon them are ſtill to be ſeen. And that the *Florentine* youth might be encouraged to ſtudy, he erected an Univerſity in *Piſa*, and hired the beſt Scholars in *Italy* to read to them: he built a Monaſtery not far from *Florence*, on purpoſe for Frier *Mariano da Chinazano*, an Auguſtine Monk, and one which he eſteemed an excellent Preacher. He was greatly beloved

Lorenzo de Medici.

both

both of God, and fortune, for all his designs came to a good end, and all his Enemies miscarried; for besides the *Pazzi*, he was set upon to have been killed by *Battista Frescobaldi*, in the *Carmine*; and by *Baldinotto da Pistoia*, at his Country House; but both of them failed, and were justly punished, with all their confederats. The excellence of his conversation, the eminence of his wisdom, and the happiness of his fortune, made him honorable not only in *Italy*, but in all the Courts of the World. *Mathias* King of *Hungary* gave many testimonies of his affection: the *Soldan* by his Embassadors and presents, visited and presented him. The great Turk delivered *Barnardo Bandini* into his hands, who had murdered his Brother *Giulian*; all which rendered him highly venerable in *Italy*, and he added to his reputation every day by his prudence. In his discourse he was eloquent, and facetious; in his resolutions wise, in his executions, quick, and courageous; nor can any thing be objected sufficient to eclipse these virtues, though he was indeed addicted to Women; took too much pleasure in the company of witty and satyrical Men; and would play at boys play sometimes, beneath the dignity of his office; for he would play many times with his Children at all the most idle and Childish recreations they would put him to. So that if the gravity of his life, be considered with its levity, he will seem to be composed of two several persons, united by an almost impossible conjunction. The last part of his days was full of sorrow and disquiet, occasioned by the distempers of his body; for he was sorely afflicted with intollerable pains at his Stomach, which brought him so low, that in *April* 1492 he died, in the 43 year of his age. Never was there any Man, not only in *Florence* but *Italy*, who departed with more reputation for his wisdom, nor more lamentation to his Country; and becaus upon his death, many desolations were like to ensue, the Heavens themselves did seem to presage it. The spire of the Church of S. *Riparata* was struck with thunder with such fury that a great part of the steeple was destroyed by it to the great consternation of the City. All the Inhabitants of *Florence*, and all the Princes of *Italy*, bewailed him, which was particularly manifested by their several compliments of condolency, and whether they had reason or not, for what they did, the effects which succeeded a while after, did clearly demonstrate; for being deprived of his Counsels, *Italy* could not find any one remaining, able to satiate, or restrain the ambition of *Lodovico* Duke of *Milan*, for want of which, after his death such seeds of dissention brake forth, as have perplexed and embroiled all *Italy* ever since.

Lorenzo died.



THE PRINCE,

Together with the

ORIGINAL

OF THE

GUELF and *GHIBILIN*,
Life of *CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI*,
Murther of *VITELLI*, &c. by Duke *VALENTINO*,
State of *FRANCE*,
State of *GERMANY*.

By Nicolas Machiavel.

Faithfully Engliſhed.

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ORIGINAL

NICOLO MACHIAVELLI
TO THE
Moſt Illuſtrious *LORENZO* Son of PIERO de MEDICI.

THoſe who deſire the favour of a Prince, do commonly introduce themſelves by preventing him with ſuch things as he either values much, or does more than ordinarily delight in; for which reaſon he is frequently preſented with Horſes, Arms, Cloath of Gold, Jewels, and ſuch Ornaments as are ſuitable to his Quality and Grandeur. Being ambitious to preſent my ſelf to your Highneſs with ſome teſtimony of my devotions towards you, in all my Wardrobe I could not find any thing more precious (at leaſt to my ſelf) than the knowledge of the Conduct and Atchievements of Great Men, which I learn'd by long converſation in modern affairs, and a continual inveſtigation of old: after long and diligent examination, having reduced all into a ſmall Volume, I do preſume to preſent to your Highneſs; and though I cannot think it a work fit to appear in your preſence, yet my confidence in your bounty is ſuch, I hope it may be accepted, conſidering I was not capable of more, than preſenting you with a faculty of underſtanding in a ſhort time, what for ſeveral years, with infinite labour and hazard I had been gathering together. Nor have I beautified or adorned it with Rhetorical Ornations, or ſuch outward imbelliſhments as are uſual in ſuch deſcriptions. I had rather it ſhould paſs without any approbation, than owe it to any thing but the truth and gravity of the matter. I would not have it imputed to me as preſumption, if an inferior perſon as I am, pretend not only to treat of, but to preſcribe, and regulate the proceedings of Princes: for as they who take the Landskip of a Country, to conſider the Mountains, and the nature of the higher places, do deſcend ordinarily into the Plains, and diſpoſe themſelves upon the Hills, to take the proſpect of the Valleys; in like manner, to underſtand the nature of the people, it is neceſſary to be a Prince, and to know the nature of Princes, 'tis as requiſit to be of the people. May your Highneſs then accept this Book with as much kindneſs as it is preſented; and if you pleaſe diligently and deliberately to reflect upon it, you will find in it my extreme deſire that your Highneſs may arrive at that grandeur which Fortune and your Accompliſhments do ſeem to preſage; from which pinacle of Honour, if your Highneſs vouchſafes at any time to look down upon things below, you will ſee how unjuſtly, and how continually I have been expoſed to the malignity of fortune.

NICOLO MACHIAVELLI

TO

PIERO de MEDICI

Machiavel's Prince.

CHAP. I.

The ſeveral ſorts of Governments, and after what manner they are obtained.

THere never was, nor is at this day any Government in the World, by which one Man has rule and dominion over another, but it is either a Commonwealth, or a Monarchy. Monarchies are either hereditary, where the anceſtors of the Soveraign have been a long time in poſſeſſion, or where they are but new. The new are either ſo wholly, and entirely (as *Milan* was to *Francis Sforza*) or annex'd to the hereditary Dominions of the Conquerour (as the Kingdom of *Naples*, to the Kingdom of *Spain*). Theſe territories thus acquired are accuſtomed either to be ſubject to ſome Prince, or to live at liberty and free, and are ſubdued, either by his auxiliaries, or own forces, by his good fortune, or conduct.

CHAP. II.

Of Hereditary Principalities.

I ſhall omit ſpeaking of Commonwealths, as having diſcourſed of them largely elſewhere, and write in this place only of Principalities, and how according to the foregoing diviſion, the ſaid Principalities may be governed, and maintained. I do affirm then that hereditary States, and ſuch as have been accuſtomed to the Family of their Prince, are preſerved with leſs difficulty than the new, and becauſe it is ſufficient not to tranſgreſs the examples of their predeceſſors, and next to comply and frame themſelves to the accidents that occur. So that if the Prince be a perſon of competent induſtry, he will be ſure to keep himſelf in the throne, unleſs he be ſupplanted ſome great, and more than ordinary force: and even then, when ſo ſupplanted, fortune can never turn tail, or be adverſe to the uſurper, but he will ſtand fair to be reſtored. Of this, *Italy* affords us an example in the Duke of *Ferrara*, who ſupported bravely againſt the invaſion of the *Venetians* in 1484, and afterwards againſt Pope *Julius* 10, upon no other foundation but his antiquity in that Government; for a natural Prince has not ſo much occaſion or neceſſity to oppreſs his Subjects, whereby it follows he muſt be better beloved, and retain more of the affections of his People unleſs ſome extraordinary vices concur to make him odious, ſo that the ſucceſſion and cohærence of his Government, takes away the cauſes and memory of innovations; for one new change leaves always (as in buildings) a toothing, and aptitude for another.

CHAP. III.

Of mixt Principalities.

But the difficulties conſiſt in Governments lately acquired, eſpecially if not abſolutely new, but as members annexed to the territories of the Uſurper, in which caſe ſuch a Government is called mixed. The tumults and revolutions in ſuch Monarchies proceed from a natural croſneſs and difficulty in all new conqueſts, for Men do eaſily part with their Prince, upon hopes of bettering their condition, and that hope provokes them to rebel, but moſt commonly they are miſtaken, and experience tells them their condition is much worſe.

This proceeds from another natural and ordinary cauſe neceſſitating the new Prince to overlay or diſguſt his new ſubjects by quartring his Army upon them, Taxes, or a thouſand other inconveniences, which are the perpetual conſequents of conqueſt. So that you make them your Enemies who ſuffer, and are injured by your uſurpation, but cannot preſerve their friendſhip who introduced you, becauſe you are neither able to ſatisfy their expectation, or imploy ſtrong remedies againſt them, by reaſon of your obligations, wherefore though an uſurper be never ſo ſtrong, and his Army never ſo numerous, he muſt have intelligence with the natives, if he means to conquer a Province. For theſe reaſons *Lewis* XII. of *France*, quickly ſubdued *Milan*, and loſt it as quickly, for the ſame People which open'd him their gates, finding themſelves deceived in their hopes, and diſappointed in the future benefits which they expected, could not brook, nor comport with the haughtineſs of their new Soveraign: 'tis very true, Countries that have rebelled, and are conquered the ſecond time, are recovered with more difficultie, for the defection of the People having taken off all obligation or reſpect from the Uſurper, he takes more liberty to ſecure himſelf by puniſhing offendors, expoſing the ſuſpected, and fortifying where ever he finds himſelf weak; ſo that Count *Lodovick* having been able to reſcue *Milan* out of the hands of the *French* the firſt time, only by harraſing and infeſting its borders, the ſecond time he recovered it, it was neceſſary for him, to arm and confederate the whole World againſt the ſaid King, and that his Army ſhould be beaten, and driven out of *Italy*: and this happened from the foreſaid occaſions. Nevertheleſs the *French* were twice diſpoſſeſs'd. The general reaſons of the firſt we have already diſcourſed; it remains now that we take a proſpect of the ſecond, and declare what remedies the ſaid King *Lewis* had, or what another may have in his condition, to preſerve himſelf better in his new conqueſts, than the King of *France* did before him. I ſay then that Provinces newly acquir'd, and joyn'd to the ancient territory of him who conquer'd them, are either of the ſame Country, or Language, or otherwiſe. In the firſt caſe, they are eaſily kept, eſpecially if the People have not been too much accuſtomed to liberty: and to ſecure the poſſeſſion there needs no more than to extirpate the Family of the Prince which governed before; for in other things maintaining to them their old condition, there being no diſcrepancy in their cuſtoms, Men do acquieſce and live quietly, as has been ſeen in the caſes of *Burgundy*, *Bretagne*, *Gaſcogne* and *Normandy* which have continued ſo long under the Government of *France*: for though there be ſome difference in their language, nevertheleſs their Laws and cuſtoms being alike, they do eaſily conſiſt. He therefore who acquires any thing, and deſires to preſerve it, is obliged to have a care of two things more particularly; one is that the Family of the former Prince be extinguiſhed; the other, that no new Laws or Taxes be impoſed; whereby it will come to paſs, that in a ſhort time it may be annexed and conſolidated with his old Principality. But where Conqueſt is made in a Country differing in Language, Cuſtoms, and Laws, there is the great difficulty, their good fortune and great induſtry is requiſit to keep it; and one of the beſt and moſt efficatious expedients to do it, would be for the Uſurper to live there himſelf, which would render his poſſeſſion more ſecure, and durable, as the great Turk has done in *Greece*, who, in deſpight of all his practices and policies to keep it in ſubjection, had he not fixed his Immperial reſidence there, would never have been able to have effected it. For being preſent in Perſon, diſorders are diſcovered in the bud, and prevented; but being at a diſtance, in ſome remote part, they come only by hear-ſay, and that, when they are got to a head, and commonly incurable. Beſides the Province is not ſubject to be pillaged by officers, by reaſon of the nearneſs and acceſſibleneſs of their Prince, which diſpoſes thoſe to love him who are good, and thoſe to dread him who are otherwiſe; and if any foreigner attacks it, he muſt do it with more care and circumſpection, in reſpect that the Princes reſidence being there, it will be harder for him to loſe it.

There

There is another Remedy, rather better than worſe, and that is, to plant Colonies in one or two places, which may be as it were the Keys of that State, and either that muſt be done of neceſſity, or an Army of Horſe and Foot be maintained in thoſe parts, which is much worſe; for Colonies are of no great expence; The Prince ſends and maintains them at very little charge, and intrenches only upon ſuch as he is conſtrain'd to diſpoſſeſs of their Houſes and Land, for the ſubſiſtance and accomodation of the new Inhabitants, who are but few, and a ſmall part of the State; they alſo who are injur'd and offended, living diſpers'd and in poverty, cannot do any miſchief, and the reſt being quiet and undiſturb'd, will not ſtir, leſt they ſhould miſtake, and run themſelves into the ſame condition with their Neighbours.

I conclude likewiſe, That thoſe Colonies which are leaſt chargeable, are moſt faithful and inoffenſive, and thoſe few who are offended are too poor, and diſpers'd to do any hurt, as I ſaid before; And it is to be obſerv'd, Men are either to be flatter'd and indulged, or utterly deſtroy'd; becauſe for ſmall offences they do uſually revenge themſelves, but for great ones they cannot; ſo that injury is to be done in ſuch a manner, as not to fear any revenge. But if in ſtead of Colonies, an Army be kept on foot, it will be much more expenſive, and the whole revenue of that Province being conſum'd in the keeping it, the acquiſition will be a loſs, and rather a prejudice than otherwiſe, by removing the Camp up and down the Country, and changing their quarters, which is an inconvenience every man will reſent, and be ready to revenge, and they are the moſt dangerous and implacable Enemies who are provok'd by inſolences committed againſt them in their own houſes. In all reſpects therefore, this kind of guard is unprofitable, whereas on the other ſide Colonies are uſeful. Moreover, he who is in a Province of a different conſtitution (as is ſaid before) ought to make himſelf head, and Protector of his inferior Neighbours, and endeavour with all diligence to weaken and debilitate ſuch as are more powerful, and to have a particular care that no ſtranger enters into the ſaid Province, with as much power as he; for it will always happen that ſome body or other will be invited by the Male-contents, either out of ambition, or fear. This is viſible in the *Etolians*, who brought the *Romans* into *Greece*, who were never admitted into any Province, but by the temptation of the Natives. The Common method in ſuch Caſes is this; As ſoon as a foreign Potentate enters into a Province, thoſe who are weaker, or diſoblig'd, joyn themſelves with him, out of emulation and animoſity to thoſe who are above them, inſomuch that in reſpect of theſe inferiour Lords, no pains is to be omitted that may gain them; and when gain'd, they will readily and unanimouſly fall into one maſs with the State that is conquered. Only the Conqueror is to take ſpecial care they grow not too ſtrong, nor be intruſted with too much Authority, and then he can eaſily with his own forces, and their aſſiſtance keep down the greatneſs of his Neighbours, and make himſelf abſolute Arbiter in that Province. And he who acts not this part prudently, ſhall quickly loſe what he has got, and even whil'ſt he injoys it, be obnoxious to many troubles and inconveniences. The *Romans* in their new Conqueſts obſerv'd this Courſe, they planted their Colonies, entertain'd the inferior Lords into their protection without increaſing their power, they kept under ſuch as were more potent, and would not ſuffer any foreign Prince to have intereſt among them. I will ſet down only *Greece* for an Example. The *Etolians*, and *Achaians* were protected; the Kingdom of the *Macedonians* was depreſs'd, and *Antiochus* driven out; yet the merits and fidelity of the *Achaians* and *Etolians* could never procure them any increaſe of Authority, nor the perſwaſions and applications of *Philip* induce the *Romans* to be his friends, till he was overcome, nor the power of *Antiochus* prevail with them to conſent that he ſhould retain any Soveraignty in that Province: For the *Romans* acted in that caſe as all wiſe Princes ought to do, who are to have an eye, not only upon preſent, but future incommodities, and to redreſs them with all poſſible induſtry, for dangers that are ſeen afar off, are eaſily prevented, but protracting till they are at hand, the remedies grow unſeaſonable, and the malady incurable. And it falls out in this caſe, as the Phyſitians ſay of an Hectick Feaver; that at firſt it is eaſily cur'd, and hard to be known, but in proceſs of time, not being obſerv'd, or reſiſted in the beginning, it becomes eaſie to be known, but very difficult to be cur'd: So is it in matters of State, things which are diſcover'd at a diſtance (which is done only by prudent men) produce little miſchief, but what is eaſily averted: But when thorow ignorance or inadvertency, they come to that height that every one diſcerns them, there is no room for any remedy, and the diſeaſe is incurable: The *Romans* therefore foreſeeing their troubles afar off, oppos'd themſelves in time, and never ſwallow'd any injury, to put off a War, for they knew that War was not avoided, but defer'd thereby, and commonly with advantage to the Enemy; wherefore they choſe rather to make War upon *Philip*, and *Antiochus* in *Greece*, than ſuffer them to invade *Italy*; and yet at that time there was no neceſſity of either,

they might have avoided them both, but they thought it not fit; for they could never reliſh the ſaying that is ſo frequent in the Mouths of our new Polititians, *To enjoy the preſent beneſits of time*, but prefer'd the exerciſe of their courage and wiſdom, for time carries all things along with it, and may bring good as well as evil, and ill as well as good. But let us return to *France*, and examine if what was there done, was conformable to what is preſcribed here: and to this purpoſe I ſhall not ſpeak of *Charles VIII.* but of *Lewis XII.* as of a Prince whoſe Conduct, and affairs (by reaſon his poſſeſſion was longer in *Italy*) were more conſpicuous, and you ſhall ſee how contrary he acted in every thing that was neceſſary for the keeping of ſo different a State. This *Lewis* was invited into *Italy* by the *Venetians*, who had an ambition to have got half *Lombardy* by his coming: I will not condemn the Expedition, nor blame the Counſels of that King, for being deſirous of footing in *Italy*, and having no Allies left in that Country, but all doors ſhut againſt him (upon the ill treatment which his predeceſſor *Charles* had uſed towards them) he was conſtrain'd to take his friends where he could find them, and that reſolution would have been lucky enough, had he not miſcarried in his other adminiſtrations; for he had no ſooner ſubdued *Lombardy*, but he recover'd all the reputation and dignity that was loſt by King *Charles*: *Genoa* ſubmitted; *Florence* courted his friendſhip, the Marqueſs of *Mantua*, the Duke of *Ferrara*, *Bentivoglio*, *Madam de Furli*, the Lords of *Faenza*, *Peſoro*, *Rimini*, *Camerino*, *Piombino*; the *Lucchesi*, *Piſani*, *Saneſi*, all of them addreſs themſelves to him for his alliance and amity; Then the *Venetians* began to conſider, and reflect upon their indiſcretion; who to gain two Towns in *Lombardy*, had made the King of *France* Maſter of two thirds of all *Italy*. Let any one now think with how little difficulty the ſaid King might have kept up his reputation in that Country, if he had obſerv'd the rules aboveſaid, and protected his friends, who being numerous, and yet weak, and fearful, (ſome of the *Pope*, and ſome of the *Venetians*) were alwayes under a neceſſity of ſtanding by him, and with their aſſiſtance he might eaſily have ſecured himſelf againſt any Competitor whatever. But he was no ſooner in *Milan*, but he began to prevaricate, and ſend ſupplies to Pope *Alexander*, to put him in poſſeſſion of *Romagna*, not conſidering that thereby he weakned himſelf, and diſoblig'd his friends who had thrown themſelves into his arms, and agrandized the Church, by adding to its ſpiritual authority (which was ſo formidable before) ſo great a proportion of temporal, and having committed one error, he was forc'd to proceed ſo far, as to put a ſtop to the ambition of Pope *Alexander*, and hinder his making himſelf Maſter of *Tuſcany*, the ſaid *Lewis* was forced into *Italy* again. Nor was it enough for him to have advanced the intereſt of the Church, and deſerted his friends, but out of an ardent deſire to the Kingdom of *Naples*, he ſhared it with the King of *Spain*; ſo that whereas before he was ſole Umpire in *Italy*, he now entertained a Partner, to whom the ambitious of that Province, and his own Male-contents might repair upon occaſion; and whereas the King of that Kingdom might have been made his Penſioner, he turn'd out him, to put in another that might be able to turn out himſelf.

It is very obvious, and no more than Natural, for Princes to deſire to extend their Dominion, and when they attempt nothing but what they are able to atcheive, they are app'auded, at leaſt not upbraided thereby; but when they are unable to compaſs it, and yet will be doing, then they are condemned, and indeed not unworthily.

If *France* then with its own forces alone had been able to have enterpriz'd upon *Naples*, it ought to have been done; but if her own private ſtrength was too weak, it ought not to have been divided: and if the diviſion of *Lombardy* to which ſhe conſented with the *Venetian*, was excuſable; it was becauſe done to get footing in *Italy*; But this partition of *Naples* with the King of *Spain*, is extreamly to be condemned, becauſe not preſs'd or quicken'd by ſuch neceſſity as the former. *Lewis* therefore committed five faults in this Expedition: He ruin'd the inferior Lords; He augmented the Dominion of a Neighbour Prince; He call'd in a Forreigner as puiſſant as himſelf; He neglected to continue there in perſon; and planted no Colonies: All which errors might have been no inconvenience whil'ſt he had lived, had he not been guilty of a ſixt, and that was depreſſing the power of the *Venetian*: If indeed he had not ſided with the *Church*, nor brought the *Spaniards* into *Italy*, it had been but reaſonable for him to have taken down the pride of the *Venetian*, but perſuing his firſt reſolutions, he ought not to have ſuffer'd them to be ruin'd, becauſe whil'ſt the *Venetian* ſtrength was intire, they would have kept off other people from attempting upon *Lombardy*, to which the *Venetians* would never have conſented, unleſs upon condition it might have been deliver'd to them, and the others would not in probability have forced it from *France*, to have given it to them: and to have contended with them both, no body would have had the courage. If it be urg'd that King *Lewis* gave up *Romagna* to the *Pope*, and the Kingdom of *Naples*, to the *King of Spain*, to evade a War, I anſwer, as before,

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That a preſent miſchief is not to be ſuffer'd to prevent a War, for the War is not averted, but protracted, and will follow with greater diſadvantage.

If the Kings faith and engagements to the Pope to undertake this enterprize for him, be objected, and that he did it to recompence the diſſolution of his Marriage, and the Cap which at his interceſſion his Holineſs had confer'd upon the *Legat of Amboiſe*, I refer them for an anſwer, to what I ſhall ſay hereafter about the faith of a Prince, how far it obliges. So then King *Lewis* loſt *Lombardy*, becauſe he did not obſerve one of thoſe rules, which others have followed with ſucceſs in the Conqueſt of Provinces, and in their deſire to keep them: Nor is it an extraordinary thing, but what happens every day, and not without reaſon. To this purpoſe I remember I was once in diſcourſe with the Cardinal *d' Amboiſe* at *Nantes*, at the time when *Valentino* (for ſo *Cæſar Borgia* Pope *Alexander*'s Son was commonly call'd) poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Romagna*: In the heat of our Conference the Cardinal telling me that the *Italians* were ignorant of the art of War; I replyed, that the *French* had as little skill in matters of State, for if they had had the leaſt policy in the world, they would never have ſuffer'd the *Church* to have come to that height and Elevation. And it has been found ſince by experience, that the grandeur of the *Church* and the *Spaniard* in *Italy*, is derived from *France*, and that they in requital, have been the ruine and expulſion of the *French*.

From hence a general rule may be deduc'd, and ſuch a one as ſeldom or never is ſubject to Exception. Viz. *That whoever is the occaſion of anothers advancement, is the cauſe of his own diminution*: becauſe that advancement is founded either upon the conduct or power of the Donor, either of which become ſuſpicious at length to the perſon prefer'd.

CHAP. IV.

Why the Kingdom of Darius *uſurped by* Alexander *did not rebel againſt his Succeſſors, after* Alexander *was dead.*

THe difficulties encountred in the keeping of a new Conqueſt being conſider'd, it may well be admired how it came to paſs that *Alexander* the Great, having in a few years made himſelf Maſter of *Aſia*, and dyed as ſoon as he had done, That ſtate could be kept from Rebellion: Yet his Succeſſors enjoy'd it a long time peaceably, without any troubles or concuſſions but what ſprung from their own avarice and ambition. I anſwer, That all Monarchies of which we have any record, were govern'd after two ſeveral manners; Either by a Prince, and his Servants whom he vouchſafes out of his meer grace to conſtitute his Miniſters, and admits of their Aſſiſtance in the Government of his Kingdom; or elſe by a Prince and his *Barons* who were perſons advanc'd to that quality, not by favour or conceſſion of the Prince, but by the ancientneſs, and Nobility of their Extraction. Theſe *Barons* have their proper juriſdictions and ſubjects, who own their Authority, and pay them a natural reſpect. Thoſe States which are govern'd by the Prince and his Servants, have their Prince more Arbitrary and abſolute, becauſe his Supremacy is acknowledged by every body, and if another be obeyed, it is only as his Miniſter and Subſtitute, without any affection to the Man. Examples of theſe different Governments, we may find in our time in the perſons of the *Grand Signore*, and the King of *France*. The whole *Turkiſh* Monarchy is governed by a ſingle perſon, the reſt are but his Servants, and Slaves; for diſtinguiſhing his whole Monarchy into Provinces and Governments, (which they call *Sangiacchi*) he ſends when and what Officers he thinks fit, and changes them as he pleaſes. But the King of *France* is eſtabliſhed in the middle (as it were) of ſeveral great Lords, whoſe Soveraignty having been owned, and families beloved a long time by their Subjects, they keep their preheminence, nor is it in the King's power to deprive them, without inevitable danger to himſelf. He therefore who conſiders the one with the other, will find the *Turkiſh* Empire harder to be ſubdued, but when once conquered, more eaſie to be kept: The reaſon of the difficulty is, becauſe the Uſurper cannot be call'd in by the Grandees of the Empire; nor hope any aſſiſtance from the great Officers, to facilitate his Enterprize, which proceeds from the reaſons aboveſaid, for being all ſlaves, and under obligation, they are not eaſily corrupted; and if they could, little good was to be expected from them, being unable for the aforeſaid reaſons, to bring them any party: So that whoever invades the *Turk*, muſt expect to find him entire and united, and is to depend more upon his own proper force, than any diſorders among them; but having once conquered them, and beaten their Army beyond the poſſibility of a recruit, the danger is at an end; for there is no body remaining to be afraid of,

of, but the Family of the Emperor, which being once extinguiſhed, no body elſe has any intereſt with the people, and they are as little to be apprehended after the Victory, as they were to be relyed upon before. But in Kingdoms that are governed according to the Model of *France*, it happens quite contrary, becauſe having gained ſome of the *Barons*, to your ſide (and ſome of them will always be diſcontent, and deſirous of change) you may readily enter: They can (as I ſaid before) give you eaſie admiſſion, and contribute to your Victory. But to defend, and make good what you have got, brings a long train of troubles and calamities with it, as well upon your friends, as your foes. Nor will it ſuffice to exterminate the race of the King; foraſmuch as other Princes will remain, who upon occaſion, will make themſelves heads of any Commotion, and they being neither to be ſatisfyed nor extinguiſhed, you muſt of neceſſity be expell'd upon the firſt Inſurrection.

Now if it be conſidered what was the Nature of *Darius* his Government, it will be found to have been very like the *Turks*, and therefore *Alexander* was obliged to fight them, and having conquered them, and *Darius* dying after the Victory, the Empire of the *Perſians* remained quietly to *Alexander* for the reaſons aboveſaid; and his Succeſſors, had they continued united, might have injoyed it in peace, for in that whole Empire no Tumults ſucceeded, but what were raiſed by themſelves. But in Kingdoms that are conſtituted like *France*, it is otherwiſe, and impoſſible to poſſeſs them in quiet: From hence ſprung the many defections of *Spain*, *France*, and *Greece* from the *Romans*, by reaſon of the many little Principalities in thoſe ſeveral Kingdoms, of which, whil'ſt there remained any memory, the *Romans* injoyed their poſſeſſion, in a great deal of incertainty, but when their memory was extinct, by power and diuturnity of Empire, they grew ſecure in their poſſeſſions, and quarrelling afterwards among themſelves, every Officer of the *Romans* was able to bring a party into the field, according to the latitude and extent of his Command in the ſaid Provinces, and the reaſon was, becauſe the race of their old Princes being extirpate, there was no body left for them to acknowledge, but the *Romans*. Theſe things therefore being conſidered, it is not to be wondred that *Alexander* had the good fortune to keep the Empire of *Aſia*, whil'ſt the reſt, as *Pyrrhus* and others, found ſuch difficulty to retain what they had got, for it came not to paſs from the ſmall, or great Virtue of the Victor, but from the difference and variety of the Subject.

CHAP. V.

How ſuch Cities and Principalities are to be Govern'd, who lived under their own Laws, before they were ſubdued.

WHen States that are newly conquered, have been accuſtomed to their liberty, and lived under their own Laws, to keep them, three ways are to be obſerved: The firſt is utterly to ruine them; the ſecond to live perſonally among them; the third is (contenting your ſelf with a Penſion from them) to permit them to injoy their old priviledges and Laws, erecting a kind of Council of State, to conſiſt of a few, which may have a care of your intereſt, and keep the people in amity and obedience. And that Council being ſet up by you, and knowing that it ſubſiſts only by your favour and authority, will not omit any thing that may propagate and inlarge them. A Town that has been anciently free, cannot more eaſily be kept in ſubjection, than by imploying its own Citizens, as may be ſeen by the Example of the *Spartans*, and *Romans*. The *Spartans* had got poſſeſſion of *Athens*, and *Thebes*, and ſetled an Oligarchie according to their fancy; and yet they loſt them again. The *Romans* to keep *Capua*, *Carthage*, and *Numantia*, ordered them to be deſtroyed, and they kept them by that means. Thinking afterwards to preſerve *Greece*, as the *Spartans* had done, by allowing them their liberty, and indulging their old Laws, they found themſelves miſtaken; ſo that they were forced to ſubvert many Cities in that Province, before they could keep it; and certainly that is the ſafeſt way which I know; for whoever conquers a free Town, and does not demoliſh it, commits a great error, and may expect to be ruin'd himſelf, becauſe whenever the Citizens are diſpoſed to a revolt, they betake themſelves of courſe to that bleſſed name of Liberty, and the Laws of their Anceſtors, which no length of time, nor kind uſage whatever will be able to eradicate, and let all poſſible care and proviſion be made to the contrary, unleſs they be divided ſome way or other, or the Inhabitants diſperſed, the thought of their old priviledges will never out of their heads, but upon all occaſions they will endeavour to recover them, as *Piſa* did after it had continued ſo many years in ſubjection to the *Florentines*; But it falls out quite contrary, where the Cities or Provinces have been us'd to a Prince whoſe race is extirpated and gone; for being on the one ſide accuſtomed to obey, and on the other, at a loſs for their old Family,

they

they can never agree to ſet up another, and will never know how to live freely without; ſo that they are not eaſily to be tempted to rebel, and the Prince may oblige them with leſs difficulty, and be ſecure of them when he hath done. But in a Commonwealth their hatred is more inveterate, their revenge more inſatiable, nor does the memory of their ancient liberty ever ſuffer, or ever can ſuffer them to be quiet: So that the moſt ſecure way is either to ruine them quite, or make your reſidence among them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Principalities acquired by ones own proper Conduct and Arms.

LEt no man think it ſtrange, if in ſpeaking of new Governments, either by Princes or States, I introduce great and eminent Examples; foraſmuch as men in their actions follow commonly the ways that are beaten, and when they would do any generous thing, they propoſe to themſelves ſome pattern of that Nature; nevertheleſs, being impoſſible to come up exactly to that, or to acquire that virtue in perfection which you deſire to imitate; a wiſe man, ought always to ſet before him for his Example the actions of great Men, who have excell'd in the atchievement of ſome great Exploit, to the end that though his virtue and power arrives not at that perfection, it may at leaſt come as near as is poſſible, and receive ſome tincture thereby: Like Experienced Archers, who obſerving the Mark to be at great diſtance, and knowing the ſtrength of their Bow, and how far it will carry, they fix their aim ſomewhat higher than the Mark, not with deſign to ſhoot at that height, but that by mounting their Arrow to a certain proportion, they may come the neater to the Mark they intend. I ſay then, that Principalities newly acquired by an upſtart Prince, are more or leſs difficult to maintain, as he is more or leſs provident that gains them. And becauſe the happineſs of riſing from a private perſon to be a Prince, preſuppoſes great Virtue, or Fortune, where both of them concur, they do much facilitate the conſervation of the Conqueſt: yet he who has committed leaſt to Fortune, has continued the longeſt. It prevents much trouble likewiſe when the Prince (having no better reſidence elſewhere) is conſtrained to live perſonally among them. But to ſpeak of ſuch who by their Virtue, rather than Fortune, have advanced themſelves to that Dignity, I ſay, that the moſt renowned and excellent, are *Moſes*, *Cyrus*, *Romulus*, *Theſeus*, and the like: And though *Moſes* might be reaſonably excepted, as being only the Executioner of God's immediate Commands, yet he deſerves to be mention'd, if it were only for that Grace which render'd him capable of Communication with God. But if we conſider *Cyrus*, and the reſt of the Conquerors and Founders of Monarchies, we ſhall find them extraordinary; and examining their Lives and Exploits, they will appear, not much different from *Moſes*, who had ſo incomparable a Maſter; for by their Converſations and Succeſſes, they do not ſeem to have received any thing from fortune, but occaſion, and opportunity of introducing what forms of Government they pleas'd; and as without that occaſion, the greatneſs of their Courage had never been known, ſo had not they been magnanimous, and taken hold of it, that occaſion had hapned in vain. It was neceſſary therefore for *Moſes*, that the people of *Iſrael* ſhould be in captivity in *Egypt*, that to free themſelves from bondage, they might be diſpos'd to follow him: It was convenient that *Romulus* ſhould be turned out of *Alba*, and expoſed to the wild beaſts when he was young, that he might afterwards be made King of *Rome*, and Founder of that great Empire. It was not unneceſſary likewiſe that *Cyrus* ſhould find the *Perſians* mutining at the the Tyranny of the *Medes*, and that the *Medes* ſhould be grown ſoft, and effeminate with their long peace. *Theſeus* could never have given proof of his Virtue and Generoſity, had not the *Athenians* been in great troubles and confuſion. Theſe great advantages, made thoſe great perſons Eminent, and their great Wiſdom knew how to improve them to the reputation, and inlargement of their Country. They then who become great by the wayes of Virtue (as the Princes aboveſaid) do meet with many difficulties, before they arrive at their ends, but having compaſs'd them once, they eaſily keep them: The difficulties in the acquiſition, ariſe in part from new Laws and Cuſtoms which they are fore'd to introduce for the Eſtabliſhment and ſecurity of their own dominion; and this is to be conſidered that there is nothing more difficult to undertake, more uncertain to ſucceed, and more dangerous to manage, than to make ones ſelf Prince, and preſcribe new Laws: Becauſe he who innovates in that manner has for his Enemies all thoſe who made any advantage by the Old Laws; and thoſe who expect benefit by the new, will be but cool and luke-warm in his defence; which luke-warmneſs proceeds from a cer-

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tain aw for their adverſaries who have their old Laws on their ſide, and partly from a natural incredulity in mankind, which gives credit but ſlowly to any new thing, unleſs recommended firſt by the experiment of ſucceſs. Hence it proceeds that the firſt time the adverſary has opportunity to make an attempt, he does it with great briskneſs, and vigour, but the defence is ſo tepid and faint, that for the moſt part the new Prince, and his adhærents periſh together. Wherefore for better diſcuſſion of this caſe, it is neceſſary to inquire whether theſe innovators do ſtand upon their own feet, or depend upon other People; that is to ſay whether in the conduct of their affairs, they do make more uſe of their rhetorick, than their Arms. In the firſt caſe, they commonly miſcarry, and their deſigns ſeldom ſucceed; but when their expectations are only from themſelves), and they have power in their own hands to make themſelves obeyed, they run little or no hazard, and do frequently prevail. For further eviction, the Scripture ſhows us that thoſe of the Prophets whoſe Armes were in their hands, and had power to compel, ſucceeded better in the reformations which they deſigned; whereas thoſe who came only with exhortation and good language, ſuffer'd Martyrdom and Baniſhment, becauſe (beſides the reaſons above ſaid) the People are unconſtant, and ſuſceptible of any new Doctrine at firſt, but not eaſily brought to retain it: ſo that things are to be ordered in ſuch manner that when their Faith begins to ſtagger, they may be forc'd to perſiſt. *Moſes*, *Cyrus*, *Theſeus*, and *Romulus* could never have made their Laws to have been long obſerved, had they not had power to have compelled it; as in our days it happen'd to Frier *Jerome Savanorola*, who ruined himſelf by his new inſtitutions, as ſoon as the People of *Florence* began to deſert him; for he had no means to confirm them who had been of his opinion, nor to conſtrain ſuch as diſſented. Wherefore ſuch perſons meet with great difficulty in their affairs; all their dangers are ſtill by the way, which they can hardly overcome, but by ſome extraordinary virtue, and excellence: nevertheleſs when once they have ſurmounted them, and arrived at any degree of veneration, having ſupplanted thoſe who envyed their advancement, they remain puiſſant, and firm, and honorable, and happy. I will add to theſe great examples, another perhaps not ſo conſpicuous; but one that will bear a proportion and reſemblance with the reſt, and ſhall ſatisfie me for all others of that nature. It is of *Hiero* of *Siracuſe* who of a private perſon was made Prince of that City, for which he was beholding to fortune no further than for the occaſion, becauſe the *Siracuſans* being under oppreſſion, choſe him for their Captain, in which command he behav'd himſelf ſo well, he deſerved to be made their Prince, for he was a perſon of ſo great virtue and excellence, that thoſe who have writ of him, have given him this Character, that even in his private condition, he wanted nothing but a Kingdom to make him an admirable King. This *Hiero* ſubdued the old Militia, eſtabliſhed a new; renounced the old Allies; confederated with others; and having friends and forces of his own, he was able upon ſuch a foundation to erect what fabrick he pleas'd; ſo that though the acquiſition coſt him much trouble, he maintain'd it with little.

CHAP. VII.

Of new Principalities acquired by acccident, and the ſupplies of other People.

THey who from private condition aſcend to be Princes, and meerly by the indulgence of fortune, arrive without much trouble at their dignity, though it coſts them dear to maintain it, meet but little difficulty in their paſſage, being hurried as it were with wings, yet when they come to ſettle and eſtabliſh, then begins their miſery. Theſe kind of Perſons are ſuch as attain their dignity by Bribes, or conceſſion of ſome other great Prince, as it hapned to ſeveral in *Greece* in the Cities of *Jonia*, and upon the *Helleſpont*; where they were inveſted with that power by *Darius* for his greater ſecurity and Glory, and to thoſe Emperours who arrived at the Empire by the corruption of the Souldiers. Theſe perſons I ſay, ſubſiſt wholly upon the pleaſure and fortune of thoſe who advanced them, which being two things very valuable and uncertain; they have neither knowledg nor power to continue long in that degree; know not, becauſe unleſs he be a Man of extraordinary qualities and virtue, it is not reaſonable to think he can know how to command other people, who before lived always in a private condition himſelf; cannot, becauſe they have no forces upon whoſe friendſhip, and fidelity they can rely. Moreover States which are ſuddenly conquered (as all things elſe in nature whoſe riſe and increaſe is ſo ſpeedy) can have no root or found-

foundation, but what will be ſhaken and ſupplanted by the firſt guſt of adverſity, unleſs they who have been ſo ſuddenly exalted, be ſo wiſe as to prepare prudently in time for the conſervation of what fortune threw ſo luckily into their lap, and eſtabliſh afterwards ſuch fundamentals for their duration, as others (which I mentioned before) have done in the like caſes. About the arrival at this Authority either by virtue, or good fortune, I ſhall inſtance in two examples that are freſh in our memory; one is *Francis Sforza*, the other *Cæſar Borgia*, *Sforza* by juſt means, and extraordinary virtue made himſelf Duke of *Milan*, and injoyed it in great peace, though gained with much trouble. *Borgia* on the other ſide (called commonly Duke *Valentine*) got ſeveral fair territories by the fortune of his Father Pope *Alexander*, and loſt them all after his death, though he uſed all his induſtry, and imployed all the Arts which a wiſe and brave Prince ought to do to fix himſelf in the ſphear, where the Arms, and fortune of other People had placed him: For he (as I ſaid before) who laid not his foundation in time, may yet raiſe his ſuperſtructure, but with great trouble to the Architect, and great danger to the building. If therefore the whole progreſs of the ſaid Duke be conſidered, it will be found what ſolid foundations he had laid for his future dominion, of which progreſs I think it not ſuperfluous to diſcourſe, becauſe I know not what better precepts to diſplay before a new Prince, than the example of his actions, and though his own orders and methods did him no good, it was not ſo much his fault, as the malignity of his fortune.

Pope *Alexander* the ſixth had a deſire to make his Son *Duke Valentine* great, but he ſaw many blocks and impediments in the way both for the preſent, and future. Firſt he could not ſee any way to advance him to any territory that depended not upon the Church, and to thoſe in his gift, he was ſure the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Venetians* would never conſent; for *Faenza* and *Riminum* had already put themſelves under the *Venetian* protection. He was likewiſe ſenſible that the forces of *Italy*, eſpecially thoſe who were capable of aſſiſting him, were in the hands of thoſe who ought to apprehend the greatneſs of the Pope, as the *Orſini*, *Coloneſi*, and their followers, and therefore could not repoſe any great confidence in them: beſides the Laws and alliances of all the States in *Italy* muſt of neceſſity be diſturbed, before he could make himſelf Maſter of any part, which was no hard matter to do, finding the *Venetians* upon ſome private intereſt of their own inviting the *French* to another expedition into *Italy*, which his Holineſs was ſo far from oppoſing, that he promoted it by the diſſolution of King *Lewis* his former marriage. *Lewis* therefore paſſed the *Alps* by the aſſiſtance of the *Venetians*, and *Alexanders* conſent, and was no ſooner in *Milan*, but he ſent forces to aſſiſt the Pope in his enterprize againſt *Romagna*, which was immediatly ſurrendred upon the Kings reputation. *Romagna* being in this manner reduc'd by the Duke, and the *Colonneſi* defeated, being ambitious not only to keep what he had got, but to advance in his Conqueſts, two things obſtructed; one was the infidelity of his own Army; the other, the averſion of the *French*: for he was jealous of the forces of the *Urſini* who were in his ſervice; ſuſpected they would fail him in his need, and either hinder his conqueſt, or take it from him when he had done; and the ſame fears he had of the *French*; and his jealouſie of the *Urſini* was much increaſed, when after the expugnation of *Faenſa*, aſſaulting *Bologna*, he found them very cold and backward in the attack: and the King's inclination he diſcover'd, when having poſſeſs'd himſelf of the Dutchy of *Urbin*, he invaded *Tuſcany*, and was by him requir'd to deſiſt. Whereupon the Duke reſolved to depend no longer upon fortune, and foreign aſſiſtance, and the firſt courſe he took, was to weaken the party of the *Urſini*, and *Colonni* in *Rome*, which he effected very neatly, by debauching ſuch of their adherants as were Gentlemen, taking them into his own ſervice, and giving them honorable penſions, and Governments, and Commands, according to their reſpective qualities, ſo that in a few months, their paſſion for that faction evaporated, and they turn'd all for the Duke. After this he attended an opportunity of ſupplanting the *Urſini*, as he had done the Family of the *Colonni* before; which happened very luckily, and was as luckily improved: for the *Urſini* conſidering too late that the greatneſs of the Duke and the Church tended to their ruine, held a Council at a place called *Magions* in *Perugia*, which occaſioned the rebellion of *Urbin*, the tumults in *Romagna*, and a thouſand dangers to the Duke beſides; but though he overcame them all by the aſſiſtance of the *French*, and recovered his reputation, yet he grew weary of his foreign allies, as having nothing further to oblige them, and betook himſelf to his artifice, which he managed ſo dexterouſly, that the *Urſini* reconciled themſelves to him, by the mediation of *Seignor Paulo*; with whom for his ſecurity he comported ſo handſomly by preſenting with mony, rich ſtuffs, and Horſes, that being convinced of his integrity, he conducted them to *Sinigaglia*, and deliver'd them into the Dukes hands. Having by this means exterminated the chief of his adverſaries, and reduc'd their friends, the Duke had laid a fair foundation for his great-

neſs, having gain'd *Romagna* and the Dutchy of *Urbin*, and inſinuated with the People by giving them a guſt of their future felicity. And becauſe this part is not unworthy to be known, for imitation ſake, I will not paſs it in ſilence. When the Duke had poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Romagna*, finding it had been governed by poor and inferiour Lord's, who had rather robb'd than corrected their ſubjects, and given them more occaſion of diſcord than unity, inſomuch as that Province was full of robberies, riots, and all manner of inſolencies; to reduce them to unanimity, and ſubjection to Monarchy, he thought it neceſſary to provide them a good Governor, and thereupon he confer'd that charge upon *Remiro d'Orco*, with abſolute power, though he was a cruel, and a paſſionate Man. *Orco* was not long before he had ſetled it in peace, with no ſmall reputation to himſelf. Afterwards the Duke apprehending ſo large a power might grow odious to the People, he erected a Court of judicature in the middle of the Province, in which every City had its advocate, and an excellent perſon was appointed to preſide. And becauſe he diſcover'd that his paſs'd ſeverity had created him many Enemies; to remove that ill opinion, and recover the affections of the People, he had a mind to ſhow that if any cruelty had been exerciſed, it proceeded not from him, but from the arrogance of his Miniſter; and for their further confirmation; he cauſed the ſaid Governor to be apprehended, and his Head chopt off one morning in the Market place at *Ceſena*, with a wooden dagger on one ſide of him, and a bloody knife on the other; the ferocity of which ſpectacle not only appeas'd, but amaz'd the People for a while. But reaſſuming our diſcourſe, I ſay the Duke finding himſelf powerful enough, and ſecure againſt preſent danger, being himſelf as ſtrong as he deſired, and his neighbours in a manner reduced to an incapacity of hurting him, being willing to go on with his conqueſts, there remaining nothing but a jealouſie of *France*, and not without cauſe, for he knew that King had found his errour at laſt, and would be ſure to obſtruct him. Hereupon he began to look abroad for new allies, and to hæſitate and ſtagger towards *France*, as appeared when the *French* Army advanced into the Kingdom of *Naples* againſt the *Spaniards* who had beſeig'd *Cajeta*; his great deſign was to ſecure himſelf againſt the *French*, and he had doubtleſs done it, if *Alexander* had lived. Theſe were his proviſions againſt the dangers that were iminent, but thoſe that were remote, were more doubtful and uncertain. The firſt thing he feared was, leſt the next Pope ſhould be his enemy, and reaſſume all that *Alexander* had given him; to prevent which he propoſed four ſeveral ways. The firſt was by deſtroying the whole line of thoſe Lord's whom he had diſpoſſeſs'd, that his Holineſs might have no occaſion to reſtore them; The ſecond was to cajole the Nobility in *Rome*, and draw them over to his party, that thereby he might put an aw, and reſtraint upon the Pope. The third was, if poſſible to make the Colledge his friends. The fourth was to make himſelf ſo ſtrong before the Death of his Father, as to be able to ſtand upon his own legs, and repel the firſt violence that ſhould be practiſed againſt him. Three of theſe four expedients he had try'd before *Alexander* died, and was in a fair way for the fourth, all the diſſeiz'd Lord's which came into his Clutches, he put to death, and left few of them remaining: he had inſinuated with the Nobility of *Rome*, and got a great party in the Colledge of Cardinals, and as to his own corroboration, he had deſign'd to make himſelf Maſter of *Tuſcany*, had got poſſeſſion of *Perugia*, and *Piombino* already, and taken *Piſa* into his protection: and having now no farther regard of the *French* (who were beaten out of the Kingdom of *Naples* by the *Spaniard*, and both of them reduc'd to a neceſſity of ſeeking his amity) he leapt bluntly into *Piſa*, after which *Lucca*, and *Siena* ſubmitted without much trouble, partly in hatred to the *Florentines*, and partly for fear, and the *Florentines* were grown deſperate & without any hopes of relief, ſo that had theſe things hapned before, as they did the ſame year in which *Alexander* died, doubtleſs he had gain'd ſo much ſtrength and reputation, that he would have ſtood firm by himſelf, upon the baſis of his own power and conduct, without depending upon fortune, or any foreign ſupplies. But his Father died five years after his Son had taken up Arms, and left him nothing ſolid, and in certainty but *Romagna* only, the reſt were *in nubibus*, infeſted with two formidable Armies, and himſelf mortally ſick. This Duke was a Man of that magnanimity and prudence, underſtood ſo well which way Men were to be wheedled, or deſtroy'd, and ſuch were the foundations that he had laid in a ſhort time, that had he not had thoſe two great Armies upon his back, and a fierce diſtemper upon his body, he had overcome all difficulties, and brought his deſigns to perfection. That the foundations which he had laid were plauſible, appear'd by the patience of his Subjects in *Romagna* who held out for him a compleat month, though they knew he was at deaths door, and unlikely ever to come out of *Rome*: to which place though the *Baglioni*, the *Vitelli*, and *Urſini* return'd, ſeeing there was no likelyhood of his recovery, yet they could not gain any of his party, nor debauch them to their ſide: 'tis poſſible he was not able to put who he pleas'd into the Pontifical chair,

yet

yet he had power enough to keep any man out who he thought was his Enemy: But had it been his fortune to have been well when his Father *Alexander* dyed, all things had ſucceeded to his mind. He told me himſelf about the time that *Julius* XI. was created, that he had conſidered well the accidents that might befall him upon the death of his Father, and provided againſt them all, only he did not imagine that at his death, he ſhould be ſo near it himſelf. Upon ſerious Examination therefore of the whole Conduct of Duke *Valentine*, I ſee nothing to be reprehended, it ſeems rather proper to me to propoſe him (as I have done) as an Example for the imitation of all ſuch as by the favour of fortune, or the ſupplies of other Princes, have got into the ſaddle; for his mind being ſo large, and his intentions ſo high, he could not do otherwiſe, and nothing could have oppoſed the greatneſs and wiſdom of his deſigns, but his own infirmity, and the death of his Father. He therefore who thinks it neceſſary in the minority of his Dominion to ſecure himſelf againſt his Enemies; to gain himſelf Friends, to overcome whether by force, or by fraud; to make himſelf belov'd, or fear'd by his people; to be followed and reverenced by his Soldiers; to deſtroy and exterminate ſuch as would do him injury; to repeal and ſuppreſs old Laws, and introduce new; to be ſevere, grateful, magnanimous, liberal, caſhier and disband ſuch of his Army as were unfaithful, and put new in their places; manage himſelf ſo in his alliances with Kings and Princes, that all of them ſhould be either obliged to requite him, or affear'd to offend him; He I ſay cannot find a freſher or better Model than the actions of this Prince. If in any thing he be to be condemned, it is in ſuffering the Election of *Julius* XI. which was much to his prejudice; for though (as is ſaid before) he might be unable to make the Pope as he pleaſed; yet it was in his power to have put any one by, and he ought never to have conſented to the Election of any of the Cardinals whom he had formerly offended, or who after their promotion were like to be jealous of him; for men are as miſchievous for fear, as for hatred. Thoſe Cardinals which he had diſobliged, were among others, the Cardinals of St. *Peter ad Vincula*, *Colonno*, St. *George*, and *Aſcanius*. The reſt, if any of them were advanced to the Papacy, might well be afraid of him, except the *Spaniſh* Cardinals, and the Cardinal of *Roan*; the *Spaniards* by reaſon of their obligations and alliance; and the other, by reaſon of his intereſt in the Kingdom of *France*. Wherefore above all things, the *Duke* ſhould have made a *Spaniſh* Cardinal *Pope*; and if that could not have been done, he ſhould rather have conſented to the Election of *Roan*, than St. *Peter ad Vincula*; for 'tis weakneſs to believe, that among great perſons, new obligations can obliterate old injuries and diſguſts. So that in the Election of this *Julius* XI. Duke *Valentine* committed an Error that was the cauſe of his utter deſtruction.

CHAP. VIII.

Of ſuch as have arriv'd at their Dominion, by wicked and unjuſtifiable means.

NOw becauſe there are two ways from a private perſon to become a Prince, which ways are not altogether to be attributed either to fortune or management, I think it not convenient to preternit them, though of one of them I may ſpeak more largely, where occaſion is offered to treat more particularly of Republicks. One of theſe ways is when one is advanced to the Soveraignty by any illegal and nefarious means: The other when a Citizen by the favour and partiality of his Fellow-Citizens is made Prince of his Country. I ſhall ſpeak of the firſt in this Chapter, and juſtifie what I ſay by two Examples, one Ancient, the other Modern, without entring farther into the merits of the cauſe, as judging them ſufficient for any man who is neceſſitated to follow them. *Agathocles* the *Sicilian*, not only from a private, but from a vile and abject Condition, was made King of *Siracuſe*, and being but the Son of a Potter, he continued the diſſoluteneſs of his life, thorow all the degrees of his fortune: Nevertheleſs his vices were accompanied with ſuch courage and activity, that he applyed himſelf to the Wars, by which, and his great induſtry, he came at length to be *Pretor* of *Siracuſe*: Being ſetled in that Dignity, and having concluded to make himſelf Prince, and hold that by violence, without obligation to any body, which was conferred upon him by conſent, he ſetled an intelligence with *Amilcar* the *Carthaginian*, who was then at the head of an Army in *Sicily*, and calling the People and Senate of *Siracuſe* together one morning, as if he had been to conſult them in ſome matter of importance to the State, upon a ſignal appointed, he caus'd his Soldiers to kill all the Senators, and the moſt wealthy of the people; after whoſe death, he uſurped and poſſeſſed the Dominion of that

City, without any obſtruction: and though afterwards he loſt two great Battails to the *Carthaginians*, and at length was beſieg'd, yet he was not only able to defend that City, but leaving part of his forces for the ſecurity of that, with the reſt he tranſported into *Affrick*; and ordered things ſo, that in a ſhort time he reliev'd *Siracuſe*, and reduced the *Carthaginians* into ſuch extream neceſſity, that they were glad to make peace with him, and contenting themſelves with *Affrick*, leave *Sicily* to *Agathocles*. He then who examines the Exploits and Conduct of *Agathocles*, will find little or nothing that may be attributed to fortune, ſeeing he roſe not (as is ſaid before) by the favour of any man, but by the ſteps and gradations of War; with a thouſand difficulties and dangers having gotten that Government, which he maintained afterwards with as many noble Atchievements. Nevertheleſs it cannot be called Virtue in him to kill his fellow-Citizens, betray his Friends, to be without faith, without pity, or Religion; theſe are ways may get a Man Empire, but no glory nor reputation: Yet if the Wiſdom of *Agathocles* be conſidered, his dexterity in encountring, and overcoming of dangers, his Courage in ſupporting and ſurmounting his misfortunes; I do not ſee why he ſhould be held inferiour to the beſt Captains of his time. But his unbounded cruelty, and barbarous inhumanity, added to a million of other Vices, will not permit that he be numbred amongſt the moſt Excellent Men. So then that which he performed cannot juſtly be attributed to either Fortune or Virtue, for he did all himſelf without either the one or the other. In our days under the Papacy of *Alexander* VI. *Oliverotto da Fermo* being left young many years ſince by his Parents, was brought up by his Uncle by the Mothers ſide, call'd *John Togliani*, and in his youth liſted a Soldier under *Paulo Vitelli*, that having improved himſelf by his Diſcipline, he might be capable of ſome Eminent Command. *Paulo* being dead, he ſerved under *Vitellezzo* his Brother, and in ſhort time by the acuteneſs of his parts, and the briskneſs of his Courage, became one of the beſt Officers in his Army. But thinking it beneath him to continue in any Man's Service, he conſpir'd with ſome of his fellow-Citizens of *Fermo* (to whom the ſervitude of their Country, was more agreeable than its liberty) by the help of *Vitelleſco* to ſeize upon *Fermo*: In order to which, he writ a Letter to his Uncle *John Fogliani*, importing, That having been abſent many years, he had ſome thoughts of viſiting him and *Fermo*, and taking ſome little diverſion in the place where he was born, and becauſe the deſign of his Service had been only the gaining of Honour, That his fellow-Citizens might ſee his time had not been ill ſpent, he deſired admiſſion for a hundred Horſe of his Friends, and his Equipage, and beg'd of him that he would take care they might be honourably received, which would redound not only to his Honour, but his Uncles, who had had the bringing him up. *John* was not wanting in any Office to his Nephew, and having caus'd him to be nobly received, he lodged him in his own Houſe, where he continued ſome days, preparing in the mean time what was neceſſary to the Execution of his wicked deſign. He made a great Entertainment, to which he invited *John Fogliani*, and all the chief Citizens in the Town. About the end of the treatment, when they were entertaining one another, as is uſual at ſuch times, *Oliverotto* very ſubtilly promoted certain grave diſcourſes about the greatneſs of Pope *Alexander*, and *Cæſar* his Son, and of their Deſigns; *John* and the reſt replying freely to what was ſaid, *Oliverotto* ſmil'd, and told them thoſe were points to be argued more privately, and thereupon removing into a Chamber, his Uncle, and the reſt of his fellow-Citizens followed; They were ſcarce ſate down, before Soldiers (who were conceal'd about the room) came forth, and kill'd all of them, and the Uncle among the reſt; After the Murder was committed *Oliverotto* mounted on Horſe back, rid about, and rummaged the whole Town, having beſieged the chief Magiſtrate in his Palace; ſo that for fear, all people ſubmitted, and he eſtabliſh'd a Government of which he made himſelf head. Having put ſuch to death as were diſcontented, and in any capacity of doing him hurt, he fortifyed himſelf with new Laws, both Military and Civil, inſomuch as in a years time he had not only fixed himſelf in *Fermo*, but was became terrible to all that were about him; and he would have been as hard as *Agathocles* to be ſupplanted, had he not ſuffered himſelf to have been circumvented by *Cæſar Borgia*, when at *Singalia* (as aforeſaid) he took the *Urſini*, and *Vitelli*; where alſo he himſelf was taken a year after his Parracide was committed, and ſtrangled with his Maſter *Vitellozzo* from whom he had learned all his good qualities, and evil.

It may ſeem wonderful to ſome people how it ſhould come to paſs that *Agathocles*, and ſuch as he, after ſo many Treacheries, and acts of inhumanity, ſhould live quietly in their own Country ſo long, defend themſelves ſo well againſt foreign Enemies, and none of their Subjects conſpire againſt them at home; ſeeing ſeveral others, by reaſon of their cruelty, have not been able, even in times of Peace, as well as War, to defend their Government. I conceive it fell out according as their cruelty was well or ill applyed: I ſay well applyed (if that word may be added to an ill action) and it may be called ſo, when committed but

once,

once, and that of neceſſity for ones own preſervation, but never repeated afterwards, and even then converted as much as poſſible to the benefit of the Subject. Ill applyed, are ſuch cruelties as are but few in the beginning, but in time do rather multiply than decreaſe. Thoſe who are guilty of the firſt, do receive aſſiſtance ſometimes both from God and Man, and *Agathocles* is an inſtance. But the others cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt long: From whence it is to be obſerved, that he who uſurps the Government of any State, is to execute and put in practice all the cruelties which he thinks material at once, that he may have no occaſion to renue them often, but that by his diſcontinuance, he may mollifie the people, and by his benefits, bring them over to his ſide: He who does otherwiſe, whether for fear, or ill Counſel, is obliged to be always ready with his Knife in his hand, for he can never repoſe any confidence in his Subjects, whilſt they, by reaſon of his freſh and continued inhumanities cannot be ſecure againſt him: So then Injuries are to be committed all at once, that the laſt being the leſs, the diſtaſte may be likewiſe the leſs; but benefits ſhould be diſtilled by drops, that the reliſh may be the greater. Above all a Prince is ſo to behave himſelf towards his Subjects, that neither good fortune or bad ſhould be able to alter him; for being once aſſaulted with adverſity, you have no time to do miſchief, and the good which you do, does you no good, being looked upon as forced, and ſo no thanks to be due for it.

CHAP. IX.

Of Civil Principality.

I Shall ſpeak now of the other way, when a Principal Citizen not by wicked contrivance, or intollerable violence is made Soveraign of his Country, which may be called a Civil Principality, and is not to be attained by either Virtue, or Fortune alone, but by a lucky ſort of craft; This Man I ſay arrives at the Government by the favour of the people or Nobility; for in all Cities the meaner, and the better ſort of Citizens are of different humours, and it proceeds from hence that the common people are not willing to be commanded and oppreſſed by the great ones, and the great ones are not to be ſatisfyed without it: From this diverſity of appetite, one of theſe three Effects do ariſe, Principality, Liberty, or Licentiouſneſs. Principality is cauſed either by the people, or the great ones, as either the one, or the other has occaſion: The great ones finding themſelves unable to reſiſt the popular torrent, do many times unanimouſly confer their whole Authority upon one Perſon, and create him Prince, that under his protection they may be quiet and ſecure. The People on the other ſide, when over-power'd by their Adverſaries, do the ſame thing, tranſmitting their power to a ſingle perſon, who is made King for their better defence. He who arrives at the Soveraignty by the aſſiſtance of the great ones, preſerves it with more difficulty, than he who is advanced by the people, becauſe he has about him many of his old Aſſociates, who thinking themſelves his Equals, are not to be directed and managed as he would have them. But he that is preferred by the people, ſtands alone without Equals, and has no body, or very few about him, but what are ready to obey: Moreover the Grandees are hardly to be ſatisfied without injury to others, which is otherwiſe with the people, becauſe their deſigns are more reaſonable, than the deſigns of the great ones, which are fixt upon commanding, and oppreſſing altogether, whil'ſt the people endeavour only to defend and ſecure themſelves. Moreover where the people is adverſe, the Prince can never be ſafe, by reaſon of their numbers; whereas the great ones are but few, and by conſequence not ſo dangerous. The worſt that a Prince can expect from an injured and incenſed people, is to be deſerted; but if the great ones be provoked, he is not only to fear abandoning, but conſpiracy, and bandying againſt him; for the greater ſort being more provident and cunning, they look out in time to their own ſafety, and make their intereſt with the perſon, who they hope will overcome. Beſides the Prince is obliged to live always with one and the ſame people, but with the Grandees he is under no ſuch obligation, for he may create, and degrade advance and remove them as he pleaſes. But for for the better Explication of this part, I ſay, That theſe great men are to be conſidered two ways eſpecially; That is, whether in the manner of their adminiſtration they do wholly follow the fortune and intereſt of the Prince, or whether they do otherwiſe. Thoſe who devote themſelves entirely to his buſineſs, and are not rapacious, are to be valued and preferred. Thoſe who are more remiſs, and will not ſtick to their Prince, do it commonly upon two Motives, either out of lazineſs or fear (and in thoſe caſes they may be employed, eſpecially if they be wiſe and of good Counſel, becauſe if affairs proſper, thou gaineſt honour thereby; if they miſcarry, thou needeſt not

to

to fear them) or upon ambition, and deſign, and that is a token that their thoughts are more intent upon their own advantage than thine. Of theſe a Prince ought always to have a more than ordinary care, and order them as if they were Enemies profeſſed, for in his diſtreſs they will be ſure to ſet him forwards, and do what they can to deſtroy him. He therefore who comes to be Prince by the favour and ſuffrage of the people, is obliged to keep them his friends, which (their deſire being nothing but freedom from oppreſſion) may be eaſily done. But he that is preferred by the intereſt of the Nobles againſt the minds of the Commons, is above all things to indeavour to ingratiate with the people, which will be as the other, if he undertakes their protection: And Men receiving good Offices, where they expected ill, are indear'd by the ſurprize, and become better affected to their Benefactor, than perhaps they would have been, had he been made Prince by their immediate favour. There are many ways of inſinuating with the people, of which no certain rule can be given, becauſe they vary according to the diverſity of the ſubject, and therefore I ſhall paſs them at this time, concluding with this aſſertion, that it is neceſſary above all things, that a Prince preſerves the affections of his people, otherwiſe in any Exigence, he has no refuge nor remedy. *Nabides* Prince of the *Spartans*, ſuſtained all *Greece*, and a Victorious Army of the *Romans*, and defended his Government and Country againſt them all; and to do that great action, it was ſufficient for him to ſecure himſelf againſt the Machinations of a few, whereas if the people had been his Enemy, that would not have done it. Let no man impugn my opinion with that old ſaying, *He that builds upon the people, builds upon the ſand.* That is true indeed when a Citizen of private Condition relies upon the people, and perſwades himſelf that when the Magiſtrate, or his Adverſary, goes about to oppreſs him, they will bring him off, in which caſe many preſidents may be produced, and particularly the *Gracchi* in *Rome*, and *Georgio Scali* in *Florence*. But if the Prince that builds upon them, knows how to command, and be a man of Courage, not dejected in adverſity, nor deficient in his other preparations, but keeps up the ſpirits of his people by his own Valour and Conduct, he ſhall never be deſerted by them, nor find his foundation laid in a wrong place.

Theſe kind of Governments are moſt tottering and uncertain, when the Prince ſtrains of a ſuddain, and paſſes (as at one leap) from a Civil, to an abſolute power, and the reaſon is, becauſe they either command and act by themſelves, or by the Miniſtery and Mediation of the Magiſtrate: In this laſt caſe their authority is weaker, and more tickliſh, becauſe it depends much upon the pleaſure and concurrence of the Chief Officers, (who (in time of adverſity eſpecially) can remove them eaſily, either by neglecting, or reſiſting their Commands: Nor is there any way for ſuch a Prince in the perplexity of his affairs to eſtabliſh a Tyranny, becauſe thoſe Citizens and Subjects who uſed to exerciſe the Magiſtracy, retain ſtill ſuch power and influence upon the people, that they will not infringe their Laws, to obey his; and in time of danger he ſhall always want ſuch as he can truſt, So that a Prince is not to take his meaſures according to what he ſees in times of peace, when of the Subjects (having nothing to do but to be governed) every one runs, every one promiſes, and every one dyes for him, when death is at a diſtance: But when times are tempeſtuous, and the ſhip of the State has need of the help and aſſiſtance of the Subject, there are but few will expoſe themſelves: And this experiment is the more dangerous, becauſe it can be practiſed but once: So then, a Prince who is provident and wiſe ought to carry himſelf ſo, that in all places, times, and occaſions the people may have need of his adminiſtration and Regiment, and ever after they ſhall be faithful and true.

CHAP. X.

How the ſtrength of all Principalities is to be computed.

TO any man that examines the nature of Principalities, it is worthy his conſideration, whether a Prince has power and territory enough to ſubſiſt by himſelf, or whether he needs the aſſiſtance, and protection of other people. To clear the point a little better, I think thoſe Princes capable of ruling who are able either by the numbers of their men, or the greatneſs of their wealth to raiſe a compleat Army, and bid Battail to any that ſhall invade them; and thoſe I think depend upon others, who of themſelves dare not meet their Enemy in the field, but are forced to keep within their bounds, and defend them as well as they can. Of the firſt we have ſpoken already, and ſhall ſay more as occaſion is preſented. Of the ſecond no more can be ſaid, but to adviſe ſuch Princes to ſtrengthen and fortifie the Capital

Capital Town in their Dominions, and not to trouble himſelf with the whole Country; and whoever ſhall do that, and in other things, manage himſelf with his Subjects as I have deſcribed, and perhaps ſhall do hereafter, ſhall with great caution be invaded, for men are generally wary and tender of enterprizing any thing that is difficult, and no great eaſineſs is to be found in attacking a Town well fortified and provided, where the Prince is not hated by the people.

The Towns in *Germany* are many of them free; though their Country and diſtrict be but ſmall, yet they obey the Emperor but when they pleaſe, and are in no awe, either of him, or any other Prince of the Empire, becauſe they are all ſo well fortified, every one looks upon the taking of any one of them as a work of great difficulty and time, their Walls being ſo ſtrong, their Ditches ſo deep, their works ſo regular, and well provided with Cannon, and their ſtores and Magazines always furniſh'd for a Twelvemonth. Beſides which, for the aliment and ſuſtenance of the people, and that they may be no burthen to the publick, they have work-houſes, where for a year together the poor may be employed in ſuch things as are the Nerves and life of that City, and ſuſtain themſelves by their labour. Military Diſcipline and Exerciſes are likewiſe much in requeſt there, and many Laws and good Cuſtoms they have to maintain them.

A Prince then who has a City well fortified, and the affections of his people, is not eaſily to be moleſted, and he that does moleſt him, is like to repent it, for the affairs of this world are ſo various, it is almoſt impoſſible for any Army to lye quietly a whole year before a Town, without interruption. If any objects that the people having houſes and poſſeſſions out of the Town, will not have patience to ſee them plundered and burned; and that Charity to themſelves will make them forget their Prince; I anſwer, That a wiſe and dexterous Prince will eaſily evade thoſe difficulties, by encouraging his Subjects, & perſwading them, ſometimes their troubles will not be long; ſometimes inculcating, and poſſeſſing them with the cruelty of the Enemy; and ſometimes by correctiug and ſecuring himſelf nimbly of ſuch as appear too turbulent and audacious. Moreover the uſual practice is for the Enemy to plunder and ſet the Country on fire at their firſt coming, whil'ſt every man's ſpirit is high, and fixed upon defence; ſo that the Prince needs not concern himſelf, nor be fearful of that, for thoſe miſchiefs are paſs'd, and inconveniencies received, and when the people in three or four days time begin to be cool, and conſider things ſoberly, they will find there is no remedy, and joyn more cordially with the Prince, looking upon him as under an obligation to them, for having ſacrificed their Houſes and Eſtates in his defence. And the Nature of Man is ſuch, to take as much pleaſure in having obliged another, as in being obliged himſelf. Wherefore all things fairly conſidered, it is no ſuch hard matter for a Prince not only to gain, but to retain the affection of his Subjects, and make them patient of a long Siege, if he be wiſe, and provident, and takes care, they want nothing, either for their livelyhood or defence.

CHAP. XI.

Of Eccleſiaſtical Principalities.

THere remains nothing of this Nature to be diſcourſed, but of Eccleſiaſtical Principalities, about which the greateſt difficulty is to get into poſſeſſion, becauſe they are gained either by Fortune or Virtue, but kept without either, being ſupported by ancient Statutes univerſally received in the Chriſtian Church, which are of ſuch power and authority, they do keep their Prince in his Dignity, let his converſation or conduct be what it will. Theſe are the only perſons who have Lands, and do not defend them, Subjects, and do not govern them, and yet their Lands are not taken from them though they never defend them, nor their Subjects diſſatisfied, though they never regard them; ſo that theſe Principalities are the happieſt and moſt ſecure in the world; but being managed by a ſupernatural power above the wiſdom and contrivance of Man; I ſhall ſpeak no more of them, for being ſet up, and continued by God himſelf, it would be great preſumption in any man who ſhould undertake to diſpute them. Nevertheleſs, if it ſhould be queſtioned how it came to paſs that in Temporal things the Church is arrived at that heighth, ſeeing that before *Alexander*'s time, the *Italian* Princes, not only ſuch as were Soveraigns, but every *Baron* and *Lord*, how inconſiderable ſoever in Temporal affairs, eſteemed of them but little; yet ſince, it has been able not only to ſtartle and confront the King of *France*, but to drive him out of *Italy*, and to ruine the *Venetians*, the reaſon of which, though already well known, I think it not ſuperfluous, to revive in ſome meaſure.

Before

Before *Charles* King of *France* passed himself into *Italy*, that Province was under the Empire of the Pope, the *Venetians*, the King of *Naples*, Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines*. It was the interest of these *Potentates*, to have a care, some of them that no foreign *Prince* should come with an Army into *Italy*, and some that none among themselves should usurp upon the other. Those of whom the rest were concern'd to be most jealous, were the Pope, and the *Venetian*: to restrain the *Venetians*, all the rest were us'd to confederate, as in the defence of *Ferrara*. To keep under the *Pope*, the *Roman Barons* contributed much, who being divided into two factions (the *Ursini*, and *Colloneſi* in perpetual contention, with their Arms constantly in their hands under the very nose of the Pope, they kept the Pontifical power very low, and infirm: and although now and then there hapned a couragious Pope (as *Sextus*) yet neither his courage, wisdom, nor fortune was able to disintangle him from those incommodities; and the shortness of their reign was the reason thereof; for ten years time (which was as much as any of them reign'd) was scarce sufficient for the suppression of either of the parties, and when the *Colonneſi* as a Man may say were almost extinct, a new Enemy sprang up against the *Ursini*, which revived the *Colonesi*, and reestablished them again. This emulation and animosity at home, was the cause the Pope was no more formidable in *Italy*; after this *Alexander* VI. was advanc'd to the *Papacy*, who more than all that had ever been before him, demonstrated what a Pope with mony and power was able to do; having taken advantage of the *French* invasion, by the Ministery and conduct of Duke *Valentine*, he performed all that I have mentioned else where among the Actions of the said Duke. And though his design was not so much to advantage the Church, as to aggrandize the Duke, yet what he did for the one, turned afterwards to the benefit of the other, for the Pope being dead, and *Valentine* extinct, what both of them had got, devolv'd upon the Church: after him *Julius* succeeded, and found the Church in a flourishing condition; *Romagna* was wholly in its possession, the *Barons* of *Rome* exterminated, and gone, and their factions suppressed by Pope *Alexander*, and besides, a way opened for raising and hoarding of Mony never practised before; which way *Julius* improving rather than otherwise, be began to entertain thoughts, not only of conquering *Bologna*, but mastering the *Venetians*, and forcing the *French* out of *Italy*. All which great enterprizes succeeding, it added much to his honor that he impropriated nothing, but gave all to the Church. He maintained also the *Colonesi* and *Ursini* in the same condition as he found them, and though in case of sedition there were those ready on both sides to have headed them; yet there were two considerations which kept them at peace. One was the greatness of the *Church* which kept them in awe; the other was their want of Cardinals, which indeed was the Original of their discontents, and will never cease till some of them be advanced to that dignity; for by them the Parties in *Rome*, and without, are maintained, and the *Barons* oblig'd to defend them; so that the ambition of the Prelats is the cause of all the dissention and tumults among the *Barons*.

His present *Holineſs* Pope *Leo* had the happiness to be elected at a time when it was most powerful, and it is hop'd, if they made the Church great by their Arms, he by the integrity of his conversation, and a thousand other virtues will inlarge it much more, and make it more venerable and august.

CHAP. XII.

How many forms there are of Military Discipline, and of those Souldiers which are called Mercenary.

HAving spoken particularly of the several sorts of Principalities as I proposed in the beginning; considered in part the reasons of their good constitution, and their evil; and the ways which many have taken to acquire, and preserve them; it remains that I proceed now in a general way upon such things as may conduce to the offence, or defence of either of them.

We have declared before that it is not only expedient, but necessary for a Prince to take care his foundations be good, otherwise his fabrick will be sure to fail.

The principal foundations of all States, (new, old, or mixt) are good Laws, and good Arms, and because there cannot be good Laws, where there are not good Arms, and where the Arms are good, there must be good Laws, I shall pass by the Laws, and discourse of the Arms.

I say, the Arms then with which a Prince defends his State, are his own, Mercenary, Auxiliary

ry or mixt. The Merciniary, and Auxiliary are unprofitable, and dangerous; and that Prince who founds the duration of his Government upon his Mercenary forces, shall never be firm nor secure, for they are divided, ambitious, undisciplin'd, unfaithful, insolent to their friends, abject to their Enemies, without fear of God, or faith to Men, so the ruine of that person who trusts to them is no longer protracted, than the attempt is deferred; in time of peace they devorse you, in time of War they desert you, and the reason is because it is not love, nor any principle of honor that keeps them in the field, 'tis only their pay, and that is not a consideration strong enough to prevail with them to die for you; whilst you have more service to imploy them in, they are excellent Souldiers; but tell them of an engagement, and they will either disband before, or run away in the battle.

And to evince this, would require no great pains; seeing the ruine of *Italy* proceeded from no other cause, than that for several years together it had repos'd it self upon Mercenary Arms; which forces 'tis possible may have formerly done service to some particular person, and behav'd themselves well enough among one another, but no sooner were they attackt by a powerful foreigner, but they discovered themselves, and shew what they were to the World: hence it was that *Charles* 8 chaulk'd out his own way into *Italy*; and that person was in the right, who affirmed our own faults were the cause of our miseries; but it was not those faults he believed, but those I have mention'd, which being committed most eminently by Princes, they suffered most remarkably in the punishment. But to come closer to the point, and give you a clearer prospect of the imperfection and infelicity of those forces. The great officers of these *mercenaries*, are Men of great courage, or otherwise; if the first, you can never be safe, for they always aspire to make themselves great either by supplanting of you who is their Master, or oppressing of other People, whom you desir'd to have preserved; and on the other side, if the Commanders be not couragious you are ruined again; if it should be urged that all Generals will do the same, whether mercenaries or others, I would answer, that all War is managed either by a Prince or Republick: the Prince is obliged to go in person, and perform the office of General himself: the Republick must depute some one of her choice Citizens, who is to be changed, if he carries himself ill; if he behaves himself well, he is to be continued, but so straitned and circumscrib'd by his commission, that he may not transgress: and indeed experience tells us that Princes alone, and Commonwealths alone with their own private forces have performed great things, whereas *mercenaries* do nothing but hurt. Besides, a martial Commonwealth that stands upon its own legs, and maintains it self by its own prowess, is not easily usurp'd, and falls not so readily under the obedience of one of their fellow Citizens, as where all the forces are foreign. *Rome*, and *Sparta* maintained their own liberty for many years together by their own forces and Arms: the *Swisses* are more martial than their Neighbours, and by consequence more free. Of the danger of *Mercenary* forces, we have an antient example in the *Carthaginians*, who after the end of their first War with the *Romans*, had like to have been ruin'd, and overrun by their own *Mercenaries*, though their own Citizens commanded them.

After the death of *Epiminandas* the *Thebans* made *Philip of Macedon* their General, who defeated their Enemies, and enslaved themselves. Upon the death of Duke *Philip*, the *Milanesi* entertained *Francesco Sforza* against the *Venetians*, and *Francesco*, having worsted the Enemy at *Caravaggio*, joyned himself with him, with design to have mastered his Masters. *Francesco*'s Father was formerly in the service of *Joan* Queen of *Naples*, and on a sudden marched away from her with his Army, and left her utterly destitute, so that she was constrain'd to throw her self under the protection of the King of *Aragon*, and though the *Venetians*, and *Florentines* both, have lately enlarged their Dominion by imploying these forces, and their Generals have rather advanced than enslav'd them; I answer that the *Florentines* may impute it to their good fortune, because, of such of their Generals as they might have rationally feared, some had no Victories to incourage them, others were obstructed, and others turned their ambition another way; he that was not Victorious was *Giovanni Acuto*, whose fidelity could not be known, because he had no opportunity to break it, but every body knows had he succeeded, the *Florentines* had been all at his mercy: *Sforza* had always the *Bracceschi* in opposition, and they were reciprocally an impediment the one to the other. *Francesco* turned his ambition upon *Lombardy*, *Braccio* upon the Church, and the Kingdom of *Naples*. But to speak of more modern occurrences. The *Florentines* made *Paul Vitelli* their General, a wise Man, and one who from a private fortune had raised himself to a great reputation: had *Paul* taken *Pisa*, no body can be insensible how the *Florentines* must have comported with him, for should he have quitted their service, and taken pay of their Enemy, they had been lost without remedy, and to have continued him in that power, had been in time to have made him their Master. If

the progreſs of the *Venetians* be conſidered, they will be found to have acted ſecurely, and honorably whilſt their affairs were managed by their own forces (which was before they attempted any thing upon the *terra firma*) then all was done by the Gentlemen and Common People of that City, and they did very great things; but when they began to enterprize at land, they began to abate of their old reputation and diſcipline, and to degenerate into the cuſtoms of *Italy*; and when they began to conquer firſt upon the Continent, having no great territory, and their reputation being formidable abroad, there was no occaſion that they ſhould be much afraid of their officers; but afterwards when they began to extend their Empire, under the command of *Carmignola*, then it was they became ſenſible of their error; for having found him to be a great Captain by their Victories (under his conduct) againſt the Duke of *Milan*, perceiving him afterwards grow cool and remiſs in their ſervice, they concluded no more great things were to be expected from him; and being neither willing, nor indeed able to take away his commiſſion, for fear of loſing what they got, they had were conſtrain'd for their own ſecurity to put him to Death. Their Generals after him were *Bartolomeo da Bergamo*, *Roberto da San Severino*, and the *Conte de Pitigliano*, and ſuch as they, under whoſe conduct the *Venetians* were more like to loſe than to gain, as it hapned not long after at *Vaila*, where in one Battle they loſt as much as they had been gaining eight hundred years with incredible labour and difficulty; which is not ſtrange, if it be conſidered that by thoſe kind of forces the conqueſts are ſlow, and tedious, and weak; but their loſſes are rapid and wonderful. And becauſe I am come with my examples into *Italy*, where for many years all things have been manag'd by mercenary Armies, I ſhall lay my diſcourſe a little higher, that their Original and progreſs being rendred more plain, they may with more eaſe be regulated and corrected. You muſt underderſtand that in latter times when the *Roman* Empire began to decline in *Italy*, and the *Pope* to take upon him authority in Temporal affairs, *Italy* became divided into ſeveral States: For many of the great Cities took Arms againſt their Nobility, who having been formerly favoured by the Emperours, kept the People under oppreſſion, againſt which the Church oppoſed to gain to it ſelf a reputation and intereſt in temporal affairs: other Cities were ſubdued by their Citizens who made themſelves Princes; ſo that *Italy* (upon the tranſlation of the Empire*) being fallen into the hands of the Pope and ſome other Commonwealths; and thoſe *Prieſts* and *Citizens* unacquainted with the uſe and exerciſe of Arms; they began to take foreigners into their pay: the firſt Man who gave reputation to theſe kind of forces was *Alberigo da Como* of *Romagna*: among the reſt *Braccio* and *Sforza* (the two great Arbiters of *Italy* in their time) were brought up under his diſcipline, after whom ſucceeded the reſt who commanded the Armies in *Italy* to our days: and the end of their great diſcipline and conduct was, that *Italy* was overrun by *Charles*, pillaged by *Lewis*, violated by *Ferrand*, and defamed by the *Swizzers*. The order which they obſerv'd, was firſt to take away the reputation from the Foot, and appropriate it to themſelves; and this they did, becauſe their dominion being but ſmall, and to be maintained by their own induſtry, a few foot could not do their buſineſs, and a great body they could not maintain; hereupon they changed their *Militia* into horſe, which being digeſted into Troops they ſuſtain'd and rewarded themſelves with the commands, and by degrees this way of *Cavalry* was grown ſo much in faſhion, that in an Army of 20000 Men, there was ſcarce 2000 Foot to be found. Beſides they endeavour'd with all poſſible induſtry to prevent trouble or fear either to themſelves or their Souldiers, and their way was by killing no body in fight, only taking one another Priſoners, and diſmiſſing them afterwards without either prejudice or ranſom. When they were in Leaguer before a Town, they ſhot not rudely amongſt them in the night, nor did they in the Town diſturb them with any ſallies in their Camp; no approaches or intrenchments were made at unſeaſonable hours, and nothing of lying in the feild when Winter came on; and all theſe things did not happen by any negligence in their Officers, but were part of their diſcipline, and introduc'd (as is ſaid before) to eaſe the poor Souldier both of labour and danger, by which practices they have brought *Italy* both into ſlavery, and contempt.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Auxiliaries, mix'd, and Natural Soldiers.

AUxiliaries (which are another ſort of unprofitable Soldiers) are when ſome potent Prince is called in to your aſſiſtance and defence; as was done not long ſince by Pope *Julius*, who in his Enterprize of *Ferrara* having ſeen the ſad experience of his Mercenary Army, betook himſelf to auxiliaries, and capitulated with *Ferrand* King of *Spain*, that he ſhould come with his Forces to his relief. Theſe Armies may do well enough for themſelves, but he who invites them, is ſure to be a ſufferer; for if they be beaten, he is ſure to be a loſer, if they ſucceed, he is left at their diſcretion; and though ancient Hiſtories are full of examples of this kind, yet I ſhall keep to that of Pope *Julius* XI. as one ſtill freſh in our Memory, whoſe Expedition againſt *Ferrara* was very raſh and inconſiderate, in that he put all into the hands of a ſtranger; but his good fortune preſented him with a third accident, which prevented his reaping the fruit of his imprudent Election; for his ſubſidiary Troops being broken at *Ravenna*, and the *Swizzers* coming in, and beating off the Victors, beyond all expectation he eſcaped being a Priſoner to his Enemies, becauſe they alſo were defeated, and to his Auxiliary friends, becauſe he had conquered by other peoples Arms. The *Florentines* being deſtitute of Soldiers, hired 10000 *French* for the reduction of *Piſa*, by which Counſel they ran themſelves into greater danger, than ever they had done in all their troubles before. The Emperor of *Conſtantinople* in oppoſition to his Neighbors, ſent 10000 *Turks* into *Greece*, which could not be got out again when the War was at an end, but gave the firſt beginning to the ſervitude and captivity which thoſe Infidels brought upon that Country. He then who has no mind to overcome, may make uſe of theſe Forces, for they are much more dangerous than the Mercenary, and will ruine you out of hand, becauſe they are always unanimous, and at the command of other people, whereas the Mercenaries after they have gotten a Victory, muſt have longer time, and more occaſion before they can do you a miſchief, in reſpect they are not one body, but made up out of ſeveral Countrys entertain'd into your pay, to which if you add a General of your own, they cannot ſuddenly aſſume ſo much Authority as will be able to do you any prejudice. In ſhort, it is Cowardize and ſloth that is to be feared in the Mercenaries, and courage and activity in the Auxiliaries. A wiſe Prince therefore never made uſe of theſe Forces, but committed himſelf to his own; chooſing rather to be overcome with them, than to conquer with the other, becauſe he cannot think that a Victory, which is obtain'd by other peoples Arms. I ſhall make no ſcruple to produce *Ceſar Borgia* for an Example. This Duke invaded *Romagna* with an Army of Auxiliaries, conſiſting wholly of *French*, by whoſe aſſiſtance he took *Imola*, and *Furli*: But finding them afterwards to totter in their faith, and himſelf inſecure, he betook himſelf to Mercenaries, as the leſs dangerous of the two, and entertained the *Urſini* and *Vitelli* into his pay; finding them alſo irreſolute, unfaithful, and dangerous, he diſmiſs'd them, and for the future employed none but his own. From hence we may collect the difference betwixt theſe two ſorts of Forces, if we conſider the difference in the *Dukes* reputation when the *Urſini* and *Vitelli* were in his Service, and when he had no Soldiers but his own: When he began to ſtand upon his own Legs, his renown began to increaſe, and indeed, before, his eſteem was not ſo great, till every body found him abſolute Maſter of his own Army.

Having begun my Examples in *Italy*, I am unwilling to leave it, eſpecially whil'ſt it ſupplies us with ſuch as are freſh in our memory; yet I cannot paſs by *Hiero* of *Syracuſe*, whom I have mentioned before. This perſon being made General of the *Syracuſan* Army, quickly diſcovered the Mercenary Militia was not to be relyed upon, their Officers being qualified like ours in *Italy*, and finding that he could neither continue, nor diſcharge them ſecurely, he ordered things ſo, that they were all cut to pieces, and then proſecuted the War with his own Forces alone, without any foreign aſſiſtance. To this purpoſe the Old Teſtament affords us a figure not altogether improper. When *David* preſented himſelf to *Saul*, and offered his Service againſt *Goliah* the Champion of the *Philiſtins*, *Saul* to encourage him, accoutred him in his own Arms, but *David* having tryed them on, excuſed himſelf, pretending they were unfit, and that with them he ſhould not be able to manage himſelf; wherefore he deſired he might go forth againſt the Enemy with his own Arms only, which were his Sling and his Sword. The ſum of all is, the Arms of other people are commonly unfit; and either too wide, or too ſtrait, or too cumberſom.

CHARLES VII. the Father of *Lewis* XI. having by his Fortune and Courage redeem'd his Country out of the hands of the *Engliſh*, began to underſtand the neceſſity of having Soldiers of his own, and erected a Militia at home to conſiſt of Horſe as well as Foot, after which, his Son King *Lewis* caſhiered his own Foot, and took the *Swiſſers* into his pay, which error being followed by his Succeſſors, (as is viſible to this day) is the occaſion of all the dangers to which that Kingdom of *France* is ſtill obnoxious; for having advanced the reputation of the *Swiſſes* he vilified his own people, by disbanding the foot entirely, and accuſtoming his Horſe ſo much to engage with other Soldiers, that fighting ſtill in Conjunction with the *Swiſſers*, they began to believe they could do nothing without them; Hence it proceeds that the *French* are not able to do any thing againſt the *Swiſſes*, and without them they will venture upon nothing: So that the *French* Army is mix'd, conſiſts of Mercenaries, and Natives, and is much better than either *Mercenaries* or *Auxiliaries* alone, but much worſe than if it were entirely Natural, as this Example teſtifies abundantly; for doubtleſs *France* would be inſuperable, if *Charles* his Eſtabliſhment was made uſe of, and improv'd: But the imprudence of Man begins many things, which ſavouring of preſent good, conceal the poyſon that is latent, (as I ſaid before of the Hectick Feaver) wherefore if he who is rais'd to any Soveraignty, foreſees not a miſchief till it falls upon his head, he is not to be reckoned a wiſe Prince, and truly that is a particular bleſſing of God, beſtowed upon few people: If we reflect upon the firſt cauſe of the ruine of the *Roman* Empire, it will be found to begin at their entertaining the *Goths* into their Service, for thereby they weakened and enervated their own Native courage, and (as it were) transfuſed it into them.

I conclude therefore, that without having proper and peculiar forces of his own, no Prince is ſecure, but depends wholly upon fortune, as having no Natural and intrinſick ſtrength to ſuſtain him in adverſity: and it was always the opinion, and poſition of wiſe Men, that nothing is ſo infirm and unſtable as the name of Power, not founded upon forces of its own; thoſe forces are compoſed of your Subjects, your Citizens, or Servants, all the reſt are either Mercenaries or Auxiliaries, and as to the manner of Ordering and Diſciplining theſe Domeſticks, it will not be hard, if the Orders which I have preſcribed be peruſed, and the ways conſidered which *Philip* the Father of *Alexander* the Great, and many other Princes and Republicks have uſed in the like caſes, to which Orders and Eſtabliſhments I do wholly refer you.

CHAP. XIV.

The duty of a Prince in relation to his Militia.

A Prince then is to have no other deſign, nor thought, nor ſtudy, but War, and the Arts and Diſciplines of it; for indeed that is the only profeſſion worthy of a Prince, and is of ſo much importance, that it not only preſerves thoſe who are born Princes in their patrimonies, but advances men of private condition to that Honorable degree. On the otherſide it is frequently ſeen when Princes have addicted themſelves more to delicacy and ſoftneſs, than to Arms, they have loſt all, and been driven out of their States; for the principal things which deprives or gains a man authority, is the neglect or profeſſion of that Art: *Franceſco Sforza* by his Experience in War, of a private perſon made himſelf Duke of *Milan*, and his Children, ſeeking to avoid the fatigues and incommodities thereof, of *Dukes* became private Men; for among other evils and inconveniences which attend when you are ignorant in War, it makes you contemptible, which is a ſcandal a Prince ought with all diligence to avoid, for reaſons I ſhall name hereafter; beſides betwixt a potent, and an impotent, a vigilant and a negligent Prince there is no proportion, it being unreaſonable that a Martial and Generous perſon ſhould be ſubject willingly to one that is weak and remiſs; or that thoſe who are careleſs and effeminate, ſhould be ſafe amongſt thoſe who are Military and Active; for the one is too inſolent, and the other too captious, ever to do any thing well together; ſo that a Prince unacquainted with the Diſcipline of War, beſides other infelicities to which he is expos'd, cannot be beloved by, nor confident in his Armies. He never therefore ought to relax his thoughts from the Exerciſes of War, not ſo much as in time of Peace, and indeed then he ſhould imploy his thoughts more ſtudiouſly therein, than in War it ſelf, which may be done two ways, by the application of the body, and the mind. As to his bodily application, or matter of action, beſides that he is obliged to keep his Armies in good Diſcipline and Exerciſe, he ought to inure himſelf to ſports, and by Hunting

Hunting and Hawking, and ſuch like recreation, accuſtom his body to hardſhip, and hunger, and thirſt, and at the ſame time inform himſelf of the Coaſts and ſcituation of the Country, the bigneſs and elevation of the Mountains, the largeneſs and avenues of the Vallies, the extent of the Plains, the Nature of the Rivers and Fens, which is to be done with great curioſity; and this knowledge is uſeful two ways; for hereby he not only learns to know his own Country, and to provide better for its defence, but it prepares and adapts him, by obſerving their ſcituations, to comprehend the ſcituations of other Countrys, which will perhaps be neceſſary for him to diſcover: For the Hills, the Vales, the Plains, the Rivers, and the Marſhes (for Example) in *Tuſcany*, have a certain ſimilitude and reſemblance with thoſe in other Provinces; ſo that by the knowledge of one, we may eaſily imagine the reſt: and that Prince who is defective in this, wants the moſt neceſſary qualification of a General; for by knowing the Country, he knows how to beat up his Enemy; take up his quarters; March his Armies; Draw up his Men; and beſiege a Town with advantage. In the Character which Hiſtorians give of *Philopomenes* Prince of *Achaia*, one of his great Commendations is, that in time of peace he thought of nothing but Military affairs, and when he was in Company with his Friends in the Country, he would many times ſtop ſuddenly, and expoſtulate with them; if the Enemy were upon that Hill, and our Army where we are, which would have the advantage of the ground? How could we come at them with moſt ſecurity? if we would draw off, how might we do it beſt? Or if they would retreat, how might we follow? ſo that as he was travelling, he would propoſe all the accidents to which an Army was ſubject; he would hear their opinion, give them his own, and reinforce it with arguments; and this he did ſo frequently, that by continual practice, and a conſtant intention of his thoughts upon that buſineſs, he brought himſelf to that perfection, no accident could happen, no inconvenience could occur to an Army, but he could preſently redreſs it. But as to the exerciſe of the mind, a Prince is to do that by diligence in Hiſtory, and ſolemn conſideration of the actions of the moſt Excellent Men; by obſerving how they demean'd themſelves in the Wars, examining the grounds and reaſons of their Victories, and Loſſes, that he may be able to avoid the one, and imitate the other; and above all, to keep cloſe to the Example of ſome great Captain of old (if any ſuch occurs in his reading) and not only to make him his pattern, but to have all his actions perpetually in his mind, as it was ſaid *Alexander* did by *Achilles*; *Cæſar* by *Alexander*, *Scipio* by *Cyrus*. And whoever reads the life of *Cyrus* written by *Xenophon*, will find how much *Scipio* advantaged his renown by that imitation, and how much in modeſty, affability, humanity, and liberality he framed himſelf to the deſcription which *Xenophon* had given him. A wiſe Prince therefore is to obſerve all theſe rules, and never be idle in time of peace, but employ himſelf therein with all his induſtry, that in his adverſity he may reap the fruit of it, and when fortune frowns, be ready to defie her.

CHAP. XV.

Of ſuch things as render Men (eſpecially Princes) worthy of blame, or applauſe.

IT remains now that we ſee in what manner a Prince ought to comport with his Subjects and friends: and becauſe many have writ of this ſubject before, it may perhaps ſeem arrogant in me, eſpecially conſidering that in my diſcourſe I ſhall deviate from the opinion of other Men. But my intention being to write for the benefit and advantage of him who underſtands, I thought it more convenient to reſpect the eſſential verity, than the imagination of the thing (and many have fram'd imaginary Commonwealths and Governments to themſelves which never were ſeen, nor had any real exiſtence) for the preſent manner of living is ſo different from the way that ought to be taken, that he who neglects what is done, to follow what ought to be done, will ſooner learn how to ruine, than how to preſerve himſelf; for a tender Man, and one that deſires to be honeſt in every thing, muſt needs run a great hazard among ſo many of a contrary Principle. Wherefore it is neceſſary for a Prince that is willing to ſubſiſt, to harden himſelf, and learn to be good, or otherwiſe according to the exigence of his affairs. Laying aſide therefore all imaginable notions of a *Prince*, and diſcourſing of nothing but what is actually true, I ſay that all Men when they are ſpoken of, eſpecially Princes (who are in a higher and more eminent ſtation) are remarkable for ſome quality or other that makes them either honorable or contemptible. Hence it is that ſome are counted liberal, others miſerable (according to the

propriety

propriety of the *Tuscan* word *Misero*, for *Quaro* in our language is one that desires to acquire by rapine, or any otherway; *Misero* is he that abstains too much from making use of his own) some munificent, others repacious, some cruel, others merciful; some faithless, others precise. One poor spirited and effeminate, another fierce and ambitious, one courteous, another haughty, one modest, another libidinous, one sincere, another cunning, one rugged and morose, another accessible and easie, one grave, another gidy, one a Devote, and another an Atheist. No man (I am sure) will deny but that it would be an admirable thing, and highly to be commended to have a Prince endued with all the good qualities abovesaid; but because it is impossible to have, much less to exercise them all, by reason of the frailty and crosness of our Nature, it is convenient that he be so well instructed as to know how to avoid the scandal of those Vices which may deprive him of his State, and be very cautious of the rest, though their consequence be not so pernicious, but where they are unavoidable, he need trouble himself the less. Again, he is not to concern himself if run under the infamy of those Vices without which his Dominion was not to be preserved; for if we consider things impartially, we shall find some things in appearance are virtuous, and yet if pursued, would bring certain destruction; and others on the contrary that are seemingly bad, which if followed by a *Prince*, procure his peace and security.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Liberality, and Parsimony.

TO begin then with the first of the above-mentioned qualities, I say, it would be advantagious to be accounted liberal; nevertheless liberality so used as not to render you formidable, does but injure you, for if it be used virtuously, and as it ought to be, it will not be known, nor secure you from the imputation of its contrary: To keep up therefore the name of liberal amongst men, it is necessary that no kind of luxury be omitted, so that a Prince of that disposition will consume his revenue in those kind of expences, and be obliged at last, if he would preserve that reputation, to become grievous, and a great exactor upon the people, and do whatever is practicable for the getting of Money, which will cause him to be hated, of his Subjects, and despised by every body else, when he once comes to be poor, so that offending many with his liberality, and rewarding but few, he becomes sensible of the first disaster, and runs great hazard of being ruined, the first time he is in danger; which when afterwards he discovers, and desires to remedy; he runs into the other extream, and grows as odious for his avarice. So then if a Prince cannot exercise this virtue of liberality, so as to be publickly known, without detriment to himself, he ought if he be wise, not to dread the imputation of being covetous, for in time he shall be esteemed liberal when it is discovered that by his parsimony he has increased his revenue to a Condition of defending him against any Invasion, and to enterprize upon other people, without oppressing of them; so that he shall be accounted Noble to all from whom he takes nothing away, which are an infinite number; and near and parsimonious only to such few as he gives nothing to.

In our days we have seen no great action done, but by those who were accounted miserable, the other have been always undone. Pope *Julius* XI. made use of his bounty to get into the Chair, but (to enable himself to make War with the King of *France*) he never practised it after, and by his frugality he maintained several Wars without any tax or imposition upon the people, his long parsimony having furnished him for his extraordinary expences. The present King of *Spain*, if he had affected to be thought liberal, could never have undertaken so many great designs, nor obtain'd so many great Victories. A Prince therefore ought not much to concern himself (so he exacts not upon his Subjects, so he be able to defend himself, so he becomes not poor and despicable, nor commits rapine upon his people) though he be accounted covetous, for that is one of those Vices which fortifies his Dominion. If any one objects that *Cæsar* by his liberality made his way to the Empire, and many others upon the same score of reputation have made themselves great; I answer, That you are either actually a *Prince*, or in a fair way to be made one. In the first case liberality is hurtful; in the second, 'tis necessary, and *Cæsar* was one of those who design'd upon the Empire: But when he was arrived at that dignity, if he had lived, and not retrenched his Expences, he would have ruined that Empire. If any replys, Many have been Princes. and with their Armies performed great matters, who have been reputed liberal, I rejoyn, that a Prince spends either of his own, or his Subjects, or other peoples.

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In the first case, he is to be frugal: In the second he may be as profuse as he pleases, and baulk no point of liberality. But that Prince whose Army is to be maintained with free quarter, and plunder, and exactions from other people, is obliged to be liberal, or his Army will desert him; and well he may be prodigal of what neither belongs to him, nor his Subjects, as was the case with *Cæsar*, and *Cyrus*, and *Alexander*; for to spend upon anothers stock, rather adds to, than substracts from his reputation, 'tis spending of his own, that is so mortal, and pernicious. Nor is there any thing that destroys it self like liberality; for in the use of it, taking away the faculty of using it, thou becomest poor and contemptible, or to avoid that poverty, thou makest thy self odious and a Tyrant; and there is nothing of so much importance to a Prince to prevent, as to be either contemptible or odious, both which depend much upon the prudent exercise of your liberality. Upon these considerations it is more wisdom to lye under the scandal of being miserable, which is an imputation rather infamous, than odious, than to be thought liberal, and run your self into a necessity of playing the Tyrant, which is infamous and odious both.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Cruelty, and Clemency, and whether it is best for a Prince to be beloved, or feared.

TO come now to the other qualities proposed, I say every Prince is to desire to be esteemed rather merciful than cruel, but with great caution that his mercy be not abused; *Cæsar Borgia* was counted cruel, yet that cruelty reduced *Romagna*, united it, setled it in peace, and rendered it faithful: so that if well considered, he will appear much more merciful than the *Florentines*, who rather than be thought cruel, suffered *Pistoia* to be destroyed: A Prince therefore is not to regard the scandal of being cruel, if thereby he keeps his Subjects in their Allegiance, and united, seeing by some few examples of Justice you may be more merciful, than they who by an universal exercise of pitty, permit several disorders to follow, which occasion Rapine and Murder; and the reason is, because that exorbitant mercy has an ill effect upon the whole universality, whereas particular Executions extend only to particular persons. But among all Princes, a new Prince has the hardest task to avoid the scandal of being cruel, by reason of the newness of his Government, and the dangers which attend it: Hence *Virgil* in the person of *Dido* excused the inhospitality of her Government.

Res dura, & regni novitas, me talia cogunt
Moliri, & late fines Custode tueri.

My new Dominion, and my harder fate
Constrains me to't, and I must guard my State.

Nevertheless he is not to be too credulous of reports, too hasty in his motions, nor create fears and jealousies to himself, but so to temper his administrations with prudence and humanity, that neither too much confidence may make him careless, nor too much diffidence intollerable. And from hence arises a new question, *Whether it be better to be belov'd than fear'd, or fear'd than belov'd?* It is answered, Both would be convenient, but because that is hard to attain, it is better and more secure (if one must be wanting) to be fear'd than belov'd; for in the general Men are ingrateful, inconstant, hypocritical, fearful of danger, and covetous of gain; whil'st they receive any benefit by you, and the danger is at distance, they are absolutely yours, their Blood, their Estates, their Lives, and their Children (as I said before) are all at your Service, but when mischief is at hand, and you have present need of their help, they make no scruple to revolt: And that Prince who leaves himself naked of other preparations, and relies wholly upon their professions, is sure to be ruined; for amity contracted by price, and not by the greatness and generosity of the mind, may seem a good pennyworth; yet when you have occasion to make use of it, you will find no such thing. Moreover Men do with less remorse offend against those who desire to be beloved, than against those who are ambitious of being feared, and the reason is because Love is fasten'd only by a ligament of obligation, which the ill Nature of Mankind, breaks upon every occasion that is presented to his profit; But fear depends upon an apprehension of punishment, which is never to be dispell'd. Yet a Prince is to render himself aweful in such sort, that if

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he gains not his Subjects love, he may eſchew their hatred; for to be feared and not hated, are compatible enough, and he may be always in that condition, if he offers no violence to their Eſtates, nor attempts any thing upon the honour of their Wifes, as alſo when he has occaſion to take away any Man's life, if he takes his time when the cauſe is manifeſt, and he has good matter for his juſtification: But above all things, he is to have a care of intrenching upon their Eſtates, for men do ſooner forget the death of their Father, than the loſs of their Patrimony: Beſides occaſions of confiſcation, never fail, and he that gives once way to that humour of rapine, ſhall never want temptation to ruine his Neighbor. But on the contrary, provocations to blood, are more rare, and do ſooner evaporate: But when a Prince is at the head of his Army, and has a multitude of Soldiers to govern, then it is abſolutely neceſſary not to value the Epethite of cruel, for without that, no Army can be kept in unity, nor in diſpoſition for any great act.

Among the ſeveral inſtances of *Hannibal's* great Conduct, it is one, That having a vaſt Army, conſtituted out of ſeveral Nations, and conducted to make War in an Enemies Country, there never hapned any Sedition among them, or any Mutiny againſt their General, either in his adverſity or proſperity: Which can proceed from nothing ſo probably as his great cruelty, which, added to his infinite Virtues, rendered him both aweful, and terrible to his Soldiers, and without that, all his Virtues would have ſignifyed nothing. Some Writers there are (but of little conſideration) who admire his great Exploits, and condemn the true cauſes of them. But to prove that his other Virtues would never have carried him thorow, let us reflect upon *Scipio*, a perſon Honorable not only in his own time, but in all Hiſtory whatever; nevertheleſs his Army mutined in *Spain*, and the true cauſe of it was, his too much gentleneſs and lenity, which gave his Soldiers more liberty than was ſuitable or conſiſtant with Military Diſcipline. *Fabius Maximus* upbraided him by it in the Senate, and call'd him *Corrupter of the Roman Militia*; The Inhabitants of *Locris* having been plundered and deſtroyed by one of *Scipio's* Lieutenants, they were never redreſſed, nor the Legat's inſolence corrected, all proceeding from the mildneſs of *Scipio's* Nature, which was ſo eminent in him, that a perſon undertaking to excuſe him in the Senate, declared that there were many who knew better how to avoid doing ill themſelves, than to puniſh it in other people. Which temper would doubtleſs in time have eclipſed the glory and reputation of *Scipio*, had that authority been continued in him; but receiving Orders, and living under the direction of the Senate, that ill quality was not only not diſcovered in him, but turned to his renown. I conclude therefore according to what I have ſaid about being feared, or beloved; That foraſmuch as men do love at their own diſcretion, but fear at their Princes, a wiſe Prince is obliged to lay his foundation upon that which is in his own power, not that which depends on other people, but (as I ſaid before) with great caution that he does not make himſelf odious.

CHAP. XVIII.

How far a Prince is obliged by his promiſe.

HOw Honorable it is for a Prince to keep his word, and act rather with integrity than colluſion, I ſuppoſe every body underſtands: Nevertheleſs Experience has ſhown in our times, That thoſe Princes who have not pinn'd themſelves up to that punctuality and preciſeneſs, have done great things, and by their cunning and ſubtilty not only circumvented, and darted the brains of thoſe with whom they had to deal, but have overcome, and been too hard for thoſe who have been ſo ſuperſtitiouſly exact. For further explanation, you muſt underſtand there are two ways of contending, by Law, and by force: The firſt is proper to Men; the ſecond to Beaſts; but becauſe many times the firſt is inſufficient, recourſe muſt be had to the ſecond. It belongs therefore to a Prince to underſtand both, when to make uſe of the rational, and when of the brutal way; and this is recommended to Princes (though abſtruſely) by ancient Writers, who tell them how *Achilles* and ſeveral other Princes were committed to the Education of *Chiron* the Centaur, who was to keep them under his Diſcipline, chooſing them a Maſter, half Man and half Beaſt, for no other reaſon but to ſhow how neceſſary it is for a Prince to be acquainted with both, for that one without the other will be of little duration. Seeing therefore it is of ſuch importance to a Prince to take upon him the Nature and diſpoſition of a Beaſt, of all the whole flock, he ought to imitate the Lyon and the Fox: for the Lyon is in danger of toils and ſnares, and the Fox of the Wolf: So that he muſt be a Fox to find out the ſnares, and a Lyon to

fright away the Wolves, but they who keep wholly to the Lyon, have no true notion of themselves. A Prince therefore that is wise and prudent, cannot, nor ought not to keep his *parole*, when the keeping of it is to his prejudice, and the causes for which he promised, removed. Were men all good, this Doctrine was not to be taught; but because they are wicked, and not likely to be punctual with you, you are not obliged to any such strictness with them: Nor was there ever any Prince that wanted lawful pretence to justifie his breach of promise. I might instance in many modern Examples, and show how many Confederations, and Peaces, and Promises have been broken by the infidelity of Princes; and how he that best personated the Fox, had the better success. Nevertheless it is of great consequence to disguise your inclination, and to play the Hypocrite well; and men are so simple in their temper, and so submissive to their present necessities, that he that is neat and cleanly in his collusions, shall never want people to practise them upon. I cannot forbear one Example which is still fresh in our memory. *Alexander* VI. never did nor thought of any thing but cheating, and never wanted matter to work upon, & though no man promised a thing with greater asseveration, nor confirmed it with more oaths and imprecations, and observ'd them less; yet understanding the world well, he never miscarried.

A Prince therefore is not obliged to have all the forementioned good qualities in reality, but it is necessary he have them in appearance; nay, I will be bold to affirm, that having them actually, and employing them upon all occasions, they are extreamly prejudicial, whereas having them only in appearance, they turn to better accompt; it is honorable to seem mild, and merciful, and courteous, and religious, and sincere, and indeed to be so, provided your mind be so rectified and prepared that you can act quite contrary upon occasion. And this must be premised, that a Prince, especially if come but lately to the throne, cannot observe all those things exactly which make men be esteemed virtuous, being oftentimes necessitated for the preservation of his State to do things inhumane, uncharitable, and irreligious; and therefore it is convenient his mind be at his command, and flexible to all the puffs, and variations of his fortune: Not forbearing to be good, whil'st it is in his choice, but knowing how to be evil when there is a necessity. A Prince then is to have particular care that nothing falls from his mouth, but what is full of the five qualities aforesaid, and that to see, and to hear him, he appears all goodness, integrity, humanity, and religion, which last he ought to pretend to more than ordinarily, because more men do judge by the eye, than by the touch, for every body sees, but few understand; every body sees how you appear, but few know what in reality you are, and those few dare not oppose the opinion of the multitude who have the Majesty of their Prince to defend them; and in the actions of all men, especially Princes, where no man has power to judge, every one looks to the end. Let a Prince therefore do what he can to preserve his life, and continue his Supremacy, the means which he uses shall be thought honorable, and be commended by every body; because the people are always taken with the appearance, and event of things, and the greatest part of the world consists of the people: Those few who are wise, taking place when the multitude has nothing else to relye upon. There is a Prince at this time in being (but his name I shall conceal) who has nothing in his mouth but fidelity and peace, and yet had he exercised either the one or the other, they had robb'd him before this both of his power and reputation.

CHAP. XIX.

That Princes ought to be cautious of becoming either odious or contemptible.

AND because in our discourse of the qualifications of a Prince, we have hitherto spoken only of those which are of greatest importance, we shall now speak briefly of the rest under these general heads. That a Prince make it his business (as is partly hinted before) to avoid such things as may make him odious or contemptible: and as often as he does that, he plays his part very well, and shall meet no danger or inconveniencies by the rest of his Vices: Nothing (as I said before) makes a Prince so insufferably odious, as usurping his Subjects Estates, and debauching their Wives, which are two things he ought studiously to forbear; for whil'st the generality of the world live quietly upon their Estates, and unprejudiced in their honor, they live peaceably enough, and all his contention is only with the pride and ambition of some few persons who are many ways, and with great ease to be restrained. But a Prince is contemptible, when he is counted effeminate, light, unconstant, pusillanimous, and irresolute; and of this he ought to be as careful, as of a Rock in the Sea, and strive that in all his actions there may appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and for-

titude, desiring that in the private affairs of his Subjects, his sentence and determination may be irrevocable, and himself to stand so in their opinion, that none may think it possible either to delude or divert him. The Prince who causes himself to be esteemed in that manner, shall be highly redoubted, and if he be feared, people will not easily conspire against him, nor readily invade him, because he is known to be an excellent Person, and formidable to his Subjects; for a Prince ought to be terrible in two places, at home to his Subjects, and abroad to his Equals; from whom he defends himself by good Arms, and good Allies; for if his power be good, his friends will not be wanting, and while his affairs are fixed at home, there will be no danger from abroad, unless they be disturb'd by some former conspiracy, and upon any Commotion *ab extra*, if he be composed at home, has liv'd as I prescribe, and not deserted himself, he will be able to bear up against any impression according to the example of *Nabis* the *Spartan*. When things are well abroad, his affairs at home will be safe enough, unless they be perplexed by some secret Conspiracy, against which the Prince sufficiently provides, if he keeps himself from being hated or despised, and the people remain satisfied of him, which is a thing very necessary, as I have largely inculcated before. And one of the best Remedies a Prince can use against conspiracy, is to keep himself from being hated or despised by the multitude; for no body plots, but he expects by the death of the Prince, to gratifie the people, and the thought of offending them will deter him from any such Enterprize, because in Conspiracies the difficulties are infinite. By experience we find that many conjurations have been set on foot, but few have succeeded, because no man can conspire alone, nor choose a Confederate but out of those who are discontented, and no sooner shall you impart your mind to a Male-content, but you give him opportunity to reconcile himself, because there is nothing he proposes to himself, but he may expect from the discovery. So that the gain being certain on that side, and hazardous and uncertain on the other, he must be either an extraordinary friend to you, or an implacable Enemy to the Prince if he does not betray you: In short, on the side of the Conspirators there is nothing but fear, and jealousie, and apprehension of punishment, but on the Princes side there is the Majesty of the Government, the Laws, the Assistance of his Friends and State, which defend him so effectually, that if the affections of the people be added to them, no man can be so rash, and precipitate as to conspire; for if before the execution of his design, the Conspirator has reason to be affraid, in this case he has much more afterwards, having offended the people in the Execution, and left himself no refuge to fly to. Of this many Examples might be produced, but I shall content my self with one which hapned in the memory of our Fathers. *Hanibal Bentivogli* (Grandfather to this present *Hanibal*) was Prince of *Bolonia*, and killed by the *Canneschi* who conspired against him; none of his race being left behind, but *John* who was then in his Cradle: The Murther was no sooner committed, but the people took Arms, and slew all the *Canneschi*, which proceeded only from the affection that the House of the *Bentivogli* had at that time among the populacy in *Bolonia*, which was then so great, that when *Hanibal* was dead, there being none of that Family remaining, in a capacity for the Government of the State, upon information that at *Florence* there was a Natural Son of the said *Bentivogli*'s (who till that time had passed only for the Son of a Smith) they sent Embassadors for him, and having conducted him honorably to that City, they gave him the Government, which he executed very well, till the said *John* came of Age. I conclude therefore a Prince need not be much apprehensive of Conspiracies, whil'st the people are his friends; but when they are dissatisfied, and have taken a prejudice against him, there is no thing, nor no person which he ought not to fear. And it has been the constant care of all wise Princes, and all well-governed States, not to reduce the Nobility to despair, nor the people to discontent, which is one of the most material things a Prince is to prevent. Among the best ordered Monarchies of our times, *France* is one, in which there are many good Laws and Constitutions tending to the liberty and preservation of the King: The first of them is the Parliament, and the Authority wherewith it is invested; for he who was the founder of that Monarchy, being sensible of the ambition and insolence of the *Nobles*, and judging it convenient to have them bridled and restrained; and knowing on the other side the hatred of the people against the Nobility, and that it proceeded from fear (being willing to secure them) to exempt the King from the displeasure of the Nobles, if he sided with the Commons, or from the malice of the Commons, if he enclined to the Nobles, he erected a third Judge, which (without any reflexion upon the King) should keep the Nobility under, and protect the people; nor could there be a better order, wiser, nor of greater security to the King and the Kingdom; from whence we may deduce another observation, *That Princes are to leave things of injustice and envy to the Ministery and Execution of others, but acts of favour and grace are to be perform'd by themselves.* To conclude, a Prince is to value his Grandees, but so as not to make the people hate him.

Contem-

Contemplating the lifes and deaths of several of the *Roman* Emperors, it is possible many would think to find plenty of Examples quite contrary to my opinion, forasmuch as some of them whose Conduct was remarkable, and Magnanimity obvious to every body, were turn'd out of their Authority, or murthered by the Conspiracy of their Subjects. To give a punctual answer, I should enquire into the qualities and conversations of the said Emperors, and in so doing I should find the reason of their ruine to be the same, or very consonant to what I have proposed. And in part I will represent such things as are most notable, to the consideration of him that reads the actions of our times, and I shall content my self with the examples of all the Emperors which succeeded in the Empire from *Marcus* the Philosopher, to *Maximinus*, and they were, *Marcus*, his Son *Commodus*, *Pertinax*, *Julian*, *Severus*, *Antoninus*, his Son *Caracalla*, *Macrinus*, *Heliogabalus*, *Alexander*, and *Maximinus*.

It is first to be considered, That whereas in other Governments there was nothing to contend with, but the ambition of the Nobles, and the insolence of the people, the *Roman* Emperors had a third inconvenience, to support against, The avarice and cruelty of the Soldier, which was a thing of such difficult practice, that it was the occasion of the destruction of many of them, it being very uneasie to please the Subject and the Soldier together; for the Subject loves Peace, and chooses therefore a Prince that is gentle and mild, whereas the Soldier prefers a Martial Prince, and one that is haughty, and rigid, and rapacious, which good qualities they are desirous he should exercise upon the people, that their pay might be encreased, and their covetousness and cruelty satiated upon them. Hence it is, That those Emperors, who neither by Art, nor Nature are indued with that address, and reputation as is necessary for the restraining both of the one and the other, do always miscarry; and of them the greatest part (especially if but lately advanced to the Empire) understanding the inconsistency of their two humours, encline to satisfie the Soldiers, without regarding how far the people are disobliged. Which Council is no more than is necessary; for seeing it cannot be avoided but Princes must fall under the hatred of somebody, they ought diligently to contend that it be not of the multitude; If that be not to be obrain'd, their next great care is to be, that they incur not the odium of such as are most potent among them: And therefore those Emperors who were new, and had need of extraordinary support, adhered more readily to the Soldiers than to the people, which turn'd to their detriment or advantage, as the Prince knew how to preserve his reputation with them: From the causes aforesaid, it hapned that *Marcus Aurelius*, *Pertinax*, and *Alexander* being Princes of more than ordinary Modesty, lovers of Justice, Enemies of cruelty, courteous, and bountiful, came all of them (except *Marcus*) to unfortunate ends. *Marcus* indeed lived and dyed in great honour, because he came to the Empire by way of inheritance and succession, without being beholding either to Soldiers or people, and being afterwards indued with many good qualities which recommended him, and made him venerable among them, he kept them both in such order whil'st he liv'd, and held them so exactly to their bounds, that he was never either hated or despised. But *Pertinax* was chosen Emperor against the will of the Soldiers, who being used to live licentiously under *Commodus*, they could not brook that regularity to which *Pertinax* endeavoured to bring them; so that having contracted the *Odium* of the Soldiers, and a certain disrespect and neglect by reason of his Age, he was ruined in the very beginning of his reign; from whence it is observable, that hatred is obtained two ways, by good works, and bad, and therefore a Prince (as I said before) being willing to retein his jurisdiction, is oftentimes compelled to be bad. For if the chief party, (whether it be people, or army, or Nobility) which you think most useful, and of most consequence to you for the conservation of your dignity, be corrupt, you must follow their humour and indulge them, and in that case honesty and virtue are pernicious.

But let us come to *Alexander* who was a Prince of such great equity and goodness, it is reckoned among his praises, that in the fourteen years of his Empire, there was no man put to death without a fair Tryal: Nevertheless being accounted effeminate, and one that suffered himself to be managed by his Mother, and falling by that means into disgrace, the Army conspired and killed him. Examining on the other side the Conduct of *Commodus*, *Severus*, *Antoninus*, *Caracalla*, and *Maximinus*, you will find them cruel and rapacious, and such as to satisfie the Soldiers, omitted no kind of injury that could be exercised against the people, and all of them but *Severus* were unfortunate in their ends: for *Severus* was a Prince of so great courage and magnanimity, that preserving the friendship of the Army (though the people were oppressed) he made his whole Reign happy, his virtues having represented him so admirable both to the Soldiers and people, that these remained in a manner stupid, and astonished, and the other obedient and contented. And because the actions of *Severus* were great in a new Prince, I shall shew in brief how he personated of the *Fox*

and the *Lyon*, whoſe Natures and Properties are (as I ſaid before) neceſſary for the imitation of a Prince. *Severus* therefore, knowing the lazineſs and inactivity of *Julian* the Emperor, perſwaded the Army under his own Command in *Sclavonia* to go to *Rome*, and revenge the death of *Pertinax* who was murthered by the Imperial Guards; and under that colour, without the leaſt pretence to the Empire, he marched his Army towards *Rome*, and was in *Italy* before any thing of his motion was known: Being arrived at *Rome*, the Senate were affraid of him, killed *Julian*, and elected *Severus*. After which beginning, there remained two difficulties to be removed before he could be Maſter of the whole Empire; The one was in *Aſia*, where *Niger* General of the *Aſiatick* Army, had proclaimed himſelf Emperor: The other, in the Weſt, where *Albinus* the General aſpired to the ſame: and thinking it hazardous to declare againſt both, he reſolved to oppoſe himſelf againſt *Niger*, and cajole and wheedle *Albinus*, to whom he writ word, That being choſen Emperor by the Senate, he was willing to receive him to a participation of that dignity, gave him the title of *Cæſar*, and by conſent of the Senate admitted him his Collegue; which *Albinus* embraced very willingly, and thought him in earneſt; but when *Severus* had overcome *Niger*, put him to death, and ſetled the affairs of the Eaſt, being returned to *Rome*, he complained in the Senate againſt *Albinus*, as a perſon, who contrary to his obligations for the benefits received from him, had endeavoured treacherouſly to murther him, told them that he was obliged to march againſt him to puniſh his ingratitude, and afterwards following him into *France*, he executed his deſign, deprived him of his Command, and put him to death. He then who ſtrictly examines the Actions of this Prince, will find him fierce as a Lyon, ſubtle as a Fox, feared and reverenced by every body, and no way odious to his Army: Nor will it ſeem ſtrange that he (though newly advanced to the Empire) was able to defend it, ſeeing his great reputation protected him againſt the hatred which his people might have conceived againſt him by reaſon of his Rapine. But his Son *Antoninus* was an excellent perſon likewiſe, endued with tranſcendant parts, which rendered him admirable to the people, and grateful to the Soldiers; for he was Martial in his Nature, patient of labour and hardſhip, and a great deſpiſer of all ſenſuality and ſoftneſs, which recommended him highly to his Armies. Nevertheleſs his fury and cruelty was ſo immoderately great (having upon ſeveral private and particular occaſions, put a great part of the people of *Rome*, and all the Inhabitants of *Alexandria*, to death) that he fell into the hatred of the whole world, and began to be feared by his Confidents that were about him, ſo that he was killed by one of his Captains in the middle of his Camp. From whence it may be obſerved, That theſe kind of Aſſaſſinations which follow upon a deliberate and obſtinate reſolution, cannot be prevented by a Prince, for he who values not his own life, can commit them when he pleaſes; but they are to be feared the leſs, becauſe they happen but ſeldom, he is only to have a care of doing any great injury to thoſe that are about him, of which error *Antoninus* was too guilty, having put the Brother of the ſaid Captain to an ignominious death, threatned the Captain daily, and yet continued him in his Guards, which was a raſh and pernicious act, and prov'd ſo in the end. But to come to *Commodus*, who had no hard task to preſerve his Empire, ſucceeding to it by way of inheritance, as Son to *Marcus*, for that to ſatisfie the people, and oblige the Soldiers, he had no more to do, but to follow the footſteps of his Father. But being of a brutiſh and cruel diſpoſition, to exerciſe his rapacity upon the people, he indulged his Army, and allowed them in all manner of licentiouſneſs. Beſides, proſtituting his Dignity, by deſcending many times upon the Theatre to fight with the Gladiators, and committing many other acts which were vile, and unworthy the Majeſty of an Emperor, he became contemptible to the Soldiers, and growing odious to one party, and deſpicable to the other, they conſpired and murthered him. *Maximinus* was likewiſe a Martial Prince, and addicted to the Wars, and the Army being weary of the Effeminacy of *Alexander* (whom I have mentioned before) having ſlain him, they made *Maximinus* Emperor, but he poſſeſſed it not long, for two things contributed to make him odious, and deſpiſed. One was the meanneſs of his Extraction, having kept ſheep formerly in *Thrace*, which was known to all the world, and made him univerſally contemptible. The other was that at his firſt coming to the Empire, by not repairing immediately to *Rome*, and putting himſelf into poſſeſſion of his Imperial ſeat, he had contracted the imputation of being cruel, having exerciſed more than ordinary ſeverity by his Prefects in *Rome*, and his Lieutenants in all the reſt of the Empire; ſo that the whole world being provoked, by the vileneſs of his birth, and deteſtation of his cruelty, in apprehenſion of his fury, *Africa*, the Senate and all the people both in *Italy* and *Rome*, conſpired againſt him, and his own Army joyning themſelves with them, in their Leaguer before *Aquileia* finding it difficult to be taken, weary of his cruelties, and encouraged by the multitude of his Enemies, they ſet upon him, and ſlew him.

I will not trouble my ſelf with *Heliogabalus*, *Macrinus*, nor *Julian*, who being all effeminate and contemptible, were quickly extinguiſhed. But I ſhall conclude this diſcourſe, and ſay that the Princes of our times are not obliged to ſatisfie the Soldiers in their reſpective Governments by ſuch extraordinary ways; for though they are not altogether to be neglected, yet the remedy and reſolution is eaſie becauſe none of theſe Princes have entire Armies, brought up, and inveterated in their ſeveral Governments and Provinces, as the Armies under the *Roman Empire* were. If therefore at that time it was neceſſary to ſatisfie the Soldiers rather than the people, it was becauſe the Soldiers were more potent. At preſent it is more the intereſt of all Princes (except the great *Turk* and the *Soldan*) to comply with the people, becauſe they are more conſiderable than the Soldiers. I except the *Turk*, becauſe he has in his Guards 12000 Foot, and 15000 Horſe conſtantly about him, upon whom the ſtrength and ſecurity of his Empire depends, and it is neceſſary (poſtponing all other reſpect to the people) they be continued his friends. It is the ſame caſe with the *Soldan*, who being wholly in the power of the Soldier, it is convenient that he alſo wave the people, and inſinuate with the Army. And here it is to be noted, that this Government of the *Soldans* is different from all other Monarchies, for it is not unlike the Papacy in Chriſtendom, which can neither be called a new, nor an hereditary Principality, becauſe the Children of the deceaſed Prince, are neither Heirs to his Eſtate, nor Lords of his Empire, but he who is choſen to ſucceed, by thoſe who have the faculty of Election; which Cuſtom being of old, the Government cannot be called new, and by conſequence is not ſubject to any of the difficulties wherewith a new one is infeſted; becauſe though the perſon of the Prince be new, and perhaps the Title; yet the Laws and Orders of State are old, and diſpoſed to receive him as if he were hereditary Lord. But to return to our buſineſs, I ſay, That whoever conſiders the aforeſaid diſcourſe, ſhall find either hatred or contempt the perpetual cauſe of the ruine of thoſe Emperors; and be able to judge how it came about that part of them taking one way in their adminiſtrations, and part of them another, in both parties ſome were happy, and ſome unhappy at laſt. *Pertinax* and *Alexander* being but Upſtart Princes, it was not only vain, but dangerous for them to imitate *Marcus*, who was Emperor by right of Succeſſion. Again, it was no leſs pernicious for *Caracalla*, *Commodus*, and *Maximinus* to make *Severus* their pattern, not having force nor virtue enough to follow his footſteps. So then if a new Prince cannot imitate the actions of *Marcus*; (and to regulate by the example of *Severus*, is unneceſſary) he is only to take that part from *Severus* that is neceſſary to the foundation of his State, and from *Marcus*, what is convenient to keep and defend it gloriouſly, when 'tis once eſtabliſhed and firm.

CHAP. XX.

Whether Citadels, and other things which Princes many times do; be profitable, or dangerous?

SOme Princes for the greater ſecurity of their Dominion, have diſarmed their Subjects; others have cantonized their Countrys; others have fomented factions and animoſity among them; ſome have applyed themſelves to flatter and inſinuate with thoſe who were ſuſpicious in the beginning of their Government: Some have built Caſtles, others have demoliſhed them; and though in all theſe caſes, no certain or determinate rule can be preſcribed, unleſs we come to a particular conſideration of the State where it is to be uſed; yet I ſhall ſpeak of them all, as the matter it ſelf will endure. A wiſe Prince therefore was never known to diſarm his Subjects; rather finding them unfurniſhed, he put Arms into their hands; for by arming them, and inuring them to warlike Exerciſe, thoſe Arms are ſurely your own; they who were ſuſpicious to you, become faithful; they who are faithful, are confirm'd; and all your Subjects become of your party; and becauſe the whole multitude which ſubmits to your Government is not capable of being armed, if you be beneficial and obliging to thoſe you do arm, you may make the bolder with the reſt; for the difference of your behaviour to the Soldier, binds him more firmly to your Service; and the reſt will excuſe you, as judging them moſt worthy of reward, who are moſt liable to danger. But when you diſarm, you diſguſt them, and imply a diffidence in them, either for Cowardize, or Treachery, and the one or the other is ſufficient to give them an impreſſion of hatred againſt you. And becauſe you cannot ſubſiſt without Soldiers, you will be forced to entertain Mercenaries, whom I have formerly deſcribed, and if it were poſſible for the ſaid Mercenaries to be good, they could not be able to defend you againſt powerful Adverſaries,

ſaries, and Subjects diſobliged. Wherefore (as I have ſaid) a new Prince, in his new Government, puts his Subjects always into Arms, as appears by ſeveral Examples in Hiſtory. But when a Prince conquers a new State, and annexes it (as a Member) to his old, then it is neceſſary your Subjects be diſarmed, all but ſuch as appeared for you in the Conqueſt, and they are to be mollified by degrees, and brought into ſuch a condition of lazineſs and effeminacy, that in time your whole ſtrength may devolve upon your own Natural Militia, which were trained up in your ancient Dominion, and are to be always about you. Our Anceſtors (and they were eſteemed wiſe men) were wont to ſay, That it was neceſſary to keep *Piſtoia* by factions, and *Piſa* by Fortreſſes, and accordingly in ſeveral Towns under their ſubjection, they created, and fomented factions and animoſities, to keep them with more eaſe. This, at a time when *Italy* was unſetled, and in a certain kind of ſuſpence, might be well enough done, but I do not take it at this time for any precept for us, being clearly of opinion that the making of factions, never does good, but that where the Enemy approaches, and the City is divided, it muſt neceſſarily, and that ſuddenly be loſt, becauſe the weaker party will always fall off to the Enemy, and the other cannot be able to defend it. The *Venetians* (as I gueſs) upon the ſame grounds nouriſhed the factions of the *Guelfs*, and the *Ghibilines* in the Cities under their jurisdiction; and though they kept them from blood; yet they encouraged their diſſentions, to the end that the Citizens being employed among themſelves, ſhould have no time to conſpire againſt them; which as appeared afterwards, did not anſwer expectation; for being defeated at *Vaila*, one of the ſaid factions took Arms, and turned the *Venetians* out of their State. Such methods therefore as theſe, do argue weakneſs in the Prince; for no Government of any ſtrength or conſiſtance will ſuffer ſuch diviſions, becauſe they are uſeful only in time of Peace, when perhaps they may contribute to the more eaſie management of their Subjects, but when War comes, the fallacy of thoſe Counſels are quickly diſcovered. Without doubt, Princes grow great when they overcome the difficulties and impediments which are given them; and therefore Fortune, eſpecially when ſhe has a mind to exalt a new Prince (who has greater need of reputation than a Prince that is old and Hereditary) raiſes him up Enemies, and encourages enterprizes againſt him, that he may have opportunity to conquer them, and advance himſelf by ſuch ſteps as his Enemies had prepared. For which reaſon many have thought that a wiſe Prince when opportunity offers, ought (but with great cunning and addreſs) to maintain ſome enmity againſt himſelf, that when time ſerves to deſtroy them, his own greatneſs may be encreas'd.

Princes, and particularly thoſe who are not of long ſtanding, have found more fidelity and aſſiſtance from thoſe whom they ſuſpected at the beginning of their Reign, than from them who at firſt were their greateſt confidents. *Pandolfus Petrucci* Prince of *Siena* govern'd his State rather by thoſe who were ſuſpected, than others. But this is not to be treated of largely, becauſe it varies according to the ſubjects; I ſhall only ſay this, That thoſe Men who in the beginning of his Government, oppoſed him (if they be of ſuch quality as to want the ſupport of other people) are eaſily wrought over to the Prince, and more ſtrictly engaged to be faithful, becauſe they know that it muſt be their good carriage for the future that muſt cancel the prejudice that is againſt them; and ſo the Prince comes to receive more benefit by them, than by thoſe who ſerving him more ſecurely, do moſt commonly neglect his affairs.

And ſeeing the matter requires, I will not omit to remind a Prince who is but newly advanced (and that by ſome inward favour and correſpondence in the Country) that he conſiders well what it was that diſpoſed thoſe parties to befriend him; if it be not affection to him, but Pique, and animoſity to the old Government, it will coſt much trouble and difficulty to keep them his friends, becauſe it will be impoſſible to ſatisfie them: and upon ſerious diſquiſition, Ancient and Modern Examples will give us the reaſon, and we ſhall find it more eaſie to gain ſuch perſons as were ſatisfied with the former Government, and by conſequence his Enemies, than thoſe who being diſobliged, ſided with him, and aſſiſted to ſubvert it.

It has been a Cuſtom among Princes, for the greater ſecurity of their Territories to build Citadels and Fortreſſes to bridle and reſtrain ſuch as would enterprize againſt them, and to ſerve as a refuge in times of Rebellion; and I approve the way becauſe anciently practiſed, yet no longer ago than in our days, Mr. *Nicolo Vitelli* was known to diſmantle two Forts in the City of *Caſtello*, to ſecure his Government; *Guidobaldo* Duke of *Urbin* returning to his State from whence *Cæſar Borgia* had driven him, demoliſhed all the ſtrong places in that Province, and thereby thought it more unlikely again to fall into the hands of the Enemy. The *Bentivogli* being returned to *Bologna*, uſed the ſame courſe: So that Fortreſſes, are uſeful, or not uſeful, according to the difference of time, and if in one place they do good,

they

they do as much mischief in another: And the case may be argued thus, That Prince who is more affraid of his Subjects than Neighbours, is to suffer them to stand: The Family of the *Sforza*'s, has and will suffer more mischief by the Castle of *Milan* (which was built by *Francesco Sforza*) than by all its other troubles whatever; so that the best fortification of all, is not to be hated by the people, for your Fortresses will not protect you, if the people have you in detestation, because they shall no sooner take Arms, but Strangers will fall in, and sustain them. In our times, there is not one instance to be produced, of advantage, which that course has brought to any Prince, but to the Countess of *Furly*, when upon the Death of *Hieronimo* her Husband, by means of those Castles she was able to withstand the popular fury, and expect till supplies came to her from *Milan*, and resetled her in the Government; and as times then stood, the people were not in a Condition to be relieved by any stranger. But afterwards they stood her in no stead when *Cæsar Borgia* invaded her, and the people being incensed, joyned with her Enemy. Wherefore it had been better for her both then, and at first to have possessed the affections of the people, than all the Castles in the Country. These things being considered, I approve both of him that builds those Fortresses, and of him that neglects them, but must needs condemn him who relies so much upon them, as to despise the displeasure of the people.

CHAP. XXI.

How a Prince is to demean himself to gain reputation.

NOthing recommends a Prince so highly to the world, as great Enterprizes, and noble Expretions of his own Valor and Conduct. We have in our days *Ferdinand* King of *Aragon*, the present King of *Spain*, who may (and not improperly) be called a new Prince, being of a small and weak King, become for fame, and renown the greatest Monarch in Christendom; and if his Exploits be considered, you will find them all brave, but some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his Reign he invaded the Kingdom of *Granada*, and that Enterprize was the foundation of his Grandeur. He began it leisurely, and without suspition of impediment, holding the Barons of *Castile* employed in that Service, and so intent upon that War, that they dreamt not of any Innovation, whil'st in the mean time before they were aware, he got reputation, and authority over them. He found out a way of maintaining his Armies at the expence of the Church, and the people, and by the length of that War, to establish such Order and Discipline among his Soldiers, that afterwards they gained him many honourable Victories. Besides this, to adapt him for greater Enterprizes, (always making Religion his pretence) by a kind of devout cruelty, he destroyed and exterminated the Jews called *Marrani*, than which nothing could be more strange, or deplorable. Under the same Cloak of Religion, he invaded *Affrica*, made his Expedition into *Italy*, assaulted *France*, and began many great things which always kept the minds of his Subjects in admiration and suspence, expecting what the event of his Machinations would be. And these his Enterprizes had so suddain a spring and result one from the other, that they gave no leisure to any Man to be at quiet, or to continue any thing against him. It is likewise of great advantage to a Prince to give some rare Example of his own administration at home (such is reported of *Messer Bernardo da Milano*) when there is occasion for some body to perform any thing Extraordinary in the Civil Government, whether it be good or bad, and to find out such a way either to reward or punish him, as may make it much talk'd of in the world. Above all, a Prince is to have a care in all his actions to behave himself so as may give him the reputation of being excellent as well as great. A Prince is likewise much esteemed when he shows himself a sincere friend, or a generous Enemy, That is when without any hesitation, he declares himself in favour of one against another, which as it is more frank and Princely, so it is more profitable than to stand neuter; for if two of your potent Neighbors be at Wars, they are either of such condition that you are to be affraid of the Victor or not: In either of which cases it will be always more for your benefit to discover your self freely, and make a fair War: For in the first case, if you do not declare, you shall be a prey to him who overcomes, and it will be a pleasure, and satisfaction to him that is conquered to see you his Fellow-sufferer, nor will any body either defend, or receive you, and the reason is, because the Conqueror will never understand them to be his Friends, who would not assist him in his distress; and he that is worsted will not receive you, because you neglected to run his fortune with your Arms in your hands. *Antiochus*, upon the invitation of the *Etolians*, passed into *Greece*, to repel the *Romans*: *Antiochus* sent Embassadors,

dors to the *Achaians* (who were in amity with the *Romans*) to perſwade them to a Neutrality, and the *Romans* ſent to them to aſſociate with them. The buſineſs coming to be debated in the Council of the *Achaians*, and *Antiochus* his Embaſſador preſſing them to be Neuters; The *Roman* Embaſſador replyed, "As to what he has remonſtrated, That it is "moſt uſeful and moſt conſiſtent with the intereſt of your State, not to engage your ſelves "in our War, There is nothing more contrary and pernicious; for if you do not concern "your ſelves, you will aſſuredly become a prey to the Conqueror, without any thanks or "reputation; and it will always be, that he who has leaſt kindneſs for you, will tempt you "to be Neuters, but they that are your friends will invite you to take up Arms. And thoſe Princes who are ill adviſed, to avoid ſome preſent danger follow the Neutral way, are moſt commonly ruin'd: But when a Prince diſcovers himſelf courageouſly, in favour of one party, if he with whom you joyn overcome, though he be very powerful, and you ſeem to remain at his diſcretion, yet he is obliged to you, and muſt needs have a reſpect for you, and Men are not ſo wicked, with ſuch ſignal and exemplary ingratitude to oppreſs you. Beſides Victories are never ſo clear and compleat, as to leave the Conqueror without all ſparks of reflexion, and eſpecially upon what is juſt. But if your Confederate comes by the worſt, you are received by him, and aſſiſted whil'ſt he is able, and becomeſt a Companion of his fortune, which may poſſibly reſtore thee. In the ſecond place, if they who contend be of ſuch condition, that you have no occaſion to fear, let which will overcome; you are in prudence to declare your ſelf the ſooner, becauſe by aſſiſting the one, you contribute to the ruine of the other (whom, if your Confederate had been wiſe, he ought rather to have preſerved) ſo that he overcoming, remains wholly at your diſcretion, and by your aſſiſtance, he muſt of neceſſity overcome. And here it is to be noted (if he can avoid it) a Prince is never to league himſelf with another more powerful than himſelf, in an offenſive War: becauſe in that caſe, if he overcomes, you remain at his mercy, and Princes ought to be as cautious as poſſible of falling under the diſcretion of other people. The *Venetians* (when there was no neceſſity for it) aſſociated with *France* againſt the Duke of *Milan*, and that aſſociation was the cauſe of their ruine: But where it is not to be avoided (as happed to the *Florentines* when the *Pope* and the *Spaniard* ſent their Armies againſt *Lombardy*) there a Prince is to adhere for the reaſons aforeſaid. Nor is any Prince or Government to imagine that in thoſe caſes any certain counſel can be taken, becauſe the affairs of this world are ſo ordered, that in avoiding one miſchief, we fall commonly into another. But a Man's wiſdom is moſt conſpicuous where he is able to diſtinguiſh of dangers, and make choice of the leaſt. Moreover a Prince to ſhow himſelf a *Virtuoſo*, and Honourer of all that is excellent in any Art whatſoever. He is likewiſe to encourage and aſſure his Subjects that they may live quietly in peace, and exerciſe themſelves in their ſeveral Vocations, whether Merchandize, Agriculture, or any other employment whatever, to the end that one may not forbear improving or imbelliſhing his Eſtate for fear it ſhould be taken from him, nor another advancing his Trade in apprehenſion of taxes; but the Prince is rather to excite them by propoſitions of reward, and immunities to all ſuch as ſhall any way amplifie his Territory, or Powers. He is obliged likewiſe, at convenient times in the year to entertain the people by Feaſtings and Plays, and Spectacles of Recreation; and becauſe all Cities are divided into Companies, or Wards, he ought to have reſpect to thoſe Societies, be merry with them ſometimes, and give them ſome inſtance of his humanity, and magnificence, but always retaining the Majeſty of his degree, which is never to be debaſed in any caſe whatever.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the Secretaries of Princes.

THe Election of his Miniſters, is of no ſmall importance to a Prince; for the firſt judgment that is made of him, or his parts, is from the perſons he has about him; when they are wiſe and faithful, be ſure the Prince is diſcreet himſelf, who as he knew how to chooſe them able at firſt, ſo he has known how to oblige them to be faithful; but when his Miniſters are otherwiſe, it reflects ſhrewdly upon the Prince; for commonly the firſt error he commits, is in the Election of his Servants. No Man knew *Antonio da Venafro* to be Secretary to *Pandolfo Petrucci* Prince of *Siena*, but he could judge *Pandolfo* to be a prudent Man for chooſing ſuch a one to his Miniſter. In the capacities and parts of Men, there are three ſorts or degrees; one Man underſtands of himſelf; another underſtands what is explained; and a third underſtands neither of himſelf, nor by any Explanation: The firſt is excellent,

excellent, the second commendable, the third altogether unprofitable. If therefore *Pandolfus* was not in the first rank, he might be concluded in the second; for whenever a Prince has the judgment to know the good, and the bad of what is spoken or done, though his own invention be not excellent, he can distinguish a good servant from a bad, and exalt the one, and correct the other; and the Minister despairing of deluding him, remains good in spight of his teeth. But the business is how a Prince may understand his Minister, and the rule for that is infallible. When you observe your Officer more careful of himself, than of you, and all his actions and designs pointing at his own interest and advantage, that Man will never be a good Minister, nor ought you ever to repose any confidence in him; for he who has the affairs of his Prince in his hand, ought to lay aside all thoughts of himself, and regard nothing but what is for the profit of his Master. And on the other side, to keep him faithful, the Prince is as much concerned to do for him, by honouring him, enriching him, giving him good Offices and Preferments, that the wealth and honour conferred by his Master, may keep him from looking out for himself, and the plenty and goodness of his Offices, make him afraid of a change, knowing that without his Princes favour he can never subsist. When therefore the Prince, and the Minister are qualified in this manner, they may depend one upon the other: But when 'tis otherwise with them, the end must be bad, and one of them will be undone.

CHAP. XXIII.

How flatterers are to be avoided.

I Will not pass by a thing of great consequence, being an error against which Princes do hardly defend themselves, unless they be very wise, and their judgment very good. And that is about Flatterers, of which kind of Cattle all Histories are full; for Men are generally so fond of their own actions, and so easily mistaken in them, that it is not without difficulty they defend themselves against those sort of people, and he that goes about to defend himself, runs a great hazard of being despised: For there is no other remedy against Flatterers, than to let every body understand you are not disobliged by telling the truth; yet if you suffer every body to tell it, you injure your self, and lessen your reverence. Wherefore a wise Prince ought to go a third way, and select out of his State certain discreet men, to whom only he is to commit that liberty of speaking truth, and that, of such things as he demands, and nothing else; but then he is to enquire of every thing; hear their opinions; and resolve afterwards, as he pleases, and behave himself towards them in such sort, that every one may find with how much the more freedom he speaks, with so much the more kindness he is accepted; That besides them, he will hearken to no body; That he considers well before he resolves; and that his resolutions once taken, are never to be altred: He that does otherwise, shall either precipitate his affairs by means of his Flatterers; or by variety of advices, often change his designs, which will lessen his esteem, and render him contemptible. To this purpose I shall instance in one Modern Example.

Father *Lucas*, a Servant to *Maximilian* the present Emperor, giving a Character of His Majesty, declared him a person that never consulted any body, and yet never acted according to his own judgment and inclination; and the reason was, because he proceeded contrary to the prescriptions aforesaid, for the Emperor is a close Man, communicates his secrets with no body, nor takes any man's advice; but when his determinations are to be executed, and begin to be known in the world, those who are about him begin to discourage and dissuade him, and he being good natur'd does presently desist: Hence it comes to pass that his resolutions of one day, are dissolved in the next, no man knows what he desires or designs; nor no man can depend upon his resolutions. A Prince therefore is always to consult; but at his own, not other peoples pleasure, and rather to deter people from giving their advice undemanded; but he ought not to be sparing in his demands, nor when he has demanded, impatient of hearing the truth; but if he understands that any suppressed it, and forbore to speak out, for fear of displeasing, then, and not till then, he is to show his displeasure. And because there are those who believe that a Prince which creates an opinion of his prudence in the people, does it not by any excellence in his own Nature, but by the Counsels of those who are about him; without doubt they are deceived; for this is a general and infallible rule, *That that Prince who has no Wisdom of his own, can never be well advised*; unless by accident he commits all to the Government and Administration of some honest and discreet man: In this case 'tis possible things may be well ordered for a while,

but they can never continue; for his Minister or Vicegerent in a short time will set up for himself; but if a Prince who has no great judgment of his own, consults with more than one; their Counsels will never agree, nor he have ever the cunning to unite them; Every man will advise according to his own interest, or Capriccio, and he not have the parts either to correct or discover it: And other Counsellors are not to be found, for men will always prove bad, unless by necessity they are compelled to be good. So then it is clear, *That good Counsels (from whomsoever they come) proceed rather from the Wisdom of the Prince, than the Princes Wisdom from the goodness of his Counsels.*

CHAP. XXIV.

How it came to pass that the Princes of Italy *have most of them lost their Dominions.*

THe Qualities aforesaid being observed, they make a new Prince appear in the number of the more Ancient, and render him presently more firm and secure in his Government, than if he had descended to it by right of inheritance; for the Actions of a new Prince are liable to stricter observation, than if he were Hereditary, and when they are known to be virtuous, gain more upon people, and oblige them farther than antiquity of Blood; because Men are more affected with present, than pass'd things, and when in their present condition they find themselves well, they content themselves with it, without looking out any where else, employing themselves wholly in defence of their Prince, unless in other things he be defective to himself: So that thereby he will have double honor, in having laid the foundation of a new Principality, and imbellished and fortifyed it, with good Laws, good Force, good Friends, and good Example: whereas he multiplies his disgrace, who being born Prince, loses his inheritance by his own ill management and imprudence. And if the Soveraign Princes in *Italy*, who in our time have lost their Dominions, be considered, as the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and others, there will be found in their beginning one common defect as to the management of their Arms, for the reasons largely discours'd of before: besides some of them will appear to have been hated by the people, or if they have had so much prudence as to preserve a friendship with them, they have been ignorant how to secure themselves against the Grandees; for without these errors no States are lost that have Mony and strength enough to bring an Army into the Field. *Philip of Macedon* (not *Alexander* the Great's Father, but he who was overcome by *Titus Quintus*) had no great force in comparison of the *Romans* and the *Grecians* which invaded him; yet, being a Martial Man, and one that understood how to insinuate with the People, and oblige the Nobility, he maintained War several years against both of them, and though at last he lost some Towns, yet he kept his Kingdom in spight of them. Those therefore of our Princes who for many years together were setled in their Principalities, if they lost them afterwards, they cannot accuse fortune, but their own negligence and indiscretion, for not having in quiet times considered they might change (and it is the common infirmity of Mankind in a calm to make no reckoning of a Tempest) when adversity approached, they thought more of making their escape than defence, resting their whole hopes upon this, that when the people were weary of the insolence of the Conqueror, they would recall them again. Which resolution is tollerable indeed, when others are wanting, but to neglect all other remedies, and trust only to that, is much to be condemned, for a man would never throw himself down, that another might take him up; besides that may not happen, or if it does, not with your security, because that kind of defence is poor, and depends not on your self, and no defences are good, certain, and lasting, which proceed not from the Princes own Courage and Virtue.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

How far in humane affairs Fortune may avail, and in what manner she may be resisted.

I Am not ignorant that it is, and has been of old the opinion of many people, that the affairs of the world are so govern'd by Fortune and Divine Providence, that Man cannot by his Wisdom correct them, or apply any remedy at all; from whence they would infer that we are not to labour and sweat, but to leave every thing to its own tendancy and event. This opinion has obtained more in our days, by the many and frequent revolutions, which have been, and are still seen beyond all humane conjecture. And when I think of it seriously sometimes, I am in some measure enclined to it my self; nevertheless that our own free will may not utterly be exploded, I conceive it may be true that fortune may have the arbitrement of one half of our actions, but that she leaves the other half (or little less) to be governed by our selves. Fortune, I do resemble to a rapid and impetuous River, which when swelled, and enraged, overwhelms the Plains, subverts the Trees, and the Houses, forces away the Earth from one place, and carries it to another, every body fears, every body shuns, but no body knows how to resist it; Yet though it be thus furious sometimes, it does not follow but when it is quiet and calm, men may by banks, and fences, and other provisions correct it in such manner, that when it swells again, it may be carried off by some Canal, or the violence thereof rendered less licentious and destructive. So It is with Fortune, which shows her power where there is no prediſposed virtue to resist it, and turns all her force and impetuosity, where she knows there are no banks, no fences to restrain her: If you consider *Italy* (the seat of all these revolutions) and what it was that caus'd them, you will find it an open field, without any bounds or Ramparts to secure it; and that, had it been defended by the Courage of their Ancestors, as *Germany*, and *Spain*, and *France* have been, those inundations had never hapned, of never made such devastation as they have done. And this I hold sufficient to have spoken in general against Fortune. But restraining my self a little more to particulars, I say it is ordinary to see a Prince happy one day, and ruined the next, without discerning any difference in his humor or Government; and this I impute to the reasons of which I have discoursed largely before; and one of them is, because that Prince which relies wholly upon Fortune, being subject to her Variations, must of necessity be ruined. I believe again that Prince may be happy whose manner of proceeding concerts with the times, and he unhappy who cannot accommodate to them: For in things leading to the end of their designs (which every man has in his eye, and they are riches and honour) we see men have various methods of proceeding. Some with circumspection, o hers with heat; some with violence, others with cunning; some with patience, and others with fury, and every one (notwithstanding the diversity of their ways) may possibly attain them. Again we see two persons equally cautious, one of them prospers, and the other miscarries, and on the other side, two equally happy by different measures, one being deliberate, and the other as hasty; and this proceeds from nothing but the condition of the times which suits, or does not suit; with the manner of their proceedings. From hence arises what I have said, That two persons by different operations do attain the same end, whil'st two others steer the same Course, and one of them succeeds, and the other is ruined. From hence likewise may be deduced the Vicissitudes of good; for if to one who manages with deliberation and patience, the times and conjuncture of affairs, come about so favourably that his Conduct be in fashion, he must needs be happy; but if the face of affairs, and the times change, and he changes not with them, he is certainly ruined. Nor is there any man to be found so wise, that knows how to accommodate, or frame himself to all these varieties, both because he cannot deviate from that to which Nature has enclined him; as likewise because if a man has constantly prospered in one way, it is no easie matter to perswade him to another; and he that is so cautious, being at a loss when time requires he should be vigorous, must of necessity be destroyed; whereas if he could turn with the times, his fortune would never betray him. Pope *Julius* XI. in all his Enterprizes, acted with passion and vehemence, and the times and accident of affairs were so suitable to his manner of proceeding, that he prospered in whatever he undertook. Consider his Expedition of *Bolonia* in the days of Messer *Giovanni Bentivogli*, The *Venetians* were against it, and the Kings of *Spain* and *France* were in treaty, and had a mind to it themselves; yet he with his promptitude and fury, undertook it personally himself, and that activity of his, kept both *Spaniard*, and *Venetian* in suspence (the *Venetians* for fear; the *Spaniards*, in hopes to recover the whole Kingdom of *Naples*, and

the King of *France* came over to his side; for seeing him in motion, and desirous to make him his friend, and thereby to correct the insolence of the *Venetian*, he thought he could not deny him his assistance, without manifest injustice; so that *Julius* with his rashness and huffing, did that which never any other Pope could have done with all his cunning and insinuation: For had he deferred his departure from *Rome*, till all things had been put into exact order, and his whole progress concluded (as any other Pope would have done) he could never have succeeded; The King of *France* would have pretended a thousand excuses, and others would have suggested twice as many fears; I will pass by the rest of his Enterprizes, which were all alike, and prospered as well, and the shortness of his life secured him against change: for had the times fallen out so, that he had been forced to proceed with accurate circumspection, he would have certainly been ruined, for he could never have left those ways to which his Nature enclined him. I conclude then, That whil'st the obstinacy of Princes consists with the motion of fortune, 'tis possible they may be happy; but when once they disagree, the poor Prince comes certainly to the ground. I am of opinion likewise, that 'tis better to be hot and precipitate, than cautious and apprehensive, for fortune is a Woman, and must be Hector'd, to keep her under; and 'tis visible every day she suffers her self to be managed by those who are brisk and audacious, rather than by those who are cold and phlegmatick in their Motions, and therefore (like a Woman) she is always a friend to those who are young, because being less circumspect, they attack her with more security and boldness.

CHAP. XXVI.

An Exhortation to deliver Italy *from the Barbarians.*

HAving weighed therefore all that is said before, and considered seriously with my self whether in this juncture of affairs in *Italy*, the times were disposed for the advancement of a new Prince, and whether there was competent matter that could give occasion to a virtuous and wise person to introduce such a form as would bring reputation to him, and benefit to all his Subjects; it seems to me that at this present so many things concur to the exaltation of a new Prince, that I do not know any time that has been more proper than this: and if (as I said before) for the Manifestation of the courage of *Moses*, it was necessary that the *Israelites* should be Captives in *Egypt*; for discovery of the Magnanimity of *Cyrus*, that the *Persians* should be oppressed by the *Medes*; and for the illustration of the excellence of *Theseus*, that the *Athenians* should be banished and dispersed; so to evince and demonstrate the courage of an *Italian* spirit, it was necessary that *Italy* should be reduced to its present condition; That it should be in greater bondage than the *Jews*; in greater servitude than the *Persians*, and in greater dispersion than the *Athenians*, without Head, without order, harras'd, spoyl'd, overcome, over-run, and over-flown with all kind of Calamity: and though formerly some sparks of virtue have appeared in some persons, that might give it hopes that God had ordained them for its redemption; yet it was found afterwards that in the very height and carreer of their exploits, they were check'd, and forsaken by Fortune, and poor *Italy* left half dead, expecting who would be her *Samaritan* to bind up her wounds, put an end to the Sackings and devastations in *Lombardy*, the Taxes and Expilations in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and *Tuscany*, and cure her sores, which length of time had fester'd and imposthumated. 'Tis manifest how she prays to God daily to send some person who may redeem her from the cruelty, and insolence of the Barbarians. 'Tis manifest how prone and ready she is to follow the Banner that any man will take up; nor is it at present to be discerned where she can repose her hopes with more probability, than in your illustrious Family, which by its own courage and interest, and the favour of God and the Church (of which it is now chief) may be induced to make it self Head in her redemption: which will be no hard matter to be effected, if you lay before you the lives and actions of the persons above named; who though they were rare, and wonderful, were yet but men, and not accommodated with so fair circumstances as you. Their Enterprize was not more just, nor easie, nor God Almighty more their friend than yours. You have Justice on your side; for that War is just which is necessary, and 'tis piety to fight, where no hope is left in any thing else. The people are universally disposed, and where the disposition is so great, the opposition can be but small, especially you taking your rules from those persons which I have proposed to you for a Model. Besides many things that they did were super-natural, and by Gods immediate Conduct, the Sea opened, a cloud directed, a rock afforded water,

it

it rained *Manna*, all these things are recompenced in your Grandeur, and the rest remains to be executed by you: God will not do every thing immediately, because he will not deprive us of our free will, and the honour that devolves upon us. Nor is it any wonder if none of the fore-named *Italians* have been able to do that which may be hoped for from your illustrious Family: and if in so many revolutions in *Italy*, and so long continuation of War, their Military Virtue seems spent and extinguished; the reason is, their old Discipline was not good, and no body was able to direct to a better. Nothing makes so much to the honour of a new Prince, as new Laws, and new Orders Invented by him, which if they be well founded, and carry any thing of Grandeur along with them, do render him venerable, and wonderful; and *Italy* is susceptible enough of any new form. Their courage is great enough in the Soldier, if it be not wanting in the Officer, witness the Duels, and Combats, in which the *Italians* have generally the better by their force, and dexterity, and stratagem; but come to their Battels, and they have oftner the worst, and all from the inexperience of their Commanders; for those who pretend to have Skill, will never obey, and every one thinks he has Skill, there having been no body to this very day, raised by his virtue and fortune to that height of reputation, as to prevail with others to obey him. Hence it came, that in so long time, in the many Wars during the last twenty years, when ever an Army consisted wholly of *Italians*, it was certainly beaten; and this may be testified by *Taruis*, *Alexandria*, *Capua*, *Genoa*, *Vaila*, *Bologna*, and *Mestri*. If therefore your illustrious Family be enclined to follow the examples of those excellent persons who redeemed their Countrys, it is necessary as a true fundamental of all great Enterprizes, to provide your selves with Forces of your own Subjects, for you cannot have more faithful, nor better Soldiers than they. And though all of them be good, yet altogether they will be much better, when they find themselves not only commanded, but preferred, and caressed by a Prince of their own. It is necessary therefore to be furnished with these Forces, before you can be able with *Italian* virtue to vindicate your Country from the oppression of Strangers: And though the *Swiss*, and *Spanish* Infantry be counted terrible, they have both of them their defects: and a third sort may be composed that may not only encounter, but be confident to beat them; for the *Spanish* Foot cannot deal with Horse, and the *Swiss* are not invincible when they meet with Foot as obstinate as themselves. It has been seen by Experience, and would be so again, the *Spaniards* cannot sustain the fury of the *French* Cavalry, and the *Swisses* have been overthrown by the Infantry of *Spain*. And though of this last we have seen no perfect Experiment; yet we had a competent essay at the Battle of *Ravenna*, where the *Spanish* Foot being engaged with the *German* Battalions (which observe the same Order and Discipline with the *Swisses*) the *Spaniards* by the agility of their Bodies, and the protection of their Bucklers, broke in under their Pikes, and killed them securely, while the poor *Germans* were uncapable to defend themselves; and had not the *Spaniards* been charged by the Horse, the *German* Foot had been certainly cut off. 'Tis possible therefore (the defect of both those Foot being known) to institute a third, which may buckle with the Horse, and be in no fear of their foot; which will be effected, not by the variation of their Arms, but by changing their Discipline. And these are some of those things which being newly reformed, give great grandeur and reputation to any new Prince. This opportunity therefore is by no means to be slip'd, that *Italy*, after so long expectation, may see some hopes of deliverance: Nor can it be expressed with what joy, with what impatience of revenge, with what fidelity, with what compassion, with what Tears, such a Champion would be received into all the Provinces that have suffered by those barbarous inundations. What Gates would be shut against him? What people would deny him obedience? what malice would oppose him? what true *Italian* would refuse to follow him? There is not, there is not any body but abhors, and nauseates this barbarous domination. Let your illustrious Family, then address it self to the work, with as much Courage and Confidence as just Enterprizes are undertaken; That under their Ensigns our Country may be recovered, and under their Conduct, *Petrarch*'s Prophesie may be fulfilled, who has promised that,

Virtu contr' al furore
Prendera l'arme, and fia il combatter Corto.
Che l'antico valore
Ne' gl' Italici curr' non e ancor morto.

Virtue shall arm 'gainst rage, and in short fight
Prove th' *Roman* Valour's not extinguish'd quite.

The

The Original of the words Guelf *and* Ghibilin, *ſo much mentioned in Hiſtory.*

THeſe two Factions ſo famous in Hiſtory, were eminent in *Italy* two ages before *Caſtruccio* was born. *Machiavel* in his Treatiſe of the Wars of that Country, affirms that *Piſtoya* was the firſt place where thoſe names of diſtinction were uſed; but the account wherewith the publick Librarys ſupply me, runs thus. Theſe two words, *Guelf* and *Ghibilin*, deduce their original from a ſchiſm which moleſted the Church in the year 1130. by the competition of two Popes, *Innocent* 11. and *Anaclet*: the greateſt part of Chriſtendom acknowledged *Innocent*, who was particularly ſupported by the Emperors of the Weſt. *Anaclet* the anti-Pope had perſwaded into his intereſts, *Roger Comte de Naples* and *Sicily*, a martial Prince, and deſcended from the *Normans*, who had conquered that Country. The pretence of this double Election having kept a War on foot eight years together, which was ſtill favourable to *Roger*, the Emperor *Conrad* the third march'd himſelf at the head of an Army of *Germans*, into *Italy*, leaving his Grand-ſon Prince *Henry* to come after. *Roger*, to oppoſe him with men of his own Nation, allured to the defence of his Countrys *Guelf* Duke of *Bavaria*. During the courſe of this War which began in the year 1139. it hapned ſometimes that the Emperors Army was commanded by the ſaid Prince *Henry*, who was brought up in a Village in *Germany* called *Ghibilin*, whoſe ſituation being very pleaſant, made the very name of it dear to him. One day the Armys being drawn up, and ready to engage, the *Bavarians* to encourage their Camrades, cryed out in their language, a *Guelf*, a *Guelf*; and the Emperors Troops (being at the ſame time as well diſpoſed to their General) to comply with the kindneſs he had for that place, cryed out on the other ſide, a *Ghibilin*, a *Ghibilin*. Theſe words ſeemed barbarous to the *Italians* that were with *Roger*, who came to *Guelf* to know what they meant: He told them the Pope's Party were intended by the word *Guelf*, and the Emperors by the word *Ghibilin*: from that time thoſe names grew ſo common in both Armys, that by them they anſwered their *Who goes there?* and they were given to the *Italians* according to their ſeveral ſides. 'Tis true, at firſt they were uſed to diſcriminate only *Anaclet*'s Party from the Emperors, but afterwards *Roger* having vanquiſhed and taken priſoner Pope *Innocent*; as the price of his liberty he oblig'd him to erect the Countrys of *Naples* and *Sicily* into Kingdoms, by which treaty *Roger* being taken off from the intereſt of the anti-Pope, and engaging entirely with the Church, he affix'd the name of *Guelf* to the Pope's Party, and confirm'd the name *Ghibilin* to the Faction of the Emperor.

The *Italians* would fain have the credit of the Etymology themſelves, and by a certain gingling of words, (and that mightily ſtrain'd) would have *Guelf* deriv'd from *Guardatori di fe*, becauſe (forſooth) 'tis they who defend the Faith of the Church: and that by corruption the word *Ghibilin* was form'd from *Guida belli*, that is *Guidatori di Bataglia*, a great Title, and ſutable to the Majeſty of the Empire.

Be it which way it will, theſe two Factions were in the height of their emulation two hundred years after, that is to ſay, about the year 1320. which was very near the time that *Caſtruccio* was in his proſperity. And in *Europe* the face of affairs ſtood thus.

The Popes (driven from *Rome* by the violence of the Emperors of the Weſt) had tranſferred the Holy Chair to *Avignon* in *France*. In the year 1320. it was poſſeſſed by *John* XXII. a Prince of himſelf firm and entire, but one who the precipitate counſels of other people had excommunicated the Emperor *Lewis* of the houſe of *Bavaria*, and been too buſy with his fulminations againſt five more Princes of *Italy*, who (being treated by him like Tyrants) confederated againſt him; their names were *Caſtruccio* Sovereign of *Lucca*, *Scaliger*, Lord of *Verona*, the Marqueſs *d'Eſti* Lord of *Ferrara*, and *Viſconti*, and *Gonzague* the firſt Sovereign of *Milan*, and the other of *Mantoua*: which created troubles to *Italy*.

The Empire of the Eaſt was at that time torn, and diſtracted by the ambition of the *Paliologi* and others, whilſt in the mean time the Sultan *Orchan* ſon of *Ottoman*, ſwept away *Lycaonia*, *Phrygia*, and all the Coaſt of the *Helleſpont* from the *Greeks*.

The

The Empire of the West was then in dispute betwixt *Frederick* of *Austria*, and *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, (whom *Machiavel*, by mistake or inadvertency, has called *Frederick*), *Lewis* after long and bloody Wars overcame his Competitor, and made several Voyages into *Italy* to invigorate and reinforce *Castruccio* and the *Ghibilins*.

France was governed by *Philip le Long*, who at the solicitation of Pope *John* passed an Army into *Italy* to the relief of the *Guelfs*, which Army was commanded by *Philip de Valois* afterwards King, but his Expedition did not answer expectation; for either the cunning or bribes of the *Ghibilins* had dispelled the storm which our preparations threatned upon *Lombardy*; or our Forces were recalled upon some secret apprehension of a fourth War with the *English*, or by the vast projects of a fifth Expedition to the Holy Land.

Spain was divided into five Kingdoms, each of which had its peculiar King; four of them were Christians, and one a *Mahumetan*.

Navar had the same King with *France*. *Philip the Long* found a way to extend the *Salick* Law into that Country, and defeat his Niece *Jane* of *France*, Daughter of *Lewis Hutin*, of both Kingdoms at once.

Alphonso XI. as *Mariana* calls him, (the XII. as *Garibay*) had at that time the Scepter of *Castile*, but his minority transferr'd the Conduct of Affairs into the hands of the two *Infanti*, *Don Pedro*, and *Don John*, insomuch as by the jealousie and division betwixt the two Regents, that Kingdom was exposed to such disorders as are inseparable from the minority of a Prince. At length the two *Infanti* were slain in the year 1320. in a Fight which their rashness caused them to lose to the *Mores* under the walls of *Grenada*.

Arragon was in obedience to *Don Jacques* the second of that name; He was Brother to *Frederick*, who reigned in *Sicily* to the prejudice of *Robert*, a Prince of the House of *Anjou*. This *Robert* was King of *Naples*, sided with the *Guelfs*, and leagued himself sundry times with the *Florentines* against *Castruccio*. *James*, King of *Arragon*, designing to establish himself in *Italy*, and judging that the Conquests which he meditated upon the isles of *Corsica* and *Sardinia*, depended much upon the Concord of his Subjects at home; He caused a General Assembly of his Estates to be held in the year 1320. in which was concluded the Union of the Kingdoms of *Arragon* and *Valentia*, with the Principality of *Catolonia*.

Don Denis reigned in *Portugal*, a person eminent among his Subjects for magnificent Building, and in great veneration for his Piety and Justice. But the felicity of his Reign was disturbed by domestick broils which he had with his Son, the Infant *Don Alphonso*, who succeeded him in the Crown. *Don Denis* instituted the Order of *Christ* in the year 1320.

The More, *Ismael*, first of that name, had the Monarchy of *Grenada*; the Battel which he gained 1320. against the two *Infanti* of *Castile*, reviv'd the affairs of that Nation, which were in their declension before, and gave new alarms to all *Spain*.

The King and Kingdom of *England* were both governed by favourites at that time. *Edward* II. gave his authority and confidence, one while to *Gaveston*, and then to the two *Spencers*; and this weakness and imprudence of his created so many discontents, and rendred him so odious to the people, that after much trouble to quit himself of an Impostor who pretended to the Crown, he was forced to go thorow a cruel War against the Nobility, and another no less dangerous against *Robert Bruce* King of *Scotland*. These great stirs and commotions could not but give some jealousies to *France*, which seeing the Provinces that the *English* had on that side the Sea perpetually in Arms, was obliged to keep upon so strong a Guard, as was little different from an open War.

It is not then to be admired, the affairs of *Europe* being in this confusion, if *Italy* was left in prey to the *Guelfs* and the *Ghibilins*, and gave opportunity to the laying the foundation of so many Principalities, that the most part of them are still in existence. But it is certain, that neither *Paulus Jovius*, *Girolamo Briani*, *il Biondo*, nor the rest of the Historians, who have written of the Wars and Concussions of these two Factions, have left any thing comparable to the adventures of *Castruccio*, they have lent me indeed some circumstances for the illustration and ornament of this History, and I have been forced to paraphrase upon five or six of the sayings of *Castruccio* to give them their true Grace, and make them intelligible, I know not whether I have followed the just temperament that is to be observed in a translation. 'Tis vitious to assume such liberty as the History will not bear, but on the other, to tye ones self up to the same, and same quantity of words, is as disingenuous and servile. 'Tis true, the same comma's and stops were by no means to be neglected, were all treatises that are translated, like the falacious answer of a Divine to *Braccio Montone* Sovereign of *Perusia*, which *Braccio* being a *Ghibilin* as well as *Castruccio*, departed for the Siege of *Aquila* a Town in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and being impatient to know his success,

ceſs, upon application to an Aſtrologer, he received this anſwer, *Ibis redibis non morieris in bello*: which if punctuated thus, *Ibis, redibis non, morieris in bello*, threatned the ſaid *Braccio* with the unfortunateneſs of his Expedition; whereas altering it thus, *Ibis, redibis, non morieris in bello*, portended quite contrary. An ambiguity like this was ſent alſo to *Manfred* King of *Sicily*, not long before he was defeated by *Charles* of *Anjou*. *NO CARLO SARA VITORIOSO DEL RE MANFREDO*, and ought to be interpreted with great exactneſs and accuracy, the miſtake of a comma being as much as a mans life is worth. There is another kind of Tyranny likewiſe, and that is when the Text of the Author is to regulate in a point of Religion: but here we are not under any ſuch neceſſities, and he who in a quarrelſom capriccio, to defame my tranſlation, would compare every line, and put the Engliſh words all along under the Italian, would make a new and pleaſant kind of Dictionary, and the beauties which are peculiar to each language, would be excellently preſented.

THE

THE LIFE OF *CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI* OF LUCCA,

Written by Nicolo Machiavelli, *and Dedicated to* Zanobi Buonbelmonti *and* Luigi Alamani *his particular Friends.*

IT ſeems (moſt Excellent Friends) to thoſe who conſider it, very ſtrange, that all, or the greateſt part of them, who in this World have perform'd any thing extraordinary, and raiſed themſelves above the pitch of their Contemporaries, have had their births and beginnings mean and obſcure, or elſe infeſted and perplexed with all the difficulties that fortune could preſent. For all of them having been expoſed to wild beaſts when they were young, or being deſcended from baſe Parentage, and aſhamed of their Extraction, they have declared themſelves Sons of *Jupiter*, or ſome other Deity, of which ſort the number being ſo great, and their ſtory ſo well known, to repeat them would be both ſuperfluous and troubleſome. The reaſon I ſuppoſe to be, that fortune willing to demonſtrate to the World, that 'tis not any ones prudence, but ſhe that raiſes men to be great, begins to ſhew and exerciſe her power at a time in which prudence can pretend to no ſhare in us; that all our ſucceſſes may be acknowledged to her. *Caſtruccio Caſtracani* of *Lucca* was one of this ſort, who in reſpect of the times in which he lived, and the place in which he was born, performed great things; for in his beginning he was neither more happy nor more eminent than the reſt, as you ſhall underſtand in my deſcription of his life, which I have thought good to tranſmit to Poſterity, having obſerved many things in it (both for virtue and event) of extraordinary example; and to you it ſeemed moſt proper to direct it, as perſons more delighted with honourable and heroick actions, than any I know beſides.

I ſay then, the Family of the *Caſtracani* is reckoned among the moſt Illuſtrious Families in the City of *Lucca*, though at preſent (according to the fatality of all worldly things) it ſeems to be extinct. Out of this houſe there was born in former times one *Antonio*, who entring himſelf into Orders, was made a Canon of Saint *Michel* in *Lucca*, and in token of Honour called *Meſſer Antoin*: He had no kindred but one Siſter, who was married long before to one *Buonaccorſo Cinami*: *Buonaccorſo* being dead, and ſhe being a Widow, ſhe lived with her Brother, with reſolution to marry no more. Behind the houſe in which he dwelt, Maſter *Anthony* had a Vineyard, which bordering upon ſeveral Gardens, was acceſſible from ſeveral parts, and without much difficulty. It hapned that one morning about Sun-riſe, *Madam Dianora* (for that was the Siſters name) walking out into the Vineyard to gather herbs for a Salad (as women frequently do), ſhe heard a ruſling under the leaves, and turning towards it, ſhe fancied it cryed; advancing up towards it, ſhe ſaw the hands and face of a child, which tumbling up and down in the leaves, ſeemed to call for relief:

Madam Dianora, partly aſtoniſhed, and partly affraid, took it up very tenderly, carried it home, waſh'd it, and having put it in clean clouts, ſhe preſented it to Maſter *Antony*, who underſtanding the caſe, and ſeeing the infant, was no leſs affected with wonder and compaſſion than his Siſter before him. Debating with themſelves what courſe was to be taken, it was concluded to bring it up, *Anthony* being a Prieſt, and ſhe having no children. They chriſtened it *Caſtruccio*, by the name of their Father, and look'd to it as carefully as it had been their own. *Caſtruccio*'s graces increaſed with his years, and his wit was ſo pregnant, they put him to nothing but he took it very well. *Anthony* deſigned him for a Prieſt, and to reſign his Canonſhip and other Benefices one day, and according to that deſign he gave him education; but he could not find that *Caſtruccio* had inclination to that kind of life; on the contrary, he perceived his natural diſpoſition tending quite another way.

In ſhort, *Caſtruccio* was ſcarce 14 years old, but abating by little and little of his awe and reſpects to *Antonio* and *Dianora*, he began to neglect his Studies, to devote himſelf to Arms, and taking great delight in wraſtling, and running, and ſuch violent exerciſes, his mettle was ſo well ſuited with the ſtrength of his body, that none of his companions were able to cope with him. He troubled himſelf very little with reading, unleſs it were ſuch things as might inſtruct him for War, or acquaint him with the great actions of ſome eminent Commander, which did not only diſquiet *Antonio*, but afflicted him.

There was at that time in *Lucca* a Gentleman called *Franciſco*, of the houſe of the *Guinigi*, a handſome man, very rich, and remarkable for many good qualities, which recommended him to one of the firſt ranks in the Town. He had born Arms all his life long, and for the moſt part under the *Viſconti's*, Dukes of *Milan*. He had with them ingaged for the *Ghibilins*, and the City of *Lucca* look'd upon him as the very life of their party. It was at the time when theſe two great Factions (the *Guelfs* and the *Ghibilins*) ſhared all *Italy* betwixt them, divided the Popes and the Emperors, engaged in their different intereſts the Inhabitants of the ſame Town, and the members of the ſame Family. *Franciſco* accompanyed uſually by perſons of Quality of his Cabal, walk'd often before the place of St. *Michel*, not far from the Palace of the *Podeſtat* or Governor. In that Market-place he took notice of *Caſtruccio*, who was often times playing there amongſt his School-fellows and Camrades. He obſerved the youth alwaies preſcribed ſuch ſports to the reſt, as he had choſen on purpoſe to prepare him for the War. *Franciſco* could eaſily perceive how much the agility of *Caſtruccio* advanced him above his Companions, and he as eaſily perceived that he aſſumed an authority over them, and that they on their part paid him a reverence, and ſuch a one as was accompanied with kindneſs and zeal. *Franciſco* took a great fancy to the boy, enquired what he was, and being informed by ſome who were by, he had a months mind to have him himſelf: calling him to him one day, he ask'd him if he did not prefer a Gentlemans Family, where he might learn to ride the great Horſe, and exerciſe his Arms before the Cloiſter of a Church-man, where he muſt ſpin out his days in idleneſs and melancholy. He no ſooner mentioned Horſes and Arms, but *Caſtruccio* was ready to have leap'd out of his skin; but recollecting himſelf, a ſentiment of modeſty kept him from anſwering, till the fine words of *Franciſco* having given him more confidence, he told him, that if he had the liberty of chooſing, he had rather a thouſand times be employed as a Gentleman, than in the way for which he was deſign'd. His reſolution was ſo pleaſing to *Franciſco*, that not long after he made a viſit to *Antonio*, and begg'd *Caſtruccio* of him, in ſo preſſing, and yet ſo civil a manner, that *Antonio* finding it impoſſible to maſter the natural inclinations of the youth, delivered him to *Franciſco*.

By this means *Caſtruccio* changed his Education, and 'tis not to be believed with what eaſineſs he improved in thoſe exerciſes which are fit for a Gentleman to learn. It was to be admired with what addreſs and vigor he mounted his horſe, with what grace he managed his launce, and with what comelineſs his ſword; and this his dexterity diſtinguiſhed him ſo highly from the croud of his companions, that it would have been impudence in any one of them to have contended with him, either at the *Barrieri* or *Juſts*. To all theſe advantages he had an engaging way with him, that obliged where-ever he came; his actions and his words ſeemed premeditated and ſtudied, ſo careful, and ſo regular he was, leſt he ſhould ſay or do any thing that might any ways offend. He carried himſelf always with reſpect to his ſuperiors, with modeſty to his equals, and with civility and complaiſance to thoſe who were beneath him; ſo that theſe good qualities did not only gain him the affection of *Franciſco*'s whole Family, but the love and eſteem of the whole City of *Lucca*.

He was eighteen years old when the faction of the *Guelfs* drove the *Ghibilins* out of *Pania*. *Viſconti* Prince of *Milan*, a zealous Partizan of the *Ghibilins*, ſolicited Succours from *Franciſco Guinigi*, who caſting his eyes upon *Caſtruccio*, as the firſt mark of his affection, made him Lieutenant of a Company of Foot, and march'd with him to *Viſconti*.

The

The first *Campania* this new Lieutenant made, put him into such reputation, that he eclipsed the glory of all the rest who served in that War: He gave so great and so many testimonies both of his courage and conduct, that his fame was spread all over *Lombardy*. When also he came back to *Lucca*, and observed the Town had doubled the respect which they had for him before, he applyed himself to make new friendships, and to that purpose made use of all the courtelie and insinuation that is necessary in that case.

Not long after *Francisco Guinigi* fell sick, and finding himself near his end, having but one Son of about 13 years of age, called *Pagolo*, he sent for *Castruccio*, and committed the tuition of his Son, and the management of his Estate into his hands, and having gently remembred *Castruccio* that he was the person who raised him, he begg'd that he would shew the same generosity towards *Pagolo* as he had done towards him; and if any thing was due to the bounty of the Father, to return it upon his Son. He fancied he discerned in the countenance of *Castruccio* all the marks and indications of a generous mind, and died without being disturbed with the least suspition of his ingratitude.

The trust, and his administration of so great an Estate made *Castruccio* more considerable than before, but they created him likewise some enemies, and lessened the affection which some had had for him: for knowing him to be of an enterprizing spirit, many began to fancy his designs were tyrannical, and to oppress the liberty of his Country. The *Signeur Giorgio Opizi* (chief of the *Guelfs* Faction in *Lucca*) was the most to be apprehended of all those that accused *Castruccio* with that abominable ambition. *Opizi* was of opinion that the death of *Francesco Guinigi*, head of the adverse party, would leave him Master of the Town, but he quickly found that the single reputation of *Castruccio* would be a new impediment to his usurpation; so that thinking to rob him of the affections of the people, he spread false reports, and aspersed him where-ever he came. At first these calumniations troubled *Castruccio* but little, but at length they alarm'd him to the purpose; for he suspected that *Opizi* would not fail to set him at odds with the Lieutenant which *Robert* King of *Naples* had setled in *Lucca*, and that if that Governor was his enemy, he should in a short time be turned out of the Town. And against so great danger, his provision was this.

The Town of *Pisa* was then under the Government of *Huguccione de Fagiola*, originally of the Town of *Arrezzo*; being chosen Captain by the *Pisans*, he had made himself their Sovereign, and having given protection to certain *Ghibilins* who were banished from *Lucca*, *Castruccio* entred into secret intelligence by the privity of *Huguccione*, and being assured of his assistance, he resolved the poor Exiles should be restored. To this effect he agreed with his friends in *Lucca* who were of his Counsel, and jealous as himself of the power of the *Opizi*. All necessary measures were taken by the Conspirators. *Castruccio* had the care of fortifying privately a Tower in the City, called the Tower of Honour. He furnished it with ammunition, in case he should be forced to defend it; and having appointed the night for the execution of their design, *Huguccione* failed not at the precise hour to be at the *Rendezvous* betwixt *Lucca* and the neighbouring Mountains. Upon a signal given to *Castruccio* he advanced towards the Gate of St. *Peter*, and set fire to the Antiport next the fields, whilst *Castruccio* broke down another on the other side of the Town. In the mean time his associates cryed out *To your Arms*, to excite the people to rise, and thereby put all things into confusion. *Huguccione* entred with his Troops, and having seized upon the Town, he caused all the *Opizi* to be murdered, and all the rest of their party which fell into their hands. The Governor for the King of *Naples* was turned out, and the Government of the Town altred, as *Huguccione* directed, who, to compleat the desolation of *Lucca*, banished no less than a hundred of the best Families that belonged to it. The miserable Exiles fled part to *Florence*, and part to *Pistoia*, two Towns of the Faction of the *Guelfs*, and for that reason enemies to *Huguccione*, and the prevailing party in *Lucca*.

The *Florentines*, and whole Faction of the *Guelfs*, apprehending this great success would hazard to re-establish the power of the *Ghibilins* in *Tuscany*, they entred into consultation which way those Exiles might be restored. They set out a considerable Army, and encamped at *Mont Carlo* to open themselves a passage to *Lucca*. *Huguccione* on his side drew the *Lucca* Troops together, and put them under the Command of *Castruccio*, and then joyning them with his own from *Pisa*, and reinforcing them with a Squadron of *German* Horse which he got out of *Lombardy*, he marched out to encounter the *Florentines*. Whereupon the *Florentines* quitted their Post at *Monte Carlo*, and entrenching betwixt *Monte-Catino* and *Pescia*, *Huguccione* possessed himself of the quarter which they had left. Their Armies being within two miles distance one from the other, their Horse met daily and skirmished, and they had come certainly to a peremptory Battel, had not *Huguccione* fallen ill just in the

nick. His indiſpoſition forcing him from the Camp to look out for better accommodation in *Monte-Carlo*, he left the Command of the Army to *Caſtruccio*, his retirement, which diſcouraged his own men, and made them think of protracting the Battel, animated the *Florentines*, but brought no great advantage to their affairs. In ſhort, the *Florentines* perceiving their Enemies without a General, began to deſpiſe them, and *Caſtruccio* obſerving how much they were elated, endeavoured to augment it. He pretended great Conſternation, and to make his fear the more credible, he gave Orders that his Troops ſhould be drawn up within the Lines, but with poſitive inhibition for any of them to go forth, though not a moment paſſed but the *Florentines* provoked them; but all to no purpoſe. Beſides that this pretended terror in *Caſtruccio* redoubled the raſhneſs of the Enemy, and perfectly blinded them, he drew another advantage from it, which was to diſcover exactly the diſpoſition of their Army, and the Order of their March. When he had well obſerved them, and tempted their timerity as much as he thought fit, he reſolved to fight them the next *bravado* they made, and omitting nothing that might encourage his Soldiers, he aſſured them of Victory if they followed his Commands. He had obſerved that the weakeſt and worſt arm'd of their Soldiers were diſpoſed ſtill in their wings, and their beſt placed in the Body. *Caſtruccio* drew up in the ſame Order, but diſtributed his Soldiers quite contrary, for the worſt and moſt unſerviceable he placed in the Body, and his beſt Men in the Wings; In this poſture he drew out of the Trenches, and had ſcarce form'd his Battalia, before the Enemy appeared, and with his uſual inſolence. *Caſtruccio* Commanded that the Body ſhould march ſlowly, but the two Wings were to advance as faſt as they could; ſo that when they came to engage, there was only the Wings that could fight; for *Caſtruccio*'s Body having lagged by Command, the *Florentine* Body had too far to march before they could charge them, ſo as they remained idle, being neither able to do any thing againſt the Main Body that was deſign'd to oppoſe them, nor ſuſtain thoſe who were engaged in the Wings; ſo it hapned that the *Florentine* Wings (compoſed of the reffuſe of their Soldiers) were eaſily broken by *Caſtruccio*'s, which conſiſted of his beſt, and when the Wings of the Enemy (which were drawn up before their Body; ſo as the whole Army was ranged in the figure of a half Moon) were routed, they turn'd tail, ran among their own Body which was marching behind them, and put all into Confuſion.

The loſs was very great to the *Florentines*, they left above 10000 men dead upon the place: Their beſt Officers, and the braveſt of the *Guelfs* periſhed there unfortunately, and to make the defeat the more lamentable, there were ſeveral Reformades which died there, of extraordinary quality. Among the reſt, *Piero* Brother to *Robert* King of *Naples*; *Carlo* Nephew to the ſaid King; and *Philip* Lord of *Tarentum*, who were all come, in Gallantry, to make that *Campania* with the *Florentines*. But that which made all the more wonderful, was that *Caſtruccio* loſt not above 300 men, though unhappily one of *Huguccione*s Sons were of that Number, his Name was *Franceſco*, who fighting briskly at the head of the Voluntiers, for want of good Conduct, was ſlain at the very firſt charge. So eminent a Victory as this, muſt needs put *Caſtruccio* into reputation beyond expreſſion; But *Huguccione* had like to have dyed with meer jealouſie, he foreſaw that nothing of all this would redound to him, but the vain honour of commanding in chief, and that the real advantage would all fall to his Lieutenant, ſo that to uſe him at that rate, was to rob him of his Soveraignty: whereupon, nettled exceedingly, in great envy of his Fortune, he reſolved he ſhould dye. Whil'ſt he was in this black reſolution, and attended nothing but ſome ſpecious pretence to get *Caſtruccio* to him, and ſo draw him into his Net, it hapned that *Agnolo Michali* (a perſon of great alliance as any in *Lucca*, was murther'd by one who took Sanctuary in *Caſtruccio*'s Houſe, and was protected: *Huguccione*'s Officers purſued, and demanded the Criminal; but *Caſtruccio* denyed them, and ſuffered him to eſcape. *Huguccione* (who was then at *Piſa*) unwilling to loſe ſo fair an opportunity to revenge himſelf, ſent for one of his Sons called *Nerli*, (whom he put before into poſſeſſion of the Soveraignty of *Lucca*) commands him to repair thither with all ſpeed, and get *Caſtruccio* to his houſe under pretence of ſupping with ſome of the moſt Eminent in the Town; and private Orders were given for the making him away, *Nerli* lay'd his ambuſh for *Caſtruccio* very handſomly, for ſuſpecting nothing, he came to the Feaſt, and was arreſted before he went out of the Palace. But *Nerli* (being over circumſpect, and imagining it might work ſome alteration in the Spirits of the people, if he killed him bluntly without any formality) writ to his Father to know how he ſhould diſpoſe of him. *Huguccione*, mad at his unſeaſonable prudence, departed from *Piſa* at the head of 400 Horſe, to go himſelf in perſon to diſpatch *Caſtruccio*; But *Huguccione* was ſcarce got to *Bagni*, before the *Piſans* revolted; cut his Deputies throat; and ſlew all his Family that were left behind; and that he might be ſure they were in earneſt, they choſe the *Comte de Guerardeſca*, and made him their Governor.

Governor. Though he had news of this Rebellion before his arrival at *Lucca*, yet he thought it inconvenient to return; on the contrary, he made all the haſte thither that he could, to be there (if poſſible) before the report, leſt if the news got before him, it might have ill effect upon the *Lucheſes*, and prevail with them to exclude him their City. But the *Lucheſes* had heard it before, had ſuch deſigns of their own, and the liberty of *Caſtruccio* was the thing they were to pretend. *Huguccione* was admitted, but his preſence was not ſufficient to keep them in their duties: They began to aſſemble in parties, to whiſper and ſpeak ſlightly of him in private, then to murmur, then to tumultuate, and taking Arms by degrees, they came boldly, and demanded *Caſtruccio* ſhould be enlarged, and this they did in ſo poſitive and audacious a manner, that *Huguccione* apprehending the conſequences, delivered him to them. *Caſtruccio* not contented with that, conceiving vaſter deſigns than formerly, and egg'd on by an equal impulſe of honour and revenge, he aſſembled his friends, and taking the benefit of the favourable diſpoſition of the people, he reſolved to oppoſe himſelf againſt *Huguccione*, and forcing of him out of *Lucca* with all his party, *Huguccione* retired into *Lombardy* to the Lords of *Scala* where not long after he dyed very poor.

This was a happy turn for *Caſtruccio*, from the incommodities of a Priſon, to the Supremacy of a Prince; and yet this was not enough. Finding himſelf accompanied by a great number of his Friends which encouraged him, and by the whole body of the people, which flattered his ambition, he cauſed himſelf to be choſen Captain General of all their Forces for a Twelve-month; and reſolving to perform ſome Eminent action that might juſtifie their choice, he undertook the reduction of ſeveral places which had revolted from that City in favour of *Huguccione*. Having to this purpoſe entered into ſtrict alliance with the City of *Piſa*, they ſent him ſupplies, and he marched with them to beſiege *Serezane*. But the place being very ſtrong; before he could carry it, he was obliged to build a Fortreſs as near it as he could. This new Poſt in two months time, render'd him Maſter of the whole Country, and is the ſame Fort that at this day is called *Serezanello*, repaired ſince, and much enlarged by the *Florentines*. Supported by the credit of ſo glorious an exploit, he reduced *Maſſa*, *Carrara*, and *Lavenza* very eaſily: He ſeized likewiſe upon the whole Country of *Lunigiana*, and to ſecure his Communication with *Lombardy*, he took *Pont Remoli* by force, and drove out *Anaſtaſio Palavicini* the Soveraign: So that full of Glory he returned to *Lucca*, where the people thronged to meet him, and received him with all poſſible demonſtrations of joy.

This was the happieſt conjuncture for *Caſtruccio* in the world, for having been ſo diſcreet before to make his intereſt with the moſt conſiderable of the *Lucheſes*, and among the reſt with *Poggio*, *Portico*, *Boccanſachi*, and *Cecco Guinigi*, the favour of theſe great men, concurring with the inclination of the people, and every thing elſe contributing to his happineſs, he was ſolemnly choſen their Soveraign Prince.

About this time *Frederick de Baviere*, King of the *Romans* paſſed out of *Germany* into *Italy*, to be crown'd Emperor there. *Caſtruccio* who had already wrought himſelf in ſome meaſure into his favour, put himſelf at the head of 500 Horſe, and went to wait upon him, having left as his Deputy in *Lucca*, *Pagolo Guinigi*, his Pupil, whom he had treated all along, as he had been his own Son, in conſideration of the benefits he had received from his Father. *Fredrick* received *Caſtruccio* with much kindneſs, and having done him ſeveral honours, and granted him many ſignal prerogatives, he made him his Lieutenant in the whole Province of *Tuſcany*; beſides all this, the Inhabitants of *Piſa* (at the ſame time mutining againſt their Governor *Gerardeſca*, and driving him out of the Town) to defend themſelves againſt his reſentment, addreſſed to *Frederick*, for protection, and he gave the Soveraignty of that Town to *Caſtruccio*. His choice was not unpleaſing to the Inhabitants, who knew not where to find a better ſupport againſt the Faction of the *Guelfs*, and particularly againſt the attempts of the *Florentine*.

After this, *Frederick* return'd into *Germany*, having made a Lieutenant General of all *Italy*, and left him in *Rome*. There was not at that time either in *Lombardy* or *Tuſcany*, any of the *Ghibilins* of the Emperor's party, but looked upon *Caſtruccio* as the true head of their Faction. Thoſe who were baniſhed their Country upon that ſcore, fled to him for protection, and promiſed unanimouſly, that if he could reſtore them to their Eſtates, they would ſerve him ſo effectually, that the Soveraignty of their Country ſhould be the recompence of his kindneſs. The chief of them were the *Guidi*, *Scalari*, *Uberti*, *Geronzi*, *Nardi*, and *Buomaccorſi*, all Exiles of *Florence*: So that, flattered by their promiſes, and encouraged by the ſtrength of his own force, he entertained a deſign of making himſelf Maſter of *Tuſcany*, and to give more reputation to his affairs, he entred into a League with *Matteo Viſconti* Prince of *Milan*. He put out a Proclamation afterwards, that all his

Subjects

Subjects which were capable to bear Arms, ſhould be ready at a certain warning to put themſelves into Service; and for the better order of the Muſter Rolls, by which his Militia was to be regulated, the City of *Lucca* having five Gates, he divided the whole Country into five parts, and diſpoſed every Soldier under his Officer with ſo much exactneſs, that in a ſhort time he could march with 20000 Men, beſides what he could draw out of *Piſa*.

Whil'ſt he was fortifying himſelf with Soldiers and Friends, it fell out, that the *Guelfs* in *Plaiſanſa* having driven out the *Ghibilins*, and received conſiderable ſuccours from *Florence*, and the King of *Naples* came thundering down upon the Territories of the Prince of *Milan*. The Prince deſired *Caſtruccio* to give the *Florentines* diverſion; to carry the War into their Country, to withdraw them from *Lombardy*, and thereby to put them upon the defenſive. *Caſtruccio* deſired no more, and fell with a flying Army into the Valley of *Arno*, took *Fucebeio* and *San-Miniato*, and ravaged the Country ſo effectually, that the *Florentines* were conſtrained to call back their Troops out of *Lombardy*; but the neceſſity of another diverſion called back *Caſtruccio* to the recovery of *Lucca*. In his abſence, the Family of the *Poggi*, which had been always his friends, and contributed more to his Elevation, than any of the reſt; regreting that they had not been rewarded, according to the merits of their Services, conſpired with ſeveral others of the Inhabitants to bring the City to revolt. They began the tumult one morning, and having put themſelves in Arms, they killed the Chief Officer which *Caſtruccio* had eſtabliſhed for the adminiſtration of Juſtice. But whil'ſt they were diſpoſing themſelves to puſh on their Sedition, *Stephano Poggio*, an old Man, of a peaceable temper, and one who had not medled at all in the Conſpiracy of his Relations, made uſe of the authority he had with them, cauſed them to lay down their Arms, and offered his interceſſion to *Caſtruccio* that they might obtain their demands. Upon the firſt notice of this Commotion, *Caſtruccio* drew a party out of his Army, and leaving the reſt under the Command of *Pagolo Guinigi*, he marched with all diligence back to *Lucca*, where finding things quieter than he expected, he knew very well how to make his advantage of ſo temperate a ſubmiſſion, and diſpoſed his Troops and his Friends in all the Poſts that might make him Maſter of the Town. *Stephano Poggio*, who though in this juncture he had highly obliged *Caſtruccio*, came to make him a viſit, and judged it unneceſſary to beg any thing of him; all that he requeſted was, that he would pardon his Family, allow ſomething to their ancient Services, and give ſome little Indulgence to the tranſports of their youth. *Caſtruccio* received him with much affection, and told him that he was more pleaſed to find thoſe troubles appeaſed, than he had been offended at the news of their Commotion; and having preſſed him to bring the Male-contents to him, he added, that he thank'd his ſtars for giving him ſuch an opportunity of ſignalizing his Clemency. Upon *Stephano*'s importunity, and *Caſtruccio*'s promiſe, they came all to attend him; but *Caſtruccio* apprehending that this new Service of *Stephano* might ſometime or other be reproached to him again, he reſolved to make a ſignal Example; and accordingly regulating himſelf by the ſevere politicks of Uſurpers, who upon ſuch nice and critical occaſions make no bones to ſacrifice the innocence of a particular man, to the conſervation of the multitude, he commanded that the Mutineers and *Stephano* with them ſhould be conducted to Priſon, and from thence to Execution.

Whil'ſt he was thus employed, the *Florentines* recovered *San Miniato*, and *Caſtruccio* holding it imprudence to keep in the Field, whil'ſt he was inſecure in the Town, reſolved to give ſome relaxation to his Arms: He endeavour'd privately to feel how the *Florentines* ſtood diſpoſed to a Truce, and (the War having exhauſted their Coffers) he found them ſo coming, that it was concluded for two years, upon condition that either party ſhould retain what was then in their poſſeſſion.

Caſtruccio being diſintangled from his foreign Embarraſments, applyed himſelf wholly to his ſecurity at home, and under ſeveral pretences, to quit himſelf of all thoſe who were likely to diſpute his Soveraignty of *Lucca*, not ſparing his Confiſcations, and Proſcriptions againſt the Exiles, nor the Executions of any who were under his hands. To excuſe himſelf he gave out that he had had too much Experience already of the infidelity of thoſe people, to truſt them again; But a ſtrong Citadel which he erected in the City, was the true way to continue his Authority; and to give the more terror to the Citizens, he cauſed the houſes of his adverſaries to be demoliſhed, and the Citadel to be built of their Materials. His Peace with the *Florentines*, and his Fortifications at *Lucca*, employ'd him not ſo much, as to leſſen his thoughts how he might make himſelf greater; being unwilling again to come to an open War, he entertained private Correſpondencies, both on one ſide and the other. He had an ardent deſire to make himſelf Maſter of the Town of *Piſtoia*, perſwading himſelf it would give him footing in *Florence*; and in this proſpect he held a ſecret Commerce of amity with the different parties, which were predominant in *Piſtoia*. This

double

double intelligence was managed with that slyness and delicacy, that each of them believed they were particularly in his Confidence. It was a long time that these two opposite Cabals had divided, or rather distracted that City. The one called the Faction of the *Bianchi*, had *Bastiano de Possente* for its head; and the other called the *Neri*, was Commanded by *Jacopo de Gia*. Each of them boyling with desire to supplant its competitor, repos'd much upon the promises of *Castruccio*: And these two Heads of the Factions who had long been suspected to one another, took Arms at length both at a time. *Jacopo* posted himself towards the Gate that goes to *Florence*, and *Bastiano* towards that which leads to *Lucca*. At first it was in debate severally by each of them, whether they should call in the *Florentines*; but finding *Castruccio* more active, and his Forces better Soldiers, each of them sent privately to him to solicit his assistance: *Castruccio* carried it very demurely, and promised succour to both. He told *Jacopo*, that in person he would relieve him; and to *Bastiano* he sent word he would do it by *Pagolo Guinigi* his Lieutenant General, and the person of the world he loved best, for he regarded him as his Son. Having acquainted them both that they should expect their supplies about midnight, he agreed with *Pagolo*, and causing him to march with part of his Troops to joyn with *Bastiano* at one Gate, he with the rest advanced the common Road towards *Jacopo*. At both Gates they were admitted as Friends; but no sooner were they entered, but upon a signal given, *Bastiano* was killed on one side with all his chief friends, and *Jacopo* and his friends scaped no better on the other; the rest of their parties betaking to their heels, the whole Town was left at *Castruccio*'s devotion. He came in person to reassure the Magistrates, and brought them out of the Palace whither they had fled to secure themselves; Having called the people together, he promised to cancel all the old debts, did many acts of Grace, lessened their imposts, and prevailed upon them to be obedient, by the force of his caresses, and new priviledges which he gave them. This profuseness of kindness, have coax'd likewise the Inhabitants of the Country, they came in great throngs to salute and recognize their new Prince, who sent them all home again in peace, all mightily taken with his Virtues, and possessed with hopes of his extraordinary benefits.

There was about this time some Mutinies in *Rome*, by reason of the dearness of provisions. The scarcity that was suffered, proceeded from the absence of the Popes, who kept then their Pontifical residence at *Avignon*, and it added much to the revolt, that the *Romans* could not endure to be governed by a *German*. This National animosity was the occasion of frequent Murthers, and perpetual disorder. *Errico* the Emperor's Lieutenant General found himself too weak to apply any remedy, and apprehended (not without cause) that the *Romans* had private intelligence with the King of *Naples*, that if their Forces should joyn, he should be forced out of *Rome*, and the Pope be restored. He concluded therefore his safest recourse would be to *Castruccio*; so that he sent to him for supplies, and begg'd of him that he would come along with them in person. *Castruccio* made no scruple of the Voyage, being equally transported to be able to do a meritorious piece of Service to the Emperor, and put himself in a condition to be regarded at *Rome*, and look'd upon as the Moderator of their affairs whenever the Emperor should be absent. Leaving therefore the care of *Lucca* to the charge of *Pagolo Guinigi*, and contenting himself only with a Convoy of two hundred Horse, he came to *Rome*, and was received by *Errico* with all possible honour. His presence having received the Authority of the Emperor, he took a gentle way to pacifie the people. The first thing he did, was to provide plenty of all things, causing store of Corn to be brought thither from *Pisa*, to take off the pretence of their revolt: After which mingling very discreetly his favours and his chastisements, he reduced all the chief Citizens to their obedience to *Errico*; In acknowledgment of which *Castruccio* was made Senator of *Rome*, and several Honours conferred upon him with more than ordinary Ceremony. The day of his promotion, he came forth in a Habit suitable to his Dignity, but enriched with a delicate Embroidery, with two devices wrought in artificially, one before and the other behind; The first was before, and in these words, (as devout, as common) *HE IS AS IT PLEASES GOD*; and behind in these, *AND SHALL BE WHAT GOD WILL HAVE HIM.*

Whilst these things were in Transaction, the *Florentines* incensed that to the prejudice of their Truce, *Castruccio* had surprized the Town of *Pistoia*, resolved to recover it by force, and thought it not likely to be difficult, if they took the opportunity of his absence. Among the Fugitives from *Pistoia* who had saved themselves in *Florence*, there were two principally considerable, *Cecchi*, and *Baldini*. They were Men of Action, and had always retain'd a private correspondence with their Friends in *Pistoia*; and they managed all things so dexterously for a revolt, that they caused a good party of *Florentines* to enter one night into the Town, who restored them their liberty, with the destruction of all *Castruccio*'s party.

This

This news being brought to *Rome*, touched *Caſtruccio* to the quick, who taking leave of *Errico*, with large Journeys came directly to *Lucca*.

The *Florentines* had notice of his return, and reſolved ſtoutly to begin the War upon him, that he might not have leiſure to prepare; wherefore having obliged all that (like themſelves) were favourers of the *Guelfiſh* Faction, to put themſelves forward in ſome extraordinary manner, they raiſed a ſtrong Army, and marched with all diligence to poſſeſs themſelves firſt of the Valley of *Nievole* to facilitate their Communication with *Piſtoia*; *Caſtruccio* on his ſide with what Forces he could get together, marched directly for *Monte-Carlo*, and having intelligence where the Enemy was encamped, and how numerous their Army, he judged the danger would be as great ſhould he go and confront them in the plain of *Piſtoia*, as to attend them in the Valley of *Peſcia*. He concluded therefore to draw them (if he could) into the ſtreights of *Seravalle*, for narrow paſſes, and rough and difficult ways were convenient for a ſmall Army as his was, which conſiſted of not above 12000 Men, and would be a diſadvantage to the *Florentines*, who were 40000 compleat. Wherefore, though he was well enough ſatisfied of the Courage of his Army, and underſtood the worth of every common Soldier, yet he thought good to withdraw out of that Champagn Country, leſt he ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be overwhelmed with the multitudes of his Enemies.

Seravalle, is a Caſtle betwixt *Peſcia*, and *Piſtoia*, ſcituate upon a hill which on that ſide puts a ſtop to the Valley of *Nievole*. This Caſtle ſtands not upon the Road, but is about two flight ſhot higher, and the paſſage down into the Valley, is rather ſtrait than ſteep, for the declenſion is very gradual to the place where the waters divide, and paſs to diſcharge themſelves into the Lake of *Tucchio*, and that paſſage is ſo ſtraight, that twenty Men in Front, take up the whole breadth. There it was that *Caſtruccio* deſigned to engage the Enemy, as well to give the advantage of the ſtraight to the ſmallneſs of his own Army; as to keep them from being ſenſible of the vaſt numbers of the *Florentines*; and prevent the terror which they might inſpire. The Caſtle of *Seravalle* belong'd to the *Signor Manfredi* a *German*, who had made himſelf Lord of it, long before *Caſtruccio* had ſeized upon *Piſtoia*, and kept it by common conſent both of the Inhabitants of *Piſtoia* and *Lucca*. Either becauſe he kept his Neutrality very ſtrictly with both, or becauſe the Caſtle was ſo ſtrong of it ſelf, it needed to fear neither. *Caſtruccio* knowing the importance of that place from the beginning, found a way to gain intelligence with a perſon who lived in the Caſtle. The night before the day of the Battel, by the miniſtery of this Man, *Caſtruccio* cauſed Four hundred of his Soldiers to enter, who cut the Throat of *Manfredi*, and ſeized on the Caſtle. Having ſecured ſo conſiderable a Poſt without noiſe, he endeavoured to perſwade the Enemy that he would not ſtir from *Monte-Carlo*, thereby to draw them into his Clutches, and make them haſte with all ſpeed to gain the avenues to the *Val de Nievole*, and this plot of his jump'd exactly with the *Florentine* deſign. For they having no mind that *Piſtoia* ſhould be the Theatre of the War, and being willing to remove it into the Vale, they encamped above *Seravalle*, with intention to have paſſed the Straights the next day, not imagining in the leaſt that the Caſtle was ſurprized. *Caſtruccio* having notice of their motion; about midnight drew his Army out of their quarters, and ſtole privately before break of day to the foot of *Seravalle*. The accident was odd, for as he marched up the Hill on one ſide, the Enemy marched up on the other: He cauſed his Foot to advance by the way of the common Road, but he drew out a party of Four hundred Horſe, and commanded them towards the left, on that ſide towards the Caſtle. There were Four hundred of the Enemies Horſe, that were a Forlorn to their Army, and the whole Infantry followed them, but their Scouts were no ſooner upon the top of the Hill, when on a ſuddain they fell foul upon the Troops of *Caſtruccio*. They were ſtrangely ſurprized, for knowing nothing of the taking of the Caſtle, they could not imagine the Enemy would come to meet them: Inſomuch that before they had leiſure to put themſelves into a poſture, they were conſtrained to engage tumultuouſly with thoſe Troops which were drawn up in good Order, but they in confuſion; Not but that ſome of the *Florentine* Cavaliers behaved themſelves gallantly, but the noiſe of ſo unexpected an Encounter, put them preſently to a ſtand, and being defuſed in the Army, it put all into great diſorder and fear. The Horſe and the Foot fell foul upon one another, and both upon the baggage: Want of ground rendered the Experience of the Officers of no uſe, and the ſtraightneſs of the paſs, confounded all their Military cunning. The firſt Troops that *Caſtruccio* charged upon the top of the Hill, were immediately routed and the ſmall reſiſtance they made was not ſo much the defect of their courage, as the effect of the place, with the incommodity of which, and the ſtrangeneſs of the ſurprize, they were conſtrained to give ground. There was no way left for them to run; on their Flanks the Mountains were inacceſſible, their Enemies were in the Front, and their own Army in the Reer.

reer. In the mean time, as this firſt charge of *Caſtruccio* was not ſufficient to ſtagger the enemies Battel, he drew out a party of Foot, and ſent them to joyn with the Horſe in the Caſtle of *Seravalle*: this body in reſerve having poſſeſſion of the Hills, and falling upon the flanck of the *Florentines*, forced them to give ground, and yield to the wild incommodity of the place, and the violence and fierceneſs of the enemy. The Reer-guard ran, and having got into the plain that looks towards *Piſtoya*, every man ſhifted as well as he could.

This defeat was bloody and great; among the multitude of priſoners, there were many of the principal Officers; among the reſt three Noble *Florentines*, *Bandino di Roſſi*, *Franceſco Brunilleſchi* and *Giovanni della Toſa*, without mentioning ſeveral conſiderable *Tuſcans*, and many of the King of *Naples* his Subjects, who, by their Princes order, were in the ſervice of the *Florentine*. Upon the firſt tidings of their defeat, the *Piſtoyans* turned the *Guelfs* Faction out of Town, and came with their keys and preſented them to *Caſtruccio*, who purſuing his Victory, carried *Prato* and all the Town in that plain, as well beyond as on this ſide the *Arno*: after which he encamped with his Army in the plain of *Peretola*, two miles from *Florence*, where he continued braving the City, and paſſed ſeveral days in the enjoyment of his good fortune, parting the ſpoil, and coining of mony, thereby exerciſing with great oſtentation a kind of Sovereign right over their Territory; and releaſing ſomething of the rigour of his diſcipline, he gave his Souldiers liberty to inſult as they pleaſed over the conquered; and to make his triumph the more remarkable, nothing could ſerve the turn, but naked women muſt run Courſes on horſe-back under the very walls of the City. But this gallantry and oſtentation entertained him but lightly, or rather ſerved but as a colour to hide his greater deſigns; for in the mean time he found a way to corrupt *Lupacci*, *Freſcobaldi*, and ſome certain other Gentlemen in the Town, who were to have delivered him a Gate, and brought him into *Florence* in the night, had not their Conſpiracy been diſcovered, and defeated afterward by the puniſhment of the accomplices.

This great Town being ſo ſtraightned, and ſo long block'd up, that the Inhabitants ſeeing no other way of preſerving their liberty, than by engaging it to the King of *Naples*, ſent Embaſſadors to that Prince, and offered to throw themſelves into his arms. It was not only for his honour to accept of their proffer, but for the general intereſt of the whole Faction of the *Guelfs*, which without that could ſubſiſt no longer in *Tuſcany*. The terms being agreed, the treaty concluded, and the *Florentines* to pay him annually two hundred thouſand florins, he ſent them four thouſand Horſe under the Command of Prince *Carlo* his Son.

During this negotiation an unexpected accident hapned, which put *Caſtruccio* into a cooler temper, and made him give the *Florentines* breath in ſpight of his teeth: there was a new Conſpiracy againſt him at *Piſa*, not to be ſuppreſſed by his preſence: *Benedetto Lanfranchi*, one of the chief Citizens in the Town, was the author of it: *Benedetto* troubled to ſee his Country ſubject to the tyranny of a *Luccheſe*, undertook to ſurprize the Citadel, force out the Garriſon, and cut the throats of all that were friends to *Caſtruccio*. But as in thoſe kind of conjurations, if a ſmall number be able to keep things ſecret, it is not ſufficient to put them in execution; and therefore whilſt *Lanfranchi* was endeavouring to hook in more aſſociates, he met with thoſe who were falſe, and diſcovered all to *Caſtruccio*. Two Noble *Florentines*, *Cecchi* and *Guidi*, who were fled to *Piſa*, were ſuſpected to be the Traitors; and the ſuſpition of that perfidy left an ill ſtain upon their reputation; which way ſoever it was, *Caſtruccio* put *Lanfranchi* to death, baniſhed his whole Family, and ſeveral of the chief *Piſans* were left ſhorter by the head.

This plot diſcovering to *Caſtruccio* that the fidelity of the Towns of *Piſtoya* and *Piſa* would be always eaſily ſhaken; he put all things in practice that cunning or open force could ſuggeſt to keep them in their duties: but whilſt his thoughts were upon the tenters about ſo important a care, the *Florentines* had ſome reſpite to recover their ſenſes, and expect the *Neapolitan* Succours, which being at length arrived under the Conduct of *Prince Carlo*, a general Counſel was held of the whole Faction of the *Guelfs*. Upon the reſolution taken there, an Army was raiſed, the ſtrongeſt that ever had been ſet out by that party, for it amounted to 30000 Foot, and 10000 Horſe. When their Forces were ready, it was debated in the Counſel of War, whether they ſhould begin with the Siege of *Piſtoya* or *Piſa*. The latter carried it, for it was fancied the Conſpiracy of the *Piſans* was ſo recent, that in probability it had left ſome ſeeds for a ſecond revolt; beſides, the Conqueſt of *Piſa* would bring *Piſtoya* along with it.

This great Army opened their Campagn in the beginning of *May* 1328. *Laſtra*, *Signia*, *Monte Lupo* and *Empoli* were taken immediately, and it advanced afterwards to beſiege *San-Miniato*. But *Caſtruccio* without diſcompoſure, either by the greatneſs of their force, or

the ſwiftneſs of their progreſs, believed rather that the favourable inſtant was arrived in which fortune was to put into his hands the ſupreme authority of *Tuſcany*; and therefore judging this effort of the enemy at *Piſa* would ſucceed no better than their deſigns at *Seravalle*, he came and entrenched at *Fucicbio* with 20000 Foot, and 4000 Horſe, having put 5000 Foot into *Piſa* under the Command of *Pagolo Guinigi*.

Fucecbio is a Caſtle ſeated ſo advantagiouſly, that there is not a better Poſt in all the plain of *Piſa*; for it ſtands upon a little eminence equally diſtant from the two Rivers *Arno* and *Guſciana*. The place of their encampment could have been no where better choſen, for unleſs the enemy divided, and came upon them in two Bodies, (which muſt needs weaken them much), they could not cut off the proviſions which came to *Caſtruccio* both from *Lucca* and *Piſa*. To come and face them in their trenches, would be raſhly to engage themſelves betwixt his Army and *Pagolo's*. To turn towards *Piſa*, they muſt paſs the River *Arno*, and leave the enemy upon their backs, which was an attempt as dangerous as the other. *Caſtruccio's* deſign was to make them pitch upon the laſt, and to invite them the better to paſs over the River; inſtead of bringing down his Line to the bank, (as he might very well have done), he turned it off ſhort towards the walls of *Fucecbio*, not ſo much to ſhelter himſelf under the ſaid walls, but cunningly to leave the enemy ſuch a ſpace free, as might tempt them to paſs the River. And in the whole art of War, there is nothing ſo ſubtil as the election of Poſts and Encampments, and that was *Caſtruccio's* maſterpiece.

The enemy having taken *San-Miniato*, conſulted for ſome time whether they ſhould fall upon *Piſa*, or *Caſtruccio* in his Camp: at length, all things well conſidered, it was concluded to march ſtraight toward him. The River *Arno* was at that time ſo low, it was fordable, but with trouble, for the Horſe paſs'd up to the ſaddle, and the Foot with proportion. At laſt on the 10th. of *June* in the morning, the *Florentines* put themſelves into Battalia, and began to paſs the River with a party of their Horſe, and a body of 10000 Foot. *Caſtruccio* having deliberated all things, and provided for more than one Event, commanded a thouſand Foot along the River, above the paſſage where the enemy appeared, and ſent a thouſand more to poſt themſelves below it; and then advancing himſelf at the head of five thouſand Foot and three thouſand Horſe, he came on couragiouſly againſt the enemy, as half of them were paſſed. The *Florentine* Foot, tired with the incommodity of their paſſage, and the weight of their Arms, advanced but faintly againſt him; and for their Horſe, they that paſſed firſt had made the bottom ſo looſe, and ſo ſlippery, that there was no paſſage for thoſe who were to follow: on the contrary, their Horſes either ſtuck faſt in the mud, or their legs came up, and they threw their Riders into the water, where many of them were drowned. So that the *Florentines* perceiving their attempt there was not like to ſucceed, recovered the bank, and marching a little higher, they ſearched for a better place; but where-ever they made their point, and endeavoured to go over, *Caſtruccio* oppoſed them with the Infantry he had drawn out, which being arm'd lightly with Targets and Darts, were every where immediately, charged the enemy both in the Front and the Flanck, and ſetting up at the ſame time moſt hideous ſhouts, the *Florentine* Horſe being frighted with noiſe, and wounded with Darts, either run back, or threw their Riders under their feet. As to the *Florentines* who had paſſed firſt, they maintained their ground with a great deal of Gallantry, and till then the loſs was equal on both ſides; for if *Caſtruccio* doubled his endeavours to force back the enemy into the River, the enemy was no leſs zealous to gain as much ground as might ſerve for drawing up their Army when it ſhould get over. Both Generals were very buſie in the encouragement of their Souldiers, both with exhortation and example. *Caſtruccio*, to vilifie the enemy, remonſtrated to his Army, that they were the ſame people they had beat before at *Seravalle*; the *Florentines* repreſented to their Troops how infamous it would be for ſo numerous an Army as theirs to be worſted by a handful of men. But *Caſtruccio* obſerving the Battel grew tedious, and his own men began to be as weary as the enemy, and that there were as many wounded and dead on the one ſide as the other, he cauſed another Body of five thouſand Foot to advance; as ſoon as they were got up to the reer of their companions, thoſe who had been fighting all the while, and were then in the front, were commanded to open to the right and left, and wheel off into the reer, whilſt the other advanced into the ground they had forſaken; but whilſt this was in agitation, the *Florentines* gained ſomething upon them, but they enjoyed it not long, for being to deal with freſh men, they were quickly diſordered, and followed with that vigour, they threw themſelves into the River. As to the Horſe both of the one ſide and the other, no advantage was to be obſerved. *Caſtruccio* being ſenſible that in number his was much inferior to the enemy, had commanded his Troops to entertain their Horſe with ſlight skirmiſhing, only to gain time; for believing his Foot able to beat the

ene-

enemies, he intended afterwards to joyn them with his Horſe, and fall both together upon the Cavalry of the *Florentines*. The *Florentines* tried another paſſage above the firſt, thinking thereby to have flanck'd *Caſtruccio* afterwards; but the banck on the other ſide being bad, and defended by the enemies Foot, they were repulſed again, and in as great diſorder as before. Then *Caſtruccio* came up to them, and charged them ſo ſmartly in all parts, that they were totally defeated; ſo that of ſo vaſt an Army, ſcarce a third part were ſaved, and ſeveral of their chief Officers taken. *Prince Carlo* ſaved himſelf at *Empoli* with *Michael Falconi*, and *Thadeo Albizi*, Commiſſaries General of the *Florentine* Army; one may eaſily imagine the plunder was great, and the ſlaughter no leſs. In ſhort, according to the exacteſt computation, there were ſlain on the *Florentine* ſide 20231 men: on the ſide of *Caſtruccio* but 1570.

Here it was that Fortune began to be weary of the great actions of *Caſtruccio*, and (inconſtant as ſhe was) inſtead of giving him long life that might have crown'd his felicity, as if ſhe had been jealous of his glory, ſhe interpoſed with the only obſtacle that was able to interrupt the proſperity of ſo incomparable a man.

This Illuſtrious *Hero* tired with the fatigues of a Battel, as painful as glorious; coming out of the Fight with his imagination full of great things that might follow, and running over in his mind the probability of his good fortune, believing no hopes were left for the enemies loſs, nor no bounds for his victory, he marched directly for the Gate of *Fucechio*. It having been always his principle to be firſt on horſeback, and laſt that came out of the field, he reſted there ſome time, not out of oſtentation, but to thank and careſs the Souldiers as they returned from the purſuit, and withal to be ready, in caſe the enemy ſhould rally. Whilſt he was ſtanding there, covered with ſweat, his heart panting, and out of breath, an unlucky cold wind came from the other ſide of the *Arno*, and with a peſtiferous quality ſo affected his blood, that he fell immediately into the cold fit of an Ague: at firſt he neglected it, though he found a general alteration, as believing himſelf ſufficiently hardned againſt the injuries of the air; but this negligence was very pernicious. The next night his Fitt increaſed, and his Fevor was ſo violent, his Phyſitians gave him over.

The univerſal ſadneſs of the Souldiers made his triumphant Troops look as melancholy as if they had been beaten. All his Officers ſtood about him with tears in their eyes, but having taken them particularly by the hand, and deſired them to withdraw, he cauſed *Pagolo Guinigi* to be called, took him in his arms, and with a feeble but affectionate voice, he ſpake to him as follows. "Had I imagined (dear Son) that fortune would have ſtop'd my "courſe in the midſt of the way that conducted me to Glory, and ſo ſoon interrupted the "felicity of my Arms, I would have better enjoyed the fruit of my pains. 'Tis poſſible I "ſhould not have left your Territory ſo large, but I ſhould have endeavoured to have left "it more quiet, by creating fewer enemies to my ſelf, and leſs envy to you. I ſhould have "contented my ſelf (dear Son) with the Sovereignty of *Lucca* and *Piſa*, and inſtead of in"tending the Conqueſt of *Piſtoya*, and contracting the hatred of the *Florentines* by ſo many "affronts, I ſhould have endeavoured by all means poſſible to have gained their affection: "by ſo doing, if I had not lengthened my days, I ſhould have made them at leaſt more "happy, and left you more quiet and ſecure. But fortune (who will have the ordering of "all humane affairs) gave me not ſo much judgment as was neceſſary to know her, nor ſo "much time as was requiſite to maſter her. You have heard (for every body has told you, "and I never denied it) how I came into your Father's houſe, young, inconſiderable, with"out hopes of advancement; in a word, in ſo mean a condition, that without his kind"neſs I could never have ſatisfied the ambition of my nature. Your Father brought me "up with the ſame care and tenderneſs as if I had been his own, and I do acknowledg, "if ever I gave any teſtimonies of Valour and Magnanimity, they were but the effects of "thoſe great examples which he ſet me, and the fair education I had from him, condu"cted me to that height which, not only you, but all the World has admir'd. When he "came to die, he committed to my care and faith both your perſon and intereſt; have I be"traid his confidence in any thing? can you complain that my generoſity has not been an"ſwerable to his? my heart does not reproach me by any ingratitude. I have not only "preſerved to you the fortune of your Father; but to leave you the fruit of my labours "and ſucceſs, I have declined all overtures of Marriage, leſt hapning to have children of "my own, my natural affection for them ſhould have deſtroyed my friendſhip for you; and "leſſened the acknowledgment which I owed to his bounty. It touches, it touches, dear "Charge, when we ſpeak of theſe things. You cannot comprehend the ſatisfaction I re"ceive, to leave you Maſter of ſo puiſſant a State; nor can you imagine how it troubles me "to leave it ſo unſetled and perplexed. The City of *Lucca* is under your ſubjection, but "be ſure 'tis not pleaſed with its condition: *Piſa* likewiſe is yours, but you know the natu-

"ral inconſtancy of that people. Though it has been often ſubdued, and paſſed from one "ſervitude to another, yet it will always diſdain to pay obedience to any native of *Lucca*, "and have a care how you regulate your Politicks in relation to this jealouſie, which is inſe- "parable from perſons of different Countries. The Town of *Piſtoya* is a place that ought "always to leave upon your ſpirit ſome ſuſpition and umbrage of their fidelity. Beſides, that "it is divided within it ſelf, the ill treatment which it has received from us will moſt ſenſibly "excite it againſt our Family. But the worſt of all is, the *Florentines* are your neighbours, "and you know mortally offended, as having been worſted by me perpetually: but that is "not ſufficient to ſuppreſs them. They will be now overjoyed, and inſult more upon the "news of my death, than if they had conquered all *Tuſcany*. As to the Succours, you are "to expect I will not diſſemble with you: you can hope for none but from the Emperor, "or Princes of *Milan*, and you will be deceived if you expect any from them; they are "either too ſlow, or too buſy, or too remote. Depend not therefore upon any thing but "your own Conduct, upon the memory of my Atchievements, and the conſternation which "my Victory has brought upon our enemy. It will be no little advantage to you if you "can allure the *Florentines* to an accommodation, and their fear, without doubt, ſufficiently "inclines them. Let your comportment with them for the future be different from mine; "and as I have always provoked them, and believed nothing could ſo much contribute to "my happineſs, as to deal with them as enemies, let it be your care to deſire their amity, and "found not your repoſe upon any thing ſo much as an alliance with them. Nothing in this "life imports us ſo deep as the knowledg of our own tempers, and how to employ them; but "this Science belongs moſt properly to thoſe who would govern; and it is neceſſary for "ſuch to ſpin our their lives in the luxuries of peace, when they find themſelves unfit for "warlike executions: my advice therefore (dear Charge) is, that you would live in repoſe, "and if you will make the advantage of the troubles of my life to ſweeten your own, you "will remember to follow it. Farewel, I am going, and with this double ſatisfaction, that "as I have left you the poſſeſſion of a large Empire, ſo I have left you ſuch precepts as will "ſecure it to you.

Caſtruccio ended this paſſionate diſcourſe by griping *Pagolo* by the hand, who heard him all the while with tears in his eyes: and as the laſt inſtance of his gratitude, this great perſon called for all the brave and faithful Officers of his Army, whether of *Lucca*, *Piſa*, or *Piſtoya*, and having recommended to them the intereſts of *Pagolo*, he obliged them to an oath of Allegiance, and as ſoon as that oath was ſolemnly taken, the great Conqueror ſurrendred his ſoul. Never was victorious Army ſo ſad, never any Prince ſo lamented, nor any memory ſo venerable. His Exequies were honourably celebrated, and his body buried in the Church of St. *Francis* in *Lucca*. *Pagolo* ſucceeded, but not with the virtue and fortune of his predeceſſor; for not long after he loſt *Piſtoya*, and then *Piſa*, and much ado he had to keep the Sovereignty of *Lucca*, yet that continued in his Family to the fourth Generation.

Theſe great actions do ſufficiently prove that *Caſtruccio* was not only a man rare in his own age, but would have been the ſame in any former. His ſtature was higher, and his proportions better than ordinary: his aſpect was charming, and he had ſo much grace and goodneſs in his accoſt, that never man went unſatisfied from his converſation: his hair was inclining to red, and he wore it ſhort above his ears: where-ever he went, ſnow, hail, or rain, let the weather be what it would, his head was always uncovered. He had all the qualities that make a man great: grateful to his friends, terrible to his enemies, juſt with his ſubjects, crafty with ſtrangers, and where fraud would do the buſineſs, he never troubled himſelf to conquer by force. No man was more forward to encounter with danger, nor no man more careful to get off. He uſed to ſay that men ought to try all things, and be terrified at nothing; for it was clear God Almighty was a lover of Courage, becauſe he made valiant men the Miniſters of his judgments, and corrected the poor ſpirited by them. He had a ſtrange preſence of wit, and made his reparties with admirable quickneſs; he would rally very handſomly, ſometimes he would be pleaſant and innocent, and ſometimes as bitter, and poinant. When occaſion offered fairly, as he never ſpared any body, ſo he was never offended when he was bitten himſelf. We have ſome of his anſwers which he gave with much wit, and others of other peoples which he heard with as much patience.

He cauſed a Bird to be bought one day, and gave a Ducat for it; one of his acquaintance blaming him for giving ſo much: you (ſays *Caſtruccio*) would have given a penny for it your ſelf? the other anſwering yes; then (ſays *Caſtruccio*) *you would have paid dearer than I, for a Ducat is not ſo much with me.*

Having a Flatterer about him who plagued him with perpetual requeſts, in great ſcorn

Caſtru-

Caſtruccio ſpit upon his Clothes: The Flatterer reply'd wittily, *a Fiſherman to get a pitiful little fiſh, is dabbled up to the neck, and ſhall I be affraid of a little ſpittle, that am catching a Whale.* *Caſtruccio* was pleaſed with his anſwer, and rewarded him for it.

A certain Hypocrite who loved his gut as well as he, reproached *Caſtruccio* one day, by the Luxury and Extravagance of his Table. *If that were a ſin* (replyed *Caſtruccio*) *there would not be ſo much feaſting upon Holy-days.*

Paſſing one day thorow a ſtreet, where there lodged certain Women of but indifferent reputation, and ſeeing a young man come from them who bluſhed, and was in mighty confuſion that *Caſtruccio* had ſeen him; *Friend, ſayes* Caſtruccio, *you ſhould not be aſhamed when you come out, but when you go in.*

He was always of an opinion that a Conqueror ought not to give too much liberty to his new Subjects, which upon a time he explained very ſubtilly to ſome who underſtood him; Having a knot given him that was very faſt tyed, he was deſired to undo it, and having tryed a good while to no purpoſe, *My Friend* (ſaid he a loud) *If a thing that is tyed can give me ſo much trouble, I ſhall be much worſe when once it is looſed.*

He was often troubled with the aſſiduities of a perſon who pretended to be a Philoſopher, and was always moleſting his Entertainments with his admonitions and Morals; *Caſtruccio* weary of his inſolence at his Table, told him, *You Philoſophers are like Dogs, you never go any where but where you may have ſomething to bite.* The Philoſopher replyed, *No Sir, we are more like Phyſicians, and go only to thoſe who have extraordinary need of us.*

Paſſing one day from *Piſa* to *Legorn* by water, a great tempeſt aroſe on a ſudden, and put *Caſtruccio* into ſome apprehenſion, which one of the Company obſerved, and told him by way of reproach, that he wondered ſuch a man as *Caſtruccio* ſhould be frighted, when he found no ſuch paſſion in himſelf. *Caſtruccio* replyed, *You have no reaſon Sir to be affraid; for every man values his life according to its worth.*

One asked him one time what he ſhould do to make himſelf eſteem'd, he replyed, *when you'r invited to a Feaſt, have a care you do not ſet a wooden Statue upon a joyn'd ſtool.*

A fellow boaſting to him one day how many Books he had read, *Caſtruccio* told him, *It would have been more credit to have remembred half of them.*

A great Drinker, who was always debauching, uſed to value himſelf very much upon this ſcore, That though his Belly was always full of Wine, he never was drunk. *Caſtruccio* told him, *a Quart pot was the ſame.*

A Friend of his ſeeing him ingaged in an amour with a very pretty young Laſs, blamed him very ſeriouſly that he ſuffered himſelf to be ſo taken by a Woman, *you are deceived Sir,* ſaid he, *ſhe is taken by me.*

One found fault with him exceedingly for being ſo delicate and ſo expenſive in his dyet; *You would not* (ſaid *Caſtruccio*) *ſpend half ſo much in yours?* and being anſwered no, *Then* (replyed *Caſtruccio*) *you are a greater Miſer, than I am an Epicure.*

He was invited one evening to Supper by *Faddeo Bernardi*, a *Lucchese*, a very rich and ſumptuous Citizen; being arrived at the houſe, and conducted by *Faddeo* into a Room, exceedingly well hung, the Pavement of Moſaique work, wrought curiouſly into Flowers, and Leaves, and Branches, which yielded a moſt excellent verdure. *Caſtruccio* admir'd it exceedingly, and pretending to have occaſion to ſpit, he turned about, this way and that way, and at laſt ſpit in *Faddeo*'s face; *Faddeo* was much troubled, but *Caſtruccio* excuſed it, and told him, *He thought he could have ſpit no where to have offended him leſs.*

One asking very ſeriouſly how *Ceſar* dyed? He anſwered as ſeriouſly, *Would I might dye like him.*

One of his Courtiers having an ambition to regal him, made a Ball one night, and invited him to it; *Caſtruccio* came, entertained himſelf among the Ladies, and being in a good humour, fell a dancing and ſolacing among them, and doing ſome impertinencies which did not ſtand with the gravity of his rank: being admoniſhed by one of his Friends that it would detract from his eſteem; He told him, *I thank you Sir for your caution, but he that is counted wiſe all day, will never be thought a fool at night.*

One coming to him to beg a boon that *Caſtruccio* was unwilling to grant, *Caſtruccio* declined him, and would not ſeem for to hear; whereupon the Petitioner threw himſelf upon the ground, and put his head to *Caſtruccio*'s feet; *Caſtruccio* reproving him; the other replyed, *You your ſelf are the cauſe, you heard ſo little when I ſtood up, I had a mind to ſee whether your Ears were not upon your Toes.* Which anſwer got him more than he deſired.

He was wont to ſay, *The way to Hell was very eaſie, for Men went thither upon their backs, and could find it with their eyes ſhut.*

Another deſiring a favour of him, with a thouſand impertinent and ſuperfluous words: *Hark you Friend,* ſays *Caſtruccio, when you would have any thing with me for the future, ſend another Man to beg it.*

Another

Another great talker having tired him with a tedious diſcourſe, excuſed himſelf at laſt, and told him he was affraid he had wearied him, *No indeed Sir*, reply'd *Caſtruccio*, *for I did not mind one word that you ſaid.*

He uſed to Droll upon a perſon, who having been a handſom boy, prov'd as handſom a Man, *His ſpight* (ſaid he) *has been always againſt Married people : when he was a boy he debauched men from their Wives, and now he debauches women from their Husbands.*

He ſaw an envious man laugh, and asked him, *Do you laugh*, ſaid he, *That things go well with your ſelf, or ill with other people.*

When he was under the Tutulage of *Franceſco Guinigi*, one of his Camerades asking him merrily, what he ſhould give him for a box at his Ear, *Caſtruccio* anſwered immediately, *a Helmet if you pleaſe.*

He was forced to put a Citizen of *Lucca* to death, who formerly had been a great inſtrument of his advancement; and being reproached by ſomebody for dealing ſo ſeverely with an old friend; *No*, ſays he, *you are miſtaken, it was with a new foe.*

Caſtruccio compared the prudence of thoſe perſons, who though they pretended to Marry, would never be brought to't, to the diſcretion of thoſe people, who though they talk'd much of going to Sea, kept conſtantly at Land.

He uſed to ſay, he wondered much at one Cuſtom among men : when they buy any thing curious, either of Chriſtal or Glaſs, they ſound it, and employ all their ſenſes to be ſure it be good; but in chooſing of a Wife, they uſe nothing but their ſight, as if ſhe was taken only to be look'd upon.

He was of opinion that after his Death there would be a general alteration; and being asked when he came to dye, how he would be buried, he replyed, *With my face downward, for I am ſure in a ſhort time this Country will be turned topſie turvy, and then I ſhall be in the ſame poſture with other men.*

Whil'ſt he was in controverſie with *Huguccione*, but had him in great veneration for his bravery and Conduct; being asked in diſcourſe whether for the ſalvation of his Soul, he never had any thoughts of turning Monk, he anſwered no, for to him it ſeemed very ſtrange if Frier *Lazarone* ſhould go to Paradiſe, and *Huguccione de Faggivola* to Hell.

Being asked what time was moſt proper for a Man to Eat, to keep himſelf in health, he anſwered, *The rich when they are hungry, and the poor when they can.*

Seeing a Friend of his make uſe of his Servant to put up his Breeches, he told him, *I hope e're long you'l have one to feed you.*

Seeing over the door of a certain perſon this Inſcription in Latin, *God keep this Houſe from ill people*; He cryed, *Then the Maſter muſt never come in to't.*

Paſſing by a little Houſe with a great Gate, he ſaid, *If they have not a care, this Houſe will run away thorow the Gate.*

Being in diſcourſe with the Embaſſador of the King of *Naples* about the ſettlement of their Frontiers; upon ſome controverſie betwixt them, the Embaſſador ask'd him in a huff, *Why then Sir you are not affraid of our King? Caſtruccio* replyed gently, *is your King a good man, or a bad?* being anſwered a Good; *Why then*, ſaid Caſtruccio, *would you have me affraid of a good man?*

We might add many other anſwers of his, all full of weight, as well as wit; but theſe ſhall ſuffice. He dyed in the 44th year of his Age, and from the time he came firſt to appear in the world, in his good and his bad fortune he expreſſed always an equality and ſteddineſs of ſpirit; and as he left ſeveral Monuments of his proſperity and good fortune behind him; ſo he was not aſhamed to leave ſome memorials of his adverſity : When he was delivered from *Huguccione's* impriſonment, he cauſed the Irons with which he was manacled, to be hung in the publickeſt place in his Palace, where they are to be ſeen to this day, being willing that poſterity might know, that how fortunate ſoever he was in the main, he was not totally exempt from diſtreſs.

That which is ſtill remarkable is, that having equalled the great actions of *Scipio* and *Philip* the Father of *Alexander*, he dyed as they did in the 44th. year of his Age, and doubtleſs he would have ſurpaſſed them both, had he found as favourable diſpoſitions at *Lucca*, as one of them did in *Macedon*, and the other in *Rome.*

A Narrative of the Murther of Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliveretto da Fermo, *Signor* Pagolo, *and the Duke* de Gravina, (*all of the Family of the* Ursini) *the one committed by Duke* Valentine, *and the other composed by* Nicolo Machiavelli.

Duke *Valentine* was returned from *Lombardy*, whither he had gone to excuse himself in relation to certain Calumnies objected against him by the *Florentines* about the revolt of *Arezzo*, and other Towns in the *Vale de Chiana*, and being come to *Imola*, upon consultation with his Friends, he concluded upon his expedition against *Giovanni Bentivogli* Soveraign of *Bolonia*, because Duke *Valentine* had a mind to reduce that City, and make it chief of his Dutchy of *Romagna*; of which the *Vitelli*, *Orsini*, and their followers having notice, it appeared to them all, that the said Duke *Valentine* grew too potent, and that upon the taking *Bologna*, it was to be feared, he would endeavour to exterminate them, and make himself the only great man in *Italy*. Hereupon a Dyet was held at *Magione* in *Perugia*, where there met the Cardinal *Pagolo*, the Duke *de Gravina Orsini*, *Vitellozzo Vitelli*, *Oliveretto da Fermo*, *Giampagolo Baglioni*, Soveraign of *Perugia*, and *Antonio da Venafro* sent from *Pandolfo Petrucci*, as head of *Siena*. Upon serious deliberation about the greatness and disposition of the Duke, it was concluded very necessary to restrain him in time; otherwise there was great danger of a General destruction. Resolving therefore to desire aid of the *Florentines*, and to continue their amity with the *Bentivogli*, they sent Embassadors to both; promising their assistance to the one, and begging the assistance of the other against the Common Enemy. This Dyet was quickly nois'd all over *Italy*, and such of Duke *Valentine*'s Subjects as were discontented (among whom were the *Urbinati*, began to hold up their heads, and hope for a revolution. While the people were in this suspence, certain of the Inhabitants of *Urbino*, laid a plot to surprize the Castle of *San Leo*, which at that time was kept for the Duke, and the manner was thus; The Governor of the Castle was busie in repairing it, and mending the fortifications, to which purpose having commanded great quantities of Timber to be brought in, the Conspirators contrived that certain of the biggest pieces should be laid (as by accident) upon the bridge, which they knew could not be cran'd up without a great deal of difficulty; whil'st the Guards were employed in hoysting the Timber, they took their opportunity, seized upon the Bridge, and then upon the Castle, which was no sooner known to be taken, but the whole Country revolted and called in their old Duke; yet, not so much upon the surprize of that Castle, as their expectations from the Dyet at *Magione*, by means of which they did not question to be protected. The Dyet understanding the revolt of *Urbino*, concluded no time was to be lost, and having drawn their Forces together, they advanced, if any Town was remaining to the Duke, to reduce it immediately. They sent a new Embassy to the *Florentines* to solicite their Concurrence against the common Enemy; to remonstrate their success, and to convince them that such an opportunity being lost, was not to be expected again. But the *Florentines* had an old pique to the *Vitelli* and *Ursini* upon several accompts, so that they did not only not joyn with them, but they sent their Secretary *Nicolo Machiavelli* to the Duke to offer him reception or assistance which he pleased to Elect. The Duke was at *Imola* at that time in great consternation; for unexpectedly on a sudden, when he dream'd nothing of it, his Soldiers revolted, and left him with a War at his Doors, and no force to repel it: But taking heart upon the *Florentine* Complement, he resolved with the few Forces he had left, to protract, and spin out the War, and by propositions and practices of agreement, gain time till he could provide himself better, which he did two ways, by sending to the King of *France*, and by giving advance Mony to all Men at Arms and Cavalry that would come in. Notwithstanding all this, the *Ursini* proceeded, and marched on towards *Fossombrone*, where being faced by a party of the Dukes, they charged them,

and

and beat them : The news of that defeat, put the Duke upon new Counsels, to try if he could stop that humour by any practice of accord; and being excellent at dissembling, he omitted nothing that might perswade them that they were the Aggressors and had taken up Arms first against him : That what was in his hands, he would willingly surrender; that the Name of Prince was enough for him, and if they pleased, the Principality should be theirs; and he deluded them so far, that they sent Signor *Pagolo* to him to treat about a Peace, and in the mean time granted a Cessation of Arms: However the Duke put no stop to his recruits, but reinforced himself daily with all possible dilligence; and that his supplies might not be discovered, he dispers'd them as they came, all over *Romagna*: Whil'st these things were in transaction, a supply of 500 Lances arrived to him from *France*; and though by their help he found himself strong enough to confront his Enemy in the field, yet he judged it more secure and profitable to go on with the cheat, and not break off the Capitulation that then was on foot : And he acted it so well, that a Peace was concluded; their old Pensions confirmed, 4000 Duckats paid down, a solemn engagement given not to disturb the *Bentivogli*; He made an alliance with *Giovanni*, and declared that he could not, and had no power to constrain any of them to come personally to him, unless they pleased to do it themselves. They promised on their part to restore the Dutchy of *Urbino*, and whatever else they had taken from him; to serve him in all his Enterprizes; not to make War without his leave; nor hire themselves to any body else. These Articles being sign'd, *Guid' Ubaldo* Duke of *Urbin* fled again to *Venice*, having dismantled all the Castles and strong holds in his Dutchy before he departed; for having a confidence in the people, he would not that those places which he could not defend himself, should be possessed by the Enemy, and made use of to keep his friends in subjection.

But Duke *Valentine* having finished the agreement, and disposed his Army into quarters all over *Romagna*, about the end of *November*, removed from *Imola* to *Cesena*, where he continued several days in consultation with certain Commissioners sent from the *Vitelli*, and *Ursini* (who were then with their Troops in the Dutchy of *Urbino*) about what new Enterprize they were next to undertake; and because nothing was concluded, *Oliverotto da Fermo* was sent to propose to him, if he thought good, an expedition into *Tuscany*; if not, that they might joyn, and set down before *Sinigaglia*. The Duke replyed, That the *Florentines* were his Friends, and he could not with honour carry the War into *Tuscany*, but their proposal for *Sinigaglia*, he embraced very willingly. Having beleaguer'd the Town, it was not long before they had News it was taken, but the Castle held out, for the Governor refused to surrender to any body but the *Duke*, whereupon they intreated him to come. The Duke thought this a fair opportunity, and the better because he went not of himself, but upon their invitation; and to make them the more secure; he dismissed his *French*, and sent them back into *Lombardy* (only he retained a hundred Launces under the Command of his Kinsman *Monsieur de Candale*). Departing about the end of *December* from *Cesena*, he went to *Fano*, where with all the cunning and artifice he could use, he perswaded the *Vitelli* and *Ursini* to stay with the Army till he came; remonstrating to them that such jealousies and suspicions as those, must needs weaken their alliance, and render it undurable; and that for his part he was a man who desired to make use as well of the Counsels, as the Arms of his Friends. And though *Vitellozzo* opposed it very much, (for by the death of his Brother he had been taught how unwise it was to offend a Prince first, and then put himself into his hands) nevertheless perswaded by *Paulo Ursino* (who underhand was corrupted by presents and promises from the Duke) he consented to stay. Hereupon the Duke upon his departure the 30th of *Decemb.* 1502. imparted his design to Eight of his principal intimates (amongst whom *Don Michael*, and *Monsignor d'Euna* were two) and appointed, that when *Vitellozzo*, *Pagolo Ursini*, the Duke *de Gravina*, and *Oliverotto* should come to meet him, two of his Favourites should be sure to order it so, as to get one of the *Ursini* betwixt them, (assigning every couple his man) and entertain them till they came to *Sinigaglia*; with express injunction not to part with them upon any terms till they were brought to the Dukes Lodgings, and taken into Custody. After this he ordered his whole Army, Horse and Foot (which consisted of 2000 of the first, and 10000 of the latter) to be ready drawn up, upon the banks of the *Metauro*, about five miles distant from *Fano*, and to expect his arrival. Being come up to them upon the *Metauro*, he commanded out two hundred Horse as a Forlorn, and then causing the Foot to march, he brought up the Reer himself with the remainder.

Fano, and *Sinigaglia*, are two Cities in *la Marca*, seated upon the bank of the *Adriatick* Sea, distant one from the other about 15 miles; so that travelling up towards *Sinigaglia*, the bottom of the Mountains on the right hand are so near the Sea, they are almost wash'd by the water, and at the greatest distance they are not above two miles. The City of *Sinigaglia* from

from theſe Mountains is not above a flight ſhot, and the Tide comes up within leſs than a Mile. By the ſide of this Town there is a little River, which runs cloſe by the wall next *Fano*, and is in ſight of the Road: So that he who comes to *Sinigaglia*, paſſes a long way under the Mountains, and being come to the River which runs by *Sinigaglia*, turns on the left hand upon the bank, which within a bow ſhot, brings him to a Bridge over the ſaid River, almoſt right againſt the Gate: before the Gate there is a little Bourg with a Market-place, one ſide of which, is ſhouldred up by the bank of the River. The *Vitelli*, and *Urſini*, having concluded to attend the Duke themſelves, and to pay their perſonal reſpects, to make room for his Men had drawn off their own, and diſpoſed them into certain Caſtles at the diſtance of ſix miles, only they had left in *Sinigaglia*, *Oliveretto* with a party of about 1000 Foot, and 150 Horſe which were quartered in the ſaid Bourg. Things being in this order, Duke *Valentine* approached, but when his Horſe in the Van came up to the Bridge, they did not paſs, but opening to the right and left, and wheeling away, they made room for the Foot, who marched immediately into the Town. *Vitellozzo*, *Pagolo*, and the Duke *de Gravina*, advanced upon their Mules to wait upon Duke *Valentine*; *Vitellozzo* was unarm'd in a Cap lin'd with green, very ſad and melancholy, as if he had had ſome foreſight of his deſtiny, which conſidering his former courage and exploits, was admired by every body: And it is ſaid, that when he came from his houſe, in order to meeting Duke *Valentine* at *Sinigaglia*, he took his laſt leave very ſolemnly of every body. He recommended his Family and its fortunes, to the chief of his Officers, and admoniſhed his Grandchildren, not ſo much to commemorate the fortune, as the magnanimity of their Anceſtors. Theſe three Princes being arrived in the preſence of Duke *Valentine*, ſaluted him with great civility, and were as civilly received; and each of them, (as ſoon as they were well obſerved by the perſons appointed to ſecure them) were ſingled, and diſpoſed betwixt two of them. But the Duke perceiving that *Oliverotto* was wanting (who was left behind with his Regiment, and had drawn it up in the Market-place for the greater formality), he wink'd upon *Don Michael* (to whom the care of *Oliveretto* was aſſign'd) that he ſhould be ſure to provide he might not eſcape. Upon this intimation, *Don Michael* clap'd ſpurs to his Horſe, and rid before, and being come up to *Oliveretto*, he told him it was inconvenient to keep his Men to their Arms, for unleſs they were ſent preſently to their quarters, they would be taken up for the Dukes; wherefore he perſwaded him to diſmiſs them, and go with him to the Duke. *Oliveretto* following his Counſel, went along with him to the Duke, who no ſooner ſaw him, but he call'd him to him, and *Oliveretto* having paid his Ceremony fell in with the reſt. Being come into the Town, and come up to the Duke's Quarters, they all diſmounted, and attended him up, where being carried by him into a private Chamber, they were inſtantly Arreſted and made Priſoners. The Duke immediately mounted, and commanded their Soldiers ſhould be all of them diſarmed; *Oliveretto*'s Regiment being ſo near at hand, were plundered into the bargain. The Brigades which belong'd to *Vitelli*, and *Urſini* being at greater diſtance, and having notice of what had hapned to their Generals, had time to unite, and remembring the Diſcipline and Courage of their Maſters, they kept cloſe together, and marched away in ſpight both of the Country people, and their Enemies. But Duke *Valentine*'s Soldiers, not content with the pillage of *Oliveretto*'s Soldiers, fell foul upon the Town, and had not the Duke by the death of ſeveral of them, repreſſed their inſolence, *Sinigaglia* had been ruined. The night coming on, and the tumults appeaſed, the Duke began to think of his Priſoners, reſolved *Vitellezzo*, and *Oliveretto* ſhould dye, and having cauſed them to be guarded into a convenient place, he commanded they ſhould be ſtrangled; but they ſaid nothing at their deaths, that was anſwerable to their lives; for *Vitellozzo* begged only that the *Pope* might be ſupplicated in his behalf, for a plenary indulgence. *Oliveretto* impeached *Vitellozzo*, and lay'd all upon his back. *Pagolo* and the Duke *de Gravina* were continued alive, till the Duke had information that his Holineſs at *Rome* had ſeized upon the Cardinal *Orſino*, the Arch-biſhop of *Florence*, and Meſſer *Jacopo da Santa Croce*; upon which News, on the 18th of *January*, they alſo were both ſtrangled in the Caſtle of *Piene* after the ſame manner.

THE STATE OF FRANCE, IN

An Abridgment written by *Nicholo Machiavelli* Secretary of *FLORENCE.*

THE Kings and Kingdom of *France* are at this time more rich and more powerful than ever, and for these following Reasons: First,

The Crown passing by succession of Blood is become rich, because in case where the King has no Sons to succeed him in his paternal Estate, it falls all to the Crown; and this having many times hapned, has been a great corroboration, as particularly in the Dutchy of *Anjou*; and at present the same is like to fall out to this King, who having no Sons, the Dutchy of *Orleans*, and State of *Milan* (his hereditary Countrys) are like to devolve upon the Crown: So that at this day most of the good Towns in *France* are in the Crown, and few remaining to particular persons.

A second great Reason of the strength of that King is, That whereas heretofore *France* was not entire, but subject to several great Barons, who were able not only to expostulate, but to contend with the King (as the Dukes of *Guienn* and *Burbon* did formerly) the said Barons are now most obsequious and dutiful.

A third reason is, because formerly all the neighbouring Princes were ready upon every occasion to invade the Kingdom of *France*, the Dukes of *Burgundy*, *Brittannie*, *Guienne* or *Flanders*, being always tempting them thereunto, and giving them access, passage, and reception; as it hapned when the *English* had Wars with *France*, by their Confederacy with the Duke of *Brittagne*, they got admission into that Country, and gave the King of *France* his hands full: and in like manner the Duke of *Burgundy* was as troublesom, by means of the Duke of *Bourbon*. But now *Brittagne*, *Guienne*, the *Bourbonois*, and greatest part of *Burgundy* being united to that Crown, and very loyal and faithful; Those neighbouring Princes do not only want their old Confederates to invite and assist them, but they have them for their Enemies; so that the King of *France* is more strong, and his Adversaries more weak.

Another reason may be, That at this day the richest and most potent of the Barons are of the Blood Royal; so that upon defect of those who are before them, the Crown may come to them, upon which score they are firm to it, hoping that some time or other it may fall either to them or their posterity, whereas to mutiny or oppose, it might prejudice their succession, as it hapned to this King *Lewis* when he was taken in the Battel of *Brittagne*, where in favour of the said Duke of *Brittagne*, he was personally in Service against the *French*. Upon the death of King *Charles*, the Crown being legally in *Lewis*, it was disputed whether that fault and defection of his should not be a bar to his succession, and had it not been that he was very rich, by means of his frugality, and able to bear the Port of that Dignity at his own Expence, and the next Heir *Monsigneur d' Angolisme* an Infant, he had lost it; but for these reasons, and some favour which he had besides, *Lewis* was created King.

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The laſt reaſon is, becauſe the States of the Barons in *France* are not divided among the Heirs, (as in *Germany*, and ſeveral parts of *Italy*) but deſcend ſtill to the Eldeſt Sons who are the right Heirs; and the younger Sons are left, by ſome little aſſiſtance from their Elder Brothers to ſhift for themſelves; whereupon they betake themſelves generally to the Wars, endeavouring to advance themſelves that way, and raiſe themſelves fortunes: and hence it is the *Frenchmen* at Arms are better at this day, and ſtand fair for preferment.

The *French* Infantry cannot be good, for it being long ſince they had any War, they muſt needs want experience. Beſides in the Country, the Towns are full of Tradeſmen and Mechanicks, all of them ſo curb'd and cow'd by the Nobleſs, that they are grown puſilanimous and baſe; and therefore the King of *France* having found them unfit, makes no uſe of them in his Wars; unleſs it be of his *Gaſcoigns* who are ſomething better than the reſt, and the reaſon is, becauſe bordering upon the *Spaniards*, they are conſtantly upon duty, or communicate ſomething of their Nature: But for ſome years ſince they have ſhown themſelves better Thieves than Soldiers; nevertheleſs in defending and aſſaulting of Towns they do well enough, but in the field they are but indifferent, quite contrary to the *Germans* and *Switzers*, who are not to be dealt with in the field, but in ſtorming or defending a Town, they are good for nothing; and I ſuppoſe it proceeds from hence that they cannot in both caſes keep the ſame order which they obſerve in the field. Wherefore the King of *France* makes uſe of *Switzers*, and *Lanzknights*, becauſe his men at Arms dare not rely upon his *Gaſcoignes* in time of Service. And if his Foot were as good as his Men at Arms, no doubt but the King of *France* would be able to defend himſelf againſt all the Princes in *Europe*.

The *French* are naturally more fierce and hot, than dexterous or ſtrong, and if reſiſted handſomly in their firſt charge, they ſlacken and cool, and grow as timerous as Women. They are likewiſe impatient of diſtreſs or incommodity, and grow ſo careleſs by degrees, that 'tis no hard matter, finding them in diſorder, to maſter and overcome them.

And of this, Experience has been many times had in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and laſt of all at *Farigliano*, where they were twice as many as the *Spaniards*, and it was expected every hour when they ſhould have ſwallowed them up: Nevertheleſs, becauſe winter came on, and the weather grew bad, they began to ſtraggle into the Neighbouring Towns, where they might be at more eaſe, and thereby leaving their Camp weak, and out of order, the *Spaniards* fell upon them, and beat them beyond all expectation. And it would have been the ſame with the *Venetians*, who had never loſt the Battle of *Vaila*, had they forborn following the *French* example but for ten days: But the fury of *Bartolmeo d' Alviano* was too hot for them. The ſame hapned again to the *Spaniards* at *Ravenna*, who might have certainly ruined the *French* in reſpect of their ill Government, and want of proviſions which were intercepted on that ſide towards *Ferrara* by the *Venetians*, and towards *Bologna* by the *Spaniards* themſelves; but by the raſhneſs of ſome, and the indiſcretion of others, the *French* got the Victory, and though as it was, it was bloody enough; yet it had been much more, had the ſtrength of either Army conſiſted in the ſame kind of men; but the *French* force lying in his Men at Arms, and the *Spaniards* force in their Foot, the ſlaughter was the leſs. He therefore who would conquer the *French*, muſt be ſure to preſerve himſelf againſt their firſt *impetus* and attack, and in ſo doing he ſhall be ſure to prevail; for *Cæſar*'s character of them is true, *At firſt they are more than Men, at laſt leſs than Women.*

France in reſpect of its greatneſs, and the convenience of its Rivers, is opulent and rich; for their Commodities and labour are worth little or nothing, by reaſon of the ſcarcity of Money among the people, which is ſo great, it is with difficulty, that they are able to raiſe ſo much as will pay the impoſitions of their Lords, though they are generally but ſmall; the reaſon is, becauſe every body gathers to ſell as he has occaſion, and no body can ſtay to finiſh his harveſt as it ſhould be. So that if there ſhould be any body (which is ſeldom ſeen) ſo rich as to be a buſhel of Corn beforehand, every body having of their own, there would be no body to buy it: and the Gentlemen, of what they receive of their Tenants, except it be for cloths, ſpend little or nothing; For Cattle, and Poultry, and Fiſh, and Veniſon, they have enough of their own: ſo that all the Mony comes into the hands of the Lords, and doubtleſs at this time they are exceedingly rich, for the people are ſo poor, he that has but a *Florin*, believes himſelf a Prince.

The Prelates of *France* carry away $\frac{3}{7}$ of the Revenue of that Kingdom, becauſe there are ſeveral Biſhops who have Temporal as well as Spiritual Revenues, who having proviſions enough of their own to keep their houſes, ſpend not one farthing of their income, but hoard it up according to the Natural covetouſneſs of the Prelates, and Religions; and that which accrews to the Chapters and Colledges, is laid out in Plate, and Jewels, and Ornaments, for the decoration of their Chappels; ſo that betwixt what is laid out upon their Churches,

and what is laid up by the Prelates, their mony and their movables is of an immenſe value.

In all Counſels for the Government and Adminiſtration of the affairs of that Kingdom, the Prelates are always the greateſt number, the other Lords not regarding it ſo much, as knowing the execution muſt come thorow their hands: ſo that both ſides are contented, one to ordain, the other to execute, though there are many times ſome of the ancienter and more experienced Souldiers taken in to direct the Prelates in ſuch things as are out of their ſphear.

The Benefices in *France* (by virtue of a Cuſtom and Law derived antiently from the Popes) are confered by the Colledges; inſomuch as the *Canons*, when their Arch-Biſhop, or Biſhop dies, calling an Aſſembly, do diſpoſe of their Benefices to them that are thought moſt worthy, whence it comes that they are frequently divided among themſelves, becauſe as many are prefer'd by favour and bribery, as by piety and worth: and it is the ſame with the Monks in the election of their Abbots. The other inferior Benefices are in the Gift of the Biſhops. If the King at any time would intrench upon this Law, and chooſe a Biſhop at his own pleaſure, he muſt do it by force; for they will deny him poſſeſſion; and though perhaps it be forc'd, that King is no ſooner dead, but his Biſhop ſhall be ſure to be diſpoſſeſſed, and another put in his place.

The *French* are naturally covetous, and deſirous of other peoples goods, which they will laviſh and ſquander as prodigally as their own: a French-man ſhall cheat, or rob you, and in a breath meet, and eat, and ſpend it as merrily with you as you could have done your ſelf; which is contrary to the humour of the Spaniard; for if he gets any thing of you, you muſt look for nothing again.

The *French* are in great fear of the *Engliſh*, for the great inroads and devaſtations which they have made antiently in that Kingdom; inſomuch, that among the common people the name of *Engliſh* is terrible to this day; thoſe poor wretches not being able to diſtinguiſh that the *French* are otherwiſe conſtituted now than they were then; for that now they are Armed, good Souldiers, and united, having poſſeſſion of thoſe States upon which the *Engliſh* did formerly rely, as the Dutchy of *Burgundy*, and the Dutchy of *Britagne*; and on the other ſide the *Engliſh* are not ſo well diſciplin'd; for 'tis ſo long ſince they had any War, there is not a man of them living who ever look'd an enemy in the face; and beſides, there is no body left to joyn with them, if they ſhould land, but only the Arch-Duke.

They are affraid likewiſe of the Spaniards, by reaſon of their ſagacity and vigilance. But when-ever that King invades *France*, he does it with great diſadvantage; for from the place from whence he muſt march, to that part of the *Piræneans* by which he muſt paſs into *France*, the diſtance is ſo great, and the Country ſo barren, that every time the *Spaniards* attempt any ſuch thing, either by the way of *Perpignan*, or *Gehenna*, they muſt needs be much incommoded, not only for want of ſupplies, but for want of victuals to ſuſtain them in ſo tedious a march; becauſe the Country behind them is ſcarce habitable for its fertility, and that which is inhabited has ſcarce wherewithal for the Inhabitants; ſo that in theſe reſpects, towards the *Pireneans*, the *French* are in little apprehenſion of the Spaniard.

Of the *Flemmings* the *French* likewiſe are in no fear, for, by reaſon of the coldneſs of their Country, they do not gather enough for their own ſubſiſtance, eſpecially of Corn and Wine, with which they are forced to ſupply themſelves out of *Burgundy*, *Piccardy*, and other places in *France*. Moreover, the people of *Flanders* live generally of their own manufacture, which they vend at the Fairs in *France*, that is, at *Paris* and *Lyons*, for towards the Sea-ſide they have no utterance for any thing, and towards *Germany* 'tis the ſame; for there are more of their Commodities made than in *Flanders*: ſo that when ever their Commerce with the *French* is cut off, they will have no where to put off their Commodities, nor no where to ſupply themſelves with victuals: ſo that without irreſiſtible neceſſity the *Flemings* will never have any controverſy with the *French*.

But of the *Swizzers* the *French* are in no little fear, by reaſon of their vicinity, and the ſudden incurſions to which they are ſubject from them, againſt which it is impoſſible to make any competent proviſion in time, becauſe they make their depredations and incurſions with more eaſe and dexterity than other Nations, in reſpect that they have neither Artillery nor Horſe; but though the *French* have Towns and Countries very near them, yet being well fortified and mann'd the *Swizzers* never make any great progreſs. Beſides, the diſpoſition of the *Swiſs* is apter to battel and fighting in the field, than to the ſtorming or defending of Towns: and it is very unwillingly (if ever) the *French* come to cope with them upon the Frontiers; for having no foot that is able to bear up with the *Swizzers*, their Men at Arms without Foot can do nothing: moreover, the Country is ſo qualified, that there is not room enough for the Men at Arms and Cavalry to draw up, and manage to advantage

vantage, and the *Swizzers* are not eaſily tempted from their borders into the plain, nor to leave ſuch ſtrong and well provided Towns (as I mentioned before) upon their backs, leſt by them their ſupplies ſhould be intercepted, and perhaps their retreat be obſtructed.

On the ſide towards *Italy* they are in no fear, in reſpect of the *Apenine* Mountains, and the ſtrong places which they have at the foot of them: ſo that who-ever invades the Dominion of *France* in thoſe parts, muſt be ſure to overcome, or by reaſon of the barrenneſs of the Country about, he will hazard to be famiſhed, or compelled to leave thoſe Towns behind him which would be madneſs, or to attaque them at diſadvantage, which would be worſe: ſo that on the ſide of *Italy* they are in no danger, for the reaſons aboveſaid; and moreover, there is not a Prince in *Italy* able to undertake him, nor are the *Italians* now in ſuch unity as in the days of the *Romans*.

Towards the South, the Kingdom of *France* is in no apprehenſion, becauſe it is waſhed by the Sea on that ſide, and accommodated with Ports always full of Ships, (partly of the Kings, and partly of other petty Princes) ſufficient to defend their Coaſts from any ſudden impreſſion; and againſt any thing premeditated, they will have time enough to prepare; for it requires time to make a ſolemn invaſion, and the preparation will be diſcovered by ſomebody, beſides, for further ſecurity, there are always parties of Men at Arms ſcowring upon the Coaſts.

Their expence in keeping of their Towns is not ſo great; for the *French* Subjects are very dutiful, and the fortreſſes are not kept at the charge of the Kingdom, and on the borders (where Garriſons, and by conſequence, expence would be more neceſſary) thoſe flying bodies of Men at Arms ſave them that charge: for againſt any extraordinary inſult, there will be time enough to provide, for that requires time to be fitted, and more to be executed.

The people of *France* are very humble and obedient, and have their King in mighty veneration. They live at very little expence, by reaſon of their great plenty, and every body hath ſomething of his own: their clothing is coorſe, of very cheap ſtuff, and they uſe no kind of Silks, neither the men nor the women; for if they ſhould, they ſhould be obnoxious to the Gentry, who would certainly be even with them.

The Biſhopricks in *France*, according to modern computation, are 146, and the Arch-Biſhopricks 18.

The Pariſhes are reckoned a milion and 700, and the Abbies 740. Of the Priories there is no account.

Of the ordinary and extraordinary Entries of the Crown, I could get no exact account, I enquired of ſeveral, and all told me they were as the King pleaſed to require. Yet ſome perſons told me that that part of his ordinary Revenue which ariſes out of his Gabels upon wine, and bread, and fleſh, and the like, amounts to a milion and ſeven hundred thouſand Crowns: and his extraordinary, by Taxes, amounts as he pleaſes: but in caſe they fall ſhort, he has another ſtring to his bow, and that is by way of loans, which are ſeldom repaid. The Letters to that purpoſe do commonly run thus: Sir, *The King recommends himſelf to you; and having at this time preſſing occaſion for mony, He deſires you would furniſh him with the ſum contained in this Letter*; which ſums are paid in to the next Receiver, and there are of them in every Town who receives all the profits and revenue accrewing to the King by Gabels, Taxes, Loans, or otherwiſe.

Thoſe Towns which are ſubject to the Crown, have no rules or orders but what His Majeſty is pleaſed to ſet them for raiſing of mony either by Taxes or otherwiſe.

The authority of the Barons over their Subjects, and half their Revenues conſiſts in bread, and wine, and fleſh, as aboveſaid, and ſo much a year for hearth-mony, but it muſt not exceed ſix pence or eight pence a hearth, to be paid every three moneths. Taxes and Loans they cannot require without the conſent of the King, which he grants very rarely.

The Crown receives no other advantage from them than in the revenue for ſalt, and never taxes them but upon extraordinary occaſion.

The King's order in his extraordinary expences both in War and Peace, is to command the Treaſurers to pay the Souldiers, which they do by tickets of aſſignment. The Penſioners and Gentlemen repair to the Generals with their tickets from month to month, where they are entred, and having received a new policy from three months to three months, the Penſioners and Gentlemen go then to the Receivers of the reſpective Provinces where they live, and are paid immediately.

The Gentlemen belonging to the King are 200, their pay 20 Crowns a month; and paid as aboveſaid, each hundred has a Captain.

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The Penſioners are no ſet number, and their Penſions are as uncertain, being more or leſs as it pleaſes the King: they are in a way of preferment, and therefore there is no exact rules for them.

The office of the Receivers General of *France*, is, to receive ſo much for fire, and ſo much for taxes by conſent of the King; and to take care that both ordinary and extraordinary expences be paid at the time, and diſcharges given as aforeſaid.

The Treaſurers have the keeping of the mony, and pay it according to their orders from the Generals.

The office of the Grand Chancellor is judicial and definitive, he can pardon and condemn as he pleaſes, and that even in Capital Cauſes, without the conſent of the King. In Cauſes where the Clients are contumaciouſly litigious, He can prefix them a day for the determination of their Suit: He can confer Benefices, but that muſt be with the King's conſent, for thoſe grants are paſs'd by the King's Letters under the Broad-Seal, wherefore that Seal is kept by the ſaid Chancellor. His ſalary is 10000 Franks *per an.* and 11000 more for his Table, which Table is intended for the repaſt and entertainment of ſuch Gentlemen, Lawyers and Counſellors as follow in his train, when they think fit either to dine or ſup with him.

The ſum which the King of *England* received annually from the King of *France* was fifty thouſand Franks, in conſideration of certain diſburſements by the preſent King of *England*'s Father in the *Dutchy* of *Britagne*, but the time of that payment is expired.

At preſent there is in *France* but one Grand Seneſchal, when there are more, (I do not mean Grand Seneſchals, for there is never but one) their authority is over the Militia both in Ordinary and Extraordinary, whom for the dignity of their Office they are obliged to obey.

The Governors of the Provinces are as many as the King pleaſes, and have their Commiſſion for life or years, and their Salaries great or little, as he thinks good to appoint: the other Governors, to the very inferior Officers in every little Town, have all their Commiſſions from the King, for you muſt know there is no office in that Kingdom, but is either given or ſold by that King.

Of the quantity of diſtributions for the Gentlemen and the Penſioners, there is no certain account, but as to them, the King's warrant is ſufficient, for they are not liable to the Chamber of Accounts.

The Office of the Chamber of Accounts is to view and audit the accounts of all ſuch as have any thing to do in the King's Moneys, as the Generals, the Treaſurers, and the Receivers.

The Univerſity of *Paris* is paid out of the Rents of the Foundations of the Colledges, but very narrowly.

The Parliaments are five, of *Paris*, of *Roan*, of *Tholoſe*, *Burdeaux* and *Dauphine*, from either of which there is no appeal.

The Univerſities at firſt were but four, at *Paris*, *Orleans*, *Bourgi* and *Poictiers*, to which theſe at *Tours* and *Angiers* have been added ſince, but they are very inconſiderable.

The ſtanding Army is as great (both for number of Men and Artillery) as the King pleaſes, and are quartered and diſpoſed according to orders from him. Yet every great Town upon the Frontiers have Artillery and Ammunition of their own, and within theſe two years ſeveral more have been caſt in ſeveral places of the ſaid Kingdom, at the charge of the Town where they were made, and to re-imburſe themſelves, they are allowed a *Toll* of a penny an head for all Cattel, and as much for every buſhel of Corn, whilſt the Kingdom is under no danger of invaſion. The ſtanding Force is divided into four Bodies, which are diſpoſed into four ſeveral Poſts for the ſecurity of the Country, that is to ſay, into *Guienna*, *Piccardy*, *Burgundy*, and *Provence*, but no preciſe number is obſerved in any, for they are leſſened, or encreaſed, and removed from one place to another, as they have occaſion to ſuſpect.

I have with ſome diligence enquired what moneys were aſſigned every year for the charges of the King's Houſhold, and his privy Purſe, and I find it is what he pleaſes himſelf.

His Archers are four hundred, deſign'd for the Guard of his Perſon, among which there are two Scotch. Their Salary is three hundred Franks a man every year, and a Coat of the King's Livery. But there are 24 conſtantly at the King's elbow, and their Salary is 400 Franks *per an.*

His *German* Foot-Guards conſiſted formerly of three hundred men, with each of them a Penſion of ten Franks a month, and two Suits of Apparel a year, that is, Coats and Shooes, one for Summer, and the other for Winter; but of theſe Foot there were 100 more particularly

cularly near the King, their Salary being 12 Franks *per menſ.* and their Coats of Silk, which was begun in the time of King *Charles*.

The Harbingers are thoſe who are ſent before to take up Lodgings for the Court, they are 32 in number, and each of them has a Salary of three hundred Franks every year, and a Coat of the King's Livery. Their Marſhals or chief Officers are four, and have each of them 600 Franks *per an.* In taking up their Lodgings, their method is this; they divide themſelves into four parties, one Marſhal (or his Lieutenant, in caſe he cannot wait himſelf) ſtays where the Court departed, to ſee all things rectified betwixt the followers of the Court, and the Maſters of the Houſes: another of them goes along with the Court; a third where the King lies that night; and the fourth where he lies the next, by which means they keep ſo exact an order, that they are no ſooner arrived, but every man knows his Lodging, and is furniſhed with every thing got ready to his hand.

The *Provoſt del Hoſtel* is a perſon who follows always the perſon of the King, and his office is judiciary: where-ever the Court goes, his Bench is the firſt, and in all Towns where he comes the people may appeal to him as to their Lieutenant. His ordinary Salary is 6000 Franks. He has under him two Judges in Civil Cauſes, paid by the King, each of them 600 Franks *per an.* he has likewiſe under him a Lieutenant Criminal, and 30 Archers paid as aboveſaid. Thoſe who are taken by this Provoſt upon any criminal account, cannot appeal to the Parliament. He diſpatches all both in Civil and Criminal affairs, and if the Plaintiff and Defendant appear once before him, it is enough, their buſineſs is determined.

The Maſters of the King's Houſhold are eight, but there is no certain rule for their Salary, for ſome have 1000 Franks *per an.* ſome more, ſome leſs, as it pleaſes the King, over whom there is a *Grand Maſter* with a Salary of 11000 Franks *per an.* and his authority is only over the reſt.

The juriſdiction of the Admiral of *France* is over all the Fleet, and Ships, and Ports belonging to that Kingdom: He can ſeize, and make what Ships he pleaſes, and diſpoſe of them as he thinks good when he has done. His Salary is 10000 Franks.

The Knights of the King's Order have no certain number, depending wholly upon the King's pleaſure. When they are created they ſwear to defend the Crown, and never upon any terms to be engaged againſt it: they can never be degraded or deprived of their Dignity but by death. The higheſt of their Penſions is 4000 Franks *per an.* ſome have leſs, for all are not equal.

The Chamberlains office is to wait upon the King, to ſee to his Chamber, and to adviſe him: and indeed his Chamberlains are perſons of the principal reputation in his Kingdom: their Penſons are ſix, eight, and ten thouſand Franks *per. an.* and ſometimes nothing, for the King does often confer thoſe Places upon ſome great and rich ſtranger, whom he has a mind to oblige: but though they have no Penſions, they are exempted from all Gabels, and have their diet in Court at the next Table to the King's.

The Maſter of the Horſe is to be always about the King; his authority is over the 12 Quieries, and the ſame that the Grand Seneſchal, the Grand Maſter, and the Grand Chamberlains is over thoſe who are under them. He has the care of the King's Horſes, and Harneſs, helps him up and down, and carries the Sword before him.

The Lords of the King's Council have Penſions of betwixt ſix and eight thouſand Franks *per an.* at the pleaſure of his Majeſty; their names at preſent are, *Monſeigneur di Parigi*, *Monſ. di Buonaglia*, the Bayliff of *Amiens*, *Monſ. du Ruſſi*, and the Grand Chancellor; but *Rubertet*, and *Monſ. di Parigi* govern all.

There is no Table kept for them ſince the death of the Cardinal of *Roan*, for when the Grand Chancellor is abſent, *Parigi* does that office for him, and takes them with him.

The Title which the King of *France* pretends to the State of *Milan*, is thus; His Grandfather married a Daughter of the Duke of *Milan*, who died without Heir males.

Duke *Giovanni Galeazzo* had two Daughters women grown, and I know not how many Sons. Of the Ladies, one was called *Madona Valentina*, and was married to *Lewis* Duke of *Orleans*, Grandfather to this preſent King, deſcended lineally from King *Pipen*. Duke *John Galeazzo* being dead, his Son *Philip* ſucceeded him, who died without legitimate iſſue, leaving only one natural Daughter behind him. Afterwards that State was uſurped illegally by the *Sforzeſchi*, as is reported, becauſe they pretend it fell to the Heirs of the ſaid *Madona Valentina*, and that from the very day in which the Duke of *Orleans* married with the Houſe of *Milan*, he added to the three Lillies in his Coat of Arms, the Snake, which is to be ſeen at this day.

In every Pariſh in *France* there is a perſon called a *Frank Archer*, who is paid by the Pariſh, and is obliged to be always ready with a good Horſe and Arms to wait upon the King, when

when ever they are required, whether abroad in time of War, or at home upon any other occaſion: they are bound likewiſe to ride up and down for the ſecurity of ſuch places as are liable to in-roads, or any ways ſuſpected; and, according to the number of the Pariſhes, they are 1700000 men.

Their Lodgings are appointed by the Harbingers according to every mans office, and uſually the richeſt men quarter the greateſt Courtiers; and that neither the Lodger nor Landlord may have reaſon to complain, the Court has appointed a rate or rule to be obſerved generally for all people, and that is a *ſous* or penny a day for their Chamber; in which there is to be bed, and chairs, and ſtools, and all things that are neceſſary.

There is an allowance likewiſe of two pence a day to every man for linen, (as towels and napkins) and for vinegar and verjuice; their linen is to be changed at leaſt twice every week, but there being great plenty in that Country, they change oftner, as Lodgers deſire it; beſides which, they are obliged to keep their beds made, and their chambers ſwept and clean.

There is allowance likewiſe of two pence a day for the ſtanding of every man's horſe; they are not bound to provide any thing for them, only to keep their ſtalls clean, and carry out the dung.

Some there are who pay leſs, as their Landlords are good natured, or they can make any ſhift: but this is the ordinary rule of the Court.

The Engliſh Title to the Crown of *France*, upon my beſt enquiry, I find to be thus: *Charles* the ſixth of *France* married his lawful Daughter *Katharine* to *Henry* the fifth, Son and Heir to *Henry* the fourth, King of *England*: In the articles of Marriage, (no notice being taken of *Charles* the ſeventh, who was afterwards King of *France*) beſides the Dower that was given with *Katharine*, *Charles* the ſixth Father to the ſaid *Katharine* inſtituted *Henry* the fifth of *England* (his Son in Law, and to be married to the ſaid *Katharine*) Heir to that Kingdom of *France*: and in caſe the ſaid *Henry* ſhould die before the ſaid *Charles*, and the ſaid *Henry* leave Sons that were legitimate behind him, that then the Sons of the ſaid King *Henry* ſhould ſucceed to the ſaid Kingdom of *France*, upon the death of the ſaid *Charles* the ſixth; which was contrary to Law, becauſe *Charles* the ſeventh was prejudiced thereby, and was afterwards of no validity or effect: againſt which the *Engliſh* pretend that *Charles* the ſeventh was illegimate.

The Arch-Biſhopricks in *England* are two.
The Biſhopricks two and twenty, and
The Pariſhes 52000.

THE

THE STATE OF GERMANY, IN

An Abridgment written by *Nicholo Machiavelli* Secretary of *FLORENCE.*

OF the power of *Germany* no body can doubt, becauſe it abounds ſo exceedingly in Men, and Mony, and Arms. As to its wealth, there is not a Free Town in the whole Country, but has a publick ſtock aforehand of its own; and ſome ſay *Argentina (Straſburgh)* alone has a Million of Florins conſtantly in Bank: The reaſon of their opulence is, becauſe they have nothing to exhauſt them, but their Fortifications, and furniſhing their Magazines, (for reparations, and recruits coſt them but little.) In the latter they have a very good way, for they have always in their publick Stores, Meat, and Drink, and firing for a Twelve-month: Beſides, to entertain the induſtry of their people, they have wherewithall to ſet the poor on work, in caſe of any Seige, a compleat year together, ſo as they may ſubſiſt upon their own labour, without being burthenſom to the Town. Their Souldiers are but little expence to them, for they are always well arm'd, and well exerciſed; and on their Feſtival days, inſtead of the Common recreations, one takes his Musket, another his Pike, one one ſort of Arms, another another, and practiſing among themſelves, they grow very ready and dexterous; and after they are arrived at ſome degree of perfection, they have certain Honours and Salaries conferred upon them, which is the greateſt part of their charge. So that in every free Town the publick Treaſury is rich.

The reaſon likewiſe why the private perſons are rich, is this, becauſe they live with great parſimony, and indeed little better than if they were poor; for they are at no expence in their Clothes, their Buildings, nor the furniſhing of their Houſes. If they have bread, and fleſh, and any thing to keep them from the cold, they are well enough; and he that wants them, is contented, and makes ſome ſhift or other without them. Two Florins will ſerve them in Clothes ten years; and according to his degree, every man lives at this rate; they do not trouble themſelves for every thing they want, but only for thoſe things that are abſolutely neceſſary, and by that means their neceſſities are much fewer than ours: The reſult of which Cuſtom is this, their Mony goes not out of their Country, they contenting themſelves with their own Native productions, whil'ſt in the mean time every man is permitted to bring in what Treaſure he pleaſes into *Germany*, to purchaſe their Commodities and Manufactures, which in a manner ſupplies all *Italy*; and their gain is ſo much the more, by how much a ſmall part of the profits of their labour, recruits them with Materials for new.

Thus do they live at liberty, and enjoy their own humours; for which reaſon they will not be got to the Wars, but upon extraordinary pay, and that will not do it neither, unleſs they be commanded by their own Magiſtrates: Wherefore an Emperor has need of more Mony, than another Prince, becauſe if men be in a good condition already, they are not eaſily allured to the Wars.

As things ſtand now, the free States muſt unite with the Princes, before any great exploit can be undertaken by the Emperor; or elſe they muſt enterprize it themſelves, which they would be able to do. But neither the one nor the other deſires the greatneſs of the Emperor; for if ever he ſhould get thoſe Free States into his hands, he would be ſtrong enough to overpower the Princes, and reduce them to ſuch a degree of ſubjection, that he would manage them as he pleaſed himſelf, as the Kings of *France* have done formerly in that Country, and particularly King *Lewis*, who by force of Arms, and the cutting off ſome few perſons brought them to their preſent obedience. The ſame thing would happen to the States, if the Princes ſhould be cajoled, they would loſe their freedoms, be wholly at the diſpoſition of the Emperor, and be forced to be ſatisfied with what he would vouchſafe to afford them. The diſtance and diviſion betwixt the free States and the Princes, is ſuppoſed to proceed from the different humors in that Country, which in general are two: The *Swiſſers* are become Enemies to all *Germany*, and the Princes to the Emperor. It may ſeem ſtrange perhaps, that the *Swiſſers*, and free States ſhould be at variance and enmity, ſeeing the preſervation of their liberty, and ſecuring themſelves againſt the Princes, is the common intereſt of both: But their diſcord is from this, that the *Swiſſers* are not only Enemies to the Princes, but to all Gentlemen whatever, and in their Country, they have neither the one, nor the other; but live without diſtinction of perſons (unleſs in their Magiſtrates) in the moſt levelling liberty in the world. This practice of the *Swiſſers* makes all the Gentlemen which are remaining in any of the free Towns affraid of them; ſo that they employ their whole induſtry in keeping their States at a diſtance with them, and preventing any intelligence betwixt them. Moreover all of thoſe States who have been Soldiers, and had their Education in the Wars, are mortally their Enemies, moved thereunto by Emulation and Envy, becauſe they themſelves are not ſo famous abroad, and their animoſity is ſo great, that they never meet in the field (let their numbers be ſmall, or great) but they fall together by the Ears.

As to the Enmity betwixt the Princes, and the free Towns, and the *Swiſſers*, I need ſay no more, it being ſo generally known; as likewiſe of the jealouſies betwixt the Emperor and the Princes. You muſt underſtand, that the Emperors principal apprehenſion is of the Princes, and not being able to correct them alone, he has made uſe of the aſſiſtance of theſe free States, and not long ſince, entertained the *Swiſſers* into his allyance, by whoſe means he thought himſelf in a very good condition. So that theſe common diſſentions being conſidered, and the particular piques and ſuſpitions betwixt one Prince, and one State and another; it is no eaſie matter to unite the Empire; and yet it is neceſſary it ſhould be united, before any great thing can be performed by the Emperor. And though he who believes *Germany* in a condition to do great things, becauſe there is viſibly no Prince who has the power, or indeed the courage to oppoſe the deſigns of the Emperor, as formerly has been done, yet he muſt know that it is a great impediment to an Emperor not to be aſſiſted by thoſe Princes; for though perhaps a Prince dares not contend with him, he dares deny him his aſſiſtance; and if he dares not deny him that, he dares break his promiſe upon occaſion, and if he dares not do that, he will at leaſt make ſo bold to deferr and delay the performance ſo long, that when his ſupplies do come, they ſhall do the Emperor no good; all which things do infinitely diſturb, and embarras his deſigns. And this was found to be true, when the Emperor would the firſt time have paſſed into *Italy*, in ſpight both of the *French* and *Venetian*; in a dyet held at that time in *Conſtance*, he was promiſed by the ſeveral Free States in *Germany* a ſupply of..... thouſand Foot, and 3000 Horſe, yet he could never get of them together above 5000, and that becauſe by that time the Forces of one State came up; another was ready to depart, their time being expired, and ſome ſent Mony in lieu; upon which ſcore that Enterprize was loſt.

The ſtrength of *Germany* conſiſts in the free Towns, rather than in the Princes; for the Princes are of two ſorts, Temporal and Spiritual. The Temporal Princes are brought very low, partly by themſelves (every Principality, being cantonized and diſtributed to ſeveral Princes by the conſtitution of their inheritances which are obſerved very ſtrictly in thoſe Countrys) and partly, having been much weakned by the Emperor and his aſſiſtance from the ſaid States; ſo that now the amity of the Temporal Princes, is of little importance. There are likewiſe Spiritual Princes, whoſe Territories, if not cantonized and divided by thoſe Hereditary Cuſtoms, are yet ſo weakned and enervated by the ambition of their own free Towns, and the favour that the Emperor ſhows them, that the Electoral Archbiſhops, and the reſt have little or no power in the great and chief Towns of their own Dominions; from whence it comes to paſs, that being divided at home, they cannot favour the Enterprizes of the Emperor, though they would themſelves. But to come to the Free, and the Imperial Towns, which are the ſtrength of that Country, as being rich, and well-govern'd.

Thoſe

Thoſe Towns for ſeveral reaſons, are grown cooler in the aſſertion of their Liberties, and much more in the acquiſition of new, and that which they do not deſire for themſelves, they do not care another ſhould have. Beſides they are ſo many; and every one to be commanded by a General of their own, that their ſupplies, when they are diſpoſed to ſend them, come but very ſlow, and when they do come, are not ſo uſeful as they ſhould be, and of this we had an Example not many years ſince. The *Swiſſers* invaded the State of *Maximilian*, and *Suevia*: The Emperor contracted with the Free Towns to repell them, and they obliged themſelves to aſſiſt him with an Army of 14000 Men, but he never got half of them, and the reaſon was as aboveſaid, when the Forces of one Town came up, another marched off, inſomuch that the Emperor deſpairing of ſucceſs, came to an agreement with the *Swiſſers*, and left *Baſil* in their poſſeſſion. And if in this caſe, where their own intereſt was concerned, they have acted at this rate, it may be gueſſed how they will behave themſelves in the concerns of other men; ſo that all theſe things laid together, though their power be great, yet it can turn but to little accompt to the Emperor. And the *Venetians* by their converſation and Commerce with the Merchants of *Germany*, in all their Tranſactions hitherto with the Emperor, have underſtood him better than any body elſe, and dealt more honourably by him; for had they been in any apprehenſion of his power, they would have inſiſted upon ſome caution, either by way of Mony or Towns; and if they had ſeen any poſſibility of uniting the whole power of the Empire, they would never have oppoſed it: But knowing that to be impoſſible, it made them the more confident, and gave them hopes of ſucceſs. If therefore in a ſingle City, the affairs of the multitude are negligently managed, in a Province they will be much worſe. Moreover thoſe little States are ſenſible, that an acquiſition in *Italy*, or elſewhere, would fall to the Princes, and not to them, becauſe they might enjoy them perſonally, which could not be done by a Common-wealth, and where the reward is like to be unequal, people will not willingly be at an equal expence. Their power therefore is great, but of little importance, and he who peruſes what has been ſaid before, and conſiders what has been done for ſeveral years paſt, will find how little it is to be rely'd upon.

The *German* Men at Arms are well mounted, and many of them well enough arm'd, but their Horſes are heavy and unactive, and it is to be obſerved that in their Encounters with the *Italians* or *French*, they can do nothing at all, not for any fault in the Men, but the accoutrement of their Horſes, for their Saddles being little, and weak, and without bows, every little joſtle tumbles them upon the ground: and another of their great diſadvantages is, that the lower part of their bodies are never armed, whereby not being able to defend againſt the firſt impreſſion (in which the excellence of thoſe Soldiers conſiſt) they lye expoſed (upon the cloſe) to the ſhort Swords of the Enemy, and may be wounded both themſelves and Horſes in thoſe diſarmed places, and it is in the power of every Foot man to pull them off on their Horſes, and rip their Guts out when they have done, and then as to the manage of their Horſes, they are too heavy to do any thing at all.

Their Foot are very good, and very perſonable men, contrary to the *Swiſs*, who are but ſmall, rough hewn, and not handſom at all: But they arm themſelves (unleſs it be ſome few) only with a Pike and a Sword, that they might be the more dexterous, and nimble, and light: and their ſaying uſed to be, that they arm themſelves no better, becauſe they feared nothing but the Artillery, againſt which no Breaſt-plate, or Corſlet, or Gorget would ſecure them: other weapons they deſpiſe; for it is ſaid, their order is ſo good, and they ſtand ſo firm to one another, 'tis impoſſible to break into them, nor come near them if their Pikes be long enough. They are excellent in a Field fight, but for the ſtorming of a Town they are good for nothing; and but little to defend one: and generally where the Men cannot keep their old orders, and manage themſelves with room enough, they are worth but little: Of this experience has been ſeen where they have been engaged with the *Italians*, or aſſaulted any Town, as at *Podua* where they came off very ill, though on the other ſide, in the Field they had done well enough. For in the Battel of *Ravenna*, betwixt the *French* and the *Spaniards*, if it had not been for their Lanceknights, the *French* had been beaten; for whil'ſt the Men at Arms were confronted, and engaged with one another, the *Spaniſh* had the better of the *French*, and had diſordered their *Gaſcoigns*, ſo that had not the *Germans* came in and relieved them, they had been utterly broken: and the ſame was ſeen lately when the *Spaniſh* King made War upon the *French* in *Guienne*, the *Spaniards* were more fearful of a Body of 10000 *German* Foot, which the King of *France* had in his Service, than of all the reſt of his Army, and therefore they declined coming to a Battel with all the Art they could uſe.

THE DISCOURSES OF Nicolas Machiavel UPON THE FIRST DECADE OF TITUS LIVIUS.

Faithfully Engliſhed.

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NICOLO MACHIAVELLI
TO
ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI
And COSIMO RUCELLAI.

I Send you a Preſent which (though not anſwerable to my obligations) is doubtleſs the greateſt that Nicolo Machiavelli *was able to ſend, having expreſſed in it whatever I know or have learned by a long practice, and continued reading of the affairs of this World, than which neither you nor any body elſe being to expect more, I am not to be blamed if my Preſent be no better. You may complain indeed of the poverty of my parts, my narrations being ſo poor; and of the weakneſs of my judgment, having perhaps miſtaken in many places of my Diſcourſes: if ſo, I know not which of us is leſs obliged to the other, I to you, for having forced me to write againſt my own inclination, or you to me, for having perform'd it no more to your ſatisfaction. Accept it then in the ſame manner as things are accepted from friends, among whom the intention of the giver is always more conſidered than the quality of the gift, and believe that as oft as I think of it, I am ſatisfied in this, that however I have been miſtaken in many other circumſtances, I have done wiſely in this, having choſen you above all others for the dedication of my Diſcourſes, both becauſe in not doing it, I ſhould have ſhewn my ſelf in ſome meaſure ingrateful for the benefits received, and in doing it, I have tranſgreſſed the common cuſtom of Authors, who for the moſt part direct their Works to ſome Prince, and (blinded with ambition and avarice) applaud and magnify him for all the virtuous qualities, when perchance they ought rather to have reproached him with all the vices imaginable. To avoid that error, I have made choice, not of thoſe who are actually Princes, but of ſuch as by their infinite good parts do merit to be ſo; not of thoſe who are actually able to advance me to Honours, Employments, and Wealth, but to thoſe, who though unable, would do it if they could: for, to judge right, men are rather to eſteem thoſe in whoſe nature, than thoſe in whoſe power it is to be liberal, and thoſe who underſtand how to govern a Kingdom, than thoſe who do govern it without that underſtanding. Accordingly Authors do commend* Hiero *the* Syracuſan, *though but a private perſon, above* Perſeus *of* Macedon, *though a great King: becauſe to* Hiero *there was nothing wanting to be an Excellent Prince, but a Principality; and* Perſeus *had nothing but a Kingdom to recommend him to be King. Accept then (whether it be good or bad) what you commanded your ſelves, and if you be ſo far in an error as to approve my opinions, I ſhall not fail to purſue the reſt of my Hiſtory, as I promiſed in the beginning. Farewell.*

THE DISCOURSES OF Nicholas Machiavel, *CITIZEN* and *SECRETARY* OF FLORENCE,

Upon The

First Decade of *TITUS LIVIUS*

TO

ZANOBIUS BONDEMONTUS

AND

COSIMUS RUCELLAIUS.

LIBER I.

CONsidering with my self what honour is given to Antiquity, and how many times (passing by variety of instances) the fragment of an old Statue has been purchased at an high rate by many people, out of curiosity to keep it by them, as an ornament to their house, or as a pattern for the imitation of such as delight in that art; and with what industry and pains they endeavour afterwards to have it represented in all their buildings. On the other side, observing the most honourable and heroick actions (describ'd in History, perform'd by Kingdoms and ancient Common-wealths; by Kings, great Captains, Citizens, Legislators, and others, which have not only tired, but spent themselves in the service of their Country) are rather admir'd than imitated, and indeed so far shun'd and declin'd in all places, there is scarce any impression or shadow to be seen in this age of the virtue of our Ancestors; I could not at the same time but admire, and lament it; and the more by how much I observed in all civil and personal controversies, in all diseases incident to mankind, recourse is continually had to such judgments and remedies as have been derived to us by our predecessors; for to speak truth, the Civil Law is nothing but the sentence and determination of their fore-Fathers, which reduc'd into order, do shew and instruct our present Lawyers which way to decide; nor is the art of the Phylitian any thing more than ancient experience handed down to our times, upon which the Practiser of our age founds all his method and doctrine. Nevertheless, in the ordering of Common-wealths, in the conservation of their several members, in the government of

King-

Kingdoms, in the regiment of Armies, in the management of War, in the adminiſtration of Juſtice, in the enlargement and propagation of Empire, there is not to be found either Prince, Republick, great Captain or Citizen, which repairs to Antiquity for example; which perſwaded me it proceeded not ſo much from the niceneſs and effeminacy our preſent Education has introduced upon the World, nor from the miſchief which a turbulent and ſeditious idleneſs has brought forth in many Provinces and Cities in Chriſtendom, as from our ignorance or inadvertency in Hiſtory, not taking the ſenſe of what we read, or not minding the reliſh and poinancy with which it is many times impregnated; from whence it comes to paſs, that many who read are much pleaſed and delighted with the variety of accidents contained in Hiſtory, but never think them intended for their imitation, that being a thing, in their judgments, not only difficult, but impoſſible; as if the Heaven, the Sun, the Elements and Mankind were altered and diſpoſſeſſed of the motion, order and power with which they were primitively inveſted. Being deſirous to reduce ſuch as ſhall fall into this error, I have judged it neceſſary to write upon all thoſe Books of *Titus Livius*, (which, by the malignity of time, have not been intercepted) what I (according to ancient and modern opinion) ſhall think uſeful for their further explanation; to the end, that they which ſhall peruſe theſe my diſcourſes, may extract ſuch advantage and document as is neceſſary for their proficiency and improvement by Hiſtory; and though my enterprize appears to be difficult, yet by the aſſiſtance of thoſe who put me upon it, I do not deſpair but to diſcharge my ſelf ſo, as to leave the way much more eaſy and ſhort to any man that ſhall deſire to come after me.

CHAP. I.

What have been generally the Principles of all Cities, and particularly of Rome.

THoſe who ſhall read the Original of the City of *Rome*, by what Legiſlators advanced, and by what Government ordered, will not wonder it ſhould remain firm and entire for ſo many ages, afterwards ſo vaſt an Empire ſpring out of it as that Common-wealth arrived to. Being to diſcourſe firſt of its Original, it is convenient to premiſe, that all Cities are built either by natives born in the Country where they were erected, or by ſtrangers. The firſt happens when, to the Inhabitants diſperſed in many and little parties, it appears their habitation is inſecure, not being able apart (by reaſon of their diſtance, or ſmalneſs of their numbers) to reſiſt an invaſion, (if an enemy ſhould fall upon them) or to unite ſuddenly for their defence, without leaving their Houſes and Families expoſed, which by conſequence would be certain prey to the enemy. Whereupon, to evade thoſe dangers, moved either by their own impulſe, or the ſuggeſtions of ſome perſon among them of more than ordinary authority, they oblige themſelves to live together in ſome place to be choſen by them for convenience of proviſion, and eaſineſs of defence. Of this ſort, among many others, *Athens* and *Venice* were two: the firſt was built under the authority of *Theſeus*, upon occaſion of the like diſtance and diſperſion of the natives. The other (there being many people driven together into certain little Iſlands in that point of the *Adriatick* Sea, to avoid the War which every day, by the acceſs and irruption of new Armies of *Barbarians* after the declenſion of the Roman Empire grew intollerable in *Italy*) began by degrees among themſelves, without the aſſiſtance or encouragement of any Prince, to treat and ſubmit to ſuch Laws as appeared moſt likely to preſerve them: and it ſucceeded to their deſire by the long reſpite and tranquility their ſituation afforded them; that Sea having no paſſage at that end, and the *Barbarians* no Ships to diſturb them; ſo that the leaſt beginning imaginable was ſufficient to exalt them to their preſent authority and grandeur.

The ſecond caſe, when a City is raiſed by ſtrangers, it is done by people that are free, or depending (as Colonies) or elſe by ſome Prince or Republick to eaſe and disburthen themſelves of their exuberance, or to defend ſome Territory, which being newly acquir'd, they deſire with more ſafety and leſs expence to maintain (of which ſort ſeveral were by the people of *Rome* all over their Empire), otherwiſe they are ſometimes erected by ſome Prince, not for his reſidence ſo much as for his glory and renown (as *Alexandria* by *Alexander* the Great). But theſe Cities not being free in their Original, do ſeldom ariſe to any extraordinary height more than to be reckoned the heads or chief of ſome Kingdom. Of this ſort was *Florence*, for (whether built by the Souldiers of *Silla*, or perchance by the Inhabi-

Inhabitants of the Mountain *di Fieſole*, who preſuming upon, and being encouraged by the long Peace under the Reign of *Auguſtus*, deſcended from their Mountain to inhabit the plain upon the River *Arnus*) it was built under the Roman Empire, and could not upon thoſe principles exalt it ſelf higher than the courteſie of the Prince would permit. The Founders of Cities are free, when by themſelves, or the command of their Sovereign they are conſtrained upon occaſion of ſickneſs, famine, or war, to abandon their own, in queſt of new Countries: and theſe do either poſſeſs themſelves of ſuch Towns as they find ready built in their Conqueſts, (as *Moſes* did), or they build them *de novo*, as *Æneas*. In this caſe the power of the builder, and the fortune of the building is conſpicuous and honourable, according as the cauſe from whence it derives its Original is more or leſs eminent. His virtue and prudence is diſcernible two ways, by the election of the Seat, and the inſtitution of the Laws; and becauſe men build as often by neceſſity as choice, and the judgment and wiſdom of the builder is greater where there is leſs room and latitude for his election; it is worthy our conſideration whether it is more advantagious building in barren and unfruitful places, to the end that the people being conſtrained to be induſtrious, and leſs obnoxious to idleneſs, might live in more unity, the poverty of the ſoil giving them leſs opportunity of diſſention. Thus it fell out in *Raugia* and ſeveral other Cities built in ſuch places; and that kind of election would doubtleſs be moſt prudent and profitable, if men could be content to live quietly of what they had, without an ambitious deſire of Command. But there being no ſecurity againſt that, but power, it is neceſſary to avoid that ſterility, and build in the fruitfulleſt places can be found, where their numbers encreaſing by the plentifulneſs of the ſoil, they may be able not only to defend themſelves againſt an aſſault, but repel any oppoſition ſhall be made to their grandeur; and as to that idleneſs to which the richneſs of the ſituation diſpoſes, it may be provided againſt by Laws, and convenient exerciſe enjoyn'd, according to the example of ſeveral wiſe men, who having inhabited Countries, pleaſant, fruitful, and apt to produce ſuch lazy people improper for ſervice, to prevent the inconvenience which might follow thereupon, enjoyned ſuch a neceſſity of exerciſe to ſuch as were intended for the Wars, that by degrees they became better Souldiers than thoſe Countries which were mountainous and barren could any where produce. Among whom may be reckoned the Kingdom of *Egypt*, which, notwithſtanding that it was extremely pleaſant and plentiful, by the virtue and efficacy of its Laws produced excellent men, and perhaps ſuch as, had not their names been extinguiſhed with time, might have deſerved as much honour as *Alexander* the Great, and many other great Captains, whoſe memories are ſo freſh, and ſo venerable among us. And who-ever would conſider the Government of the *Soldan*, the diſcipline of the *Mamalukes*, and the reſt of their Militia before they were extirpated by *Selimus* the Turk, might find their great prudence and caution in exerciſing their Souldiers, and preventing that ſoftneſs and effeminacy to which the felicity of their ſoil did ſo naturally incline them.

For theſe reaſons I conceive beſt to build in a fruitful place, if the ill conſequences of that fertility be averted by convenient Laws. *Alexander* the Great being deſirous to build a City to perpetuate his name, *Dinocrates* an Architect came to him, and undertook to build him one upon the Mountain *Athos*, and to recommend and inforce his propoſal, (beſides the goodneſs of the ſoil) he perſwaded him it ſhould be made in the ſhape and figure of a man (a thing which would be new, wonderful, and ſutable to his greatneſs). But when *Alexander* enquired whence it was to be ſupplyed, the Architect replyed, he had not conſidered of that; at which anſwer *Alexander* laugh'd very heartily, and leaving him and his mountain to themſelves, he built *Alexandria*, where people might be tempted to plant by the richneſs of the Soil, the nearneſs of the Sea, and convenience of the River *Nile*. Again, if we examine the Original of *Rome*, and admit *Æneas* for the firſt Founder, it will fall in the number of thoſe Cities built by foreigners: if *Romulus*, among ſuch as were erected by the natives; either way it was originally free, without any dependance. It will appear likewiſe (as ſhall be ſhewn more particularly hereafter) by what Laws *Romulus*, *Numa* and others fortified and ſecur'd it; inſomuch that neither the fertility of the Soil, the commodity of the Sea, the frequency of their Victories, nor the largeneſs of its Empire were able to debauch or corrupt it; but it remained for ſeveral ages for piety and virtue more exemplary than any other Common-wealth either ſince or before it. And becauſe the great things acted under that Government, and tranſmitted to us by *Titus Livius*, were performed by publick or private Counſel within or without the City, I ſhall begin with what occurr'd in the Town, and was managed by publick debate, (as judging that moſt worthy our annotation) ſuper-adding what-ever depended thereupon; and with theſe diſcourſes I intend this firſt Book (or rather Part) ſhall conclude.

CHAP. II.

The ſeveral kinds of Common-wealths; and under which kind the Roman is comprehended.

WAving the diſcourſe of thoſe Cities which in their beginning have been dependant, I ſhall ſpeak of ſuch as were originally free, and governed themſelves according to their own fancies, Common-wealths, or Principalities, as their own inclinations lead them. Of theſe (according to the diverſity of their principles) their Laws and Orders were divers. Some of them at their firſt foundation received their Laws at one time from a ſingle perſon, as the *Spartans* from *Licurgus*. Others received them by chance, at ſeveral times, upon variety of accidents, as *Rome*; and that Common-wealth is doubtleſly happy, whoſe good fortune it is to have a perſon ſo wiſe as to conſtitute and diſpoſe its Laws in ſuch manner at firſt, that it may ſubſiſt ſafely and ſecurely by them, without neceſſity of new modelling or correction. Of this ſort was *Sparta*, which for more than 800 years was obſerved to remain entire and incorrupt, without any dangerous commotion. On the other ſide, that City muſt needs be in ſome meaſure unhappy, which, not having ſubmitted to, or complyed with the prudence of a ſingle founder, is neceſſitated of it ſelf to remodel and reform. Of theſe kinds, that is moſt unhappy whoſe principles were at firſt remote and devious from the right way which might have conducted to perfection; and indeed thoſe Common-wealths which are in this degree, are almoſt impoſſible to be eſtabliſhed by any accident whatſoever. But others (whoſe Commencements are good, and capable of improvement, though perhaps not exquiſitely perfect) may become perfect afterwards by the concurrence of accidents, yet not without danger, foraſmuch as moſt men are averſe, and will not eaſily admit of any new Law which introduces new Orders and Cuſtoms into a City, without great appearance of neceſſity, and that neceſſity ariſing neceſſarily from ſome danger impending, it many times falls out the Common-wealth periſhes before remedy can be applyed. Of this the Common-wealth of *Florence* is inſtance ſufficient, which in the commotion of *Arezo* was the 11 th. time reformed, and the 12 th. time confounded by the ſedition of *Prato*.

But being now to diſcourſe of the State of the Roman Common-wealth, and what were the accidents and orders which advanced it to that perfection, it is convenient to premiſe (what has been aſſerted by ſeveral Authors) that there are but three ſorts of Governments, *Monarchy*, *Ariſtocracy*, and *Democracy*, to either of which, who-ever intends to erect a Government, may apply as he pleaſes. Others (of no leſs reputation) are of opinion the forms of Government are ſix, of which three are bad, and three good of themſelves, but ſo eaſily corrupted, even they become fatal and pernicious. Thoſe which are good are the three before mentioned, thoſe which are evil are three others depending upon the three former; and carrying ſo near a reſemblance, they many times interfere, and fall one into the other, as Monarchy into Tyranny, Ariſtocracy into Oligarchy, and Democracy into Anarchy and Confuſion: inſomuch, that who-ever forms his Government of one of the three former, forms it for no long time, becauſe no care nor remedy can prevent, but it will degenerate into its contrary, by reaſon of the ſimilitude betwixt virtue and vice: and theſe changes and variations of Government hapned by accident amongſt men; for at the beginning of the World the Inhabitants being few, they lived diſperſed after the manner of beaſts: afterwards, as they multiplyed, they began to unite, and, for their better defence, to look out for ſuch as were more ſtrong, robuſt, and valiant, that they might chooſe one out of them to make him their head, and pay him obedience; from hence the firſt diſtinction betwixt honeſt and diſhoneſt did ariſe: for obſerving that if any injur'd his Benefactor, it immediately created an hatred and compaſſion among the reſt, all people abhorring him that was ungrateful, and commiſerating him that was injur'd; leſt the ſame injuſtice might happen to themſelves, they began to make Laws, and ordain puniſhments for offenders; and this was the firſt appearance of juſtice in the World; after which, being to make Election of their Prince, they did not ſo much reſpect the ability of his body as the qualifications of his mind, chooſing him that was moſt prudent and juſt; but by degrees their Government coming to be Hereditary, and not by Election, according to their former way, thoſe which inherited degenerated from their Anceſtors, and neglecting all virtuous actions, began to believe that Princes were exalted for no other end but to diſcriminate themſelves from their ſubjects by their pomp, luxury, and all other effeminate qualities, by which means they fell into the hatred of the people, and by conſequence became affraid of them, and that fear increaſing,

creaſing, they began to meditate revenge, oppreſſing ſome, and diſobliging others, till inſenſibly the Government altered, and fell into Tyranny. And theſe were the firſt grounds of ruine, the firſt occaſion of Conjuration and Conſpiracy againſt Princes, not ſo much in the puſillanimous and poor, as in thoſe whoſe generoſity, ſpirit and riches would not ſuffer them to ſubmit to ſo diſhonourable adminiſtrations. The multitude following the authority of the Nobles, took up Arms againſt their Prince, and having conquered and extirpated that Government, they ſubjected themſelves to the Nobility which had freed them; and deteſting the name of a ſingle perſon, they took the Government upon themſelves, and at firſt (reflecting upon the late Tyranny) governed according to new Laws deviſed by themſelves, poſtponing particular profit to publick advantage, ſo that both the one and the other were preſerved and managed with great diligence and exactneſs. But their authority afterwards deſcending upon their Sons, (who being ignorant of the variations of fortune, as not having experimented her inconſtancy) and not contenting themſelves with a civil equality, but falling into rapine, oppreſſion, ambition, and adulteries, they changed the Government again, and brought it from an Optimacy to be governed by few, without any reſpect or conſideration of Juſtice or Civility; ſo that in a ſhort time it hapned to them as to the Tyrant; for the multitude being weary of their Government, were ready to aſſiſt any body that would attempt to remove it, by which means in a ſhort time it was extinguiſhed.

And foraſmuch as the tyranny of their Prince, and the inſolence of their Nobles were freſh in their memory, they reſolved to reſtore neither the one nor the other, but concluded upon a popular State, which was then regulated ſo as neither Prince nor Noble ſhould have any authority: and there being no States but are reverenced at firſt, this Populacy continued for ſome time, but not long, (eſpecially after its Founders) for it fell immediately into an irreſiſtible licentiouſneſs, contemning all authority both publick and private; and every man living after his own mind, a thouſand injuries were daily committed, ſo that forc'd by neceſſity, by the ſuggeſtions of ſome good man, or for avoiding the like enormities, they returned to their primitive Kingſhip, and from thence by degrees relapſed again in the manner, and upon the occaſions aforeſaid. And this is the Sphear and Circle in which all Republicks have, and do move; but it ſeldom or never happens that they return to the ſame circumſtances of Government again, becauſe it is ſcarce poſſible for any of them to be ſo long liv'd, as to paſs many times thorow the ſame mutations, and remain upon its legs. It ſometimes comes to paſs likewiſe, that in the conflicts and troubles of a State, being deſtitute both of counſel and force, it becomes a prey to ſome neighbouring Common-wealth that is better governed than it: but admitting that could not be, Governments would fall from one to another, and make an infinite circulation. For theſe reaſons all the foreſaid forms of Government are in my judgment infirm and unſtable; the three good ones from the ſhortneſs of man's life, and the three bad ones from their proper imperfections. Whereupon, the wiſeſt Legiſlators finding this defect, and avoiding every one of thoſe kinds, they fram'd a Government which ſhould conſiſt of them all, believing it to be more permanent and ſtable, becauſe, Prince, Nobles and People living in the ſame City, and communicating in the ſame Government, they would be all of them in ſight of one another, and more capable of correction. The perſon which in this kind has merited moſt praiſe was *Lycurgus*, who ordered his Laws in *Sparta*, in ſuch manner, that giving King, Nobility and People each of them their portion, he erected a Government that continued for more than eight hundred years, to his great honour, and that Cities repoſe.

To *Solon* it hapned clear otherwiſe, (who was the *Athenian* Legiſlator) whoſe aiming only at a popular Government, was the cauſe it was ſo ſhort lived, that before he died he ſaw the tyranny of *Piſiſtrates* ſpring out of it; and though forty years after the Tyrant's Heirs were expelled, and *Athens* reſtored to its liberty, yet reſuming the old model which *Solon* had recommended, it could not continue above an hundred years, notwithſtanding many new Laws were ſuper-added to reſtrain the inſolence of the Nobility, and the looſeneſs of the Commons. But there being no mixture and temperament of Principality and Optimacy with the other, in reſpect of *Sparta*, *Athens* was but of little duration. But to return to *Rome*, though it had not a *Lycurgus* to obſtetricate at its birth, and ſupply it with ſuch Laws as might preſerve its freedom ſo long

Nevertheleſs, the accidents which hapned upon the diſſention betwixt the people and the Senate produced that in ſome meaſure which was defective at its foundation; for though in its beginning its Laws and Orders were imperfect, yet it did not altogether deflect from the right way which was to conduct it to perfection, *Romulus*, *Numa*, and all the reſt of its Kings making many good Laws conformable to its freedom. But their ultimate deſign being to perpetuate their Monarchy, though that City remained free, there were many things omitted,

ted by thoſe Princes which were neceſſary for its conſervation. And though it fell out their Kings loſt their Dominion upon the aboveſaid occaſions, yet thoſe who expulſed them, creating two Conſuls in their ſtead, they rather drove the name than the authority of Kingſhip out of the City. After which, the Government reciding in the Conſuls and Senate, it conſiſted only of two of the three ſorts, Monarchy and Ariſtocracy: it remained now to give place only to a popular Government, and the Roman Nobility being grown inſolent upon occaſions which ſhall be mentioned hereafter, the people tumultuated, took up Arms againſt them, and prevailed ſo far, that (leſt otherwiſe they might loſe all) it was conſented the people ſhould have their ſhare, and yet the Senate and Conſuls on the other hand retain ſo much of their former authority as to keep up their degrees as before: and this was the beginning of the *Tribunes* of the people, after the creation of which, that State became better eſtabliſhed, every one of the three ſorts having a ſhare in the Government: and fortune was very favourable, that though it ſuffered many mutations, and paſſed from a Monarchy to an Ariſtocracy, and from that to the people by the ſame gradations, and the ſame occaſions I have mentioned; nevertheleſs the power was not taken from their Kings to transfer it upon the Nobles, nor from the Nobility to give it wholly to the people; but remaining mixt and compounded of all three, that Republick grew in time to be perfect, to which perfection the difference and jealouſies betwixt the Senate and People contributed exceedingly, as ſhall be largely demonſtrated in the two following Chapters.

CHAP. III.

Upon what accidents and tumults in Rome *the* Tribune *of the people was created, by which that Common-wealth became more perfect.*

According to the judgment of all Authors who have written of Civil Government, and the examples of all Hiſtory, it is neceſſary to who-ever would eſtabliſh a Government, and preſcribe Laws to it, to preſuppoſe all men naturally bad, and that they will ſhew and exert that natural malignity as often as they have occaſion to do it ſecurely; for though it may poſſibly lie concealed for ſome time, it is for ſome ſecret reaſon, which want of preſident and experience renders inviſible; but time diſcovers it afterwards, and is therefore juſtly called *the Father of Truth.*

After the expulſion of the *Tarquins* there appeared in *Rome* a very great union betwixt the Senate and the people; the Senate ſeemed to have depoſited their old arrogance, and taken up a gentleneſs and humility that rendred them grateful even to the meaneſt mechanick: in this manner they curb'd and conſtrained their evil deſigns, as having no hopes of ſucceſs while the *Tarquins* were living, who were formidable to the Nobility of themſelves, and would be much more, if the people by any ill uſage ſhould be animated to joyn with them, and this was the true ground of their hypocriſie. But no ſooner were the *Tarquins* dead, and the Nobility diſcharged of their fear, but they began to expectorate, and ſpit out the venom had lain ſo long in their ſtomachs againſt the people, uſing them with all imaginable injury and contempt, which carriage of theirs gives good teſtimony to my aſſertion, that man is naturally wicked, never does well but upon neceſſity; and when at any time it is at his choice, and he may follow his own genius with freedom, all things run immediately into diſorder and confuſion; and that ſaying is not without reaſon, *That Reputation and poverty make men induſtrious, but it is Laws which make them good*: otherwiſe, if people did well of themſelves, Laws would be uſeleſs; but where that is not to be expected, Laws become neceſſary. No ſooner were the *Tarquins* removed, and the authority and terror where-with they kept the Senate in awe, but it was thought fit to find out ſome new invention that might reſtrain the Nobility, and keep them in the ſame circles of humanity and juſtice as the *Tarquins* had done whilſt they were alive: at length, after many ſquabbles and contentions betwixt the people and them, all was accommodated by the creation of a *Tribune* for the ſecurity of the people, which *Tribune* was to be inveſted with ſuch authority and priviledge as might enable him to become afterwards an Arbitor betwixt them, and a ſtop for the future to the inſolence of the Nobility.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

The diſſentions betwixt the Senate and the people of Rome, *were the occaſion that Common-wealth became ſo powerful and free.*

I Cannot in ſilence paſs over the tumults and commotions which hapned in *Rome* betwixt the death of the *Tarquins*, and the creation of thoſe *Tribunes*. Nor can I forbear ſaying ſomething againſt the opinion of many who will needs have *Rome* to have been a tumultuous Republick, ſo full of mutiny and confuſion, that had not its good fortune and valour ſupplyed for its defects, it would have been inferior to any other Common-wealth whatſoever. I cannot deny but fortune and valour were the occaſions of the Roman Empire; but, in my judgment, they do not conſider, that where the ſouldier is good, the diſcipline is good; and where the diſcipline is good, there is commonly good fortune: but to return to the other particulars in that City, I ſay, thoſe who object againſt the tumults betwixt the Nobles and the People, do in my opinion condemn thoſe very things which were the firſt occaſion of its freedom, regarding the noiſe and clamours which do uſually follow ſuch commotions, more than the good effects they do commonly produce, not conſidering that in all Common-wealths there are two oppoſite humours, one of the People, the other of the Nobleſs; and that all Laws which are made in favour of liberty, proceed from the differences betwixt them, as may eaſily be ſeen in the revolutions of *Rome*: for from the time of the *Tarquins* to the *Gracchi*, (which was more than three hundred years) in all the tumults in *Rome* ſeldom any body was baniſhed, and ſeldomer put to death: ſo that it is not reaſonable to eſteem thoſe popular tumults ſo dangerous and horrible, nor to pronounce that a ſeditious and bloody Common-wealth, which in ſo long time, among all their heats and animoſities, ſent not above eight or ten perſons into baniſhment, executed but few, and condemned not many to any pecuniary Mulct. Nor can it be called reaſonably diſorderly and irregular, which produced ſo many examples of all ſorts of virtue; for good examples proceed from good Education, and good Education from good Laws, and good Laws from thoſe tumults which many people do ſo inconſiderately condemn; and who-ever examines their ſucceſs, will not find they have produced any Laws or Violence to the prejudice of the common intereſt, but rather on the contrary. And if any ſhould object their ways were wild and unuſual, to hear the people roaring againſt the Senate, and the Senate railing againſt the people. To ſee them running tumultuouſly about the ſtreets, ſhutting up their ſhops, and leaving the Town, I anſwer, that all Cities ought to be allowed ſome ways of vent and evacuation for their paſſions, and eſpecially thoſe who expect aſſiſtance from their people in time of exigence and danger; in which number the City of *Rome* was one, and had this cuſtom, that when the Commons had a mind to a new Law, they either committed ſome of the aforeſaid outrages, or elſe refuſed to liſt themſelves for the Wars, ſo that to appeaſe, it was in ſome meaſure neceſſary to comply with them, and the deſires of a free people are ſeldom or never deſtructive or prejudicial to liberty, becauſe they commonly ſpring from actual oppreſſion, or an apprehenſion of it; and if perhaps that apprehenſion ſhould be vain, and ill grounded, there is the remedy of Conventions, in which ſome honeſt man or good Orator may remonſtrate their miſtake; and the people, though (as *Tully* ſays) they may be ignorant, yet they are capable enough of the truth, and do eaſily ſubmit to it, when delivered to them by any perſon they think credible, and to be believed. So that it is an obligation upon us to judge more moderately of the Roman Government, and to conſider that ſo many good effects as proceeded from that Republick, could not have been produced but from ſutable cauſes: and if their tumults were the occaſion of the creation of the *Tribunes*, they were more laudable than otherwiſe; for beſides that they ſecured a ſhare of the Government to the people, they were conſtituted as Guardians and Conſervators of the Roman liberty, as ſhall be ſhewn in the Chapter enſuing.

CHAP. V.

Where the Guardianſhip of liberty may be moſt ſecurely depoſited, whether among the People or Nobility: and which has greater occaſion to tumultuate, he that would acquire more, or he that would defend and keep what he has.

THey who have given us the wiſeſt and moſt judicious ſcheme of a Common-wealth, have laid down the conſervation of liberty as a neceſſary fundamental, and according as that is more or leſs ſecured, the Government is like to be more or leſs durable. But forasmuch as all Common-wealths conſiſt of Nobility and Populacy, the queſtion ariſes in whoſe hands that liberty is depoſited moſt ſafely. In old times among the *Lacedemonians*, and in our times among the *Venetians*, it was intruſted with the Nobility; but among the *Romans* with the common people; for which reaſon it is to be examined which of them made the better elections.

If we look back to their Originals, there are arguments on both ſides; but if we regard only their fate and concluſion, the Nobility muſt carry it, in reſpect that the liberty of the *Spartans* and *Venetians* have been much longer lived. But on the other ſide, (to juſtify the *Romans*) freedom is (I conceive) moſt properly committed to their cuſtody who have leaſt appetite to uſurp. And doubtleſs, if the ends and deſigns both of the Nobility and Commons be conſidered, it will be found the Nobility are ambitious of Dominion, while the Commons have no other thoughts but to defend themſelves againſt it; and, by conſequence, having leſs hopes to uſurp, they have more inclination to live free: ſo that the conſervation of their liberty being committed to the people, it is but reaſonable to believe they will be more careful to preſerve it; and by how much they are leſs likely to uſurp upon it themſelves, with the more vigilance will they ſecure it againſt the encroachments of others. On the other ſide, he that defends the *Spartan* and *Venetian* conſtitution, alledges, that by putting that power into the hands of the Nobility, two excellent things are performed. One is, that thereby they ſatisfie their ambition who have the greateſt intereſt in the Common-wealth. The other, that they take from the people all opportunity of exerting their natural turbulency and unquietneſs, which has not only been the occaſion of infinite diſſentions, but is apt likewiſe to enforce the Nobility upon ſuch deſperate courſes as may in time produce unremediable effects. Of this, *Rome* it ſelf is propoſed as an example, where the Tribunes being inveſted with that authority, it was not ſufficient to have one Plebeian Conſul, but the people muſt have both, and not content with that neither, they would have the *Cenſor*, *Prætor*, and all the other great Magiſtrates of the City choſen out of the people. Nor was this enough, but carried on with the ſame exorbitant fury, they began by degrees to adore ſuch men as they ſaw likely to confront and beard the Nobility, which humour was the riſe of *Marius* his greatneſs, and his greatneſs the deſtruction of *Rome*. All this conſidered, it is no eaſy matter, upon impartial deliberation on both ſides, to pronounce which of the two is moſt ſafely to be truſted with the liberty, becauſe it is no leſs difficult to determine which is moſt pernicious to a Common-wealth, he that (not ſatisfied with what he has) is ambitious of more, or he that is content, and would ſecure what he has got. He that ſhall examine it critically, will conclude thus; either you argue for a Republick, whoſe aim is to extend and propagate its Empire, as *Rome*; or one whoſe deſigns reach no further than to preſerve what they have got. In the firſt caſe, 'tis neceſſary in all things to follow the example of *Rome*; in the ſecond, *Venice* and *Sparta* are rather to be imitated for the reaſons aforeſaid, which ſhall be reinforc'd in the following Chapter. But to return from whence we have ſtragled, and diſcourſe of what men are moſt nocent in a Common-wealth, they that are impatient to get, or they that are only fearful to loſe; I ſay, that when *Marcus Menenius* was made Dictator, and *Marcus Fulvius* Maſter of the Horſe, (both of them Plebeians) to enquire into certain Conſpiracies that were entred into at *Capua*, againſt the City of *Rome*, authority was given them at the ſame time to examine and take cogniſance of ſuch perſons as, by bribery, or any other unlawful means, deſign'd upon the Conſulſhip, or any other of the great offices in *Rome*: by which the Nobility being highly provoked, (as ſuſpecting it to be done in oppoſition to them) cauſed it to be ſpread abroad, that the Nobility did not by any ambitious or irregular ways affect or deſign upon thoſe great places; but the Commons, who not daring to truſt their preferment to their extraction or virtue, took all extraordinary courſes to advance themſelves to them. In particular they accuſed the Dictator, and that with ſo much vehemence and ſucceſs, he was glad to call a Counſel, and (having complained very much of the calumniations of the

the Nobility) to lay down his Dictatorſhip, and ſubmit himſelf to the judgment of the people, by whom the Cauſe being heard, he was fairly acquitted. There it was diſputed very hard which was moſt ambitious; He that would get, or He that would preſerve; for a violent appetite either in the one, or the other may be the occaſion of great diſturbances, which in my judgment are oftner cauſed by them that are in poſſeſſion, becauſe the apprehenſion of loſing what they have got, produces the ſame eagerneſs and paſſion, as deſire of acquiſition does in the other, foraſmuch as they ſeldom think themſelves ſafe in what they have, but by new accumulation; beſides, the more wealth or Territory they have, the more power and capacity they have to Uſurp as they ſee occaſion: to which may be added that their incorrigible and ambitious deportments, do provoke and kindle a deſire in ſuch as have not thoſe dignities, to compaſs them if they can, and that for two reaſons, to revenge themſelves upon them, by ſtripping them of all; and to enrich themſelves into the bargain by the wealth and honours which they ſee others manage ſo ill.

CHAP. VI.

Whether in Rome *ſuch a form of Government could be eſtabliſhed, as ſhould take away the animoſities betwixt the Senate and the People.*

WHat the continued jealouſies betwixt the Senate and the People did produce, we have already diſcourſed; but becauſe the effects of them remained till the time of the *Gracchi*, and were the occaſion of the deſtruction of their liberty, it may be demanded whether *Rome* might not have attained that height of Authority and Grandeur under another form of Government that might have prevented thoſe animoſities. To reſolve this Queſtion, it is neceſſary to look back upon thoſe Republicks whoſe Fortune it has been to retain their liberty a long time without thoſe inconveniencies, to examine what was their form, and whether it was practicable in *Rome*. As Examples, we may produce *Sparta* and *Venice*, the firſt Ancient, the latter more modern, both mentioned before *Sparta* was governed by a King, and a ſmall Senate: *Venice* did not divide the Government into diſtinct Names; but all who were admitted to the adminiſtration were called *Gentlemen* under one common appellation; and that, more by accident, than any prudence in the Legiſlator; for when to thoſe Rocks upon which that City is now ſeated, many people did repair for the reaſons aboveſaid, in proceſs of time their number encreaſing ſo faſt, that they could not live peaceably without Laws, they reſolved to put themſelves under ſome form, and meeting often together to deliberate upon what, when they found they were numerous enough to ſubſiſt by themſelves, they made a Law to præclude all new comers from the Government: and finding afterwards their numbers encreaſe, and that there were multitudes of Inhabitants incapable of publick adminiſtration; in honour to the Governors they called them *Gentlemen* of *Venice*, and the others but *Citizens*; and this diſtinction might not only be inſtituted, but continued without tumult, becauſe when firſt introduced, all the Inhabitants participating of the Government, no body could complain, and they who came after, finding it firm and eſtabliſhed, had no reaſon, nor opportunity to diſturb it; They had no reaſon, becauſe no injury was done them; they had no opportunity, becauſe the Government reſtrained them, and they were not employed in any thing that might furniſh them with authority: beſides thoſe who came after were not in number diſproportionable to the Governors, the latter being equally, if not more numerous than they; for which reaſons the *Venetians* were able not only to erect, but maintain their Government a long time, without any revolution.

Sparta being (as I ſaid before) governed by a King and a ſmall Senate, might likewiſe preſerve its Model a long time, by reaſon the Inhabitants were but few, ſtrangers excluded, and the Laws of *Lycurgus* eſtabliſhed with great veneration, ſo that living by thoſe Laws, all occaſion of tumult was taken away, and they might continue united a long time; for though the Offices and Commands were conferred upon a few, yet the revenue of the Country being equally diſtributed, the people were not Seditious, though they were kept at a diſtance; nor did the Nobility provoke them by any inſolence or oppreſſion; and this proceeded from the condition of their Kings, who being environed by the Nobility, had no ſafer way to ſecure their dignity, than by protecting the people from injuſtice and violence, by which means the fear, and the deſire of Command being taken from the people, the Emulations betwixt them and the Nobility, and the occaſions of tumultuating ceaſed, ſo that it was not hard for them to enjoy their tranquility ſeveral Ages; Of the length of

their tranquility, there were two principal cauſes; Firſt, The number of the *Spartans* being ſmall, there was no neceſſity that their Governors ſhould be many; and next no ſtrangers being admitted, they were not liable to be corrupted, nor to encreaſe to ſuch a number, as might grow inſupportable to thoſe few who were under their Government. Theſe things being conſidered, it is plain that the *Roman* Legiſlators could not have inſtituted a Common-wealth that ſhould be free from Sedition and Mutiny, any other way, than by imitating the *Venetians* and *Spartans*, that is by not employing the people in their Wars, like the *Venetians*, nor entertaining Foreigners into their City, as the *Spartans*. But the *Roman* Legiſlators tranſgreſſing in both, the people grew ſtrong, and by conſequence tumultuous; and if any way the Government were to be rendered more quiet, this inconvenience would follow, it would be rendered alſo more weak, and all means be taken away that might conduct it to that height of grandeur and authority, at which afterwards it arrived; ſo that thoſe applications which prevented the tumults in *Rome*, prevented alſo its enlargement, and the extent of its Empire, as it happens in moſt humane affairs, the removal of one inconvenience is the contracting of another. For if you arm, and adapt a numerous people for the War, by their means to enlarge your Territory; you put them into a condition of being unmanageable afterwards, and not to be kept down to your Diſcipline and Government; whereas if you keep them diſarmed, and their number but few, though you may make your ſelf Arbitrary, you can never continue it, for your Subjects will grow ſo poor ſpirited and vile, you will become a prey to the firſt man that invades you. In all deliberations therefore, the inconveniences are to be conſidered, and that reſolution prefer'd, in which there are feweſt; for none can be taken that are abſolutely free. The *Romans* then in imitation of the *Spartans*, might have ſet up a King for his life, and appointed a little Senate; but by ſo doing, they could never have laid the foundation of ſo vaſt an Empire, for an Elective King, and a ſmall Senate would have contributed but little to their unity and peace. He then who would ſet up a new Common-wealth, ſhould conſider whether he would have it (like *Rome*) extend its Dominion and Soveraignty; or keep it ſelf within its own bounds without any dilatation. In the firſt caſe it is neceſſary to imitate the *Romans*, and give way to the tumults and publick diſſentions as well as he can; for without his Citizens be numerous, and well diſciplin'd and arm'd, he can never extend his Dominion; and if he could, it would be impoſſible to keep it. In the ſecond, he is to frame to the Model of the *Spartans*, and *Venetians*; but becauſe augmentation of Empire, is commonly the deſtruction of ſuch Common-wealths, he is by all poſſible means to prohibit new acquiſitions, becauſe depending upon weak Common-wealths, they are always deſtructive and pernicious, as Experience has ſhown in the Examples of *Sparta* and *Venice*. The firſt having ſubdued moſt part of *Greece*, diſcovered, upon a ſlight accident, the weakneſs of its foundation, for the *Thebans* revolting at the inſtigation of *Pelopidas*, gave opportunity to other Cities, and quite ruined the Government. In like manner *Venice* having conquer'd the greateſt part of *Italy*, more by their Mony and Artifice, than Arms, preſuming too much upon their force, and coming to a Battel, they were worſted, and in one day loſt all which they had got. I ſhould think therefore a Common-wealth that would ſtand a long time, ſhould model it ſelf within according to the Example of *Sparta*, and like *Venice*, ſeat it ſelf in ſo ſtrong and inexpugnable a place, that it might not apprehend any ſudden inſult; nor make it ſelf ſo great on the other ſide as to become formidable to its Neighbors; For the common Motives that excite people to make War upon a Common-wealth, are two; either to conquer it themſelves, or to ſecure themſelves againſt it, and by the aforeſaid expedient, thoſe two ways are totally fruſtrated; for if it be hard of acceſs, and well-diſpoſed to defend it ſelf, it will ſeldom or never happen that any Body will attempt it. If it keeps within its own bounds, and by experience be found free from ambition, no body will fear it, nor will any body offend it; and queſtionleſs it would be the more ſafe, if by the Laws and Conſtitutions it was forbidden to extend, for I am clearly of opinion, that keeping things in this balance and *Equilibrium*, the Government would be more civil, and the peace of the City more certain. But the affairs of man being mutable, and nothing in them that is durable and firm; there is a neceſſity that they either encreaſe or diminiſh, and that neceſſity does many times conſtrain us, to what in reaſon we ſhould rather decline. Whence it happens, That if a Government be erected apt to defend it ſelf in peace and ſecurity without extending its bounds, and neceſſity enforces it to enlarge, That enlargement takes away its foundation, and ruines it the ſooner. So on the other ſide, when the Stars are ſo benign to a Common-wealth, as to place it in peace, without any occaſion of War, that peace begets idleneſs, and idleneſs effeminacy or faction, which two things (and indeed either of them alone) will be ſufficient to ſubvert it. Wherefore, it being impoſſible, as I conceive, to keep things in this balance and mediocrity; in the

the Conſtitution of all Republicks, particular care is to be had to what is moſt honourable; and things are to be ſo ordered, that if neceſſity ſhould compel them to inlarge, they might do it in ſuch manner as to be ſure to keep it. But to return, a Common-wealth, in my judgment, is better fram'd to the example of *Rome*, than either to the *Venetian* or *Spartan*, it being ſo hard to hit the exact way between the one and the other; and for the emulations betwixt the Nobility and the People, they are to be born as inconveniencies, but ſuch as are neceſſary for a people that would riſe to the grandeur of the *Romans*; againſt which nevertheleſs (as I have ſhewn before) the authority of the *Tribunes* will be ſome remedy, if inveſted with the power of impeaching, which was given to the *Tribunes* in other States, as I ſhall ſhew in my next Chapter.

CHAP. VII.

How neceſſary it is for the conſervation of a State, that any Citizen be ſecurely accuſed.

THere is nothing of more importance to the ſafety of a State, than that permiſſion be given to ſuch as are ſet up for the conſervation of its liberty, to accuſe ſuch perſons to the People, the Senate, or other Magiſtrates as ſhall any way offend againſt the Conſtitutions thereof; and this practice has two effects very profitable for the Common-wealth: the firſt is, the Citizens, for fear of being accuſed, do not attempt any thing to the prejudice of the State; and if they do, they are eaſily and readily ſuppreſs: the other is, that thereby a way is opened for the evacuation of ſuch humours as are too frequent among the Citizens of every great City; which humours, without ſome legal vent, do uſually recur to extraordinary ways that are abſolutely pernicious: wherefore there is nothing renders a Common-wealth more ſtable and firm, than the proviſion of ſome legal courſe for the evaporation of thoſe humours which endanger it. This may be demonſtrated by ſeveral examples, but eſpecially by that which is mentioned by *Titus Livius* in his diſcourſe of *Coriolanus*. He tells us, that the Nobility of *Rome* being exaſperated againſt the people, for that they thought their authority too much increaſed upon the creation of their *Tribunes*; and it hapning at that time, that in reſpect of the great ſcarcity of proviſions, the Senate had ſent into *Sicily* for ſupplies; *Coriolanus* being a great adverſary to the popular Faction, adviſed that this was a fair time to chaſtiſe the licentiouſneſs of the people, and to take from them that power which they had aſſumed to the prejudice of the Nobility, to which purpoſe he perſwaded the Senate againſt diſtributing the corn. This counſel coming to the ears of the people, they were ſo highly incenſed, that they ſet upon him tumultuouſly as he came out of the Senate, and had certainly killed him, had not the *Tribunes* interpoſed, and cited him to appear before them in order to his defence. By which accident it is plain how much it is for the intereſt of a Common-wealth, that a legal way be provided to diſcharge the choller of the people, which otherwiſe will be apt to fly to extraordinary courſes, and without doubt produce more miſchievous effects: for if a ſingle Citizen be cut off, (though poſſibly unjuſtly) it begets little or no diſorder in the Common-wealth, becauſe execution is done without private force, or foreign aſſiſtance, (which are mortal things to a free State) and what is done by courſe of Law, and publick Authority, is neither deſtructive nor dangerous. And as to ancient examples, I think this of *Coriolanus* ſufficient; from whence every man may gather what miſchief would have reſulted to the Common-wealth of *Rome*, had he been cut in pieces by the fury of the people; it would have created private diſguſts; thoſe diſguſts jealouſies, thoſe jealouſies proviſion for defence; that combinations; combinations parties; and parties deſtruction: but by the interpoſition of publick authority, all theſe evils were prevented. We have ſeen in our time what inconveniencies followed in *Florence*, becauſe the multitude had not a legal way of ſpending their indignation againſt one of their Citizens. *Franceſco Valori* was Prince of that City, ſuſpected by many people, as if he deſigned to make himſelf abſolute, and by his haughtineſs and pride to exceed thoſe limits which the Laws had preſcribed: there being in that Common-wealth no way to prevent it, but by ſetting up a Faction in oppoſition to his, he began to look out himſelf, and to make a party that might defend him. The people on the other ſide having no legal way to ſuppreſs them, betook themſelves to their Arms. And whereas, if an ordinary way had been open to have oppoſed him, his deſigns had been obviated by his ſingle deſtruction; being forced upon an extrordinary, it was effected not only by his, but by the ruine of many other eminent Citizens. To confirm what we have ſaid, another

inſtance might be produced in the City in the caſe of *Peter Soderini*, which hapned for want of a Law whereby they might impeach any Citizen that aſpir'd to the Government. There were eight Judges only in that Common-wealth, which are not enough to adminiſter juſtice againſt a powerful man; in States that are well conſtituted, 'tis neceſſary there be more; for where they are ſo few, their diſpatch is but ſmall, and they are corrupted with more eaſe than where they are many. If therefore there had been any ſuch way allowed, upon his ill Government, the Citizens would have formally impeached him, without calling in an Army of *Spaniards*; and if his Government had been well, they durſt not have accuſed him, leſt he ſhould have accuſed them again; and by that means that emulation would have been prevented which was the cauſe of ſo much miſchief: from whence it may be concluded, when ever foreign aſſiſtance is called in by any party in a City, that it proceeds from the ill conſtitution of that Government, and that there is no legal way of purging thoſe humours which are ſo natural to men; againſt all which, no remedy is more properly applicable, than by authorizing ſeveral perſons of quality and intereſt to receive informations: which practice was ſo well followed in *Rome*, that in all diſſentions betwixt the Senate and the people, it was never known that either Senate, or people, or any private Citizen what-ever had recourſe to foreign aſſiſtance; for having juſtice at home, what need of fetching it from abroad? To theſe examples aforeſaid, we may add another out of *Titus Livius*, who tells us, that in *Cluſia* the chief City of the *Tuſcans*, *Lucumon* having vitiated a Siſter of one *Aruns*, and *Aruns* being unable to vindicate her, by reaſon of the power of the delinquent, he addreſſed to the *French*, who at that time had the Government of *Lombardy*, and poſſeſſing them with the profitableneſs of the Expedition, he prevailed with them to bring an Army to revenge him of that outrage and injury which his Siſter had received: and doubtleſs he would never have betaken himſelf to the relief of a foreigner, could he have hoped for reparation at home. But as liberty of juſt accuſation is great ſecurity to a State, ſo tolleration of calumny is as dangerous on the other ſide, which we ſhall evince in the following Chapter.

CHAP. VIII.

Unjuſt calumnies are no leſs pernitious to a Common-wealth, than legal accuſations are profitable and good.

THough the valour of *Furius Camillus* (after he had raiſed their Siege, and driven the *French* from their Leaguer before *Rome*) was ſo univerſally venerable, that none of the *Romans* thought it diminution either to their reputation or dignity to give him precedence; yet *Manlius Capitolinus* could not brook that ſo much honour ſhould be given him, ſeeing, in his judgment, he had done as much towards the preſervation of the City, and deſerved as well, in ſaving the Capitol, as *Camillus* had done in the other; and in military experience he thought himſelf no way inferior: ſo that full of envy, and unable to bear the greatneſs of his Competitor, finding he could make no impreſſion upon the Senators, he turned himſelf to the people, and ſpread abroad ſeveral falſe reports againſt him. Among other things, he puts it into their heads, that the Treaſure which was raiſed for payment of the *French* had not been given, but was continued in the hands of private Citizens; which mony, if reaſſumed, might be applyed to publick uſe, and either leſſen the duties, or diſcharge the debts of the people. Theſe pretences had great influence upon the people, inſomuch as they began to talk, to murmur, to meet, to poſt themſelves tumultuouſly in many places in the City, which being obſerved, and thought very dangerous by the Senate, they created a Dictator to take cogniſance of the buſineſs, and reſtrain the fury of *Manlius*. The Dictator cited *Manlius*, and appointed him a day; *Manlius* appeared, and being environed by the people as the Dictator was by the Senate, ſilence being made, the Dictator asked *Manlius* in whoſe hands that great Treaſure he ſpake of was detained, for he did aſſure him the Senators were as deſirous to diſcover it as the people: to which *Manlius* made no poſitive anſwer, but by way of evaſion, replyed it was unneceſſary (he thought) to tell them what they knew already as well as he; upon which inſolence, the Dictator commanded him to priſon; from whence it may be obſerved how deteſtable ſuch calumniations ought to be, not only in every free City, but in every civil Society, and with what care and ſeverity they are to be ſuppreſſed; and that is done moſt commodiouſly, by allowing freedom of accuſation; for as calumny is pernitious, information is beneficial to a State.

Accuſa-

Accuſation and calumny differ in this point, that any man may calumniate another where and when he pleaſes, without bringing teſtimony, or any other circumſtance to prove it: but in caſe of accuſation 'tis quite another thing, a man muſt bring his proofs, his witneſſes, and other circumſtances to make good his charge. People are legally accuſed no where but before the Senates, the Magiſtrates, or the People: but they are calumniated every where, within doors and without, in the ſtreets and the market-place, and there moſt where there is leaſt accuſation, and the Cities leaſt diſpoſed to receive them. Wherefore he who would lay the foundation State, ought principally to provide that all perſons might have liberty to inform againſt any one, without ſuſpition or fear; which being ſolemnly provided, and faithfully obſerved, his next buſineſs is to ſecure them againſt ſcandals, and the calumniator can have no reaſon to complain if he be puniſhed, when there are publick places appointed to receive the accuſations of ſuch as are abuſed; and if in theſe things particular care be not taken, great miſchiefs will follow; for theſe kind of aſperſions do not correct, but provoke their fellow Citizens, and thoſe who are accuſed are not ſo much apt to fear the diſgrace, as to hate the authors of the reports. In theſe caſes the *Romans* had very good Laws, and they ſtood them in good ſtead; but we in *Florence* having neglected them, have ſuffered much by it, and he who peruſes the Hiſtory of our City, will ſee how ſubject to calumniations in all times thoſe Citizens have been, who have employed in its moſt important affairs. One is charged with embezling the publick treaſure; another for being corrupted, and betraying ſome publick enterprize; a third for ambition, and committing one inſolence or another, from whence feuds and animoſities do ariſe on all hands, and from thence diviſions; from diviſions parties; and from parties deſtruction. Whereas, if in *Florence* authority had been allowed for the accuſation of Citizens, many miſchiefs had been prevented, which followed for want of it; for thoſe Citizens who were accuſed (whether condemned or abſolved) would not have been able to have moleſted the State; and the impeachments would have been fewer than the calumniations, becauſe more people would have been calumniated than accuſed, in reſpect that the firſt was ſo much the more eaſy (as is ſaid before) than the other. And theſe calumnies have advanced ſome Citizens to great dignity; for having great adverſaries that oppoſed their deſigns, they joyned themſelves with the people, and making them their friends, confirm'd the ill opinion which they had of their adverſaries before. Several examples might be produced to this purpoſe, but I ſhall only inſtance in one.

The *Florentine* Army was encamped before *Lucca* under the Command of *Giovanni Guiccardini* their Commiſſary. By his ill fortune or conduct the Town was not taken; which of the two ſoever it was, *Giovanni* was aſperſed, as having been brib'd by the *Lucheſes*, which calumny being propagated by his enemies, netled *Giovanni*, and almoſt brought him to deſpair; and though, in order to his juſtification, he offered to put himſelf into the hands of the Captain, yet all was to no purpoſe; for in that Common-wealth there was no body qualified to clear him: from hence aroſe great contentions betwixt *Guiccardin*'s friends, (who were the greateſt part of the Grandees in that City) and thoſe who ſtudied novelty, which contentions, and others of the like nature, encreaſing daily upon their hands, brought that poor Common-wealth into a moſt deplorable condition. *Manlius* therefore ſpreading theſe falſe reports of the Senators about *Rome*, was a calumniator, not an accuſer; and the *Romans* in his caſe gave manifeſt inſtruction how ſuch people are to be puniſhed, that is, that they be obliged publickly to accuſe, and when their charge is made good, that they be rewarded or encouraged; but when it cannot be proved, that they be puniſhed like *Manlius*.

CHAP. IX.

How much a ſingle perſon is neceſſary for the eſtabliſhment of a new Common-wealth, or the reformation of an old.

IT may ſeem to ſome, that I have run too far into the Roman Hiſtory, having made no mention of the Founders of that Common-wealth, nor of the Orders which they obſerved either in matters of Religion, or War. To eaſe them therefore of their ſuſpence, who are deſirous to hear ſomething to that purpoſe, I ſay, that many perhaps may think it of ill example for the Founder of a State, as *Romulus* was, to kill his own Brother, and afterwards conſent to the death of *Titus Tatius Sabinus*, who was choſen his companion in the Government, ſuppoſing that according to that preſident, any of his Citizens that were ambitious

ambitious of Command, might make away their adverſaries or competitors, and remove any obſtacle that oppoſed them; and it were reaſonable enough, were it not to be conſidered to what end, and upon what motives that murder was committed.

This is to be taken for a maxim, and general rule, that it is impoſſible for any Government either to be well founded at firſt, or well reformed afterwards, unleſs by a ſingle perſon, by whoſe direction all Orders, all Laws are to be made and promulged. He therefore who is the Founder of a Common-wealth, if he be an honeſt man, and aims not at his own intereſt, and the raiſing of his Family, more than the advancement of his Country, muſt endeavour to get the power into his ſingle hands, nor will any wiſe man ever accuſe him for any action extraordinary that he ſhall do in order thereuntos; or if the fact be to be blamed, the effect will excuſe it, eſpecially if be good, as it was in *Romulus* his caſe, for it is deſtructive and pernitious violence that is to be reprehended, not that which tends to ſettlement and reformation. He is alſo to be ſo prudent and virtuous, as not to leave the authority which he aſſumed in inheritance to another, becauſe men being more prone to evil than good, his ſucceſſor may employ that power to the prejudice of the State, which he in his wiſdom made uſe of to its benefit and advantage.

Moreover, though one be fitteſt to make Laws, yet when once made, they cannot hold long, if left upon the ſhoulders of a ſingle perſon, but when the care and execution of them is transfer'd upon many, and many are concerned to maintain them, it is much better; for though many be not ſo proper in laying the foundations of a Government, becauſe their diverſity of opinions keeps them from diſcerning what is abſolutely for its good; yet when things are once ſetled, and they have found it, that very diverſity will be a means to preſerve it. And that *Romulus* was excuſable for what he did to his Brother and Companion, and that what he did was more for the common good than his own private ambition or revenge, appears by this; that he had no ſooner made them away, but he conſtituted a Senate, by whoſe advice he acted in every thing, reſerving to himſelf only the power of calling them together, and commanding the Armies when they ſhould reſolve of a War: and of this we cannot have better evidence than that which followed after the expulſion of the *Tarquins*, there being nothing innovated or altred by the *Romans*, only inſtead of one perpetual King, they created two annual Conſuls; which ſhews that *Romulus* in his firſt Inſtitutions aimed rather at the election of a civil and free, than an abſolute and tyrannical State. Many more examples might be produced to fortify what is ſaid, as thoſe of *Moiſes*, *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, and other Founders of Kingdoms and Common-wealths, who, by aſſuming a Monarchical authority, were able to frame and impoſe ſuch Laws as were for the benefit of the publick; but being ſo well known, it would be ſuperfluous. I ſhall add only one, not ſo famous perhaps, yet worthy to be conſidered by thoſe who are deſirous to be good Legiſlators; and it is this, *Agis* King of *Sparta* obſerving his Citizens had loſt much of their ancient virtue, and by conſequence were decayed both in their power and Empire, imputing it in part to their deviation from the Laws of *Lycurgus*, deſired very earneſtly to reduce them again, but before he could bring it to perfection he was ſlain by the *Spartan Ephori*, as one who deſigned to make himſelf abſolute; but *Cleomenes* ſucceeding him in the Government, having the ſame inclination, and perceiving by ſome Records and Writings which *Agis* had left behind, what was his intention, he found that he could not do his Country that ſervice any way, but by making himſelf abſolute: for by the ambition of ſome perſons, he found that he could not do the good which he deſigned to the generality, by reaſon of the malevolence of a few, wherefore he cauſed the *Ephori*, and who-ever elſe he thought likely to obſtruct him, to be killed, and revived the Laws of *Lycurgus*, which noble act might have recovered that State, and have made *Cleomenes* as venerable as *Lycurgus* himſelf, had it not been for the power of *Macedon*, and the weakneſs of other Common-wealths; for not long after that reformation, being invaded by the *Macedonians*, it proved unable to defend it ſelf, and having no body to ſuſtain it, was overcome; and that juſt and honourable deſign was unhappily laid aſide. Conſidering therefore what has been ſaid, I conclude, that a ſingle perſon is beſt for the inſtitution or regulating of any ſort of Government, and that for the death of *Remus* and *Tatius*, *Romulus* was not to be blamed.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

As they are to be praiſed who lay the foundations of any Republick or Kingdom, ſo they are to be condemn'd who ſet up a Tyranny.

AMong all Excellent and Illuſtrious men, they are moſt praiſe worthy who have been the chief eſtabliſhers of Religion and Divine Worſhip: In the ſecond place are they who have laid the foundation of any Kingdom or Common-wealth; In the third, thoſe who having the Command of great Armies have enlarged their own, or the Dominion of their Country; In the next, Learned Men of all Sciences according to their ſeveral ſtudies and degrees; and laſt of all (as being infinitely the greateſt number) come the Artificers and Mechanicks; all to be commended as they are ingenious or skilful in their Profeſſions. On the other ſide, they are infamous and deteſtable, who are contemners of Religion, ſubverters of Governments, Enemies of Virtue, of Learning, of Art, and in ſhort of every thing that is uſeful and honourable to mankind; and of this ſort, are the prophane, the ſeditious, the ignorant, the idle, the debauched, and the vile. And although Nature has ſo ordered it, that there is neither wiſe man nor fool, nor good man, nor bad, who if it were propoſed to him which he would chooſe of theſe two ſorts of people, would not prefer that which was to be preferred, and condemn the other; yet the generality of Mankind deluded by a falſe impreſſion of good, and a vain notion of glory, leaving thoſe ways which are excellent and commendable, either wilfully or ignorantly wander into thoſe paths which will lead them to diſhonour; and whereas to their immortal honour they might eſtabliſh a Common-wealth or Kingdom as they pleaſe, they run head-long into a Tyranny, not conſidering what fame, what glory, what affection, what ſecurity, what quiet and ſatisfaction of mind they part with, nor what reproach, ſcandal, hatred, danger and diſquiet they incur. It is impoſſible but all people, (whether of private condition in the Common-wealth, or ſuch as by their Fortune or Virtue have arrived to be Princes) if they have any knowledge in Hiſtory, and the paſſages of old, would rather chooſe (if private perſons) to be *Scipio*'s than *Cæſar*'s; and (if Princes) to be *Ageſilaus*, *Timolion* and *Dion*, than *Nabis*, *Phalaris*, or *Dionyſius*; becauſe they muſt find the one highly celebrated and admired, and the other as much abhor'd and condemn'd; they muſt find *Timoleon*, and the reſt to have as much intereſt and authority in their Countrys, as *Dionyſius* or *Phalaris* had in theirs, and much more ſecurity. Nor let any man deceive himſelf with *Cæſar*'s reputation, finding him ſo exceedingly eminent in Hiſtory, for thoſe who have cryed him up, were either corrupted by his fortune, or terrified by his power, for whil'ſt the Empire continued, it was never permitted that any man ſhould ſpeak any thing againſt him, and doubtleſs had Writers had their liberty, they could have ſaid as much of him as of *Cataline*, and *Cæſar* is ſo much the worſt of the two, by how much it is worſe to effect and perpretate an ill thing, than to deſign it; and this they may judge by what is ſaid of his adverſary *Brutus*, for not daring to ſpeak downright of *Cæſar*, by reaſon of his power, by a kind of reverſe, they magnified his Enemy: After *Rome* alſo was grown to be an Empire, and the Government in the hands of a ſingle perſon, it may be obſerved how much more happy and ſecure thoſe Emperors were who lived like good Princes, according to the dictate of the Laws, than thoſe who lived otherwiſe; for *Titus*, *Nerva*, *Trajanus*, *Adrianus*, *Antoninus*, and *Marcus*, had no need of Prætorian bands, nor multitude of Legions to defend them, their own excellent deportment, the benevolence of the people, and the affection of the Senate, ſaved them that charge: It will appear likewiſe how to *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Vitellius*, and ſeveral other Tyranical Emperors; their Eaſtern and Weſtern Armies were not ſufficient to ſecure them againſt the Enemies, which their irregularity and ill manners had contracted; The Hiſtory of which perſons, if well conſidered, would enable any Prince to diſtinguiſh betwixt the ways of Honour and Infamy, of Security and Fear: For of XXVI Emperors betwixt *Cæſar* and *Maximinus*, XVI were murthered, and but X dyed in their beds; and though ſome of thoſe who were ſlain might poſſibly be good, (as *Pertinax*, and *Galba*) yet they were murthered by reaſon of the corruption and ill diſcipline which their Predeceſſors had left in the Army; and if among thoſe who dyed naturally, there were any Tyranical, (as *Severus*) it is to be imputed to his great Courage and Fortune, which are two things very ſeldom Concomitant in one man, it is legible likewiſe in the ſame Hiſtory upon what Baſis and foundation a Monarchy muſt be built, to make it ſolid, and permanent; for all thoſe Emperors who ſucceeded by hereditary right were ill men, except *Titus* only, and thoſe who came in by Election were good,

good, as *Nerva* and the four which ſucceeded him; but when the Empire became wholly Hereditary, it ran furiouſly to deſtruction. Let the times therefore from *Nerva* to *Marcus* be diſplayed before your Prince, and let him compare them which went before with thoſe which came after, and then make his choice when he would have been born, or when he would have been Soveraign; He will find when good men were at the Helm, the Prince ſafe in the ſecurity of his Subjects; Peace and Juſtice flouriſhing in the world; The Senate in Authority; The Magiſtrates in Eſteem; Rich men enjoying their Eſtates; Nobility and Virtue Exalted; and all things quiet and well; No rancour; No licentiouſneſs; No corruption; No ambition to be found; The times were golden; Every man enjoyed his opinion, and defended it as he pleaſed; In a word, He will find the world triumphing in felicity, The Prince happy in the reverence and affection of the people; and the people ſafe in the generoſity of their Prince. If then the Reigns of the other Emperors be contemplated, they will appear full of commotion, diſcord, and ſedition, aſſaſſinations in Peace; Cruelty in War; Many Princes murther'd; many Foreign, many Domeſtick embroilments; All *Italy* afflicted; and all its Cities deſtroyed; *Rome* burnt; The Capital by its own Inhabitants demoliſhed; The ancient Temples deſolate; Religious Ceremonies prophaned; and the whole City full of Adulteries; The Sea covered with Exiles, and the Rocks with blood; Infinite Cruelties and Barbariſms committed daily in the City; And Nobility, Riches, Honour, and eſpecially Virtue, grown to be Capital offences. Informers and Calumniators will be found to be rewarded; Servants inſtigated againſt their Maſters; Children againſt their Parents; and thoſe few who were ſo unhappy as to have no Enemies; to be deſtroyed by their Friends; Then it will appear what mighty obligations *Rome*, and *Italy*, and the whole world had to *Ceſar*; and doubtleſs if the Prince be indued with the leaſt ſpark of humanity or good nature, he will deteſt the imitation of the bad, and be inflamed with an ardent propenſity to the good. All which things conſidered, that Prince certainly which aims at glory, and reputation in the world ſhould deſire a Government where the manners of his Subjects are corrupted and depraved, not to ſubvert and deſtroy it like *Ceſar*, but to rectifie and reſtore it like *Romulus*, than which the Heavens cannot confer, nor man propoſe to himſelf greater honour. And if a Prince who would regulate and reform a City, cannot do it, without depoſiting his Authority; In that caſe he is excuſable in ſome meaſure, if he diſpences; but where he can retain the one, and accompliſh the other, he is altogether unpardonable; they therefore to whom the Heavens are ſo propitious as to preſent ſuch an opportunity, are to conſider that they have two ways before them, one leading to ſecurity whil'ſt they live, and an honourable memory when they are dead, the other to continual troubles here, and perpetual infamy hereafter.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Religion and Ceremonies of the Romans.

THough *Rome* ſhould have been founded by *Romulus*, and owe him (as his Daughter) for her Birth, and Education; yet the Heavens foreſeeing that the Conſtitutions of *Romulus* would not be ſufficient for ſo great an Empire, put it into the heart of the *Roman* Senate, to create *Numa Pompilius* for his Succeſſor, to the end that what was left defective by the firſt, might be compleated by the latter. *Numa* finding the people martial and fierce, and being deſirous by the Arts of Peace to reduce them to civil obedience, he betook himſelf to Religion, as a thing abſolutely neceſſary to the maintenance of civil policy; and he ordered things, ſo that for many ages together never was the fear of God ſo eminently conſpicuous as in that Common-wealth, which was a great promotion to whatever was deſigned either by the Senate or Princes. And he who ſhall peruſe the infinite actions of that City collectively, or of ſeveral *Romans* in particular, will find thoſe Citizens more tender of falſifying an Oath, than of violating the Laws, judging an offence againſt God more hainons, than an offence againſt Man, and God more able to puniſh it: Of this we have manifeſt Evidence in the Examples of *Scipio*, and *Manlius Torquatus*; for after the defeat which *Hanibal* had given the *Romans* at *Cannas*, the people tumultuating, and many of them aſſembling in great fear to conſider of their condition; They reſolved among themſelves to leave *Italy*, and tranſplant into *Sicily*. *Scipio* having notice, repaired to them immediately, and coming in ſuddenly among them with his Sword drawn, he forced them to recant,

recant, and take a peremptory Oath not to abandon their Country. *Lucius Manlius* Father to *Titus Manlius* (who was afterwards called *Torquatus*) was impeached by *Marcus Pomponius* a *Tribune* of the people. Before the day arrived for the hearing of the Father, the Son coming to the Tribune and threatning to kill him, unless he would swear to withdraw his accusation, he forced him to his Oath, and he performed as he had sworn; and so those Citizens who could not be retained by either the love of their Country, or Laws; were kept at home by an Oath which they took upon force: and the Tribune laid by his hatred to the Father, passed by the insolence of the Son, and neglected the reflection it would have upon his own honour, to be punctual in his Oath; which proceeded from nothing but those principles of Religion which *Numa* had diffused. And surely it will be found by whoever considers the *Roman* History, how useful a thing Religion was to the governing of Armies, to the uniting of the people, to the keeping men good, and to the deterring them from being bad; so that should it fall into dispute whether *Rome* was most obliged to *Romulus* or *Numa*, I am of opinion, *Numa* would have the preheminence, because where Religion is fixed, Military Discipline is easily introduced; but where Religion is wanting, Discipline may be brought in with difficulty, but never in perfection. It is to be seen likewise, that for the constituting a Senate, and establishing of Laws both Military and Civil, *Romulus* had no need to pretend Divine Authority; But with *Numa* it was otherwise, he was of necessity to pretend to it, and thereupon gave out that he had private Conference with a Nymph, who dictated to him what he was to prescribe to the people; and all was, because he had a mind to introduce new Laws and Customs into that City, which he thought his own private authority would never effect. And certainly never any man brought in new Laws, or set up any Doctrine extraordinary, but with pretence of Religion; because otherwise they would never have been admitted; for a man may be wise, and know many things are good, and yet want reasons and argument to convince other people; wherefore to remove that difficulty, prudent men do make that always their pretence, and *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, and several others who had the same design, practised the same. The people (then) admiring the goodness and wisdom of *Numa*, submitted in all things; True it is the devotion of the age, and ignorance of the people contributed much, for thereby he was able to impress them with what new form he thought good; and questionless, he that would establish a Common-wealth at this day, would find it more easie among the rude people of the Mountains who have not been acquainted with Civility; than among such as have been educated in Cities, where their civility was corrupted; like rude unpolished Marble which is more readily carv'd into a Statue, than what has been mangled already by some bungling workman. So that all things considered, I conclude, That the Religion introduced by *Numa*, was one of the first causes of that Cities felicity, because Religion produced good Laws, good Laws good Fortune, and good Fortune a good End in whatever they undertook. And as strictness in Divine Worship, and Conscience of Oaths, are great helps to the advancement of a State, so contempt of the one, and neglect of the other are great means of its destruction. Take away Religion, and take away the foundation of Government; for though perhaps the goodness and fear of their Prince may sustain it for some time, and supply the want of Religion in his Subjects; yet because he is mortal, and possibly but very short lived, that Kingdom can hardly out-live the virtue of its Governor: Wherefore those States which depend only upon the piety of their Princes, are of little duration, for commonly one dyes with the other, and the virtue of the Father seldom revives in the Son, as *Dante* has said very wisely,

Rade volte discende per li rami
L' tunn ana probitate, et questo vuole
Quel che la da, perche da lui si chiami.

Virtue's but seldom to the branches spread,
He who bestows't, has in his wisdom said,
Let him that wants, come to the fountain-head.

Things being thus, it is not sufficient for a Common-wealth or Kingdom to have a Prince who governs it wisely whil'st he lives, but he must lay his foundations so, as it may outlive him, and flourish when he is in his grave; and though rude, and uncultivated people are more susceptible of new Laws, or new Doctrines; yet men that are civil, and presume more upon their Education are not altogether impenitrable. The people of *Florence* thought themselves no fools, and they had a good opinion of their breeding; nevertheless they suffered themselves to be deluded by Frier *Girolamo Savonarola* into a perswasion that he had

had Conference with God. A perſon of his gravity is not to be mentioned but with reverence, and therefore whether true, or not true, I will not determine, only this I ſhall ſay, many believed him, who never ſaw any thing extraordinary to induce them; his Life, his Doctrine, the ſubject of his diſcourſing being in their thoughts enough to convince them. Let no man therefore deſpair of what another man has attained, for men (as I ſaid in my Preface) are born, live, and dye, in the ſame method as formerly.

CHAP. XII.

How neceſſary for the preſervation of a State it is, that Religion be in eſteem, and how much Italy *has ſuffered for want of it, by means of the Church of* Rome.

THoſe Princes and Common-wealths who would keep their Governments entire and incorrupt, are above all things to have a care of Religion and its Ceremonies, and preſerve them in due veneration, for in the whole world there is not a greater ſign of imminent ruine, than when God and his Worſhip are deſpiſed. This is eaſily underſtood by obſerving upon what foundation the Religion is placed where every man is born. The Religion of the *Gentiles* ran much upon the anſwers of Oracles, upon Divinations, and Soothſaying, upon which all the reſt of their Sacrifices, Rights, and Ceremonies did depend; for they did not doubt but the ſame thing that could preſage your fortune (be it good, or be it bad) could as eaſily confer it; and therefore they built their Temples, they made their Sacrifices, they offered up their Prayers, and uſed all other Ceremonies that might ſignifie their veneration; for the Oracles of *Delos*, the Temple of *Jupiter Ammon*, and ſuch other things had a ſtrange influence upon people, and kept them in moſt wonderfull devotion; but afterwards when they began to ſpeak according to the intereſt or directions of great perſons, and their partiality began to be diſcovered; the people grew incredulous, and prone to all kind of diſturbance: A Prince therefore or Common-wealth ought moſt accurately to regard, that his Religion be well founded, and then his Government will laſt, for there is no ſurer way than to keep that good and united. Whatever therefore occurs that may any way be extended to the advantage and reputation of the Religion which they deſign to eſtabliſh (how uncertain or frivolous ſoever it may ſeem to themſelves) yet by all means they are to be propagated and encouraged, and the wiſer the Prince, the more ſure it is to be done; This courſe having been obſerved by wiſe men, has produced the opinion of Miracles, which are celebrated even in thoſe Religions which are falſe; for let their Original be as idle as they pleaſe, a wiſe Prince will be ſure to ſet them forward, and the Princes authority recommends them to every body elſe. Of theſe miracles, there were many in *Rome*, as at the ſacking of *Urii*, ſome of the *Roman* Soldiers entring into the Temple of *Juno*, accoſting her Image, and asking it *Vis venire* Romam, *will you come to* Rome; To ſome of them ſhe ſeemed to beckon by way of conſent, and others fancied ſhe ſaid *Yes*; For thoſe men being more than ordinary religious (as *Titus Livius* infers from the devotion, and reverence, and quietneſs wherewith they entered) they fancied they heard that anſwer, which 'tis poſſible they expected before; and *Camillus* and the other Magiſtrates of the City promoted their belief: And if this diligent care in Divine Worſhip were regarded by Chriſtian Princes according to the Precepts and Inſtructions of him that gave it at firſt, the States and Common-wealths of Chriſtendom would be much more happy and firm: Nor can any thing portend the ruine of our Church with more certainty, than that thoſe who are neareſt the Church of *Rome*, (which is the head of our Religion) ſhould have leſs Religion than other people: and he who ſhould conſider the preſent practice, with the Primitive foundation, would find that either utter deſtruction, or ſome great judgment was hanging over our heads. And foraſmuch as ſome are of opinion, that the felicity and welfare of *Italy* depends upon the Church of *Rome*, I ſhall ſet down ſome few reaſons to the contrary, which I have fram'd to my ſelf, two of which are in my judgment unanſwerable: One is that by the corrupt example of that Court, that Province has loſt all its Religion, and all its Devotion, which has been followed by many inconveniences, and diſorders; for as the Religiouſneſs of the people preſuppoſe all well, ſo where they are wicked, it betokens the contrary; ſo then, we *Italians* have this Obligation to the Church and its Miniſters, that by their means we are become Heatheniſh and Irreligious; beſides another (little leſs pernicious) and that is, that we are grown divided and factious, which muſt of neceſſity be our ruine, becauſe never was any Province happy

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or united, unless under the obedience of one Common-wealth, or one Prince, as *France* and *Spain* at this time: and the reason is, because *Italy* is not upon the same terms, as having no one Republick or Common-wealth to govern it, but the Church, and though the Pope has assumed a Temporal as well as Spiritual jurisdiction, yet he was never so couragious or powerful as to possess himself of all, and make himself Prince; nor was he ever so weak, but upon any apprehension of losing his Temporal Dominion, he could call in some Foreign Potentate to defend him against any man who was grown too formidable; and this has been seen antiently in many Examples, as when by the assistance of *Charles* the Great, he repelled the *Lombards* who in a manner had made themselves Masters of all *Italy*; and when again in our days he retrenched the power of the *Venetians* by the help of the *French*, after which he drove out the *French* by the succour of the *Swizzers*. The *Church* therefore being neither so strong as to conquer all *Italy*, nor so weak as to suffer it to be over-run by any body else, has been the occasion that it never fell into the hands of one person, but has been cantonized into several Principalities, by which means it has been so weak and disunited, that it has been not only exposed as a prey to the power of the *Barbarians*, but to every one that thought good to invade it, which is an unhappiness we *Italians* owe only to the Church: If any man suspects what is said, and would by experience inform himself of the truth, it would be necessary he should be so potent as to transplant the Court of *Rome*, and all its Authority in *Italy* into the Territories of the *Swizzers*, who are the only people at this day which live either as to their Ecclesiastical or Military, Discipline, according to the Model of the Ancients, and then he would quickly find that the wickedness and depravity of that Court, would produce more confusion and disorder in that Country than ever befell it by any accident before.

CHAP. XIII.

How the Romans *pretended Religion many times to regulate their City, to prosecute their Wars, and to pacifie their tumults.*

And I hold it not extravagant to produce two or three Examples in which the *Romans* made use of their Religion both in the regulation of their City, and prosecution of their Wars; and although in *Titus Livius* they be very frequent, yet I shall content my self with these.

After the people of *Rome* had created their Tribunes with consular power, and all of them (except one) from among the *Plebeans*; there hapning that year, a furious Plague, a desperate Famine, and other Prodigies besides, the Nobility in the next creation of Tribunes took advantage of that occasion, and pretended that the Gods were incensed against the people, for that they had debased the Majesty of the Empire, and that there was no remedy to appease them, but to reduce the Election of the Tribunes to its primitive institution; upon which the people were so frighted, they chose all their Tribunes that year, out of the *Patricii*. It was the same case in the taking of *Veii*. The *Romans* had been before it ten years, and no great likelyhood of carrying it; but the Tenth year, the Lake of *Albin* being miraculously swell'd; so as to drown a good part of the Country, the great Officers of the Army observing their Soldiers weary of the Seige, and impatient to be at home, feigning to have consulted the Oracles, they pretended that they had received this answer, That *Veii* should be taken that year that *Albin* overflow'd; which answer reflecting upon their Devotion, the Soldiers reassumed their Courage, continued the Seige, and (*Camillus* being chosen Dictator) carried the Town; and thus you may see how the *Romans* made use of their Religion to encourage their Army against the fatigues and dangers of a tedious Leaguer, and to fright the people from entrenching upon the priviledges of the Nobility in the Election of their Tribunes; without which pretence it would have been a hard matter to have perswaded either the one or the other. There was another example to the same purpose, *Terentillus* a *Tribune* of the people, would needs make a Law (which was called *Lex Terentilla*, and shall be mentioned hereafter) contrary to the interest, and inclination of the Senate. The Senate resolved to oppose it, and the best means they could think of, was pretence of Religion; of which they made use two ways; they ordered the Books of the *Sybils* to be look'd over, and this answer to be returned; That that very year the City would be in great danger of losing its liberty, unless civil Sedition was prevented; which artifice, (notwithstanding it was discovered by the Tribunes) put the people into such a fright, they grew cool in the business, and refused to stand by them. After this, they made use of the same pretence another time; *Appius Herdonius*

having got together of Slaves and Exiles to the number of Four thousand men, seized upon the Capitol in the night, and brought such a terror upon the City, it might very well be feared if the *Æqui* and the *Volsci* (perpetual Enemies to the *Romans*) had taken their opportunity and marched to *Rome*, they would have gone near to have master'd it: However the Tribunes persisted, and nothing could serve their turns, but the *Lex Terentilla* must be promulged; for they affirmed the Stories of being invaded, were but suggestions and fallacies, and not one word of them true: Hereupon one *Publius Rubetius* (a grave Citizen, and of good authority among them) came forth of the Senate, and partly by fair words and partly by foul, remonstrating the danger of the City, and the unseasonableness of their demands, he play'd his part so well, that he constrained the people to take an Oath of fidelity to the Consul; and in testimony of their integrity, the people ran to their Arms, and recovered the Capitol from *Herdonius*; but *Publius Valerius* their Consul being slain in the Conflict, *Titus Quintius* was chosen immediately in his place; who to keep the populace employed, and leave them no time to think of their Law *Terentilla*, commanded them out of Town forthwith against the *Volsci*, alleadging that the Oath which they had taken to be true to the Consul, obliged them to follow him; and though the Tribunes opposed it, and objected that that Oath extended no further than to the Consul that was dead; nevertheless *Livy* tells us, That such was the peoples tenderness and veneration for Religion, that they chose rather to follow the Consul, than to strain and presume upon their Consciences, giving this reason for it.

Nondum hæc, quæ nunc tenet seculum, negligentia deum venerat, nec interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum, & leges aptas faciebat.

The neglect of the Gods, which has overspread this Age, was not then come to that height, nor did every man interpret his Oaths, and accommodate his Laws, to his own interest and advantage.

Upon which the Tribunes perceiving their danger, and that if they persisted, they should run a hazard of being utterly extinguished; they came to an agreement with the Consul, received his Orders, obliged themselves not to insist upon the *Lex Terentilla* for a Twelvemonth, in case the Consuls for the same time would forbear drawing out the people. And thus you see how by pretence of Religion, the Senate overcame a difficulty, which without it, it could never have done.

CHAP. XIV.

The Romans *were wont to interpret their* Auspices *with accommodation to their own pleasures and designs; and when at any time they were forced to transgress, they managed it wisely, and pretended to be very precise; and if any body rashly despised them, he was sure to be punish'd.*

AMong the *Gentiles*, *Auguries* were a great part of their Religion (as I have said elsewhere) and they contributed not a little to the well being of the *Roman* Commonwealth; for which reason the *Romans* had them in particular care, above any other Ordinance, and made use of them in the creation of Consuls, in the undertaking of Enterprizes, in drawing out their Armies, in their Battels and Engagements, and in every other business of importance, whether Military or Civil; nor would they ever begin an Expedition, till they had possessed the Soldiers that the Gods had promised them success. Among the several Orders of *Auspices*, they had one called the *Pullarii*, who were to give their presages before ever they fought with their Enemy: If the Pullen, over which they had inspection, Eat, it was a good Omen, and they might with confidence engage; if they did not Eat, It was an ill sign, and they were obliged to forbear: Nevertheless, when reason told them their Enterprizes were practicable, they went roundly about them, though perhaps their *Auspices* were averse, but acted with great nicety and cunning, that it might not seem done in defiance of Religion: This was practised by *Papirius* the Consul before his Battel with the *Samnites* after which they never recovered. For being drawn up with his Army against the *Samnites*, with all visible advantage, and being willing to fall on, he commanded the *Pullarii* to try their Experiment; the Chickens refusing to peck, was a great trouble to the chief of the *Pullarii*, who observed the great alacrity of the Soldiers, and the great confidence of the General; that an occasion therefore of so signal a Victory might not be taken from the Army, he return'd answer to the Consul that the Omen was good; *Papirius* put his Men immediately into Battalia, and advanced against the Enemy; but some of the *Pullarii* having told it up and down among the Soldiers, that the Pullets did not eat, it came to the ears of *Spurius*

Papirius, Nephew to the Consul, who in great hast advertising his Uncle, received this answer, Spurius *be you diligent, and observe your Orders; to my self and my Army the* Auspicia *are good; if the* Pullarius *has told me false, the misfortune will be to him*; and that the event might correspond to his Prognostick, he commanded the *Pullarii* to be placed in the front of the Battel; His Commands being executed, it hapned by accident as they were advancing to the fight, the chief of the *Pullarii* was killed by a dart from one of the *Roman* Soldiers, which being told to the Consul, *Now* (said he) *all will be well, the Gods are appeased, and the blood of the Author has atton'd for his lye*; and so by a discreet accommodation of his designs to the *Auspice*, he went on to the Combat, his Army taking no notice that he had violated their Religion. Had *Appius Pulcher* been so ingenious in *Sicily* in the first *Punick* War, it had fared better with him when he came home, but being to fight the *Carthaginian* Army, he consulted the *Pullarii*, who informing him that the Pullen would not eat, *We will see then* (said he) *if they will drink*, and caused them to be thrown into the Sea: and coming afterwards to an Engagement, his Army was defeated, himself condemn'd at his return, and *Papirius* advanced, not so much because one had prevailed, and the other was beaten, as because one had prudently evaded the Omen, and the other rashly defyed it; and these *Auguries* were invented for no other end, but that the Soldiers might go to the fight with more confidence and alacrity; for their alacrity was observed to contribute much to their success; and this practice was so fortunate to the *Romans*, that forreign Governments began to make use of it; as I shall show by one Example in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XV.

How the Samnites *in the extremity of their affairs, as their last refuge, had recourse to Religion.*

THe *Samnites* had long War with the *Romans*, fought several Battels with them, and in the last fight in *Tuscany*, were so utterly broken, that their Army was destroyed, their chief Officers slain, and the *Tuscans*, *Gauls*, and *Umbri* (their allies) uncapable of giving them any further assistance; so that *Livy* tells us, *Nec suis, nec externis viribus jam stare poterant, tamen bello non abstinebant, adeo ne infeliciter quidem defensæ libertatis tædebat, & vinci, quam non tentare victoriam malebant.* That though they were reduced to such a condition, *That they could neither support themselves by their own strength, nor the supplies of their Friends, yet they continued the War; so that the unhappiness of their defence could not discourage them, but they chose rather to be conquered, than not to try for the Victory.* Hereupon knowing that no Victory is to be expected, where the Soldier is diffident; and that nothing enhanses them like a Religious opinion; as their last effort, they concluded (by the Ministery of *Ovius Paccius* their Priest) to revive an old Ceremony, which they did in this manner; Altars being erected, and solemn Sacrifice made, betwixt the flaming Altar, and the bones of the Victims, the Officers having first sworn never upon any distress whatsoever to abandon the fight; the Soldiers were called over one by one, and in the same place (before several Centurions with their naked Swords in their hands appointed to that purpose) required to swear, first, that they would not deride any thing that they should either hear or see; after which, with execrable words, and Verses full of horror, they caused them to take their Oaths to be ready at the Command of their Generals, never to fly, and to kill any of their fellows that offer'd to turn his back: and if ever they broke them, they imprecated a judgment upon themselves, and their race. Some of them being scrupulous, and unwilling to swear, were killed upon the place, which struck such terror into the rest, that none of them refused. And that this Ceremony might be performed with more magnificence, there being 40000 Men in the field, half of them were clothed in white, with Plumes of feathers upon their Helmets, in which posture they encamped not far from *Aquilonia*; *Papirius* was sent against them, and in his Speech to his Soldiers, he had this Expression, *Non enim Cristæ vulnera facere, & pilla, atq; aurata scuta, transire* Romanum *pilum. For their feathers made no wounds, nor could the paint or glittering of their Shields protect them against the darts of the* Romans. And to take off the opinion from his Soldiers, that the Solemnity and Nature of their Oath, might make the Enemy desperate; he told them, That that would be rather a terror, than an encouragement to them, when they came to consider that by their own folly they had brought themselves in danger of the Gods, the *Romans*, and their Camarades. In short the *Samnites* were beaten, the

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Roman virtue, and the memory of their own frequent misfortunes prevailing against all the forc'd courage which either their Oath or their Religion could give them. Nevertheless their sense of it was visible, seeing they made use of it as their last remedy, when they had no other hopes to recover their spirits.

This might possibly have been better brought in among my forein discourses, but depending upon one of the ancientest and most important Ceremonies of the *Roman* Common-wealth, lest I should divide my matter, and give too much occasion to look back, I thought it not improper to insert it in this place.

CHAP. XVI.

A people accustomed to the dominion of a Prince, though by accident they may acquire their liberty, yet it is with great difficulty, if they maintain it.

IF the Records of ancient History will serve our turn, it is manifest by many examples, that a people born and bred up in subjection to a Prince, cannot without great difficulty preserve its liberty, if by any accident it attains it, as the *Romans* did upon the expulsion of the *Tarquins* & not without reason; for the people is like a wild beast, (which, though naturally fierce, disposed to live in the woods, and to find out dens and coverts to conceal it self) yet having been always brought up as it were in prison and servitude, if by accident it breaks its bonds, and escapes out into the field, it is in a maze, knows not whither to run, where to sustain, or where to conceal it self, as having been accustomed to bondage and confinement; by which means, if worth the looking after, it is easily recovered. It is the same with a people which has lived always in subjection, who, understanding nothing of publick offence or defence, and knowing as little of Princes as Princes do of them, are with the greatest ease imaginable reduced to a yoke which is commonly more grievous than what they escaped from before; and this happens to them where they are not totally debauched (for where the Mass is corrupted, they cannot subsist a moment): I speak now of those where the malignity is not so diffused, but that there are still left more good men than bad; in which case another difficulty does likewise occur, and that is, whenever the yoke of tyranny is shaken off, and liberty set up, it follows continually that many enemies are created, whose interest it is to subvert it, and no friends made that shall have any advantage by supporting it. By enemies I mean all those *privado's* and favourites of Princes who have enjoyed the preferments and wealth of their Master, and cannot but be disgusted to find themselves dispossessed; wherefore they are constantly ready to take any occasion of restoring their old Prince, that they themselves might be restored to their authority and employment. And for friends whose interest it is that (upon the shaking off their tyrant) their liberty should be preserved, they are not to be expected, because in free States, honours and offices are confer'd upon such as by their virtue, some great atchievement for the benefit of the Common-wealth, or some other honourable action have seemed to deserve them: and when a man receives no more than what he thinks he has deserved, he ascribes it to his own merits rather than to the liberality of the State, and holds himself not obliged. Besides, the common utility resulting from a free State, though it be in their power, is not at all in their knowledg; for who is it that considers, or takes care that every man enjoys quietly what God has given him; that their wives be not dishonoured, their children abused, nor their fellows oppressed? For who is it that will think himself bound to any man for doing him no wrong? and things being so, a free State newly acquired, never creates such friends as will be half so solicitous for its conservation, as those enemies who have been dispossessed of their fortunes and preferments, will be to undermine it, and restore their old Master again: and if it be enquired what course is to be taken against the inconveniencies and disorders which follow thereupon; there is not a more efficacious, safer, and more necessary remedy, than to kill the sons of *Brutus*, who (as History tells us) entred into a conspiracy against the State, with other young Gentlemen of *Rome*, for no other reason but because they could not be so loose and licentious under the Consuls as under the Kings; as if their freedoms were incompatible, and the liberty of the people was servitude to them: wherefore he who proposes to govern a people, whether by the way of Monarchy or Republick, and does not secure himself of those who are adverse to the change, must never think to effect, or at least to enjoy it long: and on the other side, it is convenient he should know the infelicity of those Princes who cannot secure their Dominion without murder and blood; by which means the multitude is incensed, and become mortally their enemies: he

who

who has but few enemies may ſecure it the better; but where the multitude is provoked, no ſecurity is to be had; and the more cruelty is uſed, the weaker the Government; ſo that when all's done, the ſureſt remedy is to indulge the people, and make them your friends. And now (though I may ſeem ſomething confuſed and immethodical in ſpeaking ſometimes of a Prince, and then of a Republick) I ſhall take the liberty to do it here briefly, that I may have no occaſion hereafter. A Prince therefore who, by uſurping upon the liberties of the people, has made them his enemies, (if he deſires to reconcile himſelf) is above all things to conſider what the people affect, and he ſhall find it to conſiſt principally in two things; one is, revenge upon thoſe who have been inſtrumental in their ſlavery; and the other is reſtitution of their liberty. In the firſt the Prince may gratify them fully, in the ſecond but in part. Of the firſt we have an exact inſtance. *Clearchus* Governour of *Heraclia* being baniſhed for his tyranny, a controverſy betwixt the Nobility and the Commons hapning afterwards in that Town, it fell out, that the Nobility finding themſelves the weaker, addreſſed to *Clearchus*, and having entred into confederacy with him, they gave him admiſſion, and overcoming the people, he took away their liberties. But *Clearchus* perceiving himſelf in the clutches of the Nobility, and not only ſubject to their inſolence, (which was neither to be ſatiated nor corrected) but to the rage and fury of the multitude, which could by no means digeſt his encroachments upon their liberty, he reſolved at one blow to rid himſelf of his Grandees, and reconcile himſelf to the people, and taking his opportunity, he cut off all his Nobility with great ſatisfaction to the reſt. The other thing which they deſire with ſo much fervour is reſtitution of their liberty, in which the Prince cannot totally comply without degrading himſelf: he is therefore to examine upon what grounds the people are ſo fond of it, and he will find that ſome few indeed are zealous for their liberty, in hopes of office and preferment; but the greateſt part deſire it only to be ſecure againſt oppreſſion, and to live comfortably, and at eaſe. For in all Governments, whether Republick or Monarchical, forty or fifty men go away with all the commands and offices of importance, which number being ſmall, it is no hard matter for a Prince to ſecure himſelf againſt them, by cutting them off, or by ſuch addition to their former advantages as may in ſome meaſure oblige them.

The reſt, whoſe aim is only to live quietly, are eaſily ſatisfied by conſtituting ſuch Laws and Ordinances as may make the power of the Prince conſiſtant with the ſecurity of the people. If a Prince does this, and be obſerved upon no accident what-ever to violate their Laws, the people will quickly be contented, and believe themſelves ſafe. And of this the Kingdom of *France* is an example; being quiet, and at peace, becauſe the Kings are bound by innumerable Laws, which comprehend the ſecurity of the ſubject; for by the firſt inſtitution of that Monarchy, the Kings have the diſpoſition of their Revenue, and the management of their Armies, but in every thing elſe they are circumſcribed by the Laws. That Prince therefore, or Common-wealth, which at its firſt erection ſecures not it ſelf, is obliged to do it at the firſt opportunity, as the *Romans* did when they murdered the ſons of *Brutus*, and he that ſlips it will repent when 'tis too late: for the people of *Rome* (not yet entirely corrupted) having recovered their liberty, it was ſufficient to maintain it, that they made away the *Bruti*, and extinguiſhed the *Tarquins*, which otherwiſe was not to have been done, had the whole maſs and body of the people been debauched, as I ſhall ſhew in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

A people wholly corrupted in their manners, may poſſibly recover their liberty, but they will find inſuperable difficulty to maintain it.

HAd not Kings been expelled as they were in *Rome*, that City, in my opinion, muſt of neceſſity have declined, and its ancient virtue and authority been loſt; for if the corruption of thoſe Kings be conſidered, had it been propagated but to the third ſucceſſion, it would eaſily have diffuſed it ſelf among the people; and that being infected, nothing could have preſerved the City, much leſs have reſtored it to its former vigour and reputation; but the trunk being entire, and the diſtemper only in the head; by taking off that, the members were capable of being preſerved, and their liberty recovered. And this may be laid down as a poſitive truth, that a City accuſtomed to the dominion of a Prince (if the manners of the people be corrupted) can never make it ſelf free, though the Prince and his whole race be extinguiſhed; for ſome new Lord or other will always ſpring up, unleſs by

by accident the courage and fortune of ſome good Citizen concurs to its preſervation; and even then its liberty will be continued no longer than the life of that perſon; as it hapned in *Siracuſe*, which remained free during the lives of *Dion* and *Timoleon*, (though in different times) but when they were dead, it relapſed, and fell under the ſame tyranny as before; but the moſt evident example of all was in *Rome*, which City having turned out the *Tarquins*, found out a way of ſetting up, and maintaining their liberty a long time; yet when *Cæſar* was ſlain, and *Caligula*, *Nero*, and the whole race of the *Cæſars* extirpated; the *Romans* were ſo far from maintaining it, that they could not ſo much as introduce the leaſt form or appearance of liberty; and the reaſon of that diverſity in the ſame City was no other, but becauſe in the time of the *Tarquins* the people were not generally ſo vitious as afterwards in the reign of *Caligula* and *Nero:* for at the expulſion of the *Tarquins*, to poſſeſs the people then againſt tyranny, it was ſufficient to tender them an oath, by which they engaged never to admit ſingle perſon again in *Rome:* whereas afterwards, upon the death of *Cæſar* and the reſt, neither the authority nor rigour of *Brutus*, with all his Legions in the Eaſt, was able to diſpoſe the people to the aſſertion of that liberty which ſo happily had been ſet up by the firſt of *Brutus* his name. So ſtrangely had the Faction of *Marius* diffuſed their poiſon among the Commons, of which *Cæſar* being head, he had opportunity of blinding the people, and coaxing them into ſervitude ſo ſlily, they could not perceive the yoke into which they were thruſting their necks. Though this example of the *Romans* be pregnant enough, yet it is not brought in for any want in our own times. For in *Naples* and *Milan* the manners of the people being totally debauched, nothing could do, no opportunity could reſtore them to a condition of liberty. 'Tis true, upon the death of *Philip Viſconti*, the *Milaneſes* attempted, but they could never effect it. For which reaſon it was very happy for the *Romans* that their Kings diſcovered their depravity ſo ſoon; for by that means they were driven out before their wickedneſs could dilate, and ſpread it ſelf among the people; which if it had done, the troubles and tumults which ſucceeded thereupon had never had ſo good end, as to make rather for the advantage than prejudice of the City: from whence it may be infer'd, that where the multitude is not corrupt, tumults and diſorders do no very great miſchief; where it is corrupt, Laws may be well conſtituted and provided, and yet do no good, unleſs executed by ſome perſon ſo ſeverely, that the people are compelled to obſerve them, and by ſtrict obſervation to become good; which is a thing I can neither ſay has hapned hitherto, or promiſe it ever will. For it is clear, (as I ſaid before) that a City declining, upon the corruption of the Maſs, can never recover, unleſs it be by the virtue and magnanimity of ſome active Citizen, who takes the adminiſtration of Juſtice into his own hands, and ſees every thing faithfully performed; and even then, that good man is no ſooner in his grave, but the people are in their old ſervitude again. Thus it fell out with the *Thebans*; *Epaminondas*, by his virtue and conduct, enabled them to keep up a form of a Common-wealth whilſt he was alive, but, alas, at his death it was quickly diſſolved; the reaſon is, becauſe no man is ſufficiently long lived, to reclaim a City that has been long accuſtomed to licentiouſneſs, and to reduce it to be good. So that though it happens to have ſuch a good man among them, and he lives a long time; nay, though there be two ſucceſſions of good men, if the third (as I ſaid before) be defective, all goes to wrack, it muſt neceſſarily be ruined, unleſs by many dangers, and great effuſion of blood it happens to be preſerved; becauſe that corruption which renders it ſo unapt and indiſpoſed to a free life, proceeds from the great inequality in that City; and to reduce things to an equality, extraordinary ways muſt be uſed which few people know, and fewer will take, as ſhall be ſhewn more particularly in another place.

CHAP. XVIII.

A corrupt City having made it ſelf free, how its liberty may be maintained; and not having made it ſelf, how its liberty may be procured.

I Think I ſhall not be extravagant, if to what has been ſaid already, I add another quæry; Whether, in a corrupt City, a free State may be maintained (if by any accident it be ſet up); or, if there be no ſuch thing already, how it is to be obtained? I anſwer, both of them are hard; and though a certain rule cannot be preſcribed, (unleſs we knew the degrees of its corruption); nevertheleſs, it being good that every thing be fairly diſcuſt, this queſtion ſhall not be ſuffered to paſs.

I ſhall,

I ſhall preſuppoſe, that the City of which I ſpeak is corrupt in extremity, and in that caſe the difficulty encreaſes with proportion; for no Laws nor Cuſtoms can reſtrain an univerſal depravity; becauſe, as good Cuſtoms cannot ſubſiſt without good Laws, ſo good Laws cannot be executed without good Cuſtoms: beſides, the Laws which are made in the minority and innocence of a Common-wealth, are not ſutable or efficacious when it is grown wicked and robuſt; for the Laws of a City do vary upon ſeveral accidents and emergencies, but the Statutes and fundamental Orders are ſeldom or never changed, for which reaſon new Laws are not ſo neceſſary afterwards, as good Statutes at firſt: but to illuſtrate it farther. By ancient Statute and Cuſtom time out of mind, the Common-wealth of *Rome* was divided betwixt the Senate and the People, and all authority was derived either from the People, or Senate, or Tribunes, or Conſuls; as alſo their creation of Magiſtrates, and enacting of Laws: theſe Cuſtoms were little (if at all) changed in all the revolutions of that State; but the Laws for puniſhing malefactors, and regulating enormities, were enacted or repealed as the exorbitance of the people did fluctuate and require, as the ſumptuary Laws, the Law againſt adultery, ambition, and ſeveral others, inſtituted from time to time, as the Citizens grew corrupter. But the old cuſtoms of State being retained, (though tainted, and ſharing in the corruption of the people) the reviving of old Laws, or introducing of new, was not ſufficient to keep the Citizens good, but it would have contributed much, had the old Cuſtoms been reform'd when thoſe new Laws were introduced, and a new form of Government ſet up: for that thoſe ancient Cuſtoms are of no uſe or advantage where a City is overflown with ſuch a deluge of corruption, is apparent by their methods in the creation of Magiſtrates, and the exhibition of Laws. The Conſulſhip, nor any other office or dignity was never confer'd by the people of *Rome* upon any body but by formal application, which Cuſtom was originally very good, becauſe none ſought for them who was conſcious of being unfit; foraſmuch as to be repulſed was a diſhonourable thing, and to make himſelf fit, every man choſe to be virtuous. But afterwards the manners of the people growing ſo fatally corrupt, this Cuſtom loſt its primitive convenience, and became not only uſeleſs but pernitious; for they who had moſt power, not they who had moſt virtue and capacity, pretended to the Magiſtracy; the poor and the virtuous not daring to appear for fear of an ignominious repulſe: but this inconvenience (like the City it ſelf) was not the product of a day, it ſtole into the Common-wealth, lay concealed, encreaſed, and exerted it ſelf by degrees, as all other inconveniencies do. For having conquered *Affrica* and *Aſia*, and reduced the greateſt part of *Greece*, the *Romans* began to hug themſelves in their liberty, as not knowing any enemy they ought in reaſon to fear: this ſecurity and unhappy ſcarcity of enemies was the occaſion that in their creation of Conſuls the people of *Rome* began to regard riches and favour more than ability and virtue; prefering ſuch perſons as could entertain and treat people handſomely, before ſuch as were grave, and could only conquer their enemies; afterwards, from thoſe who were moſt plauſible, they came down, and created ſuch as were moſt powerful; ſo that perſons of virtue and capacity were totally excluded. In the making of Laws, a *Tribune* and any one Citizen had power to propoſe any thing to the people which they thought of importance to the publick; before whom it was canvas'd and diſcuſs'd, every man having free liberty to object, or promote it (as his judgment directed) before it could paſs.

And this Cuſtom was good likewiſe whilſt the Citizens were ſo too; for it was always, and is ſtill convenient, that if any man be wiſer than the reſt, and can contrive any thing for the ſecurity or benefit of the publick, that he have liberty to propoſe it; and it is as uſeful on the other ſide, every man have the the ſame freedom to ventilate and examine it; that all being well argued, and every mans opinion heard, the beſt may be choſen. But as the Citizens grew corrupt, this Cuſtom grew incommodious: none but great men propoſed any thing to the people, and what they did was not for the common, but their own private intereſt, and which was worſe, no man had the liberty to diſpute it; ſo that the people were either circumvented, or forced to conſent to their own ruine and deſtruction. So then, to have maintained *Rome* free in ſuch an age of corruption, it was neceſſary, as they altered their Laws according to the prevalence of each vice, ſo they ſhould have altered their fundamentals, in the making of Laws, and creation of Magiſtrates; for the ſame Cuſtoms are not equally convenient where the people are not equally good, no more than the forms can be alike where the matter is contrary. But 'tis worth our enquiry whether theſe Cuſtoms be to be reform'd at a blow, as ſoon as their inconvenience is deſcried, or by degrees, before every body obſerves them. I ſay both of them are almoſt impoſſible: for to alter them by degrees, requires ſome wiſe and ſagacious Citizen, that can foreſee the dangers at a diſtance, and trace them to their firſt cauſes; but of ſuch perſons perhaps a City may never ſee one, or if it does, how hard is it for him to perſwade other people; for people accuſtomed to a

way are not eaſily got out of it, eſpecially when the miſchief is rather in probability than proſpect. And when theſe old Cuſtoms are to be reformed, (as appearing unprofitable and dangerous for the Common-wealth) though they be eaſily diſcovered, they are hard to be removed, eſpecially at once; becauſe the common maſs being infected, common ways are too weak; and recourſe muſt be had to extraordinary, as violence and arms; for before the fabrick of the Government can be changed and modelled to your deſire, 'tis neceſſary above all things to make your ſelf Maſter of the City, and to be able to diſpoſe of it at your pleaſure: and becauſe to reform a State, and reduce it to a Civil Regiment, preſuppoſes a good man; and to uſurp, and make ones ſelf Prince by violence, preſuppoſes an ill; therefore it ſeldom falls out that a good man makes himſelf Prince by unjuſt means, be his ends never ſo good; nor will an ill man, who has made himſelf Prince, ever do good: it never falls into his thoughts to employ that authority well which he has unjuſtly acquir'd. From the cauſes aforeſaid therefore ariſes the difficulty (or rather impoſſibility) in a corrupt City, to maintain a free State, much leſs to erect one; and if there ſhould be any way found out to effect it, it would (in my judgment) be neceſſary to frame it rather according to a Regal than a Popular State; that thoſe perſons whoſe inſolence is incorrigible by the Laws, may be bridled and reſtrained by ſome ſupreme Magiſtrate in the nature of a King; and to attempt any other way, muſt be either vain and timerarious, or exorbitantly cruel. For though *Cleomenes* (being a ſingle perſon) killed the *Ephori*, (as is ſaid before) and *Romulus*, his Brother, and *Titus Tatius*, and afterwards employed their authority to the advantage of the publick; yet it is to be conſidered, that the ſubjects neither of the one or the other were ſo vitious or depraved as thoſe of whom we have treated in this Chapter, and therefore they were able to do what they pleaſed, and excuſe it when it was done.

CHAP. XIX.

Though a weak Prince ſucceeds an excellent, the Government may ſtand; but if one weak Prince ſucceeds another, 'tis impoſſible.

IF the virtue and conduct of *Romulus*, *Numa*, and *Tullius* (the three firſt Kings of *Rome*) be conſidered, it will be found to have been much for the advantage of that City to have its firſt King martial, and fierce; the ſecond King, quiet and religious; and the third (like the firſt) active, and war-like again. For, as after the firſt inſtitution, it was neceſſary there ſhould be ſome-body to diſpoſe the people to ways of Religion, and civil converſation; ſo it was neceſſary again after that, that the next King ſhould reaſſume the vigour and magnanimity of their predeceſſor; otherwiſe the minds of the Citizens would have grown effeminate, and the City have become a prey to any of its neighbours. Wherefore it is to be conſidered, that a Prince not altogether ſo valiant and enterprizing, may maintain the Government upon the ſcore of his Predeceſſor, and enjoy the fruits of his courage and labour; but if it happens he be long lived, and that he is not ſucceeded by a martial Prince to revive the activity of the Founder, the Government muſt neceſſarily be ruined. On the other ſide, if two Princes immediately ſucceeding, are martial and heroick, they are obſerved to do great things, and to advance the Government exceedingly: *David*, without doubt, was a perſon no leſs excellent in military experience than in learning and wiſdom; and ſo great was his courage, that he left his Kingdom to his Son *Solomon* in quiet and peace, who by arts of peace rather than war enjoyed it happily his time upon account of his Father; but he could not leave it to *Reboboam* as he had received it of his Father: for *Reboboam* being neither like his Grandfather in courage, nor his Father in wiſdom, ſucceeded ſcarcely to the ſixt part of his Empire. *Bajazet* the *Turkiſh* Scholar, though more ſtudious of peace than of war, enjoyed the labours of *Mahomet* his Father, who having (like *David*) ſubdued all his neighbours, left him a Kingdom entire, that might be peaceably maintained; but had (*Bazjazet*'s Son) *Selimus* now reigning, taken after his Father, and not his Grandfather, that Empire had been ruined; but he out-goes the glory of his Grandfather.

From hence may be obſerved, that after an excellent and magnificent Prince, a puſillanimous may ſucceed, and the Government ſtand; but if one poor ſpirited Prince ſucceeds another immediately, 'tis impoſſible it ſhould ſubſiſt, unleſs (like *France*) it be ſupported by its old Cuſtoms and Laws: I call thoſe Princes weak and puſillanimous, who are not converſant, nor addicted to the exerciſe of Arms, and do conclude, that the tranquillity of *Numas*'s Reign (which continued for many years) was to be attributed to the courage and activity of *Romulus*,

mulus, which was revived again in *Tullus* the third King, after whom followed *Ancus*, a Prince of so excellent a temper, that he knew how to comport as well in the calms of peace as the tempests of war. His first practice was gentle, and by methods of peace, but finding he was look'd upon as effeminate, and grew contemptible to his neighbours, he perceived the way to preserve his dignity, was, to betake himself to martial courses, and manage his affairs rather like *Romulus* than *Numa*. From hence an useful example for all Princes may be taken, and it may be observed, that whoever is in the possession of a State, and follows the example of *Numa*, may either keep it, or lose it, according to the different circumstances of fortune, or time. But he who imitates *Romulus*, and is arm'd with wisdom and prowess, shall be sure to keep it, unless some extraordinary and irresistible power intervenes to supplant him. And 'tis in probability to be thought, that had not the third King of *Rome* prov'd a martial Prince, and one who knew by his Arms to recover his declining reputation, he could never (or with great difficulty) have regained it, or performed those exploits which he did afterwards: so that whilst *Rome* was a Monarchy, and under the Government of Kings, it was under a double danger of destruction, either by the mildness, or the tyranny of its Prince.

CHAP. XX.

Two good Princes, immediately succeeding, may do great things; and well-grounded Common-wealths having always a virtuous succession, their Conquests and Acquisitions must of necessity be according.

When Monarchy was banished by the *Romans*, their dangers were banished with them, and they lay under no fear of either weak Prince or Tyrant; for the command of the Empire was put into the hands of the Consuls, who came to that authority, not by inheritance, or any indirect or violent ambition, but by the suffrage of the people, and were always excellent persons. The City of *Rome* enjoying from time to time the benefit of their fortune and virtue, might without much difficulty arrive at the highest top of greatness and dignity, (as it did) in the same number of years as it was under the Government of Kings. For we see in the examples of *Philip* of *Macedon*, and his Son *Alexander* the Great, that a succession of two martial Princes (without a peaceable interposed) is sufficient to conquer the World. And if it were possible in a Monarchy, 'tis easy in a Common-wealth, in whose power it is to elect, not only two, but an infinite and continued succession of virtuous persons; so that in a well-ordered Common-wealth, the succession is constantly good.

CHAP. XXI.

How much that Prince or Common-wealth is to be condemned, which neglects to train up Souldiers of its own.

The Princes and Common-wealths of our times, if to defend themselves, or offend their enemy, (as occasion serves) they be unable to bring Souldiers of their own into the Field, they may thank themselves, and acknowledge (with *Tullus*) that 'tis not so much want of capacity in their subjects, as want of wisdom in them for neglecting to train them. For when *Tullus* came to the Crown, *Rome* had been forty years together in peace, (during all *Numa*'s Reign) and there was not a man to be found who had ever seen the face of an enemy, nevertheless his own designs being martial, he resolved to make no use of the *Samnites* or *Tuscans*, or any other Mercenarie, but as a wise Prince, to discipline his own; and his art and experience was such, that in a short time he made them excellent Souldiers; and there is nothing more certain, than that where men are unapt for war, the fault is not in the situation or nature of the place, but in the carelessness or defect of the Magistrate; of which we have a fresh and memorable example. There is scarce any body ignorant, that of late years the English invaded *France*, and entertained no Souldiers but their own; and yet, though *England* had had no wars of thirty years before, and had neither Officer nor Souldier who had ever seen a Battel, they ventured to attaque a Kingdom where the Officers were excellent, the Souldiers very good, having been trained up for several years together in the

Italian wars. This proceeded from the prudence of the Prince, and the excellence of that Government, in which (though in times of peace) the exerciſe of Arms is not intermitted; *Pelopidas* and *Epiminondas* having relieved *Thebes*, and reſcued it from the tyranny of the *Spartans*, finding themſelves in the middle of a ſervile and effeminate people, they ſo ordered it by their virtue and diſcipline, that they brought them to the uſe of Arms, took the field with them againſt the *Spartans*, and overthrew them. From whence that Hiſtorian infers, that there are Souldiers not only in *Lacedemon*, but where-ever there are men, if there be any body to exerciſe and train them; which *Tullus* performed moſt exquiſitly among the *Romans*, and as moſt excellently expreſſed by *Virgil*, in theſe words.

---------- *Deſideſq; movebit*
Tullus *in arma viros.*

No ſoft unactive people *Tullus* knows,
But trains up all promiſcuouſly to blows.

CHAP. XXII.

What is to be obſerved from the Combat betwixt the three Roman Horatii, *and the three Alban* Curiatii.

BY Articles betwixt *Tullus* King of *Rome*, and *Metius* King of *Alba*, it was agreed, that whichſoever of the two ſides ſhould overcome, that King ſhould have the dominion of the other. The *Curiatii* were all killed; but one of the *Horatii* being left, *Metius* and his *Albans* fell into ſubjection to the *Romans*.

Horatius returning in great triumph into the City, and meeting a Siſter of his (who was married to one of the *Curiatii*) lamenting the loſs of her Husband, in a great paſſion he killed her; for which inhumanity being brought to his trial, he was, after many arguments, diſcharged, but more upon his Fathers interceſſion than his own merits. In which accident there were three things conſiderable; that we are never to venture our whole fortune upon the ſucceſs of a Party; another is, that offences and deſerts are not equally rewarded in a well-ordered City; the third, that no compact is well made, where the performance is or ought to be ſuſpected. For to become ſervile, and in ſubjection to another City, is a thing of ſuch moment and importance, that it is not to be believed that any Prince or State whatſoever ſhould be content that their liberty ſhould be expoſed to the ſucceſs or courage of three of their Citizens; and this was evident in *Metius*; for though upon the Victory of the *Romans* he ſeemed to acquieſce, and promiſed obedience, as by Articles was agreed, yet in the firſt Expedition the *Romans* undertook againſt the *Veientes*, 'tis manifeſt he would have deceived *Tullus*, as one who repented of the covenants which he had made: but becauſe of the third we have ſpoken largely already, in the next two Chapters we ſhall ſpeak only of the other two.

CHAP. XXIII.

That our whole fortune is not to be ventured upon part of our force, and that for that reaſon the keeping of paſſes is many times dangerous,

IT was never thought diſcretion to put your whole fortune in danger, unleſs your whole force was ready to defend it. This error is committed ſeveral ways; one is when, like *Tullus* and *Metius*, they commit the fortune and virtue of ſo many men as either of them had in their Army, to the fortune and virtue of three particular perſons, which was but a pitiful part of either of their ſtrength, not conſidering how, by that agreement, all the pains which their Predeceſſors had taken to eſtabliſh their liberty, and enable their fellow Citizens to defend it, was rendred vain and ineffectual, by putting it into the power of three perſons to deſtroy it; than which (in my judgment) thoſe two Kings could not have done worſe. Another great error is, when, upon the approach of an enemy, we truſt all to the keeping of an avenue, or the defence of a paſs, unleſs it may be done with our whole force: in that caſe indeed the reſolution is good; but if the paſſage be narrow, and not room

room enough for your whole power, it is uncertain and dangerous; and that which perſwades me to be of that opinion, is the example of ſuch as having been invaded by a potent Enemy, though their Country was environed with Mountains and Rocks, yet they would not attend, and engage the Enemy upon the paſſes or Mountains, but marched out of their holds to encounter him; or elſe (which is as bad) they forſook their advantages, and expected him in ſome plain or convenient place within: And the reaſon is (as aforeſaid) becauſe many men cannot be brought to defend ſuch places as are Rocky, for want of ſubſiſtance; and the paſſage being ſtraight, it can receive but few people, and by conſequence is not able to ſuſtain the inſult of a very great Army, and the Enemy may bring as many as he pleaſes to attack it, becauſe his buſineſs is not to fix there, but to paſs thorow and be gone: whereas he who is to defend it, cannot be in any conſiderable Body, being (by reaſon of the uncertainty of the Enemies approach) to lye there continually, though (as I ſaid before) the places are both barren and ſtraight. Having loſt therefore that paſs which you imagined to keep, and upon which your Army and People did wholly rely, the remainder of your Army, and Subjects are poſſeſſed with ſuch a fear, that you can have no farther trial of their courage, but all goes to wrack, and your whole fortune loſt, but with part of your Army. With what difficulty *Hanibal* paſſed the *Alps* betwixt *France* and *Lombardy*, and betwixt *Lombardy* and *Tuſcany*, there is no body ignorant; nevertheleſs the *Romans* choſe rather to attend him upon the *Teſin*, and afterwards in the plain of *Arezzo*, where the danger was equal both to the Enemy and them, than to carry their Army up into the clouds upon the Rocks and the Snow, to be conſumed by the incommodity of the place, before the Enemy came at them. And whoſoever ſhall read Hiſtory deliberately, ſhall find few great Captains that would coop themſelves up in ſuch paſſes and ſtraights, not only for the reaſons aboveſaid, but becauſe all of them cannot be ſtop'd, the Mountains in that reſpect being like the fields, having not only their Roads and High-ways, but by-paths and paſſages, which though not obſerved by Strangers, are well enough known to the Inhabitants, who will be always ready to conduct the Enemy, to remove them farther off who lye conſtantly upon them. Of this a late Example may be brought, in the year 1515. when *Francis* King of *France* deſign'd to paſs into *Italy* for the recovery of *Lombardy*, the great objection by thoſe who were againſt the Expedition, was, That the *Swizzers* would obſtruct his paſſage over the Mountains, which argument was found idle afterwards, for the King of *France* waving two or three places which they had guarded, paſſed by a private and unknown way, and was upon their backs in *Italy*, before they perceiv'd him; ſo that being mightily ſurprized, the Enemy quitted his Poſts, and retired into *Italy*, and all the *Lombards* ſubmitted to the *French*; they being deceived in their opinion, who thought the *French* were with more Eaſe and Convenience to be obſtructed in the Mountains.

CHAP. XXIV.

In well Ordered Governments, offence and deſert are never ſet one againſt the other, but he who does well, is rewarded, and he who does otherwiſe, is puniſhed.

THe merits of *Horatius* were very great, having by his own ſingle valor and conduct, overcome the *Curiatii*; after which he committed a moſt abominable act, in killing his own Siſter: which Murther was ſo hainous in the Eyes of the *Romans*, that he was brought to a Trial for his life, though his deſerts were ſo freſh and conſiderable; which at firſt ſight ſeem ingrateful in the people; but he who examines it ſtrictly, and weighs how neceſſary and ſacred a thing Juſtice ought to be in every Common-wealth, will find them more blameable for diſcharging, than they would have been for condemning him; and the reaſon is, becauſe in a well conſtituted State no man's good actions ſhould indemnify him for doing ill, for puniſhment being as due to ill actions, as rewards are to good, having rewarded a man for doing well, he is ſatisfied for what he did, and the obligation diſcharged; ſo as if afterwards he commits a Crime, he is to be puniſhed ſeverely according to the Nature of his offence; by the obſervation of which Orders, a City may continue free a long time, which otherwiſe will quickly go to ruine. For if a Citizen having perform'd any great Exploit for his Country, ſhould expect not only honor and reward for what he has done, but priviledge, and impunity for any miſchief he ſhould do afterwards, his inſolence would in a ſhort time grow inſupportable, and inconſiſtent with Civil Government. So

then

then it is very neceſſary for diſcouragement from ill actions, to recompence good, which was the practice in *Rome*, and though where a Common-wealth is poor, her rewards cannot be great; yet even out of that ſmall ſtock, ſhe is to be punctually grateful, for a thing (how little ſoever) given in acknowledgment of ones good Service (let it be never ſo great) is look'd upon as Honorable, and received as a Magnificent reward. The Stories of *Horatius Cocles*, and *Mutius Scevola* are generally famous. *Cocles* with incomparable courage maintained fight againſt a great body of the Enemy upon the Bridge over *Tiber*, till it was cut behind him, and their paſſage obſtructed: The other deſigning againſt the life of *Porſinna* King of *Tuſcany*, and killing his Secretary by miſtake, being apprehended and brought before the King, to ſhow the courage and conſtancy of the *Romans*, he thruſt his own hand into the fire, and burnt it off before his face; and how were they gratified? marry each of them had two *Staiora's*, which is as much ground as can be ſown with two Buſhels of Corn. The Hiſtory of *Manlius Capitolinus* is no leſs remarkable: Having relieved the Capitol (which the *French* had ſurprized in the night) and beaten them out again, his Camerades in requital gave him a certain meaſure of Flower, which (as times went then) was a mighty reward, and eſteemed ſo adequate to the Service, that *Manlius* afterwards either out of ambition or ill nature, cauſing a tumult in *Rome*, and endeavouring to debauch the people, (his former exploits being as they thought amply rewarded) without farther regard to him, they threw him headlong down that *Capitol*, which he had ſo glorioufly preſerved.

CHAP. XXV.

Though it is many times convenient to reform the old Fundamental Cuſtoms of a free City, yet it is convenient ſtill to retain ſome ſhadow and appearance of their ancient ways.

HE who deſires to ſet up a new form of Government in a Common-wealth, that ſhall be laſting, and acceptable to the people, is with great caution to preſerve at leaſt ſome ſhadow and reſemblance of the old, That the people may (if poſſible) be inſenſible of the innovation; for the generality of Mankind do not penetrate ſo far into things, but that outward appearance, is as acceptable to them as verity it ſelf. For this cauſe the *Romans* at the beginning of their liberty, when their Kings were expelled, thought it expedient to create two Conſuls inſtead of one King, aſſigning them only XII Lictors, that their number might not exceed what attended upon the King. Beſides this, there was an anniverſary Sacrifice in *Rome*, in which the Miniſtry of the King was of neceſſity required: To ſalve that defect, the *Romans* created a chief of the ſaid Sacrifice with the Title of Royal Prieſt (but with ſubordination to the High Prieſt) by which Artifice the people were ſatisfied with their Sacrifice, and took no occaſion to complain for the expulſion of their King. He therefore who deſires to reform the policy of a State, and to introduce a new, is to diſguiſe it to the people by the retention (at leaſt in appearance) of ſome part of the ancient Cuſtoms, that may keep them from diſcerning it; and if at any time by accident there be a neceſſity of changing the power, the number and duration of the Magiſtrates, it will be convenient to continue the Name. This (as I ſaid before) is to be obſerved by any one who would eſtabliſh an abſolute power either in a Republick; or Monarchical way, but he who would erect ſuch an abſolute power, as by Authors is called Tyrannies muſt unravel the whole bottom, and innovate all.

CHAP. XXVI.

A new Prince in a new Conqueſt, is to make every thing new.

WHoever makes himſelf Lord of a City or State (and eſpecially if he finds himſelf weak) and ſuſpects his ability to keep it) if he intends not to continue the Government in the old way, either by Kingſhip or Common-wealth, the beſt courſe he can take is to ſubvert all, to turn every thing topſie turvy; and make all things as new as himſelf. To alter the Magiſtracy, create new Titles, elect new perſons, confer new Authorities, advance the Poor, and impoveriſh the Rich, that what is ſaid of *David*, may be ſaid of him, *Eſurientes implevit bonis, & divites dimiſit inanes. He filled the hungry with good*

good things, and the rich he ſent empty away. Beſides it is his intereſt to build new Cities, to erect new Corporations; to demoliſh and uncharter the old; to ſhift the Inhabitants from one place to another; in a word, ſo to toſs and tranſpoſe every thing, that there be no honor, nor wealth, nor preferment in the whole Province, but what is ownable to him. And for this he need go no farther than *Philip* of *Macedon* (Father to *Alexander* the Great) for his pattern, who by this practice, of a ſmall Prince, made himſelf Monarch of all *Greece*, of whom it is ſaid, *That he removed his people, as a Shepheard did his fold.* Thoſe ways are cruel, and contrary not only to all civil, but to all Chriſtian, and indeed humane converſation; for which reaſon they are to be rejected by every body, for certainly 'tis better to remain a private perſon, than to make ones ſelf King, by the calamity and deſtruction of his people. Nevertheleſs, he who neglects to take the firſt good way, if he will preſerve himſelf, muſt make uſe of this bad; for though many Princes take a middle way betwixt both, yet they find it extream difficult and dangerous; for being neither good nor bad, they are neither fear'd nor belov'd, and ſo unlikely to proſper.

CHAP. XXVII.

Men are as ſeldom perfectly bad, as they are perfectly good.

IN the year 1505. Pope *Julius* II. marched his Army into *Bologna* to drive the Family of the *Bentivogli* out of that State, where they had commanded with Supremacy a hundred years. In the ſame Expedition he reſolved to remove *John Pagolo Baglione* out of *Perugia* (where he had uſurped) and in a word, all ſuch Tyrants as had got any Church Lands into their poſſeſſion. Coming to the Town with the deſire and reſolution aforeſaid, he attended not till he could march in with his Army; but enter'd as it were naked and diſarmed (though *John Pagolo* was in perſon in the City, and many of his party which were got together to defend him) ſo that tranſported with the uſual vehemence wherewith he managed all his affairs, he put himſelf (with his bare guards) into the hands of his Enemy; yet he ſucceeded ſo well, that he carried *Pagolo* off with him, and put in another Governor in behalf of the Church. Wiſe men who were then about his Holineſs, admiring the timerity of the one, as much as the puſilanimity of the other, could not imagine how it ſhould come to paſs, that *Pagolo* having his Enemy as it were naked in his hands, and by conſequence an opportunity (with perpetual glory to himſelf) to have ſecured him, and pillaged his Equipage (for all the Cardinals were then with him, with the moſt precious of their Jewels) ſhould ſo ſtrangely neglect it; eſpecially when they conſidered that it was neither Conſcience nor good nature which reſtrained him; for neither of thoſe were to be ſuppoſed in a man who had been nought with his own Siſter, and murther'd ſeveral of his Relations, to make his way to the Government; wherefore it was concluded to happen, becauſe it is ſo provided by Providence, that no man can be exquiſitely wicked, no more than good in perfection; for where there is any thing great and magnificent in a miſchief, they know not how to commit it: So *John Pagolo* who made no bones of either Parricide or Inceſt, could not (or to ſpeak more properly) durſt not make uſe of his opportunity to perpetrate a thing, which would have filled the world with admiration of his courage, and made his memory venerable to poſterity; for he would have been the firſt who had given his Cardinals to underſtand how little it is to their reputation to Lord it, and luxuriate as they do; and the greatneſs of the Fact would have leſſened the Scandal, and prevented any danger that might enſue.

CHAP. XXVIII.

For what reaſons the Romans *were leſs ingrateful to their Citizens, than the* Athenians.

WHoever reads and obſerves the paſſages in Common-wealths, will find a touch of ingratitude towards their Citizens in them all, but leſs in *Rome* than in *Athens*, and perhaps in any other Republick whatever. The reaſon (I ſuppoſe was, becauſe *Rome* had not that occaſion of Jealouſie as *Athens* had: For in *Rome*, from the expulſion of the Kings, to the time of *Silla* and *Marius*, the liberty of the City was never diſturbed by any

man

man within it; so that there being no reason to apprehend, there was no reason to persecute. In *Athens* it was otherwise; for their liberty being invaded and taken away by *Pisistratus* when it was most flourishing, and compleat; and that by a pretence of advancing it; They no sooner recover'd it; but remembring the injuries which they had received, and their passed servitude, they flew out into such an exorbitancy of revenge, that they punished not only the faults of their fellow Citizens, but the least umbrage, and appearances of them, from whence followed the Banishment, and Execution of so many excellent persons; Hence came the *Ostracism* Laws, and all the rest of the outrages committed afterwards upon the chief of their City, for as ye Writers of Politicks observe very well, the people are more cruel and vindicative who have lost and recovered their liberty, than they who have preserved it, as it was left them by their Fathers. He therefore who considers what is said, will neither condemn *Athens*, nor magnifie *Rome*; but impute all to necessity upon the diversity of accidents which hapned in each City. And certainly, if it be seriously considered, it will appear, that if the liberty of the *Romans* had been oppressed, as the liberty of the *Athenians* was, *Rome* would have been no better natur'd, or shown more compassion to its fellow Citizens, than *Athens* did: And this may be infallibly deduced by what hapned (after the expulsion of the Kings) against *Collatinus* and P. *Valerius*; for *Collatinus* (though he had been very active in asserting their liberty) was banished for bearing only the Name of *Tarquin*; and the other had like to have ran the same destiny, for building a house only, upon the top of Mount *Celius*, which they suspected was to command the City. So that it may probably be presumed (by its suspition and severity in the two cases aforesaid) that *Rome* would have exercised the same ingratitude, had it been injured in its minority, as *Athens* had been. And that I may have no occasion to discourse of ingratitude hereafter; I shall speak of it more largely in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether the Prince, or the People, is most subject to be ingrateful.

And because we have undertaken to enlarge upon this subject, I think it not amiss to examine which are most frequently guilty of ingratitude, the Prince, or the People: For better explication, I say, That men are ingrateful, either out of suspition, or avarice. For if a Prince, or Republick send out any of their great Captains upon some important Expedition, which the said Captain atchieves, and gains honor to himself, and reputation to his Master, in this case the Prince, or State, is obliged to reward him; but if instead of rewarding, they casheer, or disgrace him, or out of a covetous principle, deny him his pay, the ingratitude is inexcusable, and leaves a scandal behind it that can never be worn out, and yet many Princes are too guilty of it; *Cornelius Tacitus* gives us the reason in this Sentence, *Proclivius est injuriæ, quam beneficio vicem exoluere, quia gratia Onori, ultio in quæstu habetur. 'Tis more natural to return an injury, than a courtesie, because courtesies are burthensom, but revenge is sweet.* But if this ingratitude either in Prince or People, proceeds not so much from avarice, as suspicion, in that case it is somewhat excusable, and of that kind we read of good store, as when a General has conquered a Province or Empire for his Master, when he has exterminated his Enemies, enriched his Army, and gain'd himself a great Name, 'tis impossible but he must be so acceptable to his own Soldiers, and so dreadful to his Enemies, as must beget a jealousie in the Prince; for the Nature of man being jealous and ambitious, and not to be confined within the bounds of his fortune, it cannot be but if the Prince has taken a fancy that the glory of his General, is a diminution to his, the General must by some vain-glorious, or discontented action, establish and confirm it; and then what has the Prince to do? but to secure himself either by causing him to be murthered, by taking away his Command, lessening his reputation with the Soldiers and People, and by all ways of industry possessing them, that the Victory was not obtained by any Conduct of his, but by the kindness of Fortune, vileness of the Enemy, or prudence and good management of the rest of the Officers.

After *Vespasian* (being in *Judea*) was declared Emperor by his Army, *Antonius Primus* being at the same time in *Illyria* with another Army, declared for the Emperor, and marched into *Italy* against *Vitellius* who was then Paramount in *Rome*; and having beaten him in two pitch'd Battels, he enter'd the City in the Name of *Vespasian*: So that *Mutianus* being sent against *Vitellius* by *Vespasian*, he found the Enemy broken, the Town taken,

and

and all things done by *Antonius* to his hand. And how was he requited? Why *Mutianus* took away his Commiſſion, removed him from the Army, and by degrees ſo leſſened his Authority in *Rome*, that *Antonius* going into *Aſia* to make his Complaints to *Veſpaſian*, was received ſo coldly, that in a ſhort time he was ſtript of all kind of authority, and dyed very miſerable: and of this Nature examples are very frequent in Hiſtory; every body knows how in our times *Gonſalvo Ferrante*, being the King of *Arragon*'s General in the Kingdom of *Naples* againſt the *French*, behaved himſelf ſo well, that by his ſingular Conduct he conquered it, and put it wholly under the obedience of his Maſter, who coming afterwards to *Naples* himſelf, took from him the Command of his Army, diſpoſſeſſed him of many ſtrong places which he held in that Country, and carried him with him into *Spain*, where not long after, he dyed in obſcurity. But there is no remedy; theſe kind of jealouſies are ſo natural to Princes, that it is almoſt impoſſible for them to be grateful to any man, who has performed any great thing for them. And if it be ſo with Kings, no wonder if it be ſo with the people, for in a free State, they have always two principal ends, one is to enlarge their Dominions, the other to keep what they have got, and their eagerneſs to both theſe, makes them ſo often guilty of ingratitude. As to the firſt point, we ſhall ſpeak elſewhere; the errors in preſerving their liberty; to diſguſt ſuch perſons as ought to be rewarded, and to ſuſpect ſuch as ought to be truſted; and though ſuch practices are the occaſion of great miſchiefs in a corrupt Common-wealth, and Tyranny does many times enſue (as in *Rome* by *Ceſar*, who took that by force, which the ingratitude of the people denied to his merits) yet in a Town that is entire, and incorrupt, they do very well, and add much to the duration of their liberty, to enforce great and ambitious men for fear of puniſhment to comport themſelves better. In my judgment of all the Common-wealths that ever had Empire, *Rome* was the leaſt ingrateful for the reaſons aboveſaid, there being never an Example of its ingratitude but in the caſe of *Scipio*: For *Coriolanus* and *Camillus* were baniſhed for their injuries to the people, and though one of them remaining obſtinate, was never recalled; yet the other was not only recalled, but ſo reſtored to the affections of the people, that all his life after, they adored him as a Prince. But their jealouſie of *Scipio* was of ſuch a ſort, as had never been known before, proceeding from the Ornaments of his body, and the endowments of his mind; His youth, his wiſdom, his excellent qualifications had render'd him too admirable; the powerfulneſs of his Enemy, the danger and tediouſneſs of the War (which he had concluded in a very ſhort time) his deliberation in reſolving, and his quickneſs in Execution, had gained him a greater reputation, than was ever got by any General before him, inſomuch as the Senators, Pretors, and all the chief Magiſtrates in the City began to fear and reſpect him. This was no pleaſing ſight to the graver ſort, becauſe it had not been formerly the Cuſtom in *Rome*; whereupon *Cato* (a man of great eſteem for his piety and juſtice) took up the Cudgels againſt him, and complained publickly that the City could not be called free, whil'ſt the Magiſtrates were in awe of any particular Citizen; if then in a thing ſo nearly importing their liberty, the people followed the opinion of *Cato*, in my judgment they were in ſome meaſure to be excuſed. In ſhort, my opinion is, as I ſaid before, that it is avarice and ſuſpicion which makes men ingrateful: To the firſt of which the people are not naturally addicted; and to the laſt, with much leſs propenſity than Princes, as having leſs occaſion, which ſhall be proved hereafter.

CHAP. XXX.

What rules are to be obſerved by a Prince or Common-wealth to avoid this Vice of ingratitude, and how a General or great Citizen is to demean himſelf to elude it.

TO avoid the neceſſity of living always in ſuſpition, and being ingrateful to his Miniſters, a Prince ought to go perſonally with his Armies, as was done at firſt by the Emperors of *Rome*, as the great *Turk* does now, and as all they do and have done that are valiant and couragious; for in ſo doing, the honor and profit of their Victories accrews to themſelves; but where they are not preſent at their Conqueſts themſelves, the honor redounds upon their Officers, and they have not any compleat enjoyment of their ſucceſſes, till they have eclipſed, if not extinguiſhed that glory in other people, which they durſt not venture for themſelves; ſo that their ingratitude, and injuſtice to their Officers, does them more miſchief, than their Conqueſts do them good. But when out of negligence, or

imprudence, they lye at home idle themſelves, and ſend their Generals in their ſtead, know no better precept to give them, than what they know already themſelves. As to the General, if he finds that jealouſie inevitable, he has his choice of two things. As ſoon as the War is ended, he is voluntarily to lay down his Commiſſion, and to preſent it to his Maſter, before he has occaſion to demand it, uſing great care that none of his actions diſcover him to be either inſolent or ambitious, that his Prince having no cauſe to ſuſpect him, may have the greater obligation to reward him. If this way does not pleaſe, the other is quite contrary; and that is, to declare himſelf boldly, and try always to ſet up for himſelf, cajoling and ſweetning his Soldiers and Subjects, making new alliances with his Neighbors, ſeizing upon the ſtrong Towns, corrupting the Officers, and where they will not be corrupted, ſecuring them ſome other way, and by doing thus, he ſhall be even with his Lord, for his ingratitude deſigned: And beſides theſe two ways, there is none that I know. But (as I ſaid before) becauſe men can neither be good nor bad in extremity, it happens that great men are unwilling to quit their Commands, and retire after the gaining of a Victory; behave themſelves modeſtly they cannot: and to uſe rigour in an honourable way is impoſſible. So that whil'ſt they are in ſuſpence, and uncertain which courſe to ſteer, they are many times deſtroyed. As to a Common-wealth that would preſerve and exempt it ſelf from this deteſtable vice of ingratitude, the ſame remedy cannot be preſcribed, as was preſcribed to a Prince; for not being able to manage its Wars in Perſon as a Prince may do, the command of their Forces muſt of neceſſity be committed to ſome of their Subjects. The beſt way they can take, is to follow the Example of *Rome*, and that will render them leſs ingrateful than their Neighbors. In the Wars of the *Romans*, by ancient Cuſtom all people were employed, as well Nobles as others, and from thence it came that they were always well furniſhed with Generals and Officers of all ſorts, which kept them from being jealous of any one, having ſo many of equal merit to oppoſe him: Beſides which, there were expreſs Laws againſt ambition, and all people ſo narrowly obſerved, that no man durſt diſcover the leaſt deſign or inclination that way; and in the creation of Dictators, he was commonly prefer'd, who debas'd himſelf moſt, or diſcovered leaſt deſire to obtain it; by which means preventing the occaſion of ſuſpicion, they prevented the ingratitude. That State therefore which would avoid the guilt of ingratitude, is to imitate *Rome*, and that perſon who would avoid the effects, muſt obſerve how the *Romans* defended themſelves.

CHAP. XXXI.

That the Romans *uſed no extraordinary puniſhments towards their great Captains, when they committed an Error of ignorance, or malice, provided the Government was not damnified by it.*

THe *Romans* (as I ſaid before) were not only leſs unthankful, than their Neighbors; but they were more humane and gentle in the puniſhment of their Generals, than any other State; if their miſcarriage was malicious, they puniſhed it not ſeverely; but if it was by ignorance or miſtake, inſtead of revenging, they did many times reward it; and this they did upon very grave conſideration, for the *Romans* underſtood the charge of an Army to be ſo great a care, and of ſuch tranſcendant importance, that whoever undertook it, ought to have his mind free and indiſturbed by any other reſpects or troubles whatſoever, for his thoughts being with his troubles, he would never mind his Army, nor take any advantage. For Example, an Army is ſent into *Greece* againſt *Philip* of *Macedon*, or into *Italy* againſt *Hanibal*, or thoſe people upon the Frontiers, which had been conquered before, and the Captain who has the General Command, is loaden with all the cares which do commonly attend great and extraordinary Enterprizes. Now if to thoſe neceſſary cares for his Army, there ſhould be ſuperadded a fear, and apprehenſion of being puniſhed at his return (if things went otherwiſe than well) and perpetual reflexion upon thoſe who have been abuſed and put to death upon the ſame ſcore, it muſt needs diſturb the tranquility of his mind, and make him unfit for any great action. The wiſe *Romans* thought the infamy and diſhonour of loſing a Battel, puniſhment enough, without heaping one affliction upon another. And as to thoſe whoſe errors proceed rather from malice than ignorance, we have another Example. *Sergius*, and *Virginius* had each of them an Army, and were encamped before *Veii*: *Sergius* was poſted againſt the *Tuſcans*, and *Virginius* on the other ſide againſt any body elſe. It hapned the *Faliſci* having joyned with ſeveral

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of their neighbours, came to fall upon *Sergius*. *Sergius* had notice, and found himſelf too weak; yet rather than ſend to his Companion for ſupplies, he choſe to be routed; and *Virginius* on the other ſide, though he knew his diſtreſs, would by no means relieve him, unleſs he deſired it; ſo that that *Roman* Army was cut off by the ambition and emulation of their Generals; a thing of very ill example, had it been ſuffered to paſs without puniſhment.

Nevertheleſs, whereas other States would have puniſhed them with death, *Rome* inflicted only a pecuniary mulct, but their crime deſerved ſharper correction, but the *Romans* were unwilling to do any thing againſt cuſtom, which (as is ſaid before) is very ſacred with them. As to the errors of ignorance, we have another example in *Varro*, by whoſe folly and raſhneſs the *Romans* having loſt the Battel of *Cannas* againſt *Hanibal*, and brought their whole Government in danger, had *Hanibal* known how to uſe, as well as gain a Victory; yet his offence having in it more of ignorance than malice, when he came back, the Senate went out to meet him in their Formalities, and not being able to congratulate his ſucceſs, they gave him thanks for his return, and that *De ſalute reipublicæ non deſperaſſet, That he did not deſpair of their affairs*, When *Papirius Curſor* the Dictator would needs put *Fabius* to death, becauſe contrary to orders he had fought with the *Samnites*, among other reaſons which the Father of *Fabius* urged againſt that ſentence, this was one, that the people of *Rome* had till that time never been ſo ſevere upon of their any Commanders for the loſs of a Battel, as *Papirius* would now be be upon the Victor for gaining one.

CHAP. XXXII.

A Common-wealth or Prince is not to defer his beneficence till the neceſſity of the object requires it.

THe liberality of the *Romans* to the people ſucceeded very well when *Porſenna* invaded *Rome* in behalf of the *Tarquins*; for the Senat apprehending the people might be brought to reſtore the Kings rather than endure the war, to oblige them, releaſt their gabels upon ſalt, and all their other duties, declaring the people were ſufficient benefactors to the publick, in providing, and bringing up their children: all which was done to cajole them into ſuch an humour as might make them endure the ſiege, and ſwallow the calamities of the War: but let no man rely upon this example, and defer his indulgence to the people, till the enemy be upon his back; for it ſhall never ſucceed ſo well to him as it did to the *Romans*, becauſe the multitude will think themſelves more obliged to the enemy than to him, and believe, that when the neceſſity is over, they ſhall be as bad as before. The reaſon why this way ſucceeded ſo happily to the *Romans*, was, becauſe their State was but new, and ſcarce ſetled, and the People were ſenſible that ſeveral Laws were made before for their advantage and reputation; as particularly the Law of appeal to the people: ſo as they were able to ſatisfy themſelves that the benefits which were confer'd upon them by the Senate, proceeded rather from a diſpoſition in the Senate to do them good, than from any apprehenſion of the enemy: beſides, the injuries and outrages of their Kings lay freſh and heavy upon their memories. But theſe caſes hapning very ſeldom, 'tis but very ſeldom that ſuch remedies ſucceed; wherefore it is better for any Common-wealth or Prince to conſider the worſt beforehand, and what people he is moſt like to have need of in time of adverſity; and to live ſo with them in time of proſperity, as that they may be encouraged to relieve him upon any diſtreſs. And he who acts otherwiſe, whether Prince or Common-wealth, (but eſpecially a Prince) and preſumes, when the danger is hanging over his head, that it is time enough to favour the people, will find himſelf miſtaken, and the people readier to contribute to his ruine than defence.

CHAP. XXXIII.

If an inconvenience encreaſes either within a State, or againſt it; it is better to temporize and comply, than to endeavour to remove it by violence.

THe *Roman* Common-wealth encreaſing in Empire, Reputation and Force, their neighbours not having conſidered it, nor what damage that greatneſs might pull down upon them, began now (when too late) to diſcover their error; and being willing to do that now which had been more eaſy before, forty little States of them confederated againſt *Rome*. The *Romans*, among their uſual proviſions in caſe of imminent danger, created a *Dictator*, who, without any mans advice, might reſolve as he pleaſed, and execute his reſolutions without being called to an account. This Magiſtrate was not only the occaſion of overcoming their enemies at that time, but was very uſeful upon all accidents afterwards when their dominion encreaſed. Which may teach us, that when either at home within, or abroad againſt a Common-wealth, an inconvenience ariſes, (whether from an inward or an outward cauſe it is not material) 'tis better counſel to comply and temporize, than to endeavour furiouſly to ſuppreſs it; for to reſiſt, is to augment it, and to pull down upon our heads what we were but afraid of before. And theſe kind of accidents fall out in a Common-wealth oftner from intrinſick than extrinſick cauſes, where the power and authority of ſome Citizen is permitted to encreaſe too faſt, and more than is convenient for the honour or benefit of the State; or when ſuch Laws are abrogated or neglected as were moſt for the intereſt of their State; which error, if ſuffered to run on, will be more dangerous to oppoſe than to comply with; for it is ſo much the harder to find out theſe inconveniencies in the beginning, by how much 'tis natural for all people to favour every thing that is new, eſpecially if introduced by a young man, with the leaſt ſhew or pretence of advantage: for if a young Gentleman appears in a Common-wealth endued with more than ordinary qualities, the eyes of the whole City are immediately upon him, they run unanimouſly to reſpect him, and pay him all the honour that can be imagined; ſo that if he has the leaſt ſpark of ambition or vain-glory, he is preſently puffed up, and enflamed with the contemplation of his own worth, and the affection of the people: and when he is arrived at ſuch an height, as to be as viſible as their error, then 'tis too late; there are but few remedies in the caſe; and when moſt of them are applyed, they do but magnify his power. Many examples might be brought to this purpoſe, but I ſhall only inſtance in one.

Coſimo di Medicis (from whom the famous Family of the *Medici* in our City had their firſt grandeur) was in ſuch reputation for his wiſdom; and his fellow Citizens were ſo ignorant, that he began to be formidable to the State, and the Magiſtrates began to think it difficult to take him down, but deſtructive to let him ſtand. There was at that time in *Florence* a perſon of great experience in matters of State, called *Nicolo da Uzano*, who being well adviſed of the firſt fault which he had committed in not conſidering in time the inconveniencies which might follow upon *Coſimo*'s reputation, reſolved to obviate the ſecond; that is, that no force ſhould be uſed to oppreſs him, as knowing that courſe would be the ruine of the State; and ſo it proved not long after his death. For the Citizens which remained, not following his counſel, began to combine, and fortify againſt *Coſimo*, and indeed forc'd him out of *Rome*. Whereupon, his party being incenſed, in a ſhort time called him home again, and made him their Prince, to which dignity he could never have arrived, but by the oppoſition of his enemies.

The ſame hapned to *Julius Cæſar*, whoſe great virtue and excellent qualifications recommended him ſo highly to the favour of *Pompey* and the people, that by degrees he became terrible, and their favour was turned into fear; of which *Cicero* complains, when he ſays that *Pompey* began to fear him too late; for when his fear prompted him to look out for a remedy, that remedy haſtned the ruine of the State. I ſay then (when this caſe happens) it is incomparably better to temporize, than to endeavour to repel the miſchief which threatens by violence and force. For many times, by that means, it paſſes as it came, and goes out of it ſelf, or elſe the damage it brings is the longer a coming. In theſe caſes Princes ought to be very vigilant, leſt going about to retrench and leſſen the great power of a neighbour, they give him opportunity to encreaſe it, and bring themſelves into greater danger: you are therefore to compare your own ſtrength, and your enemies; and if you find your ſelf the ſtronger, to attaque him couragiouſly; but if weaker, you had better be quiet, leſt it happens to you as it did to thoſe little States who confederated againſt *Rome*, to whom (as appeared by the event) it had been much better to have ſate ſtill, and endeavoured

voured their friendſhip, than to have irritated the great power of the *Romans*, and forc'd them to a war; for the *Romans* had never got to that height, if that confederacy had not given them occaſion of trying all experiments for their defence, and put them among the reſt, upon the creation of Dictators, by which new invention they not only maſtered all dangers that threatned them, but prevented a thouſand miſchiefs into which (without that remedy) the Common-wealth would moſt certainly have fallen.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The Dictatorſhip was uſeful, not hurtful to the Common-wealth of Rome; *and how that Power which is uſurp'd, and illegally aſſumed, is pernitious to a State; not that which is conferred legally by the ſuffrage of the people.*

THere are thoſe to be found who have ſaid that the Dictatorſhip was the ruine and deſtruction of that Common-wealth, alledging that the firſt Tyrant that was ever in that City, ſet himſelf up, under the title of Dictator, and affirming that *Cæſar* could not under any other name have juſtified his Tyranny.

Thoſe who maintain that opinion did not examine it thorowly, and are not for that reaſon to be believed. For it was not the name or dignity of the Dictator which brought *Rome* into ſlavery, but the authority aſſumed by the Citizens upon the perpetuation of that office; and if there had been no ſuch thing as Dictator, *Cæſar* had taken ſome other Title upon him to compaſs his deſigns; for when ones power is abſolute, he can aſſume what name he pleaſes; but 'tis not a great Title that gives any man power. Whilſt the Dictatorſhip was diſpoſed by publick ſuffrage, it was very beneficial; thoſe who attained it by ways extraordinary, abuſed it exceedingly; the reſt were never known to have done any injury to the Common-wealth thorow all the Dictatorſhips: the reaſon is probable, becauſe a man muſt be endued with many good qualities before he can uſurp ſuch an authority. He muſt be abundantly rich; he muſt know how to inſinuate with every body; he muſt have a great party, and make every man his friend, which is not practicable where the Laws are in force; and if he had all thoſe qualifications, they would render him ſo formidable, that the free voices would ever concur in his election: beſides, the Dictator was not perpetual, but created only upon particular exigence, and with limited power, extending no farther than the preſent danger, during which he had power to diſpoſe of all things at his pleaſure, and puniſh as he thought good without any appeal; but he could do nothing in diminution to the Government, he could not intrench upon the authority of the Senate or People, abrogate their old Laws, or inſtitute new: ſo that the ſhortneſs of his Dictatorſhip, the limitation of his authority, and the incorruption of the people, made it impoſſible for him to tranſgreſs, and do any miſchief to the City; and on the contrary, that Office has been always beneficial, and, in my judgment, the principal in *Rome*, and has contributed more than all the reſt to make it Miſtreſs of the World; for without that, that City had never been able to have obviated ſo many dangers, nor gone thorow ſo many difficulties, againſt which their accuſtomed and ordinary means would have been of little validity, as being too tedious, and ſlow; (no one Counſel or Magiſtrate being able to do all things alone, but being in a mutual neceſſity the one of the other) for in caſes which require immediate remedy, time paſſes away, and is often loſt whilſt they are in their counſels, and when they come to a reſolution, 'tis too late, and their remedies dangerous.

Wherefore I think it convenient that a Common-wealth have a certain way to be uſed only in caſe of urgent neceſſity, as the *Seignory* of *Venice*, (which at this day is the beſt regulated Common-wealth in the World) that State in time of imminent danger has a reſerved power to confer authority upon ſome few of their Citizens, by virtue of which they may order all as they pleaſe, without the conſultation of the reſt, for when a Common-wealth is deſtitute of ſome ſuch cuſtom, it muſt of neceſſity be ruined by ſticking to their old, or break them to preſerve it ſelf: and it were to be wiſh'd that nothing might happen in a Common-wealth that might give occaſion for theſe extraordinary ways; for though thoſe extraordinary ways may ſometimes be good, yet the example is ill, and introduces a cuſtom of breaking old orders for good, which afterwards, under that pretence, will be broken for ill: wherefore that Common-wealth can never be perfect, that by its Laws has not provided againſt every thing, prepared remedies for every accident, and appointed in what manner they ſhall be managed; which is to be done no better way than by a Dictator, or ſome ſuch Magiſtrate to be created upon extraordinary occaſion; for without them

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they muſt certainly be ruined: and one thing very remarkable in this order, is, the wiſdom of the *Romans* in the formality of its election: for the Dictators being introduced with ſome diminution to the Conſuls, (who being from heads of the City brought down to obedience like other people, might poſſibly reſent it, and in time be the occaſion of diſſention in the City) they committed their election into the hands of the Conſuls, to the end that upon any extraordinary emergence, when *Rome* ſhould have occaſion of ſo extraordinary a Magiſtrate, the Conſuls ſhould comply the more willingly, becauſe they had the making them themſelves; for the wounds which a man gives himſelf ſpontaniouſly, and of his own election, are not ſo grievous as what he is forced for to bear. But towards the latter end of their Empire, the *Romans*, inſtead of a Dictator, inveſted their Conſul with an equivalent authority in theſe words, *Videat Conſul, ne Reſpublica quid detrimenti capiat*; *Let it be the Conſuls care that the Common-wealth receives no prejudice.* So that to return to our matter, I conclude, that the neighbouring States conſpiring againſt the *Romans*, and endeavouring to oppreſs them, made them contrive better, not only for their defence, but to put themſelves into a poſture, with more vigour, and counſel, and authority to repel their invaſion, and turn their force upon them.

CHAP. XXXV.

How it came to paſs that the Creation of the Decem-virat *was prejudicial to the liberty of that State, though it was done freely, and by publick ſuffrage.*

IN the laſt Chapter we have ſhewn that a power legally conferred, and by the ſuffrage of the people, is not dangerous to the State; but that which is uſurped, and gotten by force, to which the election of the *Decem-viri* may ſeem to be contrary, who were choſen by the people of *Rome* to make their Laws, and reform extravagancies in the Common-wealth, which *Decem-viri* by degrees encroached upon their liberties, and made themſelves Tyrants. Wherefore we are to conſider what is ſaid, with limitation and reſtraint; and reſpect both the manner in which ſuch power is confer'd, as likewiſe the time it is to continue, whether for longer or ſhorter: for an abſolute power (though granted but for a year) is very dangerous, and produces ſuch effects as are ſutable to the mind of the perſon to whom it is granted. And the power of the *Decem-viri* (if examined) will be found much greater than the power of the Dictators. For notwithſtanding the creation of the Dictator, the majeſty of the Conſuls and Senate remained, together with the authority of the Tribunes, which were as bounds to reſtrain and circumſcribe the juriſdiction of the Dictator; and although the Dictator had power to remove any one out of the Conſulſhip, or take from him his Tribunitial authority; yet he could not vacat or aboliſh the whole Orders of Senators, Conſuls, and Tribunes, make new Laws, nor introduce a new form of Government. So that their eyes being always upon him, he was forced (as it were) to intend only ſuch things as were for the benefit of the Gommon-wealth. But in the creation of the *Decem-viri* it was otherwiſe; for the whole power of the people was transfer'd to them, the Conſuls and Senate being caſhiered, and the power of the Tribunes of the people almoſt quite laid aſide; ſo that ſtanding alone in the Government, without Conſuls, or Tribunes, or appeal to the people, or any other Magiſtrate to correct or controul them; it was no ſtrange thing that the very next year after their creation, they ſhould become intollerable and inſolent, eſpecially being inſtigated by the ambition of *Appius*. And for this reaſon it is to be obſerved, that when it is ſaid, a Power conferred legally, and by the ſuffrage of the people, is never prejudicial to the State; it is to be ſuppoſed to be confer'd with due circumſtances, and for a certain time; but when the people is cheated, and gives it imprudently and raſhly, as in this caſe of the *Decem-viri*, things never go better, which is eaſily proved by conſidering what it was that kept the Dictators ſo good, and made the *Decem-viri* ſo wicked; and weighing withal the manner which other Republicks that were reputed well ordered, obſerved, in conferring their authority for a long time, as the *Spartans* to their Kings, and the *Venetians* to their Dukes: both of them preſcribing them rules and limits that they were not to exceed, and appointing ſuch guards upon them as ſhould be able (though they were never ſo ill diſpoſed of themſelves) to keep them from employing their power to the detriment of the State.

Nor is it ſufficient if this Power be confer'd upon good men; for men are frail, and eaſily corrupted, and then in a ſhort time he that is abſolute may eaſily corrupt the people, contract friendſhips, make parties, heap up riches, and commit a thouſand extravagancies; nor can the

the poverty of their perſons, or the want of relations prevent it, for wealth, and honour, and every thing follows them which are abſolute, as we ſhall ſhow particularly when we ſpeak of the creation of the *Decem-viri*.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Citizens who have executed the greateſt Offices, ought not afterwards to diſdain or ſcruple the leſs.

Marcus Fabius and *Caius Manlius* being Conſuls, the *Romans* obtained a glorious Victory over the *Veientes*, and the *Etruſci*, in which was ſlain *Quintus Fabius* Brother to the Conſul, who was choſen the year before. From whence occaſion is offered of admiring the excellence of the *Roman* conſtitution; and obſerving how well it was accommodated for the enlargement of their Empire, from whoſe Model the more the Common-wealths of our days do recede, the more do they wander and deviate from the beſt. For though the *Romans* affected glory and command as much as other people, they did not diſdain notwithſtanding to obey in their Armies, the ſame perſons whom they had formerly commanded; and ſerve as private Soldiers, where they had formerly been Generals. This is a practice contrary to the opinion and genius of our age ſo much, that in *Venice* it is provided by a publick Law, that a Citizen who has had a greater command, may refuſe to accept of a leſs (and the City allows it) which Law though it may be convenient for private perſons muſt needs be prejudicial to the publick; becauſe the publick may with more confidence commit an inferior command to a great Officer, than prefer an inferior Officer to a great command: For to a young Soldier, thoſe places of importance are not ſafely entruſted, unleſs perſons of experience and wiſdom be placed about him, by whoſe Counſel he may be directed: And if the *Romans* had done then, what the *Venetians* and other Common-wealths do now, and not ſuffered any man who had ever been Conſul, to ſerve in any other quality, many things had befallen them that would have endangered their liberty; and again, if any young Officers had been admitted to the ſupream commands, and no body placed about them to manage and direct them, they would have grown diſſolute and careleſs, and many things have hapned that might have ruined the State.

CHAP. XXXVII.

What troubles and offence was created in Rome *by the* Agrarian *Law; and how dangerous it is to make a new Law oppoſite to an old Cuſtom, with too much retroſpection.*

IT is obſerved by moſt ancient Writers, that as men are afflicted in adverſity, ſo they are ſatiated in proſperity; and that joy and grief have the ſame effects: For when men are not neceſſitated to fight, they fight for ambition, which is ſo powerful in our minds, that let us arrive at what height of good fortune we can, we are never contented, but are ſtill labouring for more; and this happens to us, becauſe we are naturally capable of deſiring many things, which we are unable to compaſs; and therefore our deſire being greater than our power to acquire, our minds are never at reſt with what we enjoy. And this is the occaſion of all our varieties of fortune, for when we are always driving at more, and fearful of loſing what is already in our poſſeſſion, we are apt to fall into ſuſpicions, from thence into quarrels, and from thence into Wars, which do uſually bring after them the ruine of our Country. This we have diſcourſed, to give you a better contemplation of the People of *Rome*, which by a kind of neceſſity was forced by their Tribunitial power to fortifie themſelves againſt the oppreſſions of the *Patricii*; but when they had obtained what indeed neceſſity impelled them to deſire, being inſtigated by their ambition, they went on further, and contended with the *Patricii* both for Honor, and Eſtate; which was the occaſion of the Seditions about the *Agrarian* Law, and by degrees the deſtruction of the Common-wealth. And becauſe it is neceſſary in every well order'd State, that reſpect be had rather to the enrichment of the Publick, than particular Citizens, the people of *Rome* could not (in what belong'd to this Law) but erre againſt the Fundamentals

mentals of their Government, if they were ſo conſtituted, that proceſs of time could give no occaſion of difference, unleſs we will rather affirm that at firſt all things were ſo well, that it was beyond the power of time to diſorder them: Be it which way it will, it is certain this Law was never mentioned in *Rome*, but with great controverſie, and tumult. This Law conſiſted principally in two heads. One was, That no Citizen of *Rome* ſhould be permitted to poſſeſs more than a certain proportion of Land. The other, that what Land ſhould be taken from the Enemy, ſhould be divided equally among the people; both of which Articles were againſt the intereſt of the Nobility; for moſt of them having more Land than was allowed by this Law, their fortunes by it were to be confiſcated, and half of them taken away; and then by the diſtribution of what they ſhould take from the Enemy, they ſhould loſe all opportunity of enriching themſelves for the future; which being certainly true, and this Law ſo perfectly pernicious to the intereſt of the Nobility, it was never mentioned by the Tribunes, but the *Patricii* oppoſed it, and with all the eagerneſs imaginable; yet not always by force, but ſometimes by evaſion, either commanding out their Armies upon ſome pretended deſign, or by ſetting up another Tribune in oppoſition to him who propoſed the Law, that thereby they might diſſolve it, or elſe by ſending new Colonies. And ſo it hapned when the Colony was ſent to *Antium* at the time when the difference was ſo high betwixt the *Patricii* and the *Agrarians*, that no other expedient could be found to keep them from blood. *Livy* tells us, That there were very few that would liſt themſelves upon that accompt, to fill up the number of that Colony, ſo much more did the people prefer an alotment about *Rome*, than in any other place. But afterwards the quarrel grew higher, and to appeaſe their Seditions, the *Romans* were glad to ſend their Armies ſometimes to the extreameſt parts of *Italy*, and ſometimes beyond them. But afterwards it falling out that the Lands which they took from the Enemy were remote, at great diſtance from *Rome*, and not to be cultivated with any convenience, the people grew weary, and inſiſted not ſo fiercely on their *Agrarian* Law: They began alſo to be more moderate in thoſe kind of confiſcations, but when any Country was ſeized, they ſent Colonies to plant them: With theſe Arts they skin'd over their animoſities till the time of the *Gracchi*, who reviving them again, gave occaſion to the ruine of their Government: for the Nobility having encreaſed their ſtrength, the quarrel advanced ſo far, that they came to blows, and the Magiſtrate being unable to reſtrain them, the fury of the Faction encreaſing, each party began to look out for a head. The people choſe *Marius*, and made him four times Conſul, (with ſome little interval) which authority he managed ſo well to his own advantage, that by the power and intereſt which he had got in that time, he made himſelf thrice Conſul afterwards. The Nobility having no other remedy againſt ſo growing a Plague, applyed themſelves to *Sylla*, and having made him their chief, they fell to down right Wars, which were carried on with much blood and variety of fortune, till at laſt the Nobility prevailed. The ſame faction revived again in the days of *Cæſar* and *Pompey*, and was attended by the deſtruction of the State: For *Cæſar* eſpouſing the *Marian* party, and *Pompey* the *Syllan*, *Cæſar* overcame, and was the firſt that ſet up a Tyranny in *Rome*; after whoſe time that City could never recover its liberty. This was the beginning, and this was the end of the *Agrarian* Law, which may ſeem to contradict what we have ſaid elſewhere. That the diſcords and enmity betwixt the people and Senate of *Rome* conduced to the enlargement of their Empire, and the conſervation of their liberty, by giving opportunity for the making of ſuch Laws, as were great corroboration to their liberties and freedom; but I anſwer, That the effects of the *Agrarian* Law, does not hinder, but that what we have ſaid may be true; for ſo great was the ambition of the Nobility, that had it not been curb'd and check'd ſeveral ways, it would have uſurped upon the City, and got the whole power into its hands. And if we obſerve that the *Agrarian* diſpute was three hundred years together in *Rome*, before it could ſubvert it, we may eaſily imagine, the ambition of the *Patricii* would have done it much ſooner, had it not been ballanced and depreſſed by the people with their *Agrarian* Laws, and ſome other inventions. From whence likewiſe we may obſerve that wealth is more eſtimable among men, than honor; for when the *Patricii* were in controverſie with the people about Titles and Honor, they never went ſo high as to give them any extraordinary diſguſt: But when their Eſtates and Fortunes were at ſtake, they defended them with ſuch zeal, that they choſe rather to put the whole Common-wealth into a flame, than to part with them quickly. The great authors of that Conflagration were the *Gracchi*, whoſe good will and intentions towards the people, was much more to be commended than their wiſdom. For to remove an inveterated inconvenience, and to that purpoſe to make a Law with too much retroſpection, is ill Counſel (as I ſaid before) and haſtens that ruine which it was deſigned to prevent, but with Patience and Com-

Compliance, the miſchief is either delayed, or ſpends it ſelf in time, before it does any great hurt.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Weak Common-wealths are generally irreſolute, and ill adviſed, as taking their meaſures more from Neceſſity, than Election.

THe *Volſci*, and the *Equi* underſtanding that *Rome* was ſadly viſited with a Contagion, concluded it a fair opportunity to conquer it, and having betwixt them raiſed a powerful Army, they invaded the *Latini*, and *Hernici*; over-ran moſt of their Country, and forced them to ſend to *Rome* for aſſiſtance. The *Romans* returned anſwer, That they ſhould put themſelves in Arms, and make as good defence as they could; for the Sickneſs was ſo raging, they could give them no relief. Which ſhows the generoſity and wiſdom of that Senate, That in all conditions, and under the greateſt of their calamities never receded from its Majeſty and Grandeur; but at all times would have the diſpoſal of the affairs of its Subjects; and when neceſſity required, made no ſcruple to command things contrary to their old ways of proceeding. This I ſay, becauſe formerly the Senate had forbidden them to arm, upon any occaſion whatever; and perhaps another Counſel would have thought it derogatory to their Grandeur, to permit them to defend themſelves: But this Senate was endued with admirable prudence, underſtood how things were to be taken, and rejected; and of two evils, how to make choice of the leaſt. It troubled them much that they were not in condition to protect them; and it troubled them no leſs, That they would be forced to defend themſelves upon their own ſcore, without ſuccours from *Rome*; yet finding there was a neceſſity of it, the enemy being at their Gates, and threatning them with death, they retained their authority, and with great gravity ſent them word to defend themſelves, and raiſe what forces they could. This may ſeem but a common reſolution, and what any other Common-wealth would have taken as well as that; but weak and ill ordered Common-wealths cannot come off with ſo much honour. Duke *Valentine* having taken *Faenza*, and overrun moſt part of *Bologna*, demanded paſſage of the *Florentines* to march his Army to *Rome*. The *Florentine* Counſel met, and conſulted, and there was not one man who thought it convenient to grant it. This was not according to the diſcretion of the *Romans*; for the Duke being very ſtrong, and the *Florentines* but weak, it had been more for their honour to have granted him paſſage, when they could not obſtruct it; that what they could not reſiſt, might have been imputed to their courteſie. But there is no remedy; 'tis the property of weak States to do every thing amiſs, and never to do well but in ſpight of their teeths, for there is no ſuch thing as prudence amongſt them. And this *Florence* has verified in two other caſes.

In the year 1500. when *Lewis* XII. had repoſſeſſed himſelf of *Milan*, he had an inclination to reſtore *Piſa* to the *Florentines* upon the payment of 50000 *Florins*: To this purpoſe he ſent thither his Army under the command of Monſieur *de Beaumont* in whom (though a *French* man) the *Florentines* had great confidence. *Beaumont* came up with his Army betwixt *Caſſina* and *Piſa*, and lodged it conveniently for the battering the Town; having been two or three days before it, and all things ready for the aſſault, Commiſſioners came out, and offered to ſurrender to the *French*, upon condition that he would engage upon the honor of his Maſter that it ſhould not in four months time be delivered to the *Florentine*; to which the *Florentines* not conſenting, the Commiſſioners returned. The cauſe why the *Florentines* refuſed it, was their jealouſie of the King, though they had put themſelves under his protection. They did not conſider that the King could better have put the Town into their hands when he was Maſter of it himſelf (and if he had refuſed it, it would have diſcover'd him) than promiſe to do it when he was not in poſſeſſion, and yet they be forced to purchaſe that promiſe at a very great rate. Two years after, *Arezzo* revolted, and the King ſent Seigneur *Jubalt* with ſupplies to the *Florentines*, who had beſieged the Town. *Jubalt* was no ſooner arrived, but the Inhabitants of *Arezzo* made him the ſame proffer, and the *Florentines* could not be brought to conſent: *Jubalt* reſented it, and knowing it to be a great fault, he practiſed privately with the *Aretines*, without communicating with the *Florentine* Comiſſaries: An agreement was clap'd up betwixt them, by virtue of which *Jubalt* entered the Town, and reproached the *Florentines* by their indiſcretion, as people wholly inexperienced in the

affairs of the world. He told them, if they deſired to have it, they ſhould ſignifie it to the King, who would be better able to gratifie them in the Town, than without. The *Florentines* were highly offended, and ſpake very hardly of *Jubalt*, till they conſidered that of *Beaumont* had done the ſame at *Piſa*, they had both as well as one. I ſay therefore, that weak and irreſolute States, do ſeldom take good Counſels, unleſs they be forced; for their weakneſs ſuffers them not to deliberate, where any thing is doubtful; and if that doubt be not removed by a violent neceſſity, they never come to a reſolution, but are always in ſuſpence.

CHAP. XXXIX.

Divers People have many times the ſame Accidents.

WHoever compares paſt things with the preſent, will find that in all Ages men have had the ſame humours, and appetites as now. So that 'tis an eaſie matter by conſulting what is paſs'd, not only (in all Common-wealths) to ſee what will follow, but to provide ſuch remedies as their Predeceſſors did apply; or if there be no Preſidents, to invent new remedies according to the ſimilitude of the accidents. But becauſe theſe conſiderations are neglected, Hiſtory not read, or not underſtood, at leaſt by him who governs, it comes to paſs that all Ages have their miſcarriages and troubles. The City of *Florence* after the Government had ſtood 94 years, having loſt a good part of its Territory, as *Piſa*, and other Towns, was forced to make War upon thoſe who poſſeſſed them; and the Inhabitants being ſtrong, and unwilling to reſtore them, much was ſpent in the War, to very little purpoſe. Their great expence, occaſioned great *Taxes*, and their impoſitions upon the people, made them mutinous, and unquiet. Theſe affairs were adminiſtred by a Magiſtracy of ten Citizens, who were called the *Dieci della Guerra*: The people began to repine, and to complain that the ſaid Counſel was the cauſe of the War, and that they embezled their Mony. That the beſt way would be to remove them from that Office, or when their time was expired to chooſe no more, but let the Government fall back into its old chanel again. Theſe grave perſons who had the ſuperintendancy of the War, were no ſooner diſcharged, but things grew worſe and worſe, and inſtead of recovering *Piſa*, and the reſt of the Towns in diſpute, they loſt *Arezzo*, and ſeveral other places. The people finding their miſtake, and that their malady was rather from the Feaver, than the Phyſitian, they reſtored the ten *Commiſſaries*, which before they had caſheer'd. The people of *Rome* had the ſame fancy againſt the Conſuls, and would not believe but they were the cauſes of all their diſtractions, and that to ſettle all things, and preſerve themſelves in peace, the beſt way would be to remove them entirely, and provide that there ſhould never be any more, or elſe to reſtrain and limit their authority in ſuch manner, that they ſhould have no power over them, either within the City or without. They believed that all proceeded from the ambition of the Nobility, who not being able to chaſtiſe the people in the City, becauſe they were protected by their Tribunes, contrived to carry them out of Town under the command of their Conſuls, to correct them where they ſhould not be capable of any redreſs. The firſt man who had the confidence to propoſe it, was *Terentillus* a *Tribune*, who moved that it might be committed to five perſons to conſider the power of the Conſuls, and to appoint limitations. The Nobility oppoſed it, and (it is probable) employed all their intereſt againſt it, for it was no leſs, than to debaſe the Majeſty of the Government, and leave themſelves no dignity in the Common-wealth. Nevertheleſs the obſtinacy of the Tribunes was ſuch, that the Name of Conſul was laid aſide, and after ſeveral experiments, the people choſe rather to create their Tribunes with Conſular power, than to create new Conſuls again, ſhowing thereby that their quarrel was not ſo much againſt the Authority, as Name: But they found their error at length, and reſtored their Conſuls, as the *Florentines* did their Council of ten.

CHAP. XL.

The creation of the Decem-virat *in* Rome; *what things are moſt remarkable in it; and how far ſuch a Conſtitution may be uſeful or pernitious to a Common-wealth.*

BEfore we diſcourſe of the troubles and commotions which hapned in *Rome* by means of the *Decem-virat*, it will not be amiſs to give a ſhort hiſtory of its Creation, in which there are many things well worthy our remark, as well for the preſervation as deſtruction of a State; and this diſcourſe will remonſtrate the errors both of the Senate and People in prejudice to their liberty, and of *Appius* (chief of the *Decem-viri*) againſt that tyranny which he deſign'd to erect. The *Romans* therefore after a long debate betwixt the Nobility and People about the conſtitution of ſuch Laws as might ſettle and eſtabliſh the liberty of their State, by common conſent, ſent to *Athens Spurius Poſthumus*, with two other perſons, for exemplifications of ſuch Laws as *Solon* had made there, that thereby they might model their own. As ſoon as they were returned they choſe certain learned and grave men to peruſe the ſaid Laws, and ſelect ſuch as they thought convenient for the *Romans*. The perſons created for this office were ten of the principal Citizens, (with Commiſſion for a year) among whom *Appius Claudius* was one, a witty, but a turbulent man. And that they might act freely, without any awe or impediment in their affairs, they laid aſide all the other Magiſtrates, (in particular the Tribunes and Conſuls) and forbad all appeal to the people, ſo that this Magiſtracy were compleat Sovereigns in *Rome*. Not long after *Appius* aſſumed the whole authority of the ten his Companions, paying a reverence, as their Superior, by reaſon of his intereſt with the people; for he had made himſelf ſo popular on a ſudden, it was almoſt a miracle to conſider how ſoon his nature was changed, and he of their only cruel and fierce adverſary become their greateſt Courtier and Favourite.

The firſt year all went very well, and he who preſided marched only with twelve Lictors before him; when any Citizen was to be tried for murder, they framed the Proceſs, but appointing a day, left it to be judged by the people, though their juriſdiction was Soveraign, and without any appeal. They writ their Laws in ten Tables, but before they were ratified they expoſed them to the people, that every man might ſee them at his pleaſure, and approve or object as he ſaw occaſion. When *Appius* perceived the end of his Commiſſion approaching, he cauſed it to be rumoured among the people, that to compleat all, and give perfection to their deſigns, it would be convenient to add two Tables more to their Ten, in order to which the common people conſented that the *Decem-virat* ſhould be continued for a year; and they did it with the more readineſs, that neither the Conſuls nor Tribunes might be reſtored, but Cauſes be left to their own judgment, as is ſaid before. A day being appointed for a new creation, 'tis not to be imagined how all the Nobility ſtickled, and endeavoured to gain that honour which they had ſo ſtifly impugned by their applications to the people, whom they had ſo highly provoked. But among them all, none was ſo ſolicitous for the continuation of the *Decem-virat*, as *Appius Claudius* who preſſed it of the people with ſo much inſtance and humanity, that he began to be ſuſpected by his aſſociates, *Credebant enim haud gratuitam in tanta ſuperbia Comitatem fore; They could not imagine a perſon of his pride would ſtoop to ſuch flattery without ſome great deſign*: that they might defeat neatly, and with cunning, what they could not do by force; though he was the youngeſt of them all, they committed the nomination of the next ten to him, ſuppoſing he would have obſerved antient rules, and not named himſelf, which was a practice of no uſe nor reputation in *Rome*. *Ille vero impedimentum, pro occaſione arripuit*, he ſpoil'd their Plot, *made advantage of their impediment*, and named himſelf among the foremoſt, to the amazement and diſpleaſure of all the Nobility.

This Creation was no ſooner over, but both Nobility and People began to be ſenſible of their error; for, as was ſaid of him, *Finem fecit ferendæ alienæ perſonæ*, Appius *began to ſhew himſelf, and lay aſide the diſguiſe he had put on*: he began to act according to his own natural pride, and in a little time had made his Collegues as bad as himſelf. To terrify the Senate and People both, the firſt day of their Magiſtracy they multiplyed their *Lictors* to 120, whereas formerly they had but 12, which were carried before every one of them by turns, but now every one of them had as many. This terror for ſome time was equally diffuſed, but afterwards they began to favour the Nobility, and inſult upon the people only; and if any of the people that had been injured by any of the *Decem-viri*, and had no right done him by the firſt, to whom he addreſſed, if he appeal'd to another, he was ſure to be worſe;

inſomuch as the people finding their error, began in their affliction to look upon the Nobility; *Et inde libertatis captari auram, unde ſervitutem timendo, in eum ſtatum rempublicam adduxerant; and from thence hope for their liberty, from whence their apprehenſion of ſervitude had brought their Common-wealth into the condition in which it was.*

And this affliction in the people was no little ſatisfaction to the Nobility, *Ut ipſi tædio præſentium, Conſules deſiderarent; that the tediouſneſs of their ſufferings might make them reſtore their Conſuls.* By this time their year was expired, and the two Tables to be added to the ten, both ready, and wanted nothing but publication: the *Decem-viri* had no mind to lay down, but began to think of continuing their authority by force, to which end they raiſed themſelves Guards out of the young Nobility, and paid them out of the Eſtates of thoſe who were condemned. *Quibus donis juventus corrumpebatur, & malebat licentiam ſuam, quam omnium libertatem; by which preferment the youth were debauched, and choſe rather to be licentious themſelves, than that their Countrey ſhould be free.*

Whilſt things were in this poſture, the *Sabini* and the *Volſci* made war upon the *Romans*, and invaded them with a great Army. The Romans were in great conſternation, and the *Decem-viri* began to find the weakneſs of their Government, for without a Senate they were at a loſs to manage their war; and with it their authority would be ſupplanted. But being neceſſitated at laſt, they came to a reſolution, and reaſſembled the Senate. Many ſpeeches were made againſt the *Decem-viri*, in particular by *Valerius* and *Horatius*; and doubtleſs their authority had been utterly exploded, but that the Senate, in ſpight to the people, choſe rather to continue them, leſt, if they were depoſed, the people ſhould ſet up their Tribunes, and the Conſuls be quite laid aſide; whereas, if afterwards the *Decem-viri* could be brought fairly to lay down, by degrees the Conſuls might be reſtored, and the Tribunes be caſhiered. Hereupon the Senate ſilently, without further proſecution of them, prepared for the War, and ſent forth two Armies under the Command of ſeveral of the Ten, but *Appius Claudius* was left behind for the government of the City. Whilſt his Collegues were abroad, it was his fortune to fall in love with a Plebeian's daughter called *Virginia*, and not being able to perſwade, he would take her away by force; *Virginius* the Father of the Virgin was willing to defend the chaſtity of his Daughter, and knowing no other way to ſecure it, he got *Appius* to be impriſoned: whereupon great tumults ſucceeding in *Rome*, and in the Army, the Souldiers returned, and joyning with the people, they encamped upon the holy Mountain, where they reſolved to continue till the Ten had reſigned, Tribunes and Conſuls were reſtored, and the Common-wealth had recovered its old liberty and freedom. This is the ſtory of the *Decem-virat*, as ſhortly related as could be; in which it may be obſerved, that the people of *Rome* fell into ſubjection and ſervitude upon the ſame cauſes as other Common-wealths very frequently do; that is, by the too great deſire of the people to be free, and the too great ambition in the Nobility of Command: when theſe two Factions cannot agree, they are forced to refer all to ſome third perſon in whom they confide; and then begins the Tyranny. The *Decem-virat* was erected in *Rome* by conſent both of the Nobility and People, and inveſted with ſo much power, out of a hatred which the Nobility bare to the Tribunitial, and the People to the Conſular authority: as ſoon as the *Decem-viri* were choſen, *Appius* pretended highly for the people, and promiſed to be their Champion, whereupon they favoured him exceedingly. And (be it in what City it will) when-ever the people are brought to extol and applaud a perſon, for no other reaſon, but becauſe it is in his power to puniſh their enemies; if that perſon be cunning and induſtrious, their liberty is loſt, and he can uſurp when he pleaſes; for by the aſſiſtance of the people he may maſter the Nobility; and when they are down, it will be no hard matter to ſubdue the people, who will have no body to fly to, nor no body to ſupport them: but before the Nobility be ſuppreſſed, he is by no means to meddle with the people. And this has been the method of all thoſe who have laid the foundation of Tyranny in any Common-wealth; which if *Appius* had followed, he had not loſt his ill-got authority ſo ſoon: but he went quite contrary, and with as much imprudence as was poſſible, ran himſelf into the diſpleaſure of the ſame perſons which advanced him; and ingratiated with thoſe who were againſt his preferment, and were no way able to ſuſtain him, whereby he loſt his old friends who were powerful, and endeavoured to get new that could do him no good. For though the Nobility have naturally no averſion to Tyranny; yet that part of the Nobility which ſhares not in the profits, is always an enemy to the Tyrant, and their ambition and avarice is ſo great, all the riches and honours in the Tyrants diſpoſal are too little to take them off. Hence it is that the aggreſſor in any enterprize is of neceſſity to be ſtronger than his adverſary; and he who in the eſtabliſhment of a Tyranny makes the People rather than the Nobility his friends, will be ſtronger and more ſecure than he who goes the other way, cajoles with the Nobility, and diſobliges the People:

for

for the people being always ſtronger in the City, by their friendſhip, a Tyrant may ſubſiſt without any foreign ſupplies. This was viſible in the caſe of *Nabis* the Tyrant of *Sparta*, who having the affections of the people, and ſecured himſelf of ſome of the Nobility, defended himſelf againſt all *Greece*, and the whole power of the *Romans*, which without the hearts of the people he could never have done. But he who makes his intereſt with the Nobility, cannot maintain himſelf without foreign aſſiſtance; for he will want Guards for the ſecurity of his Perſon, Souldiers to do the office of the Militia in the Country, and Confederates and Allies to ſuccour him in his diſtreſs; whereas if he could be ſupplyed in theſe three defects, it might be poſſible for him to ſubſiſt without the friendſhip of the people. But *Appius* failing in theſe, miſcarried in the very beginning of his Tyranny.

In the creation of the *Decem-virat* the Senate and the People were guilty of very great error; for though in our diſcourſe of Dictators we have ſaid before, that thoſe Magiſtrates only are pernitious to the publick liberty, who ſet up themſelves by force, not they who are legally choſen, and by the ſuffrage of the people; yet the people are to take ſpecial care in the election of their Magiſtrates, that they may not eaſily uſurp. But the *Romans* inſtead of placing Guards about their *Decem-viri* that might have kept them in order, they not only took their Guards away, but diſplaced all the reſt of their Magiſtrates, and made them abſolute for that year, and all out of a deſign to countermine one another; the Nobility to ſuppreſs the Tribunes, and the People the Conſuls. So that it hapned to them, as *Ferdinand* King of *Arragon* was wont to ſay it hapned to men that hated one another; that is, that they acted like birds of prey, all of them purſuing the quarry with equal rapacity; but the little birds not regarding the greater over their heads, are eaſily interrupted, and made prey themſelves. But we have ſaid enough to demonſtrate the ill counſel of the *Romans* in thinking to preſerve their liberty by the creation of the *Decem-virat*, and the errors of *Appius* in driving at the Soveraignty, and miſcarrying ſo ſoon.

CHAP. XLI.

For a mean man to grow immediately inſolent, or a meek man immediately cruel, without juſt ſteps of gradation, is both imprudent and unprofitable.

AMong the reſt of *Appius* his faults in the management of his Tyranny, it was of no little ill conſequence that he changed his humour ſo ſuddenly: his cunning in cajoling the people, and pretending to be of their party, was good: his invention to renew the creation of the Ten was no worſe; his boldneſs in preſenting himſelf contrary to the expectation of the Nobility was well enough, and his creating Collegues for his turn was not amiſs. But having gone thus far, (as is ſaid before) to change his nature in a moment; of a friend, to become an enemy to the people; of an humble and affable man, to ſhew himſelf proud; of a mild man, to become difficult and perverſe; and all this with ſo little circumſtance, that the whole World might ſee it was either the falſneſs or levity of his temper, was high indiſcretion: for he that has ever pretended to be good, and is willing for his advantage to become otherwiſe, muſt not do it at a leap, but by degrees, and upon occaſion, that before the diverſity of his deportment deprives him of his old friends, he may have gained himſelf new, without diminution to his authority; otherwiſe being diſcovered and deſerted, he is certainly ruined.

CHAP. XLII.

How eaſily mens manners are corrupted.

IT is remarkable likewiſe in the paſſages of the *Decem-viri*, that men are eaſily corrupted, and become wicked, be their education never ſo good. The youth which *Appius* debauched, and took for his Guards, is ſufficient to prove it; who, though of honourable extraction, and brought up with all poſſible advantage, ſuffered themſelves to be corrupted by their preferments, became favourers of tyranny, and prefer'd their own licentiouſneſs before the liberty of their Country: *Quintus Fabius* did the ſame, who, though an excellent perſon at firſt, and one of the *Decem-viri* of the ſecond creation, blinded with ambition,

and

and enveigled by the cunning of *Appius*, changed his good humour into bad, and grew as intollerable as he; which things, if ſeriouſly conſidered, ſhould make all Legiſlators (either in Common-wealths or Kingdoms) the more careful and diligent to reſtrain the ambition of mankind, and take from them all hopes of impunity when they offend in that kind.

CHAP. XLIII.

Thoſe Souldiers which fight for their own honour are the beſt, and moſt to be truſted.

FRom the ſame Hiſtory it may be obſerved how much it imports the proſperity or adverſity of affairs to have the minds of the Souldiers quiet, and ready to engage upon a principle of honour, rather than to have them turbulent, and diſpoſed to fight upon every mans ambition: for whereas the Roman Armies were always victorious under the conduct of the Conſuls; under the *Decem-viri* they were always unfortunate: from hence likewiſe it may be collected how unſafe it is to commit the defence of our affairs to a mercenary Army, who have nothing to encourage or oblige them but their pitiful pay, which is not conſiderable enough to make them ſo faithful as to lay down their lives in your quarrel. For in an Army where the Souldier is not bound to the perſon for whom he fights by ſome particular obligation, or the expectation of more than ordinary advantage by the Victory, if the enemy be ſtrong, they will make but little reſiſtance; and this kindneſs and affection of the Souldiers to the General cannot be but where they are Subjects fighting under a good Prince or a lawful Magiſtrate in defence of their Poſterity and Religion; ſo that it is neceſſary for every King or Common-wealth who deſires to defend himſelf well, to train up his own Subjects in Military Diſcipline, that he may ſafely depend upon them in time of diſtreſs; and it has been the practice of all thoſe who have done any great things. The Roman Armies under the *Decem-viri* had doubtleſs the ſame courage as under the Conſuls; but not being ſo well affected towards the one as the other, they would not put it forth, nor give ſuch teſtimonies as formerly: but when the tyranny of the *Decem-virat* extinguiſhed, and their liberty was recovered, having then the ſame tenderneſs and affection to their Country, they fought as well as before, and their enterprizes had the ſame happy ſucceſs.

CHAP. XLIV.

A multitude without an head is altogether unſerviceable; nor is any man to threaten that has any thing to deſire.

UPon the accident of *Virginius*, the people having taken Arms, and retir'd to the holy-Mount, the Senate ſent to them to know upon what account they had abandoned their Officers, and betaken themſelves to that Mount: and the authority of the Senate was ſo venerable among the people, that having no head among them, there was no body durſt return an anſwer: *Titus Livius* tells us, *Non defuit quid reſponderetur, ſed deerat qui reſponſum daret*; *They wanted not what to ſay, but who to deliver it.* For having no certain Commander, every private perſon was unwilling to expoſe himſelf to their diſpleaſure. From whence we may underſtand how uſeleſs a thing the multitude is without a head, which being obſerved by *Virginius*, he cauſed twenty Military Tribunes to be made, with power to treat and expoſtulate with the Senate inſtead of an Head.

The people inſiſting to have *Valerius* and *Horatius* ſent to them, to whom they would communicate their grievances, *Valerius* and *Horatius* refuſed to go till the *Decem-viri* had laid down their authority; which being at length obtain ed with much concertation; *Valerius* and *Horatius* repaired to the people, and underſtood that they would have new Tribunes to be choſen; they would have appeals from every Magiſtrate to the people; and they would have the *Decem-viri* to be delivered up into their hands, that they might burn them alive: the Embaſſadors liked the firſt of their demands, but refuſed to conſent to the laſt as inpious, telling them, *Crudelitatem damnatis, incrudelitatem ruitis: You condemn cruelty, and practiſe it your ſelves*; and before you will be free, you will tyrannize over your adverſaries;

adverſaries; adviſing them to lay that Article by, and mention the *Decemviri* no farther, but to addreſs themſelves to the reaſſumption of their power and authority, after which they would not want ways of receiving ſatisfaction; for then every man's life and fortune would be at their diſpoſing. Hence we may learn how weak and imprudent it is to deſire a thing, and before we receive it, declare to what ill uſes we intend it, eſpecially if we mean to do miſchief, 'tis juſt as you ſhould ſay, pray give me your Sword, that I may run you thorow: 'Tis ſufficient to borrow the Sword, and when you have it, you may do as you pleaſe.

CHAP. XLV.

'Tis a thing of ill Example to break a new Law, eſpecially for the Maker: and 'tis no leſs dangerous to the Governor of a State, to multiply injuries, and repeat them every day.

THE Commotions about the Tyranny of the *Decem-viri* being compoſed, and *Rome* reſtored to its old form of Government again; *Virginius* cited *Appius* before the the people to anſwer what he had attempted upon his Daughter. *Appius* appeared with his Nobility about him; *Virginius* commanded him to Priſon; *Appius* cryed out, he appealed to the people: *Virginius* replyed, That he who had taken away thoſe appeals from the people, ought not to have any benefit by them, nor be permitted to implore their protection, whoſe Laws and Liberties could receive no protection from him. *Appius* inſiſted, that they ought not to violate a thing which they had urged with that eagerneſs, and ordained with that zeal. And though indeed the life of *Appius* was wicked enough, and there was no puniſhment that he did not deſerve; yet it was inhoſpitable and contrary to all civil Society, to violate their own Laws, which were but newly made, and paſſed with ſo much importunity: for in my judgment there is nothing ſo indecorous, nor of ſuch ill example in a Common-wealth, as the infraction of a new Law, by the Legiſlator himſelf.

When in the year 1494. the State of *Florence* was reſtored by the aſſiſtance of a Frier called *Hieronimo Savonarola* (whoſe writings give ſufficient teſtimony of his Learning and integrity) having among other things for the ſecurity of the Citizens, obtained a Law for appeals to the people in matters of State, both from the Senate and the Council of Eight. (which Law he had a long time ſolicited, and got with much difficulty at laſt) It hapned that not long after, there were five perſons condemned to death by the Senate, which perſons endeavouring very earneſtly to appeal to the people, they were denyed that liberty, and could not have the benefit of that Law; which was greater diminution to the reputation of the Frier, than any thing that had ever hapned before: For if that Law was of ſuch importance as he had pretended, it ought to have been obſerved; if not, why was it ſolicited ſo earneſtly? And it was the more remarkable in the Frier, becauſe in his many Sermons and Diſcourſes afterwards to the people, he neither blamed the breaking of that Law, nor went about to excuſe it, for being to his purpoſe, he would not condemn it, and excuſe it he could not, having nothing to ſay; which action having diſcovered the ambition and partiality of his mind, took much off from his repute, and loaded him with ſcandal. It is of great inconvenience likewiſe in a State, to revive, and ferment the humours in the minds of the Citizens, by a daily renovation of their injuries upon one perſon or other, as it hapned in *Rome* after the *Decem-virat* was diſſolved, and the Tribunitial authority re-eſtabliſhed by the people: For all the *Decem-viri*, and ſeveral other conſiderable Citizens were accuſed, and condemned, inſomuch as there was a General conſternation among the Nobility, who thought there would be no end of their condemnation, till they were utterly extinct: Which proceeding and apprehenſion, would doubtleſs have produced great troubles in the State, had not they been prevented by *Marcus Duellius* the Tribune, who publiſhed an Edict, That for a twelve-month it ſhould not be lawful either to cite or accuſe any man that was a Citizen of *Rome*; by which act of Moderation, he ſecured the Nobility. From whence we may diſcern how unſafe it is for any Prince or Common-wealth to keep the minds of their Subjects in perpetual fear and ſuſpence; and without doubt nothing can be more pernicious; for men being inſecure, and jealous of being queſtioned for ſome Capital offence, will look out for protection, and not only ſo, but are provoked to more boldneſs, and become leſs ſcrupulous of doing great miſchiefs. If therefore ſuch Commotions happen, it is better if poſſible to compoſe them without

without blood, but if Example muſt be made, it is to be done at once, that afterwards the people may be reaſſured, and recover their old ſecurity, and tranquility of mind.

CHAP. XLVI.

How men leap from one paſſion to another, and how they who at firſt aim at nothing but Self-preſervation, when ſecured of that, grow oppreſſors of other People.

After the people of *Rome* had recovered their liberty, and had by ſo much improved their former condition, by how much they had made many new Laws to fortifie their power, one would have expected they ſhould have been quiet, and after ſo much trouble and embroilment, enjoyed ſome time of repoſe; but it fell out quite contrary, they were more perplexed than before, every day producing ſome new Sedition or Diſturbance: Of which, *Livy* giving the reaſons ſo clearly, I do not think it amiſs to inſert them in this place. Theſe two Orders (ſays he) were in perpetual oppoſition; when the people were humble, the Nobility was proud; when the populace was quiet, and content with their bounds, the young Nobility took their time to be inſolent; and when the Tribunes interpoſed in their behalf, they made little progreſs at firſt, and at length were as much injur'd themſelves. The graver ſort of the Nobility on the other ſide, though they thought their own youth to be too furious and inſolent, yet they had rather if one ſide muſt tranſgreſs, that it ſhould be their own, than the peoples: So that their immoderate deſire of preſerving their priviledge, was the cauſe that when either party was prevalent, it employed its whole power in oppreſſing the other. It is common among men, when they would ſecure themſelves, to injure other people; they begin firſt to do miſchief, to revile, or to beat, or what other outrage they are able, as if the injury they would avoid themſelves, was to be thrown upon their Neighbour, and there was no Medium betwixt doing, and ſuffering of wrong. From hence we may ſee after what manner (among other things) Common-wealths are diſſolved, and how ſuddenly men paſs from one ambition to another, according to that true ſaying which *Saluſt* put into the mouth of *Cæſar*. *Omnia mala exempla, bonis initiis Orta ſunt.* *All diſorders and abuſes, are good in their beginnings.* The firſt thing an ambitious Citizen endeavours, is ſo to fortifie, that he may defend himſelf not only againſt his private adverſary, but againſt the publick Magiſtrate, if at any time he would offend him; to which end he makes what friends he can, by furniſhing them with Mony, or ſupporting them againſt their Oppreſſors; and this ſeeming very honeſt in appearance, people are eaſily deluded, and no body goes about to prevent it; ſo that no obſtacle being given, he grows inſenſibly ſo great, that not only the private Citizens, but the Magiſtrate begins to apprehend him; and then there is no reſiſting him without manifeſt danger, for the reaſons (which I have mention'd before) of the dangerous contending with an inconvenience that has got that growth and maturity in a City. What is then to be done? Let him alone in his proſperity, and he enſlaves you for ever, unleſs death or ſome other kind accident delivers you: If you think to remove him on a ſudden, you do but add to his power, and haſten your own ruine; for finding himſelf in ſuch a poſture, that his Friends, his Enemies, the Magiſtrates, and all people are affraid of him, he will then begin to domineer, and diſpoſe of all things according to his own judgment and pleaſure: If there be any way to prevent it, it is by watching in time, by having a diligent eye over your Citizens, that under colour of doing good, they may not be able to do miſchief; and that they may have as much reputation as may ſerve, not ruine their liberty: but of this more hereafter.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLVII.

Though the People, in things that are discuss'd in General, are many times mistaken, yet when they are reduced to particulars, they are more sensible and judicious.

THe Name of Consul (as we said before) being grown odious to the people of *Rome*, they resolved to have them created for the future out of the Populace; or else to limit and circumscribe their authority with such rules as they should think fit. The Nobility, to prevent both inconveniences, took a way betwixt both, and was contented that they should create four Tribunes with Consular authority, to be chosen indifferently out of the people, and Senate. The people were well enough satisfied, as thinking by that means the Consulship would extinguish, and that they should have a share in the supream dignity themselves. But observe what followed when they came to the creation of their Tribunes, and it was not only in their power, but expected, that they should have been all made out of the people, they chose them all out of the Nobility, which gave occasion to *Livy* to say, *Quorum Comitiorum eventus docuit, alios animos in Contentione libertatis & honoris, alios secundum deposita Certamina in incorrupto judicio esse. The success of that Election did shew, That when their honour and liberty were in controversie, the people were of one mind; when they were secure and free, they were of another.* Considering with my self what might be the reason, I suppose it is because men are more apt to be mistaken in generals, than in particulars. The people thought themselves more worthy of the Consulship than the Nobility, because they had the greatest interest in the City; They underwent the greatest difficulty in the Wars, and it was their Arms which defended its liberty, and propagated the Empire of *Rome*: according to which argument, their desires seeming but reasonable, they resolved they would have them in spight of all opposition: But when they came to particulars, and to examine their own private Capacities for Government, they found themselves so weak and defective, that though altogether they thought themselves able enough, yet they could not find one man they judged proper for the employment; ashamed therefore of their incapacity, they gave their voices for such as they found were more really worthy; which *Titus Livius* admiring, has these words, *Hanc modestiam, equitatemq; & altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quæ tunc populi universi fuit? Where will you find now-a-days, that Modesty, that Equity, that Magnanimity in one man, that was then obvious in the whole body of the people?* To the same purpose there hapned another notable Example in *Capua*, after *Hanibal* had defeated the *Romans* at the Battel of *Cannæ*. After that defeat, the Inhabitants of *Capua* began to mutiny against the Government (as indeed all *Italy* did at that time) the grounds of their discontent, was an old pique betwixt the people and Senate, which the first thought then to improve to the destruction of the other. *Pacuvius Calanus* being a very wise man, and at the Helm at that time, considering with himself of what dangerous consequence a tumult might prove in so populous a City, resolved to find out some way to accommodate their difference. To this end, he assembled the Senate, and in few words remonstrated to them the implacable hatred which the people had to them; That they were in great danger of being murthered by them, and the City delivered up to *Hanibal*, by reason that the condition of *Rome* was become so deplorable; and at length he concluded, that if they would commit the whole matter to him, he would find out an expedient to unite them, and his expedient was to lock up the Senate in the Palace, and by putting them into the peoples power, to preserve them. The Senate submitted, were lock'd up in the Castle, and having assembled the people, he told them, That the hour was now come for redeeming their liberty, and chastising the insolence of their Nobility, who had so often abused them. He told them he had them all lock'd up in his Custody, to be disposed of as they pleased; but because he could not think it was their desire to leave the City without a Government, before they proceeded to the execution of the ancient Senators, it would be necessary, as he conceived, to think of creating a new one; to that purpose he had brought the Names of the old Senators in a Purse, would draw them out one by one, and as they resolved upon another to succeed in each place, he would see the old one delivered out to execution. The people were content, and *Pacuvius* drew one, and nam'd him aloud, upon which a great noise was raised, some said he was cruel, others he was proud, and others that he was arrogant: Then says *Pacuvius*, he is unfit to be continued, pray will you make choice of another in his stead. Silence was commanded, and one of the people was named; He was named no sooner, but some began to hum,

others to laugh, and all to revile, and ſo proceeding from one to another, they were all concluded unfit for ſo honourable a degree. *Paccuius* taking the occaſion, told them, ſince you are ſenſible it is unfit that the City ſhould be without a Senate; and ſince you cannot agree about the Election of a new; it would be expedient in my judgment, that you propoſe ſome way of reconciliation; for doubtleſs the fear in which the Senators have been, muſt of neceſſity have ſo humbled them, that that gentleneſs and humanity which you have ſought for elſewhere, may now be found in them. The people began then to diſcover in particular, the fault which they had committed in judging in general, and declared they were ready for any reaſonable reconciliation. And in this manner it is that moſt people deceive themſelves in judging generally of things and their accidents, which upon particular examination they do eaſily diſcover.

After the year 1414. the chief of the *Florentines* being driven out of the City, it was left wholly without order or government, over-whelm'd with licentiouſneſs and ambition, and the intereſt of the publick running headlong to ruine. Many of the popular party foreſeeing the inevitable deſtruction of the City, and not knowing to what elſe to impute it, they charged it upon the ambition of ſome perſons among the Nobility, which (as they pretended) fomented their diſorders, to take away their liberty, and model the State according to their own fancies, and deſigns. And theſe Mutineers were in all places; in the Streets, in the Houſes, in the Palaces, declaring publickly, and threatning that if ever they came to the government, they would look farther into the buſineſs, and puniſh all thoſe which they ſhould find conſcious of it. It hapned afterwards that ſome of theſe Citizens were advanced as they deſired; but when they were at that height, and ſaw things nearer than before, they became ſenſible of their error, and found that it was not the ambition of the Nobility, but the malignity of the times, which was the occaſion of all their trouble and commotion; ſo as they became new men, and exerciſed a new way of adminiſtration; Inſomuch that thoſe who had heard them complain and threaten when they were in private capacity, ſeeing them now at the helm, and performing nothing that they had promiſed, did not look upon it as conviction of their judgment, ſo much as corruption of their minds. Which thing being frequent among them, gave occaſion to the Proverb, *Coſtoro hanno vn animo in Piazza, et vno in Palazzo. They are of one mind in the Town, and another in the Throne.* Thus, by ſerious conſideration of what has been ſaid, we may ſee how to open the eyes of the people, and reduce them to a ſence of their errors, if we take them from their general and abſtracted notions, and fix them upon particulars, as in the caſe of *Paccuius* in *Capua*, and the Senate in *Rome*. Again, I am of opinion that no wiſe man is to decline the judgment of the people in the diſtribution of Offices and Honours, and ſuch particular affairs; for in thoſe things they are almoſt infallible, and when they do miſtake, it is rather to be attributed to the obſtinacy of ſome few, to whom that buſineſs is referred, than to the ignorance of the whole body; which being certainly ſo, I think it not ſuperfluous to ſhow in my next Chapter the Order which the Senate obſerved to over-reach the people in thoſe kinds of diſtributions.

CHAP. XLVIII.

To prevent the advancement of mean people to the Magiſtracy, it is particularly to be contrived that the competition be, betwixt the beſt and moſt Noble, and the wickedeſt and moſt abject.

WHen the Senate began to apprehend, that the Tribunes would be choſen out of the people, and inveſted with Conſular power; they had two ways, one of which they conſtantly made uſe of. They put the beſt and moſt honorable perſons to ſtand, or elſe by their Mony they foiſted in ſome ſordid and ignoble Plebeian, among thoſe of the better ſort which pretended to the Magiſtracy, and demanded it for him: The laſt way made the people aſhamed to confer it: the firſt made them aſhamed to remove it; which reinforces what I have ſaid ſo often before, that though in generals the people may be miſtaken, in particulars they are provident enough.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLIX.

If thoſe Cities which have been free from their foundation (as Rome*) have found it difficult to contrive ſuch Laws as might maintain them ſo. Thoſe which have been always ſervile, will find it almoſt impoſſible.*

THE Government of *Rome*, and its affairs abroad and at home, do ſufficiently ſhow how hard it is to eſtabliſh ſuch Laws in a Common-wealth as may preſerve it always in a good and quiet Eſtate. It had firſt *Romulus*, then *Numa*, *Tullus Hoſtilius*, *Servius*, and others, who employed their induſtry and capacity to regulate it well, and preſcribe good Laws; after which, ten Citizens were created on purpoſe, and yet new difficulties aroſe every day, which required new remedies: One of their great expedients (which indeed contributed much to the incorruption of that City) was the creation of the *Cenſors*, to correct the exorbitances, ſplendor, and ill husbandry of the Citizens; and although in the beginning it was with ſome inconſideration decreed that thoſe Officers ſhould be created for five years, yet by the prudence of *Mamercus* the Dictator, that error was afterwards rectifyed, and the time of their continuance reduced to 18 months, which diſguſted the then Cenſors ſo highly, that they found means to turn *Mamercus* out of the Senate, to the great regret, both of the Senators and people. And becauſe the Hiſtory does not ſhow how *Mamercus* defended himſelf, it muſt needs be the neglect of the Hiſtorian, or the defect of the Laws; for it is not to be thought that in a perfect Common-wealth, a Citizen ſhould be ſo ill treated for promulging a Law ſo much for the ſecurity of their liberty, and his innocence left without ſanctuary or protection. But to return to my deſign, I ſay, it is not to be admired if Cities conceived, and born, and brought up all along in ſervitude, find ſo much difficulty to regulate, and preſerve themſelves in tranquility and peace (as was to be ſeen in *Florence*) when *Rome* and other States (which have been free from the beginning) have ſcarce been able to do it. *Florence* was in ſubjection to the *Roman* Empire, and governed by other people, ſo long that it had ſcarce any hopes of ever being free. Afterwards having time to breathe, it began to look up, and make Laws for it ſelf, but mingling them with their old Laws, which were bad, they did them no good. For two hundred years together their Government was in this manner, ſo that it was ſcarce worthy the name of a Common-wealth. And the ſame inconveniencies have been incident to all Cities whoſe beginnings have been ſervile like that. And though the *Florentines* did many times by publick and free ſuffrage transfer an Authority upon a few of their principal Citizens, to examine and reform all things; yet thoſe few regarded not ſo much the common intereſt and liberty, as their own private deſign and advantage in the whole manner of their proceedings; which was ſo far from producing any order or ſettlement as was intended, that it augmented the diſorder, and made things worſe than before. To paſs by other things which are likewiſe to be obſerved, I ſay that in every Common-wealth it is particularly to be conſidered in whoſe hands the Cognizance of Capital offences is placed, and who has the execution of the Sanguinary Laws: This was well ordered in *Rome*, an appeal lying to the people from all the Courts and Magiſtrates of the City; and if at any time by that appeal, the delay of execution became dangerous to the State, they had recourſe to the Dictator, who commanded execution immediately; but they never made uſe of that refuge, but in extream neceſſity.

But *Florence*, and other Cities born in ſervitude and ſubjection, had not the benefit of ſuch an Officer, but were governed by ſtrangers upon whom the Prince had transferred his Authority; which Cuſtom they kept up, after they had made themſelves free, and continued the ſame Authority in a Foreigner, whom they called their *Captain*, which was a dangerous thing, conſidering how eaſily he might be corrupted by the better ſort of the Citizens: Afterwards that Cuſtom changed with the revolutions of State; and eight Citizens were created to do the Office of the Captain, which alteration proved much for the worſe, for (as I ſaid before) a few men prefer'd to the government, are always liable to be careſſed and cajoled by the Nobility, to the prejudice of the people. Againſt which inconvenience, *Venice* provided very well, where there is a Council of Ten, which can puniſh any Citizen whatever without any appeal; yet for fear they ſhould not be ſufficient (though they have Authority enough) for the puniſhment of perſons of more than ordinary quality, they have conſtituted the *Quarantie* to aſſiſt them, and the Council of *Pregni* beſides, which is the higheſt Council in that City; ſo that if any man will accuſe, there are judges enough ready to hear him. If therefore in *Rome* which was originally free, and

model'd and govern'd by the Counsels of so many wise men, new faults were daily discovered, and fresh occasion for new Laws to be made, for the preservation of their liberty; it is not to be admir'd, if in other Cities it was worse, where their Original was not so free, nor so many wise men to model, and instruct them.

CHAP. L.

No Magistrate or Council ought to have power to check or controul the publick acts of the City.

Titus Quintius Cincinnatus, and *Cneus Julius Mentus* being Consuls together in *Rome*, but at perpetual odds, the affairs of that State was at a stand, their Laws were not executed, their Wars were not prosecuted, nor any thing managed as it should be. The Senate observing it, perswaded them to make a Dictator, by whom the State might be reformed, and their differences composed, which had hitherto hindered the reformation: But the Consuls how contrary soever in other things, consented not to do it; the Senate having no other remedy, addressed to the Tribunes, who by the Authority of the Senate required, and compelled the Consuls to the creation of a Dictator: In which place it is remarkable how beneficial the assistance of the Tribunitial power was, not only to defend the people against the insolence of the Nobility, but to controul and restrain the emulation and difference among themselves. And here it is carefully to be provided in the settlement of a Common-wealth, that it be not in the power of a few persons to whom the Government is entrusted, to quash or obstruct any Customs or Acts that are necessary to its subsistance: For example, If you authorize a Counsel, or any other persons to distribute Honours, dispose of Offices, or execute any other of your commands, you must either lay a strict injunction or necessity upon them to do as you appoint, or provide, so that if it be neglected by them, it may be done by some body else; otherwise things are ill managed, and the order is defective, as is manifest by that example in *Rome*, if the perverseness of the Consuls had not been opposed by the Authority of the Tribunes. In the Republick of *Venice*, the Grand Council (or Senate) has the distribution of Honours, and the Election of Magistrates, both abroad and at home; and it hapning one time, that the Senate either upon some disgust, or false suggestion omitted to create Successors to the Magistrates at home, or to their Officers abroad, there followed great disorders immediately; the Territory and City wanting their lawful judges, could have no justice in any thing, till the Senate was appeased. And this inconvenience would in time have brought the City into an ill condition, had it not been prevented by the wisdom of some Citizens, who taking the opportunity obtained a Law, That there should be no vacancy of Offices, either within the City or without, but the old Officers should be continued till their Successors were chosen, by which Law they deprived that great Counsel of a power to interrupt the course of Justice, which could not have been suffered without hazard to the State.

CHAP. LI.

A Prince or Common-wealth that is constrained to do a thing, is to seem to do it frankly, and without any compulsion.

A Wise man orders his affairs so, that whatever he does, seems rather voluntary and gracious, than done by force and compulsion, be his necessity of doing it never so great, which point of wisdom being well observed by the *Romans*, got them great reputation among the people, especially when they decreed stipends to the Soldiers out of the publick Treasury, who before were obliged to serve at their own proper charges; for seeing their Wars were like to be tedious, and their Armies to be carried into far Countries, before they could be finished, they found neither the first could be continued, nor the latter perform'd but at the publick expence, wherefore the Senate was forced and necessitated to pay the Soldiers out of the publick stock; yet they did it so slyly, and with that artifice, that though compelled by necessity, it was received as a grace, and gain'd them exceedingly the affections of the people, who had never so much as mention'd it by their Tribunes, or thought of it themselves: So that never any thing was received with more demon-

demonſtration of joy. But the Tribunes were not ſo well ſatisfied, but endeavoured to poſſeſs the people that it was not an act of that grace as they imagined; and that if they looked cloſely into it, it would appear rather a grievance, than a benevolence; for how was this Mony to be rais'd, but by Taxes and Impoſitions upon the people? ſo that if the Senators were bountiful, it was out of other mens purſes. But all would not do, let the Tribunes ſay as they pleaſed, the people believed themſelves highly obliged; and then the manner of raiſing the Mony made it much the more grateful, for it was done with more than ordinary equity, the greateſt part of it being levyed upon the greateſt men, and the poor favoured as much as was poſſible.

CHAP. LII.

The beſt and moſt ſecure way to repreſs the inſolence of an ambitious and powerful State, is to preclude and ſtop up thoſe ways by which he would come to his greatneſs.

BY what has been ſaid before, it appears what affection the Senate conciliated among the people, not only by the frankneſs of their bounty, but by their kindneſs in collecting it; which order, if continued to the people, would have prevented all the tumults which hapned afterward in that City, and deprived the Tribunes of their great credit and authority. And indeed there is not a better or more ſecure way to ſuppreſs the inſolence, or croſs-bite the deſigns of an ambitious Citizen, than to take the ſame ways to prevent, which he takes to advance them; which courſe, if it had been followed by the adverſaries of *Coſimo de Medici* would have been much more for their advantage than to have forced him out of the Town. For had they applyed themſelves to careſſing and inſinuating with the people, (which was the way he took to fortifie himſelf) they had diſarm'd him without any tumult or violence, and taken from him the only arms upon which he depended for his defence. About the ſame time *Piero Soderini* by his extraordinary beneficence got himſelf a great intereſt and reputation among the people, and was publickly eſteemed the great Champion and Protector of their liberties: and doubtleſs his adverſaries, who began to grow jealous of his greatneſs, had done much more wiſely, and honourably, and ſafely, to have gone the ſame way to work, and countermined him by their indulgence to the people, than to oppoſe themſelves downright, and ruine him and their whole Country together; for could they by any art or inſinuation have gained the affections of the City, they had taken from him the only thing upon which he relyed, without noiſe or confuſion, and they might have oppoſed in all his counſels, without fear of the people: if it be urged here, that if the Citizens which were enemies to *Piero* committed an error, in not taking the ſame courſes to retain as he had done to debauch the people, *Peter* committed the ſame fault by not making uſe of the ſame inſtruments which his adverſaries employed againſt him; it is anſwered, that *Soderini* indeed might have tryed, but he could have done it neither with honour nor eaſe; for the way that his adverſaries took was to ſet up the *Medici*, by whoſe aſſiſtance they bearded him exceedingly, and ruined him at laſt; and it had been diſhonourable for *Soderini* to have deſerted the liberties of the people, which he had undertaken to defend, and gone over to the party of the *Medici*; nor could he have done it ſo ſecretly or ſuddenly, but the people would have ſmelt it, and have turned the violence of their affection into as furious an hatred, which would have made his deſtruction much more eaſy to his enemies; for who-ever was but ſuſpected to be a favourer of the *Medici*, was thought, *ipſo facto*, an adverſary to the people. It is neceſſary therefore in all deliberations to weigh all things, to conſider what danger and what advantage every thing will yield, and make choice of what is leaſt dangerous: otherwiſe it will happen to you as it did to *Marcus Tullius*, who raiſed and augmented the greatneſs of *Mark Anthony* by the ſame way which he intended for his deſtruction; for when *Mark Anthony* was declared an enemy by the Senate, having a great Army attending him, and moſt of them of *Cæſar*'s old Souldiers, *Cicero* to draw them off from him, perſwaded the Senate to put *Octavius* at the head of their Army, and ſend him (with the Conſuls) againſt *Antonius*, pretending that the very name of *Octavius* (being Nephew to *Cæſar*) would bring over all his Unckles Party to him, whereby *Antonius* would be ſo weakned, it would be no hard matter to reduce him. But it hapned quite contrary; for *Antonius* having gained *Octavius* to his ſide, they joyned their Forces againſt *Tully* and his Senate, and ruined their whole Party. Which might have been eaſily foreſeen; nor ought *Cicero* ſo imprudently to have reviv'd the name of *Cæſar*, by whom

whom the whole World was brought into ſervitude, and eſpecially *Rome*; nor have perſwaded himſelf that a Tyrant or any of his race would ever reſtore that liberty which his Predeceſſor had ſuppreſſed.

CHAP. LIII.

The people (deceived with a falſe appearance of good) do many times deſire that which turns to their deſtruction: and how great hopes and large promiſes do eaſily debauch them.

After the taking of *Veii* by the *Romans*, a report being ſpread of the convenience and pleaſantneſs of the Town, and richneſs of the Country about it, the people of *Rome* began to fancy that it would be much for their advantage to tranſplant one half of their City, and ſend them thither to inhabit, for there were many fair houſes to receive them; and it could be no weakning or diminution to *Rome*, ſeeing the diſtance betwixt the two Cities was ſo ſmall, *Veii* would be taken rather for a member of *Rome*, than a diſtinct and particular City. The Senate and graver ſort of Citizens had ſo little inclination to this deſign, that they reſolved to die before ever they would conſent to it. The people were ſo mad upon it on the other ſide, that when it came to a debate, and it was to be reſolved what was to be done, the diſpute was ſo hot, they had proceeded to blows, and the whole Town been engaged in blood, had not the Senate interpoſed certain ancient and eminent men, who by their intereſt and veneration among the people defended the blow, and appeaſed them for that time. In which paſſage there are two things conſiderable: the firſt, that the people being deceived with a falſe imagination of good, do many times ſolicit their own ruine, and run the Common-wealth upon infinite dangers and difficulties, unleſs ſome perſon in whom they have great confidence ſtrikes in to inſtruct them which is the good, and which is the evil; and when by accident it falls out that the people (having been formerly deceived either by perſons or things) cannot repoſe that confidence in any one, then of neceſſity all goes to wrack, and nothing can prevent it: to this purpoſe *Dante* in his diſcourſe about Monarchy, tells us,

Il popolo molte volte grida
Viva la ſua morte, & muoia la ſua vita.

The enraged multitude do often crie
Give us our death, our life we do defie.

This incredulity is many times the occaſion that good counſels are neglected, as it hapned to the *Venetians* when invaded by ſeveral enemies at one time, they could not take off any one of them, by reſtoring what they had taken wrongfully from other people; which was the occaſion of the war, and almoſt of their ruine. From whence we may conſider the eaſineſs and difficulty of perſwading the people, and make this diſtinction, if the affair propoſed be in appearance either magnanimous, or profitable, though at the bottom it never ſo deſtructive, the people are always eaſy to be perſwaded: on the other ſide, if any thing be offered (how honourable, how uſeful ſoever) with the leaſt ſhew or glance of cowardize or inconvenience, they are never, or with great difficulty to be wrought to it. To confirm this, we have many examples both modern and ancient in *Rome* and other places. From hence ſprang their jealouſies againſt *Fabius Maximus*, who could never beat it into the heads of that City, that it was better for their Common-wealth to protract, and ſpin out the war, than to puſh things on, and bring all to the hazard of a Battel; for the people looking upon it as cowardly and baſe counſel, and not diſcerning the utility at the bottom, would by no means admit it; and *Fabius* wanted rhetorick to enforce it upon them: and ſo ſtrangely are they blinded ſometimes with their bravery and courage, that though the *Romans* had committed the ſame error once before, and given authority to *Fabius* his Maſter of the Horſe to fight when he ſaw occaſion whether *Fabius* would or not; (which authority had like to have ruined the whole Army, had not *Fabius* with his prudence prevented it) yet that experiment doing no good, they were guilty again, and inveſted *Varro* with the ſame power, upon no other account, but becauſe he had ſwagger'd up and down the Town, that when-ever they qualified him

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CHAP. LIV.

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All's whiſt, and nothing ſtirring but their ears.

He therefore who commands in a mutinous Army, or in a ſeditious City, and deſires to appeaſe either the one or the other, is in my judgment to preſent himſelf with the moſt grace and advantage that he can; adorned with all the ornaments of his dignity, and what-ever elſe

whom the whole World was brought into ſervitude, and eſpecially *Rome*; nor have perſwaded himſelf that a Tyrant or any of his race would ever reſtore that liberty which his Predeceſſor had ſuppreſſed.

CHAP. LIII.

The people (deceived with a falſe appearance of good) do many times deſire that which turns to their deſtruction: and how great hopes and large promiſes do eaſily debauch them.

After the taking of *Veii* by the *Romans*, a report being ſpread of the convenience and pleaſantneſs of the Town, and richneſs of the Country about it, the people of *Rome* began to fancy that it would be much for their advantage to tranſplant one half of their City, and ſend them thither to inhabit, for there were many fair houſes to receive them; and it could be no weakning or diminution to *Rome*, ſeeing the diſtance betwixt the two Cities was ſo ſmall, *Veii* would be taken rather for a member of *Rome*, than a diſtinct and particular City. The Senate and graver ſort of Citizens had ſo little inclination to this deſign, that they reſolved to die before ever they would conſent to it. The people were ſo mad upon it on the other ſide, that when it came to a debate, and it was to be reſolved what was to be done, the diſpute was ſo hot, they had proceeded to blows, and the whole Town been engaged in blood, had not the Senate interpoſed certain ancient and eminent men, who by their intereſt and veneration among the people defended the blow, and appeaſed them for that time. In which paſſage there are two things conſiderable: the firſt, that the people being deceived with a falſe imagination of good, do many times ſolicit their own ruine, and run the Common-wealth upon infinite dangers and difficulties, unleſs ſome perſon in whom they have great confidence ſtrikes in to inſtruct them which is the good, and which is the evil; and when by accident it falls out that the people (having been formerly deceived either by perſons or things) cannot repoſe that confidence in any one, then of neceſſity all goes to wrack, and nothing can prevent it: to this purpoſe *Dante* in his diſcourſe about Monarchy, tells us,

Il popolo molte volte grida
Viva la ſua morte, & muoia la ſua vita.

The enraged multitude do often crie
Give us our death, our life we do defie.

This incredulity is many times the occaſion that good counſels are neglected, as it hapned to the *Venetians* when invaded by ſeveral enemies at one time, they could not take off any one of them, by reſtoring what they had taken wrongfully from other people; which was the occaſion of the war, and almoſt of their ruine. From whence we may conſider the eaſineſs and difficulty of perſwading the people, and make this diſtinction, if the affair propoſed be in appearance either magnanimous, or profitable, though at the bottom it never ſo deſtructive, the people are always eaſy to be perſwaded: on the other ſide, if any thing be offered (how honourable, how uſeful ſoever) with the leaſt ſhew or glance of cowardize or inconvenience, they are never, or with great difficulty to be wrought to it. To confirm this, we have many examples both modern and ancient in *Rome* and other places. From hence ſprang their jealouſies againſt *Fabius Maximus*, who could never beat it into the heads of that City, that it was better for their Common-wealth to protract, and ſpin out the war, than to puſh things on, and bring all to the hazard of a Battel; for the people looking upon it as cowardly and baſe counſel, and not diſcerning the utility at the bottom, would by no means admit it; and *Fabius* wanted rhetorick to enforce it upon them: and ſo ſtrangely are they blinded ſometimes with their bravery and courage, that though the *Romans* had committed the ſame error once before, and given authority to *Fabius* his Maſter of the Horſe to fight when he ſaw occaſion whether *Fabius* would or not; (which authority had like to have ruined the whole Army, had not *Fabius* with his prudence prevented it) yet that experiment doing no good, they were guilty again, and inveſted *Varro* with the ſame power, upon no other account, but becauſe he had ſwagger'd up and down the Town, that when-ever they qualified him

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elſe may make him venerable to the people. Not many years ſince *Florence* was divided into Factions, the *Frateſchi* and the *Arabiati*; and their animoſity was ſo great, they came to blows, and the *Frateſchi* were overthrown, and *Pagolantonio Soderini* ſlain among the reſt, who was as eminent a Citizen as moſt of his time; upon the ſtrength of this Victory the people ran in a tumult to his houſe, with intention to plunder it; but his Brother *Franceſco* (then Biſhop of *Volterra*, and Cardinal now) being accidentally there, as ſoon as he underſtood how things were, and perceived the rabble to encreaſe, he called for the richeſt of his Robes, and having put them on, and his Epiſcopal Rochet over them, he marched out into the croud, and by the majeſty of his perſon, and the efficacy of his language, prevailed with them to forbear, and to return peaceably to their houſes; which action was ſo grateful to the City, that it was celebrated publickly many daies after. I conclude therefore that there is not a ſurer, nor more neceſſary way to compoſe the diſtractions of the people, than the appearance of ſome grave perſon in ſuch a poſture as may make him venerable to them. To return therefore to what we ſaid before, it may be ſeen from hence, with what obſtinacy the *Romans* accepted of that propoſition for tranſplanting to *Veii*, becauſe they thought it profitable, and did not perceive the inconvenience that was in it; for as there hapned many tumults thereupon, ſo much more miſchief had followed, had not the Senate and ſome other grave perſons interpoſed, and by good fortune reſtrain'd them.

CHAP. LV.

How eaſily things are managed in a City where the Commons are incorrupt; how hard it is to erect a principality where there is an equality; and where is not, it a Common-wealth is impoſſible.

THough we have declared before what we thought was to be expected from a City whoſe inhabitants were totally corrupt; yet that will not hinder us from conſidering the ſubtilty of the Senate in relation to a vow which *Camillus* had made to conſecrate the tenth part of the ſpoils of the *Veientes* to *Apollo*; which ſpoils being fallen into the clutches of the common people, the Senate had no way but to publiſh an Edict, requiring all of them at a certain time and place to bring in the tenth part of their gains. 'Tis true, that Proclamation had no great effect, becauſe another expedient was found out to ſatisfy the vow; yet it is remarkable, the confidence the Senate had in the good nature and complyance of the people; and the great opinion that they would punctually bring in whatever they were commanded. On the other ſide it is obſervable, that the people went not about to ſhuffle or defraud the Edict by bringing in leſs than their due; but declared frankly againſt it, as a thing illegally required. Which example, with many other which I have mentioned before, are brought to ſhew the probity and religion wherewith that people was endued, and what good might be expected from them: and certainly where there is not that ſubmiſſion and conformity, no confidence is to be had; as in thoſe Provinces which are corrupted at this day, in *Italy* above all the reſt, and I may ſay in *France* and in *Spain*, which are likewiſe in ſome meaſure under the ſame corruption; for tho they are not perhaps ſubject to ſo many, and ſo dangerous diſorders as we are in *Italy*; yet it proceeds not from the meliority of the people, but from the excellence of their conſtitution, being governed by a Monarchy, which keeps them united, not only by the virtue and example of their Prince, but by the Laws and Cuſtoms of each Kingdom, which are preſerved to this day. *Germany* is the place of the whole World where the footſteps of the old *Roman* virtue and fidelity is conſpicuous; and that fidelity is the cauſe why ſo many Cities live happily in liberty; for they are ſo careful and ſtudious of their Laws, that that very one thing keeps them from ſervitude, and being over-run by their enemies; and if any inſtance be deſired of this more than ordinary probity in the *Germans*, I ſhall produce one, not unlike that before betwixt the Senate and the people of *Rome*. It is the cuſtom in thoſe States when they have occaſion for mony upon the publick account, for the Councils or Magiſtrates in authority to lay a tax of one or two *per cent.* upon all the inhabitants under their juriſdiction, according to their reſpective Eſtates; at the day and place appointed for payment, every man appears with his mony, and having taken his oath firſt that the ſum he pays is according to the full of his Eſtate, he throws it into a cheſt provided for that purpoſe, and no notice taken what it is he throws in; from whence we may conclude that there is ſtill ſome ſparks left in that people of their old ingenuity and religion: nor is it to be doubted but every man pays his due, for otherwiſe the ſum would not amount to the impoſition, nor

to

to what they formerly paid; whereby the fraud would be diſcovered, and they become liable to a new tax: which integrity and juſtice is the more admirable in our days, becauſe it is to be found no where but in *Germany*, and the reaſon (as I conceive) is twofold; one, becauſe they have had little or no commerce with their neighbours, neither trading into foreign parts, nor admitting foreigners into theirs; contenting themſelves with their own diet, and clothes, and commodities, and thereby preventing all occaſion of evil converſation, which is the corruption of good manners, eſpecially among the *French*, the *Spaniards* and *Italians*, which are wicked enough to debauch the whole World. The other reaſon is, becauſe thoſe Common-wealths who have preſerved their liberties, and kept themſelves incorrupt, do not ſuffer any of their Citizens to live high, and at the rate of a Gentleman; but they live all in an equality and parity, as thoſe few Noblemen or Gentlemen who are there are very odious to the people; and when-ever any of them fall by accident into their hands, they dye without mercy, as thoſe who are the fountain of all their luxury, and the occaſion of their ſcandal. I call thoſe Gentlemen who live idly and plentifully upon their Eſtates without any care or employment, and they are very pernicious where-ever they are; but above all, they are moſt dangerous, who, beſides their great revenues, have their *Caſtellanies*, their Juriſdictions, and their Vaſſels, which pay them fealty and homage: of theſe two ſorts the Kingdom of *Naples*, the Territorys of *Rome*, *Romagna* and *Lombardy* are full; for which reaſon there is no ſuch thing as a free State in all thoſe Countries, becauſe the Gentry are mortal enemies to thoſe conſtitutions, and it would be impoſſible to erect a Republick where they had the dominion; if any alteration be to be wrought, it is by reducing them into a Monarchy; for the matter being ſo corrupt, that the Laws are become ineffectual to reſtrain them, there is a neceſſity that force be applyed, and that by a regal power the licentiouſneſs and ambition of the Grandees be reduced into order: this may be illuſtrated by the example of *Tuſcany*, which is a ſmall Territory, and yet has three conſiderable Common-wealths in it, as *Florence*, *Siena* and *Lucca*; and the reſt of the Cities of that Province, though they depend upon them, yet their minds and their laws ſhew a ſtrange propenſity to freedom; all which proceeds from the ſcarcity of Gentry in thoſe parts, eſpecially with ſuch power and juriſdiction as aforeſaid. On the contrary, there is ſo great an equality among them, that if a prudent & publick man ſhould happen among them, who had any knowledg of that kind of Government, he might eaſily form them into a ſolid Common-wealth: but hitherto it has been their misfortune to have no ſuch man: I conclude therefore, that he who would eſtabliſh a Common-wealth, where the Country conſiſts moſt of Gentlemen, will find it impoſſible, unleſs he ruines them firſt; and on the other ſide, he who would ſet up a Monarchy or Principality where the equality is great, muſt ſelect the moſt conſiderable and unquiet amongſt them; give them Caſtles, and Lands, and Preferments, and any thing that may oblige them to his ſide: by which means they ſhall not only maintain the power of their Prince, but their own inſolence and ambition, and the people be forced to ſubmit to a yoak, to which nothing elſe could compel them: for whilſt there is a due proportion betwixt the Prince and the Subject, all things go well, and every man enjoys his Eſtate: but to ſettle a Republick in a Country diſpoſed to Monarchy, or to erect a Monarchy where the condition of the people have a tendency to a Common-wealth, requires a perſon of more than ordinary authority and brain: Many have tried it, but very few have ſucceeded; the greatneſs and difficulty of the enterprize confounding them ſo at firſt, that they know not where they are, and give over as ſoon as they have begun. But it may be objected, that the conſtitution of the *Venetian* Government confutes my poſition, *That no Common-wealth can be eſtabliſhed where the Gentry are conſiderable*, for under that State no man is admitted to any office but thoſe who are Gentlemen. I anſwer, that the *Venetian* Gentry are nothing but name; for their Lands and Poſſeſſions are very few, the principal part of their Eſtates lying in their merchandize and goods: beſides, none of them have any Seigneuries or Juriſdiction over the people, ſo that a Gentleman among them, is but a title of honour and preheminence, founded upon none of thoſe things which in other places make them ſo conſiderable. For as in other Common-wealths the Citizens are diſtinguiſhed into ſeveral Orders, ſo *Venice* is entirely divided into two, the Populace and the Gentry, the Gentry having, or being capable of all honours and employments, from which the Populace are utterly excluded; which for the reaſons aboveſaid, it has produced no diſturbance in that State. Theſe things being conſidered, let him who deſires to erect a Government, ſettle a Common-wealth where there is a parity among the inhabitants; and a Monarchy where there are many great men, and the Gentry numerous. Otherwiſe his Government will be incongruous, and of little duration.

CHAP. LVI.

Great accidents, before they happen to any City or Province, are commonly prognoſticated by ſome ſign, or predicted by ſome men.

HOw it comes to paſs, I know not; but by ancient and modern example it is evident, that no great accident befalls a City or Province, but it is prefaged by Divination, or Prodigy, or Aſtrology, or ſome way or other; and that I may not go far for my proof, every one knows what was foretold by Frier *Girolamo Savonarola* before the Expedition of *Charles* viii into *Italy*; beſides which it was reported all over *Tuſcany*, that there were arm'd men ſeen fighting in the air over the Town of *Arezzo*, and that the claſhing of their arms in the conflict was heard by the people.

It is generally known in *Florence*, that before the death of the old *Laurence de Medici* the *Duomo* or chief Church in that City was ſtruck with lightning, and the people deſtroyed: and before *Piero Soderini* (who was made *Gonfaloniere* for his life by the people) was baniſhed and degraded, the Palace was burn'd by lightning likewiſe: many other inſtances might be produced, which I omit for brevity ſake: I ſhall only add one which is mentioned by *Livy* before the coming of the *French* to *Rome*. *Marcus Cedetius* a Plebeian acquainted the Senate, that paſſing one night about twelve a clock thorow the *Via-nova*, he heard a voice (bigger than a mans) which adviſed him to let the Senate know the *French* were upon their march to *Rome*. How theſe things could be, it is to be diſcourſed by perſons well verſed in the cauſes of natural and ſupernatural events; for my part I will not pretend to underſtand them, unleſs (according to the opinion of ſome Philoſophers) we may believe, that the air being full of intelligences and ſpirits, who foreſeeing future events, and commiſerating the condition of mankind, gives them warning by theſe kind of intimations, that they may the more timely provide and defend themſelves againſt their calamities. But what-ever is the cauſe, experience aſſures us, that after ſuch denuntiations, ſome extraordinary thing or other does conſtantly happen.

CHAP. LVII.

The multitude united, is formidable and ſtrong, but ſeparated, is weak and inconſiderable.

THe Romans being overthrown, and their Country much waſted, upon the coming of the *French*; many of them (contrary to an expreſs Order and Edict of the Senate) tranſplanted to *Veii*, and left *Rome*. Whereupon, by a new Proclamation, the Senate commanded, that by a preciſe day, and upon a certain penalty, they ſhould return to their old habitations: when the news of this Proclamation was firſt brought to *Veii*, it was deſpiſed and laugh'd at by every body; but when the day appointed for their return arrived, there was not a man but pack'd up his goods, and came back as was required, and as *Livy* ſays in the caſe, *Ex ferocibus univerſis, ſinguli metu ſuo obedientes*; *Not one of them who were ſo contumacious together, but apart began to fear, and that fear made him obedient.* And certainly nothing can give us a more lively deſcription of the nature of a multitude than this caſe. They are bold, and will ſpeak liberally againſt the decrees of their Prince; and afterwards when they ſee their puniſhment before their faces, every one grows fearful of his neighbour, ſlips his neck out of the coller, and returns to his obedience. So that it is not much to be conſidered what the people ſay, either of their Princes good management or bad; ſo they be ſtrong enough to keep them in their good humour when they are well diſpoſed, and provide (when they are ill) that they do them no hurt. By this ill diſpoſition of the people, I mean all ill diſpoſitions but what ariſe either from the loſs of their liberty, or the loſs of ſome excellent Prince ſtill living, upon whom they had ſetled their affections.

For the evil diſpoſitions proceeding from theſe cauſes are tranſcendently dreadful, and ſtrong remedies are to be applyed to reſtrain them.

In other caſes their anger is nothing, eſpecially having no body to head them; for as there is nothing ſo terrible as their fury in one caſe, ſo there is nothing ſo vain and inconſiderable in the other, becauſe, though they have betaken themſelves to their Arms, they

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are eaſily reduced, if you can but avoid the firſt heat of their fury; for by degrees they will cool, and every man conſidering it is his duty to return, will begin to ſuſpect himſelf, and think of his ſecurity, either by making his peace, or eſcape. Whenever therefore the multitude is in a mutiny, their beſt way is immediately to chooſe themſelves a Head, who may correct, keep them united, and contrive for their defence, as the *Romans* did when leaving *Rome* upon the death of *Virginia*; for their protection and ſecurity, They created twenty Tribunes from among themſelves: and if this courſe be neglected, it happens to them as *Livy* preſaged in the foregoing Sentence, *That as nothing is more courageous than the multitude united, ſo nothing is more abject when they are ſeparate and divided.*

CHAP. LVIII.

That the multitude is wiſer, and more conſtant than a Prince.

THat nothing is more vain and inconſtant than the multitude, *Titus Livius* and all other Hiſtorians do agree. You ſhall many times find them condemning a man to death, and lamenting him when he is dead, and wiſhing for him again. This hapned in the caſe of *Manlius Capitolinus*, who being ſuſpected to deſign againſt their liberty, was by the people thrown headlong down the rock, and in a ſhort time exceedingly regretted. The words of our Author are theſe. *Populum brevi, poſteaquam ab eo periculum nullum erat, deſiderium ejus tenuit. When their fear of him was over, their affection revived.* And in another place where he ſhows the accidents which hapned in *Siracuſe* after the death of *Girolamo* Nephew to *Hierone*, he ſays, *Hæc natura multitudinis eſt, aut humiliter ſervit, aut ſuperbe dominatur. The nature of the Multitude is, to be ſervilly obedient, or inſolently Tyrannical.*

Things being thus, I know not whether I ſhall not ſeem too bold, to undertake the defence of a thing, which all the world oppoſes; and run my ſelf upon a neceſſity of either quitting it with diſgrace, or purſuing it with ſcandal; yet methinks, being to maintain it with arguments, not force, it ſhould not be ſo criminal. I ſay then in behalf of the multitude; that what they are charged withall by moſt Authors, may be charged upon all private perſons in the world, and eſpecially upon Princes; for whoever lives irregularly, and is not reſtrained by the Law, is ſubject to the ſame exorbitancies, and will commit as bad faults as the moſt diſſolute multitude in the world: And this may be eaſily known, if it be conſidered how many Princes there have been, and how few of them good, I mean of ſuch Princes as have deſpiſed, and broke thorow thoſe Laws which were intended to reſtrain them. The Kings in *Egypt* were not anciently of this ſort, for they were govern'd by Laws in thoſe Provinces from the very beginning; and the Kings of *Sparta* were the ſame: Nor need we look back ſo far for examples; we have the Kings of *France* in our own days, whoſe Kingdom in my judgment, is at this time the moſt regular, and beſt govern'd in the world. Thoſe Princes therefore who are born under ſuch Laws and Conſtitutions, and obliged to live by them, are not to be reckoned or compared with the diſſolute and mutinous multitude; but they are to be conſidered with a multitude under the ſame Laws and reſtrictions; As the people of *Rome* were whilſt their Common-wealth was incorrupt, and they were found neither to be inſolent in authority, nor ſlaviſh in their ſubjection; but by their Laws, and their Magiſtrates, they kept up their dignity with honour: And if at any time neceſſity required that they ſhould appear againſt the power of any particular perſon; they did it effectually, as in the caſes of *Manlius*, the *Decem-viri*, and others who deſigned to enſlave them. On the other ſide, when it was for the intereſt of the Publick, they were as obſequious and dutiful to the *Dictators* and *Conſuls*, as they had been obſtinate before. Nor was their regret for *Manlius* when he was dead, at all to be admired; it was the memory of his virtues that cauſed it, which are commendable even among Enemies. The ſame thing might have hapned to the beſt of Princes; for all writers agree, that virtue is laudable whereſoever it is to be found. And I am of opinion, that could *Manlius* have been raiſed again, and preſented to them in the height of their ſadneſs, they would have ſerved him as before, diſcharged him of his impriſonment, but condemned him to death. Nor are Princes (and thoſe held very wiſe) exempt from this kind of inconſtancy. They have put many to death, and lamented them afterwards; as *Alexander* for *Clito*, and other of his friends, and *Herod* for *Mariamnes*. But what *Titus Livius* ſays of this ſubject, is not intended of a multitude regulated by Laws, as the *Romans* were; but a looſe and diſorderly multitude, like the people of *Syracuſe*, who behaved themſelves

ſelves like mad-men, and committed the ſame faults that *Herod* and *Alexander* had committed before them. The multitude therefore is no more to be accuſed of fury and inconſtancy, than a Prince; for they are both ſubject to extravagance, when they have no Laws, nor no rules to reſtrain them. And of this (beſides what I have ſaid) there are many examples, not only among the *Roman* Emperors, but among other Princes and Tyrants, which have been guilty of more giddineſs and inconſtancy, than any multitude whatever. I conclude therefore againſt the common opinion, that the people are no more light, ingrateful, nor changeable than Princes; but that both of them are equally faulty, and he that ſhould go about to excuſe the Princes, would be in a very great error; for a people which governs by Law, and is well ordered, ſhall be as ſtable, as wiſe, and as grateful as a Prince, and perhaps more, though he be never ſo wiſe: And on the other ſide, a diſſolute and irregular Prince ſhall be more mutable, imprudent, and ingrateful, than any multitude whatever, and that not ſo much from any diverſity in his Nature (for they are much at one, and if there be any excellence, 'tis on the ſide of the people) as from their greater or leſſer reſpect to the Laws under which they are to live: And he who ſhall conſider the people of *Rome*, will find that for 400 years together, they hated the very name of a King, were ambitious of honour, and ſtudious exceedingly for the good of their Country, as may be juſtified by many examples. If it be objected that the *Romans* were ingrateful to *Scipio*, I refer them to what I proved ſo largely before, that the people are leſs ingrateful than Princes. And as to prudence, and conſtancy, I affirm, They have much the advantage, and are more wiſe, more ſteddy, and more judicious than Princes; for which reaſon the voice of the people, is reſembled to the voice of God, becauſe by ſome occult and ſingular quality it does often preſage things that are wonderful, and relating to their own welfare or calamity. In giving their judgment about dubious things; you ſhall ſeldom find them miſtake, if at any time two eminent Orators equally excellent in their profeſſion, do controvert and diſcourſe a thing *pro* and *con* before them, they will aſſuredly take the moſt rational ſide; which ſhows they are no leſs capable of truth, than other people. And if in matters of honour, or enterprize which carry an appearance of publick utility, they be ſometimes miſtaken, (as is ſaid before) the Princes are more, by reaſon of their paſſions, and perturbations of mind, to which they are much more obnoxious than the people. In the election of Magiſtrates they are more dexterous, and judicious than Princes, nor ſhall the people be ever perſwaded to advance a corrupt, and infamous man, which among Princes is eaſie and common. If it takes a diſguſt or abhorrency to any thing, 'tis not readily removed, but ſticks by them for ſeveral ages, which among Princes is not ſo; both which points may be evicted by the people of *Rome*, who in ſo many hundred years, and ſo many elections of Conſuls, and Tribunes, never made four elections that they repented of afterwards, and for the name of a King they abhorred it ſo perfectly, that no virtue, no former Service to his Country could excuſe any man whom they ſuſpected to aſpire to it. It is evident likewiſe that thoſe Cities which are governed by the people, have enlarged their Territories in a ſhort time, and extended their Empire farther, than thoſe who have been ſubject to Princes; as *Rome* after the expulſion of Kings, and *Athens* after they had reſcued themſelves from the tyranny of *Piſiſtrates*; which can proceed from nothing, but that the Government by a free State is intrinſically better, than the Government by a Prince: Nor can *Livy*'s expreſſion about the levity of the *Syracuſans* oppoſe my opinion; for let all the good and ill qualities of the Prince and people be compared, and it will be found, That the people are leſs extravagant, and more honourable of the two. And if in the inſtituting of good Laws, the ordaining of new Statutes, and the making new Orders for civil converſation and Society, Princes have the better, yet the people preſerving, and executing them better than they, are doubtleſs as worthy of praiſe, as the Founders themſelves. To be ſhort, Principalities and Republicks have both of them ſubſiſted ſeveral years, and both of them had occaſion to be regulated and reformed; for a Prince that is licentious, and does what he has a mind to; has a mind to that which does him hurt, and is a weak man for his pains; and the people which takes the ſame liberty, is as mad on the other ſide. And if the compariſon be made betwixt mix'd Principalities, that are circumſcribed, and bounded by Laws, and popular Governments under the ſame tyes and reſtrictions; the people will be found more virtuous than the Princes; but if it be betwixt looſe and diſſolute Governments both of the one kind, and the other, the errors on the ſide of the Princes will appear more great, more numerous, and more incapable of redreſs: for in popular tumults, a ſober man may interpoſe, and by fair words reduce them to reaſon; but to an enraged Prince, who dares intercede; or what remedy is there to repair to, but violence, and the Sword? From whence we may judge and diſtinguiſh betwixt the inconvenience of the one and the other: The people are appeaſed with gentleneſs, and

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good words; and the Prince not to be prevailed upon, but by violence and force; and if it be ſo, who is it that will deny, That the Diſeaſe is more dangerous, where the Cure is moſt difficult? Moreover when the people tumultuate, there is not ſo much fear of any preſent miſchief that they are likely to commit, as of the conſequences of it, and that it may end in a tyranny. But with ill Princes it is quite contrary, the preſent miſery is the moſt dreadful, becauſe they hope when he dyes, their liberty may be recovered. You ſee then the difference betwixt them; one is more dangerous at preſent, and the other for the future; the cruelty of the people extends only to ſuch as (in their opinion) conſpire againſt the common good. The ſeverity of the Prince, is more againſt them who deſign againſt his particular intereſt. But this opinion of the people goes daily down the wind; for every man has liberty to ſpeak what he pleaſes againſt them (though even the Government be popular): But againſt a Prince no man can talk without a thouſand apprehenſions, and dangers. Nor will it ſeem to me incongruous (the matter having drawn me thus far) in my next Chapter to diſcourſe what Confederacies are moſt ſafe, thoſe which are made with Princes, or thoſe which are made with Common-wealths.

CHAP. LIX.

What Leagues or Confederacies are moſt to be truſted; Thoſe which are made with Princes, or thoſe which are made with free States.

BEcauſe Princes with Princes, and free States among themſelves, and many times with Princes do enter into leagues of friendſhip and confederacy, I thought it not amiſs to enquire in this place, whoſe faith is the moſt firm, and in whoſe amity the greateſt confidence is to be repoſed. Having conſidered it diligently with my ſelf, it ſeems to me that in many caſes they are alike, and in ſome they differ. And firſt, when neceſſity of State requires, and there is any viſible danger of loſing the Government, neither the one nor the other are ſo preciſe, but they will make bold with their engagements, and behave themſelves ingratefully: *Demetrius Poliorcetes* had obliged the *Athenians* by many good Offices; but his Army being afterwards defeated, and himſelf flying to them for refuge, as to his Confederates, and Friends he was repulſed, and not admitted into the City, which troubled him more than the loſs of his Army. *Pompey* being beaten in *Theſalia* by *Caſar* fled likewiſe into *Egypt* to *Ptolomy*, whom he had formerly reſtored to his Kingdom, and was murthered by him for his confidence. In both theſe Examples the ingratitude ſeems to be the ſame; yet the inhumanity was greater on the Princes ſide, than on the Common-wealths; but be it as it will, when the State is in danger, they are neither of them ſcrupulous. And if there be any Prince or Common-wealth ſo punctual as to preſerve their league, though with deſtruction to themſelves; it may proceed from the ſame cauſes. It may very well happen that a Prince may confederate with ſome other great Potentate, (who though unable to defend him at that time, may give him hopes notwithſtanding of reſtoring him ſome other) and perſevere in his Confederacy, as thinking that by having made himſelf of that Princes party, he has rendered his accommodation with the adverſary impoſſible. This was the caſe of all the *Neopolitan* Princes who ſided with the *French* in their Expedition into thoſe parts: And as to the free States, they ſuffered of old ſomething in this Nature, as *Saguntum* in *Spain*, which City choſe rather to expoſe its ſelf to direption, and all the Calamities of War, than forſake its confederacy with the *Romans*, and in the year 1512. *Florence* did almoſt the ſame to continue its amity with the *French*. So that computing every thing, and conſidering what both parties have done upon ſuch imminent and irreſiſtable danger, I believe there is more conſtancy and firm friendſhip to be found among Common-wealths than among Princes; for though perhaps they may have the ſame ſentiments and inclinations as Princes; yet their motions, and reſolutions being ſlower, they are longer before they violate their faith. But when their leagues and confederacies are to be broken, upon the bare proſpect of advantage; in that caſe your Common-wealths are much more religious and ſevere; and examples may be brought where a ſmall gain has tempted a Prince, when a great one could not move a Common-wealth. *Themiſtocles* in an Oration to the *Athenians*, told them, That he had ſomething to adviſe that would be infinitely to their advantage, but durſt not communicate it in publick, becauſe to publiſh it, would hinder the Execution; whereupon the people deputed *Ariſtides* to receive it; and act in it afterwards as he ſhould think convenient. *Themiſtocles* acquainted him, That the whole *Grecian* Fleet (though under their paſsport and parole)

parole) were in a place where they might be all taken or deſtroyed, which would make the *Athenians* abſolute Maſters in thoſe Seas; and *Ariſtides* reported to the people, That the Council of *Themiſtocles* was profitable, but would be a great diſhonour to their State; upon which it was unanimouſly rejected. But had the ſame occaſion been offered to *Philip* of *Macedon*, or ſome other Princes, they would not have been ſo tender; for it was a practice among them (and eſpecially with *Philip*) who got more by breaking his faith, than by all his other deſigns. As to the breaches upon the non-obſervance of Articles, they are ordinary things, and I have nothing to ſay of them: I ſpeak only of extraordinary occaſions, and am of opinion from what I have ſaid, That the people do tranſgreſs leſs in that Nature, than Princes, and may therefore with more confidence be truſted.

CHAP. LX.

How the Conſulſhip, and other Dignities in Rome *were conferred without reſpect of age.*

IT is manifeſt in the Hiſtory of the *Roman* Common-wealth, that after the people were made capable of the Conſulſhip, the Citizens were promiſcuouſly prefer'd without reſpect either of age or extraction; but any man was advanced for his Virtue, whether he was a young man, or an old: and this was evident in *Valerius Corvinus*, who was created Conſul in the 23 year of his age; upon which conſideration in one of his Speeches to the Army, he told them that the Conſulſhip was, *Præmium Virtutis, non Sanguinis. The reward, not of Nobility, but Virtue.* Whether this was prudently done, or not, may admit of diſpute: But as to the receiving all ſorts of perſons to that dignity without conſideration of their blood; there was a neceſſity of that, and the ſame neceſſity that was in *Rome*, may happen in any other City that deſires to do the ſame great things which were done in *Rome*, of which we have ſpoken elſewhere. For men are not to be perſwaded to ſuffer, but in hopes of reward; and that hope cannot be taken away, without manifeſt danger. It was but equitable therefore that the people ſhould be capable of the Conſulſhip, that being nouriſhed a while with only the hopes, they might at length be ſo happy as to have it in effect. A City that employs not its people in any great affair, may order them as it pleaſes; but if it deſigns to extend its Empire, and do as the *Romans* did, there muſt be no diſtinction. And that no regard ought to be had of any man's age, appears by this, That in the election of a young man to a degree, in which the wiſdom of an old man is requiſite, the multitude being to elect, it is neceſſary that the young man be recommended by ſome extraordinary Exploit; and when a young man is ſo happy, as to have made himſelf conſpicuous in the City by ſome honourable Atchievement, it were not only hard, but inconvenient if the ſaid City might not receive the benefit of his virtue immediately, but be forced to attend till his mind as well as body was ſuper-annuated, and all that vigour and promptitude loſt, which at that time might have been ſo ſerviceable to his Country: at which age *Valerius Corvinus*, *Scipio*, *Pompey*, and many others did great things, and were permitted to triumph for their pains.

THE

THE DISCOURSES OF Nicholas Machiavel, *CITIZEN* and *SECRETARY* OF FLORENCE, Upon the First Decade of *LIVY* TO *ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI*, AND *COSIMO RUCELLAI.*

LIBER II.

The Preface.

IT is the common practice of Mankind, to commend the ancient, and condemn the preſent times; but in my judgment not always with reaſon; for ſo ſtudiouſly are they devoted to things of antiquity, that they do not only admire what is tranſmitted by old Authors, but applaud and cry up when they are old, the paſſages and occurrences in their youth. But my opinion is, This their way of computation is many times falſe, and that upon ſeveral accompts. Firſt, becauſe of ſuch very ancient things we can have no abſolute knowledge; for moſt commonly in the Narrative of affairs, what is infamous, or ill done, is pretermitted in ſilence, whilſt what is well done, and honourable, is related with all the Arts, and amplifications of Rhetorick; for ſo much are Hiſtorians accuſtomed to attribute to the fortune of the Conqueror, that to encreaſe his praiſe, they do not only exſpatiate upon his Conduct, and Exploits, but they do likewiſe ſo magnify and illuſtrate the very actions of the Enemy, That they who come after beholding things at a great diſtance, have reaſon to admire thoſe times, and thoſe men, and by conſequence to love them. Beſides it being envy or fear which diſpoſes people to hatred; neither of thoſe paſſions extending to what cannot poſſibly hurt them, two great cauſes are wanting of finding fault with Antiquity; for as things ſo long paſſed cannot any way prejudice, ſo they cannot provoke

provoke to envy or diſcontent : But preſent things which are obvious to our own ſence, are univerſally known, and no circumſtance that paſſes (whether good or bad) that can be totally conceal'd; from whence it proceeds, that obſerving with the excellence and virtue of our preſent affairs, whatever is concomitant of imprudence or vice, we are in a manner compelled to poſtpone them to things of antiquity, where the good only is diſplayed, and the bad paſſed by, though perhaps the preſent things are more worthily glorious. I do not intend any thing hereby of the Arts and Sciences of our predeceſſors, ſo highly improved and illuſtrated, that 'tis not in the power of time either to add any thing, or ſubſtract. I only ſpeak of the manners and civil converſations of men; in which indeed we have not ſo many virtuous examples, as were to be found among our Anceſtors : So that it is not altogether unjuſtly if antiquity be prefer'd; yet are not our preſent tranſactions to be always condemn'd as worſe than the former, as if antiquity had no errors at all. Humane affairs are in perpetual fluctuation, and have their times of decreaſe, as well as advancement. A City or Province founded by ſome excellent perſon upon good Principles and Laws, not only ſtands, but flouriſhes and encreaſes a long time in honour, authority, and wealth; and thoſe perſons whoſe happineſs it is to be born under thoſe governments whilſt they are glorious, and powerful, are apt to prefer their old Cuſtoms, to the diſparagement of the new; yet they are in an error, and for the reaſons aboveſaid. But thoſe who are born when the State is in its declenſion, do not ſo much tranſgreſs when they commend what is paſs'd, and decry what is preſent; which things (having ſeriouſly conſidered with my ſelf) I conceive to be cauſed, becauſe the world has been always the ſame, and made up promiſcuouſly of good things and bad; yet theſe good and bad things have varied ſometimes, and as it were tranſmigrated from one City, and one Province to another; ſo that in thoſe places where virtue has been a long time predominant, vice has ſtoln in by degrees, and ſupplanted it; which is evident by the revolutions of Kingdoms and Empires, where virtue and juſtice has had its time, and been tranſfuſed afterwards into other Countries. However the world was the ſame, though its virtue and magnanimity was unſtable, removing and ſhifting from the *Aſſyrians* firſt, to the *Medes*, from the *Medes* to the *Perſians*, and from them to the *Romans*; and if after the *Roman* Empire, there has been no government ſo great as to comprehend and ingroſs the virtue of the whole world; yet the ſame virtue that was of old among the *Romans* is not extinct, but diſperſed and branched out into ſeveral Kingdoms and Provinces, as the Kingdom of *France*, the Kingdom of the *Turks*, the Kingdom of the *Soldan*, the Empire of the *Germans*, and the Sect of the *Saracins*, which conquered ſo many Provinces, and committed ſuch devaſtations, as were the ruine of the Empire of the Eaſt. In theſe Kingdoms rent and divided from the Empire of the *Romans*, the old *Roman* virtue is diffuſed, and retains ſtill ſomething of its priſtine luſtre, ſo that it may without injuſtice be admired in ſome places : Which being ſo, he who is born in thoſe Provinces where the *Roman* virtue and diſcipline is ſtill in being (but declining) if he applauds his old Country-men, and blames his Contemporaries, his error is not great : But he that is born in *Italy*, and is not in his heart a *Tramontan*, or in *Greece*, and is not a *Turk*, muſt needs bewail his own times, and cry up his Predeceſſors, in which he will find many things well worthy his admiration; whereas in theſe there is nothing but wickedneſs and obloquy, no Religion, no Laws, no Diſcipline, but all things impure and brutiſh, and they are the more deteſtable and deplorable, by how much the ſame perſons who would be imitated; and are ſet aloft to command all, and correct thoſe that are vitious, are moſt diſſolute, and moſt vitious themſelves.

But to return to our diſcourſe, I ſay, That though humane judgment is frail, and may be miſtaken in its Character of ſuch things as by reaſon of their antiquity, cannot fall ſo perfectly under ones Cognizance; yet that will not excuſe old men for preferring the tranſactions in their youth, becauſe both the one and the other were equally liable to their knowledge; nor would they be of that opinion, if men had the ſame ſentiment and appetite as long as they lived; but our affection altering, and our rational Soul being otherwiſe diſpoſed than formerly, we judge otherwiſe of things, though the times be the ſame; for how is it poſſible the ſame things ſhould pleaſe in our youth and old age, when their Studies, and delights are ſo different and remote? For (to ſay no more) as the quickneſs and vigour of the body decreaſes in old men, ſo their judgment and prudence increaſes proportionably; and thence it follows that the ſame things which ſeemed tollerable in their youth, grow inſupportable when they are old; ſo that the fault is more in their judgment, than the age, for ſuppoſing thoſe things to be good, which, being wiſer, by experience, they find to be otherwiſe. To which it may be added, that the deſires of mankind are immenſe, and unſatiable; that naturally we are covetous of every thing, whereas fortune allows us but little; That from thence it happens that no man is contented, every man deſpiſes what he

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is already poſſeſſed of, commends what is paſſed, condemns what is preſent, and longs for what is to come, though induced by no reaſonable occaſion. Things being thus, I cannot reſolve my ſelf whether ever I may not be of that number, who in theſe my diſcourſes have ſo highly magnified the old times and exploits of the *Romans*, to the diminution of our own: and truly, were not the virtue of that age as clear as the Sun, and the wickedneſs of ours as manifeſt as that, I ſhould have been more moderate, and feared to have run into the ſame error which I have condemned in other people.

But things being ſo evident, I may with boldneſs deliver my opinion of both times, to the end that the minds of ſuch young perſons, as ſhall peruſe my conceptions, may be admoniſhed to avoid thoſe vices which are ſo prevalent now, and prepared to imitate the virtue of our Anceſtors, when-ever occaſion ſhall be offered. For it is the office of a good man to recommend that to other people which he thinks for the intereſt and honour of his Country, though perhaps the adverſity of his fortune, and the malignity of the times will not ſuffer him to practiſe it himſelf; that by his inſtructions ſo many, at leaſt ſome one may be ſo fortunate as to be able to follow him.

Wherefore having in my firſt Book done with what I propoſed about the original inſtitution of Government, and what was in my judgment neceſſary to preſerve them: I ſhall now in this ſecond, diſcourſe of what the *Romans* did abroad for the inlargement and augmentation of their Empire.

CHAP. I.

Whether the virtue or fortune of the Romans *was the occaſion of the greatneſs of their Empire.*

MAny have thought, and *Plutarch* (a grave Author) among the reſt, that the people of *Rome* were more beholding to their fortune than virtue, in the acquiſition of their Empire; and among other reaſons, he infers it from their own ſilent confeſſion, in having erected more Temples to Fortune than to any of their Gods. *Livy* ſeems to be likewiſe of the ſame opinion; for he ſeldom introduces a Roman ſpeaking any thing of virtue, but immediately it is followed with fortune, with which nevertheleſs I can by no means comply, nor believe it will hold water; for though no Common-wealth be to be found that has made ſuch progreſs as the Roman, why ſhould it be rather imputed to their good Fortune than the ſolid conſtitution of their Laws? the courage of their Armies, and the excellent conduct of their Emperors, extended their Empire; and then their own juſt meaſures, and the wiſe inſtitutions of their firſt Legiſlator preſerved what they got, as we ſhall hereafter more largely diſcover. It is objected that the *Romans* were never at one time involved in two conſiderable wars, (which is imputed rather to their fortune than wiſdom) for they had no quarrel with the *Latins* till they had ſubdued the *Samnites*, and were forced to make war in their defence; they had no controverſy with the *Tuſcans* till they had beaten the *Latins*, and with their frequent victories almoſt extinguiſhed the *Sabines*, whereas if two of theſe States had confederated, and joyned their powerful Armies againſt them, no doubt but the affairs of the *Romans* would have been in very great danger. But be it as it will, this is moſt certain, they never had two great wars upon their hands at a time; but they began one when they ended the other, or the end of the firſt was the beginning of the ſecond; and this may be obſerved in the ſeries of their wars, for (to paſs by their quarrels before *Rome* was taken by the *French*) whilſt the *Æqui* and *Volſci* were powerful and ſtrong, they had no enemies but they; when they were conquered, their war brake out with the *Samnites*; and though before that was perfectly concluded, the *Latins* rebelled; yet before it could be brought to a war, the *Samnites* had made their peace, and joyned their Army with the *Romans*, to reduce the *Latini*. That war being finiſhed, the war with the *Samnites* revived, and was the occaſion of much miſchief to the *Samnites*; after which, the *Romans* began with the *Tuſcans*, and that being compoſed, the *Samnites* broke out again upon the paſſage of *Pyrrhus* into *Italy*, who being repulſed into *Greece*, they had opportunity for their wars with the *Carthaginians*, and their firſt war with that State was no ſooner determined, but the *French*, and the inhabitants on this and the other ſide of the *Alps* conſpired ſo effectually againſt them, that betwixt *Popolonia* and *Piſa* (where the Tower of St. *Vincent* is at this day to be ſeen) the Confederates were routed with a very great ſlaughter.

This war being concluded, for twenty years together they had no conſiderable war, for they had no body to fight with but the *Ligures*, and the relicts of thoſe *French* who were remaining in *Lombardy*. In this poſture they continued till the ſecond Punic war, which laſted 16 years, and perplexed them exceedingly. That war being ended with a great deal of honour, their next enterprize was againſt the *Macedonians*; after which their war happened with *Antiochus* in *Aſia*, and when he was overcome, there was not a Prince or State in the whole World, which by it ſelf, or conjunction with the reſt, was able to contend with the Romans. But before this laſt victory, who-ever conſiders the method of their wars, and their manner of proceeding, ſhall find great virtue and wiſdom intermixed with their good fortune, ſo that the reaſon of their good fortune is eaſily diſcovered; for this is moſt certain, when a Prince or Common-wealth arrives at that height of reputation that no neighbour-Prince or People dares venture to invade him, (unleſs compelled by indiſpenſible neceſſity) he may do what he pleaſes, 'tis in his Election with whom he will make war, and with whom he will be at peace; for his neighbours being affraid of his power, are all glad to be his friends; and thoſe Potentates who are fartheſt off, and have no commerce with them, look on as unconcern'd, as if the conſequence could have no reflexion upon them; and in this error they do many times continue till the calamities be brought home to their own dores; and then, when 'tis too late, they have nothing but their own private force to oppoſe, which is too weak when the enemy is grown ſo ſtrong. I will not inlarge upon the *Samnites*, nor recount how they ſtood ſtill, and look'd on, while the *Romans* conquer'd the *Æqui* and the *Volſci*; but to avoid prolixity, I ſhall paſs to the *Carthaginians*, who were of great power and authority when the *Romans* were at war both with the *Samnites* and *Tuſcans*; they had the command of all *Affrick*, and were ſupreme in *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, and great part of *Spain*. Blinded with their power, and (as they thought) ſecure in their diſtance, it never came into their heads to invade them at that time, or to give any aſſiſtance to the *Samnites* or *Tuſcans*; but (according to the practice of the World with things that are new, and encreaſing) they rather ſided with them, and deſired their friendſhip, not ſo much as perceiving their error, till the *Romans* had conquered all the intermediate States, and began to contend with them for the Empire of *Sicily* and *Spain*. And what hapned to the *Carthaginians*, hapned likewiſe to the *French*, to *Philip* of *Macedon*, and to *Antiochus*; each of them believing (whilſt the *Romans* were employed in their wars with other people) that they would either be overcome, or that they themſelves ſhould have time enough to make peace or war with them, as they ſaw it moſt for their advantage: ſo that conſidering what is good, I am of opinion that the ſame fortune and proſperity may be expected by any Prince or State which exerciſes the ſame virtue and induſtry as the *Romans* have done before them. And here we might very properly diſcourſe of the *Roman* method in the invaſion of other Provinces, but we have done that at large in our Treatiſe called the Prince; yet this I ſhall ſay in ſhort, that the *Romans* made always ſure of ſome friend or other in the Provinces againſt which they deſign'd, that might be a means to admit them, and give them entrance, and help afterwards to keep what they had been inſtrumental in getting. So by intelligence with the *Capuans* they invaded *Samnium*; by the help of the *Camertines* they got into *Tuſcany*; by the *Mamertines* into *Sicily*; by the *Saguntines* into *Spain*; *Maſſiniſſa* gave them entrance into *Affrick*, the *Etoli* into *Greece*, *Eumenes* and other Princes into *Aſia*, and the *Maſſilienſes* and *Hedai* into *France*; and as by their correſpondence they conquered moſt of thoſe Countries, ſo by their intereſt they preſerved them; which way, if diligently obſerved by other people, it will be found that their proſperity depended leſs upon fortune than thoſe States who obſerved not that courſe: but to illuſtrate what we have ſaid, and make it ſo plain and perſpicuous that every one may ſee how much more their virtue than their fortune contributed to their Empire; in our next Chapter we will conſider what thoſe people were whom the *Romans* ſubdued, and with what obſtinacy they defended their liberty.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

With what Nations the Romans contended, and with what obſtinacy thoſe Nations reſiſted.

NOthing made it ſo difficult for the *Romans* to conquer their Neighbours, and ſome other remoter Provinces, as the love which the people of thoſe times did bear to their liberty: for in the defence of that, they were ſo indefatigably ſtudious, that nothing but ſingular and extraordinary virtue could have ſubdued them: and this is demonſtrable by the many and great dangers to which they expoſed themſelves, ſometimes to preſerve, and ſometimes to recover it; as alſo by the ſeverity of their revenge upon thoſe who had uſurp'd it. 'Tis evident likewiſe in Hiſtory what detriment the People and Cities have ſuffered whilſt they were in ſervitude and ſubjection; and whereas now a-days there is but one Province which can boaſt of free Cities, in ancient times there was not one Province but had plenty. In *Italy* from the *Alps* (which divide *Tuſcany* and *Lombardy*) to the extremeſt part of that Country, there were many free States; as the *Tuſcans*, the *Romans*, the *Samnites*, and others; nor is there mention of any King (but what reigned in *Rome*) beſides *Porſena* King of *Tuſcany*, the extinction of whoſe line, though not ſet down in Hiſtory, yet it is manifeſt that *Tuſcany* was free at the time when the *Romans* encamped before *Veii*; ſo well ſatisfied with their liberty, and ſo abhorring from the very name of a King, that the *Veientes* having for their better defence created one in their own Town, and ſent to the *Tuſcans* to implore their aſſiſtance againſt the *Romans*, after a grave and ſolemn debate, it was reſolved no aſſiſtance ſhould be ſent whilſt they were under the dominion of a King; as thinking it unfit to engage in the defence of a Country that had betraid it ſelf, and proſtituted to the dominion of a ſingle perſon. Nor is this univerſal affection to liberty ſo wonderful in the people.

Experience tells us that no Cities have augmented their Revenues, or enlarged their Territories, but whilſt they were free and at liberty: and certainly 'tis a prodigious thing to conſider to what height and grandeur in an hundred years time the City of *Athens* arrived, after it had freed it ſelf from the tyranny of *Piſiſtrates*; but much more to conſider the greatneſs of *Rome* upon the expulſion of her Kings; and the reaſon of all is, becauſe in Common-wealths private wealth and emolument is not ſo much aim'd at as the improvement of the publick; nor is there any where ſo much care of the publick as in free States, where what-ever is equitable, and for the common advantage, is decreed and executed, without reſpect to particular perſons, who may perhaps be ſufferers thereby; whereas in Cities that are governed by a Prince it falls out quite contrary; for there, what makes commonly for the advantage of the Prince, is prejudice to the publick: ſo that when a free State degenerates into a Tyranny, the leaſt miſchief that it can expect, is, to make no further advancement in its Empire; and no farther encreaſe either in riches or power; but for the moſt part it goes backward, and declines: and if it ſhould ſo happen that the Tyrant ſhould be a virtuous man, and one who by his courage and military diſcipline ſhould enlarge his Dominions; yet what-ever he took would be converted to his own private uſe, without any benefit to the publick. For he dares not advance any of thoſe Citizens (how worthy and honeſt ſoever) leſt he ſhould have occaſion to ſuſpect them afterwards. Nor can he make thoſe Cities which he ſubdues, dependant or tributary to that where he is abſolute; for 'tis not the intereſt of a Tyrant to make his Subjects powerful or united; but to keep them low, and divided, that every Town, every Province may depend wholly upon himſelf; ſo that the Conqueſts of an Uſurper may turn to his own profit, but never to the publick; to which purpoſe many things are very handſomely written by *Xenophon* in his Treatiſe of Tyranny; and things being thus, no body is to admire if our Anceſtors had ſo great a zeal for their liberty; and the very name of a Tyrant was ſo odious to them, that when long ſince news was brought to the Army of the aſſaſſination of *Hieronymo* the Nephew of *Hiero* of *Syracuſe*, and the whole Camp was in an uproar againſt the Conſpirators; yet when it was told them that they had proclaimed Liberty, and a free Government, they laid by their indignation againſt the Tyrannicids, and being pacified with the very name of liberty, fell into conſultation how it was to be preſerved. Nor is it to be wondred at then, if their revenge be ſo violent and extraordinary upon thoſe who would violate it; of which, though there be many examples, I ſhall inſtance only in one, but that moſt remarkable and horrid; and happning in *Corcirca* a City in *Greece*: for all *Greece* being divided, and conſiſting of two Factions, one of them under the protection of the *Athe-*

thenians, and the other of the *Spartans*; and in *Cocirca* the Nobility prevailing, and having uſurped upon the liberty of the people, it hapned that the people being reinforced by the aſſiſtance of the *Athenians*, overpowred the Nobility, and conquered them again. Having reſtored their liberty, and ſhak'd off their ſervitude, they clap'd up all the Nobility in a large priſon, and bringing them forth by ten at a time, as if they were to be baniſhed, they put them to death with moſt exquiſite torments; which ſeverity coming by degrees to the ears of the remainder, they reſolved to do what was poſſible to defend themſelves againſt it, upon which they ſtood upon their guard, and would ſuffer none of the Officers to come in; whereupon, in a great fury, the people ran thither, pull'd off the covering of the houſe where they were, and throwing down the walls, buried them all in the ruines: and of this ſort of cruelty there were many other examples in that Province; for the people are uſually more impetuous in revenging the loſs of their liberty, than in defending it.

But it may (not unfitly) be admir'd in this place what ſhould be the cauſe that the ancients ſhould be more zealous for publick liberty than we in our days: if my opinion may paſs, I think it is for the ſame reaſon, that in thoſe times men were more robuſt, and ſtronger than now; which proceeded much from the diverſity betwixt their Education, their Religion and ours: for whereas our Religion gives us a juſt proſpect and contemplation of things, and teaches us to deſpiſe the magnificence and pomp of the World; the Ethnicks valued them ſo highly, that believing them their chiefeſt happineſs, it made them more fierce and buſy to defend them: and this may be collected from ſeveral of their cuſtoms; for if the ſacrifices in their days be compared with the ſacrifices in ours, theirs will be found magnificent and horrid; ours delicate and neat, but neither ſo magnificent nor cruel. They wanted not pomp nor formality in thoſe ceremonies, and yet to make them the more venerable and ſolemn, they added blood and ſlaughter to them, offering up infinite numbers of beaſts, which being ſlain before the people, made them more hard-hearted and cruel. Moreover the Religion of the Gentiles did not place their beatitude any where but upon ſuch as were full of worldly glory, and had done ſome great action for the benefit of their Country. In our Religion the meek and humble, and ſuch as devote themſelves to the contemplation of divine things, are eſteemed more happy than the greateſt Tyrant, and the greateſt Conqueror upon earth; and the *ſummum bonum*, which the others placed in the greatneſs of the mind, the ſtrength of the body, and what-ever elſe contributed to make men active, we have determined to conſiſt in humility, abjection, and contempt of the World; and if our Religion requires any fortitude, it is rather to enable us to ſuffer than to act. So that it ſeems to me, this way of living, ſo contrary to the ancients, has rendred the Chriſtians more weak and effeminate; and left them as a prey to thoſe who are more wicked, and may order them as they pleaſe, the moſt part of them thinking more of Paradiſe than Preferment, and of enduring than revenging of injuries; as if Heaven was to be won rather by idleneſs than arms: but that explication of our Religion is erronious, and they who made it were poor and puſillanimous, and more given to their eaſe than any thing that was great: for if the Chriſtian Religion allows us to defend and exalt our Country, it allows us certainly to love it, and honour it, and prepare our ſelves ſo as we may be able to defend it. But that lazy and unactive way of education, and interpreting things falſly has been the cauſe that there are not ſo many Common-wealths as formerly in the World, nor ſo many Lovers and Champions for their liberty: and yet I believe the greatneſs of the Roman Empire contributed ſomething, by reducing all the free States and Republicks under their dominion.

Nevertheleſs when that great Empire was broken and diſſolved, very few of thoſe poor States could recover their liberty; but when it began firſt to encreaſe and extend it ſelf, no Country was without them, and where-ever the *Romans* carried their Arms, they found little Common-wealths bandying and confederating againſt them, and defending their liberties with all imaginable conſtancy; which ſhews that the *Romans* were a people of more than ordinary courage, or they could never have ſubdued them. The *Samnites* alone will be example ſufficient, who (as *Livy* reports) were ſo powerful, and ſo hearty defenders of their liberty, that for 46 years together they maintained war with the *Romans*; and though they had received many loſſes, and ſuch devaſtations had been committed in their Country, yet they could never be wholly reduc'd before the Conſulſhip of *Papyrius Curſor*, the Son of the firſt *Papyrius*. But 'tis a ſpectacle worthy of any mans pity, to ſee a Country ſo full (formerly) of brave Cities, and brave Men, and all of them free; now deſolate and uninhabited, and ſcarce any body left; to which condition it could have never been reduced but by the diſcipline, and diligence, and courage of the *Romans*: but all this proceeded from diverſity of Conſtitution, for all Cities and free States whatſoever, encreaſe not only

only in riches and authority, but in the numbers of their men: for who is it that had not rather procreate and have children where he may marry and enrich himſelf freely, than where there is danger that what he gets painfully, and lays up carefully for his children, may be raviſhed from them by a Tyrant.

In a free State you may be ſure your children ſhall be no ſlaves, and that if they behave themſelves virtuouſly, they ſhall be ſure of preferment, and perhaps come to be Princes; riches encreaſe there faſter, and that not not only by tillage and agriculture, but by traffick and arts; and people do naturally throng to thoſe places where they may get what they lawfully can, and keep ſecurely what they have got. The quite contrary happens in Countries that are ſervile, and their condition is worſe, as their ſervitude is greater: but there is no ſervitude ſo ſevere as to depend upon a Common-wealth, and that for two reaſons; firſt becauſe it is more durable, and leſs hopes of recovering their liberty; and ſecondly, becauſe it is the practice of all Common-wealths to impoveriſh and weaken what-ever they conquer, to fortifie themſelves; which with Princes is not the way, unleſs they be very barbarous indeed, and like the Eaſtern Princes, who not only ruine whole Countries, but deſtroy all humane converſation: but where Princes are well inſtituted, they know better things, and do many times indulge their new Conqueſts as much as their own Territories, leaving them the exerciſe of their Arts, and the enjoyment of their Laws; ſo that though they cannot encreaſe their wealth as where they are free, yet they are not ſo ſubject to be ruined as where they are ſlaves: I ſpeak now of ſervitude to a foreign Prince, for the uſurpation of a Citizen I have ſpoken before. All which being conſidered, no wonder if the *Samnites* whilſt they enjoyed their liberty were ſo couragious and ſtrong, and when it was once loſt grew ſo abject and contemptible. *Titus Livius* tells us in his Hiſtory of the *Punic* War, that the *Samnites* were ſo overlaid and cowed by one ſingle Legion of the *Romans* at *Nola*, that they ſent Embaſſadors to *Hanibal* to beg his aſſiſtance, and that the ſaid Embaſſadors in their Oration to *Hanibal*, the better to move his compaſſion, had this expreſſion, *We are the people who for an hundred years together waged War with the Romans with our own private Forces, and bore up many times againſt two Armies and two Conſuls at once; but now our miſery is ſo great, and our ſpirits ſo low, we are unable to defend our ſelves againſt one pitiful Legion.*

CHAP. III.

It contributed much to the grandeur of the City of Rome, *that they ruined the neighbouring Cities, and admitted ſtrangers to their own dignities and priviledge.*

CReſcit interea Roma, Albæ ruinis; *The ruine of* Alba *was the riſe of the Romans.* 'Twas the ſaying of *Livy*, and 'tis true; for who-ever would make any City great, and apt for dominion, muſt endeavour with all induſtry to throng it with inhabitants, otherwiſe it will be impoſſible to bring it to any great perfection. And this is done two ways, by love and by force: the firſt by giving paſſage and ſecurity to all perſons that will come and inhabit there, that every man ſhall be free; the ſecond by deſtroying the neighbour Cities, and forcing the people to come and dwell in yours. The *Romans* obſerved both ways, and grew ſo numerous upon it, that in the time of their ſixt King they had 80000 men in the Town able to bear Arms, proceeding in ſome reſpects like the Country-man, who to make his plant larger, and more fruitful, cuts off its firſt ſhoots, that the juice and virtue which otherwiſe would dilate into the branches, being kept cloſe to the trunk, might break out with more vigour afterwards, and make it more beautiful and fertile. And that this way is neceſſary for the propagation of the ſtrength and authority of a City, appears by the example of *Athens* and *Sparta*, which Cities, though they were both free, numerous in Men, and happy in their Laws; yet they could never arrive at the grandeur of the *Romans*, though *Rome* ſeemed more tumultuous, and not ſo well governed as they, and all for the reaſon aboveſaid: for *Rome* having by both thoſe ways encreaſed the number of their Citizens, was able to ſet out an Army at one time of 280000 men, whereas *Sparta* and *Athens* could never exceed 20000, which is not to be attributed to the excellence of the ſituation of *Rome*, but to the diverſity of their Conduct; for *Lycurgus* the Founder of the *Spartan* Common-wealth, conceiving nothing could be more pernitious to it, nor more eaſily abrogate his Laws, than intermixing with new inhabitants, he provided with all poſſible induſtry that his Citizens ſhould have no commerce or converſation with ſtrangers. To

that

that end he not only prohibited the admiſſion of foreigners, and their marrying with them, but that there might be no encouragement or occaſion of entercourſe betwixt them, he put out a certain Mony of Leather, ſo pitifully inconſiderable, that he preſumed no Merchants would trouble themſelves to import any foreign Commodities for it; by which means that City was never in a capacity of being very populous: And becauſe all humane affairs do hold ſome proportion and analogy with Nature; and it is impoſſible that a ſlender trunk, ſhould bear vaſt and ponderous branches, it is not to be expected that a ſmall Common-wealth conſiſting of a ſmall number of Citizens, ſhould ſubdue, or at leaſt keep and maintain greater and more populous States than themſelves; and if it ſhould happen that they ſhould conquer them at any time, upon every ſlight accident they would be ſubject to loſe them, like the tree it would be too weak for its boughs, and every puff of wind apt to blow it down. And thus it fell out with *Sparta*, though it had conquered all *Greece*, made it ſelf abſolute thorow that whole Province; yet *Thebes* no ſooner rebelled, but all the reſt of the Cities revolted, and having loſt its great Empire in a moment, its remained like a Tree deſtitute of its branches. But with *Rome* it was otherwiſe, it Root and Trunk was ſtrong enough to ſupport its branches how heavy and ſpacious ſoever; and this was the great cauſe of the greatneſs of the *Roman* Empire, which *Livy* expreſſed in two words, when he ſaid, *Creſcit interea Roma, Alvè ruinis.*

CHAP. IV.

There are three ways which Common-wealths have taken to enlarge their Territories.

HE who has read and obſerved the Hiſtory of our Anceſtors muſt find, That Common-wealths had generally three ways of enlarging their Empire. One is that which was obſerved by the *Tuſcans* of old, who entered into a League of Confederacy with ſeveral other Common-wealths, with condition of Equality, that no particular ſhould have any degree or authority above the reſt, and that comprehenſion ſhould be left for all their new Conqueſts to come in, not much unlike the practice of the *Swizzers* in our times, and the *Achaians*, and *Ætolians* of old. And becauſe the *Romans* had in thoſe times much controverſie with the *Tuſcans* and their Confederates, I ſhall enlarge my ſelf ſomething in the explanation of their affairs, of which though there be but little Monument in Hiſtory, yet we are aſſured, that before the greatneſs of the *Romans*, the *Tuſcans* were very powerful both by Sea, and by Land; of which power it is no ſmall argument, their ſending a Colony into the *Mare ſuperum* to a place called *Adria*, which grew ſo conſiderable and famous, that it denominated that whole Sea, and it has been called the *Mare Adriaticum* ever ſince. It is known likewiſe that their Empire extended from the *Tyber* to the foot of the *Alps*, which comprehends the greateſt part of *Italy* at this day; though 200 years before the *Romans* came to any conſiderable ſtrength, the *Tuſcans* received a great defeat by the *Gauls*; who under the Command of *Beloveſus*, either in queſt of new quarters, or tempted by the pleaſantneſs of the Country, having paſſed the *Alps*, poſſeſſed themſelves of that Province called *Lombardy*, and gave it the name of *Gallia Ciſalpina*; after which they turn'd out the Natives, ſetled themſelves there, and built ſeveral Cities, which they enjoyed, till in proceſs of time, they alſo were ſupplanted by the *Romans*. And this was the method of the *Tuſcan* proceeding, and the manner of their confederating with their Neighbours, which were no leſs than XII Cities; of which *Cluſium*, *Veii*, *Feſulæ*, *Aretium*, and *Volterra* were the chief; but yet with all their aſſiſtance they could not exceed the limits of *Italy*, nor indeed conquer all that, for reaſons which we ſhall mention hereafter. Another way of extending your Empire, is by aſſociating with ſeveral Cities, but ſo as that the dignity of the command, the ſeat of the Empire, and the honour of the Enterprize may remain with you, which was the way obſerved by the *Romans*. The third is the way of the *Spartans*, and *Athenians*, who entertained no Confederates, but what ever Territories they conquered, they annexed them to their own: which way is undoubtedly the worſt of the three, as appeared by the two ſaid Republicks, who were ruined upon no another account, but becauſe they had graſped more dominion than they were able to hold. For it is a thing in it ſelf very arduous and difficult, to keep a City in ſubjection by a continued force, eſpecially if ever it was free; wherefore unleſs your Citizens be very numerous, and your aſſociates very conſiderable, by whoſe aſſiſtance you may be able to keep what you conquer, it will never be in your power to enlarge your dominion very much, and

and the *Spartans* and *Athenians* miſcarrying in their way, miſcarried likewiſe in their end, and all their great conqueſts came to nothing: The *Romans* took the ſecond way, and ſucceeded to that vaſt and extraordinary power, by aſſociating equally in many things, with many States, but reſerving always to themſelves the Seat of the Empire, and the chief command in their Wars, by which means it came to paſs, that their Confederates (e're they were aware) ſubjected themſelves to the *Romans*, at the expence of their own labour, and blood. For after they had carried their Arms out of *Italy*; reduced ſeveral Kingdoms into Provinces, and the Inhabitants being accuſtomed to live in ſubjection, without much difficulty ſubmitted, the *Romans* bearing the name of the War, and the Nations that were conquered knowing nothing of their Allies, ſubmitted to their dominion, and would own no body elſe: whereby it happen'd that their aſſociates in *Italy* being over-powred by the multitude of Provinces which had ſubmitted to the *Romans*, and by the ſtrength and populouſneſs of *Rome*, began to find their error by degrees, but too late, and when they had no way left to defend themſelves; for if any of them conſpired, they were quickly ſuppreſſed, and made Subjects of Aſſociates. This way of adminiſtration, and enlarging their Empire was peculiar to the *Romans*; no other people obſerved it, and certainly no better is to be found. The next way of confederating (which was practiſed by the *Tuſcans*, *Achaians*, and *Ætolians* in old time, and by the *Swizzers* of late) is the beſt way next to that of the *Romans*; for though it cannot arrive at any great Empire, the Confederacy conſiſting of ſo many free Cities, which being all to be conſulted, makes their reſolutions very tedious, beſides the Citizens are not ſo vigorous in a War, where the prize is to be divided into ſo many parts; yet for theſe reaſons it has two advantages of the third. Firſt, whatever it gains, it keeps a long time, and loſes very hardly; and ſecondly, it engages not ſo raſhly in War, but enjoys with more eaſe and felicity the bleſſings of Peace: for they are longer in their conſultations and debates, where there is to be a general Dyet and Convention, than where things are to be diſpatched within the Walls of one City: Beſides experience tells us that this way has certain bounds, which have not been exceeded by any example we can find. For after XII or XIV Cities have confederated, they admit no more into the League, as holding themſelves enough, and ſufficient for their defence; nor are they much ſolicitous of extending their Empire, becauſe they are under no neceſſity of making themſelves ſtronger; and their conqueſts would be of little advantage to every particular State, for they would be forced upon one of theſe two rocks, either to incorporate them into their League, and then the multitude would breed confuſion, or make them their Subjects which they will hardly continue: When therefore they are got to ſuch a number in their aſſociation, as that they ſeem ſafe againſt foreign invation, and ſtrong enough to defend themſelves; They take one of theſe two ways, either they receive their Neighbour States or Cities into their protection (by which means they draw vaſt ſums of Mony ſometimes, that are eaſily diſtributed) or elſe they fight for other people, and receive pay from this or that Prince, as the *Swizzers* do now, and other Nations have done of old. To this purpoſe *Titus Livius* gives us an account, That at a conference betwixt *Philip* of *Macedon* and *Titus Quintus Flaminius*, an *Ætolian* Prætor being preſent, there happening ſome words betwixt the ſaid Prætor and King *Philip*, King *Philip* reproached him by the avarice, and inconſtancy of his Country, as a people that were not aſhamed to take pay on one ſide, and ſend ſupplys to the other, by which means it was frequently ſeen that in both Armies the *Ætolian* Colours were diſplayed; from whence we may conclude that this way of proceeding by Leagues and Confederacies, has been always the ſame, and has had the ſame effects. The third way of ſubjecting your conqueſts and annexing them to your own dominions, is very incommodious, and inſtable; and if it were ſo to a Common-wealth well conſtituted and armed, it muſt needs be much worſe to a Government that is weak, as moſt of the *Italian* States are at this day; but the *Roman* way is the beſt, and moſt to be admired; for there is no example of any body that made uſe of it before them, nor has any body imitated them ſince; and as to the practice of the *Tuſcans*, and *Ætolians* in their Confederations, there is no body follows it now a days, but the *Swizzers*, and the *Suevians*: Which being ſo, and ſo many brave things performed by the people of *Rome* as well for the conſervation, as the augmentation of their Empire, it is not ſtrange our affairs ſucceeded no better, and that we have been a prey to whoever would invade us; for (to ſay nothing of the reſt) it had doubtleſs becom'd the *Tuſcans* if they could not have imitated the *Roman* Diſcipline, nor followed their meaſures in extending their Empire, at leaſt to have follow'd the example of their own Anceſtors, who though they brought not their Empire to that Grandeur and immenſity as the *Romans*; yet they enlarged it as far as they thought good, and as far as conſiſted with the Nature of their Government; and by doing ſo, they kept it a long time, with immortal honour to

their

their memory, till they were first shaken by the *Gauls*, and afterwards so totally ruined by the *Romans*, that there is scarce the least token left, that there was ever any such thing; which having brought it into my mind to consider what may be the causes of this oblivion of things, I shall discourse of them in the following Chapter.

CHAP. V.

The variation of Religions and Languages, with the accidents of Deluges and Plagues have been the cause that many great things have been forgotten.

IN my judgment it may be objected to those Philosophers who hold the world to be Eternal, that if so long a course of antiquity was true, it would be but reasonable that the memory of some of their affairs should have lasted above five thousand years: yet there may be some reasons given for that oblivion of things, and they seem twofold, partly from the Nature of Man, and partly from the influence of the Heavens; the memory of great things are abolished from the nature of Man, by the variation of their Religion, or Language; for when a new Religion is introduced, the first care of him that would propagate it, is to explode, and extinguish whatever was memorable in the old, to give the greater credit to his new innovation; and if it fall out that the introducers of this new Sect, be of a different language, all goes to wreck, and whatever was before, is easily forgotten. And that this is so, appears by the institution of the Christian Religion, whose first establishers did principally intend the cancelling and extirpation of all old Ethnick Customs, Ceremonies, and Theology; and if there remained any memory of their affairs, it was because there was no new language introduced with it, the Christians being constrain'd to explain themselves in *Latine*; whereas could they have done it in a new tongue (considering their other persecutions) we may conclude there would have been no memory left of their Religion or Worship: For so diligent and zealous was Saint *Gregory*, and other Moderators of the Christian Religion, in abolishing the superstitions of the Gentiles, that they caused the works of all the Poets and Historians to be burn'd, which made any mention of them; they threw down their Images and Idols, and destro'yd all that might afford the least memory of Paganism; to which diligence of theirs, if a new language had been added, in a short time all would have been utterly forgotten; what therefore was done by the Christians for the extirpation of Gentilism, it is not improbable but the Gentils might have done of old for the extirpation of the Religion before. And because in five or six thousand years, Religion may be twice or thrice changed, no wonder if what was before be so entirely lost, that if there remains any thing of it, it is looked upon as fabulous and incredible, as it hapned to the Histories of *Diodorus Siculus*, which gives an account of 40 or 50000 years, and are not unworthily accounted false. As to the Cœlestial causes from the influence of the Heavens, they are such as destroy mankind in general, or reduce it to a very small number, as great Mortalities, Famines, and inundations of Water, but especially the last, because the mischief is more universal, and if any be saved, it is only the Mountaneers, which being commonly barbarous, have no knowledge of antiquity, and by consequence can convey nothing of it to their posterity; and if it so happens that among them which are preserved, some one man may be more learned than ordinary, and have some knowledge of affairs, to give himself a name and reputation afterwards, he conceals, perverts, and transmits them as he pleases; so that there remains to posterity no more than he thought fit to communicate. Nor do I believe it is doubted but these accidents happen, and Famine, and Pestilence do sometimes rage in the world, seeing all Histories mention them, and this oblivion of things is a certain effect of them: Nor is it unreasonable to think that the great Universe has its way of evacuation, as well as the Microcosm; for as in that, when the humours are redundant, and the body unable to digest them, Nature exerts, and finds out some way to throw them off, without which the person must certainly miscarry; so it is in the other, when all Countries are repleat, and no room left for those that are to come; when the Cunning and Malignity of mankind is at the height, there is a necessity the world should be purged by some of those three ways, that men being reduced in their numbers, and humbled under the consideration of their Mortality, may (if possible) become better: which being so, no wonder if the *Tuscans* formerly so famous for their administration both in War and in Peace, so eminent for their Courage, and so venerable for their Religion, should be oppressed by the *Romans*, and so totally abolished, that (as is said before) there remains nothing of them but the name.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

How the Romans *proceeded in making of War.*

WE have already diſcourſed of the way of the *Romans* in extending their Empire; we ſhall now ſpeak of their Cuſtoms in the management of their Wars, by which it will appear with what wiſdom they deviated from the common ways of the world, and by what eaſie methods they arrived at that Supremacy and Grandeur. He who makes War at his own choice (and is under no conſtraint) or elſe by ambition, has doubtleſs this end; To get what he is able, and to keep it whilſt he can, and rather to enrich than impoveriſh his own Country; for ſuch a one it is neceſſary to have regard to his charge, and to ſee that neither the conquering nor maintaining are more expenſive to him, than will conſiſt with his revenue. This the *Romans* obſerved very ſtrictly, by coming ſtrong and ſuddenly into the field; for by that one practice, all their Wars with the *Latini*, *Samnites*, and *Tuſcans*, were diſpatched in a ſhort time. And whoever conſiders their Wars from the beginning of *Rome*, to the Seige of the *Veientes*, will find that they were determined in a very ſhort time, ſome in ſix, ſome in ten, and ſome in twenty days. For their Cuſtom was, upon the firſt appearance of a War, immediately to draw out their Army, and ſeeking out the Enemy, they did what they could to bring him to a Battel; having beaten him (by reaſon of the ſurprize.) The Enemy (that his Country might not wholly be harraſſed) for the moſt part propoſed an agreement, in which the *Romans* were ſure to inſiſt upon ſome part of their Territory; which either they converted to their particular profit, or conſigned to ſome Colony which was to be placed there for the ſecurity of their Frontiers; by which means the wars being ended in a ſhort time, their Conqueſts were kept without any conſiderable expence, for the Colony had that Country for their pay, and the *Romans* had their Colonies for their ſecurity. Nor could there be any way more advantagious and ſafe; for whilſt there was no enemy in the field, thoſe guards were ſufficient; and when any Army was ſet out to diſturb them, the *Romans* were always ready with another in their defence, and having fought them, they commonly prevailed, forced them to harder conditions, and returned when they had done: by which means they gained daily upon the enemy, and grew more powerful at home: and in this manner they proceeded till their Leaguer before *Veii*, where they altred their method, and allowed pay to their Souldiers for the better continuation of the war, whereas before that, their wars being ſhort, there was no neceſſity of paying their Armies. Nevertheleſs, though they paid their Souldiers from that time, and maintained war at greater diſtance, (whereby they were obliged to continue longer in the field) yet they left not their old cuſtom of diſpatching it as ſoon as they could, with reſpect to the circumſtances of place and time; for which reaſon they continued their Colonies: and beſides their old cuſtom of ſhortning their wars as much as they were able, the ambition of their Conſuls contributed exceedingly; for their Conſulſhips being but for a year, and ſix months of that to be ſpent in their employments at home, they were as diligent and vigorous as poſſible, becauſe they were not capable of triumphing till the war was concluded: and then for continuing their Colonies; the great advantage and convenience that reſulted from them, was ſufficient to prevail. This practice therefore was obſerved perpetually among the *Romans* in the management of their wars; only they varied ſomething about the diſtribution of the prey, in which formerly they were more liberal than in after-times; either becauſe they thought it not ſo neceſſary when the Souldiers were paid; or elſe becauſe their ſpoils being greater than before, they thought convenient that the publick ſhould have its ſhare; that upon any new enterprize they might not be conſtrained to lay new taxes upon the people; and by this way their Coffers were filled in a ſhort time. So that by theſe two ways, by the diſtribution of their prey, and the ſetling of Colonies, *Rome* grew rich by its wars, whereas other Princes and States (without great diſcretion) grow poor: and ſo great was every mans ambition of enriching the *Ærarium*, that by degrees it came to that paſs, no Conſul was permitted to triumph, unleſs he returned with a vaſt quantity of ſilver or gold, or ſome other ineſtimable commodity, and put it into the treaſury. So that the deſigns of the *Romans* tended wholly to this, to finiſh the war quickly, by forcing the enemy to a Battel; or elſe to harraſs and tire them with frequent excurſions, that thereby compelling them to diſhonourable conditions, they might make their advantage, and become more powerful and rich.

CHAP. VII.

What proportion of Land the Romans allowed to every man in their Colonies.

I Think it no eaſy matter to ſet down the exact proportion of Land, which the *Romans* aſſigned to every ſingle perſon in their Colonies; for I believe they gave more or leſs according to the barrenneſs or fertility of the ſoil; and that in all places they were ſparing enough. And the firſt reaſon that induces me, is, that thereby they might ſend more men, and by conſequence their frontiers be better guarded: another is, becauſe living at home indigent themſelves, it is not to be ſuppoſed they would ſuffer thoſe whom they ſent abroad to grow too opulent and rich: and in this I am much confirm'd by *Livy*, where he tells us that, upon the taking of *Veii*, the *Romans* ſent a Colony thither, and in the diſtribution of the Land allotted every man no more than three acres, and a little more according to our meaſure.

They might conſider likewiſe that their wants would not be ſupplyed by the quantity ſo much as the improvement and cultivation of their Land. Yet I do not doubt but they had publick Paſtures and Woods to ſuſtain their Cattel, and ſupply themſelves with firing, without which a Colony could hardly ſubſiſt.

CHAP. VIII.

What it is that diſpoſes ſome people to leave their native Countries, to diſpoſſeſs other people.

SEeing I have ſpoken already of the Military Diſcipline of the *Romans*; and how the *Tuſcans* were invaded by the *French*; it follows properly enough that we ſay ſomething of their ſeveral kinds of war, which are two: one ſort is commenced upon the ambition of ſome Prince or Common-wealth, in hopes to extend, and enlarge his Empire; as thoſe wars which were made by *Alexander* the Great, by the *Romans*, and by one Prince againſt another: which wars, though dangerous, are not yet ſo pernitious as to ſupplant the inhabitants, and drive them out of their Country; for the Conqueror contents himſelf with his Victory, and the ſubmiſſion of the people allows them their own Laws, and many times their Eſtates. The other kind of war is much more dangerous and deſtructive, and that is when an entire Nation with their Wives and their Children, compelled either by hunger, or war, leaves its own Country, to fix themſelves ſomewhere elſe, not to extend their dominion, or exerciſe any authority, (as in the other) but to kill or expel all the Natives, and poſſeſs themſelves of their Eſtates.

This war indeed is moſt bloody and dreadful, as *Saluſt* ſhews very well in the end of his *Bellum Jugurtinum*, where, after *Jugurtha* was beaten, ſpeaking of the invaſion of the *Gauls*, he tells us, *Cum cæteris Gentibus a populo Romano de imperio tantum fuiſſe dimicatum, cum Gallis, de ſingulorum hominum ſalute; With other Nations the Romans fought only for Empire and Dominion, with the Gauls they fought for their Country and Lives.* For when a Prince or Common wealth invades a Country according to the firſt way, it is ſufficient, if thoſe who are at the Helm be removed or deſtroyed; in this every mans life is in danger; for when a whole Nation tranſplants, and invades a new Province, not only the Colonies, but the Natives muſt be extinguiſhed, that they may fix themſelves upon their Lands, and poſſeſs themſelves of their Goods: and by theſe kind of people the Romans were three times invaded. Firſt by the *Gauls*, who took *Rome*, and (as I ſaid before) drove the *Tuſcans* out of *Lombardy*; of which invaſion *Titus Livius* gives two reaſons: one was the pleaſantneſs of the Country, and the delicacy of the Wine, wherewith (being then but ill provided in *France*) they were infinitely taken: the other was, the Country was grown ſo exceedingly populous, that it was not able to ſuſtain its own natives; whereupon the Princes of thoſe parts judging it neceſſary to find them new quarters, they appointed which were to tranſplant, and putting *Belloveſus* and *Sicoveſus* (two French Princes) at the head of them, they ſent one part of them into *Italy*, and the other into *Spain*: it was *Belloveſus* lot to invade *Italy*, and he did it ſo effectually, that he poſſeſſed himſelf of all *Lombardy*, and made the firſt war upon the *Romans* that was ever made upon them by the French. The ſecond time

time they were invaded in this manner was likewise by the French, and it was after the first *Punic* war, in which invasion the *Gauls* lost above 200000 men betwixt *Pisa* and *Piombino*: the third and last was by the *Germans* and *Cimbreans*, who having defeated several Armies of the Romans, were at last themselves defeated by *Marius*. From whence we may observe the great courage and constancy of the Romans of old, that could not only bear up against three such dangerous invasions, but overcome them at last; whereas afterwards their courage began to fail, and they were not able to resist the inundation of those Barbarians; for when the *Gothi* and the *Vandals* invaded, they possessed themselves of the whole Western Empire, without any considerable opposition. The reasons which move these Nations to transmigrate (as I said before) is necessity, and that necessity proceeds either from famine, or from wars and disturbances at home; and when they undertake these Expeditions with vast and innumerable numbers, they invade with irresistible violence, put all the Natives to the sword; possess themselves of their Estates; establish a new Kingdom, and change the very name of the Province, as *Moses* did of old, and the *Barbarians* since, who possessed themselves of the Roman Empire.

From hence are all the new names in *Italy* and elsewhere imposed by their several Conquerors: *Lombardy* was called anciently *Gallia Cisalpina*, *Francia* (from the Franks) was called anciently *Gallia trans Alpina*, *Selavonia* was called *Illyria*, *Hungaria Pannonia*, *Anglia Brittania*; *Moses* gave the name of *Judea* to that part of *Syria* which he conquered, and many other Countries have changed their names upon the same occasion, which would be too long to recount. And because I have said before, that sometimes these kind of people are forc'd out of their Country by intestine troubles and disturbances, I shall present you with one example of the *Maurusians* an ancient people of *Syria*, who foreseeing the invasion of the *Hebrews*, and knowing themselves unable to oppose them, thought it more wisdom to forsake their Country betimes, and preserve themselves, than to expect their coming, and lose both; whereupon they pack'd up their goods, and with their wives and children removed into *Affrick*, where they drove out the inhabitants, and setled in their Country: so that they who were too weak to defend their own Province, were strong enough to force out another people. To this purpose *Procopius* who writes the wars of *Belisarius* against the *Vandals* (who had setled themselves in *Affrick*) tells us, that upon certain pillars in the houses where these *Maurusians* had lived, he himself read these words, *Nos Maurusii qui fugimus a facie Jesu latronis filii* Navæ; *We Maurisians fled hither from Jesus the Usurper, who was the son of* Navi. By which we may perceive the occasion of their departure out of *Syria*. And certainly these Nations forc'd out of their own Country by irresistible necessity, are more than ordinarily dreadful, and not to be opposed but by a potent and well disciplin'd people: but when they move in small numbers, their danger is not so great, because they dare not use that violence, but are put to their wits, and to possess themselves of some quarters by cunning and insinuation, which they are to keep afterwards by ways of amity and friendship, as *Æneas* did, and *Dido*, the *Massilians* and others, who by the assistance and friendship of their neighbours, made good what they had possessed. But the people that came out of their own Countries the most numerous and strong, were the *Scythians*; for their Country being barren and cold, and the natives too numerous to be sustained in it, they were forced abroad, as having nothing to preserve them at home. And if now for five hundred years and upwards we have not heard of any such transmigration, I conceive the reasons may be several: the first may be the great evacuation in those Countries, from whence the *Roman* Empire was invaded. A second may be, because *Germany* and *Hungaria* (from whence those inundations came) is better cultivated and improved, so as they can live plentifully at home, without rambling abroad: another reason may be, that the *Germans*, *Poles*, *Cimbrians*, and other Nations which border upon the *Scythians*, being martial people, and continually at wars with them, are as it were a Bulwark to these parts, and keep the *Scythians* from all new invasions. The *Tartars* likewise have been many times upon their march with very great Armies, but they have been always encountred and repulsed by the *Poles* and *Hungarians*, which has given them occasion frequently to boast, that were it not for their arms and resistance, not only *Italy*, but the very Roman Church had been many times sensible of the barbarity of the *Tartars*.

CHAP. IX.

What thoſe occaſions are which do moſt commonly create war among Princes.

THE occaſion of the war betwixt the *Samnites* and the *Romans*, who had been a long time in league together, was the common cauſe betwixt all Princes and Governments; and was either fortuitous, or deſigned. The war betwixt the *Samnites* and the *Romans* was fortuitous; for when the *Samnites* made war upon the *Sedicins*, and afterwards upon the *Campani*, they intended not any controverſy with the *Romans*; but the *Campani* being beaten, and betaking themſelves to the *Romans* for relief, (contrary to the expectation both of the *Romans* and *Samnites*) the *Romans* being in league with the *Samnites*, could not, without violence to the ſaid league, give them protection; upon which (having no other way to ſecure themſelves, the *Campani* ſubmitted to the *Romans*, and made themſelves their ſubjects; and the *Romans*, how unjuſt ſoever they thought it before to aſſiſt the *Campani* (whilſt they were but aſſociates) againſt the *Samnites*, their old friends, yet now they were become their ſubjects, and had incorporated with their State, the caſe was altred, and they thought it very reaſonable, ſuppoſing, that if they ſhould refuſe to defend them, they ſhould diſcourage all others that had an inclination to do the like, which would have been contrary to the great deſign of the *Romans* to propagate their Glory and Empire. The ſame accidental cauſe gave occaſion to their firſt war with the *Carthaginians*, upon the *Romans* protecting the *Maſſinenſes* in *Sicily*. But their ſecond war with the *Carthaginians* was deſigned; for *Hanibal* the *Carthaginian* General fell upon the *Saguntins* in *Spain*, (who were in alliance with the *Romans*) not ſo much out of malice to the *Saguntins*, but that the *Romans* being provoked to their defence, ſhould give the *Carthaginians* occaſion to tranſport the war into *Italy*.

This way of provoking and hedging in a war has been always practiſed among Potentates, eſpecially where they had any faith or reſpect for other people; for, that the peace which has been a long time betwixt them upon articles of alliance may ſeem firm and inviolate, they will not meddle with him againſt whom they do principally deſign, but turn their arms upon ſome of his friends and confederates that he is moſt particularly obliged to receive into his protection, knowing, that if he appears in their defence, they muſt have occaſion to fight him; if he does not, but diſowns his allies, they publiſh his weakneſs and infidelity to the World, and by either of thoſe ways they do their buſineſs. This example of the *Campani* is of ſingular importance, as well to thoſe who would make war upon any body, as thoſe that are in diſtreſs; for when you are unable to defend your ſelf, and unwilling to fall into their hands that invade you, the beſt and moſt ſafe way is to put your ſelf in ſubjection to ſome neighbouring Prince, as the *Campani* did then, and the *Florentines* afterward when they found themſelves too weak to ſupport againſt the power of *Caſtruccio* of *Lucca*; for finding that *Robert* King of *Naples* would not protect them as friends, they threw themſelves into his arms to be defended as his ſubjects.

CHAP. X.

That, according to the common opinion, mony is not the ſinews of War.

BEcauſe it is eaſy to begin war as a man pleaſes, but harder to end it; every Prince before he undertakes an enterprize is obliged to conſider his own ſtrength well, and to regulate by it. But then he muſt be ſo wiſe too as not to make a wrong judgment, and that he will certainly do as oft as he computes it by his Baggs, by the ſituation of his Towns, or the affection of his Friends, rather than by his own proper Power and Arms. Mony, and Towns, and Friends are all good, when in conjunction with a ſtrong Army of your own, but without it they do nothing: without Men, to what purpoſe is either Mony or Towns? and the affection of your ſubjects will hold no longer than you are able to defend them. There is no mountain, no lake, no ſtraight inacceſſible, where there is no force to defend it. Vaſt ſums of mony are not only incapable of protecting you, but they expoſe you to more danger; nor can any thing be more falſe than that old and common ſaying, *That mony is the ſinews of the war*: *Quintus Curtius* was the firſt author of it in the war betwixt *Antipater* of *Macedon*, and the King of *Sparta*, where he tells us, that for want of monies the *Spar-*

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tans were forced to fight, and were beaten; whereas, could they have protracted but ſome few daies, they had had the news of *Alexander*'s death, and got the victory without fighting a blow; but wanting mony, and apprehending their Army would moulder, they were conſtrained to come to a Battel, and were defeated; which was the occaſion of that Apophthegm, *That mony is the ſinews of war*: which ſaying is now a-days in every Princes mouth, but improperly, in my judgment: for relying wholly upon that Maxim, they think their treaſure is ſufficient to defend them, not conſidering that, if that would have done it, *Darius* would have conquered *Alexander*; the *Grecians* the *Romans*; Duke *Charles* the *Swizzers*: and of late the Pope and *Florentines* united, would not have found it ſo hard to have maſtered *Franceſco Maria* (Nephew to *Julius* 2d.) at the Battel of *Urbin*. But theſe whom I have mentioned, preſuming more upon the multitude of their baggs than the goodneſs of their men, were all beaten and overcome. *Craſus* the King of *Lydia* carrying *Solon* into his Treaſury, and ſhewing him an immenſe quantity of riches, ask'd him what he thought of his power; to which *Solon* replyed, I think it never the greater for this; for War is carried on, and Battels are fought more with iron than gold; and it might happen for ought he knew, that ſome body might come with his iron and take it all from him. Again, when after the death of *Alexander* the Great, a great Army of *Gauls* tranſplanted into *Greece*, (from whence they paſſed afterwards into *Aſia*) before they began their march, the *Gauls* ſent Embaſſadors to the King of *Macedon* to treat an accord; which being almoſt concluded, to make the Embaſſadors more plyable, the ſaid King ſhews them his treaſure, which conſiſted of a vaſt quantity of ſilver and gold, which the Embaſſadors had no ſooner ſeen, but longing impatiently to be at it, they broke off the treaty, and brought their Army into his Country; ſo that that very thing in which he had repoſed his great confidence and ſecurity proved his ruine and deſtruction. The *Venetians* not long ſince had their Coffers well ſtor'd, yet they loſt all, and their wealth was not able to defend them. So that I do affirm 'tis not mony, (as the common opinion will have it) but good Souldiers that is the ſinews of war: for mony cannot find good Souldiers, but good Souldiers will be ſure to find mony; had not the *Romans* done more in their wars with their iron than their gold, the treaſure of the whole World would not have been ſufficient for them, conſidering their great enterprizes abroad, and their no leſs difficulties at home; but fighting with iron, they had no want of gold, for thoſe who were afraid of their Armies ſupplyed them. And if the King of *Sparta* was forced to run the hazard of a Battel, and was beaten for want of monies, it was no more than what has hapned to others, and might have hapned to him upon other occaſions: for it falls out many times that for want of proviſions an Army is forc'd either to fight or to ſtarve; in which caſe there is no General ſo weak but he will chooſe that which is moſt honourable, where fortune has ſome power to befriend him. Again, a General having news of ſupplies that are coming to the enemy, conſiders with himſelf whether he had not better engage them as they are, than attend till their recruits come up, and then fight them with more diſadvantage: ſometimes likewiſe it falls out, (as it did to *Asdrubal* in the Country of the *Piſeni*, when he was ſurprized by *Claudius Nero*, and the other *Roman* Conſul) that a General is either forc'd to fight, or to fly, in which caſe it is incomparably more ſafe to hazard all in a Battel, than to loſe all in a Flight. Which being ſo, we ſee there are many cauſes that conſtrain a General to fight upon diſadvantage; among which, if want of mony be one, there is no more reaſon we ſhould therefore call that *the ſinews of war*, than any of the reſt which do the ſame thing: ſo that mony is not ſo much the ſinews of war, as good ſouldiers: 'tis true, mony is requiſite for the carrying on of a war, but not principally, and in the firſt place; for good ſouldiers have many times been contented without it, though it is but ſeldom they want it, for 'tis as impoſſible for good ſouldiers to want mony, as it is for mony alone to make good ſouldiers. And this is clear by the teſtimony of Hiſtorians in a thouſand places. *Pericles* perſwaded the *Athenians* to a war with all *Peloponeſſus*, and aſſured them of ſucceſs, upon conſideration of their induſtry and riches; the *Athenians* undertook the War, and for ſome time proſpered with their induſtry, but at laſt it appeared that the conduct and diſcipline of the *Spartans* was too hard for the *Athenian* induſtry and treaſure. *Livy* deſides this controverſy the beſt of any man, where, in his compariſon of Commanders, enquiring what would have been the event if *Alexander* the Great had turn'd his Arms againſt the *Romans*, he declares that in war there are three things fundamentally neceſſary, good Souldiers, good Officers, and good fortune; and then arguing whether *Alexander* or the *Romans* were more conſiderable in thoſe three points, he concludes, without the leaſt mention of mony. It is not improbable but the *Campani*, (of whom we have ſpoken in the former Chapter) when they undertook the aſſiſtance of the *Sidicins* againſt the *Samnites*, meaſured their power more by their mony than their men; from whence it hapned that, being

being defeated in two Battels, they were forced to ſubmit, and become tributary to the *Romans*.

CHAP. XI.

'Tis not diſcretion to enter into ſtrict amity with a Prince, whoſe reputation is greater than his ſtrength.

THe *Sidicins* were in a great error to deſire the aſſiſtance of the *Campani* againſt the *Samnites*, as being (by reaſon of their luxury) unable to aſſiſt them, but the error of the *Capuans* was greater, in not knowing their own weakneſs and incapacity to defend them: both their errors *Livy* has very well deſcribed in theſe words, *Campani magis nomen in auxilium Sidicinorum, quam vires ad præſidium attulerunt; The Capuans made a great noiſe, but they brought no force to the relief of the Sidicins.*

And here it is not unſeaſonable to conſider, that the leagues which are made with Princes whoſe diſtance is too great, or power too little to relieve one, are more honourable than ſafe, and give more reputation than ſecurity to the perſon that deſires them. This was experienced by the *Florentines* in the year 1489, when the Pope and King of *Naples* invaded them; for they were at that time confederate with the King of *France*, yet they had more reputation than aſſiſtance thereby. The ſame would happen likewiſe to ſuch of the Italian Princes as ſhould confederate with *Maximilian* the Emperor, and in confidence of his alliance, undertake any great enterprize, becauſe that alliance would be one of thoſe that bring more reputation than relief. So then, as it was a great error in the *Capuans*, when they were unable to defend themſelves, to undertake the protection of the *Sidicins*, ſo it is and will be the ſame in whoever follows their example. It was the ſame caſe with the *Tarentini*, who would needs interpoſe betwixt the *Samnites* and the *Romans*, to mediate a peace: for when both *Romans* and *Samnites* were in the field, and their Armies preparing for an engagement, the *Tarentini* ſent Embaſſadors to the Conſul, to let him know from the Senate of the *Tarentini*, that they would have peace betwixt them and the *Samnites*, and that they were reſolved to take Arms againſt them which refuſed it. But the Conſul ſmiling at their imprudence, in the preſence of the ſaid Embaſſadors, cauſed a charge to be ſounded, and immediately marching his Army againſt the enemy, he let them ſee by his proceedings what anſwer they deſerved.

Thus you have ſeen to what errors Princes are ſubject, who undertake the protection of other States; I ſhall now in the next Chapter remonſtrate what ways are moſt convenient for their own proper defence.

CHAP. XII.

Upon an apprehenſion of being invaded, whether it be better to make war, or expect it.

AMong wiſe men, and very good ſouldiers, I have heard it often diſputed, whether when two Princes are of equal ſtrength, and one of them deſigning war (viſibly) againſt the other) it be better for that Prince which is like to be invaded, to ſit ſtill, and expect him at home; or to begin with him, and make the firſt inroad himſelf? There are arguments on both ſides, and they who think it beſt to be the aggreſſor, and fall upon the enemy firſt, may alledge the counſel which *Cræſus* gave to *Cyrus*, when being with his Army upon the Frontiers of the *Maſſageti*, *Thamyris* Queen of that Country ſent to him to take his choice whether ſhe ſhould fight him within her Country, or upon the Frontiers: if he deſired to advance, ſhe would ſtand ſtill and expect him; if he had rather fight where he was, ſhe would be with him immediately: when it came to be debated in Counſel, *Cræſus*, contrary to the opinion of the reſt, was for marching to her; and the reaſon he gave was, becauſe if ſhe ſhould be beaten at any diſtance, *Cyrus* would get but little of her Country, for ſhe would have time to recruit; whereas, if ſhe were beaten at home, he would be able to ſit ſo cloſe upon her ſkirts, that ſhe being never capable of rallying, or bringing another Army into the field, muſt of neceſſity loſe her whole Kingdom: *Hanibal* gave the ſame counſel to *Antiochus*, aſſuring him that if the *Romans* were any way to be conquered,

conquered, it was by carrying the war into *Italy*, for by ſo doing he might have the benefit of their Arms, their Wealth, and their Allies; but whilſt the war was abroad, and *Italy* undiſturbed, he would leave them an inexhauſtible magazine that would ſupply them with what, and whereſoever they had occaſion; and at laſt *Hanibal* concluded that *Rome* was to be taken more eaſily than the Empire, and *Italy* it ſelf, than any of its Provinces. *Agathocles* being unable to reſiſt the *Carthaginians* at home, invaded their borders, and forc'd them to a peace; and *Scipio* in the ſame manner to remove the war out of *Italy*, tranſported it into *Affrick*. Thoſe who are on the other ſide do argue as ſtifly, that there can be nothing more dangerous than to hazard an Army in an enemies Country, at a great diſtance from their own; and they produce the *Athenians* for an inſtance, who, whilſt they kept themſelves upon the defenſive part, and expected their enemies at home, were always victorious; but when they began to make war at a diſtance, and ſend Armies into *Sicily*, they loſt their liberty, and every thing elſe. They produce alſo the Fable of *Antius* King of *Lybia*, who being invaded by *Hercules* the *Egyptian*, was invincible whilſt he kept himſelf within his own borders, but being enveigled out by the ſubtilty of his enemy, he loſt both his Kingdom and Life; upon which occaſion that ſtory was raiſed of *Antius*; that being born of the earth, (as they pretended) ſo oft as he touch'd it, ſo oft he received new vigour from his Mother, which *Hercules* perceiving, got him up in his arms, and cruſh'd him to death.

They produce likewiſe more modern examples. Every body knows that *Ferrand* King of *Naples* was eſteemed a wiſe Prince in his time, and hearing two years before his death that King *Charles* viii of *France* was preparing to invade him, he let him alone; but falling ſick afterwards, as he lay upon his death-bed, he called his Son *Alphonſo* to him, and among other things, charged him that he ſhould expect the King of *France* upon his Frontiers, and fight him there, but that by no means he ſhould be tempted beyond them; and it had been better for *Alfonſo* to have follow'd his Counſel, for neglecting it afterwards, and ſending an Army into *Romagna*, he loſt both Army and Kingdom without ſtriking a blow: But beſides theſe arguments on both ſides, it is urged in behalf of the Aggreſſor, that he invades with more confidence and courage than his Adverſary receives him (which is a great advantage and inhancement to his Army, That he brings many inconveniences upon the perſon whom he invades, to which he would not be liable, if he expected him at home. For when the Enemies Country is waſted, and their Houſes plunder'd, his Subjects are not much to be truſted, nor can any more Taxes be laid upon them, without great difficulty, by which means (as *Hanibal* ſaid) their Magazines will be ſpent, and their fountain dryed up that was to ſupply them with all Proviſions for War. Beſides, if your Army be in the Enemies Country, it will be under a greater neceſſity of fighting, and by conſequence will fight more deſperately than at home. But to this it is anſwered on the otherſide, That it is more for your advantage to attend your Enemy in your own Country, than to ſeek him abroad; for thereby you may furniſh your ſelf with Victuals and Amunition, and all other neceſſaries without any inconvenience, and diſtreſs him by driving the Country. You may likewiſe with much more eaſe incommode and fruſtrate his deſigns, by your better knowledge of the Country, and what places are more proper to attack him in; as alſo you may attack him with your whole force at once, or give him battel as you pleaſe, which out of your own Confines is not to be done: Moreover if Fortune ſhould be adverſe, and it be your chance to be beaten; more of your Men will eſcape where their refuge is ſo near, and and you will ſooner rally them again: In ſhort, if you fight at home, you venture your whole force, and not your whole fortune; but if you fight abroad, you venture your whole fortune with but part of your force: Others there have been, who with deſign to weaken the Enemy, and fighting him afterwards with more eaſe and advantage, have ſuffered him quietly to march ſeveral days Journey into their Country, and poſſeſs himſelf of ſeveral Towns; but whether they did well or not, I will not determine, only I think this diſtinction is to be conſidered, whether my Country be ſtrong in Fortreſſes, and Men, as the *Romans* were of old, and as the *Swizzers* at this day; or whether it be weak and unfortified, as the Territory of the *Carthaginians* formerly and *France* and *Italy* now. In this caſe the Enemy is by all means to be kept at a diſtance, becauſe your chief ſtrength lying in your Mony, and not in your Men, whenever you are interrupted in raiſing or receiving of that, your buſineſs is done; and nothing interrupts you ſo fatally, as an Enemy in your Country. And of this the *Carthaginians* may be an example, who whilſt they were free at home, were able by their Revenue and Taxes to wage War with the *Romans* themſelves; whereas afterwards when they were aſſaulted, they were not able to contend with *Agathocles*. The *Florentines*, when *Caſtruccio* of *Lucca* brought his Arms into their Country, could not ſupport againſt him, but were forced to put themſelves under

der the Dominion of the King of *Naples*, to procure his protection; but *Caſtruccio* was no ſooner dead, but they were agog again, and had the confidence to invade the Duke of *Milan*, and to attempt the beating him out of that Province; ſo couragious were they in their foreign Wars, and ſo abject at home. But when Countries are in a poſture of defence, and people Martial and well diſciplin'd (as the *Romans* of old, and the *Swizzers* at this day) 'tis better to keep off; for the nearer they are to their own Country, they are the harder to overcome, becauſe they can raiſe more force to dend themſelves, than to invade another people. Nor does the opinion of *Hanibal* affect me at all; for though he perſwaded *Antiochus* to paſs into *Italy*, he did it as a thing that would have been more for his own, and the *Carthaginian* than for *Antiochus* his advantage; for had the *Romans* received thoſe three great defeats which they received of *Hanibal* in *Italy*, in the ſame ſpace of time, in *France* or any where elſe, they had been ruined irrecoverably, for they could neither have rallyed, nor recruited ſo ſoon. I do not remember any foreign Expedition by the *Romans* for the Conqueſt of any Province, in which their Army exceeded the number of 50000. But upon the invaſion of the *Gauls*, after the firſt *Punic* war, they brought 118000 Men into the Field for their defence: Nor could they beat them afterwards in *Lombardy*, as they did at firſt in *Tuſcany*, becauſe it was more remote, and they could not fight them with ſo much convenience, nor with ſo many men. The *Cimbri* repulſed the *Romans* in *Germany*, but following them into *Italy*, they were defeated, and driven out again themſelves; and the reaſon was, becauſe the *Romans* could bring more forces againſt them: The *Swizzers* may without much difficulty be over-powered abroad, becauſe they ſeldom march above 30 or 40000 ſtrong; but to attack and beat them at home, is much more difficult, where they can bring into the field 100000 and more. I conclude therefore that that Prince whoſe people are in a poſture, and provided for War, does wiſely if he expects a Potent and dangerous Enemy at home, rather than to invade him in his own Country: But that Prince whoſe Country is ill provided, and whoſe Subjects are ill diſciplined, does better if he keeps the War as far off as he can: and by ſo doing, each of them (in his ſeveral degree) will defend himſelf beſt.

CHAP. XIII.

That from mean to great fortune, people riſe rather by fraud, than by force.

I Have found it always true, that men do ſeldom or never advance themſelves from a ſmall beginning, to any great height, but by fraud, or by force (unleſs they come by it by donation, or right of inheritance). I do not think any inſtance is to be found where force alone brought any man to that Grandeur, but fraud and artifice have done it many times, as is clear in the lives of *Philip* of *Macedon*, *Agathocles* the *Sicilian*, and ſeveral others, who from mean and inconſiderable extraction, came at length to be Kings. *Xenophon* in his Hiſtory of *Cyrus* inſinuates the neceſſity of fraud when he repreſents (in his firſt Expedition againſt the King of *Armenia*) how all *Cyrus* his actions and negotiations were full of fallacy and deceit, and that it was that way he conquered his Kingdom, and not by bravery and force, by which he implys that no Prince can do any great matters without that art of diſſembling. Beſides he repreſents him juggling, and playing of tricks with his own Uncle by the Mothers-ſide, the King of the *Medes*, and ſhows that without that excellence, he had never been King; and indeed I am of opinion that from a mean and baſe fortune never any man came to be very great by down-right generoſity and force; but by fraud alone there have been many, as particularly *John Galeazzo*, who by that alone wreſted the Government of *Lombardy* out of the hands of *Meſſer Bernardo*, his Uncle. And the ſame courſes which Princes are forced to in the beginning of their authority, the ſame courſes are taken by Common-wealths at firſt, till they be ſetled in their government, and have force ſufficient to defend themſelves. *Rome* (which either by chance or election took all ways to make it ſelf great) was not without this: and what greater cunning or artifice could it uſe in the beginning of its greatneſs, than what it did take, and is mentioned before. For by their fair carriage and inſinuation, they got ſeveral Cities into conſideration, and under that name, they ſubjected them inſenſibly, and made them their ſlaves. The *Latins*, and other Neighbouring people were of this ſort, by whoſe Arms and Alliance, the *Romans* having conquered their Enemies, they were rendered ſo powerful, that they began to handle them now, not as Aſſociates, but Subjects; nor could the *Latini*

be

be convinced of their servitude, till they saw the *Samnites* twice over-thrown, and forced to accept of their Conditions. Which Victories, though they gain'd the *Romans* great reputation abroad, among remote Princes, who understood more of the name, than the power of the *Romans*, yet they created envy and jealousie among those who were nearer and more sensible of their greatness; and this jealousie and apprehension was so great, that not only the *Latins*, but the Colonies in *Latium* and *Campagnia* (which had been sent thither not long before) confederated against the *Romans*, and resolved to make War upon them. And this War was commenced in the same manner (as I have said before) most other Wars are commenced. Not by down-right denuntiation of War against the *Romans*, but by defending the *Sidicins* against the *Samnites*, who made War by allowance from the *Romans*. Nor was there any other reason of their Conspiracy, but because the Confederates began to smell out their cunning, and to be sensible that under that false title of Allies, they were in great danger of being made slaves, which *Annius Selinus* (a Latin Prætor) in an Oration to the Counsel expressed very properly in these words, *Nam si etiam nunc sub umbra fœderis æqui, servitutem pati possumus, quid obest quin proditis Sidicinis, non* Romanorum *solum, sed* Samnitium *dictis pareamus? For if even now under the shadow of an equal Confederacy, we can endure servitude: What hinders but that we betray the* Sidicins, *and put our necks under the feet not only of the* Romans, *but the* Samnites. Which things being so, it is manifest the *Romans* wanted not at the beginning of their rise, that dexterity of cheating that is so necessary to all people that are ambitious of raising themselves to a great height, from an inconsiderable beginning; which artifice as always the less scandalous, by how much he that does practise it, understands better how to disguise it by some honorable pretence, as the *Romans* did very well.

CHAP. XIV.

Many People are mistaken, who expect with meekness and humility to work upon the proud.

IT falls out many times that humility and modesty towards such as have any picque or prejudice to you, is so far from doing good, that it does a great deal of mischief; and of this the debate and consultation of the *Romans* about the preservation of their peace with the *Latins*, is an example, from whom they were in expectation of a War. For the *Samnites* complaining to the *Romans* that the *Latins* had invaded them, the *Romans* (unwilling to exasperate them more, who were already too prone to be quarrelling) return'd this answer, that by their league with them, the *Latins* were not tyed up from making War as they pleas'd. The *Latins* were so far from being satisfied by the mildness of their answer, that it made them more insolent; insomuch that not long after they profess'd themselves their Enemies, as appears by that speech of the foresaid *Annius* in the Council aforesaid, where he tells the *Latins*, *Tentastis patientiam negando militem: Quis dubitat exarsisse eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc dolorem. Exercitus nos parare adversus* Samnites, *fœderatos suos audierunt, nec moverunt se ab urbe. Unde hæc illis tanta modestia, nisi a conscientia virium, & nostrarum, & suarum. You tryed their patience before, in refusing them supplies; who doubts but they were nettled? yet they swallow'd it: They had notice of our preparations against the* Samnites *their Confederates, and stirred not in their defence. Whence comes this mighty modesty, and good nature? from nothing but a sence of the disparity betwixt our strength, and their own.* From hence it is clear, the patience and civility of the *Romans*, augmented the arrogance of the *Latins*; and that it is the interest of all Princes to be very cautious of condescending from their dignity, or stooping willingly to any thing that may give the Enemy an opinion of his weakness or pusilanimity; for it is better to lose any thing bravely and by open War, than to part with it poorly in hopes to prevent it; and it many times happens that those who part so easily with their Lands or Monies to prevent a War, do rather excite, than satisfie the Enemy, whose nature commonly is such, that upon the discovery of their impotence or fear, his desires encrease, and new things are successively demanded; nor will your friends be so ready to assist, if they find you timorous and irresolute. But if as soon as you have notice of the designs or insolence of the Enemy, you immediately prepare to correct him; he will not invade you so boldly, though he be stronger than you, and then your friends will come in more freely to your assistance, who, had you abandoned your self, would certainly have forsaken you. This is intended only where you have but one Enemy; where you have more, the best way is to give

and promiſe what you think fit, that if poſſible you may draw off ſome or other of them from their Confederacy, and ſo break their League by dividing them.

CHAP. X.

Weak States are irreſolute and uncertain in their Councils, and ſlow Councils are moſt commonly pernicious.

FRom theſe occaſions and beginnings of the War betwixt the *Latins* and the *Romans*, we may obſerve, that in all conſultations, it is beſt to come immediately to the point in queſtion, and bring things to a reſult, without too tedious an heſitation and ſuſpence. And this we may learn from the Council which the ſaid *Latins* took at that time when their war with the *Romans* was in debate. For the *Romans*, ſuſpecting the defection of the *Latins*, for their better information, and that they might reduce them (if poſſible) without blows, ſent to them to ſend over eight of their Principal Citizens to *Rome*, to conſult with them about keeping of the Peace. The *Latins* being conſcious to themſelves of many things which they had acted againſt the pleaſure of the *Romans*, call'd a Council to conſider of the perſons that were to go, and what their Commiſſioners ſhould ſay when they came there. The Council being divided, one man propoſing one thing, and another man another, *Annius* the Prætor had this expreſſion, *Ad ſummam rerum noſtrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitetis magis, quid agendum nobis, quam quid loquendum ſit, facile erit explicatis Conſiliis, accomodare rebus verba. I conceive it more pertinent to our buſineſs, That you conſider rather what is to be done, than what is to be ſaid; for when you are come to a reſolution, it will be no hard matter to accomodate your words.* Which ſaying was doubtleſly true, and ought to be regarded by all Princes and Common-wealths. For whilſt we are ambiguous, and uncertain what is to be done, we cannot tell how to adapt and accommodate our language; but when we are come to a reſolution, and have decreed what is to be done, it is not ſo difficult. I have inſerted this paſſage the more willingly, becauſe I my ſelf have known this irreſolution do much miſchief, to the detriment and diſhonour of our State; and it is a fault peculiar to all weak and improvident Princes and Governments to be ſlow and tedious, as well as uncertain in their Councils, which is as dangerous as the other, eſpecially when the debate is about the relief or protection of a friend; for your ſlowneſs does no good to him, and expoſes your ſelf. Theſe uncertain or tedious reſolutions proceed either from want of courage and force, or from the croſſneſs and malevolence of the Counſellors, who carried away by ſome private paſſion of their own, will rather ruine the State, than not accompliſh their revenge; ſo that inſtead of expediting and puſhing things to a concluſion, they impede and obſtruct whatever is before them. For your good Citizens (though the vogue of the people runs the more dangerous way) will never hinder the coming to a reſult, eſpecially in things that will not diſpenſe with much time. *Giralomo* a Tyrant in *Syracuſe* being dead, and the War betwixt the *Romans* and *Carthaginians* very hot, a Council was called by the *Syracuſans*, and it was debated which ſide they ſhould take. The queſtion was canvaſs'd with ſuch ardor by both parties, that it remained *in ambiguo*, and nothing was reſolved, till at length *Appolonides* (one of the Principal in that City) in a grave and prudent Oration remonſtrated, That neither they were to be blamed who had ſpoken for the *Romans*, nor they who adhered to the *Carthaginians*, but the length and uncertainty of their debate; for that irreſolution would be the occaſion of certain ruine; but if they came to a concluſion, with which ſide ſoever they joyn'd, they might hope for ſome good. *Titus Livius* could not better have diſplayed the danger of this kind of ſuſpence, than in this caſe of the *Latins*; whoſe aſſiſtance againſt the *Romans* being deſired by the *Lavinians*, they were ſo long in their debate, that when at laſt they came to a reſolution, their ſupplies were ſcarce gone out of their Gates, before they had news that their Confederates were beaten. Whereupon *Milonius* the Prætor ſaid very wittily, This little ground which we have marched, will coſt us very dear to the *Romans*; and this hapned to them for the tediouſneſs of their Councils; for they ſhould either have aſſiſted, or denyed them out of hand; had they denyed them, the *Romans* had not been diſguſted; had they complyed, they might have ſupported their Aſſociates, and have kept them from being ruined; but doing neither, they deſtroyed their friends, and hazarded themſelves. Had this precept of bringing things to a ſpeedy reſolution, been followed by the *Florentines*, they had prevented many miſchiefs and damages which they met withall upon the coming

of

of *Lewis* XII into *Italy* againſt the Duke of *Milan*; for the ſaid King *Lewis* having reſolved upon the ſaid expedition, he propoſed to their Embaſſadors in his Court, that the *Florentines* ſhould not interpoſe or concern themſelves in the quarrel, upon which terms, he would receive them into his protection, and defend them from any harm; the Embaſſadors agreed, and a Months time was allowed for ratification from the City. But the ratification was deferred (by the imprudence of ſome perſons who favoured the Duke of *Milan*'s intereſt) till the *French* had almoſt conquered all, and being offred then, it was refuſed by the King of *France* (who knew well enough that the *Florentines* were then forced to what they did; and deſired his amity more out of fear, than affection; which piece of delay coſt the *Florentines* a good round Sum of Mony, and might well have been their ruine; as juſt ſuch an accident was afterward. And this indiſcretion of theirs was the greater, becauſe they were no way ſerviceable to the Duke of *Milan*; who, if he had prevailed, would doubtleſs have ſhown himſelf a greater Enemy to them, than the King of *France*. Of this ſlowneſs, and uncertainty of Councils I have ſpoken before, but new occaſion preſenting it ſelf, I have diſcourſed of it again, as a thing worthy the obſervation of all Common-wealths, eſpecially like ours.

CHAP. XVI.

How much the Soldiers of our times do differ from the Diſcipline of the Ancients.

THe Battel which the *Romans* fought with the *Latins*, in the Conſulſhips of *Manlius Torquatus*, and *Decius*, was the greateſt and moſt important that ever they had in any War, with any other Nation: For as the *Latins* loſt all by loſing the Victory, and the *Romans* got the Dominion of them: So the *Romans* had they loſt the Battel, muſt have loſt their liberty with it, and turn'd Subjects to the *Latins*. *Livy* tells us the ſame thing, for (ſays he) the *Latin* Army was in nothing inferiour to the *Romans*; their courage the ſame, their conſtancy the ſame, and their numbers the ſame; if the *Romans* had any advantage, it was in their Generals, which indeed were better than the *Latins*, and it is expreſſed by ſeveral, both *Latins* and *Romans* who have left an account of that Battel to poſterity; that where-ever *Manlius* had been, that ſide would certainly have conquered. In this Battel there were two things very exemplary and remarkable: One of the Conſuls, to keep his Soldiers firm in their obedience, and preſerve their Military Diſcipline, cauſed his own Son to be ſlain for tranſgreſſing his Orders, though he gain'd the victory by the means; The other devoted himſelf freely to death, for the good of his Country; for the diſpute was like to be very hard, fighting againſt the *Latins*, who (as *Livy* tells us) had the ſame Language, the ſame Cuſtoms, the ſame Arms, the ſame Diſcipline with the *Romans*; the Soldiers, the Captains, the Tribunes both in one Army and the other, had been Camerads and ſerved formerly together, not only in the ſame Army, or Garriſon, but in the ſame Company and Band: It was neceſſary therefore, being equal in their numbers, and equal in their courage, that ſomething extraordinary ſhould be done, that might render the Soldiers fiercer, and more obſtinate to overcome, upon which fierceneſs and obſtinacy the whole hopes of the victory did depend; for whilſt there is any ſuch in the breaſts of the Soldiers, they never think of running, but preſs ſtill on for victory and prize; and becauſe there was more of this conſtancy and fortitude in the breaſts of the *Romans*, than in the breaſts of the *Latins*, partly the deſtiny, and partly the bravery of the Conſuls effected that for the good ſucceſs of their Army, and the preſervation of their Diſcipline, *Torquatus* killed his Son, and *Decius* himſelf. *Titus Livius* in his deſcription of the equality of their force, gives us an exact account of the Orders which they obſerved in their Armies and Fights, and he has done it ſo largely, I need not repeat it all, but ſhall only ſelect what I think moſt particularly remarkable, and what, if obſerved by the Generals of our days, might have prevented very great diſorders. I ſay then that according to *Livy*'s deſcription, their Armies were divided into three principal *Schieri* or Squadrons. The firſt conſiſted of their *Haſtati*, which were moſt of them young men in the flower of their age digeſted into *Manipuls* or ſmall parties, and diſpoſed at a certain diſtance with Pikes or Darts in their hands from whence they were called *Haſtati*. The ſecond Squadron was as numerous as the firſt, and divided into as many *Manipuls*, but their diſtance was ſomething greater, and it conſiſted of choice men, from whence they were called *Principes*. The third and laſt Squadron was the biggeſt of the three, and had almoſt as many in it as both the other: and

this was made up of the ancienteſt and moſt experienced Soldiers, whom they called *Triarii*. They too had their certain diſtances, but ſomething greater than in either of the other. In their Battels, the *Haſtati* were in the Van; the *Principes* behind them, and the *Triarii* in the Rear. To every one of theſe Squadrons there was a body of Horſe, which being drawn up in two diviſions, and diſpoſed one of the right, and the other on the left hand of the Army, repreſented two wings, and were therefore called *Ala*. Theſe three Squadrons preceded and followed one another exactly, but the *Haſtati* in the firſt Squadron were drawn up cloſer, That, being to receive the firſt *impetus* of the Enemy, they might endure it the better. The *Principes* that followed them was not in ſuch cloſe order, but were diſpoſed at more diſtance, to the end that if the *Haſtati* ſhould be forced to retire, they might be received into that Squadron without diſorder or confuſion. But the *Triarii* were drawn up with greater ſpaces and intervals than both the other, and for the ſame reaſon, that if they were repulſed, that might fall back among them, and make an entire Body together: Being drawn up in this order, the *Haſtati* began the fight; if they were over-powred by the Enemy and forced to give ground, they fell back to the *Principes*, and uniting with them, renewed the fight in one body; if they were both of them too weak, and unable to bear up againſt the Enemy, they retreated gradually into the ſpaces betwixt the *Triarii*, and then all the three Squadrons being joyned, the whole Army charged in a body, and if they were beaten, farewell, there was no more reſerves, but the Battel was loſt; and becauſe whenever the *Triarii* was engaged, the whole Army was in danger, this Proverb grew very frequent, *Res redũcta eſt ad Triarios. Things are now at the Extremity.* The Generals of our times, having laid aſide all the old diſcipline of the *Romans*, have neglected this among the reſt, to their no little prejudice. For he that draws up his Army in a poſture with two ſuch reſerves, muſt be beaten three times before he can be utterly defeated; whereas once beating will do the Enemies buſineſs. But he that truſts only to the firſt ſhock (as the Chriſtian Armies do generally now) may eaſily be broken, the leaſt diſorder or relaxation of courage, putting all to the rout. And that which is the reaſon why our Armies are ſo quickly defeated, is, becauſe they have loſt the old way of falling back one body into another, and rallying three times. For whoever draws up his Army according to Modern Cuſtom, does it with one of theſe two inconveniences, He either draws up his ſeveral Squadrons ſhoulder to ſhoulder, and by enlarging his Ranks, makes his Files very thin (which weakens his Army very much by leaving the diſtance ſo ſmall betwixt the Front, and the Rear) or elſe he draws them up deeper, according to the manner of the *Romans*; but then their Files are ſo cloſe, that if the Front be beaten (there being no ſpaces in the Battel to receive them) they entangle and confound one another; ſo as the Front being repulſed, falls foul upon the middle Squadron, and both of them upon the third, whereby they are embarraſſed, and hindred from advancing or receiving the Enemy in any order, and the whole Battel is loſt. The *Spaniſh* and *French* Armies at the Battel of *Ravenna* (where *Monſieur de Foix* the *French* General was ſlain) fought very well, being drawn up according to the mode of our times, with their Fronts ſo extended, that their Battalions were much more in wideneſs than depth and this was done in reſpect of the ground, which in that place was very ſpacious and large; for being ſenſible that retreats are more difficult where the Files are too deep, they drew them up large in the Front to prevent it as much as poſſible: But when they are ſtraightned for room they are forced to be contented, and draw up as well as they can, for there is no remedy. They are ſubject likewiſe to the ſame diſorders in their Marches and Incurſions into the Enemies Country, whether to forrage, or upon ſome other deſign. In the War betwixt the *Florentines* and *Piſans* (upon their Rebellion after the King of *France*'s paſſage into *Italy*) coming to a Battel at *Santo Regolo*, the *Florentines* were defeated by their own Horſe, which being drawn up in the Front of the Army, and charged ſmartly by the Enemy, were put into diſorder, and forced to fall foul upon their Foot, which broke the whole Army. And I have been many times aſſured by *Monſieur Griacus de Burgo* (an old Officer of Foot in the *Florentine* Army) that their Foot had not fled that day, but for the diſorder of their own Horſe; The *Swizzers* (the beſt Soldiers of our times) when they are drawn up with the *French*, will be ſure to be drawn up in the Flanks, that if their Horſe ſhould be beaten, they may not be driven in among them. And though theſe things ſeem eaſie to be underſtood, and more eaſie to practiſe, yet there has not been one of our late Generals that has found the way of imitating this old method, or correcting the new; for though they alſo have their Armies divided into three Squadrons, which they call the Van-guard, the Body, and the Rear; yet they uſe them only in their Marches, and Incampments; but when they come to a Battel, it is ſeldom ſeen but they are drawn up as aboveſaid, and altogether run

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the risk of one ſhock, and no more. And becauſe ſome people to excuſe their ignorance, pretend the Execution of the Canon, will not ſuffer them to make uſe of the old order, I ſhall examine in the next Chapter whether that can be a juſt impediment, or not.

CHAP. XVII.

How the Armies of our times are to judge of Artillery, and whether the general opinion of it, be true.

WHen I conſider with my ſelf how many Field Battels were fought by the *Romans* in ſeveral times, it falls into my thoughts to examine what many people have believed, that had there been great Guns in thoſe days, as there are now, the *Romans* could never have over-run Provinces, nor made them tributary ſo eaſily, nor have done ſo many great things as they did; for by reaſon of theſe fire-arms, Granadoes, and ſuch kind of Engines, people are ſooner terrified, and cannot ſhow their valour ſo freely as heretofore; To which it is added, that Armies come with more difficulty to a Battel, and that their Orders and Ranks are not ſo eaſily kept, ſo that in time the whole buſineſs of War will be diſpatched by the Canon. Not thinking it improper to enquire into theſe opinions; to examine whether Artillery have added or ſubſtracted from the ſtrength of our Armies, and taken away, or given more occaſion to our Captains of doing brave things; I ſhall begin with their firſt opinion, that the *Romans* would not have made thoſe vaſt Conqueſts, had there been Artillery in thoſe days: In anſwer, I ſay, that War is two fold, defenſive, or offenſive; and it is firſt to be conſidered, which of theſe two Wars it does moſt miſchief or good; and though it may be ſaid it does great miſchief in both, yet I am of opinion, it is much more prejudicial to him that is upon the defenſive, than him that is upon the offenſive part. The reaſon is, becauſe he who defends himſelf, is either blocked up in ſome Town, or ſtraightned in his Camp: If in a Town, it is either ſmall (like your Citadels) or large: In the firſt caſe the beſieged is loſt; for the force of thoſe Guns is ſuch, that no wall is ſo thick, but in a few days they will beat it down; So that if he has no retreat, nor time to ſtop up the breaches, or throw up new works within, the Enemy enters pell mell at the breach, and the Canon of the Town, does the Garriſon very little good; for this is a Maxim, where people can fall on in a crowd, and run headlong in their fury to a ſtorm, great Guns do never repell them. Wherefore the fierce aſſaults of the *Tramontani* are not ſo eaſily ſuſtained, as the attacks of the *Italians* who fall not on with that fury and impatience as the other, but march up cooly and quietly to the Battel, and do rather skirmiſh, than ſtorm. Thoſe who enter a breach in this gravity and ſtate, are ſure to go to pot, for the Artillery does certain execution upon them: But thoſe who fall on briskly, and crowd one another into the breach (if there be no new works or retrenchments thrown up within) enter as they pleaſe without any great prejudice by the Cannon; for though ſome of them may be killed, yet they cannot be ſo many as to hinder the taking of the Town. That this is true, we find by many inſtances in *Italy*, and among the reſt in the Siege of *Breſcia*, the Town revolted to the *Venetians*, only the Caſtle ſtood firm for the *French*. That the Town might receive no prejudice from the Caſtle, the *Venetians* fortified the great Street that comes down from the Caſtle with great Guns in the Front, Flanks, and every where, ſo that they thought themſelves ſecure not only from ſallies within, but from relief without. But *Monſieur de Foix* made no reckoning of them; for marching thither with a Body of Horſe, he alighted, and charging boldly thorow the ſaid Street, relieved the Caſtle, without any conſiderable loſs. So that he who is ſhut up in a ſmall place, his walls battered down, and has nothing left but his Artillery to defend him, is in very great danger, and can hardly eſcape: If the place you defend be a large Town, where you have room enough to retire, and throw up new works; yet your diſadvantage is great, and the Enemies great Guns ſhall do more miſchief upon you, than yours upon him. For firſt you muſt be forced to advance your Cannon, and raiſe them to ſome higher place; for whilſt they are level with the ground, every blind, or ſmall work that the Enemy throws up, is ſufficient to ſecure him; and being forced to plant them higher, either upon the top of ſome Wall, or Church, or Mount (erected on purpoſe) you fall under two inconveniences; One is, that you cannot bring ſuch large Guns upon thoſe places, as he can bring without, becauſe in thoſe little places, great Guns are not to be managed; The other is, that if you could get them up, they cannot be ſo eaſily

easily secur'd, because they cannot have the convenience of works or baskets to defend them, as the Enemy has whose Guns are planted as he pleases. So that it is almost impossible for him that is besieged, to keep his Cannon long upon a high place, without being dismounted, if the Enemy without has any store of Artillery; and to keep them upon the ground, is to have little or no use of them, as I said before: so that when all is done, the best way to defend a Town is as they did of old, by their small shot, and the courage of the Soldier: And yet though small shot be of some use to the besieged, it cannot countervail the dammage which they receive from the Enemies great shot, for by them their walls are battered, and beaten down into the Ditches, so that when the Enemy comes to storm (which he may do with more ease when the ditches are filled up with the ruines of the walls) the besieged are under great disadvantage. Wherefore as I said before, those Guns are more beneficial to the besieger, than the besieged. And if you do not defend your self either in a great Town or a little, but shall choose rather some strong and convenient place, where you may encamp and entrench, so as not to be forced to an Engagement, but with advantage to your self; I say that in this case you have no better way now, than the Ancients had of old, and that many times your great Guns are more inconvenient, than otherwise; for if the Enemy falls upon your back, with any advantage of ground, as may easily happen; That is, if he gains by accident any eminence that commands your Camp, or surprizes you before your intrenchments are finished, he quickly dislodges you, and compells you to fight. This was the case with the *Spaniards* before the Battel of *Ravenna*, who entrenched upon the River *Roncus*, but made their Trenches too low, whereupon the *French* having the advantage of the ground, with their great Guns played so furiously over them into their Camp, that the *Spaniards* were glad to dislodge, and forced afterwards to give them Battel. And if you shall choose such a place to entrench in, as commands the whole Country, and fortifie it so well, that the Enemy dares not attack you; yet the Enemy will have the same ways of provoking and dislodging you, as were practised of old, that is, by making inroads, and plundring your Country; by infesting your Roads, and intercepting your Convoys, and a thousand other distresses and incommodities which he will put upon you, against which your Artillery will give but little relief. So that considering what has been said, and that the *Roman* Wars were most commonly offensive; they would have had advantage by them, and in probability have augmented their conquests, had there been any Artillery in their times. As to the second allegation, that by reason of those great Guns, men could not show their valour so much as in ancient times; I answer, it is true, and the danger is greater when they come to place their Ladders, and make an assault dully and heavily, and rather one by one, than in a body; their Officers being in the same hazard, and liable to be killed at greater distance, nor can the strongest guards, nor choicest men about them, secure them; yet for all these great dangers, no memorable instance can be produced of any great dammage that ever was received. For Towns are not taken usually by storm, or assault; but by way of Leaguer as formerly; and in those that are taken by storm, the danger is not much greater than it was then; for even in those times, whoever undertook the defence of a Town, had his Machines and instruments of War, which though not discharged with such force, did the same execution. And as to the reaching of Commanders at a distance, and killing them in the midst of their Reserves, there have been fewer of them slain (since great Guns came up) in 24 years War in *Italy*, than there was in any ten years in the time of the *Romans*; for unless it were *Count Lodovic della Mirandola* (who was killed in *Ferrara*, when the *Venetians* invaded that State) and the Duke of *Nemours* who was killed at *Cirignuola*, there has not been one great Officer slain; for *Monsieur de Foix* at *Ravenna* dyed by the Sword. So that if men show themselves not so couragious as formerly; it is from the weakness and ill order of their Armies, rather than the Artillery: And whereas it is said that these great Guns are an impediment to their fighting, and that the decission of Battels will by degrees be left to the Artillery; I reply, That that opinion is clearly a mistake, and has been judged so by all those who are for the old way of Discipline. For he that would have his Soldiers good, must exercise them well, and with frequent Alarms (true or false, 'tis no matter) accustom them to the Enemy, bring them to handy-stroaks, and as it were to take one another by the beards; by which means they will come to a greater dexterity in handling their weapons, and grappling with the Enemy; and for the same reason, the Foot are rather to be relyed upon than the Horse; for if your Foot be nimble and good, you may fall with more security upon an Enemy perplexed and embarrassed with a train of Artillery, than you could of old when they had their Elephants, their Chariots with Cythes, and such other devices. And if the *Romans* could find out remedies daily against such daily inventions, no question but they would have found out some or other against great Guns; and so much

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the more eaſily, becauſe the danger of the Guns is ſooner over, than the danger of the other: for the execution which is done by the Cannon, is done before the engagement begins; The execution by the Chariots and Elephants, during the whole fight; beſides the Cannon is eaſily avoided by the Infantry, either by poſting themſelves behind ſome bank, or clapping down upon their bellies; and yet of this ſo eaſie and obvious an evaſion, experience tells us there is ſeldom any neceſſity; for it is a hard matter to point your great Guns ſo exactly, but that either they will be mounted too high and ſhoot over you, or too low, and never come at you: And when the Battel is joyn'd, 'tis as clear as the day, that neither great nor ſmall ſhot is of any advantage; for if the Artillery be placed before the Army, 'tis odds but it is taken; if behind, the execution it does, is upon themſelves; and on either ſide it can gaul you but little, before you get to it, and either cloy, or ſecure it, and if an example be required, we have one ready in the *Swizzers*, who at *Novarro* in the year 1513. without Horſe or Artillery, or any ſuch thing, fell upon the *French* Camp, and overcame them, though they were as ſtrong as Trenches and Artillery could make them; and another reaſon is (beſides what has been urged before) becauſe Artillery ought to be guarded (if you would have it do ſervice) with walls or ramparts, or ſome ſuch thing as may ſecure it from being taken, otherwiſe it will be of no uſe, as when in field fights, it has nothing to defend it, but the Bodies of men. In the Flanks they are of no uſe, more than the old *Roman* Engines in thoſe days who were placed out of their Squadrons, that they might be managed with more dexterity, and (when-ever overlaid by the Horſe or any thing elſe) they were received into their Legions: and if there be any way of making advantage of Artillery in a field fight, it is this; He that uſes it otherwiſe, underſtands not very well, and puts his confidence in that which may eaſily deceive him: The *Turk* indeed by the help of his great Guns, obtained two or three Victories againſt the *Sophy*, and the *Soldan*, but it proceeded more from the novelty of the noice, and the terror it brought upon their Horſe, than any great execution they did. I conclude therefore that Artillery may be good, in an Army that is ſtout; but where they are uſed in an Army that is raw and inexperienced, they are of little advantage, if the Enemy be either couragious or ſtrong.

CHAP. XVIII.

How by the authority of the Romans, *and the univerſal Diſcipline of the Ancients, the Foot are more ſerviceable than the Horſe.*

BY many Arguments and Examples, it may be proved that the *Romans* in their Military exploits had greater eſtimation for their Infantry, than their Horſe; and how all their principal deſigns were executed by their Foot: This appeared in their Wars with the *Latins*, when the *Roman* Army being over-powered, and giving ground in that great Battel near the Lake of *Regillum*, the *Roman* General cauſed his Cavalry to diſmount, and fight on foot, and by ſo doing, they recovered their ground, and got the Victory; by which it is manifeſt the *Romans* thought them more ſerviceable on foot than on horſe-back, and in that poſture placed more confidence in them. The ſame thing they practiſed in many other fights, and always with good ſucceſs: nor can the raillery of *Hanibal* be objected againſt this, who when news was brought him at the Battel of *Cannæ*, that the Conſuls had cauſed all their Horſe to diſmount, reſolving to fight it out on foot, cryed out in deriſion, *Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent Equites. They might as well have bound them, and delivered them to me.* Which expreſſion though coming out of the mouth of an excellent perſon, yet his ſingle authority is not to be put in the ballance againſt the judgment of the whole *Roman* Common-wealth, and the experience of ſo many brave Captains as had been educated under it; and if it were, there are reaſons to defend it: The Foot can get into ſeveral places, where the Horſe cannot get: The Foot keep their ranks better than the Horſe, and in any diſorder, are ſooner rallyed, and in a poſture again, whereas the Horſe are more unmannageable, and when once out of order, with great difficulty to be rallyed. Beſides (as it is among men) ſo it is among Horſes, ſome are high ſpirited and couragious, others are untoward and dull; and it frequently happens, that a mettled Horſe, has a cowardly Rider, or a mettled Rider a dull Horſe; be it which it will, the diſparity is inconvenient. A body of Foot well order'd and drawn up, will eaſily be too hard, for the ſame number of Horſe; but the ſame number of Horſe, will have hard ſervice to break a Body of Foot, if there be any thing of proportion betwixt them; and this

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opinion is confirmed not only by ancient and modern examples, but by the relations and conſtitutions of Legiſlators, and whoever elſe have left any rules and directions for the Government of an Army; for though they tell us, indeed, That at firſt, Horſe were in greateſt reputation, becauſe the way of ordering of Foot was not known; but as ſoon as the way of managing them was found out, and their uſefulneſs was diſcovered, they were preferred to the Horſe. Not but that Horſe are very neceſſary in an Army to ſcout abroad, make incurſions into the Enemies Country, purſue the Enemy when he runs, and confront their Horſe when they come to a Battel, yet the hopes and ſtrength of an Army lyes more eſpecially in the Foot, and if any one error in the Conduct of our *Italian* Princes has contributed to the enſlaving of their Country, it is their neglecting to improve themſelves in the management of Foot, and addreſſing themſelves wholly to the Horſe. And this fault proceeded from the malignity of the Officers, or the ignorance of thoſe who govern'd the State: For this laſt 25 years, the Commands of the *Italian* Militia being in the hands of Reformades and Soldiers of fortune, who had no ſetled Eſtates, they made it their deſign to preſerve their Commands by all poſſible means, though with never ſo much prejudice to their Maſters: And becauſe a great Body of Foot, was not like to be long paid (nor would there always be occaſion to uſe them) and a little one would not turn to account; they applyed themſelves wholly to the Diſcipline of Horſe; for 200 or 300 Horſe was a fair Command, and maintained the Officers in good reputation; nor was the charge ſo great, but their Governors could pay them. For the better inſurance therefore of their places, they began to undervalue and decry the Foot ſervice, in ſuch manner, that by degrees they were almoſt wholly laid aſide; ſo that in the greateſt of their Armies, there were very few Foot; the unhappineſs of which practice, with other irregularities in our days, has made the *Italian* Militia ſo weak, it has not been able to defend it ſelf againſt the inſults, and depredations of foreigners. So then the Foot is with more confidence to be rely'd upon, than the Horſe; and that this was the judgment of the *Romans*, appears by another example. The *Romans* were encamped before *Sora*, and a party of Horſe ſallying out of the Town to beat them from ſome poſt, was met by a *Roman* Captain at the Head of his Troop, who charging his adverſary, it was their fortune both of them to be ſlain. However, their Troops continued the fight, though their Officers were dead, and the *Romans* to facilitate their Victory, diſmounted in the middle of the fight, and forced the Enemy to do the ſame, if they had a mind to defend themſelves; ſo that the nature of the fight was changed; the Foot ſervice was preferred, and the *Samnites* were routed. Nothing can be more plain, that the Foot were preferred than this caſe; for though upon other occaſions the Conſuls many times diſmounted their Troops, yet it was to reinforce and bring off the Foot, that were overlaid by the Enemy; but here they diſmounted not to relieve their own Foot, or to engage with the Enemies, but fighting Horſe againſt Horſe, and finding their Victory doubtful, they thought though they could not maſter them on Horſe-back, they might do it on foot, and accordingly they alighted: I conclude therefore, that a Body of well ordered Foot is very hardly to be broken, but by another Body of the ſame. *Craſſus* and *Marcus Antonius*, with a ſmall Body of Horſe, but a good Army of Foot, over-run and harraſſed the whole Country of the *Parthians* for ſeveral days together, though the *Parthians* had a vaſt Army of Horſe to defend it. *Craſſus* 'tis true miſcarried in the Expedition, but it was more by the falſhood, than gallantry of the Enemy; for relying too much upon their promiſes, he was reduced to ſuch diſtreſs for Proviſions, that he and his whole Squadron were loſt; nevertheleſs in the midſt of theſe exigences, being in an open and Champian Country, where there were no Mountains, no Woods, no Rivers to ſhelter or eaſe them, far from all relief, and nothing left to ſuſtain them, the Foot brought themſelves off under the command of *M. Anthonie*, and behaved themſelves ſo well in the opinion of the *Parthians* themſelves, that their vaſt Army of Horſe durſt not venture upon them: But to what purpoſe do we trouble our Reader with examples ſo remote, we have teſtimony nearer home that will do it effectually. We have known in our time 9 thouſand *Swizzers* at *Novara* attack 10000 Horſe, and as many Foot (being moſt *Gaſcoignes*) they never regarded: After this 26000 *Swiſſers* ſet upon the King of *France* in *Milan*, who had with him 20000 Horſe, 40000 Foot, and a hundred pieces of Artillery, and though they did not vanquiſh him, as at the Battel of *Novara*, yet they fought him bravely for two days together, and though worſted at laſt, yet the greateſt part of them got off. *Marcus Regulus Attilius*, placed ſuch confidence in his Foot, that he not only oppoſed them to the Enemies Horſe, but to their Elephants; and though his ſucceſs did not anſwer his expectation, yet it hindered not, but that as great matters might have been expected from his Foot. So then whoever would defeat a Body of Foot well ordered, muſt do it with another Body better ordered than they, or it is never to be done.

In

In the time of *Philip Viſconti* Duke of *Milan*, 16000 *Swizzers* having made a deſcent into *Lombardy*, *Carmignuola* the ſaid Dukes General marched againſt them with about 1000 Horſe, and ſome Foot; for not being acquainted with their way of fighting, he thought they would have been ſufficient, but having fallen upon them with his Horſe, and been repulſed with loſs, being a wiſe man, and one that knew how to frame himſelf to every accident, he recruited very well, marched againſt them again, and coming to an engagement, cauſed all his Cuiraſſiers to diſmount, and at the Head of his Foot, fall on upon the *Swizzers*, who were not able to reſiſt them. For the Cuiraſſiers being compleatly arm'd, forced their way into the Body of the *Swizzers* without any loſs, ſo as their whole Army was defeated, and cut off, and none left alive, but what were preſerved by the humanity of *Carmignuola*. I do not doubt but many people are well enough ſatisfied in their judgments, that Foot are more ſerviceable than Horſe, yet ſuch is the infelicity of our times, that neither ancient nor modern examples, nor the confeſſion of thoſe who have tryed them are ſufficient to prevail with our Princes to correct this Error, or to believe that to give reputation to the Arms of a Province, it is neceſſary to revive this Order, countenance their Foot, and ſee them well pay'd; and then doubtleſs they will repay him by their noble Exploits. But they deviate from this way, as they do from the reſt, and therefore no wonder if their Conqueſts be more to the detriment, than augmentation of their State.

CHAP. XIX.

The Conqueſts of Common-wealths that are ill governed, and contrary to the Model of the Romans, *do conduce more to the ruine, than advancement of their affairs.*

THeſe falſe opinions of the uſe and excellence of Horſe and Foot, are ſo rooted in the minds of men, and ſo confirmed with ill Examples, that no body thinks of reforming our late errors, or reſtoring the old Diſcipline of the *Romans*. Thirty years ſince who could have perſwaded an *Italian* that 10000 Foot could have aſſaulted 10000 Horſe, and as many Foot, and have beaten them? yet this was done by the *Swizzers* at *Novara*. For though all Hiſtories ring of it, yet none of our people will believe that it is poſſible to do now, what was anciently done. They object the excellence of our Horſe, and ſay they are ſo well arm'd, that they are able to repulſe not only a Body of Foot, but even a Mountain or Rock; and by theſe kind of fallacious Arguments, they deceive themſelves, not conſidering that *Lucullus* with a few Foot defeated 150000 of *Tigranes* Horſe, and yet they had a ſort of Cuiraſſiers among them like ours. This Exploit of *Lucullus* we have ſeen acted over again by the *Germans* in *Italy*, as if on purpoſe to convince us of our error. Which if Princes and Common-wealths could be perſwaded to believe, they would commit fewer faults, be more ſtrong againſt the inſults of the Enemy, and not place all their hopes in their heels, as they do at this day; and thoſe who had the Government of any civil State, would know better how to conduct and manage themſelves, either as to the enlargement, or conſervation of their Dominion, and find, that Leagues and Confederacies, rather than abſolute Conqueſts; ſending Colonies into what they had conquered; making publick feuds of the ſpoils of the Enemy; to infeſt and perplex the Enemy rather with Excurſions, and Battels, than Seiges; to keep the publick rich, and the private poor, and with all poſſible caution to keep up the Diſcipline of the Army, are the ways to make a Common-wealth formidable and great. Theſe are the true ways of enlarging an Empire; all the reſt are uncertain, or pernicious; and if thereby any to whom theſe ways are not pleaſing, they are by any means to lay aſide all thoughts of extending their Dominion; to think only of regulating their Laws at home and providing for their defence, like the little States in *Germany*, which by ſo doing have lived in peace and tranquillity for many years together. But how induſtrious and careful ſoever we are, in abſtaining from injury, or uſing violence to our Neighbour, ſome body or other will be injuring us, and it will be impoſſible to live always in quiet; from which provocation will ariſe not only a deſire in us, but a neceſſity of vindicating our ſelves, and retaliating upon them; and when this deſire is once kindled, if our Neighbours do not ſupply us with occaſion, we can find it at home, as will inevitably fall out where Citizens are opulent and ſtrong. And if the Cities of *Germany* have continued free, and at peace a long time, it proceeds from a peculiar diſpoſition in that Country, which is ſcarce to be found any

where elſe. That part of *Germany* of which I now ſpeak (like *France* and *Spain*) was ſubject to the Empire of the *Romans*: But when afterwards that Empire began to decline, and the title of the Empire was removed into that Province, Thoſe that were the wealthieſt and moſt powerful of the Cities (taking advantage of the puſilanimity or diſtreſſes of their Emperors) made themſelves free, paying only a ſmall annual Rent for the redemption of their liberties; which being permitted, by degrees all thoſe Cities which held immediately of the Emperour, and had no dependance upon any body elſe, redeemed themſelves in that manner. Whilſt theſe Cities were employed in this Traffick with the Emperor, it fell out that ſeveral Corporations that belonged to the Duke of *Auſtria*, rebelled, and having eſtabliſhed their liberty, they increaſed ſo faſt in reputation and wealth, that inſtead of returning to their ſubjection to the Duke, they became terrible to all people about them. From hence it is, that in our days this Province is ſaid to conſiſt of the *Swizzers*, the free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperor. And if in the diverſity of their conſtitutions, no Wars do ariſe, or at leaſt continue any time, it is from their univerſal reſpect and defence to the Emperor, who, though his force be not great, has ſuch reputation among them, that upon any controverſie betwixt them, he can eaſily compoſe it; and this it is that has kept them quiet ſo long, that in man's memory they have had little or no troubles, but what hapned betwixt the *Swizzers* and the Houſe of *Auſtria*; and though for many years paſt, the title of Emperor has been in the ſaid houſe; yet has it not been able to reduce the pertinacity of the *Swizzers*, though it has attempted it very ſolemnly. Nor did the reſt of the Princes and free Towns in *Germany* contribute their aſſiſtance againſt the *Swizzers*, partly becauſe they were favourers of liberty, and partly becauſe being poor themſelves, they had no mind the Houſe of *Auſtria* ſhould be rich. *Germany* being conſtituted in this balance, and *æquilibrium*, it rather reverences than fears the authority of the Emperor, and is quiet and at peace, becauſe the particular Princes, and States being contented with their own moderate Dominions, and in awe one of another, do forbear thoſe injuries and encroachments which are common in other places; whereas if its conſtitution was otherwiſe, the people would certainly think of enlarging as well as their Neighbours, and by conſequence interrupt that happy tranquillity which at preſent they enjoy. In other Countries where there is not that exact proportion and equality of power betwixt the Princes and free Towns, 'tis not ſo eaſie to preſerve them in peace; ſo that thoſe Common-wealths which have an ambition of extending their Empire, muſt do it by confederation, or by the ways of the *Romans*, and whoever takes any other courſe, rather ruines, than advantages himſelf; for new Conqueſts are prejudicial a thouſand ways, and eſpecially when your force does not encreaſe with your Territory, and you are not able to keep what you conquer; and this happens when the expence of an Enterprize is greater than the profit, though it ſucceeds. This was the caſe with our *Florentines*, and the *Venetians*, who after they had conquered *Lombardy*, and *Tuſcany*, were much weaker than before, when one of them was contented with the Dominion of the Gulf, and the other with a territory of ſix miles about. We all think of getting what we can, but take no care which way we ſhall keep it; which is the more inexcuſable, becauſe we have the *Roman* example before our eyes, which we may follow if we pleaſe, whereas they had no ſuch advantage, but wrought all out by their own induſtry, and wiſdom. But there is another way by which new Conqueſts do a great deal of miſchief, and eſpecially to a well ordered Common-wealth; and that is when the City or Province that is conquered, is voluptuous, or effeminate; as it hapned firſt to the *Romans*, and then to *Hannibal* in the Conqueſt of *Capua*, where the contagion of their ill manners ſpread it ſelf ſo ſuddenly among the Soldiers, that had *Capua* been farther off, the remedies not ſo near, or the *Romans* in the leaſt meaſure corrupted themſelves, that Conqueſt would have been the ruine of their State: For it was true what *Livy* told us in theſe words, *Jam tunc minime ſalubris militari diſciplinæ* Capua, *inſtrumentum omnium voluptatum, delinitos militum animos avertit a memoria patriæ.* Capua *at that time was no place for Military Diſcipline; for being the inſtrument and contriver of all ſorts of ſenſuality, it debauched the minds of the Soldier from the memory of his Country.* And certainly ſuch Cities and Provinces do revenge themſelves of their Conqueror without effuſion of blood; for diffuſing their ill manners among his people, they become ſo weak and enervated thereby, that they are at the mercy of whoever aſſails them: which *Juvenal* has excellently well expreſſed, when he tells us that by their converſation among ſtrangers, the *Roman* manners were ſo changed, that inſtead of their old temperance and parſimony, they were given up wholly to luxury and exceſs.

--------Sævior armis
Luxuria incubuit, victumq; ulciſcitur Orbem.

What by the Conquer'd world could never be
Reveng'd by force, is done by luxurie.

Things being thus, and even the people of *Rome*, notwithſtanding the excellence of their conſtitution and diſcipline, being ſubject to ſuffer, and be corrupted by their new acquiſitions; what will become of thoſe who have no ſuch virtue nor education to defend them? but beſides all the errors above-mentioned, are guilty of another as dangerous as the reſt, and that is, by making uſe in their Wars not of their own Subjects or Soldiers, but of Auxiliaries, and Hirelings.

CHAP. XX.

No Prince, or Common-wealth without manifeſt danger, can employ foreign Forces, either Auxiliary, or Mercenary.

HAd I not diſcourſed at large in another place about the inconvenience of Auxiliary or Mercenary Forces, in reſpect of ones own, I would have taken this opportunity to have ſpoken more of it here, then I ſhall do now: but having done it already, I ſhall only touch upon it at preſent, which I cannot forbear, upon a new occaſion which I have met withall in *Livy*. I call thoſe Forces Auxiliaries, which a Prince or Confederate ſends to your aſſiſtance under his own Officers, and pay. Of this ſort were the two Legions which after the defeat of the *Samnites*, upon the importunity of the *Capuans* were left with them for the ſecurity of their City. But thoſe Legions which were intended for the defence of that City, languiſhing in eaſe, and wallowing in luxury, began to forget the Diſcipline of their Country, and their Reverence to the Senate, and contrive how they might make themſelves Maſters of the Town, conceiving the Inhabitants unworthy to enjoy thoſe poſſeſſions which they were unable to defend. But this Conſpiracy was diſcovered in time, and not only prevented, but puniſhed by the *Romans*, as we ſhall ſhow more largely hereafter: At preſent I ſhall only ſay this, that of all Soldiers, none are employed with ſo much hazard, as your Auxiliaries. For firſt, neither Soldiers nor Officers receiving pay from you, but from the Prince or State by whom they are ſent, they have but little regard either to your intereſt or authority; but when the War is done, give themſelves wholly to pillaging and miſchief, and that not only with the Enemy, but their Friends; moved ſometimes by their own, and ſometimes by the avarice of their Prince. The *Romans* when they left thoſe *Legions* at *Capua*, had no thoughts of breaking their league, or offering them any injury; but the Soldiers being depraved by the licentiouſneſs of the place, and encouraged by the puſilanimity of the Inhabitants, took occaſion to conſpire, and doubtleſly had they not been prevented, had ſeized upon the Town. This we could enforce with ſeveral other examples, but the caſe is ſo plain, I ſhall content my ſelf with this, and that of the *Regini*, whoſe Inhabitants were not only rob'd and diſpoſſeſſed, but murther'd by a Legion which the *Romans* ſent to them for their ſecurity. So then in prudence a Prince or Common-wealth is to take any courſe, rather than to bring himſelf into a neceſſity of employing Auxiliaries, eſpecially when he is to rely wholly upon them; for no treaty or accommodation can be made with the Enemy, but ſhall be more for his advantage, than to entertain ſuch Forces. And if old paſſages be conſulted, and conſidered together with the new, it will be found that for one time in which they ever did good, there are hundreds in which they have done harm: Nor can an ambitious State or Prince have a more commodious occaſion to poſſeſs himſelf of a City or Province, than when he is invited in this manner for its aſſiſtance and defence. Wherefore he whoſe indiſcretion is ſo great as to make uſe of ſuch Armies, not only for his defence, but his conqueſts of other people, takes a courſe that muſt neceſſarily undo him; for he aims at the acquiſition of what he cannot keep any longer than his Auxiliaries will give him leave, for they can take it from him when they pleaſe: But ſuch is the unhappineſs of humane ambition, that fixing their eyes only upon preſent ſatisfaction, they never think of inconvenjences that will follow, whereas if they would reflect upon ancient examples, they would find that the leſs injurious they

were to their Neighbours, and the more generoſity they ſhew towards them, the more ready would they be to throw themſelves into their arms, as ſhall be ſhown in the next Chapter, by the example of the *Capuans*.

CHAP. XXI.

The firſt Prætor which the Romans *ever ſent out of their own City, was to* Capua, *and that was* 400 *years after they began firſt to make War.*

THE people of *Rome* (as we have ſaid many times before) in the management of their Wars, and the enlargement of their Empire differed much from the methods of our times: For the Cities which they conquered (if they did not think fit to demoliſh them) were left free, with the exerciſe of their own Laws, as before, and that without any other mark of ſubjection, than the ſubſcribing certain articles of agreement, and whilſt they kept them, they kept their old priviledges and dignity. And this Cuſtom they obſerved till they carried their Arms into Foreign Countries, and began to unravel the Governments where they conquered, and reduce whole Kingdoms and States into Provinces: This will be clear'd, if we conſider that the firſt *Prætor* which was ever ſent abroad by the *Romans*, was to *Capua*; not out of any ambitious deſign, but at the requeſt of the ſaid *Capouans* to rectifie and compoſe ſome differences, which they could not do among themſelves. The *Antiates* following the example of the *Capouans*, and moved by the ſame neceſſity, deſired a *Prætor* likewiſe, becauſe at that time, as *Livy* tells us, *Non ſolum arma, ſed jura* Romana *pollebant. Not only the Arms, but the Laws of the* Romans *were victorious.* And this way of lenity in their Government, contributed exceedingly to the enlargement of their Empire; for thoſe Cities or States which have been accuſtomed to their own liberty and Laws, do more eaſily ſubmit to a Dominion that ſeems remote and at a diſtance (though indeed it may have ſomething of ſervitude in it) than to that which is always before their eyes, and keeps them in perpetual apprehenſion of ſlavery; and there is this advantage beſides, That if in the adminiſtration of Juſtice, or the management of publick affairs, any thing be acted to the diſpleaſure of the people, it has leſs infamous reflection upon the Prince who leaves them to their own Cuſtoms and Laws, than upon him who ſets up Magiſtrates of his own, and diſpatches all things by them; and this way takes off a great deal of hatred and calumny from the Prince, which would otherwiſe fall heavily upon him. Of the certainty of this opinion, we have a freſh inſtance in *Italy*; every body knows that *Genoua* was oftentimes in the poſſeſſion of the *French*, and that that King (excepting of late years) uſed all ways to ſend thither a Governor of his own; at preſent, (the neceſſity of his affairs requiring it) he has given them the election of their own Governor, and it is conſtantly a *Genoueſe*. No body queſtions but this way is moſt pleaſing to the City, and by conſequence their affections muſt be much enlarged to the King. For it is the Nature of Mankind (and inſeparable from it) to truſt thoſe with more frankneſs, who are leaſt like to oppreſs them; and to fear thoſe leaſt, who are moſt merciful and humane. This gentleneſs and familiarity in the *Romans* prevailed ſo far upon the *Capuans*, that they made it their ſolemn requeſt, that they would ſend them a *Prætor*, which if the *Roman* auſterity had but pretended to have done, they would not only have refuſed, but uſed all means to have freed themſelves from them. But what need we go to *Rome* and *Capoua* for examples, when we have them at home? Every one knows how long it is ſince *Piſtoia* threw it ſelf voluntarily into the Arms of the *Florentines*: Every one knows the jealouſies and emulations that were betwixt them and the *Florentines*, *Piſans*, *Lucchezi*, and *Saneſi*: and this diverſity of humours proceeded not from any neglect in the *Piſtoians* of their affairs, or from any diſeſteem they had of their liberty, more than the others; but from an ancient experience they had had of the affection and tenderneſs of the *Florentines*, and that was the true cauſe why they threw themſelves under their protection; whereas carrying themſelves more ſeverely to the reſt, they were ſo far from coming in, and ſubmitting to their juriſdiction, that they did what they could, and tryed all ways poſſible to diſclaim it. And doubtleſs had the *Florentines*, by their Leagues, or ſupplies comported themſelves with more kindneſs to their Neighbors, and not incenſed them by their auſterities, they had been Maſters of all *Tuſcany* at this hour; Not but that Arms and Severity are to be uſed upon occaſion, but mild ways are to be tryed firſt, and extremities only in extremity.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

How uncertain the judgments of moſt people are, in things of greateſt importance.

HOw falſe and erroneous the opinions of men are, all perſons can teſtifie who have any converſation in their Counſels; which, unleſs managed by perſons of more than ordinary ſagacity, are for the moſt part contrary to the truth. And becauſe men of theſe excellent qualifications, in corrupted States (eſpecially in times of peace) by reaſon of the envy or ambition of other people, are ſubject to be hated; ſuch Counſels are frequently followed, as the deluded Commons think beſt, or ſuch as are recommended by thoſe who are more ſolicitous of the favour, than the benefit of the people: But their errors being diſcovered in the time of their adverſity, neceſſity directs them to thoſe perſons whom in the time of proſperity they deſpiſed, as ſhall be ſhown at large in convenient place. Moreover humane conſultations are ſubject to certain accidents by which men are frequently deluded, unleſs their experience be more than ordinary, which accidents are apt by their likelyhood and probability to perſwade people to whatever they deſire. This I mention, in conſideration of the advice of *Numicius* the *Prætor*, (after the *Latins* were defeated by the *Romans*) and of what was not long ſince generally believed when *Francis* I. of *France* invaded *Milan*, which was defended by the *Swizzers*. For *Lewis* XII. being dead, and *Francis d'Angoleſme* ſucceeding in that Kingdom, he had a great deſign of recovering *Milan*, which not many years before had been taken from them by the *Swizzers*, at the encouragement of *Julius* II. To facilitate his Enterprize, he made it his buſineſs to gain a party in *Italy*, and having made ſure of the *Venetians*, he addreſſed himſelf to the *Florentines*, and Pope *Leo* X. conceiving it would be a great corroboration to his affairs if he could make them, ſeeing the forces of the King of *Spain* were in *Lombardy*, and the Emperors at *Verona*. Pope *Leo* could not be brought to conſent, being perſwaded (as is ſaid) by his Counſel, that if he kept himſelf Neuter, he ſhould be certain of Victory; for it was not for the intereſt of the Church, that either the King of *France*, or the *Swizzers* ſhould be too potent in *Italy*; but he who would reſtore it to its ancient liberty, muſt deliver it from the ſervitude both of the one and the other: And becauſe both of them together were not to be dealt withall, nor indeed either of them apart, as things ſtood then; occaſion was to be expected, and they were to attend till the King of *France* and *Swizzers* had fought, and one of them beaten the other; and then before the Conqueror had recruited, or recovered what he had loſt in the Battel, the Pope and his Friends ſhould fall upon him, and ſo both of them be expulſed. It was impoſſible he ſhould ever have a fairer opportunity; for the Enemy were both of them in the field, and the Popes Army very ſtrong upon the borders of *Lombardy* (under pretence of ſecuring the Territories of the Church) where it might attend the event of the Battel, which the vigor, and ſtrength of both Armies portended would be bloody, and when they had deſtroyed one another, and were both of them weaken'd, then might his Army fall ſecurely upon them, poſſeſs it ſelf of *Lombardy*, and govern all *Italy* as he pleaſed himſelf. Theſe were the Counſels which were given his Holineſs, and at firſt they ſeemed ſolid enough, but how vain they prov'd afterwards, the event did clearly demonſtrate; for the *Swizzers* after a long and bloody fight being defeated, the *Popes* and the King of *Spains* forces were ſo far from taking that opportunity of falling upon the *French* (as they had promiſed themſelves) That they prepared to run away, nor would that have ſecured them, had not they been befriended by the humanity (not to ſay lazineſs) of the King of *France*, who contenting himſelf with one Victory, never regarded a ſecond, but ſtrook up a Peace with the *Pope*: And truly at a diſtance theſe Counſels ſeem'd not unreaſonable, though in reality they were irrational and idle; for the Conqueror ſeldom loſes many men, what he loſes is in the fight, and the greateſt part of the execution is in the purſuit; but grant a Battel is a long time before it be decided (which notwithſtanding happens but ſeldom) and that many are ſlain and diſabled of the conquering ſide, yet the reputation of Victory gives the Conqueror ſuch eſteem, and ſtrikes ſuch awe and terror into all people, as tranſcends the conſideration of any loſs he can ſuſtain: ſo that he is in an egregious error, who thinks a victorious Army may be the more eaſily overcome by reaſon of the prejudice it received in the fight; for 'tis madneſs to attempt ſuch an Army with a leſs number, than you would have engaged it before; becauſe their late fortune will add to their courage. This appeared by

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the experience of the *Latins*; by the Counſel of *Numiſius* the *Prætor*; and by the loſſes of the people who followed it. For the *Romans* having beaten the *Latins* with much adoe, and ſuch ſlaughter of their own men, that they ſeemed to have got nothing of a Victory but the Name; *Numiſius* proclaimed it up and down, that then was the time to recover their liberty, and that if with new Forces they fell ſuddenly upon the *Romans*, before they were recruited, or had any expectation of being invaded, they would certainly be overthrown: Upon which the *Latins* believing him, raiſed a new Army, and fell upon the *Romans*, but they were preſently defeated, and ſuffered the inconveniences to which all people are ſubject that follow ſuch Counſels.

CHAP. XXIII.

How the Romans *upon any accident which neceſſitated them to give judgment upon their Subjects, avoided always the mid way.*

JAm Latio is ſtatus erat rerum, ut neq; bellum neq; pacem pati poſſent. The Latins were now in ſuch a condition, that they were neither fit for War nor Peace. And what *Livy* ſaid of *Latium*, is true every where elſe; That Prince or Common-wealth is at the higheſt pitch of unhappineſs, which is in ſuch a condition, as that he can neither receive Peace, nor maintain War: And this happens, when people are conquered, and neceſſitated to ſubmit upon ſuch hard terms as in their hearts they diſdain, or elſe (to go on with the War) are conſtrained to implore their aſſiſtance, who will make them a prey. The ways by which we are brought into ſo ſad a condition, are commonly ill Counſels, for want of juſt conſideration of our affairs, both as to Mony and Men. For that Common-wealth or Prince who takes right meaſures in thoſe, ſhall very hardly fall into the diſtreſſes of the *Latins*, who accepted the conditions of the *Romans* when they ſhould have refuſed them; and declared War againſt the *Romans* when they ſhould have deſired a Peace; ſo that as they ordered the matter, the enmity, and the amity of the *Romans* did equally afflict them. The firſt that overcame them was *Manlius Torquatus*, and after him *Camillus*, who ſeized upon all their Cities, and putting Garriſons in them, return'd to *Rome*, and in his account to the Senate acquainted them, that the whole Country of the *Latins* was then in their hands. And becauſe the Sentence and Judgment of the Senate at that time upon the *Latins* is more than ordinarily remarkable; That it may be readier for the imitation of Princes when occaſion is offered, I ſhall ſet down the words which *Livy* makes *Camillus* ſpeak, which confirm what we have ſaid about the ways which the *Romans* obſerved in the enlargement of their Empire; and ſhows, that in their determinations in matters of State, they left the middle ways, and followed only the extreams. For Government is nothing but keeping Subjects in ſuch a poſture as that they may have no will, or power to offend you. And this is done either by taking away all means from them of doing you any hurt; or by obliging and indulging them ſo, as they may not in reaſon hope to better their fortune; all which will appear, firſt by *Camillus* his Speech to the Senate, and then by their reſolution upon it. His words were theſe, *Dii immortales ita vos potentes hujus Conſilii fecerunt, ut ſit Latium, an non ſit, in veſtra manu poſuerint. Itaq; pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet, parare in perpetuum, vel ſæviendo, vel ignoſcendo poteſtis. Vultis crudeliter conſulere in debitos victoſq;? licet delere omne Latium. Vultis exemplo Majorum augere rem Romanam, victos in Civitatem accipiendo? Materia creſcendi per ſummam gloriam ſuppetit. Certe id firmiſſimum imperium eſt, quo obedientes gaudent. Illorum igitur animos dum Expectatione ſtupent, ſeu pœna, ſeu beneficio præoccupari opportet. The Gods have put it into the power of this Reverend Counſel, to determine whether the Latins ſhall be a people, or not. As to them, your peace will be perpetual, which way ſoever you take; Are you diſpoſed to ſeverity, and will deſtroy thoſe poor people that are conquered, and your Priſoners? They are at your mercy, and you may extinguiſh their very name. Are you diſpoſed according to the example of your Anceſtors to propagate your intereſt by receiving them into your City? You have an opportunity of doing it with the higheſt advantage and glory. Certainly no Empire is ſo firm, as where Subjects exſult in their obedience. I will be expedient therefore, whilſt they are in amazement and ſuſpence, to ſettle their minds one way, either by puniſhment or pardon.* According to the Conſul's propoſal, the Senate came to an iſſue, and gave ſentence Town by Town, according to the Nature of their deſerts; but all in extreams, without any mediocrity; for ſome they not only pardoned, but loaded them with benefits, made them free of their own City, and gave them many other priviledges, and exemptions, and thereby

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ſecured them not only from Rebelling, but from ever conſpiring again. The reſt whom they thought fit to make examples, were brought Priſoners to *Rome*, puniſh'd with all kind of ſeverity, Their Houſes deſtroyed, their Lands confiſcated, their Perſons diſperſed, ſo as it was not poſſible for them any way to do any miſchief for the future. This was the way the *Romans* took in the ſettlement of *Latium*, which ought to be obſerved and imitated by all wiſe Princes and States; and if the *Florentines* had followed it in the year 1502. when *Arezzo* and the whole Valley of *Chiana* rebelled, they had continued their Authority, augmented their State, and ſupplyed themſelves with thoſe fields which they wanted for their ſubſiſtance. But they took the middle way (betwixt the extreams of rigour and remiſſion) which is always moſt dangerous; they kept the City, removed the Magiſtrates, degraded the great Men, baniſhed ſome, and executed others. If any in their Councils adviſed to have the City demoliſhed, it was anſwered, It could not be done without diſhonor and reflexion upon their own; as if *Florence* was ſo weak and inconſiderable, it was not able to keep a Garriſon in *Arezzo*. This argument was of that ſort which carry ſome appearance, but are not really true. 'Tis much as if we ſhould argue a Parricide or Felon, or other egregious Malefactor, is not to be put to death, leſt it ſhould be thought the Prince or Republick was too impotent to reſtrain them any other way. But thoſe who are of that opinion are to conſider, that when a private perſon, or whole City offends ſo highly againſt his Prince, or his Government; To make them examples to other people, and bridle them ſo as they may be ſure to be no more guilty for the future, the ſureſt way is utterly to deſtroy them; and it is more honourable for a Prince to extirpate them quite at once, than to endeavour to preſerve them with a thouſand difficulties and dangers: For whoever he be that knows not how to puniſh his delinquents according to the merits of their offence, and ſo as to ſecure himſelf for the future, is either a weak, or a poor ſpirited Prince. To confirm what is ſaid, we may produce another example of the *Romans*, in their Sentence upon the *Privernates*; from whence (as *Livy* ſays) two things are to be concluded; one is, that Rebels are to be pardoned frankly, and obliged; or utterly extinguiſhed. The other that generoſity of mind, and ſteddineſs and conſtancy in our anſwers when given to wiſe men, make ſtrangely for our advantage. The *Roman* Senate was aſſembled to give Sentence upon the *Privernates* who had been in Rebellion, and being reduced by force of Arms, had ſent ſeveral of their chief Citizens to implore the mercy of the *Romans*: being brought into the Senate (where every body was perſwading according to his inclination, ſome for mercy, and ſome for ſeverity) one of the Senators (before they could come to a reſolution) ask'd one of the Petitioners, *Quam pœnam meritos Privernates cenſeret. What puniſhment he thought his fellow Citizens deſerved:* To which he replyed, *Eam quam merentur qui ſe libertate dignos cenſent. The ſame that they deſerve, who deſire to be free.* The Senator continuing, *Quid ſi pœnam remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobiſcum ſperemus? If we ſhould pardon you this time, what peace could we hope for from you?* To which he anſwered, *Si bonam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam; ſi malam, haud diuturnam. If it be upon good terms, it will be firm and perpetual; if upon ill, it will hardly laſt long.* Upon which the better part of the Senate (though ſome oppoſed it) declared, *Se audiviſſe vocem liberi & viri; nec credi poſſe illum populum aut hominem deniq; in ea conditione cujus eum pœnitiat, diutius quam neceſſe ſit manſurum. Ibi pacem eſſe fidam, ubi voluntarii pacati ſint, neq; eo loco ubi ſervitutem eſſe velint, fidem ſperandam. That he had ſpoke like a man, and like a Free-man. That it was not to be imagined any people or private perſon would ſubmit to a condition that oppreſs'd him, longer than by neceſſity he was conſtrained. That if any peace be laſting and inviolable, it is where the parties do voluntarily ſubſcribe, not where ſervitude and ſlavery is impoſed.* And thereupon it was decreed, that the *Privernates* ſhould be *Civitate donati*, and enjoy all the Priviledges of the *Romans*, concluding, *Eos qui nihil præterquam de libertate cogitant dignos eſſe qui Romani fiant. That they deſerved to be Romans, whoſe liberty was the greateſt part of their care.* And this frank and generous way of anſwering, took mightily with thoſe grave men, as knowing that whatever they had ſaid otherwiſe, would not have been from the heart, but with compliance and ſubmiſſion to their fortune and diſtreſs. And this is moſt certain, whoever ſpeaks otherwiſe (eſpecially if either he has been, or but thought himſelf free) does but equivocate, and he that believes him, takes wrong Counſels, ſuch as are neither good for himſelf, nor ſatisfactory to them, which many times produces Rebellion, and the ruine of the State: And things being ſo, we conclude, according to our propoſition in the beginning of our diſcourſe; That upon any great Sentence to be given againſt a people or City that has been formerly free, the ſureſt way is, to wave all moderation, and either to careſs or extinguiſh them. He that proceeds otherwiſe, will find himſelf in an error, as the *Samnites* were, when having encloſed the Romans *ad Furcas Caudinas*, they neither diſcharged them freely, nor

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put them to the Sword, as one of their grave Citizens adviſed; but abuſed them, and pillaged them, and diſmiſſed them *ſub jugum* when they had done. But not long after they were made ſenſible of their error, and that the old Citizen was in the right; as we ſhall ſhow more at large hereafter.

CHAP. XXIV.

That in the Generality, Caſtles and Citadels do more miſchief than good.

TO the States-men of our times, it may perhaps ſeem indiſcretion or inadvertancy in the *Romans*, that being deſirous to keep *Latium*, and *Privernum* in ſubjection, they built neither Caſtles nor Citadels to ſecure them: and indeed they differed exceedingly from our *Florentine* Politicians, who are of opinion that not only *Piſa*, but all other Cities whatever are to be kept under that way, and ſurely had the *Romans* been like us, they would have been of the ſame opinion; but differing in their courage, their judgment, and their power, they differed likewiſe in their reſolutions. Nor during all the time of their liberty, were the *Romans* known to build any Caſtle or Citadel to keep any City in awe, or any Province in peace; only ſome indeed which were fortified before, they garriſoned, and continued; which being ſo, and quite contrary to the Sentiment of our times, I think it not amiſs, if in this place I enquire whether ſuch things be profitable or unprofitable to the perſons who build them. It is therefore to be conſidered, that ſuch Fortreſſes are erected, either to repel an Enemy, or reſtrain a Subject, and keep him in obedience. In the firſt caſe I do pronounce them unneceſſary; in the ſecond dangerous. They are dangerous, and do rather obſtruct than promote obedience in the ſubject; becauſe the great danger of Rebellion proceeds from hatred which the people have conceived againſt their Prince, that hatred proceeds from his injuſtice to the people, and he is ſaid to be unjuſt when he governs them arbitrarily, and by force, which is never ſo manifeſt, as when he builds ſuch Caſtles and Citadels among them, that no man might be able in any manner to oppoſe him. Which being ſo, thoſe kind of fortifications are not only uſeleſs and improper to keep the Subject in ſubjection; but dangerous, ſeeing by preſumption upon them, Princes are encouraged to treat their Subjects worſe than otherwiſe they would do, by which they contract the odium of the people; and what is the conſequence? Rebellion, and Blood, and Confuſion: Neither when troubles ariſe, and Wars break out, is there that defence or ſecurity in them, as is now adays imagined; for there are only two ways of keeping a conquered people in obedience, you muſt either have a ſtanding Army (as the *Romans* had) always ready to ſubdue them; or you muſt divide, diſperſe, or deſtroy them in ſuch manner, that they may never get together again to diſturb you: For though you impoveriſh and plunder them never ſo much, *Spoliatis arma ſuperſunt*, *They will find Arms to revenge themſelves*; and if you diſarm them never ſo carefully, *Furor arma miniſtrat. Their fury, will ſupply them.* If you cut off their Commanders, like *Hydra*'s, others will ſucceed, and do as much miſchief: If you build theſe Caſtles, in time of Peace they may be ſerviceable, and make you more bold, and ſecure againſt your Subjects; but when War comes, and both your Subjects and Enemies infeſt you, it is impoſſible they ſhould defend you againſt both. And if ever they were uſeleſs, it is now ſince the uſe of Artillery is known, againſt the fury of which no little Fort (from whence other Guns cannot play with ſecurity again, and where they want ground for repairing their breaches, or making new retrenchments upon occaſion) can poſſibly ſtand: and being ſo, conſider ſeriouſly with your ſelf whether theſe kind of Fortreſſes are like to keep your old Subjects, or your new Conqueſts in obedience? If your Territory be hereditary, and you have received it from your Anceſtors, to build Caſtles to keep your own natural Subjects in obedience, will be to little purpoſe, for the reaſons aboveſaid, ſeeing they will be but a means to make you and your poſterity the more Tyrannical, and by conſequence expoſe you to the hatred of the people, againſt which they will be afterwards unable to defend you. So that for theſe reaſons, that neither he himſelf nor his heirs may have occaſion to entrench too much upon the people; and the people have no occaſion to abhor him, a wiſe Prince will never build Citadels; and though *Franceſco Sforza* Duke of *Milan* was reputed a wiſe man, and built a Citadel at *Milan* to ſecure his Uſurpations, yet his wiſdom did not appear in that, for it proved afterwards the ruine of his poſterity. For preſuming upon that, they took the more confidence to oppreſs the people, which incenſed them ſo highly, that they revolted upon the firſt approach of an Enemy, and turned their Prince out of that Province.

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So that that Citadel did him no good in time of War againſt the incurſions of the Enemy; and in time of Peace, making him more inſolent, it did but expoſe him to the hatred of the people; whereas if no Citadel had been built, and yet they had been ſo indiſcreet as to have behaved themſelves inſolently to their Subjects, ſome or other of them who had been injured would have remonſtrated to their Prince, the danger of his courſes, before he had contracted the general odium; by which there would have been a poſſibility that he might have reform'd, and reconciled himſelf to his Subjects; and had he done ſo, he would have better defended himſelf againſt the *French* with the affections of his people, and no Citadel; than with a Citadel, and no affections of the people. Beſides there are many ways of loſing theſe Citadels; by force, by fraud, by corrupting the Governour, by ſtarving, and by ſtorm. And if you have loſt a City, which you are in hopes of recovering by the favour of the Citadel, which ſtill holds out for you; it will require an Army as much as if there were no Citadel at all; and ſo much the ſtronger, by how much 'tis probable the people may be more incenſed from the miſchief which they have received out of the Caſtle, than they would have been, had there been no Caſtle at all. Experience it ſelf has ſince taught us that that Citadel of *Milan* was of no advantage, either to the Dukes of *Milan*, nor *French* in time of their adverſity; but in time of Peace did them much prejudice, by hindring them from taking ſuch ways as might have obliged the people, and rendered them well affected to their Government. *Guido Ubaldo* Son to *Frederic* Duke of *Urbin*, was a great Captain as any in his time, being driven out of his Country by *Cæſar Borgia* (Son to *Alexander* VI.) and recovering it afterwards by an accident, he cauſed all the Fortreſſes in the whole Province to be diſmantled, and deſtroyed; as things which he had found by experience were more to his prejudice than ſecurity. For being beloved by the people, he would not do them the injury to put Garriſons in them; and if he had, upon any invaſion from the Enemy, he could not have kept them without a field Army to relieve them. *Julius* the Pope, having driven the *Bentivogli* out of *Bononia*, built a Citadel there, and put in ſuch a Governour as partly by his own ill nature, and partly by the inſtructions of his Maſter, killed many of the Citizens, and committed ſeveral cruelties, which provoked the *Bononians* ſo exceedingly, that they rebelled, and recovered the Citadel, which had the Governour been more moderate, might have been longer in his power. *Nicolo de Caſtello* Father of the *Vitelli*, (returning into his Country, from whence he had been baniſhed by the Popes) immediately demoliſhed two Fortreſſes which had been raiſed by *Sixtus* IV. as judging the hearts of the people more like than thoſe Caſtles to ſecure him. But of all, there is no example, evinces the unuſefulneſs of theſe kind of Garriſons, and the convenience of taking them away, more than that which hapned lately at *Genoua*; for the ſaid City revolting from *Lewis* XII. of *France*, in the year 1507. *Lewis* came with a ſtrong Army into *Italy*, and having reduced it, built a Caſtle of greater ſtrength and capacity than any of that time; for it was built upon a promontory that Commanded the Sea called *Godeſa*, the Harbour, and the Town, ſo that by all people it was held inexpugnable. But the *French* being driven out of *Italy* in the year 1512. *Genoa* rebelled (notwithſtanding the Caſtle) and *Ottanio Fegoſa* taking the Government upon him, in ſixteen months brought the Caſtle to ſuch extremity, that it was forced to ſurrender; whereupon, though he was adviſed to keep it as a refuge in caſe of any diſaſter; yet being a wiſe man, and knowing well that a Prince is in nothing ſo ſafe, as in the affections of his Subjects, he cauſed it to be demoliſhed, and he found the benefit of that Counſel, for by it he has held that Government to this day; and that ſo ſtrongly, that whereas before, the appearance of a thouſand Foot was ſufficient at any time to have carried it; his adverſaries aſſaulted it with ten thouſand, and could do him no wrong. So that we ſee the demoliſhing *de Fegoſa* no hurt, and the making it did the King of *France* no good; for when he was able to bring an Army into *Italy*, he was able to recover *Genoa* without the help of the Caſtle; but when he could bring no Army, he could not keep it, though the Caſtle was for him: From whence it follows, that as the building of it, was a great expence, and the loſs of it a great diſhonour to the King of *France*; ſo the taking of it was great glory to *Ottaviano*, and the ruining it, a great advantage. And it is the ſame thing with thoſe who build them in their new Conqueſts, to keep their new Subjects in obedience, which if the example of *Genoua* and the *French* ſhould be inſufficient to prove, the Cities of *Florence* and *Piſa*, will do it effectually. The *Florentines* built a Citadel at *Piſa*, and ſeveral other Fortreſſes to keep it in awe; not conſidering that a City which had been free, and in continual emulation of the *Florentine* greatneſs, was not any other way to be kept to its duty, unleſs (according to the practice of the *Romans*) they made a fair and honourable league with it, or utterly ſubverted it. But how much thoſe Fortreſſes anſwered their deſigns, appeared when *Charles* VIII. made his Expedition into *Italy*, to

whom they were generally ſurrendered, either thorow the fear or falſhood of their Governours. So that had not they been built, the *Florentines* had never relyed ſo much upon them for the keeping of *Piſa*, but had thought of ſome ſafer way to have ſecured it againſt the King of *France*. I conclude then, that to keep ones own Native Country in ſubjection, Fortreſſes are dangerous, and to keep new Conqueſts, they are ineffectual: To prove that the authority and practice of the *Romans* ought to be ſufficient, who whenever they had a mind to reſtrain the power, and bridle the fury of the people, did it not by erecting new Fortreſſes, but by demoliſhing the old. If it be objected that *Tarentum* of old, and *Breſſia* of late years were recovered by the fidelity of the Caſtles, when the Towns had revolted. I anſwer, that as to the recovery of *Tarentum*, the Caſtle contributed nothing, for the Conſul *Quintus Fabius* was ſent thither with an Army ſtrong enough to have retaken it, had there been no Caſtle at all: and, what advantage was it to the *Romans* that the Caſtle held for them, if the recovery of the Town required a Conſular Army, and the preſence of ſo great a Soldier as *Fabius Maximus*; and that they might have retaken it without the help of the Caſtle, is clear in the example of *Capua*, which they recovered, when there was no Caſtle to befriend them. In the caſe of *Breſſia*, the circumſtances were very extraordinary; for it ſeldom happens that when a City revolts, and the Caſtle holds out for you, That the Caſtle has a field Army hard by, and ready to relieve you. *Monſieur de Foix* General for the King of *France*, being with his Army at *Bologna*, and underſtanding the defection of the *Breſſians*, marched immediately to recover it, and in three days time (by the help of the Caſtle) was Maſter of it again. So that it was not wholly by the benefit of the Caſtle that *Breſſia* was recovered, but by the preſence and dexterity of *Monſieur de Foix* and his Army. And this example may be ſufficient to ballance all others to the contrary; for we ſee daily in our times, multitudes of Caſtles taken and retaken, and following the fate of their Cities, and that with no more difficulty or variety of fortune, than when there are none at all; as has been viſible in *Lombardy*, *Romagna*, the Kingdom of *Naples*, and all other quarters of *Italy*. And as to thoſe Citadels which are built in your new Conqueſts, to defend you from your Enemies abroad; they alſo are abſolutely unneceſſary, where you have an Army in the field; and where you have none, they are of no uſe. A good Army without any ſuch Forts, is ſufficient to defend you. And this has been found by experience by all thoſe who have been thought excellent in the Arts of War, or of Peace; and particularly by the *Romans* and *Spartans*: The *Romans* never erected any new *Caſtles*, and the *Spartans* never ſuffered any old; but what Cities ſoever they conquered, down went their Walls; nay, even in their own Cities they would not permit any fortification, as believing nothing ſo proper to defend them as the virtue and courage of their Citizens. A *Spartan* being demanded by an *Athenian*, *Whether the Walls of* Athens *were not very beautiful? Yes, ſays the* Spartan, *if it was but inhabited by Women.* A Prince therefore who has a good Army in the field, may have ſome benefit by his Caſtles, if they be upon the Frontiers of his Country, or in ſome places upon the Coaſt, where they may retard and entertain an Enemy for ſome time till the Army can come up: But if the Prince has no Army on foot, let his Caſtles be where they will, upon the Frontiers or elſewhere, they are either unſerviceable or dangerous: dangerous, becauſe they are eaſily loſt, and made uſe of by the Enemy againſt you; or if they be too ſtrong to be taken, yet the Enemy marches on, and leaves them unſerviceable behind him. For an Army that has no Enemy in the field to confront it, takes no notice of Cities or Caſtles, but paſſing by as it pleaſes, rambles up and down, and ravages the whole Country; as may be obſerved both in ancient Hiſtory and new. *Franceſco Maria* not many years ſince invaded the Dutchy of *Urbin*, nor concern'd himſelf at all, though he left ten of his Enemies Cities behind him. Wherefore that Prince who has a good Army, need not ſtand upon Caſtles; and he that has no Caſtles, need not trouble himſelf to build any; all that he is to do, is, to fortifie the Town of his own reſidence as well as he can, and accuſtom the Citizens to Arms, that he may be able to ſuſtain an Enemy, at leaſt for a while, till he can make his conditions, or procure relief: All other deſigns are expenſive in times of Peace; and unprofitable in time of War; ſo that he who conſiders what has been ſaid, muſt acknowledge that as the *Romans* were wiſe in every thing elſe, ſo more particularly in their affairs with the *Latins*, and *Privernates*, in not thinking of Caſtles and Fortreſſes, but of more noble and generous ways of ſecuring their allegiance.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

To attempt a City full of inteſtine diviſions, and to expect to carry it thereby, is uncertain and dangerous.

THe diviſions in the Common-wealth of *Rome* were ſo great betwixt the People and the Nobility, that the *Veientes* and *Hetruſci*, taking the opportunity, conſpired its deſtruction, and having raiſed an Army, and harraſſed their whole Country, the Senate ſent out G. *Manlius*, and M. *Fabius* againſt them; whoſe Army encamping near the Enemy, were ſo provoked by the inſolence of their language, that the *Romans* laid aſide their private animoſities, and coming to a Battel overthrew them; by which we may obſerve how eaſily we erre in our Counſels, and how we loſe things many times the ſame way by which we intended to gain them. The *Veientes* thought by aſſaulting the *Romans* whilſt they were embroil'd in their inteſtine diviſions, they ſhould certainly overcome them; and their invading them at that time, united the Enemy, and ruined themſelves; and not without reaſon, for the occaſion of diſcord and faction in a Common-wealth is idleneſs, and peace; and there is nothing unites like apprehenſion, and War. So that had the *Veientes* been wiſe as they ſhould have been, they ſhould have forborn making War upon them at that time, and have tryed other artificial ways to have deſtroyed them. The ſureſt way is to inſinuate, and make your ſelf a Mediator betwixt them, and to take upon your ſelf the arbitration, rather than they ſhould come to blows. When it is come to that, you are privately and gently to ſupply the weaker ſide; to foment and continue the War, till they conſume one another; but be ſure your ſupplies be not too great, leſt both parties begin to ſuſpect you, and believe your deſign is to ruine them both, and make your ſelf Prince. If this way be well managed, it will certainly bring you to the end which you deſired; for when both ſides are weary, they will commit themſelves to your arbitration. By theſe Arts, the City of *Piſtoia* returned to its dependance upon *Florence*; for labouring under inteſtine diviſions, the *Florentines* favouring firſt one ſide, and then the other (but ſo ſlily that no occaſion of jealouſie was given to either) brought them both in a ſhort time to be weary of their diſtractions, and throw themſelves unanimouſly into their arms. The Government of the City of *Siena* had never been changed by their own domeſtick diſſentions, had not the *Florentines* ſupplied both parties under-hand, and fomented them that way, whereas had they appeared openly and above board, it would have been a means to have united them. I ſhall add one example more, *Philip Viſconti* Duke of *Milan* made War many times upon the *Florentines*, hoping by the diſſentions of the City to have conquered them the more eaſily, but he never ſucceeded. So that complaining one time of his misfortunes, he had this Expreſſion, *The follies of the* Florentines *have coſt me two millions of Mony, to no purpoſe.* In ſhort, as the *Veientes* and *Tuſcans* found themſelves in an error (when they thought by help of the differences in *Rome*, to have maſtered the *Romans*) and were ruined themſelves for their pains. So it will fare with whoever takes that way to oppreſs or ſubvert any other Government.

CHAP. XXVI.

He who contemns or reproaches another perſon, incurs his hatred, without any advantage to himſelf.

I Look upon it as one of the greateſt points of diſcretion in a man, to forbear injury and threatning, eſpecially in words: neither of them weakens the Enemy, but threatning makes him more cautious, and injury the more inveterate, and induſtrious to revenge it. This is manifeſt by the example of the *Veienti* (of which I diſcourſed in the foregoing Chapter) for not contenting themſelves with the miſchiefs that they brought upon them by the War, they added contumely and opprobrious language, which ſo provoked and enflamed the *Roman* Army, that whereas before they were irreſolute, and ſeemed to decline it, they now fell upon them unanimouſly, and over-threw them. So that it ought to be the principal care in an Officer that neither himſelf nor his Soldiers do incenſe and exaſperate his Enemy by ill language; for that makes him but the more ſo, does not at all hinder him from revenging himſelf, but does the Author more miſchief than the Enemy. And

of this we have a notable example in *Aſia*. *Gabades* the *Perſian* General having beſieged *Amida* a long time, without any conſiderable progreſs; weary of the tediouſneſs of the Leaguer, and hopeleſs of ſucceſs, he reſolved to draw off and be gone; but as he was raiſing his Camp, the Garriſon perceiving it, got all upon the Walls, and with the baſeſt and moſt provoking circumſtances imaginable upbraided them with Cowardize; which nettled *Gabedes* in ſuch manner, that he changed his Counſels, ſate down again, and ply'd it with that induſtry and indignation, that he took it in few days, and gave it up to the fury of the Soldier. The ſame thing hapned to the *Veienti* (as I ſaid before) who not contenting themſelves to make War upon the *Romans*, went up under their very Noſes to reproach them; and what followed? they irritated them ſo, that they ſettled the courage, and united the animoſities of the *Roman* Army, and put them into ſo high a fit of impatience, that they forced the Conſul to a Battel, in which the *Veientes* received the reward of their contumacy. He therefore who is General of an Army, or Governour of a Common-wealth, and commands or governs diſcreetly, takes particular care that ſuch ill language be not uſed either in the City or Army, to one another, nor to the Enemy: For to an Enemy, they make him but worſe, unleſs ſuch remedies be applyed, as are practiſed by wiſe men. The *Romans* having left two of their Legions at *Capoua*, they conſpired againſt the *Capouans* (as ſhall be deſcribed more largely hereafter) which occaſioned a great ſedition, but it was afterwards appeaſed by *Valerius Corvinus*, and among other things neceſſary in that juncture, an act of Oblivion was paſſed, with great penalty to any man that ſhould upbraid any of the Soldiers by their Sedition. *Tiberius Gracchus* having the command of a certain number of Servants (in the time of *Hanibal*'s Wars) which the ſcarcity of men, had forced the *Romans* to Arm, made it no leſs than death for any man to reproach them by their ſervitude. So mindful were the *Roman* Officers always of preventing ſuch exprobration, as knowing that nothing provokes and incenſes a man ſo highly as to have his imperfections rip'd up, whether in earneſt, or in jeſt, 'tis the ſame thing. *Nam facetiæ aſperæ, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem ſui memoriam relinquunt*; for biting raillery, eſpecially with a tincture of truth, leaves an ill impreſſion upon the Memory.

CHAP. XXVII.

Wiſe Princes, and well governed States ought to be contented with victory; for many times whilſt they think to puſh things forward, they loſe all.

THat we uſe our Enemy with rude and diſhonorable language, proceeds either from inſolence upon ſome victory paſt or extraordinary confidence of obtaining it, which being falſe, perplexes our underſtanding, and makes us err not only in our words, but our actions. For from the time that error ſeizes upon our judgments, it makes us many times loſe the occaſion of a certain good, in hopes of a better that is but uncertain, which is a point not unworthy our conſideration, ſeeing thereby our reaſon is diſturbed, and our State many times brought in danger of ruine; and this I ſhall demonſtrate by examples both ancient and modern, becauſe arguments cannot do it ſo diſtinctly. *Hanibal* after he had defeated the *Romans* at *Cannas*, ſent Meſſengers to *Carthage* with the news of his Victory, and to deſire Supplies. The Senate was a long time in Counſel what was to be done, *Annon*, a grave and ſolid Citizen being preſent, adviſed them to make wiſe uſe of their Victory, and think of making Peace with the *Romans*, which they might do upon better conditions now they were Conquerors, than they were in reaſon to expect upon any diſaſter. That the *Carthaginians* had ſatisfied the whole world that they were able to balance the *Romans*; for they had fought with them, and beaten them; and having gone ſo far with honour and ſucceſs, they ought not (at leaſt in his judgment) expoſe what they had got, and by hoping for more, run a hazard of loſing all: But this Counſel was not followed, though afterwards, when too late, it was found to be the better.

Alexander the great had conquered all the Eaſt, when the Common-wealth of *Tyre* (a great Town ſcituate like *Venice* in the water) amazed at the grandeur of *Alexander*, ſent Embaſſadors to him to offer him their obedience and ſubjection upon what terms he pleaſed, only they were unwilling either himſelf, or any of his Army ſhould come into their Town. *Alexander* diſdaining to be excluded by a private City, to whom the whole world had opened their Gates; rejected their offers, ſent their Embaſſadors back, and went immediately to beſiege it. The Town ſtood in the Sea, and was well provided both with

Victual

Victual and Ammunition; inſomuch as at four months end *Alexander* began to conſider that that ſingle Town had deprived his glory of more time, than many other of his Conqueſts of much greater importance: Whereupon he reſolved to come to an agreement with them, and to grant them the conditions which they demanded at firſt; but the *Tyrians* tranſported with pride, not only refuſed his proffers, but put his Meſſengers to death; upon which in a rage *Alexander* cauſed it to be aſſaulted immediately, and it was done with that fury, that the Town was taken and ſack'd, and part of the people put to the Sword, and the reſt made ſlaves. In the year 1512. a *Spaniſh* Army came into the Dominions of the *Florentines* to reſtore the *Medici* in *Florence*, and tax the City; and they were called in, and conducted by the Citizens themſelves, who had promiſed, that as ſoon as they appeared in thoſe parts, they would take Arms, and declare for them; being entered in the plain, and finding no body to joyn with them, or ſupply them, ſcarcity of proviſions prevailed with the *Spaniard* to think of a Treaty, and propoſe it to the Enemy, but the *Florentines* were too high, and refuſed it, which was the loſs of *Prato*, and the ruine of their State. So then a Prince that is attack'd by another Prince more potent than himſelf, cannot be guilty of a greater error, than to refuſe an agreement, eſpecially when it is offered; for it can never be ſo bad, but it ſhall have in it ſomething of advantage for him who accepts it, and perhaps contribute to his Victory. It ought therefore to have ſatisfied the people of *Tyre* that *Alexander* accepted of the conditions which he had formerly denyed them; and it had been Victory enough for them, that with Arms in their hands they had forced ſo great a Conqueror to condeſcend. It was the ſame caſe with the *Florentines*; they ought to have been contented, and thought it honour enough that the *Spaniſh* Army complyed, and was reduced to a condition of granting part of their deſires, though they would not gratifie them in all; for it was plain, the deſign of that Army was to change the Government; to break their league with the *French*; and to raiſe what Money upon them they could. Though of theſe three points, they had obtained the two laſt, and the firſt alone had remained entire to the *Florentines* (that is to ſay, the Government of the City) every Citizen (beſides the ſecurity of his life) would have had ſome honour and ſatisfaction, without concerning themſelves ſo much for the loſs of the other two. And though by the poſture of their affairs their ſucceſs ſeem'd to be certain; yet they ought not to have expoſed things to the diſcretion of Fortune, ſeeing their all was at ſtake, which no wiſe man will hazard but upon inevitable neceſſity. *Hanibal* having left *Italy*, where he had been ſixteen years together with a great deal of honour, being called home to the relief of his own Country, found *Aſdrubal* and *Siphax* defeated; the Kingdom of *Numidia* loſt; The *Carthaginians* retired, and coop'd up within the circumference of their own walls, ſo as they had no hopes but in *Hanibal* and his Army. *Hanibal* being ſenſible that this was the laſt caſt, and that if he miſcarried, his Country was quite loſt, reſolved to put nothing to a hazard, till he had tryed all other ways; and was not aſhamed to make the firſt overture of a Peace, as knowing that if there was any hopes left for his Country, it was in that, rather than War; but being refuſed, he reſolved to fight (though with very little hopes) ſuppoſing he might poſſibly win the day, or if he did loſe it, it ſhould not be without leaving ſome teſtimony of his courage and generoſity. If then *Hanibal*, a perſon of that great Experience and Conduct, at the head of a great Army, choſe rather to have had things determined by treaty and accommodation, than Battel; upon the loſs of which, the wealth and liberty of his Country depended: what is he to do, who has not his courage nor experience? But men are ſubject to ſtrange and imaginary hopes, upon which repoſing with too much confidence, they take their meaſures amiſs, and are many times ruined.

CHAP. XXVIII.

How much it is for the intereſt of all Governments that all injury be puniſhed, whether againſt the publick, or particular perſons.

IT is eaſily known to what men are often tranſported by choler and indignation, by what hapned to the *Romans*, when they ſent the three *Fabii* Embaſſadors towards the *Gauls*, who were entered into *Tuſcany*, and had laid ſiege to *Cluſium*. For the *Cluſians* being beſieged, ſent to the *Romans* to relieve them, and the *Romans* ſent to the *French* to require them in the name of the people of *Rome*, to withdraw their forces out of *Tuſcany*; The *Roman* Embaſſadors arrived at the Army, but being better Soldiers than Orators, when

when the Armies came to engage, they put themſelves at the head of the *Cluſians*, to fight againſt the *French*, which being obſerved by the *French*, turn'd all their former hatred to the *Tuſcans*, upon the *Romans*, which was much encreaſed after they had ſent Embaſſadors to complain of it at *Rome*, and to require that thoſe who had committed that fault, might be delivered up into their hands, to make ſatisfaction for their offence. But inſtead of granting their demands, or puniſhing their delinquency themſelves, they were created Tribunes with Conſular authority. Which coming afterwards to the Ears of the *French*, finding thoſe perſons advanced, who ought rather to have been puniſhed, they interpreted it as done in affront to them, and being enflamed with anger and diſdain, they marched directly to *Rome*, aſſaulted and took it, all but the Capitol, which hapned to them for nothing, but that the *Romans* (when their Embaſſadors had *contra jus gentium*, fought againſt the *French*) had been ſo far from doing them juſtice, that the ſaid Embaſſadors were advanced and preferred. For which reaſon, a Prince and Common-wealth is to take care that no ſuch injury be done, not only to a Nation, or Commonalty, but to any particular perſon; for if a man be highly offended either by a State, or private perſon, and has not the ſatisfaction he deſires, if it be in a Republick, he ceaſes not to purſue his revenge, though with the ruine of the State. If it be under a Monarchy, and he finds himſelf touched in point of honour, if he has the leaſt ſpark of generoſity in him, he will never be quiet till he be revenged, though with never ſo much prejudice to himſelf, of which caſe we cannot have an apter and truer example, than in *Philip* of *Macedon*, the Father of *Alexander* the great. *Philip* had in his Court a young Gentleman of very exquiſite beauty called *Pauſanias*, with whom *Attalus* (a great favourite of the ſaid *Philips*) was enamoured; having tempted and ſolicited him many times to ſatisfie his paſſion, and found him always averſe, he reſolved to do that by force or ſurprize, which he could not do otherwiſe: To this purpoſe he made a ſolemn feaſt, and invited *Pauſanias*, and ſeveral other great perſons: when they had filled themſelves well with their good cheer, he cauſed *Pauſanias* to be taken from the Table, and carried to a private place, and not only ſatisfied his own luſt, but cauſed him to be vitiated by ſeveral others. *Pauſanias* complained heavily to King *Philip*, who having kept him for ſome time in hopes of doing him juſtice, inſtead of performing, he advanced *Attalus* to the Government of a Province in *Greece*: Which *Pauſanias* reſenting; in great anger that his adverſary againſt whom he had ſo long, and ſo earneſtly ſolicited, ſhould now be preferred, he began to turn his indignation upon the King, who had refuſed to right him, rather than upon the perſon who had done him the wrong: Inſomuch that the very morning his Daughter was married to *Alexander* of *Epirus*, as *Philip* was going to the Temple to celebrate the Nuptiality with his Son *Alexander* on one hand of him, and his new Son in Law on the other, *Pauſanias* aſſaulted and ſlew him. This example is much like that of the *Romans*, and is to be obſerved by any man that governs; who is never to deſpiſe any body ſo as not to believe but he who is injured will revenge himſelf ſome time or other, though with never ſo much danger and detriment to himſelf.

CHAP. XXIX.

Fortune caſts a miſt before peoples eyes, when ſhe would not have them oppoſe her deſigns.

IF the courſe of humane affairs be conſidered, it will appear, that many accidents ariſe, againſt which the Heavens do not ſuffer us to provide: And when this hapned at *Rome*, where there was ſo much Virtue, and Piety, and Order, well may it happen more frequently in thoſe Cities and Provinces where there are no ſuch things to be found. And becauſe the place is remarkable, to ſhow the influence which the Heavens have upon humane affairs, *Titus Livius* has diſcourſed of it largely and efficaciouſly, telling us, That the Stars to make us ſenſible of their power, firſt diſpoſed the ſaid *Fabii* (who were ſent Embaſſadors to the *French*) to fight as aboveſaid, to the end that upon that occaſion, they might make War upon *Rome*. In the next place, they beſotted the *Romans* ſo, as they did nothing worthy of the name of *Romans* in order to their defence, having baniſhed *Camillus* (the only perſon capable of ſtanding them in ſtead) to *Ardea*. Again, when the *French* were upon their march towards *Rome*, thoſe who to repel the inroads of the *Volſci*, and other bordering Enemies, had made Dictators many times, and with very good ſucceſs, made none upon the approach of the *French*. They were ſo ſlow likewiſe, and ſo remiſs in the

the raiſing of Men, and ſo tedious in furniſhing them with Arms, that they could ſcarce draw out any conſiderable force againſt them, till the Enemy was as far as the River *Alia* which is within ten miles of *Rome*; and when their Army was come thither, it was not encamped by the Tribunes with the uſual diligence and diſcretion, they having neither choſen a good place, nor drawn their line, nor fortified themſelves with Trenches, nor Stoccadoes as formerly, nor done any thing for their ſecurity, either humane, or divine: When they came to fight, they drew up their men ſo awkwardly and untowardly, that neither Soldier nor Officer did any thing worthy of the Diſcipline of the *Romans*, ſo that the Battel was loſt without any effuſion of Blood, the *Romans* running at the very firſt charge, the greateſt part of them to *Veii*, the reſt to *Rome*, and in ſuch conſternation, that they fled directly to the Capitol before they went home to their houſes. So that the Senat without ſo much as thinking to defend their City, any more than the reſt, never-cauſed the Gates to be ſhut, but part of them fled away, and part into the Capitol. There, it is true they began to obſerve better orders than before, and managed things with leſs confuſion; They diſcharged all thoſe that were unſerviceable, and furniſhed themſelves with what proviſion they could get, that they might be able to hold out. The greateſt part of thoſe uſeleſs people which were turn'd out of the Capitol, as old Men, Women, and Children, fled into the Neighbouring Cities; the reſt continued in *Rome*, and were a prey to the *French*. So that if a man ſhould have read their Exploits in former times, and compared them with their actions then, he would not have believed them to be the ſame people; and *Titus Livius* gives the reaſon after he had deſcribed all the diſorders aforeſaid in theſe words, *Adeo obcæcat animos fortuna, cum vim ſuam ingruentem refringi non vult. So ſtrangely does fortune blind other people, when ſhe would not be obſtructed in her deſigns*; and there can be nothing more true. Wherefore men are not ſo much to be blamed or commended for their adverſity or proſperity; for it is frequently ſeen, ſome are hurried to ruine, and others advanced to great honour by the ſwing and impulſe of their fate, wiſdom availing little againſt the misfortunes of the one, and folly as little againſt the felicity of the other. When fortune deſigns any great matter, ſhe makes choice of ſome man of ſuch courage and parts, as is able to diſcern when ſhe preſents him with an occaſion: and ſo on the otherſide, when ſhe intends any great deſtruction, ſhe has her Inſtruments ready to puſh on the wheel, and aſſiſt to her deſigns; and if there be any man capable of obſtructing them in the leaſt, ſhe either rids him out of the way, or deprives him of all authority, and leaves him without any faculty to do good. And this is abundantly cleared by this place, where Fortune, to amplifie *Rome*, and bring it to that Grandeur to which it arrived afterwards; thought fit to debaſe it, (as we ſhall ſhow at large in the beginning of our third Book) but would not utterly deſtroy it: For which reaſon, though ſhe permitted *Camillus* to be baniſhed, ſhe would not ſuffer him to be killed; though ſhe let *Rome* be taken, ſhe preſerved the Capitol: Though ſhe intimidated the *Romans*, and would ſuffer them to do nothing wiſely for the ſafety of the City, yet ſhe left them ſo much wiſdom as ſecured the Capitol: That *Rome* might be taken, ſhe cauſed the greateſt part of the Army that was defeated upon the *Allia*, to retire to *Veii*, thereby cutting off all ways for the defence of *Rome*: But in the midſt of her Career, when ſhe ſeem'd in ſuch haſte, and ſo impatient of its deſtruction, ſhe prepared every thing that was neceſſary for its preſervation; having conveyed a good Army to *Veii*, and *Camillus* to *Ardea*, that once again they might make head under a General whoſe reputation was never ſully'd with the ignominy of ſuch a loſs, but ſtood clear and entire for the recovery of his Country: And here we might bring ſtore of modern examples to prove what is ſaid, were not this ſufficient without them. Yet this I ſhall aſſert again (and by the occurrences in all Hiſtory there is nothing more true) That men may ſecond their fortune, not reſiſt it; and follow the order of her deſigns, but by no means defeat them: Nevertheleſs men are not wholly to abandon themſelves, becauſe they know not her end; for her ways being unknown and irregular, may poſſibly be at laſt for our good; ſo that we are always to hope the beſt, and that hope is to preſerve us in whatever troubles or diſtreſſes we ſhall fall.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXX.

Princes and Republicks that are truly magnificent, do not make their Leagues and Alliances with Money, but by their virtue, reputation, and force.

THe *Romans* were beſieged in the Capitol, and though they were in expectation of relief from *Veii* and *Camillus*, yet Famine conſtraining them, they propoſed a parley with the *French*, and were to pay a certain Sum of Money for their liberty; The Articles were ſign'd, all things concluded, and Commiſſioners ſent in to receive the Money, when on a ſudden *Camillus* appears with his Army, as if fortune had done it (ſays *Livy*) *Ut Romani auro redempti non viverent. That it might not be ſaid the Romans had ever been ranſom'd:* Which point is not only obſervable in this place, but in the whole progreſs of the affairs of that Common-wealth, where it may be ſeen that they never got Town, nor never made Peace with their Money; whatever they did, was bravely, and with their Arms, which I think is more than can be ſaid of any other State in the world. One of the great marks of the puiſſance of this Common-wealth, was the manner of her living with her Neighbors. When things are ſo managed in a Government, that the Neighbors purchaſe its amity, and make themſelves its Penſioners; 'tis a certain ſign of the potency of that Government: But when the Neighbors on the contrary receive Money from it, 'tis as infallible a ſign of its weakneſs. If one reads the *Roman* Hiſtory, he ſhall find the *Maſſilians*, the *Edui*, the *Rhodians*, *Hiero* of *Siracuſe*, and *Maſſiniſſa*, as they were Neighbors, ſo they were Tributaries to the *Romans*, contributing to their expences, and Taxes as there was occaſion, without expectation of any other recompence, but protection. Where a Prince or Common-wealth is weak, it is otherwiſe, as it appeared by our own City of *Florence*, which in former times when it was in its greateſt reputation, paid annual ſtipends to moſt of the little Governments in *Romania*, beſides what was received by the *Perugians*, *Caſtellans*, and all their other Neighbors; whereas had it been ſtrong, and well Armed, it would have been quite otherwiſe, and all the reſt would have given *Florence* Money for her protection. Nor were the *Florentines* ſingular in this caſe, the *Venetians* did the ſame, and ſo did the King of *France*, who notwithſtanding the greatneſs of his Kingdom, was tributary to the *Swizzers*, and the King of *England*, which proceeded from his having diſarmed the people, and preferring a preſent opportunity of ſqueezing them, and avoiding an imaginary danger, before the doing thoſe things that might have ſecured his State, and made it happy for ever; which practice though for ſome time it may produce quiet and repoſe, yet the end is troubles, and loſſes, and ruine without remedy.

It would be too tedious to recount how often the *Florentines*, the *Venetians*, and the Kingdom of *France* have bought off their Wars, and ſubmitted to ſuch diſhonorable terms, as the *Romans* could never be brought to but once. It would be too tedious to recount how many Towns the *Florentines*, and the *Venetians* have bought with their Money, which have been the occaſion of great diſorders afterwards, and prov'd that what is gotten by gold, is not to be kept with iron.

This point of generoſity, and this manner of living the *Romans* obſerved very punctually whilſt they were free; but after they fell under the Government of Emperors, and thoſe Emperors grew bad, they began to degenerate too, and prefer the ſhadow before the Sun. They began to be Penſionaries firſt to the *Parthians*, then to the *Germans*, and by degrees to all their Neighbors, which was the firſt ſtep to the ruine of that great Empire; and all theſe inconveniences proceeded from the diſarming of the people, and neglecting to train them up to Military Diſcipline, from whence a greater miſchief does ariſe; and that is, That the nearer the Enemy approaches, the weaker, and more unable he finds you; and therefore not being ſtrong enough of your ſelf to repel the Enemy from your borders, you are forced to pay tribute to your Neighbors to undertake it for you; which being to be raiſed and extorted from your Subjects, renders them more feeble and impotent. By which means it happens ſometimes that thoſe States which are in this condition, may perhaps make ſome little reſiſtance upon the Frontiers, but if the Enemy paſſes that, all is gone without remedy. But all this is diſorderly, and unnatural; for as nature in all animals has fortified the vital and principal, and not extream parts of the body, becauſe the body can ſubſiſt without the one, but not without the other. So 'tis in all Governments, the heart and center is to be fortified, rather than the Frontiers: But this was very ill obſerved by the *Florentines*, for whenever an Enemy had paſt our borders, and took his way towards the City, there was no body in a condition to oppoſe him. It was the ſame with

with the *Venetians* not many years ſince, and had not their City been as it were ſwadled with the Sea, it had been certainly deſtroyed. This indeed has not been ſeen ſo frequently in *France*, becauſe it is ſo great a Kingdom, and too ſtrong for moſt of its neighbours; nevertheleſs when in the year 1513 they were invaded by the *Engliſh*, the whole Kingdom trembled, and the King of *France* himſelf, and many others were of opinion, that if he loſt one Battel, the whole Kingdom was gone. With the *Romans* it was quite contrary; the nearer the enemy approached the City, the ſtronger he found it: this was evident in *Hanibal*'s invaſion, though he had forc'd his way into *Italy*, fought three great Battels with the Romans, and beat them in every one, though they had loſt ſo many brave Souldiers and Officers, yet they were not only able to continue the War, but to conquer them atlaſt, & all by fortifying the heart & center of their Country, and leaving the extremities to ſhift for themſelves: for the vitals and fundamentals of their State was the People of *Rome*, the Country of the *Latini*, the neighbouring Cities that were in League, and their Colonies from whence they drew ſo many Souldiers as were able to fight, and entertain the whole World. And this *Hanno* the *Carthaginian* underſtood very well: for when after the Battel at *Cannas* *Hannibal* ſent *Mago* to *Carthage* to give them an account of the particulars of the Victory, *Mago* having exceedingly magnified the exploits of his Brother, and debaſed the Condition of the *Romans*, *Hanno* interrupted him, and enquir'd whether any of the *Roman* Cities, or any of their Confederates had revolted? whether any of their Senators were come in to *Hanibal*? or whether they had ſent any Embaſſadors to him to treat? and when *Mago* denied that any thing of all this had paſſed, *Hanno* replyed, *Hoſtium ergo multum ſupereſt, & bellum tam integrum habemus, atq; habuimus qua die* Annibal Italiam *eſt ingreſſus*: *There is work enough behind, and the War is as entire as when* Hanibal *paſſed firſt into* Italy. It is apparent therefore, both by what is ſaid in this Chapter, and what has been ſaid often before, that there is great difference betwixt the preſent and ancient methods of the *Romans*; and if we ſeriouſly conſider it, we ſhall not wonder that ſo many Towns are taken and loſt, and ſo many Governments ſubverted, as we have ſeen in our days: for where diſcipline is neglected, and military virtue laid aſide, all things are committed wholly to Fortune, which being various and unconſtant, produces various mutations; and this viciſſitude and unconſtancy of affairs will continue till ſome excellent perſon ariſes to reſtore the ancient diſcipline, and reſtrain fortune from giving ſuch evidences of her power every hour of the day.

CHAP. XXXI.

How dangerous it is to believe Exiles too far.

I Think it not amiſs in this place to ſhew how much it imports all perſons not to give too much credit to thoſe who are baniſhed, for many times they are but the practices and ſtratagems of Princes and States. We have a memorable example of their inconſtancy in *Livy*, though ſomething improper. When *Alexander* the Great paſſed into *Aſia* with his Army, *Alexander* of *Epirus* his Kinſman and Unckle paſſed with another into *Italy*, invited by the Exiles of *Lucca*, who put him in hopes that by their means he ſhould be Maſter of that whole Province: but when he was come into *Italy*, inſtead of aſſiſting him, they conſpir'd againſt him, and ſlew him, upon promiſe of indempnity, and reſtitution of their Eſtates. From whence we may learn what faith is to be given to ſuch as are baniſhed out of their own Country: for as to their engagements, they are nothing; it is not to be doubted but when ever they can return by any other means, they will leave you, and betake themſelves to any body elſe, notwithſtanding any promiſe or engagement to you; and that which makes their promiſes and confidence the leſs to be truſted, is, becauſe their extreme paſſion and deſire to come home, make them believe many things that are impoſſible, and pretend many things that they do not believe: ſo that betwixt what they believe, and what they pretend, they feed you with fair hopes, but if you depend upon them, you are undone, your expence is all loſt, and your whole enterprize miſcarries; I ſhall only give you an inſtance in the aforeſaid *Alexander*, and *Themiſtocles* the *Athenian*; *Themiſtocles* being in rebellion againſt the *Athenians*, fled into *Aſia* to *Darius*, whom he ſolicited with large promiſes to an expedition into *Greece*. *Darius* was perſwaded, and paſſed into *Greece*, but *Themiſtocles* being unable to make his promiſes good, either for ſhame of what he had done, or fear of puniſhment for what he had not, he poiſoned himſelf; and if *Themiſtocles* a man of that Excellence and Virtue could delude the King, and promiſe more than he could

perform, how little are they to be truſted, who having no ſuch thing to reſtrain them, give themſelves up wholly to their paſſion and deſires? Princes therefore and States ought to be very tender of undertaking any enterprize upon the encouragement of an Exile, for they ſeldom ſucceed. And becauſe it ſeldom happens that Towns are taken by intelligence within, I ſhall diſcourſe of it in my next Chapter, and add what variety of ways the *Romans* uſed to come by their Conqueſts.

CHAP. XXXII.

How many ſeveral ways the Romans uſed to Conquer their Towns.

THe *Romans* being a martial people, and given wholly to war, they conſidered every thing very diligently that might any ways conduce to the facilitating their deſigns; whether it was matter of charge, or any thing elſe: for this reaſon they ſeldom attempted any Town by the way of ſiege, becauſe they thought the expence and incommodity of that way would be more than could be recompenced by the taking it; ſo as they never tried that whilſt there was any other hopes; and in all their great Wars, there are but very few examples of any long Leaguers by them. The ways which they took were commonly either by ſtorm, or ſurrender: when they took a Town by ſtorm, it was either by open force, or ſtratagem. Open force was when they made their attaque without battering the walls, which they called *Aggredi urbem cum Corona*; *To begirt a Town*, becauſe they drew their whole Army round the Town, and fell on in all quarters, and in this manner it happened ſometimes that they carried very conſiderable places at one Storm, as when *Scipio* took new *Carthage* in *Spain*. If this way was ineffectual, they battered down the walls with their Rams, and other engines of War. Sometimes they min'd, and entred the Towns under ground, as they did at *Veii*; ſometimes that they might fight with the enemy upon equal terms, they built wooden Towers, or raiſed Mounts to the height of the walls from whence they might plague and moleſt them within their Works. The beſieged were in moſt danger in the firſt caſe upon a general aſſault, for their walls were to be made good in all places at once, and it fell out many times, that there were not men enough to ſupply and relieve all parts; or if they had men enough to do that, they were not all of an equal courage, and when any gave ground, the whole Town was like to be loſt, and by this means that way was often ſucceſful. When this way miſcarried, they ſeldom ſate down before a Town, or went formally to beleaguer it, becauſe it could not be done but with greater hazard to their Army, for their quarters being to be extended, and their guards round about the Town, they muſt of neceſſity be thinner and weaker in ſome places, and unable to make any conſiderable oppoſition, if the enemy ſhould make any conſiderable eruption, ſo that the ſudden and briſk way was preferr'd: when their walls were battered with their Engines, thoſe who were in the Town defended themſelves much as we do now againſt great Guns, by repairing their breaches as well as they could. Their way of defeating their mines was by countermining, and oppoſing themſelves perſonally againſt the enemy, or diſturbing them with their inventions, as particularly, putting of feathers, and oils, and other ſtinking ſtuff into barrels of wood, they ſet them on fire, and then tumbled them among the enemy, that what with the fire, the ſmoak, and the ſtench, they might not be able to endure them: their Towers of wood, they deſtroyed commonly by throwing fire into them; and then for the mounts which were raiſed againſt the walls, their way was to dig under the walls, & ſteal away their earth, or by looſening the foundations of the mount, till it all fell to the ground. But theſe ways of taking a Town are not long to be tried; if they carrried it not quickly, they raiſed their ſiege, and ſought out ſome other way of proſecuting the War, as *Scipio* did when he went over into *Africk*, for having aſſaulted *Utica*, without any ſucceſs, he altred his Counſels, raiſed his Siege, and addreſſed himſelf wholly to the bringing the *Carthaginian* Army to an engagement; yet ſometimes they continued their Siege, as they did at *Veii*, *Carthage*, and *Jeruſalem*: as to their way of taking of Towns by fraud and intelligence, (as they took *Palæopolis*) the *Romans* and others attempted many places after that manner, but they ſeldom ſucceeded; for thoſe ſecret correſpondencies are eaſily diſcovered, and the leaſt diſcovery ſpoils the whole deſign, becauſe the conſpiracy is commonly diſcovered before it comes to execution, it either being unpracticable in it ſelf, or betrayed by the infidelity of ſome of the Conſpirators, there being a neceſſity of meeting and diſcourſing with ſuch perſons, as it is not lawful to diſcourſe with but upon

upon ſome ſpecious occaſion. But ſuppoſe it be not diſcovered in the management, there are ſo many difficulties in putting it into action, that it is almoſt impoſſible to overcome them; for if you come too ſoon, or too late, all is ſpoiled: if any noiſe be made, (as by the geeſe in the Capitol) the leaſt diſorder, the leaſt error or miſtake deſtroys the whole enterprize. Beſides, theſe things being executed in the night, the darkneſs ſtrikes a terror into the inſtruments, and the more, becauſe they are commonly unacquainted with the place or people which they are to attaque, and therefore every little noiſe or accident is ſufficient to confound them, and every trifling imagination will make them turn their backs; but no body was ſo daring and ſucceſful in theſe fraudulent and nocturnal deſigns as *Aratus Sicionius*, though in the day-time he was but like other men, which was rather from ſome ſecret virtue in him, than any excellence in the way. And as to the taking of Towns by ſurrender, they either ſurrender freely, or by force. When they do it freely, it is done out of ſome extrinſick neceſſity, (as when *Capua* ſurrendred to the *Romans*, for fear of falling into the hands of the *Samnites*) or elſe out of deſire to be well governed, as being taken with the adminiſtration of that Prince to whom they ſurrender; and thus it was with the *Rhodians*, the *Maſſilians*, and other Cities which gave themſelves up to the *Romans* upon no other inducement, but that they might live more happily under the *Roman* Laws, and be under a better Conſtitution. But there are many Cities which ſurrender by force, which force proceeds either from the fatigues and calamities of a tedious Siege, or from continual excurſions and depredations to which they are ſubject; and againſt which they have no other way to ſecure themſelves. And then all the ways we have mentioned, the *Romans* made more uſe of this, carrying on their wars with their neighbours 450 years together, in this manner for the moſt part; for though they tried all the other, they found this the more profitable and ſafe. In Sieges there is delay and loſs of time, in ſtorms, hazard and danger; and uncertainty in conſpiracies: but in bringing things to a Battel, it has been ſeen that by beating the enemies Army, they have got a whole Kingdom in a day, whereas an obſtinate Town has coſt them ſeveral years.

CHAP. XXXIII.

How the Romans *upon any Expedition, gave their Generals general Commiſſions.*

I Am of opinion, that to read the Hiſtory of *Livy*, with any profit and advantage we muſt conſider not only the actions, but the whole means and proceſs both of the People and Senate of *Rome*. Among other things, it is very remarkable with what authority they inveſted their Conſuls, Dictators and Generals of their Armies, and it was ſo great, that the Senate reſerved to it ſelf only the power of making Peace, or new Wars as they ſaw occaſion; all the reſt was left to the diſcretion of the Conſul, who might fight, or not fight, aſſault this Town or that Town as he pleaſed, without any contradiction.

This may be proved by many examples, but more eſpecially by what hapned in an Expedition againſt the *Tuſcans*; for *Fabius* the Conſul having defeated the enemy at *Sutri*, reſolving to paſs the Forreſt of *Gimina* with his Army, and invade *Tuſcany*, he was ſo far from receiving Orders from the Senate, or conſulting them in the buſineſs, that he gave them not the leaſt notice, though the War was to be removed into another Country, and like to be very dangerous; which appeared by the reſolution of the Senate in that very caſe; for having heard of his Victory at *Sutri*, and apprehending that he might fall upon ſuch counſels, and paſs his Army into *Tuſcany*, thorow that dangerous Forreſt, they ſent two Embaſſadors to him to adviſe him from that Expedition; but they came too late, for he was gone before, and having over-run the whole Country, and routed the enemy, inſtead of hindering his deſign, the Embaſſadors went back with the news of his Victory. This cuſtom of the *Romans*, if it be ſeriouſly conſidered, will be found to be very ſolid and wiſe. For ſhould the Senate have been conſulted by their Generals upon every particular occaſion, and have expected all their Orders from them, it would have made their Generals leſs circumſpect, and vigorous, becauſe the honour of the Victory would not accrew totally to them, but they muſt participate with the Senate. Beſides, the Senate underſtood very well that Fortune is various, and that many accidents and advantages happen which

cannot be known or improved by any but thoſe who are preſent; ſo that if they ſhould deſire to be conſulted in things of which they can have no knowledg, they muſt of neceſſity err, though they were perſons of never ſo much experience and wiſdom. Wherefore they gave their General abſolute power of diſpoſing all things at his own will, and the whole honour of the Expedition was to be his, that it might be a ſpur to prick on his diligence, and a bridle to regulate his raſhneſs. And this I have thought fit to inſert, that I might ſhew how much the famous Common-wealths in our times do differ from the *Romans*, particularly the *Venetians* and *Florentines*, who are ſo ſtrict with their General, that if a great Gun be but to be planted againſt a Town, the Senate muſt be adviſed, and give order how, and from whence it is to play. But this cuſtom deſerves commendation as much as the reſt, which all together, have brought their affairs into that ſad condition in which they are at preſent.

THE

THE DISCOURSES OF Nicholas Machiavel, CITIZEN and SECRETARY OF FLORENCE, Upon the First Decade of TITUS LIVIUS.

LIBER III.

CHAP. I.

That a Sect or Common-wealth be long-liv'd, it is neceſſary to correct it often, and reduce it towards its firſt Principles.

'TIS a certain truth, that the things of this World are determined, and a ſet time appointed for their duration; but thoſe run thorow the whole courſe which is aſſigned them by their Stars, who keep their body in ſuch order, that it may not alter at all, or if it does, it is for the better. I ſpeak now of mixt bodies, as Common-wealths, and Sects, and I ſay that thoſe alterations are ſalutiferous, which reduce them towards their firſt principles; and therefore the beſt ordered, and longeſt liv'd are they who (by their own orders) may be often renewed, or elſe by ſome accident (without the help of the ſaid orders) may tend to renovation: 'tis as clear as the day, that no bodies of men are of long duration, unleſs they be renewed; and the way to renew them (as is ſaid before) is to reduce them to their principles. For the Fundamentals of all Sects, Common-wealths and Kingdoms have always ſomething of good in them, by means of which they recover their firſt reputation and grandeur. And becauſe in proceſs of time that goodneſs corrupts, that body muſt of neceſſity die, unleſs ſomething intervenes that reduces it to its firſt principles. The Phyſitian ſpeaking of the body of man, tell us, *Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid, quod quandoq; indiget curatione; That there is not a day paſſes, but it contracts ſomething which afterwards will require to be cured.* 'Tis the ſame with the Body Politick; and as to them, I ſay that they are to be cured, by being renewed; and they are renewed partly by external accident, and partly by internal prudence. The firſt happens as it were by deſtiny or fate, as that *Rome* ſhould be taken by the *French*, that thereby it might reaſſume its old cuſtoms and virtues, and revive its ancient Worſhip, Religion

ligion and Juſtice, which were ſuperannuated and decayed, as appears very plain by the deſcription of their preparation againſt the *French*, in which it is declared by *Titus Livius*, that upon the marching out of their Army, and inveſting their Tribunes with Conſular power, they obſerved no religious ceremony: at the ſame time they not only refuſed to correct the three *Fabii*, who *contra jus gentium* had fought againſt the *French*, but created them Tribunes. And it is eaſily to be preſum'd that they made leſs account of the good Laws and Conſtitutions ordained by *Romulus* and other wiſe Princes, than was reaſonable and (perhaps) neceſſary to preſerve the liberty of their State. This foreign invaſion hapned to them therefore, that all the obſolete Laws of that City might be revived, and that the people might be taught that it was neceſſary not only to maintain Religion and Juſtice, but to reſpect their good Citizens, and eſteem their virtue above the advantages which they ſeemed to want, for want of their aſſiſtance. And it fell out exactly, for *Rome* was no ſooner taken, but they began to renew the Orders of their old Religion: they puniſhed the *Fabii* who had fought againſt the Law of Nations, and conceived ſo great a value for *Camillus*, that the Senate and People both laid aſide their old animoſity, and plac'd the whole burden of the Common-wealth upon his ſingle ſhoulders. 'Tis neceſſary therefore (as was ſaid before) that men which live together under a Government, be often reminded by theſe exterior or interior accidents. The interior way is when there is a Law which takes an account of all people in that Corporation; or elſe when there is ſome excellent perſon among them who by his virtuous example does the ſame thing, ſo that this happineſs reſults to a Common-wealth either by the virtue of ſome great perſon, or the authority of ſome Law. And as to this laſt, the Orders which redue'd the Common-wealth towards its firſt principles, were the Tribunes of the people, the Cenſors and all the other Laws againſt the ambition and inſolence of man; which Laws have need to be revived and quickned by the virtue of ſome Citizen, who with great courage and generoſity ſhall put them in execution in deſpight of all the power of the delinquents. The moſt remarkable executions before the taking of *Rome* by the *French*, were the death of *Brutus* his Sons, the puniſhment of the *Decem-viri*, the execution of *Sp. Melius:* after the City was ſack'd by the *French*, the moſt conſiderable were the death of *Manlius Capitolinus*, the death of the Son of *Manlius Torquatus*, the proſecution of *Papirius Curſor* againſt *Fabius* the Maſter of his Horſe, and the accuſation againſt *Scipio*; which things being extraordinary, were the more remarkable, and when ever any of them hapned, they reminded the people of their beginning, and that they were to live according to Law. But when theſe examples began to be more rare, men took occaſion to grow worſe, and their exorbitancies were with more danger and tumult; for if in ten years ſpace no examples be made, nor no execution done, people begin to forget and deſpiſe the Laws, and unleſs ſomething happens that may remember them of the puniſhments, and infuſe ſomething of fear into them, the Delinquents will grow ſo numerous that it will be dangerous to puniſh them. To this purpoſe they who governed the State of *Florence* from the year 1434 to the year 1494 were wont to ſay, that it was neceſſary every five years to review the State; for otherwiſe it would be very hard to maintain it: They call'd *reviewing the State*, reducing the people to the ſame terror and awe, as they had upon them of old, when every man was puniſhed according to his crime, let his quality be what it would. But when the memory of theſe puniſhments are loſt, and ſuffered to go to decay, men take the confidence to attempt any thing, and ſpeak ill of whom they pleaſe, againſt which no remedy is ſo proper as reducing them towards their firſt principles, which is to be done by the example of ſome excellent perſon, inciting you to ſuch executions, without dependance upon any Law; and they are many times of ſo great reputation, that good men deſire to imitate them, and bad men are aſhamed to live contrary to them. Thoſe who in *Rome* liv'd after this manner were *Horatius Cocles*, *Scævola*, *Fabritius*, the two *Decii*, *Regulus Attilius* and ſome others, whoſe rare and virtuous examples had the ſame effect in *Rome*, that good Laws, and good Cuſtoms would have had; and if every ten years ſome of thoſe examples or executions aforeſaid had hapned in that City, the minds and manners of the people could never have been ſo corrupted, but as thoſe virtuous examples, and heroick puniſhments grew ſeldom, and ſcarce, ſo corruption began to multiply, for after *Regulus* his time, there was not any ſuch example to be ſeen; and though the two *Cato*'s ſucceeded, yet there was ſuch great diſtance betwixt them, that their examples could do but little good, eſpecially the laſt of the *Cato*'s, who finding the greateſt part of the City debauched, could not work any conſiderable reformation upon them. And ſo much for Civil Governments; as to the conſervation of Sects, the ſame renovation is neceſſary, as may appear by the example of the *Roman Religion*, which would doubtleſs have been loſt before this, had it not been reduced towards its firſt principle by St. *Francis* and St. *Dominick*, who by their poverty,

and

and Chriſtian-like examples revived it in the minds of men, where it was almoſt effaced; and prevailed that the looſneſs and depravity of the Prelates and Cardinals did not ruine it; for men ſeeing them live in that indigence and poverty; by confeſſing their ſins to them, and hearing them preach, they began to learn meekneſs, and charity, and obedience; not to upbraid people by their vices, but to leave them to God, whereas their lives muſt neceſſarily be bad, who neither ſee nor feel what puniſhment is. So then it is this renovation and reduction to its firſt principles, that has, and does ſtill maintain our Religion. And as to Kingdoms, they as well as Common-wealths have occaſion to reform, and reduce as the other; which courſe has been of no ſmall advantage to the Kingdom of *France*; for that Kingdom living under Laws and Cuſtoms more than any other, the ſaid Laws and Cuſtoms are preſerved and executed by Parliaments, and eſpecially by that of *Paris*, which revives them every time it makes out proceſs againſt any great Perſon, or oppoſes the King in its arreſts: and hitherto it has preſerv'd it ſelf by its ſeverity againſt Delinquents, without regard to the greatneſs of their quality, whereas ſhould they paſs unpuniſhed, they would multiply ſo faſt, that they would become incorrigible in a ſhort time, and not to be reform'd but with the diſorder, if not the diſſolution of the whole Government. We may conclude therefore, that there is no ſafer way of preſerving a Common-wealth, Kingdom or Sect, than by reforming and reducing them to their primitive reputation, which is to be done rather by good Laws, and examples at home, than foreign force; for though that way be effectual ſometimes, (as it was in *Rome*) yet it is ſo uncertain and dangerous, it is not to be deſired. And to demonſtrate how much particular examples have conduced to the grandeur of *Rome*, and what great effect they have wrought, I ſhall make them the ſubject of my diſcourſe in this third Book; and although among them ſome great examples might be produced, which have been exhibited by Kings, yet Hiſtory having ſpoken of them ſo largely, I ſhall paſs them by without ſpeaking any thing of them but what belongs to their own private advantage. And begin with *Brutus* the Father of the liberty of the *Romans*.

CHAP. II.

'Tis the part of a wiſe man ſometimes to pretend himſelf a fool.

NO man was ever ſo commendable for his wiſdom and prudence, as *Junius Brutus* for counterfeiting the fool. For though *Livy* gives us but one reaſon why he did ſo, and that is, that under that contempt he might live quietly, and enjoy his patrimony in peace; yet it is probable by his ways of proceeding, that he did it, that thereby he might be leſs under the obſervation of the Kings, and have fairer advantage of expelling them, and delivering his Country, when occaſion ſhould be offered. And that this was in his thoughts, may be preſumed from his interpretation of the Oracle of *Apollo*, to which when the *Tarquins* repair'd to underſtand which of them ſhould ſucceed in the Government, it being anſwered that the Government ſhould come to him who firſt kiſſed his Mother, the *Tarquins* thought it not to be accompliſhed till they came to *Rome*; but *Brutus* pretending to ſlip, fell down upon the ground, and kiſſed it, as the common Mother of us all. And afterwards upon the death of *Lucretia* in the preſence of her Father, and Husband, and Kindred, he was the firſt that drew the dagger out of the wound, and conjured all the ſtanders by, that for the future they ſhould never ſuffer a King in *Rome*. This example may be followed by thoſe who are diſguſted with their Prince, but ſo as firſt to conſider their own power exactly, and if they find it ſufficient, they may profeſs themſelves publickly, and declare open War, and it is the moſt ſafe, and moſt honourable way: but if their force be but ſmall, and they find themſelves that way too weak, they are with all induſtry to endeavour to inſinuate with the Tyrant, ſerving him in his pleaſures, applauding him in all his actions and words, and imitating him in every thing he does. By this means you ſhall be ſecure from danger, enjoy all the pleaſures and delights of the Court, and be ready for any occaſion of effecting your deſigns. Others are of opinion that you keep ſuch a diſtance with the Prince, as that you be neither ſo near him as to be covered with his ruines, nor ſo remote, but that you may take the advantage of his deſtruction to advance your ſelf; and this middle way was certainly the beſt, if it were eaſy to be kept, but becauſe I think it impoſſible, it is neceſſary to take to one of the other two, and either to remove your ſelf quite, or get in as near him as you can; he who does otherwiſe, is in a great deal of danger, eſpecially if he be a man of any Eminence and Eſtate: for it is not

enough

enough to ſay, I expect nothing, I deſire neither honour nor preferment, I had rather live at eaſe, without any controverſy or trouble, for thoſe ſayings are oftner heard than believed: nor can great men, if they did really deſire it, continue in that condition, becauſe no body believes them, and no body will ſuffer them. A man is therefore rather to play the fool like *Brutus*, and he does it abundantly that flatters and applauds every thing his Prince ſees, or ſpeaks, or does, how contrary ſoever it be to his own judgment and mind. And as *Brutus* was wiſe in pretending that folly, till occaſion was offered for the deliverance of his Country, ſo he was a ſevere aſſertor of its liberty, when obtained, of which ſeverity we ſhall ſpeak in the next Chapter.

CHAP. III.

The liberty newly acquired, could not have been preſerved, but by the execution of Brutus his Sons.

THe ſeverity of *Brutus* in maintaining that liberty which he had procur'd in *Rome*, was no leſs neceſſary than profitable. 'Tis an example well worthy to be tranſmitted to poſterity, to ſee a Father ſitting in judgment upon his Sons, and not only ſentence them to death, but be preſent, and a ſpectator of their execution. But ſo it is decreed, and it will be found ſo by all that are converſant in Antiquity, that upon any alteration of Government, (whether from better to worſe, or worſe to better, it is the ſame thing) it is neceſſary ſevere example ſhould be made of ſomebody that oppoſed it, if you deſire the new form ſhould be preſerved. In ſhort, this I affirm, that whoever ſets up a Tyranny, cannot hope to maintain it, but by cutting off *Brutus*, and whoever ſets up a free State, is as unlike to continue it, but by taking off *Brutus* his Sons; and of this we have diſcourſed ſo largely before, there is no need of enlarging here, I ſhall add only one example which hapned in our Country and times. *Piero Soderini* having reſtored the liberty of *Florence*, believed that by his patience and moderation he could have mollified their minds, who like the Sons of *Brutus* were impatient of reviving the old tyranny again. But he was highly miſtaken, and ſo much the more to blame, by how much he was a wiſe man, and knew well enough that there was a neceſſity of removing ſuch perſons as by their ambition oppoſed themſelves againſt him; yet though there was a neceſſity to do it, & he had ſo fair an occaſion, he let it paſs, & never made uſe of it: for beſides that, he believed his patience & good nature would have wrought upon ſome, and his munificence and bounty upon others (as he often declared among his friends) he had an opinion, that to make a ſtout & vigorous oppoſition againſt his enemies, it would be neceſſary for him to take upon him an extraordinary authority, which would not only be a breach of the Laws, but of the civil equality of the City: and if he ſhould aſſume ſuch a power, and perhaps exerciſe it well himſelf, yet the people would be ſo terrified thereby, that after his death they would never agree to the making their *Gonfalonieré* for life, which office he thought fit to have augmented and maintained: this conſideration, though wiſe and good in it ſelf, was not prudent at that time, becauſe we are never to entertain a preſent miſchief in hopes of a future good, eſpecially when, for ought we know, that good may be oppreſt by that miſchief: he ought rather to have had a care that the end of his intentions might have appeared for the good and benefit of his Country, and not out of any particular ambition; and to have provided that whoever ſucceeded him afterwards in his dignity, ſhould not be able to employ that authority to the ruine of the State, which he was forc'd to take upon him to preſerve it. But the good man was miſtaken in his firſt opinion, as not underſtanding that the malice of mankind is not to be extinguiſhed with time, nor appeaſed with preſents; for could he have imitated the ſeverity of *Brutus*, he had preſerved his own dignity, and the liberty of the State. But as it is a difficult thing to preſerve the liberty of a State, ſo it is no leſs difficult to preſerve the authority of a King, as ſhall be ſhewn in the next Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

A Prince is never safe in his new Conquests, whilst they are in being whom he dispossessed.

THe death of *Tarquinius Priscus* by the sons of *Ancus*, and the death of *Servius Tullus* by *Tarquinius Superbus* shews how dangerous it is to dispossess any man of a Kingdom, and suffer him to live, though you endeavour by all means possible to caress him. *Tarquinius Priscus* thought his Title unquestionable, being made King by the People, and confirmed by the Senate; nor could it enter into his thoughts that the malice and indignation of the Sons of *Ancus* should be so great, as to keep them from submitting to that, wherewith the whole City of *Rome* was contented. *Servius Tullus* was mistaken in the same manner, in thinking with new favours and obligations to have pacified the Sons of *Tarquin*. So that from the first example, a Prince may take warning, and not delude himself with an opinion he is safe, whilst any of them are living whom he dispossessed; and from the second he may inform himself that old injuries are never cancelled by new favours, especially if the favours be not equivalent to the injury. And without doubt *Servius Tullus* was ill advised to believe that the Sons of *Tarquin* would be content to be his Sons-in-Law, when it was their due to be his King. And this ambition, and impatience to govern, is so great and insatiable in mankind, that it not only affects those persons who have some right and expectation to govern, but those likewise who in reason can have no such expectancy, as in the example of *Tullia* the Daughter of *Servius*, but married to one of the *Tarquins*: which *Tullia* was so enflamed with a desire of governing, that not contented with being a King's Daughter, transported with rage, contrary to all filial duty and affection, she incited her Husband against her Father, and forc'd him into a conspiracy, not only against his Kingdom, but Life. Whereas if *Tarquinius Priscus* and *Servius Tullius* had known how to have secured themselves against those they had supplanted, they had neither lost their Kingdoms nor Lives. But *Tarquinius Superbus* was expell'd for not observing the Laws and Practices of the ancient Kings his Predecessors, as shall appear in the next Chapter.

CHAP. V.

How a King may lose his Kingdom, though he comes to it by inheritance.

TArquinius Superbus seemed to have secure possession of the Kingdom upon the death of *Servius Tullius*, who dying without heirs, left him nothing of that trouble and vexation which his Predecessors encountred. For although the way by which he came to the Government was irregular and abominable; nevertheless had he followed the steps of his Predecessors, and observed their old rules, he would not have run himself so fatally into the displeasure of the Senate and People, nor have provoked them to have been so diligent in his expulsion. Nor is it to be believed that his Son *Sextus* his deflowring of *Lucretia* was the chief cause that he lost his Kingdom, but his infraction of the Laws, his tyranny, his usurpation upon the Senate, and his ingrossing all authority to himself: for he had brought things to that pass, that those affairs which were formerly debated publickly by the Senate, and according to their sentiment and order were put in execution, were now transacted and determined privately in his own Palace, with great dissatisfaction and offence; so that in a short time *Rome* was deprived of the liberty which it enjoyed under other Kings: nor was it enough for him to disoblige the Senate, but he run himself into the odium of the people, harrassing them out by mechanick and servile employments to which they had never been used in the days of his Predecessors; by which cruel and insolent actions he had so incensed and enflamed the minds of the *Romans* against him, that they were ready for rebellion the first opportunity that offered it self; and if that accident had not hapned to *Lucretia* as soon as any other had fallen out, it would have had the same effect. And if *Tarquin* had governed, and lived according to the example of his Ancestors, and his son *Sextus* had committed that error, *Brutus* and *Collatinus* would have addressed themselves to *Tarquin* (and not to the people of *Rome*) for justice against his son. Let Princes therefore observe that they begin to ruine their own dignity and power, when

they firſt go about to tranſgreſs and violate the old Laws and Cuſtoms of their Anceſtors: and if after they are removed, and diſpoſſeſſed of their authority, they ſhould grow ſo wiſe as to underſtand the felicity of governing a Kingdom with good Counſel, their loſs would be more inſupportable, and they would condemn themſelves to a greater puniſhment than any body elſe would condemn them; for 'tis eaſier to be beloved by good people, than bad, and to obey Laws, than to command them; and to underſtand the way by which this is to be done, they have no more to do, but to obſerve the lives of good Princes, as *Timoleon* the *Corinthian*, *Aratus Sicionius* and others, in which they will find ſo much eaſe and ſecurity to him that governs, and them that are governed, that they will be tempted to imitate them, if for nothing but the eaſineſs of it. For when men are governed well, they deſire no other liberty; as it hapned to the people who were governed by the two perſons above named, whom they compelled to continue their Princes whilſt they lived, though they endeavoured ſeveral times to have laid down, and betaken themſelves to a private condition. And becauſe in this and the two precedent Chapters we have diſcourſed of the hatred contracted againſt Princes, and the conſpiracy of the ſons of *Brutus* againſt the State, and others againſt *Tarquinius Priſcus*, and *Servius Tullus*, I think it not amiſs to ſpeak of conſpiracies more largely in my next Chapter, as being a ſubject well worth the obſervation both of Princes and private perſons.

CHAP. VI.

Of Conſpiracies.

I Did not think it inconvenient in this place to diſcourſe ſomething of Conſpiracies, ſeeing they are things of ſuch conſequence and danger both to Princes and private Perſons; for by them more Princes have loſt their States and their lives, than by open War, and the reaſon is, becauſe few perſons are qualified to make War, but every body can conſpire. On the other ſide, for a private perſon, no enterprize is more dangerous and raſh; for let him manage it as wiſely as he can, it is full of difficulty, and uncertainty of ſucceſs; and from hence it is that among ſo many Conſpiracies there are ſo few which arrive at the end that was deſigned. To the end therefore that Princes may learn how to defend themſelves; and private perſons might be more cautious of engaging themſelves in them, but may rather be contented to live quietly under the Government where they are placed, I ſhall enlarge upon the ſubject, and leave nothing behind that is conſiderable for the document either of the one or the other. It is a certain truth, and well ſaid of *Cornelius Tacitus*, that men are to pay an honour and reſpect to things paſt, and obedience to things preſent: that they ought to deſire good Princes, but when they are once in authority, they are to be endur'd, and thoſe who go about to conſpire againſt them, do moſt commonly ruine themſelves or their Country.

To come therefore to the point, we are firſt to conſider againſt whom theſe Conſpiracies are made, and we ſhall find them either againſt their Country, or Prince: and of theſe two ſorts of Conſpiracies we ſhall diſcourſe at preſent, becauſe of thoſe which are entred into to deliver up a beſieged Town to the enemy, or upon ſuch occaſion, we have ſpoken amply before. And firſt of the Conjurations againſt a Prince, and the occaſions of them, which are many, but one of more importance than all the reſt, and that is the hatred of the people: for that Prince who has contracted the univerſal odium of the people, may with reaſon believe that ſome of thoſe whom he has offended will ſtudy to revenge themſelves; and they will be the more induſtrious in it, by how much they obſerve the general diſcontent and animoſity againſt him. A Prince therefore is by all means poſſible to prevent the hatred of the people, (but having ſpoken of it before, I ſhall not enlarge upon it again). For by keeping himſelf from the general hatred, particular offences will not be able to amount to a War; firſt, becauſe all men have not the ſame reſentment, and will not put themſelves in danger to revenge an injury; and then becauſe if the diſcontented were all of a mind, and had power to do it, yet they are diſcouraged by the affection which they obſerve in the multitude towards their Prince. The injury done by the Prince, is either upon the eſtate, blood, or honour of the Subject: where the injury extends to blood, threatning is very dangerous, and much more than down-right execution; for when a man is kill'd, he is paſt thinking of revenge, and thoſe who are alive will quickly forget him; but when a man is threatned, and finds himſelf under a neceſſi y of ſuffering, or doing

ing ſomething extraordinary, he becomes immediately dangerous, and ought to be regarded by the Prince, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter. Next to this neceſſity for the preſervation of ones life; Honour and Eſtate are the two tendereſt points in which men are ſooneſt offended, and of which the Prince is likewiſe to have a particular care, for no man can be pillaged ſo perfectly, but he will have a knife left to revenge himſelf; nor no man can be diſhonoured to ſuch a degree of debaſement, but he will have courage enough left to attempt ſomething in revenge; and in point of honour, no injury goes ſo near a man as what reflects upon the women; and next to that, is to be deſpiſed. This was it that arm'd *Pauſanias* againſt *Philip* of *Macedon*, and many other Subjects againſt many other Princes. In our times *Julius Belanti* had never conſpired againſt *Pandolfus* Tyrant of *Siena*, had he not firſt given him his Daughter to Wife, and then taken her from him again, as we ſhall ſhew more at large hereafter. The great motive of the Conjuration of the *Pazzi* againſt the *Medici* was the Patrimony of *Giovanni Bonromei*, which was given from them by the award of the *Medici*. But there is another motive (and that no ſmall one) which makes people conſpire againſt their Prince, and that is a deſire of reſcuing their Country from tyranny and uſurpation. This was it which ſet *Brutus* and *Caſſius* at work againſt *Cæſar*. This was it which excited others againſt *Phalaris*, *Dionyſius*, &c. and againſt this there is no remedy, but depoſiting their uſurpations, and becauſe there are few will do that, there are but few which eſcape the ill conſequence.

Ad Generum Cereris, ſine cæde, & ſanguine pauci
Deſcendunt Reges, & ſicca morte Tyranni.

Slaughter and Blood purſues, he ſeldom lies
Dry in his Coffin that a Tyrant dies.

But in Conſpiracies, as I ſaid before, the dangers are ſo great and various, that there is not only a hazard in the deſigning, management, and execution, but even after the execution is done. The Conſpirators are either one or more; one cannot properly be called a Conſpiracy, but a firm reſolution in a ſingle perſon to make away his Prince; this way of Conſpiracy is more ſecure than the other, becauſe till it comes to execution, it can never be known, no body being privy to his ſecret, and therefore no danger of coming to the ears of the Prince. Theſe kind of reſolutions may fall into the heart of any man, great or ſmall, noble or ignoble, favourites or ſtrangers: no man but ſome time or other may have acceſs to his Prince, and he that has opportunity to ſpeak with him, has opportunity to do worſe. *Pauſanias* murdered *Philip* of *Macedon* as he was going to the Temple attended with a thouſand of his Guards, and walking betwixt his own ſon and his ſon-in-law; but *Pauſanias* was a Gentleman, and very converſant at Court, but there was a poor contemptible Spaniard who ſtabb'd *Ferdinand* King of *Spain* in the neck, and though the wound was not mortal, yet it was enough to ſhew us that there is no man ſo inconſiderable, but if he has courage to undertake, he may have opportunity to do it: *Dervis* a Turkiſh Prieſt drew his ſword upon *Bajazet* Father to this preſent Emperor, and though he did not kill him, yet it was not for want either of courage or opportunity. Nor is it to be doubted but there are many ill enough diſpoſed, who wiſh from their hearts to be revenged on their Tyrants, but there are few that dare venture, and ſcarce one of thoſe few but dies in the attempt, and no man will expoſe himſelf where there is no hopes to eſcape. But enough of this pertinacious malevolence in a ſingle perſon, we will ſpeak now of Conſpiracies betwixt a number: I ſay that in Hiſtory all Conſpiracies are found to be acted by great Perſons, and ſuch as have familiarity with their Prince: for others, unleſs they be mad men or fools, will never attempt it, becauſe people that are weak, & remote from the Court, are deſtitute of all thoſe hopes and conveniences that are requiſite for the execution of ſuch a deſign. Firſt, men of ſlender fortune or intereſt cannot impart themſelves freely, no body will be true to them, becauſe no man can concur with them upon any of thoſe hopes which do uſually encourage men to the undertaking of any great danger; ſo that they can hardly communicate to two or three perſons, but one of them is an informer, and the other are ruined. But if they ſhould be ſo happy as not to be betrayed, the execution is attended with ſo many difficulties by reaſon of the difficulty of their acceſs, that it is impoſſible but they muſt miſcarry: and if great perſons, and ſuch as are very converſant with their Prince are ſubject to ſuch hazards, thoſe doubtleſs muſt be much more who are under none of thoſe qualifications. Wherefore, when men of mean fortune, or little acceſs at Court conſider their own weakneſs and inability, they are diſcouraged from any ſuch deſigns; and if at any time they be offended, and would do their Prince a miſchief, they content themſelves

with libelling and railing, and expect when perſons of greater acceſs and capacity ſhould revenge them upon his perſon, and if any of theſe perſons are ſo far tranſported, as to attempt any thing of this nature, their good will is more to be commended than their diſcretion. We ſee then, where any great Conſpiracy has been made, it has been by great perſons, and ſuch as have been familiar with their Prince, and that as often upon the ſcore of benefits, as injuries received; ſo it was in the Conſpiracy of *Perennius* againſt *Commodus*, *Plautianus* againſt *Severus*, *Sejanus* againſt *Tiberius*, all of them preferred by their ſeveral Emperors, and advanced to ſuch Honours, Authority and Eſtates, that their power ſeem'd to want nothing of perfection, but the Imperial Enſigns, and that they might have them as well as the reſt, they conſpired every one of them againſt their Prince, and their Conſpiracies had ſuch ends as their ingratitude deſerved. However, in the memory of our Fathers the Conſpiracy of *Giacopo d'Apiano* againſt Meſſer *Piero Gambacorti* Prince of *Piſa* had a better end; for the ſaid *Giacopo* having been brought up, and careſſed, and advanced by the ſaid *Piero*, depoſed his benefactor, and took away his Government for his pains. Another of the ſame nature was that of *Coppola* in our days againſt *Ferdinand* of *Arragon*, though it had not the ſame ſucceſs; for *Coppola* being arrived at that height of authority, that there was nothing but the bare name wanting to make him King, he attempted for that, and loſt his life in the buſineſs. And certainly if any Conſpiracy might have ſucceeded, it was his, being a perſon as powerful as the King himſelf, and ſeconded with all the conveniences he could deſire: but the ſame greedineſs of dominion that blinded him in the undertaking, blinded him in the proſecution of his deſign; for had it been managed with the leaſt prudence, it would have been impoſſible to have miſcarried.

A Prince therefore who would preſerve himſelf againſt Conſpiracy, is to have an eye rather upon thoſe he has obliged, than thoſe he has offended; for they that are offended have not thoſe frequent opportunities that the other have; and for the diſpoſition, it is much alike, the deſire of dominion being as great if not greater than the deſire of revenge; ſo then authority is to be given to his friends with that caution, that there be always ſome ſpace or interval left betwixt the preferment of the Favourite, and the ſovereignty of the Prince, leſt if his ambition ſhould not be ſatisfied, he ſhould aſpire immediately at the Crown. But to return to our deſign, I ſay, that Conſpirators being to be great men, and ſuch as have eaſy acceſs to the Prince, we are now to enquire into the ſucceſſes of their plots, and ſee what have been the cauſes of their proſperity or miſcarriage. And becauſe (as I ſaid before) the danger is conſiderable in the management, execution, and afterwards; for that reaſon there are very few of them that arrive at their propoſed end. In their contrivances and conſultations there is ſuch extraordinary danger, that unleſs they be carried on with ſingular caution and prudence, they will be eaſily diſcovered; and they are diſcovered two ways, either by down-right impeachment, or by conjecture and preſumption. Impeachment proceeds either from infidelity or folly in thoſe perſons with whom you have communicated; infidelity is eaſily found, for you cannot communicate in that nature but with ſuch of your Confidents as you ſuppoſe will venture their lives for you; or elſe with ſuch perſons as are diſſatisfied with the Government: of ſuch kind of Confidents, one or two may poſſibly be found, but when you begin to multiply them, and commit your ſecret to more, you muſt neceſſarily be betrayed; for their affection to you muſt be very great, if the apprehenſion of the danger, and the fear of the puniſhment do not deter them: beſides, men are many times miſtaken in the affection of their friends; for they can never be aſſured of them till they have made experiment, and to make experiment in ſuch ways as this, is exceedingly dangerous, and if perchance you have had trial of them in ſome other matters of importance in which they have behaved themſelves faithfully and well, yet you can take no true meaſures from that, becauſe this ſurpaſſes all other dangers whatſoever. If you preſume upon his diſcontent, and animoſity to his Prince, you may be eaſily deceived, for as ſoon as you have diſcovered your deſign, you have given him a power to reconcile himſelf, and his rancour muſt be very great, or your influence extraordinary to keep him faithful: hence it is that many Conſpiracies are diſcovered, and as it were nipp'd in the bud; and when any of them are kept private where many perſons are privy, 'tis look'd upon as a miracle, as that of *Piſo* againſt *Nero*, and in our times that of the *Pazzi* againſt *Lorenzo*, and *Giuliano de Medici*, in which though fifty were concerned, it was never diſcovered till it came to execution; for diſcoveries by indiſcretion, they happen when one of the Conſpirators talks carleſly, ſo as ſome ſervant or third perſon picks it out, as it hapned to the ſons of *Brutus*, who in their negotiations with *Tarquin*'s Embaſſadors, were over-heard, and accuſed by one of the ſervants: another way is when out of levity you communicate with ſome child or woman that you love, or ſuch other incontinent perſon, as *Dinus* did, who being (with *Philotas*) entred into a Conſpiracy againſt *Alexander* the

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Great, imparted it to a Boy that he loved, called *Nicomachus*, who told it to his Brother *Cibalinus*, and *Cibalinus* diſcovered it to the King. As to diſcoveries by circumſtances and conjecture, we have an example in the *Piſonian* Conſpiracy againſt *Nero*, in which *Scevinus* one of the Conſpirators having the day before *Nero* was to have been murther'd, made his will, ordered *Milichius* his freeman to furbiſh up his old ruſty Sword, enfranchiſed all his Slaves, diſtributed Mony among them, and cauſed Plagets and Ligatures to be made to bind up wounds, he gave occaſion of conjecture to *Milichius*, who accuſed him thereupon to *Nero*, and Orders being given for his apprehenſion, *Scevinus* was taken into cuſtody, and with him *Natalis* another of the Conſpirators, who had been obſerved to have talked privately with him a long time the day before, and not agreeing about their diſcourſe, they contradicted one another, and were forced to confeſs all.

From theſe occaſions of diſcovery it is impoſſible to be ſecur'd, but either by malice, imprudence, or inadvertency, all will out when ever the Conſpirators exceed the number of three or four. For if more than one of them be taken, 'tis impoſſible but they muſt interfere, becauſe two people cannot hang together ſo exactly in a Story. If there be but one apprehended, and he be a ſtout man, perhaps he may have that conſtancy and reſolution as to conceal his Confederates; but then his Confederates muſt have as much courage as he, and not diſcover themſelves by their flight; for whoſe heart ſoever fails, whether his that is apprehended, or his that is eſcaped, 'tis the ſame thing, for the Plot is diſcovered. That example which is mentioned by *Titus Livius* is very rare and unuſual, where in a Conſpiracy againſt *Girolamo* King of *Siracuſe*, he ſpeaks of one of the Conſpirators called *Theodorus*, who being ſeized, concealed his accomplices with incomparable conſtancy, and accuſed all the Kings Friends; and his Companions were ſo confident in his courage, that none of them fled, or made the leaſt diſcovery by their fear. Theſe are the dangers which are to be paſs'd in the Conduct or management of an Enterprize, before it comes to execution; and as there are dangers, ſo there are ways of evading them.

The firſt, the ſureſt, and indeed the only way is not to give your Confederates time to diſcover you, but to communicate the buſineſs to them when it is juſt ready for execution, and not before. Thoſe who take that courſe, are free from the danger of Treatings and Negotiations, and commonly from all the reſt, and have been obſerved frequently to come to good end; and there is no man that is wiſe, but would carry it ſo if he could. I ſhall give you only two Examples. *Nelimatus* being unable to endure the Tyranny of *Ariſtotimus* King of *Epirus*, got ſeveral of his Friends and Relations together into his houſe, and exhorting them to the deliverance of their Country, ſome of them deſired time to conſider, and prepare themſelves; whereupon *Nelimatus* cauſed his Servants to make faſt the doors, and proteſted to all the whole Company, that they ſhould ſwear to go immediately about it, or he would deliver them up Priſoners to *Ariſtotimus*, upon which they all took the Oath, and falling incontinently to the work, they effected their deſign, as *Nelimatus* had contriv'd it. One of the *Magi* having by fraud poſſeſſed himſelf of the Kingdom of *Perſia*, and *Orthanus* a great Perſon of that Kingdom, having diſcovered the cheat, he had a conference with ſix others of his own quality, to contrive how they might reſcue their Country from the Tyranny of that Uſurper, and (as in the caſe before) when ſome of them deſired time, *Darius* (one of the ſix) ſtood up and declared boldly, That if they would not execute it preſently, he would accuſe them every one, and doing it forthwith, they proſpered accordingly. Not unlike theſe two, was the way which the *Ætolians* uſed in the Aſſaſſination of *Nabis* the Tyrant of *Sparta*: They ſent one of their Citizens called *Alexamenes* to him with 30 Horſe, and 200 Foot, under pretence of a ſupply, commanding the Soldiers to be obedient to the orders of their chief Officers, but acquainted nobody with the deſign but *Alexamenes* himſelf. *Alexamenes* marched to *Sparta* with his Forces, but communicating nothing of his inſtructions, till they were fit to be executed, he did his buſineſs, and the Tyrant was ſlain; by which reſervedneſs they avoided the firſt dangers of being diſcovered, which are obvious in the management, and whoever takes the ſame courſe, ſhall avoid them as well as they. *Piſo* (whom I have mention'd before) was a man of honour and reputation, a great intimate of *Nero*'s, and one in whom he placed a great deal of confidence. *Nero* viſited him often, and was many times treated very magnificently in his Garden: *Piſo* by virtue of this intimacy was able to make choice of ſuch Complices as were ſtout and couragious, and diſpoſed to ſuch an Exploit (which for great men to do, is no difficult matter) and when occaſion was offered, to break the buſineſs to them ſo ſuddenly, that having no time either to deliberate or deny him, he muſt neceſſarily ſucceed; and he who examines all the other Examples that are mentioned, will find very few, but have been managed the ſame way. But men of little experience in the affairs of the world, do many times commit great errors, and more, when their deſigns

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are extraordinary, as in this. A Plot then is never to be imparted, but upon neceſſity, and when it is ripe for execution; and when you do communicate, do it but to one, and that, a perſon of whom you have had long experience, or one that is prompted by the ſame intereſt and provocation as your ſelf; and to find one perſon ſo, is much eaſier than to find many, and by conſequence that way is nothing ſo dangerous. Beſides, if you ſhould be miſtaken in your confidence, you have more remedy and defence, than where the Conſpirators are ſeveral; for I have heard wiſe men ſay, that to a ſingle perſon a man may ſay any thing; for (if nothing be to be produced under your hand) your no, will be as good as his yea: But writing is to be ſhun'd as a rock, for nothing is of ſo much conviction, as a note under a man's own hand. *Plautianus* deſiring to murther *Severus* the Emperor, and his Son *Antoninus*; commited the execution to *Saturninus* a Tribune, who had more mind to betray, than obey him; but ſuſpecting that when he came to accuſe him, *Plautianus* ſhould have more credit than he, he deſired a Warrant under his hand to confirm his Commiſſion, which *Plautianus* granted, being blinded with ambition, whereby it happen'd that he was accuſed, convicted, and condemned, whereas without that Note, and ſome other circumſtances, *Plautianus* would have been acquitted, and his accuſer been puniſhed, ſo obſtinately did *Plautianus* deny all. In the *Piſonian* Conſpiracy, there was a Woman called *Epicaris*, who had been formerly one of *Nero*'s Miſſes. This *Epicaris* thinking it of importance to bring in a Captain of certain Galleys which *Nero* kept for his Guard, ſhe communicated the Plot, but conceal'd the Conſpirators, and the Captain betraying her, and accuſing her to *Nero*, *Epicaris* maintained the contrary with ſuch conſtancy, that the Emperor was amaz'd, and diſcharged her. So then, he that communicates a thing of this Nature to one, runs but theſe two dangers, either of being ſpontaneouſly accuſed, and proof brought to make it good; or elſe being accuſed by accident and of force, as when his Confederate is apprehended upon ſuſpition, and impeaches him upon the Rack, in both which caſes there is ſomething to be ſaid; for in the firſt he may pretend malice, in the ſecond fear, and that the extremity of his torture conſtrained him to ſay falſe: So that it is great wiſdom to communicate with no body, till your deſigns be ripe but to proceed according to the examples aforeſaid; but if you muſt communicate, to do it but to one alone, and by himſelf; in which though there be ſome danger, yet there is much leſs than where you communicate with many. Another way, and not unlike this, is when the fury or violence of a Tyrant neceſſitates you to do that to him, which otherwiſe he would be ſure to do to you; and ſometimes it is ſo ſudden and fierce, it leaves you ſcarce time to think of ſecuring your ſelf. This is an exigence and neceſſity that has moſt commonly a good end, and to prove it, I will produce two examples, and no more. *Commodus* the Emperor had two Captains of his Guards (one of them called *Lettus*, and the other *Elettus*) particularly in his favour, and *Martia* was the moſt intimate of his Concubines. They having taken the liberty to admoniſh him of his ill Courſes, and the reflection his ill converſation had both upon his Perſon and Government, he reſolved to rid himſelf of his Monitors, and to that end writ down the names of *Martia*, *Lettus*, *Elettus*, and others (who he deſigned ſhould be put to death the next night) and put the Note under his Pillow. Being gone out into a Bath, a Child that he lov'd exceedingly, being rummaging about the room, happened upon this Paper, and going out with it in his hand, *Martia* met him by accident, took it from him, read it, ſent it immediately to *Lettus* and *Elettus*, who being ſenſible of their danger, reſolved to prevent him, and without more ado, killed *Commodus* in the Evening.

Antoninus Caracalla the Emperor was with his Army in *Meſopotamia*, and having made *Macrinus* his General (a better Stateſman than Soldier) it hapned (as it does to all Princes that are wicked) that he began to apprehend (what he knew he deſerved) that ſome body conſpired againſt him. To be more certain, he writ privately to a friend (called *Maternianus*) in *Rome*, to conſult the Aſtrologers, and give him notice whether any body was contriving againſt the Empire. *Maternianus* writ him word he had conſulted them, that there were thoſe who did aſpire at the Empire, and that *Macrinus* was the man. This Letter coming by accident to the hands of *Macrinus*, before the Emperor ſaw it, he found the neceſſity that was upon him either to kill or be kill'd; and thereupon committed the execution to a confident of his call'd *Martialis* (whoſe Brother *Antoninus* had ſlain not many days before) who kill'd him accordingly. We ſee then that this neceſſity which allows us no time, has the ſame effect in a manner with the courſe which was taken by *Nelimatus* of *Epirus*, as I have mentioned before. We ſee likewiſe, that (as I ſaid in the beginning of theſe diſcourſes) that Commination and threatning does a Prince more miſchief, and are the occaſion of more Plots, than violence it ſelf. A Prince therefore is to have a care of that; to careſs thoſe that are about him, and keep them in their Allegiance

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by his courteſie and kindneſs; if that will not do, he is to ſecure himſelf otherwiſe as well as he can, but never to bring them into a condition of thinking themſelves under a neceſſity of killing or being kill'd. As to the dangers which attend the execution of a Plot, they proceed either from a ſudden alteration of Orders; a ſudden defection of courage in him that is to execute; ſome imprudence in the attempt; or ſome imperfection in the act, as when all are not killed that were intended. And firſt we muſt underſtand that there is nothing gives ſo much Embarraſment, and diſtraction to the actions of men as new and contradictory orders to be executed in an inſtant, and quite contrary to what was determined before. And if in any thing this variation be dangerous, it is in Martial affairs, and in ſuch things as we have now ſpoken of; for in thoſe caſes there is nothing ſo neceſſary as that every man may know certainly his part, that beforehand he may contrive with himſelf, and conclude upon all the circumſtances of the fact; whereas if they have frain'd their deſigns, and fix'd upon their way, and immediately new Orders are brought repugnant to the former, it diſturbs all, and the whole Plot muſt be ruined; ſo that it is better to execute it according to the firſt Order, though there be ſomething of inconvenience, than to vary your Orders, with a thouſand times more: But this is meant only where the variation is ſudden, for where you have time enough, it is not ſo dangerous. The Conſpiracy of the *Pazzi* againſt *Lorenzo* and *Giuliano de Medici* is very well known. Their firſt Orders were, That an Entertainment ſhould be made for the Cardinal of *St. George*, to which the *Medici* ſhould be invited, and killed. Every mans Office was aſſigned; ſome were to kill them; ſome were to ſecure the Palace; and others to ride up and down the City, and proclaim liberty to the people: It happened when the *Pazzi*, *Medici*, and Cardinal were altogether in the Cathedral in *Florence* at Divine Service, news was brought that *Julian* would not be at Dinner: Hereupon the Conſpirators conſulting again, it was reſolved to alter the Plot, and do that in the Church which was deſigned in the Chamber; This ſudden alteration, diſcompoſed the whole order; for *Giovan batiſta da Monteſicco* would not conſent to add Sacrilege to his Murther, and commit it in the Church; upon which they were forced to appoint another in his place, and ſhift all their Agents from one Office to another, and their time being too ſhort to fix their reſolutions, they committed ſo many errors in the execution, that all of them miſcarried. And among theſe Conſpirators, when things come to be executed, their heart many times fails them, either out of ſudden reverence, or ſudden fear; for the preſence and Majeſty of ſome Princes is ſo aweful, it either mitigates or frightens the fury of the Executioner; *Marius* being taken and kept Priſoner by the *Minturnenſes*, they ſent a Servant to kill him; but the poor ſlave was ſo terrified at the ſight of his perſon, and the Memory of his name, that his courage fail'd, and he was not able to go thorow; and if the conſideration of his quality, and the Majeſty of his Countenance could do ſo much, in a perſon that was a Priſoner, and in diſtreſs; how much more are they effectual in a free Prince, magnificently adorn'd, and as nobly attended. Certainly ſuch a ſight is able to ſtrike terror into the boldeſt perſon, and work compaſſion in the moſt cruel miſcreant.

Some there were who conſpired againſt *Sitalcis* King of *Thrace*: The day was appointed for the execution; they met at the place, where the Prince was; but when the ſtroke was to be given, no body durſt venture, they departed as they came, every body blamed one another, but no body knew what was the impediment, and having attempted it often with the ſame intimidation, they were diſcovered at laſt, and received puniſhment for an offence which they might, but would not put in execution. *Alfonſo* Duke of *Ferrara* had two Brothers, who conſpired againſt him, and employed *Giannes* a Prieſt and Chantor in the ſaid Dukes Chappel, to bring the Duke to them, which he did many times, and it was in their power to have killed him; but yet not any of them durſt ſtrike him, ſo that at length they alſo were diſcovered, and received their reward. This remorſe can proceed from nothing but the terror of his preſence, or the influence of his behaviour and humanity, which compels them to mercy. But the defects and diſappointments in theſe kind of executions, proceed either from imprudence, or terror, with either of which, the minds of the Conſpirators being diſturbed, they become ſo confuſed and diſtracted, they can neither ſay, nor do any thing as they ſhould. And that men are ſubject to thoſe confuſions and ſurprizes, cannot be better demonſtrated than by *Livy*'s deſcription of *Alexamenus* the *Ætolian*, of whom we have ſpoken before: For when the time was come for the execution of his deſign againſt *Nabis* the *Spartan*, having imparted it to his friends, *Livy* tells us, *Collegit & ipſe animum, confuſum tantæ cogitatione rei. He recollected his mind, which was in ſome meaſure confounded with the contemplation of the Enterprize.* For there is no man, how reſolute and bloody ſoever he be, but muſt be ſurprized and diſcompoſed in ſuch caſes as thoſe; wherefore for ſuch Exploits, experienced men, and ſuch as have

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been uſed to thoſe kind of affairs, are to be choſen, and no other, though never ſo ſtout: for he that has had no tryal of himſelf in that nature, ought not to preſume barely upon his courage; nor can he promiſe himſelf any certain ſucceſs, by reaſon that the terror and perturbation of his mind is many times ſo ſtrong, that it makes his weapon fall out of his hand, or words fall from his mouth, which diſcover the whole Plot. *Lucilla* the Siſter of *Commodus*, ordered *Quintianus* to kill her Brother: *Quintianus* waited for *Commodus* as he came into the Amphitheater, and meeting him when he came, he ran at him with his naked Sword, crying aloud, *Queſto ti mando il Senato*, *The Senate ſends you this*; but thoſe words gave an alarm, and he was ſeized before he could lift up his arm to give the blow. *Meſſer Antonio da Volterra*, deputed (as is ſaid before) to kill *Lorenzo de Medici*, when he advanced to aſſault him, cryed out *Ah Traytor!* but that exclamation was the preſervation of *Lorenzo*, and the ruine of the Conſpirators. But theſe Enterprizes are difficult, when directed only againſt one perſon, for the reaſons aboveſaid, yet when they are bent againſt two, they are much more, becauſe in ſeveral places it is impoſſible any deſign ſhould be well executed at once, ſo that to conſpire againſt a Prince in that way, is a doubtful, dangerous, and imprudent thing. Were it not for the reverence I bear to the Author, I ſhould ſcarce believe what *Herodian* ſays of *Plautianus* that he committed to one ſingle Centurion called *Saturninus* the killing of *Severus* and *Antoninus* who lived in ſeveral places; for 'tis ſo irrational a thing, that nothing but his Authority could have perſwaded me to it. Certain young Gentlemen of *Athens* conſpired againſt *Diocles* and *Hippias*, two Tyrants in that City. They killed *Diocles*, but *Hippias* eſcaped, and revenged his death. *Chiones* and *Leonides* of *Heraclea*, two of *Plato's* Diſciples, conſpired againſt *Clearchus* and *Satirus*, two Tyrants of that place; *Clearchus* was murthered, but *Satirus* ſurvived and revenged it. The *Pazzi* (whom we have ſo often mentioned) killed only *Julian de Medici*, his brother eſcaping; ſo that from theſe Conſpiracies againſt ſeveral perſons, all wiſe people will abſtain, as things that are fatal to themſelves, their Country, and every body elſe; for thoſe who eſcape are thereby render'd the more cruel and Tyrannical, as appears by the aforeſaid examples in *Florence*, *Athens*, and *Heraclea*. And therefore the Conſpiracy of *Pelopidas* againſt the Tyrants of *Thebes* was admirable, in reſpect of the ſucceſs, ſeeing not only one, but ten of them were to be murthered; and that he was neither a favourite, nor had eaſie acceſs to them; but was a rebel, and in baniſhment; yet he overcame all theſe difficulties, got into *Thebes*, killed the Tyrants, and delivered his Country; but with the aſſiſtance of *Caron* one of the Tyrants great Counſellors who gave him admiſſion, and contributed much to his ſucceſs. But let no man preſume upon this example, for it is looked upon not only as a rare thing, but as a miracle. The execution of ſuch a deſign may be interrupted likewiſe by a falſe imagination, or ſome unexpected accident happening in the very act. The very morning that *Brutus* and his Confederates were to murther *Cæſar*, it happened that he had a long diſcourſe with *Gn. Popilius Lenas* one of the Conſpirators, which the reſt of the accomplices obſerving, concluded that *Popilius* had diſcovered all to *Cæſar*, and was giving him an account; whereupon it was propoſed to kill *Cæſar* preſently, and not to defer it till he was in the Senate; and doubtleſs they had done it, but that their diſcourſe broke off, and *Cæſar* went away without any Commotion. Theſe imaginations are ſometimes very conſiderable, and to be regarded with a great deal of prudence, and the rather, becauſe they are eaſily taken up; for he who is conſcious to himſelf, is always apt to ſuſpect that they are talking of him; and it may ſo fall out, that a word ſpoken to another intent, may gaul and diſturb you as much as if it were ſpoken on purpoſe, and either force you to fly, or ſo haſten and precipitate the execution, that you run your ſelf upon many inconveniences, eſpecially where many are privy to the Plot. As to the accidents, becauſe they are unexpected and occaſional, no directions can be given againſt them, but examples by which men are to regulate and be cautious. *Julius Belanti* of *Siena* (whom we have mentioned before) being incenſed againſt *Pandolfus*, who had given him his Daughter in Marriage, and taken her from him again, conſpired his death, and laid his deſign thus, *Pandolfus* went almoſt every day to viſit one of his Relations that was ſick; and in his paſſage went commonly by *Julius* his houſe: upon this conſideration, *Julius* got all his accomplices together into his houſe, with intention to aſſault him as he went by; to which purpoſe he armed them all, and diſpoſed them into the Porch, that they might be ready upon a ſignal to be given from a Window above: It happened that *Pandolfus* being juſt by, the perſon at the Window gave the ſignal, when by accident in the very nick of time *Pandolfus* met a friend, and ſtopt to ſalute him: Some of his Attendants paſſing on, heard a noiſe of Arms, took the Alarm, and diſcovered the Ambuſcade; ſo that *Pandolfus* was miraculouſly preſerved, *Julio* and his Companions forced to fly from *Siena*, and all by the accident of this rencounter,

counter, which not only hindred the execution at that time, but defeated the whole enterprize.

But againſt theſe accidents no remedy can be preſcribed, becauſe they happen ſo rarely; however it is neceſſary to think of as many, and provide againſt them as well as we can. It remains now that we ſay ſomething of thoſe dangers which we incur after execution is done; of which ſort there is but one, and that is, when ſomebody is left alive that may revenge it: as his children, brothers, kinſmen, and ſuch others to whom the ſovereignty may deſcend by right of inheritance, and theſe may be left to revenge the death of their Predeceſſor, either by your negligence, or by ſome of the accidents aforeſaid, as it hapned to *Giovan-Andrea da Lampognano*, who conſpiring with other perſons, killed the Duke of *Milan*, but they left two of his Brothers and one of his Sons behind, who revenged it in due time. But in theſe caſes the Conſpirators are to be excuſed, becauſe there is no remedy to be provided; but where by their own imprudence or negligence they ſuffer any ſuch to eſcape, there it is otherwiſe, and they are highly to be condemned. At *Forum Livii* ſome there were who conſpired againſt Count *Girolamo*, ſlew him, ſeized upon his wife and children, (which were very young) and clap'd them in Priſon: a great mind they had to the Caſtle, but the Governour was refractory, and would not admit them; the Counſels (called *Madonna Caterina*) made them a propoſition, that if they would ſuffer her to go into him, ſhe would prevail with the Governor to ſurrender, and that in the mean time her children ſhould be left as hoſtages in their hands. The Conſpirators believed her, and let her go in, but ſhe was no ſooner in the Caſtle, but ſhe began to upbraid them by the death of her Husband, and threaten them with all poſſible revenge; and to convince them that her care and compaſſion for her children ſhould not reſtrain her, ſhe ſhew'd them her genitals thorow the windows, to let them know, that if they killed thoſe, ſhe had wherewithal to have more: ſo that perceiving their error too late, and being deſtitute of all counſel, their indiſcretion was puniſhed with their perpetual baniſhment. But of all dangers after the fact is committed, none is ſo fatal as the affection of the people to their Prince whom you have ſlain. For their revenge is not poſſible to be prevented. Of this, the murder of *Cæſar* may be an example: for the people of *Rome* being his friends, his death was thorowly revenged upon the Conſpirators, who afterwards (though in ſeveral times and places) were all of them ſlain. Conjurations againſt ones Country are not ſo dangerous as Conjurations againſt ones Prince; for in the contrivance and management the dangers are not ſo many; in the execution they are but the ſame; and after the fact is committed, they are nothing at all. In the management and preparation the dangers are not ſo many, becauſe a Citizen may make his party, and put his affairs in a poſture without diſcovery; and if his orders be not interrupted, bring his deſigns to a very good end; or if they be interrupted by ſome Law, it is in his power to adjourn the execution, or find out ſome other way that may be more commodious; but all theſe (it is to be underſtood) are to be done only in Common-wealths, where the manners of the people are beginning to be corrupted; becauſe where the City is incorrupt, ſuch deſigns will never come into any of their thoughts; but in a corrupt Republick where the dangers are not ſo great, there are many ways for private Citizens to make themſelves Princes; becauſe a Common-wealth is not ſo quick and dexterous as a Prince, their ſuſpition is leſs, and by conſequence their caution: beſides, they are commonly in more awe of their Grandees; and therefore the Grandees are more bold and couragious againſt them. Every body has read *Catiline*'s Conſpiracy written by *Saluſt*, and can tell how *Catiline* (after it was detected) not only continued in *Rome*, but came audaciouſly into the Senate, and had the confidence to talk inſolently both to the Senate and Conſul; ſo great reverence had that City, for its Citizens. And when things were gone ſo far, that he had left the City, and was got to the head of an Army, *Lentulus*, and the reſt of the Conſpirators had never been ſeized, had not there been Letters produced againſt them under their own hands.

Hanno a great Citizen in *Carthage* had a mind to uſurp; and in order thereto; he had contrived at the Wedding of one of his Daughters to poiſon the whole Senate, and then make himſelf Prince: when his plot was diſcovered, the Senate troubled themſelves with no farther proviſion againſt it, than by making a Law againſt exorbitant feaſting upon ſuch kind of occaſions, ſo great was their reſpect to a Citizen of his quality! But in a Conſpiracy againſt ones Country, the greateſt danger lies in the execution; for it ſeldom happens that a particular Citizen is ſtrong enough to ſubdue a whole Country; and every man is not General of an Army, as *Cæſar*, *Agathocles*, *Cleomenes* and others were, who had their Armies ready to back their deſigns. To ſuch the way is eaſy and ſecure; but they who want thoſe advantages muſt manage their buſineſs with more cunning, or employ foreign aſſiſtance: this cunning and artifice was uſed by *Piſiſtrates* the

Athenian; for having overcome the *Megarenſes*, and thereby got himſelf great reputation among the people, he came forth of his houſe one morning, and ſhew'd himſelf wounded to them, complaining that the Nobility had abuſed him, and deſiring that he might be permitted to have a guard for the ſecurity of his perſon; which being granted inconſiderately, gave him opportunity by degrees to make himſelf abſolute. *Pandolfus Petrucci* (with other Exiles) returned to *Siena*, and by way of contempt was made Keeper of the Palace, which was a mechanick employment that others had refuſed. Yet thoſe few arm'd men who were under his Command by virtue of that place, by degrees gave him ſuch reputation, that at length he made himſelf Prince. Others have taken other ways, and by time, and their induſtry, arrived at the ſame dignity without any danger: but thoſe who have endeavoured to make themſelves Maſters of their Country by their own force, or foreign ſupplies, have had various events, as fortune was pleaſed to befriend them: *Cataline* was ruined: *Hanno* (of whom we have ſpoken before) failing in his poiſon, arm'd many thouſands of his Partiſans, which were all ſlain with him. Certain of the principal Citizens of *Thebes*, by the help of a *Spartan* Army, made themſelves Maſters of that City, and tyranniz'd over it: ſo that if all conſpiracies againſt their Country be examined, there will none, or but very few be found to have miſcarried in the management; but the whole ſtreſs of their good or bad fortune has lain upon the execution, which being once paſs'd, they are ſubject to no more dangers than what depend upon the nature of the Government; for when a man uſurps, and makes himſelf a Tyrant, he expoſes himſelf to thoſe natural and inſeparable dangers which are the conſequences of Tyranny, againſt which he has no other remedies than what have been deſcribed before.

This is what I have thought convenient to write upon the ſubject of Conſpiracies; and if I have diſcourſed only of thoſe which are executed by the ſword, and not by poiſon, it is becauſe they have the ſame orders and methods. True it is, the way of poiſon is the moſt dangerous, as being the more uncertain, becauſe every one has not convenience, but is forc'd to confer with other people, and the neceſſity of that Conference is much to be feared: beſides, many things happen which makes your potion ineffectual, as it fell out to thoſe who killed *Commodus*; who having diſgorg'd his poiſon, forc'd the Conſpirators to ſtrangle him. Princes then have no enemy to which they are more dangerouſly expoſed, than to theſe Conſpiracies, becauſe they are never undertaken againſt any of them, but they take away his life, or reputation. If they ſucceed, he dies; if they miſcarry, and the inſtruments be put to death, it is look'd upon as a pretence and invention of the Prince to ſatiate his avarice or cruelty upon the blood or fortunes of his enemies. My advice therefore is (both to Prince and Common-wealth), that upon the diſcovery of a Conſpiracy, (before they think of revenge) ſeriouſly to conſider the quality of it, and to compare the condition of the Conſpirators with their own: if they find them potent and ſtrong, till they have furniſhed themſelves with a proportionable force, no notice is to be taken; if notice be taken, they are unable to defend themſelves, and certainly ruined; for the Conſpirators finding themſelves diſcovered, will grow deſperate, and be under a neceſſity of venturing, let the ſucceſs be what it will. The *Romans* may be an example of this way of diſſembling; for having (as we ſaid before) left two of their Legions at *Capua* for the ſecurity of that City againſt the *Samnites*; the Commanders of the ſaid Legions conſpir'd to make themſelves Maſters of the Town. The *Romans* having notice of their deſigns, committed the prevention of it to *Rutilius* their new Conſul, who to lull and delude the Conſpirators, gave out that the Senate had confirmed that Station to thoſe Legions for another winter, which the Legions believed, and thinking then they ſhould have time enough, they neglected to haſten their deſign, till at length obſerving the Conſul to draw them away inſenſibly, and diſpoſe them into other parts, they began to ſuſpect, and that ſuſpition made them diſcover themſelves, and put their plot in execution. Nor can an example be brought more properly for either ſide; for by it we may ſee how cool and remiſs people are when they think they have time enough; and how ſudden and vigorous when neceſſity preſſes them. And the Prince or Common-wealth which would defer the diſcovery of a Plot, cannot do it with more advantage to himſelf, than by giving the Conſpirators ſome handſom occaſion to believe that they may execute it with more eaſe and ſecurity another time; for thereby the Prince or Common-wealth will have more leiſure to provide for their defence: they who have proceeded otherwiſe, have but haſtened their own ruine, as we have ſeen in the caſe of the Duke of *Athens*, and *Gulielmo de Pazzi*. The Duke having made himſelf Sovereign in *Florence*, and underſtanding there were Conſpiracies againſt him; without enquiring farther into the buſineſs, cauſed one of them to be apprehended, which giving an alarm to the reſt, they immediately took arms, and turn'd the Duke out of his Supremacy. *Gulielmo* being Commiſſary for that City in the

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Val di Chiana in the year 1501, having news of a great Plot in *Arezzo* in favour of the *Vitelli*, and that their deſign was to renounce the dominion of the *Florentines*, he marched thither directly, without conſidering the power of the Conſpirators, or his own, or ſo much as furniſhing himſelf with what Forces he might have done; and by the advice of the Biſhop his Son, cauſing one of the Conſpirators to be ſeized, the reſt fell preſently to their arms, diſclaim'd the *Florentines*, and took their Commiſſary priſoner. But when Conſpiracies are weak, and in their infancy, if they be diſcovered, they are to ſuppreſs them out of hand, without any ſuſpence, and not to follow the example either of the Duke of *Athens*, or *Dion* of *Siracuſe*, of whom the firſt cauſed a Citizen who had diſcovered a plot to him, to be put to death, that the reſt obſerving how unwilling he was to believe any thing of them, might be the more ſecure, and hold themſelves obliged. *Dion* on the other ſide ſuſpecting the affections of ſome people, cauſed one of his Confidents called *Calippus* to pretend a Conſpiracy, and ſee if he could draw them in; but both theſe practices ſucceeded very ill, for by the firſt, all people were diſcouraged from making any diſcovery, and all Conſpirators confirmed; and by the other, a way was recommended for the murdering of himſelf; for *Calippus* finding he had an opportunity to practice without danger, he did it ſo effectually, that it coſt *Dio* both his Government and Life.

CHAP. VII.

How it comes to paſs that in the changes of State, from liberty to ſervitude, and from ſervitude to liberty, ſome are very innocent, and others very bloody.

SOme people perhaps may wonder how it ſhould come to paſs that Governments ſhould be changed from one form to another, ſometimes eaſily, and without blood, and ſometimes with great difficulty and ſlaughter, be the variation as it will, either from liberty to tyranny, or from tyranny to liberty. And this diverſity of mutations is ſo ſtrange, that as Hiſtory tells us, they happen ſometimes with infinite effuſion of blood, and at other times without the leaſt injury to any body: as in *Rome*, when the Government was taken from the Kings, and put into the hands of the Conſuls, no body was expulſed, or ſo much as moleſted but the *Tarquins*; but in other alterations it has been otherwiſe, and the cauſe of this diverſity may (in my judgment) be deduced from the manner in which that State was acquired; if it was obtained by force, it could not be without injury to many people, and then when ever it is deſtroyed, it will neceſſarily follow that all thoſe who were injured before, will endeavour to repair and revenge themſelves; which is not to be done without great tumult and ſlaughter. But when a Common-wealth is fix'd gradually, and by univerſal conſent of the people, when it comes to be changed, there is no need of diſturbing any body elſe; for the bare removal of thoſe who are then in authority, will effectually do the buſineſs. Of this ſort was the revolution at *Rome* upon the tranſlation of the Government from the Kings to the Conſuls; and the accident at *Florence* in the year 1494, when the *Medici* were expelled without the leaſt prejudice to any body elſe; for they having been advanced by the general vote of the people, there was no need of doing more than turning them out of the City. Such mutations are not therefore ſo dangerous; but thoſe others where many have been injured, and as many are to be revenged, have been ſo dreadfully deſtructive, that the very Hiſtory of their conſequences is enough to terrify the Reader; but all Books being full of them, I ſhall ſpeak no more of them in this place.

CHAP. VIII.

He who would change the form of a Government, is to conſider ſeriouſly upon what grounds he does it, and the diſpoſition of the ſubject.

IT has been ſaid before, that an evil diſpoſed Citizen can do no great hurt but in an ill diſpoſed City, which concluſion (beſides my former arguments) is much fortified by the examples of *Spurius Caſſius*, and *Manlius Capitolinus*; *Spurius* was an ambitious man, and being deſirous to procure to himſelf extraordinary authority in *Rome*, by favouring the people in the ſale of ſuch Lands as the *Romans* had conquered from the *Hernici*, the Senate diſcovered it, and grew ſo jealous of him, that when in a ſpeech of his to the people he proffered to give them the mony which had been received for corn that the Senate had ſent for out of *Sicily*, the people abſolutely refuſed it; ſuppoſing that *Spurius* intended that their liberty ſhould make it good: but had the people of *Rome* at that time been corrupt, or ill diſpoſed, they had taken his mony, and opened him a way to the making himſelf abſolute; but the example of *Manlius Capitolinus* is greater than this, for by that we may ſee how the courage and integrity which he expreſſed to his Country in their wars againſt the *Gauls*, was afterwards clowded and extinguiſhed by an infatiable deſire of authority ariſing from an emulation of *Camillus*, whom the *Romans* had advanced to a greater degree of honour; and ſo ſtrangely was he blinded with this paſſion, that not conſidering the ſtate and incorruption of the City, or how indiſpoſed the people were to any ſuch enterprize, he began to make parties, and raiſe tumults in *Rome* both againſt the Senate and Laws. In which paſſage it was evident how well that Government was conſtituted, and how well that people was diſpoſed; for in this caſe (though the Nobility and he were great friends, and fierce defenders of one anothers intereſt) none of them, nor his very relations appeared in his behalf; and whereas at other Trials the friends of the criminal uſed to accompany him to the Bar in mourning, and with all other circumſtances of ſadneſs that they could think of, to work (if it were poſſible) the Judges to compaſſion; *Manlius* went alone, without ſo much as one friend to attend him: the Tribunes of the people who were in other things always oppoſite to the Nobility, and created on purpoſe to balance their power; when they found the deſign tending to the ruine of them all, they joyn'd heartily with them to remove ſo common a deſtruction: and the people of *Rome*, who were zealous in any thing that made for their advantage, and lovers of any thing that croſſed the Nobility, (though they alſo had their kindneſs for *Manlius*); nevertheleſs when the Tribunes cited him, and referred him to the judgment of the people, they condemned him to death, without any conſideration of his former ſervices. Wherefore I am of opinion, that in the whole tract of this Hiſtory there is not an example that with more efficacy demonſtrates the juſtice of that Common-wealth in all its orders and degrees of men than this; ſeeing there was not one Citizen appeared in the defence of *Manlius*, who was a perſon of known virtue and endowments, and had done many honourable things both in publick and private, and the reaſon was, becauſe the love to their Country had a greater influence upon them than any other reſpect; and the conſideration of the preſent danger of their affairs, being ſtronger than the memory of his paſt merits, they choſe to free themſelves by decreeing his death. *Titus Livius* tells us, *Hunc exitum habuit vir niſi in libera Civitate natus eſſet, memorabilis*; *This was the end of a man who had been very memorable, had he been born any where but in a free State.* And in his caſe there are two things very remarkable; one, that in a corrupt State glory and authority is acquir'd a quite contrary way, than where they live exactly according to the true rules of policy and juſtice; the other, (not much unlike the former) that men in their affairs, eſpecially of greateſt importance, are to conſider the times, and accommodate thereunto; and thoſe who by the unhappineſs of their election, or their natural inclination do otherwiſe, live always unfortunately, and are more unſucceſful in all their enterprizes than they who comply with the times. And doubtleſs, by the fore-mentioned expreſſion of the Hiſtorian, had *Manlius* been born in the days of *Marius* and *Silla*, when the Maſs was corrupt and depraved, and ſuſceptible of any form his ambition would have imprinted, he had had the ſame ſucceſs that they had when they aſpired to be abſolute. So again, had *Marius* and *Silla* come into the World in the time of *Manlius*, they had miſcarried as he did, and been loſt in their firſt attempt. For one man by his ill cuſtoms and converſation may indeed give a touch and tincture of corruption to the people, but 'tis impoſſible his life ſhould be long enough to debauch them ſo totally that he may expect any advantage of it in his time; or if he ſhould

ſhould be ſo happy, and live long enough to infect a whole City; yet ſo impatient are the deſires of man, that they cannot reſtrain their paſſions, or attend an opportunity of purſuing them wiſely, but they circumvent and delude themſelves in thoſe very things of which they are moſt eagerly ambitious; ſo that ſometimes for want of patience, and ſometimes for want of judgment they venture raſhly upon things before the matter be prepared, and are ruined in their deſigns. He therefore who would alter a Government and ſet up himſelf, muſt attend till time has corrupted the Maſs, and by degrees brought all into diſorder, which of neceſſity muſt follow, when it is not (as we ſaid before) purged and refined by the Examples of good Men or good Laws, that may reduce it towards its firſt principles. *Manlius* then had been a great and memorable perſon, had he been born in a corrupt City; for whoever deſigns any innovation in a State, whether it be for the reſtitution of liberty, or the erection of Tyranny, is particularly to regard the manners of the people, and to conſider how far they are diſpoſed to ſubmit to his ambition; and by ſo doing he may be able to judge of the ſucceſs of his Enterprize. For to endeavour to make a people free, that are ſervile in their Nature, is as hard a matter, as to keep them in ſervitude, who are diſpoſed to be free. And becauſe we have ſaid before, That in all their operations men are to conſider and proceed according to the quality of the times, we ſhall ſpeak of it at large in the following Chapter.

CHAP. IX.

How he that would ſucceed, muſt accommodate to the times.

I Have many times conſidered with my ſelf that the occaſion of every mans good or bad fortune conſiſts in his correſpondence and accommodation with the times. We ſee ſome people acting furiouſly, and with an *impetus*; others with more ſlowneſs and caution; and becauſe both in the one and the other they are immoderate, and do not obſerve their juſt terms, therefore both of them do err; but their error and misfortune is leaſt, whoſe cuſtoms ſuit and correſpond with the times; and who comports himſelf in his deſigns according to the impulſe of his own Nature. Every one can tell how *Fabius Maximus* conducted his Army, and with what carefulneſs and caution he proceeded, contrary to the ancient heat and boldneſs of the *Romans*, and it hapned that grave way was more conformable to thoſe times; for *Hanibal* coming young and brisk into *Italy*, and being elated with his good fortune, as having twice defeated the Armies of the *Romans*, that Common-wealth having loſt moſt of her beſt Soldiers, and remaining in great fear and confuſion, nothing could have happen'd more ſeaſonably to them, than to have ſuch a General who by his caution and cunctation could keep the Enemy at a Bay. Nor could any times have been more fortunate to his way of proceeding; for that that ſlow and deliberate way was natural in *Fabius*, and not affected, appeared afterwards when *Scipio* being deſirous to paſs his Army into *Affrick*, to give the finiſhing blow to the War, *Fabius* oppoſed it moſt earneſtly, as one who could not force or diſſemble his Nature, which was rather to ſupport wiſely againſt the difficulties that were upon him, than to ſearch out for new. So that had *Fabius* directed, *Hanibal* had continued in *Italy*, and the reaſon was becauſe he did not conſider the times were altered, and the method of the War was to be changed with them: Andlif *Fabius* at that time had been King of *Rome*, he might well have been worſted in the War, as not knowing how to frame his Counſels according to the variation of the times. But there being in that Common-wealth ſo many brave men, and excellent Commanders of all ſorts of tempers and humours, fortune would have it, That as *Fabius* was ready in hard and difficult times, to ſuſtain the Enemy, and continue the War; ſo afterwards when affairs were in a better poſture, *Scipio* was preſented to finiſh and conclude it. And hence it is, that an Ariſtocracy or free State is longer lived, and generally more fortunate, than a Principality, becauſe in the firſt they are more flexible, and can frame themſelves better to the diverſity of the times: For a Prince being accuſtomed to one way, is hardly to be got out of it, though perhaps the variation of the times require it very much. *Piero Soderini* (whom I have mentioned before) proceeded with great gentleneſs and humanity in all his actions; and he and his Country proſpered whilſt the times were according; but when the times changed, and there was a neceſſity of laying aſide that meekneſs and humility, *Piero* was at a loſs, and he and his Country were both ruined.

Pope

Pope *Julius* XI. during the whole time of his Papacy carried himſelf with great vigour and vehemence; and becauſe the times were agreeable, he proſpered in every thing; but had the times altered, and required other Counſels, he had certainly been ruined, becauſe he could never have complyed. And the reaſon why we cannot change ſo eaſily with the times, is twofold; firſt, becauſe we cannot readily oppoſe our ſelves againſt what we naturally deſire; and next, becauſe when we have often tryed one way, and have always been proſperous, we can never perſwade our ſelves that we can do ſo well any other; and this is the true cauſe why a Princes fortune varies ſo ſtrangely, becauſe ſhe varies the times, but he does not alter the way of his adminiſtrations. And it is the ſame in a Common-wealth, if the variation of the times be not obſerved, and their Laws and Cuſtoms altered accordingly, many miſchiefs muſt follow, and the Government be ruined, as we have largely demonſtrated before; but thoſe alterations of their Laws are more ſlow in a Common-wealth, becauſe they are not ſo eaſily changed, and there is a neceſſity of ſuch times as may ſhake the whole State, to which one man will not be ſufficient, let him change his proceedings, and take new meaſures as he pleaſes. But becauſe we have mentioned *Fabius Maximus*, and how he kept *Hanibal* at a Bay, I think it not amiſs to enquire in the next Chapter whether a General who is reſolved upon any terms to engage, can be obſtructed by the Enemy.

CHAP. X.

A General cannot avoid fighting, when the Enemy is reſolved to Engage him upon any terms.

CNeus Sulpitius Dictator (ſays *Livy*) *adverſus Gallos bellum trahebat, nolens ſe fortunæ committere adverſus hoſtem, quem tempus deteriorem indies, & locus alienus, faceret. Cneus Sulpitius the Dictator declined fighting with the French, becauſe he would not expoſe himſelf unneceſſarily againſt an Enemy, who by the incommodity of the ſeaſon, and inconvenience of his Station was every day in danger to be undone.*

When ſuch a fault happens as deceives all, or the greateſt part of Mankind, I think it not improper to reprehend it over and over again; and therefore though I have formerly in ſeveral places ſhown how much our actions in great things, are different from thoſe in ancient times; yet I think it not ſuperfluous to ſay ſomething of it here.

If in any thing we deviate from the practice of the Ancients, it is in our Military Diſcipline, in which we are ſo abſolutely new, that there is ſcarce any thing uſed that was preferred by our Anceſtors; and the reaſon is, becauſe Common-wealths and Princes, being unwilling to expoſe themſelves to danger, have ſhifted off that ſtudy and charge upon other people: And when in our times any Prince goes in perſon into the field, no extraordinary matter is to be expected, for he takes the command upon him to ſhow his grandeur and magnificence, more than for any thing elſe. Yet they commit fewer faults (by reviewing their Armies ſometimes, and keeping that command in their own hands) than Republicks are wont to do, eſpecially in *Italy*, where truſting all to other people, they underſtand nothing of War themſelves; and on the other ſide, in their Counſels and determinations (which to ſhow their ſuperiority they reſerve to themſelves) they commit a thouſand times more errors than in the field; ſome of which I have mentioned elſewhere, but I ſhall ſpeak here of one of them, and that of more than ordinary importance; when theſe unactive Princes, or effeminate Commonwealths ſend out an Army, the wiſeſt thing which they think they can give in command to their General, is to enjoyn him from fighting, and above all things to have a care of a Battel, ſuppoſing that therein they imitate the wiſdom of *Fabius Maximus*, who preſerved the State, by deferring the combat; but they are miſtaken, and do not conſider that moſt commonly that injunction is either idle, or dangerous; for this is moſt certain, a General who deſires to keep the Field, cannot avoid fighting when the Enemy preſſes, and makes it his buſineſs to engage him. So that to command a General in that Nature, in as much as to bid him fight when the Enemy pleaſes, and not when he ſees occaſion himſelf. For to keep the field, and avoid fighting, is to be done no way ſo ſecurely as by keeping 50 miles off, and ſending out ſtore of Spies and Scouts that may give you notice of the Enemies approach, and opportunity to retreat. There is another way likewiſe to ſecure your ſelf, and that is to ſhut your ſelf up in ſome ſtrong Town, but both the one and the other are dangerous. In the firſt caſe, The Country is expoſed to the depredations of the Enemy, and a generous Prince will ſooner run the

the hazard of a Battel, than ſpin out a War with ſo much detriment to his Subjects. In the ſecond, your ruine is evident; for cooping up your Army in a City, the Enemy will block you up, or beſiege you, and then the multitude of your men will quickly bring a ſcarcity of proviſions, and ſupplies being cut off, you will be forced to ſurrender; ſo that to avoid fighting either of theſe two ways, is very pernicious. *Fabius* his way of ſtanding upon his guard, and keeping his Army in places of advantage, is laudable and good, when your Army is ſo ſtrong, that the Enemy dares not attack you: Nor can it be ſaid that *Fabius* declined fighting, but that he deferred till he could do it with advantage; for had *Hanibal* advanced againſt him, *Fabius* would have kept his ground and engaged him, but *Hanibal* was too cunning for that; ſo that *Hanibal* as well as *Fabius* avoided fighting; but if either of them would have fought upon diſadvantage, the other had only three remedies; that is, the two foreſaid, and flying. That this which I ſay is true, is manifeſt by a thouſand examples, but more particularly by the War which the *Romans* made upon *Philip* of *Macedon*; *Philip* being invaded by the *Romans*, reſolved not to come to a Battel; and to avoid it, he (as *Fabius* did in *Italy*) encamped his Army upon the top of a Mountain, and entrenched himſelf ſo ſtrongly, that he believed the *Romans* durſt not have ventured to come at him: But they not only adventured, but removed him from the Mountain, forced him to fly with the greateſt part of his Army, and had it not been for the unpaſſableneſs of the Country which hindered the purſuit, the *Macedonians* had all been cut off. *Philip*, then, being unwilling to fight, and having (as I ſaid before) encamped upon the Mountains not far from the *Romans*, durſt not truſt himſelf to his advantages; and having found by experience that he was not ſecure there, he would not pin himſelf up in a Town, but made choice of the other way, and kept himſelf at a diſtance; ſo as when the *Romans* came into one Province, he would remove into another, and what place ſoever the *Romans* left, he would be ſure to come to: At length finding this protraction of the War, made his affairs but worſe, and that his Subjects were harraſſed by both Armies, he reſolved to try his fortune, and bring all to the deciſion of a Battel: But it is convenient to avoid fighting when your Army is in the ſame condition as thoſe of *Fabius*, and *Sulpitius*; that is, when it is ſo conſiderable that the Enemy fears to attack you in your entrenchments; and though he has got ſome footing in your Country, yet not ſo much as is able to ſupply him with proviſions; in this caſe 'tis beſt to decline fighting, and follow the example of *Sulpitius*, *Nolens ſe fortunæ committere*, &c. But in all other caſes it is not to be done, but with diſhonour and danger; for to fly (as *Philip* did) is as bad as to be routed, and more diſhonorable, becauſe he gave no proof of his courage, and though he eſcaped by the difficulty of the Country; yet whoever follows his example without that convenience, may chance to be ruin'd. No man will deny but *Hanibal* was a great Soldier, and of more than ordinary experience; when he went into *Africa* againſt *Scipio*, if he had ſeen it for his advantage to have protracted the War, he would have done it, and perchance (being a great Captain, and having as good an Army) he would have done it the ſame way as *Fabius* did in *Italy*; but ſeeing he did not do it, it is probable he was diverted by ſome extraordinary occaſion. For that Prince who has got an Army together, (if he perceives that for want of pay, or ſupplies, he is not likely to keep them long) is ſtark mad if he tries not his fortune before his Army diſbands, for by delaying, he is certainly loſt; by fighting he may poſſibly overcome: And above all things, whether we are victorious or beaten, we are to behave our ſelves honourably, and 'tis more honourable to be overcome by force, than by ſome error to run your ſelf into incommodities that ruine you afterwards. 'Tis not unlikely but *Hanibal* might be impelled by ſome ſuch neceſſity; and on the other ſide *Scipio* (if *Hanibal* ſhould have deferred fighting) might have choſe whether he would have attacked him in his Trenches, becauſe he had already conquered *Syphax*, and got ſuch footing in *Affrick*, that he was as ſafe, and with as much commodity as in *Italy*; but it was otherwiſe with *Hanibal* when he had to do with *Fabius*; and with the *French* when they had to do with *Sulpitius*. And he who invades an Enemies Country, avoids fighting with more difficulty, as being obliged (when ever the Enemy appears to obſtruct him) to give him Battel; and if he ſets down before any Town, he is obliged ſo much the more, as in our times it happen'd to *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy*, who was beaten up in his Leaguer before *Morat* by the *Swizzers*, and defeated. And the ſame thing fell out to the *French* at the Seige of *Novarra*, where they were attacht and beaten by the *Swizzers*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

One perſon that has many Enemies upon his hands, though he be inferiour to them, yet if he can ſuſtain their firſt impreſſion, carries commonly the Victory.

THE power of the Tribunes of the people was great and neceſſary in the City of *Rome* to corect the ambition of the Nobility, who otherwiſe would have debauch'd the ſaid City much ſooner than they did: But as it happens in other things, ſo it happened in this; in the beſt and moſt beneficial thing to the Common-wealth, there was an occult, and remote evil that lay ſnug, which required new Laws, and new methods to ſuppreſs. For the inſolence of the Tribunitial authority grew ſo great, that it became terrible both to the Senate and people, and had doubtleſly produced ſome great miſchief to the Common-wealth, had not *Appius Claudius* by his great wiſdom, found out a way to temper and ballance their fury, by the interceſſion of their Colleagues, and the way was by chooſing out ſome perſon among the Tribunes, whom either out of fear, or corruption, or love to his Country they could diſpoſe to withſtand the deſigns of his Brethren, and oppoſe himſelf againſt them, whenever their reſolutions were tending to the diminution of the Nobility, or prejudice of the State. Which way of reſtraining the petulancy of the Tribunes was for a long time of great advantage to the *Romans*, and may give us occaſion to conſider, whether a combination of ſeveral great perſons, againſt one leſs powerful than they (whilſt united) is like to be ſucceſsful againſt him that is alone; or whether the ſingle perſon has the advantage againſt the Confederacy. I anſwer, That thoſe whoſe Forces are united, are many times ſtronger, but their performances are ſeldom ſo great, as the ſingle perſons, though he be nothing ſo ſtrong, for committing an infinite number of other things (in which the ſingle perſon has the advantage) he will be able with a little induſtry to break, and divide and enfeeble them: To this purpoſe there is no need of going to antiquity for examples (where there is plenty enough) the paſſages of our own times will furniſh us ſufficiently. In the year 1484, all *Italy* confederated againſt the *Venetian*, who, when they were ſo over-power'd and diſtreſs'd that they were unable to keep the field, found a way to work off Count *Lodavic* (Governor of *Milan*) from their League, by which means they not only obtained a Peace, and reſtitution of what they had loſt; but they got a good part of the Dutchy of *Ferrara*; ſo that they whoſe Forces were too weak to appear before the Enemy; when they came to treat, were the greateſt gainers by the War. Not many years ſince, the whole Chriſtian world ſeemed to conſpire againſt *France*; yet before the end of the War, the *Spaniard* fell off from the League, made his Peace with the *French*, and forced the reſt of the Confederates, one after one, to do the ſame. And from hence we may eaſily collect that as often as many Princes or States are confederated together againſt any ſingle Prince or Common-wealth, if the ſingle Prince and Common-wealth be ſtrong enough to withſtand their firſt impreſſion, and ſpin out the War, he will certainly prevail; but if his force be not ſufficient to do that, he is in extraordinary danger, as it happen'd to the *Venetians*; for had they been able to have ſuſtained their firſt ſhock, and protracted the War, till they had debauched ſome of the Confederates, the *French* had never done them ſo much miſchief, and they had preſerv'd themſelves from ruine: But their Army being too weak to confront them, and their time too little to divide them, they were undone; and this is evident by what happen'd afterward; for as ſoon as the Pope had recovered what he had loſt, he reconciled himſelf, and became their friend; the *Spaniard* did the ſame, and both of them would have been glad to have continued *Lombardy* to the *Venetians*, rather than the *French* ſhould have got it, and made himſelf ſo conſiderable in *Italy*. The *Venetians* at that time might have prevented a great part of their calamities, had they given ſome ſmall part of their Territory to the Enemy, and thereby have ſecured the reſt; but then they muſt have given it in time, and ſo as it might not have appeared to have been done by neceſſity, as they might well have done before the War was commenced; when that was begun, it would have been diſhonourable, and perhaps ineffectual. But before thoſe troubles, there were few of the *Venetian* Citizens that could foreſee a danger; fewer that could remedy it; and none at all that could adviſe. To conclude therefore this Chapter, I do pronounce, that as the *Roman* remedy againſt the ambition of their Tribunes, was the multitude of them, out of which they always found ſome or other, that they could make for the intereſt of the Publick; ſo it is a ready remedy for any Prince that is engaged againſt a confederate Enemy, when he can break their League, and work any of the Confederates to a ſeparation.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

A wiſe General is to put a neceſſity of fighting upon his own Army, but to prevent it to his Enemies.

WE have formerly diſcourſed of what uſe and importance neceſſity is in humane Exploits, and ſhown how many men, compelled by neceſſity, have done glorious things, and made their memories immortal. Moral Philoſophers have told us, That the Tongue, and the Hands are noble Inſtruments of themſelves; yet they had never brought things to that exactneſs and perfection, had not neceſſity impelled them. The Generals therefore of old, underſtanding well the virtue of this neceſſity, and how much more deſperate and obſtinate their Soldiers were rendered thereby, made it their care to bring their Soldiers into a neceſſity of fighting, and to keep it from their Enemies; to which end, they many times opened a paſſage for the Enemies Army, which they might eaſily have obſtructed; and precluded it to their own, when they might as eaſily have paſſed. Whoever therefore, deſires to make his Garriſon ſtout and couragious, and obſtinate for the defence of a Town, or to render his Army pertinacious in the field, is above all things to reduce them into ſuch a neceſſity, or at leaſt to make them believe it: So that a wiſe General, who deſigns the beſieging of a Town, judges of the eaſineſs or difficulty of the expugnation, from the neceſſity which lyes upon the Citizens to defend themſelves: If the neceſſity of their defence be great, his enterprize is the more difficult, becauſe the courage and obſtinacy of the beſieged is like to be the greater; but where there is no ſuch neceſſity, there is no ſuch danger. Hence it is that revolted Towns are much harder to be recovered, than they were to be taken at firſt; for at firſt having committed no fault, they were in fear of no puniſhment, and therefore ſurrendered more eaſily: But in the other caſe having the guilt of their defection upon their Spirits, they are fearful of revenge, and ſo become more obſtinate in their defence. Theſe are not unuſual, and yet there are other cauſes which render the minds of people obſtinate in their defence, and one of them is the natural hatred and animoſity which is frequently betwixt Neighbouring Princes and States, which proceeds from an inſatiable deſire of Dominion in Princes, and as zealous an inclination to liberty in Common-wealths, eſpecially if they be conſtituted as in *Tuſcany*, where that emulation and jealouſie has made them refractory both on the one ſide, and the other. Hence it is, though the that *Florentines* have been at greater charges than the *Venetians*, yet their acqueſts are not ſo much, becauſe the Towns in *Tuſcany* were moſt of them free, and by conſequence more difficult to be brought to ſubjection; whereas the Towns which the *Venetians* conquered, having been moſt of them under Princes, and accuſtomed to ſervitude, it was indifferent to them under whoſe dominion they were; and they are ſo far from reſiſting a change, that they do many times deſire it. So that though the Cities upon the frontiers of the *Venetian*, were generally ſtronger, than thoſe upon the frontiers of the *Florentine*, yet they were reduced with more eaſe; becauſe being not ſo free, they were leſs obſtinate in their defence: when therefore, a wiſe General reſolves upon a Siege, he is with all diligence to take away that neceſſity from the Citizens which may make them inflexible, either by promiſing indempnity, if they have deſerved to be puniſhed; or if it be only their liberty of which they are fearful, by aſſuring them that his deſigns are not againſt that, but only againſt the ambition and exorbitancy of ſome particular perſons; which kind of promiſes have had ſtrange effects in the facilitating of Enterprizes, and the taking of Towns; for though wiſe men will eaſily diſcover the fraud, yet the multitude are commonly ſo impatient of War, and ſo mad to be at quiet, that they ſhut their Eyes againſt any thing of miſchief that comes to them under propoſitions of peace; by which means many Cities have loſt their liberty, as it happened to *Florence* not long ſince; and to M. *Craſſus* and his Army heretofore, who though he was ſenſible that the promiſes of the *Parthians* were fraudulent, and made only to keep his Soldiers from that neceſſity of defending themſelves, yet he could not convince them, nor prevail with them to ſtand bravely upon their guard, but being blinded with their overtures of Peace, both Army and General were cut off, as may be ſeen by the Hiſtory. The *Samnites*, put on by the ambition of ſome of their Citizens, brake their Peace with the *Romans*, and invaded their Country; but being afterwards ſenſible of what they had done, they ſent Embaſſadors to *Rome* offering reſtitution of what they had taken, and to deliver up the Authors of that Counſel into their hands, to be puniſhed as they pleas'd; but being rejected, and their Embaſſadors ſent home without any hopes of agreement, *Pontius* their General uſed

it as an argument to encourage his men to fight more obſtinately, that the *Romans* having refuſed their fair overtures of Peace, were reſolved upon War; and therefore there was no other courſe, but of neceſſity they muſt fight. And (ſays he) *Juſtum eſt bellum, quibus eſt neceſſarium & pia arma, quibus nulla niſi in armis ſpes eſt. That War is juſt that is neceſſary, and Arms are piouſly taken up by him, who has no other hopes to ſecure himſelf.* Upon which neceſſity he founded the hopes of his Victory. C. *Manlius* was at the head of an Army againſt the *Vejentes*, and part of the Army of the *Vejentes* being got into his Camp, *Manlius* to cut off their retreat, doubled his Guards at the gates, and fortified all the Paſſes by which they were to return; but the *Vejentes* perceiving they were deſperate, fought with ſo much courage and fury, that they killed the Conſul, and had cut off his whole Army, had not one of the Tribunes very wiſely opened them a way to be gone: In which action we may obſerve that whilſt the *Vejentes* were under a neceſſity of fighting, there was no reſiſting of their courage; but when a way was opened for their retreat, they choſe rather to fly. The *Volſci* and the *Equi* were entered upon the confines of the *Romans*, who ſent their Conſuls againſt them with an Army: and coming to a Battel, it happened that in the heat of it, the *Volſci* were encloſed by the *Romans*, and as it were ſhut up in their own Camp. *Vettius Meſcius* their General, finding their exigence, and that there was a neceſſity of being killed, or making their way by the Sword, *Ite mecum* (ſays he to his Soldiers) *Non murus, non vallum, armati armitis obſtant, virtute pares, (quæ ultimum & maximum telum eſt) neceſſitate ſuperiores eſtis. Follow me then couragiouſly, you have no Wall, no Rampart, nothing but armed men to withſtand you: you are equal to them in valour, and being under neceſſity, have the ſame advantage of the Weapon.* For *Livy* calls it in this place the higheſt and heavieſt of weapons,

Camillus one of the wiſeſt of all the *Roman* Generals (having ſtormed and entred *Veii* with ſome part of his Army) to facilitate his Victory, and take away from the Enemy that laſt neceſſity of fighting; gave Orders (and ſo loud that the *Vejentes* might be ſure to hear) that no Soldier ſhould dare to touch any man who had thrown down his Arms, by which Proclamation every man was encouraged to throw down his Arms, and the City was taken with ſo little loſs, that ſince that time, that Stratagem has been uſed by ſeveral Commanders.

CHAP. XIII.

Whether we are more ſafe in a good General with a bad Army, or a good Army with a bad General.

Martius Coriolanus being baniſhed from *Rome*, retired to the *Volſci*, where having got an Army together, he returned to *Rome* to revenge himſelf for the injury his fellow Citizens had done him, and he had done it effectually, had not the Prayers and Piety of his Mother prevailed more upon him, than all the power of the *Romans*. From which paſſage *Titus Livius* obſerves, that the *Roman* Common-wealth encreaſed more by the virtue of their Commanders, than by the excellence of their Soldiers; becauſe though the *Volſci* had been always beaten before; yet when they got a *Roman* General, they were too hard for the *Romans*: But though *Livy* was of that opinion in that place, yet in many parts of his Hiſtory there are inſtances, where the private Soldiers have done great things, and ſometimes fought better and in better order, after their Conſuls were killed, than they had done whilſt they were living. Thus it happened in the Army which the *Romans* had in *Spain* under the Command of the two *Scipio's*, which, when both their Commanders were ſlain, behaved it ſelf ſo well, that it not only defended it ſelf, but defeated the Enemy, and preſerved that Province to the *Romans*. So that in the whole, there are examples on both ſides, where the Soldiers have done bravely, and got the Victory by their valour, and where the Conduct of the General has done as much as a whole Army; from whence it may be concluded that they are mutually uſeful, and that the Soldier is as much advantaged by the excellence of his General, as the General by the courage of his Army. However, this I think will not be unworthy our conſideration, whether is moſt formidable, a good Army under a bad Commander, or a good Commander with a bad Army: In the opinion of *Cæſar* neither of them was conſiderable; for when he went into *Spain* againſt *Afranius* and *Petreius*, who had a good Army under their command, he went with much confidence; becauſe, as he ſaid himſelf, *Ibat ad exercitum ſine duce*, *He went againſt an Army without a head*; reflecting thereby upon the inſufficiency of their Generals. Again when

when he went into *Theſſaly* againſt *Pompey*, his expreſſion was *Vado ad ducem ſine Exercitu. I go now againſt a General without an Army.* It remains now that we conſider whether it be moſt eaſie for a good Captain to make a good Army, or a good Army to make a good Captain. But to this, in my opinion, it is eaſily anſwered; for many good men in an Army can ſooner ſelect one out of their number, and inſtruct him ſo, as that he may be fit to command the reſt, than the beſt General in the world can make an Army expert and ready. *Lucullus* when he was ſent againſt *Mithridates*, was utterly unexperienced in matters of War, yet being in a good Army, where his inferior Officers were good, he quickly became a good General. The *Romans* for want of men, were forced to arm their Servants, and having referred them to be diſciplin'd by *Sempronius Gracchus*, in a ſhort time he made them excellent Soldiers. *Pelopidas*, and *Epominondas* after they had reſcued their Country from the Tyranny of the *Spartans*, in a ſhort time made their Country-men ſo good Soldiers, that they were not only able to contend, but to conquer the *Spartans*. So that the caſe is equal, and which ſoever is good, may make the other ſo too. Nevertheleſs a good Army, without a good Commander, grows inſolent and dangerous, as it hapned in the *Macedonian* Army after *Alexander* was dead, and as it is in civil Wars among all old Soldiers; ſo that I think if there be more confidence to be repoſed in the one than in the other, it is to be rather in the General, than the Army, eſpecially if he has time to inſtruct and diſcipline his Men; for an Army without a head, is inſolent and mutinous. Thoſe Captains therefore are worthy of double honour, who have not only the Enemy to overcome; but are to inſtruct, and prepare their Forces, before they bring them to engage. And in doing ſo, they do highly recommend the Conduct of their General, which is ſo rare a thing, that if the trouble were laid upon many, they would be much leſs eſteemed and reſpected than they are now.

CHAP. XIV.

What ſtrange effects new inventions have ſometimes in a Battel, and how new Noices have the ſame.

WHat ſtrange conſequences have ſucceeded from ſudden and unexpected accidents that have been ſeen or heard in the heat of a Battel, appears by ſeveral examples in Hiſtory, but eſpecially in the conflict betwixt the *Romans* and the *Volſci*, where *Quintius* obſerving one of the wings of his Army to ſtagger and give ground, cry'd out to them to ſtand firm, for that in the other wing the Victory was theirs; with which words he not only reincouraged his own men, but put ſuch a terror upon the Enemy, that they fled in good earneſt. And if in a well ordered Army thoſe unexpected vociferations have ſuch wonderful effect, in a tumultuous and ill governed Army they have much more, where every thing is more ſubject to the agitation of ſuch winds. And of this we have a memorable example in our times. The City of *Perugia* not many years ſince was divided into two parties, the *Oddi*, and the *Baglioni*. The *Baglioni* prevailing, the *Oddi* were baniſhed. But the *Oddi* having got an Army together, and brought them privately to a place not far from *Perugia*, by the favour of their friends they were let one night into the Town, and poſſeſſed themſelves as far as the *Piazza*. And becauſe the Streets were chained up from one ſide to the other to hinder the paſſage of the Horſe, the *Oddeſche* had a man who went before them with a great engine of Iron wherewith he brake the chains, and he had done his work ſo effectually, that he had broke all the chains, but what opened into the *Piazza*; the alarm being taken, and every body crying out *Arm*, *Arm*, he who broke down the chains being preſſed ſo cloſe by the throng that was behind him, that he had not room for his blow, cryed out to thoſe that were next *Back*, *Back*, intending only to have made more room for his arm: But they who were next him calling *back* to thoſe who were behind them, by degrees the word went thorow the whole Army, and they who werein the Rear not knowing the reaſon, began to run, and being followed by thoſe who were next, the whole Army retreated by little and little, till at laſt they brake out into an abſolute flight, by which inconſiderable accident, the *Oddi* were defeated of their deſign. So that it is to be conſidered, that in a Battel, order is not only to be taken that the Army be well drawn up, and put into a good poſture to fight; but that no ſuch trifling accident be able to diſcompoſe it: For if for any thing the popular multitude be unfit for the Wars, it is becauſe every noiſe, rumour, or alarm, diſtracts them, and puts them to the rout. Wherefore it ought to be a principal care in a good General to appoint ſuch perſons as are to receive

all orders and words of command, and derive them to the reſt, that by ſo doing the Soldiers being accuſtomed to their Officers, may not receive any ſuch orders, but from ſuch perſons as are commiſſioned thereunto; the want of which cuſtom has many times produc'd very great confuſion. As to apparitions, and ſuch things as are many times ſeen, it is the part of a good General, to contrive and exhibit (in the very height of the Battel) ſuch ſights as may encourrge his own men, and diſcourage the Enemy; for among many accidents which conduce to your victory, this may be eſpecially effectual. To this purpoſe is that invention of which *Sulpitius* made uſe againſt the *Frene*; being drawn up and ready to engage the Enemy, he cauſed all the Servants and refuſe of his Army to be armed and mounted upon the Mules and Horſes belonging to the Baggage; and having furniſhed them ſo formally with Colours and Trumpets, that they appeared a compleat body of Horſe, he diſpoſed them behind a hill, where they were to continue, till in the heat of the fight, they were to come forth and ſhow themſelves to the Enemy; which ſtratagem being as well executed as deviſed, ſtruck ſuch a terror into the *French*, that it loſt them the day. So that a good General has a double care upon him, to contrive by theſe new ſurprizes to intimidate the Enemy; and to provide that if any ſuch practices be uſed upon him, he may diſcover, and defeat them. Thus an *Indian* King ſerved *Semeramis*, who obſerving the ſaid King to be very ſtrong in the number of Elephants, to fright and perſwade him that ſhe was as ſtrong as he, ſhe cauſed ſeveral of her Camels to be dreſs'd up, and covered with the Skins of Bufaloes and Bulls, that they might look big, and carry the repreſentation of Elephants; and having done ſo, ſhe marched them in the Van of her Army, but her deſign did not take; for the King having intelligence of it, perverted it to her prejudice.

The *Fidenates* being beſieged by *Mamorcus* the Dictator, to terrifie the *Roman* Army, contrived to have ſeveral of the Townſmen in the heat of the Engagement to come ſuddenly out of the Town with Fire-works at the end of their Launces, hoping that the newneſs of the ſight might be a means to diſturb them. And here it is to be noted, that when ſuch ſtratagems have more of reality than pretence, they may very well be made uſe of, becauſe having ſomething of ſolidity in them, their weakneſs is not ſo ſoon diſcovered; but where they have more of appearance and fiction than truth, it is beſt either not to uſe them at all, or if you do, to keep them at ſuch a diſtance, as that their fallacy may not be diſcerned; as *Sulpitius* did with his Muletiers; for when they are intrinſically weak, their vanity appears upon their approach, and they do more miſchief than good, as the Elephants of *Semiramis*, and the falſe fires of the *Fidenates*, which fires though at firſt, they gave ſome diſturbance to the *Roman* Soldiers; yet the Dictator coming in, and queſtioning them aloud whether they were not aſhamed to be ſmoaked like Bees out of their Huts; encouraging them to turn again, he cryed out, *Suis flammis delete Fedenas quos veſtris beneficiis placare non potuiſtis; Go to, deſtroy the Fidenæ with their own fires, ſeeing all your kindneſſes have not been able to oblige them*; and by ſo doing, he defeated the *Fidenates*, and made their project unprofitable.

CHAP. XV.

One General is beſt for an Army, and that to govern it by Commiſſioners, is not ſo good.

THe *Fidenates* having rebelled, and cut off that Colony of the *Romans* that was amongſt them, the *Romans* created four Tribunes, and inveſted with Conſulary power, whereof one being left behind for the ſecurity of the City of *Rome*; the other three were ſent againſt the *Fidenates* and *Veientes*; but diſagreeing among themſelves, they came off with diſhonour, though their loſs was not much: That they gain'd no more honour, they may thank themſelves; that they received no more loſs, they may thank their good Souldiers. However the *Romans* finding the inconvenience, returned to their old way of Dictators, that what three perſons had diſordered, might be remedied by one. From whence we may diſcern the inconvenience of many Commanders either in an Army or Town, which *Livy* has expreſſed very clearly in theſe following words, *Tres Tribuni Poteſtate Conſulari, documento fuere, quam plurium imperium bello inutile eſſet, tenendo ad ſua quiſq; Conſilia, cum alii aliud videretur, apperuerunt ad occaſionem locum hoſti*; *Theſe three Tribunes with Conſular power, gave us to underſtand the uſeleſneſs of multiplicity of Commanders, for each of them adhering to his own Counſels, whilſt one was for*

for one thing, and another as poſitive for another, nothing was done, and they gave the enemy an advantage. And though this be example enough to prove the inconvenience of many Commanders, yet for better illuſtration I ſhall add ſome others both ancient and modern. In the year 1500 King *Lewis* XII of *France* having retaken *Milan*, ſent his Army to *Piſa* to recover it for the *Florentines*; who to command it had ſent thither two Commiſſaries, one of them called *Giovan-battiſta Ridolfi*, and the other *Luca d'Antonio de gli Albizzi*. *Giovan-battiſta* was a perſon of reputation and gravity, and being ancienter than *Luca*, *Luca* left the whole adminiſtration to him; but though he ſhewed no ambition in oppoſing him; he did it abundantly by his ſilence, and ſullenneſs, neglecting, and undervaluing every thing that was done; ſo that he was ſo far from aſſiſting his Colleague either with his counſel or perſon, that he appeared as if he had been utterly ignorant in matters of war: but it proved otherwiſe afterwards, when upon ſome accident *Giovan-battiſta* was recalled, and *Luca* remained behind with abſolute command; for then he gave ample teſtimony both of his courage and conduct, which before, whilſt he had a Colleague, no body could have believed. To this purpoſe I ſhall add another ſaying of *Livy*, who giving an account how *Quintius* and *Agrippa* (his Colleague) being ſent againſt the *Æqui*, *Agrippa* would needs have the whole management of the war to be committed to *Quintius*, for (ſays he) *Saluberrimum in adminiſtratione magnarum rerum eſt, ſummam imperii apud unum eſſe; In the adminiſtration of great affairs it is beſt that the Sovereign power be inveſted in one perſon.* Which is contrary to the preſent practice of our Princes and States, who do often depute more than one Commander both to their Armies and Towns; which (however they think it for the beſt) muſt needs breed inconceivable confuſion. And if the cauſe of the ruine of ſo many *Italian* and *French* Armies in our times be enquired into, it will be found to be the multitude, and emulation of their Commanders, and it may be ſafely concluded, that it is better to ſend a man of ordinary prudence, and experience, upon any expedition, than two of the wiſeſt and beſt Souldiers they have, with equal commiſſion.

CHAP. XVI.

That in times of difficulty, virtue is in eſteem; in times of eaſe and luxury, men of riches and alliance are in greateſt requeſt.

IT always was, and always will be the fortune of perſons of more than ordinary endowments to be laid aſide and neglected in times of peace, eſpecially in a Common-wealth; for that envy which is contracted by their virtue, ſets up many Citizens againſt them, who will not only be their equals, but ſuperiors. To this purpoſe *Thucidides* (a Greek Author) has a place in his Hiſtory, where he ſhews how the Republick of *Athens*, having had the better in the *Peloponeſian* War, depreſſed the pride of the *Spartans*, and ſubdued the greateſt part of *Greece*, was ſo enhanſed and elated with their ſucceſs, that it was propoſed to fall upon *Sicily*.

It was ſeriouſly debated in *Athens* whether the ſaid enterprize ſhould be undertaken or not; *Alcibiades* and other Citizens of his party promoted it highly, not ſo much in reſpect of the publick good as their own private advantage, expecting that the management of that war would be placed in their hands. But *Nicias* (a perſon of the greateſt reputation in *Athens*) diſſwaded it; and his great argument to make the people believe he ſpake his judgment, and more for the benefit of the Common-wealth than any intereſt of his own, was, that he adviſed rather contrary to his own advantage, becauſe in time of peace there were many of his fellow Citizens before him, but in time of war he knew he ſhould be the firſt: by which we may ſee it has been an ancient infirmity in Common-wealths not to value perſons of worth in times of peace, which diſobliges them doubly; to ſee themſelves deprived of their dignities, and to ſee others preferred to them of leſs ſufficiency than they, which error has been the occaſion of much confuſion; for thoſe perſons who find themſelves neglected, and know the reaſon of all is, the tranquility of the times make it their buſineſs to embroil them, and put their Country upon war, though never ſo much to its prejudice. And thinking ſometimes with my ſelf what remedies were moſt proper, I could light but on two, one was to keep the Citizens from growing too rich, that wealth without virtue might not be ſufficient to advance any man, or able to corrupt other people, or themſelves: the other, ſo to prepare and adapt themſelves for war, that they may never be ſurprized, but have always employment for the braveſt of their Citizens, as *Rome* had in the time of her proſperity. For that City having Armies always abroad, there was con-

ſtant

ſtant exerciſe for the virtue of their Citizens: nor could a man of worth be degraded, nor an improper man be prefer'd in his place, becauſe when ever ſuch a thing was done, (whether by way of error, or experiment, it was the ſame) the diſorders and dangers which followed, were ſo ſudden and great, that they quickly found their miſtake, and return'd to their old method again. But other Cities and States not ſo well conſtituted as that, which make war only in caſes of neceſſity, cannot defend themſelves from thoſe inconveniences, but are always in trouble and diſorder when ever that excellent Citizen which is neglected is vindicative, and hath any reputation or party in the City. And though for ſometime *Rome* kept her ſelf free from theſe inconveniences, yet after ſhe had conquered *Carthage* and *Antiochus*, (as has been ſaid before) and ſeemed to be paſt all fear of war for the future, ſhe choſe ſeveral Commanders for her Army, not ſo much for their conduct or virtue, as for thoſe qualities which were likely to recommend them to the people. *Paulus Æmilius* ſtood many times for the Conſulſhip, and was repulſed; nor could he ever be made Conſul till the *Macedonian* war, which was committed unanimouſly to his conduct, becauſe they ſaw it was like to be dangerous and difficult. After the year 1494 our City of *Florence* being engaged in ſeveral wars, in which none of our Citizens had perform'd any great matter, at laſt the City hapned upon a perſon who ſhewed them after what manner an Army was to be commanded, his name was *Antonio Giacomini*; whilſt the war was dangerous, and there was any trouble or difficulty to manage it, *Antonio* was free from the ambition of his fellow Citizens, and had no competitor in his election to be Commiſſary, and General of their Armies: but when thoſe were paſt, and new wars that were more eaſy and honourable were to be undertaken, he had ſo many competitors, that when three Commiſſaries were to be choſen for the reduction of *Piſa*, *Antonio* could not obtain to be one: and though it be not manifeſt what inconvenience accrewed to the Common-wealth by the waving of *Antonio*, yet it may be eaſily conjectured, for the *Piſans* being diſtreſſed for want of proviſions, and having nothing left wherewithal to defend themſelves, (had *Antonio* been there) would have been forc'd to have ſurrendred at diſcretion; but being beſieged by ſuch Officers as knew not how to ſtraihgten or preſs them, they held out ſo long, that the *Florentines* were glad to buy them out at laſt, whereas they might as well have had them by force. No queſtion but *Antonio* reſented it highly, and he had need be a good man, and of more than ordinary patience not to think of revenging himſelf, though with the ſubverſion of the whole City, (if he could) and the ruine of every private Citizen, which is to be carefully prevented by every State, as ſhall be ſhewn in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

A man is not to be diſobliged, and employed afterwards in any matter of importance.

A Common-wealth is diligently to provide that no Citizen be entruſted in any weighty affair, who has received any remarkable injury; *Claudius Nero* (who divided the Army which was deſigned to confront *Hanibal*, and marched away with a ſtrong party into *la Mara* to joyn with the other Conſul, and engage *Aſdrubal* before he got up with his ſupplies to *Hanibal*) having formerly commanded the *Roman* Army in *Spain* againſt the ſaid *Aſdrubal*, had come off with diſhonour; for though he had encloſed *Aſdrubal* and his whole Army, and ſo poſſeſt himſelf of all paſſes, that he muſt either fight with diſadvantage, or periſh with hunger, yet he was over-reach'd with the ſubtilty of the *Carthaginians*, who drill'd him on with pretended overtures of peace, till at length in the night he ſtole his Army thorow the woods, and got off where he was ſafe. This paſſage being known in *Rome*, was no ſmall diminution to *Nero*'s reputation both with the Senate and the People: but being afterwards made Conſul, and ſent with an Army againſt *Hanibal*, he ventured upon that deſperate counſel of dividing the Army, which was a thing ſo doubtful and uncertain in the opinion of the *Romans*, that the City was in ſtrange anxiety and ſuſpence till they had the news of his Victory. It is reported that when *Claudius Nero* was queſtioned afterwards by his friends what it was that mov'd him to ſo hazardous an enterprize, in which, without any neceſſary provocation, he had ventured the whole liberty of their Country, he anſwered, he had done it, becauſe he knew if he ſucceeded, he ſhould recover that honour which he had loſt in *Spain*; if he miſcarried, and his deſign ſhould have a contrary end, he ſhould have had the ſatisfaction to have been revenged of the City and Citizens, by whom he had been ſo ingratefully, and ſo indiſcreetly calumniated. And if the indigna-

indignation ariſing from theſe kind of provocations could work ſo ſtrongly upon a *Roman* Citizen, in thoſe times when *Rome* was in its innocence; we may eaſily imagine what prodigious effects it may have upon perſons in a City not ſo well conſtituted as that; and becauſe againſt theſe kind of diſorders (to which all Common-wealths are ſubject) no certain remedy can be preſcrib'd, it follows that no Common-wealth can be poſſibly perpetual, foraſmuch as a thouſand unexpected accidents fall in, to haſten its deſtruction.

CHAP. XVIII.

Nothing is more honourable in a General, than to foreſee the deſigns of his enemy.

IT was the ſaying of *Epaminondas* the *Theban*, that no one quality was more uſeful and neceſſary in a General, than to be able to know the reſolutions and deſigns of his enemy, and diſcover that by conjecture, which he could not do by any certain intelligence. Nor is it difficult only to underſtand his deſigns, but his actions; and of thoſe actions not only ſuch as are perform'd privately, or at a diſtance, but ſuch as are done (as it were) before his face. For it many times falls out, that when a Battel continues till night, he who has the better, believes he has the worſt; and who has loſt all, ſuppoſes he has the Victory. Which miſtake has put the Generals many times upon pernitious counſels, as it hapned betwixt *Brutus* and *Caſſius*; for *Brutus* having defeated the enemy with his wing, *Caſſius* ſuppoſing he had been loſt, and his whole Body diſperc'd, kill'd himſelf in deſpair. In our times, at the Battel of S. *Cilicia* in *Lombardy*, *Francis* King of *France* coming to an engagement with the *Swizzers*, the Fight continued till night: a body of the *Swizzers* remaining entire, and hearing nothing of the defeat and execution of their Camrades, concluded the Victory was theirs, which error was the occaſion that they marched not off as they might have done, but kept their ground till the next morning, at which time they were charged again, and overthrown.

The ſame error had almoſt ruined the Armies of the Pope and King of *Spain*, who upon a falſe alarm of the Victory of the *Swizzers*, paſſed the *Po*, and advanced ſo far, that ere they were aware they had like to have fa len into the mouths of the victorious French. The like fell out of old in the Camps of the *Romans* and *Æqui*; *Sempronius* the Conſul being commanded out with an Army againſt the enemy, and forcing him to a Battel, it continued till night without any viſible advantage on either ſide. Night coming on, and both Armies ſufficiently ſpent, neither of them retir'd to their Camps, but betook themſelves to the neighbouring hills, where they believed they ſhould be more ſafe. The *Roman* Army divided into two parts, one went with the Conſul, and the other with *Tempanius* the Centurion, by whoſe courage the Roman Army was preſerved that day. The next morning the Conſul hearing no more of the enemy, retreated towards *Rome*; the *Æqui* with their Army did the ſame, for both of them thought they had been beaten, and marched away without regarding the loſs or plunder of their Camps. It hapned that *Tempanius* being behind with his ſquadron, and marching off as the reſt, he took certain of the wounded *Æqui* priſoners, who inform'd him that their Generals were gone out of the field, and had quitted their Camps. Upon enquiry finding it to be true, he entred into the *Roman*, and ſecured it, but the enemies Camp was given in prey to the Souldier, after which he returned with Victory to *Rome*, which Victory conſiſted only in having the firſt intelligence of the enemies diſorder: from whence it is obſervable that two Armies engaged, may be each of them in the ſame diſtreſs and deſpair, and that that Army goes away with the Victory which has firſt notice of the neceſſities of the other: and of this I ſhall give a pregnant example of late days, and at home. In the year 1498 the *Florentines* had a great Army in the Country of *Piſa*, and had belieged that City very cloſe. The *Venetian* having undertaken its protection, and ſeeing no other way to relieve it; to divert the enemy, and remove the war, they reſolved to invade the Territory of the *Florentines*, to which purpoſe they raiſed a ſtrong Army, marched into their Country by the *Valdi Lamona*, poſſeſſed themſelves of the Town of *Marradi*, and belieged the Caſtle of *Caſtigione* which ſtands above upon an hill. The *Florentines* upon the alarm reſolved to relieve *Marradi*, and yet not weaken their Army before *Piſa*, whereupon they raiſed a new Army both Horſe and Foot, and ſent them thither under the Command of *Jacopo Quarto Appiano* (Lord of *Piombino*) and the Count *Rinuccio da Marciano*. The *Florentine* Army being conducted to the hills, the *Venetian* raiſed his ſiege before *Caſtiglione*, and retreated into the Town:

Town: the Armies being in this poſture, and facing one another for ſeveral days, both of them ſuffered exceedingly for want of all manner of proviſions; at length neither of them being very earneſt to come to a Battel, and each of them being ignorant of the others diſtreſs, they reſolved the next morning to break up their Camp, and each of them to retire, the *Venetian* towards *Berzighella* and *Faenza*, and the *Florentine* towards *Caſaglia* and *Mugello*. The morning being come, and the baggage ſent away before, a poor woman hapned to come into the *Florentine* Camp, from *Marradi* to ſee ſome of her relations who were in the ſervice of the *Florentine*: by this woman the *Florentine* Generals had notice that the *Venetians* were gone; whereupon reaſſuming their courage, they altered their counſels, purſued the enemy, and writ Letters to *Florence*, that they had not only beaten the *Venetians*, but made an end of the war. Which Victory proceeded from nothing but becauſe they had the firſt news of the retreat of the enemy, which if it had come to the other ſide, as it did to them, the conſequence would have been the ſame, and the *Florentines* have been beaten.

CHAP. XIX.

Whether for the Government of the multitude, obſequiouſneſs and indulgence be more neceſſary than puniſhment.

THe *Roman* Common-wealth was perplexed with the diſſentions betwixt the Nobility, and the people; nevertheleſs, their foreign Wars requiring it, they ſent forth with their Armies, *Quintius*, and *Appius Claudius*: *Appius* being rough, and cruel in his commands, was ſo ill obeyed by his Soldiers, that he was defeated, and fled out of his Province. *Quintius* being more gentle and benign, was better obeyed, and carried the Victory where he was; from whence it appears more conducing to the well governing of a multitude, to be rather obliging, than proud, and pitiful, than cruel. However *Cornelius Tacitus* tells us, (and many others are of his mind) *In multitudine regenda plus pœna quam obſequium valet, That to the managing of a multitude, ſeverity is more requiſite than mildneſs.* And I think both may be true to this diſtinction, of Companions and Subjects; if thoſe under your command be Companions and fellow Citizens with you, you cannot ſecurely uſe them with that ſeverity, of which *Tacitus* ſpeaks; for the people of *Rome* having equal authority with the Nobility, was not to be uſed ruggedly by any man that was put over them for but a while. And it has been many times ſeen that the *Roman* Generals, who behaved themſelves amicably towards their Souldiers, and governed them with mildneſs, have done greater things than thoſe who uſed them with auſterity, and kept them in perpetual fear, unleſs they were endued with more than ordinary virtue, like *Manlius Torquatus*. But he whoſe command is over his Subjects, (of whom *Cornelius* ſpeaks) is to have a care they grow not inſolent, and contemn him for his eaſineſs, and there, is rather to uſe ſeverity than gentleneſs with them; yet that is to be done (too) with ſuch moderation, that they may be kept from abhorring him; for the hatred of the Subject is never good for a Prince, and the beſt way to prevent it, is by not interrupting the Subject in the quiet enjoyment of his eſtate; for blood (unleſs there be ſome deſign of rapacity under it) no Prince does deſire it, but upon ſome extraordinary neceſſity, and that neceſſity happens but ſeldom. But when cruelty and rapine meet together in the nature of one perſon, there never wants deſire, nor pretences for cruelty, as I have demonſtrated largely in another Treatiſe upon this occaſion. *Quintius* therefore deſerved more praiſe than *Appius* deſerved: and the ſaying of *Tacitus* is true enough with the aforeſaid reſtriction, but not in the caſe of *Appius*: and becauſe I have ſpoken of kindneſs and ſeverity, I will give you one example, how mildneſs prevailed more upon the *Faliſci* than violence could do.

CHAP. XX.

One inſtance of humanity wrought more upon the Faliſci, *than all the force of the* Romans.

Camillus having beſieged the *Faliſci*, and attempted many things againſt them but in vain, a School-maſter who had the tuition of ſeveral of the principal young Gentlemen of that City, thinking to gratify *Camillus*, and ingratiate with the people of *Rome*, carrying them out of the walls, under pretence of exerciſe and recreation, he conveyed them all into the Camp of *Camillus*, and preſenting them to him, told him, that by their means he might become Maſter of the Town: *Camillus* was ſo far from accepting his preſent, that he cauſed the Pædagogue to be ſtrip'd, and his hands tied behind him, and then putting a rod into every one of the young Gentlemens hands, he cauſed them to ſcourge him back again into the Town: which piece of humanity and juſtice when the Citizens underſtood, they reſolved to defend themſelves no longer, and ſo immediately ſurrendred: a great example doubtleſs, and by which we may learn, that many times kindneſs and generoſity moves an enemy more than all the force and artifice of war; for 'tis frequently ſeen that thoſe Provinces and Cities which no violence or ſtratagem have ſubdued, have been melted and wrought upon by one ſingle act of pity, chaſtity, or liberality: and of this, Hiſtory is full of many other examples beſides. *Pyrrhus* could not be got out of *Italy* by all the power of the *Romans*; and yet *Fabritius* ſent him packing by one act of generoſity, and that was giving him notice that ſome of his intimates would poiſon him, and had made overtures to the *Romans* to that purpoſe. Again, *Scipio Africanus* got not ſo much honour by the taking of *Carthage*, as he did by one act of chaſtity, when he ſent home a young beautiful Lady (that was taken priſoner, and preſented to him) untouch'd to her Husband; for at the news of that one act, all *Spain* was aſtoniſhed, and began to admire the virtue and innocence of the *Romans*, which virtue is a thing ſo univerſally celebrated, that there are no great perſons endued with it, but are highly eſteemed by all people, as appears by all Ethicks, Politicks, and Hiſtory, among which, the Hiſtory of *Xenophon* is abundantly copious, in demonſtrating what Honours and what Victories accrewed to *Cyrus* upon the bare account of his affability and mildneſs; and how he was never guilty of the leaſt pride, or cruelty, or luxury, or any other vice that defiles the converſation of man. Nevertheleſs, ſeeing *Hanibal* did the ſame things, and by a contrary way, it will not be amiſs in the next Chapter to enquire the reaſon.

CHAP. XXI.

How it came to paſs that Hanibal *by methods quite contrary to what were practiced by* Scipio, *did the ſame things in* Italy *that the other did in* Spain.

I Doubt not but it may ſeem ſtrange to ſome people, that other Captains who have taken a quite contrary way to what is preſcribed in my laſt Chapter, ſhould notwithſtanding have had the ſame ſucceſs; for from thence it ſeems to follow, that Victory does not depend either upon humanity or juſtice, when we ſee the ſame praiſe and reputation acquir'd by quite contrary habits: and to prove this, we need not go far for examples: the ſame *Scipio* whom we mentioned before, being with an Army in *Spain*, carried himſelf with ſo much piety, and juſtice, and liberality to all people, that he got the love of the whole Province: on the other ſide we ſee *Hanibal* in *Italy* acting quite contrary, and with violence, cruelty, rapine, and all manner of infidelity perſecuting the people, and yet with the ſame laudable effects as *Scipio* had in *Spain*. And conſidering with my ſelf what might be the reaſon, they ſeemed to me to be ſeveral. The firſt is, becauſe men are ſtudious of novelty, and that not only thoſe who are under ſlavery or ſubjection, but thoſe who are free, and in peace; for (as is ſaid before) men are as well ſatiated with happineſs, as afflicted with miſery.

This deſire (therefore) of change opens a door to any man that invades a Province with any conſiderable force: if he be a foreigner, they all follow after him: if a native, they attend him, aſſiſt him, and encourage him: ſo that let him take which way he pleaſes, he muſt needs make great progreſs in thoſe places. Again, people are generally excited

two ways, either by love, or by fear; ſo that he that is feared, is often times as readily obeyed as he that is beloved, and ſometimes more. It is not material therefore to a Commander which of theſe two ways he takes; for if he be a virtuous perſon, and of any extraordinary faculties, he will be admired by the people, as *Hanibal* and *Scipio* were, whoſe great worth effaced, or covered all the faults that they committed. But in either of theſe two ways, great inconveniences may ariſe, and ſuch as may ruine a Prince. For he who deſires to be beloved, upon the leaſt exceſs or immoderation in his Courtſhip, is ſubject to be deſpiſed; and he on the other ſide who affects to be feared, upon the leaſt extravagance makes himſelf odious: and to keep the middle way exactly, is not poſſible to our nature; wherefore it is neceſſary to thoſe who exceed in either kind, to attone for it with ſome extraordinary virtue, as *Hanibal* and *Scipio* did, who though perſons of great prudence and conduct, yet it appeared that both of them ſuffered by their manner of living, as well as they were advanced. Their advancement is mentioned before; their ſufferings (as to *Scipio*) was the rebellion of his Army, and part of his friends in *Spain*, which proceeded from nothing but want of being feared, for men are naturally ſo unquiet, that every little dore that is opened to their ambition ſets them a-gog, and aboliſhes all that love which they ow'd to their Prince for his humanity towards them, as in this example of the Friends and Army of *Scipio*; wherefore *Scipio* was conſtrained to make uſe of that ſeverity in ſome meaſure, which he had always declined. As to *Hanibal*, there is not any particular example where his cruelty or infidelity did him hurt; only it may be ſuppoſed that they were the occaſion why *Naples* and ſeveral other Towns ſtood ſo firm to the *Romans*. It is plain likewiſe that his bloodineſs and impiety made him more odious to the people of *Rome*, than all the enemies that ever that City had: for whereas when *Pyrrhus* was with a great Army in *Italy*, they gave him notice of a deſign on foot to have poiſoned him, they were ſo inveterate againſt *Hanibal*, that they never forgave him, but when they had defeated and diſarm'd him, they purſued him to the death. And theſe ſad inconveniences hapned to *Hanibal* from no other cauſes, but becauſe he was impious, unfaithful, and cruel: but then on the other ſide he had the advantage of being admired of all Writers for keeping his Army without any mutiny or diſſention either againſt him, or among themſelves, though it conſiſted of ſo many different Nations, which could be derived from nothing but the awe and terror of his perſon; which terror was ſo great, (conſidered with the reputation and authority that he received from his valour) that thereby he kept his Souldiers united and quiet. I conclude therefore, it imports not much which way a General takes, ſo there be any great excellence in him to recommend it; for (as is ſaid before) both in the one and the other there is danger and defect, if there be not ſome extraordinary virtue to balance it. And if *Hanibal* and *Scipio*, one by laudable, and the other by ignominious and deteſtable ways arrived at the ſame end, and had the ſame effects, I think it convenient in my next Chapter to diſcourſe of two *Roman* Citizens, who by divers ways (but both honourable) arrived at the ſame pitch of glory and renown.

CHAP. II.

How the auſterity of Manlius Torquatus, *and the humanity of* Valerius Corvinus *gain'd each of them the ſame honour and reputation.*

THere were two famous Captains contemporary in *Rome*, *Manlius Torquatus*, and *Valerius Corvinus*, both of them equal in courage, equal in their triumphs, and each of them (as to the enemy) acquir'd all with equal virtue and terror; but as to their own Armies, and manner of diſcipline, it was quite different. *Manlius* commanded with all kind of ſeverity, excuſed his Souldiers from no labour, nor no puniſhment. *Valerius* on the other ſide uſed them with as much gentleneſs and familiarity: *Manlius* to keep his Souldiers ſtrictly to their diſcipline, executed his own ſon; which *Valerius* was ſo far from imitating, that he never offended any man: yet in this great diverſity of conduct, the effects were the ſame, both as to the enemy, the Common-wealth, and themſelves; for none of their Souldiers ever declin'd fighting; none of them rebelled, or ſo much as diſputed their commands, though the diſcipline of *Manlius* was ſo ſevere, that afterwards all exceſſive and extravagant commands were called *Manliana imperia*: in which place it is not amiſs to enquire how it came to paſs that *Manlius* was conſtrained to ſo rigorous a method; what it was that made *Valerius* comport himſelf ſo mildly; how it was that this different way of proceeding ſhould have the ſame effect; and laſt of all, which of the two is moſt worthy

thy to be imitated. If *Manlius* be conſidered as he is repreſented by the Hiſtorian, he will be found to be very valiant, carrying himſelf with great piety to his Father, and Country, and with great reverence to his Superiors, which appeared by his defence of his Father with the hazard of his own life againſt a Tribune who accuſed him; and by his fighting with the *Gaul*, in the behalf of his Country, which notwithſtanding he would not undertake without orders from the Conſul; for when he ſaw a vaſt man, of a prodigious proportion, marching forth upon the Bridge, and challenging any of the *Romans*, he went modeſtly to the Conſul for leave, and told him, *Injuſſu tuo adverſus hoſtem, nunquam pugnabo, non ſi certam victoriam videam*; *Without your permiſſion I will never engage with the enemy, though I was ſure to overcome:* and the Conſul giving him leave, he conquered his enemy. When therefore a man of his conſtitution arrives at ſuch a command, he deſires all men may be as punctual as himſelf; and being naturally brave, he commands brave things, and when they are once commanded, requires that they be executed exactly; and this is a certain rule, when great things are commanded, ſtrict obedience muſt be expected, otherwiſe your enterprize muſt fail. That therefore thoſe under your command may be the more obedient to your commands, it is neceſſary that you command aright; and he commands right, who compares his own quality and condition with the quality and condition of thoſe they command; if he finds them proportionable, then he may command, if otherwiſe, he is to forbear; and therefore that ſaying was not amiſs, that to keep a Common-wealth in ſubjection by violence, it was convenient that there ſhould be a proportion betwixt the perſons forced, and forcing; and whilſt that proportion laſted, the violence might laſt too, but when that proportion was diſſolved, and he that was forced grew ſtronger than he that offered it, it was to be doubted much his authority would not hold long. But to return; great things therefore, and magnificent, are not to be commanded but by a man that is great and magnificent himſelf; and he who is ſo conſtituted, having once commanded them, cannot expect that mildneſs or gentleneſs will prevail with his ſubjects to execute them: but he that is not of this greatneſs and magnificence of mind, is by no means to command extraordinary things; and if his commands be but ordinary, his humanity may do well enough, for ordinary puniſhments are not imputed to the Prince, but to the Laws and Cuſtoms of the place: ſo that we may conclude *Manlius* was conſtrained to that ſeverity by his natural temper and complexion; and ſuch perſons are many times of great importance to a Common-wealth, becauſe by the exactneſs of their own lives, and the ſtrictneſs of their diſcipline, they revive the old Laws, and reduce every thing towards its firſt principles.

And if a State could be ſo happy to have ſuch perſons ſucceeding one another in any reaſonable time, as by their examples would not only renew the laws, reſtrain vice, and remove every thing that tended to its ruine or corruption, that State would be immortal. So then *Manlius* was a ſevere man, and kept up the *Roman* diſcipline exactly, prompted firſt by his own nature, and then by a ſtrong deſire to have that obeyed, which his own inclination had conſtrained him to command. *Valerius Corvinus* on the other ſide might exerciſe his gentleneſs without inconvenience, becauſe he commanded nothing extraordinary, or contrary to the cuſtoms of the *Romans* at that time; which cuſtom, being good, was ſufficient to honour him, and not very troubleſom to obſerve, whereby it hapned that *Valerius* was not neceſſitated to puniſh offenders, becauſe there were but very few of that ſort, and when there were any, their puniſhment (as is ſaid before) was imputed to the Laws, and not to the cruelty of the Prince; by which it fell out that *Valerius* had an opportunity by his gentleneſs ro gain both affection and authority in the Army, which was the cauſe that the Souldiers being equally obedient to one as well as the other, though their humours and diſcipline were different, yet they might do the ſame things, and their actions have the ſame effects. If any are deſirous to imitate either of them, they will do well to have a care of running into the ſame errors as *Scipio* and *Hanibal* did before, which is not to be prevented any other way, but by ſingular virtue and induſtry. Theſe things being ſo, it remains now that we enquire which of theſe two ways are moſt laudable to follow, and it is the harder to reſolve, becauſe I find Authors are ſtrangely divided, ſome for one way, and others for the other. Nevertheleſs, they who pretend to write how a Prince is to govern, are more inclinable to *Valerius* than *Manlius*, and *Xenophon* in his character of *Cirus* jumps exactly with *Livy*'s deſcription of *Valerius*, eſpecially in his expedition againſt the *Samnites* when he was Conſul: for the morning before the Fight he made a ſpeech to his Souldiers with that mildneſs and humanity, that the Hiſtorian tells us, *Non alias militi familiarior dux fuit, inter infimos militum omnia haud gravate munia obeundo. In ludo præterea militari, cum velocitatis, viriumq; inter ſe æquales certamina ineunt, comiter facilis vincere, ac vinci, vultu eodem; nec quenquam aſpernari parem qui ſe offerret; facilis benignus*

prore; dictis, haud minus libertatis alienæ quam ſuæ dignitatis memor, & (quo nihil popularius eſt) quibus artibus petierat Magiſtratum, iiſdem Gerebat. No General was ever more familiar with his Soldiers; no Soldier too mean for him to converſe with, no office too baſe for him to undertake. In their Military recreations when they ran, or wreſtled for a prize, he would not only run or wreſtle, but win or loſe, be overcome, or conquer, with the ſame evenneſs, and unconcernment; nor did he ever diſdain or refuſe any man that challenged him. In his actions, he was bountiful, as occaſion was offered; in his words, he was as mindful of other peoples liberty, as of his own dignity, and (which is the moſt grateful thing to the people in the world) the ſame arts which he uſed in the obtaining, the ſame he exerciſed in the management of his Magiſtracy.

Livy ſpeaks likewiſe very honourably of *Manlius*, acknowledging that his ſeverity upon his Son, made the whole Army ſo obedient, and diligent, that it was the occaſion of their victory againſt the *Latins*; and he goes ſo far in his praiſe, that after he has given an exact account of the Battel and victory, and deſcribed all the dangers and difficulties to which the *Romans* were expoſed, he concludes that it was only the Conduct and courage of *Manlius* that got the victory that day; and afterwards comparing the ſtrength of both Armies, he does not ſcruple to ſay, that on which ſide ſoever *Manlius* had been, that ſide would certainly have had the day. Which being ſo, makes my queſtion very hard to determine, nevertheleſs, that it may not be altogether unreſolved, I conceive that in a Citizen brought up under the ſtrictneſs of a Common-wealth, the way of *Manlius* would be beſt, and leaſt ſubject to danger, becauſe it ſeems moſt for the intereſt of the publick, and not at all proceeding from private ambition; beſides to carry ones ſelf ſeverely to every body, and purſue nothing but the benefit of the Publick, is not a way to make parties, or friends, without which there can be no troubles in a State. So that he who proceeds in that manner, muſt needs be very uſeful, and not at all ſuſpicious to the State. But the way of *Valerius* is quite contrary; for though the Common-wealth reaps the ſame fruits as in the other; yet jealouſies will ariſe, and people will be fearful that in the end his great favour among the Soldiers will be employed to ſet up himſelf, with very ill conſequences upon their liberty. And if in *Publicola*'s time theſe ill effects did not happen, it was becauſe as then the minds of the *Romans* were not corrupt, nor had he been long enough in authority. But if we conſider a *Prince*, as *Xenophon* did, in that caſe we muſt leave *Manlius*, and follow *Valerius* clearly; becauſe a Prince is by all means to endeavour the obedience of his Subjects and Soldiers by ways of amity and kindneſs. They will be obedient, if they find him virtuous, and a ſtrict obſerver of his Laws; they will love him, if they ſee him courteous, and affable, and merciful, and endued with all the good qualities which were in *Valerius*, and which *Xenophon* attributes to *Cirus*. For to be particularly beloved, and have an Army true to his intereſt, is *inſtar omnium*, and anſwers to all other policies of State. But it is otherwiſe when an Army is commanded by one who is a Citizen of the ſame City with the reſt of his Army; for he is ſubject to the ſame Laws and Magiſtrates as well as they. In the Annals of *Venice* we read, that in former times the *Venetian* Galleys returning from ſome expedition, and lying near the Town, there happened a quarrel betwixt the Citizens and the Seamen, which proceeded ſo far, that it came to a tumult, both ſides betook themſelves to their Arms, and neither the power of their Officers, the reverence of the Citizens, nor the authority of the Magiſtrate was able to quiet them: But as ſoon as a certain Gentleman appeared, who had commanded them the year before, remembring with what courteſie he had behaved himſelf, their kindneſs to him prevail'd above all other courſes, and they gave over the combat, and retir'd; but that affection, and ready obedience to his commands, coſt the poor Gentleman very dear; for thereby he became ſo obnoxious to the Senate, that not long after they ſecured themſelves againſt him, either by impriſonment or death. I conclude then, that a Prince may better follow the example of *Valerius*; but to a Citizen, it is dangerous both to himſelf, and the State; to the State, becauſe that way leads directly to Tyranny; to himſelf, becauſe (let his intentions be never ſo innocent) he will certainly be ſuſpected, and bring himſelf in danger. So on the other ſide, the ſeverity of *Manlius* is as pernicious in a Prince, but in a Citizen it is convenient, and particularly for the State; for it never does hurt, if the hatred which follows your ſeverity be not encreaſed by a jealouſie of your great virtue and reputation, as it happen'd to *Camillus*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

Upon what occaſion Camillus *was baniſhed from* Rome.

WE have concluded in the Chapter before, that to imitate *Valerius* may prejudice your Country, and your ſelf; and that to imitate *Manlius* may be convenient for your ſelf, and prejudicial to your Country; which opinion is much confirmed by the caſe of *Camillus*, whoſe proceedings were more like *Manlius*, than *Valerius*; for which reaſon, *Livy* ſpeaking of him tells us, *Ejus virtutem milites oderant, & Mirabantur. His virtue was both odious, and admirable to his Soldiers.* That which made him admired was his Diligence, Prudence, Magnanimity, and Conduct: That which made him hated was, that he was more ſevere in puniſhing, than liberal in rewarding. And of this hatred *Livy* gives theſe following reaſons: Firſt, becauſe he cauſed the Money which was made of the goods of the *Vejentes* to be applyed to publick uſe, and not diſtributed with the reſt of the prey: Next, becauſe in his Triumphal Chariot he cauſed himſelf to be drawn by four white Horſes, which was accounted ſo great a piece of arrogance, that it was thought he did it to equalize the Sun. A third was, that he had devoted a tenth part of the ſpoils of the *Vejentes* to *Apollo*, which (to keep his Vow) was to be taken back again from the Soldiers who had got it in their clutches: From whence it may be obſerved, that nothing makes a Prince more odious to the people, than to deprive them of their poſſeſſions, which is a thing of ſo great importance, that it is never forgotten, becauſe upon every little want, it comes freſh into their Memories, and men being daily ſubject to thoſe wants, will daily remember it; and next to this is, being inſolent and proud, which is likewiſe extreamly odious to the people, eſpecially if they be free. And although perhaps no detriment accrews to them from his pride, yet they are obſerved always to deteſt him that uſes it. So that a great perſon is to avoid it as a rock, becauſe it begets hatred, and that without any advantage, which makes it a very raſh, and imprudent thing.

CHAP. XXIV.

The prolongation of Commiſſions brought Rome *firſt into ſervitude.*

IF the diſſolution of the *Roman* Common-wealth be accurately conſidered, it will be found to proceed partly from the differences about the *Agrarian* Law, and partly from the prorogation of their Magiſtrates, which errors, had they been known in time, and due remedies applyed, would not have been ſo pernicious, but *Rome* might have enjoyed her freedom longer, and perhaps with more quiet. For though from the prolongation of Offices, there were no tumults nor ſeditions to be ſeen in that City; yet it was clear that thoſe Magiſtrates which were continued took much upon them, and by degrees their power and authority became a great prejudice to the liberty of the State. Had all the Citizens who were continued, been wiſe, and honeſt like *L. Quintius*, they would not have incurred this inconvenience. The goodneſs of *Quintius* appeared in one thing very remarkably; a meeting being appointed for accommodation of the differences betwixt the Nobility, and the People; the people continued their authority to their Tribunes another year, as believing them very proper to reſiſt the ambition of the Nobles: The Senate to retaliate upon the people, and ſhow themſelves as conſiderable as they, continued the Conſulſhip to *Quintius*; But *Quintius* refuſed it abſolutely, alledging that ill examples were to be ſtifled, and not encreaſed by others that were worſe, and therefore preſſed them to the election of new Conſuls, and prevailed with much importunity and contention. Had the reſt of the *Roman* Citizens imitated this perſon, they had never admitted that cuſtom of proroguing of Magiſtrates, and then the prolongation of their Commands in the Army had never been introduced, which very thing was at length the ruine of that Common-wealth. The firſt perſon whoſe Commiſſion was continued in *Rome*, was *P. Philo*, who having beſieged *Palepolis*, and by the time his Conſulſhip was to expire, reduced it to ſuch extremity, that the victory ſeemed already in his hands. The Senate would not ſend another to ſucceed him, but continued his authority with the title of *Proconſul*: which thing (though done then upon grave conſideration, and for the benefit of the publick) proved afterwards of ſuch

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ill conſequence, that it brought that City in ſervitude and ſlavery: For by how much their Wars were more remote, by ſo much they thought theſe prorogations convenient; from whence it hapned, that fewer of the *Romans* were prepared for Military Commands, and the glory of their Victories redounded but to few: and beſides, he whoſe Commiſſion was renew'd, and had been a long time accuſtomed to the Army, might inſinuate ſo, and gain ſuch an intereſt in it, as might make it diſclaim the Senate, and acknowledge no Head but their General. This it was that enabled *Marius* and *Sylla* to debauch the Army; this was it that enabled *Cæſar* to conquer his native Country; which miſeries had never happned, had not that cuſtom of continuing Magiſtrates, and Commanders been introduced. If it be objected, that their great affairs could not have been managed at ſo great a diſtance, without that prorogation of commands; I anſwer, That 'tis poſſible their Empire might have been longer before it came to that height; but then it would have been more laſting, for the adverſary would never have been able to have erected a Monarchy, and deſtroyed their liberty ſo ſoon.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus *and ſeveral other Citizens of* Rome.

WE have ſaid elſewhere, that nothing is of more importance to the conſervation of the liberty of a State, than to keep the Citizens low, and from being two wealthy. Whether there was any Law to that purpoſe, or what that Law was, I muſt acknowledge my ignorance, (eſpecially when I conſider with what zeal and paſſion the *Agrarian* was oppoſed) yet 'tis clear by experience, that for 400 years after the building of *Rome*, that City was in very great poverty: And it is probable the great cauſe of it was, that poverty was no impediment to preferment: Virtue was the only thing required in the Election of Magiſtrates, and the diſtribution of Offices; and wherever it was found, let the perſon or family be never ſo poor, it was ſure to be advanced; which manner of living, made riches contemptible: And this is manifeſt by the following example. *Minutius* the Conſul being circumvented, and he and his whole Army, as it were block'd up by the *Æqui*, the *Romans* were ſo poſſeſs'd with the danger of their Army, that they betook themſelves to the creation of a Dictator, which is their laſt remedy in their greateſt afflictions: They concluded upon *L. Quintius Cincinnatus*, who was then (when they ſent for him) in a little Country farm at Plough, which *Livy* magnifies exceedingly, and ſays; *Operæ pretium eſt audire, qui omnia præ divitiis humana ſpernunt, neque honori magno locum, neque virtuti putant eſſe, niſi effuſe affluant opes: It is pleaſant to hear ſome people talk of riches, as if nothing in this world were comparable to them; as if all honour and virtue depended only upon the Eſtate.* *Cincinnatus* (as I ſaid before) was at plough in his farm, (which conſiſted only of four acres of ground) when the Embaſſadors came to him from the Senate to ſalute him Dictator, and to remonſtrate their diſtreſs. Having received their meſſage, he made no delay, but call'd immediately for his Robe, came directly for *Rome*, rais'd his Army, and marched away for the relief of *Minutius*: having defeated the Enemy, and pillaged their Camp, he would not ſuffer the Army of *Minutius* to participate in the prize, telling him, *I do not think it reaſonable that you ſhould have ſhare in the prey, who was ſo near being a prey your ſelf.* After which he degraded *Minutius* of his Conſulſhip, and made him only a Legat with this expreſſion; *You ſhall continue here in this Station, till you learn to behave your ſelf more like a Conſul.* The ſame Dictator, in the ſame expedition, made *L. Tarquinius* his Maſter of his Horſe, though he had none to be Maſter of of his own, for his poverty was ſuch, he was forced to ſerve on foot. 'Tis remarkable how in thoſe days poverty and honour were not ſo inconſiſtant as now, and that to an excellent and worthy perſon as *Cincinnatus* was, four acres of Land was a ſufficient Eſtate. In the days of *Attilius Regulus* poverty was in the ſame reputation; for being at the head of an Army in *Affrica*, and having conquered the *Carthaginians*, he made it his requeſt to the Senate that he might be permitted to come home, and husband his own farm, which his Servants had neglected. And this frugality of the *Romans* is exceedingly wonderful; for looking for nothing but praiſe and honour from their Victories, they brought all their prize into the publick Treaſury: and doubtleſs had *Regulus* propoſed any thing of advantage to himſelf by that War, he would never have been concerned to have had his four acres neglected by his Servants. Nor was the modeſty and magnanimity of the *Romans* leſs remarkable, who being put into command, and placed at the head of an Army, thought them-

themſelves above any Prince; no King, no Common-wealth was able to diſmay them: But when their Commiſſions expired, and they were returned privately to their houſes; no body ſo frugal, no body ſo humble, no body ſo laborious, ſo obedient to the Magiſtrates, or reſpectful to their ſuperiors as they; inſomuch that one would have thought it impoſſible the ſame minds ſhould have been capable of ſuch ſtrange alterations. And this poverty continued till the time of *Paulus Emilius* (which was the laſt age of that Common-wealths happineſs) for though he by his Triumph enriched the whole City, yet not regarding his own fortunes, he continued poor himſelf, and poverty was in that eſteem, that *Paulus* to gratifie and encourage one of his Sons-in-Law who had behaved himſelf bravely in thoſe Wars, gave him a ſilver Cup, which was the firſt piece of Plate that was ever ſeen in his family. And here I have a fair occaſion to enlarge upon poverty, and ſhow how much more uſeful it is to Mankind than riches, and how many excellent Arts it has produced and improved, which riches and luxury have deſtroyed: But this having been treated of ſo amply by other people before, I ſhall mention it no farther at this time.

CHAP. XXVI.

Women are many times the deſtruction of States.

IN the City of *Ardea* there was a great controverſie betwixt the *Patricii* and the People, about the Marriage of a young Lady; who being a great Fortune, had a great many Servants, but more eſpecially two, one of them a *Patrician*, the other a Plebean. Her Father being dead, her Guardian would needs beſtow her upon the Plebean; her Mother was for the Nobleman; not agreeing among themſelves, it came to a tumult, and by degrees to blows; inſomuch as the whole Nobility appeared in Arms for the one, and all the people for the other. The reſult was, the people being beaten out of the Town, and ſending to the *Volſci* for aid, the Nobles ſent to *Rome*. The *Volſci* were readieſt, and coming firſt to the aſſiſtance of the Plebeans, they clap'd down before the Town. They had not entrench'd themſelves long, but the *Roman* Army came upon their backs, and ſhut them up betwixt the Town and them; inſomuch that they were quickly diſtreſſed, and forced to ſurrender at diſcretion. The *Romans* entred the Town, killed all that were acceſſary to the ſedition, and ſetled their affairs. In which paſſage there are many obſervable things. Firſt, we ſee Women have been the occaſion of much deſolation, prejudice, and diſſention: The Rape of *Lucrece* loſt the *Tarquins* their Government; the attempt upon *Virginia*, was the ruine of the *Decem-viri*. And *Ariſtotle* in his Poleticks imputes the abomination of Tyranny to the injuries they do to people upon the account of Women, either by their Debauchments, their Violences, or Adulteries, as we have ſhow'd at large in our Chapter about Conſpiracies. So that in the Government of any Kingdom or Common-wealth, thoſe things are not to be reckon'd as trifles, but as the occaſions of much miſchief, and are by all means to be prevented, before the rancour has taken too deep root, and is not to be cured, but by the deſtruction of the State: as it hapned to the *Ardeates*, who let it go ſo long among their fellow Citizens, that at laſt they came to an abſolute diviſion not to be compoſed nor ſetled, but by foreign aſſiſtance, which is always the forerunner of ſervitude and ſlavery.

CHAP. XXVII.

How the civil diſcords in a City, are to be compoſed, and of the falſity of that opinion, That the beſt way to keep a City in ſubjection, is to keep it divided.

IN the reconciliation of a City that is labouring under civil diſſentions, we are to follow the example of the *Roman* Conſuls, and obſerve their method in compoſing the diſtractions among the *Ardeates*, which was by cutting off the chief Actors, and confiſcating their Eſtates. And to compoſe the diſtractions of a City, there are three ways; either by cutting off the chief actors (as the *Romans* did) by baniſhing them the City, or by forcing them to an accommodation upon ſuch penalties as they ſhall be afraid to incur: of theſe three ways the laſt is moſt dangerous, uncertain, and unprofitable, becauſe it is impoſſible where

where much blood has been ſhed, or much injury done, that that peace ſhould laſt long, which was made by compulſion; for ſeeing, and hearing, and converſing with one another daily, their animoſities muſt of neceſſity revive, and provoke them to new outrage, by preſenting them with new occaſions of indignation and revenge: and of this we cannot have an apter example than in the City of *Piſtoia*, which 15 years ſince (as it is now) was divided into the *Panciatichi*, and *Cancellieri* (only then they were at open defyance, which now they are not). After many conteſts and diſputes among themſelves, they proceeded to blood, to the plundering and demoliſhing one anothers houſes, and committing all other hoſtilities imaginable: The *Florentines* whoſe buſineſs it was to unite them, uſed this third way, which rather encreaſed, than mitigated their tumults; ſo that weary of that way, and grown wiſer by experience, they made uſe of the ſecond; baniſhed ſome of the Ring-leaders, and impriſoned the reſt, whereby they not only quieted their differences then, but have kept them ſo ever ſince. But doubtleſs the ſafeſt way had been to cut them off at firſt, and if thoſe executions were forborn then by us, or have been ſince by any other Common-wealth, it is for no other cauſe, but that they require a certain generoſity and greatneſs of ſpirit, that in weak Common-wealths is hardly to be found. And theſe are the errors, which as I ſaid in the beginning, are committed by the Princes of our times, when they are to determine in ſuch great controverſies; for they ſhould inform themſelves how others have comported in the ſame caſes before them; but they are ſo weak by reaſon of the ſlightneſs of our preſent education, and their unexperience in Hiſtory, that they look upon the examples of the ancients as inhumane, or impoſſible: So that our modern opinions are as remote from the truth, as that ſaying of our wiſe men was upon a time, *Che biſognava tener Piſtoia con le parti, & Piſa con le fortezze: That Piſtoia was to be kept under under by factions, and Piſa by a Citadel*; but they were miſtaken in both. What my judgment is about Citadels, and ſuch kind of Fortreſſes, I have delivered elſewhere; ſo as in this place, I ſhall only demonſtrate how unpracticable it is to keep Towns in ſubjection by fomenting their differences and factions, and firſt it is impoſſible to keep both parties true to you (be you Prince, or Common-wealth, or whatever) for men are naturally ſo inconſtant, it cannot be that thoſe parties which favour you to day, ſhould be affected to you alwayes; for they will ſtill look out for ſome new Patron, and Protector: ſo that by degrees one of the parties taking ſome diſguſt againſt you, the next War that happens, you run a great hazard of loſing your Town. If it be under the Government of a State, the City is in more danger, than in the other caſe, becauſe each party looks out for friends among the great ones, and will ſpare no pains nor mony to corrupt them. From whence two great inconveniences do ariſe: One is, you can never make them love you, becauſe by reaſon of the frequent alteration of Governors, and putting in ſometimes a perſon of one humour, and ſometimes another of another; they can never be well govern'd: And then the other is, by this fomenting of Factions, your State muſt be neceſſarily divided. *Blondus* ſpeaking of the paſſages betwixt the *Florentines* and *Piſtoians*, confirms what we have ſaid in theſe words, *Mentre che i Fiorentini diſegnavano de riunir Piſtoia, diviſono ſe Medeſimi. Whilſt the Florentines thought to have united the Piſtoians, they divided themſelves.* In the year 1501. *Arezzo* revolted from the *Florentines*, and the Valleys *di Tenere*, and *Chiana* were entirely over-run by the *Vitelli*, and Duke *Valentine*. Whereupon *Monſieur de Lant* was ſent from the King of *France* to ſee all that they had loſt, reſtored to the *Florentines*. Wherever *Monſieur de Lant* came obſerving the perſons that came to viſit him, did ſtill profeſs themſelves of the party of *Morzocco*, he was much diſſatisfied with their factions, and more that they ſhould declare themſelves ſo freely; for (ſaid he) if in *France* any man ſhould pronounce himſelf of the King's party, he would be ſure to be puniſhed, becauſe it would imply that there was a party againſt the King, and it was his Maſters deſire, that his Kingdom and Cities ſhould be all of a mind: If therefore a Prince believes there is no way for him to keep his Towns in obedience, but by keeping up Factions, it is a certain argument of his weakneſs; for being unable by force and courage to keep them under, he betakes himſelf to theſe pernicious arts, which in peaceable times may palliate a little, but when troubles, and adverſity come will aſſuredly deceive him.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

A ſtrict eye is to be kept upon the Citizens, for many times under pretence of Officiouſneſs, and Piety, there is hid a principle of Tyranny.

THe City of *Rome* being diſtreſſed for want of proviſions, and the publick ſtores being unable to ſupply it, it came into the thoughts of *Spurius Melius* (a rich Citizen of thoſe times) to furniſh the common people *gratis* out of his own private ſtock, whereby he wrought himſelf ſo far into the favour of the people, that the Senate ſuſpecting the ill conſequences of his bounty, began to conſpire his deſtruction before his intereſt became too great, to which purpoſe they created a Dictator, who put him to death: from whence it may be obſerved, that many times thoſe actions which ſeem charitable and pious at firſt ſight, and are not reaſonably to be condemned, are notwithſtanding cruel and dangerous for a State, if not corrected in time. To make this more clear, I ſay a Common-wealth cannot be well governed, nor indeed ſubſiſt without the aſſiſtance and miniſtry of powerful and great men: and yet on the other ſide that power and reputation of particular Citizens is the occaſion of tyranny. To regulate this inconvenience, it is neceſſary that ſeeing there muſt be great men, things ſhould be ſo ordered that they may have praiſe and reputation by ſuch things as are rather uſeful than prejudicial to the State. Wherefore it is carefully to be obſerved what ways they take to acquire their reputation; and they are uſually two, either publick or private. The publick way is when they arrive at their reputation by ſome good counſel, or ſome great exploit which they have atchieved for the benefit of the publick: and this way of reputation is not only not to be precluded to the Citizens, but to be opened by ſuch promiſes of reward for their good counſels or actions as may both dignify and enrich them; and when a reputation is gain'd by theſe plain and ſincere ways, it is never to be feared. But when their courſes are private, (which is the other of the two ways) they are dangerous, nay totally pernitious. Thoſe private ways are by obliging particular perſons, by lending them mony, by marrying their relations, by defending them againſt the Magiſtrates, and doing ſeveral other particular favours which may encourage their Clients to violate the Laws, and vitiate the Common-wealth; for which cauſe it ought to be ſo well fortified with good Laws, that the endeavors of ſuch ambitious men may be either diſcouraged or defeated; and on the other ſide rewards propoſed to ſuch as arrive at their greatneſs by any extraordinary exploit. In *Rome* the higheſt reward of thoſe perſons who behaved themſelves gloriouſly for the good of their Country, was a triumphbeſides which they had other inferior honours,for more inferior ſervices; & to reſtrain or puniſh the ambition of thoſe who went about by private and clandeſtine ways to diſturb the peace of their Country, their greateſt remedy was to accuſe them to the people, and when thoſe accuſations were inſufficient, (the people being blinded by ſome ſpecious pretence of benefit and advantage) they created a Dictator, who with a kind of regal authority was to reduce the delinquent from his aberrations, or puniſh him as he did *Spurius Melius*; and the leaving of one ſuch fault unpuniſhed, is enough to ruine a Common-wealth, for a ſingle example afterwards will hardly be effectual.

CHAP. XXIX.

That the tranſgreſſions of the people do ſpring commonly from the Prince.

PRinces cannot reaſonably complain of the tranſgreſſions of their ſubjects, becauſe it is neceſſarily their negligence, or ill example that debauches them: and if the people of our times are infamous for thefts, and robberies, and plundering, and ſuch kind of enormities, it proceeds from the exorbitance and rapacity of their Governors. *Romania* (before Pope *Alexander* VI exterminated thoſe Lords who had the command in thoſe parts) was a place of all kind of diſſoluteneſs and iniquity, every day, and every trivial occaſion producing notorious murders and rapines; which was not ſo much from any depravity in the nature of the people, (as ſome perſons would have it) as from the corruption of their Princes; for being poor of themſelves, and yet ambitious to live in ſplendor and magnificence, they were forced upon ill courſes, and indeed refuſed none that could ſupply them.

To paſs by ſeveral others, one of their deteſtable ways was to make Laws againſt ſuch and ſuch things, which after they were publiſhed, they themſelves would be the firſt that ſhould break, to encourage others to do the ſame; nor was any man ever puniſhed for his inobſervance, till they ſaw enough involved in the ſame *premunire*; then (forſooth) the Laws were executed moſt ſtrictly, not out of any true zeal to juſtice, but out of a deſire to be fingring the Fines; from whence it followed, that by grievous mulcts and expilations the people being impoveriſhed, were conſtrained to uſe the ſame violences upon thoſe who were leſs potent than they; by which means men were not ſo much corrected, as inſtructed to do ill; and all theſe miſchiefs proceeded from the iniquity of their Princes. *Livy* has a ſtory to this purpoſe, where he tells us, that the *Roman* Embaſſadors (paſſing with a great preſent to *Apollo*, which was taken out of the ſpoils of the *Veientes*) were taken by the Corſairs of *Lipari* in *Sicily*, and carried with it into that Iſland. *Timaſitheus* Prince of that Town underſtanding what the Preſent was; whither it was going; and from whom it was ſent, (though born at *Lipari*) behaved himſelf in that like a *Roman*, and remonſtrated to the people the impiety of the fact, which he preſt upon them ſo home, that by common conſent the Preſent was reſtored, and the Embaſſadors diſmiſſed; the words of the Hiſtorian are theſe, *Timaſitheus multitudinem religione implevit, quæ ſemper regenti eſt ſimilis*: which agrees with that ſaying of *Lorenzo de i Medici*.

Et quel che fa il Signor fanno poi molti,
Che nel Signor ſon tutti gl'occhi volti.

A Prince does nought (or regular, or rude,)
But's followed ſtraight by th'gaping multitude.

CHAP. XXX.

A Citizen who would do any great matter by his own authority, muſt firſt extinguiſh all envy. In what manner things are to be ordered upon the approach of an enemy, and how a City is to be defended.

THE Senate of *Rome* having intelligence that the *Tuſcans* had made new levies of men to make a new inroad into their Country; and that the *Latini* and *Hernici* (formerly in amity with the *Romans*) had confederated with the *Volſci*, (implacable enemies to the very name of a *Roman*) they concluded that War would be dangerous. *Camillus* being Tribune at that time, and inveſted with Conſular authority, they thought he would be able to defend them, (without creating a Dictator) if the reſt of his Colleagues would intruſt him with the chief Command; to which they readily condeſcended, *Nec quicquam* (ſays *Livy*) *de majeſtate ſua detractum credebant, quod Majeſtati ejus conceſſiſſent*; *Nor did they think any thing ſubſtracted from their authority that was added to his.* Upon which *Camillus* (taking their paroles for their obedience) cauſed three Armies to be raiſed. The firſt he deſigned againſt the *Tuſcans*, and commanded it himſelf. The ſecond was to continue about *Rome* to attend the motions of the *Latini* and *Hernici*, and was commanded by *Quintus Servilius*. The third was left in the City, as Guards for the ſecurity of the Gates, and the Court, and to be ready upon any accident that ſhould ariſe, and the Command of this Army was committed to *Lucius Quintius*. The care of his Magazines was refer'd to *Horatius* one of his Colleagues, who was to ſee them furniſhed with ſuch arms and proviſions, and other things as were neceſſary in times of War. He cauſed another Tribune of his Colleagues (called *Cornelius*) to preſide in the Senate, and publick Counſel, that he might be preſent in all their debates, and ready to adviſe in all their daily tranſactions. So excellent were the Tribunes in thoſe times, that when the ſafety of their Country was at ſtake, they were equally diſpoſed either to command or obey. And here may be obſerved the great ability which a wiſe and good man has to do good, by the ſuppreſſion of envy, which is many times a great impediment to the good which ſome perſons would do, could they but get up into ſuch authority as is requiſite in affairs of importance. This envy is extinguiſhed two ways; either by ſome great and difficult accident, in which every man foreſeeing his own ruine, lays his ambition aſide, and ſubmits himſelf voluntarily to the obedience of ſome perſon from whoſe virtue he may hope to be delivered: ſuch a perſon was this *Camillus*, who having been three times Dictator, and acted in all his adminiſtrations more for the good of the publick, than any benefit of his own, and given

many

many excellent teſtimonies of his integrity and conduct beſides, his Colleagues were not ſcrupulous to transfer their authority, nor the people at all apprehenſive of his greatneſs, nor any (how great ſoever) aſhamed to be inferior to him.

Wherefore it was not without reaſon that *Livy* uſed that expreſſion, *Nec quicquam, &c.* The other way of extinguiſhing envy, is, when either by violence, or the courſe of nature your competitors die; that is, ſuch perſons as envying your reputation and grandeur, and diſdaining that you ſhould be above them, cannot contain themſelves, and be quiet, but rather than not ſatisfy the perverſity of their minds, will be contented their Country ſhould be ruined, eſpecially if they have been brought up in a corrupt State, and not been meliorated by their education.

Againſt this ſort of envy there is no remedy but in the death of the Subject. And when an excellent perſon is ſo happy as to have theſe impediments removed by the courſe of nature, without any machination or concurrence of his, he becomes great and honourable without obſtacle, and may exerciſe his virtues without any offence. But when he has not this good fortune, and nature is ſo unkind as to ſuffer them to live, it is neceſſary he remove them ſome extraordinary way, and make it his whole buſineſs to find one; yet with that caution and deliberation, that he be ſure his way be practicable before he ventures upon it. He who reads the Bible ſoberly, and conſiderately, will find *Moſes* (for the promotion and eſtabliſhment of his Laws) was forced to put ſeveral to death, for no other reaſon but becauſe out of envy they oppoſed his deſigns: and this neceſſity of removing Competitors was not unknown to *Girolamo Savonarola* the Frier, and *Pietro Soderini Gonfaloniere* of *Florence*. The Frier could not Maſter it for want of authority; and thoſe of his followers who could have done it, had no true knowledg of his mind; yet that was not his fault, for his Sermons were full of declamations againſt the wiſdom of this World, and invectives againſt the wiſe men, by whom he intended ſuch envious perſons as oppoſed his Doctrines and Inſtitutions. *Soderini* was in hopes by the goodneſs of his converſation, and his beneficence to all people, that he ſhould have been ſo fortunate as to have out-lived and worn out the envy of his adverſaries, ſeeing he was but young, and found new Clients coming in daily to his party, whom his excellent deportment had drawn over. So that he abſtain'd from all kind of ſeverity and violence, not conſidering that time is not to be loſt; that goodneſs is ineffectual; that fortune is changeable; and that envious perſons are not to be obliged by all the preſents and good offices in the World. So that both theſe perſons were ruined at laſt, one of them becauſe he had not authority enough to maſter the envy of his adverſaries; the other becauſe he did not do it (though he had authority) in time. The other thing remarkable in that Story, was, the order taken by *Camillus* for the ſafety of *Rome*, both abroad and at home. And certainly it is not without reaſon that good Hiſtorians (as ours is) ſet down certain diſtinct and particular caſes, that poſterity may learn upon ſuch accidents in what manner to defend themſelves: it is to be obſerved likewiſe, that the moſt dangerous and unprofitable defence is that which is made by tumult and diſorder; and this is apparent by that third Army which *Camillus* left as a Guard to the City, which many would have thought unneceſſary, becauſe the Citizens were generally arm'd, and martial; ſo that there needed no more than to have arm'd the reſt upon occaſion, without troubling them with an Army. But *Camillus* (and any other wiſe man would have done the ſame) was of another opinion; for a multitude is not to be truſted with arms but in an orderly and regular way. For which reaſon, and according to which example, he who has the Government of a Town, is above all things to avoid arming the people in a confuſed and tumultuous way; but is rather to cull and ſelect ſuch as he dare truſt with arms, and ſuch as he is ſatisfied will obey him, let him ſend or command them whereſoever he pleaſes. The reſt are to be required to keep at home, and every man look to the defence of his own houſe. He who is beſieged, and obſerves this courſe, may defend himſelf well enough; he that does otherwiſe, does not follow the example of *Camillus*, and will hardly defend himſelf.

CHAP. XXXI.

Powerful States, and excellent Perſons, retain the ſame mind and dignity in all kind of conditions.

AMong the reſt of the great actions and words which our Author commemorates, and mentions as certain arguments of the great virtue and excellence of *Camillus*, in a ſpeech of his to his Souldiers, he brings him in with this expreſſion; *Nec mihi Dictatura animos fecit, nec exilium ademit*; *I was neither elated with my Dictatorſhip, nor dejected with my Baniſhment.* From whence we may obſerve that great men are never diſcompoſed; let fortune vary as ſhe pleaſes, let her advance them ſometimes, and depreſs them at others, they are in the ſame ſettlement and tranquility, ſo quiet and firm in their minds, that every man may ſee 'tis not in the power of fortune to diſorder them; whereas puſilanimous and mean ſpirited perſons, inebriated with their good fortune, and attributing all to their own virtue and good conduct, make themſelves odious and inſupportable to all that are about them, and that arrogance expoſes them to many revolutions, which coming upon them on a ſudden, do ſo terrify and diſmay them, that they run into the other extreme, and become as abject and vile. Hence it is that in time of adverſity ſuch Princes think more of their eſcape than defence, having made themſelves uncapable of that by their ill management before. And as this diverſity of temper is many times to be found in particular Perſons, and Princes; ſo is it incident to Common-wealths, as may be ſeen by the example of the *Romans* and *Venetians.* The firſt were never dejected by any ill fortune, nor tranſported by any good; as appears by their defeat at the Battel of *Cannæ*, and their victory againſt *Antiochus*: their defeat at *Cannæ* was the third which they had received, and for that reaſon was very conſiderable; yet they were not ſo terrified, or cowed, as to commit any thing contrary to the old dignity of the *Romans*; for they reſolved to continue the war; they raiſed more forces; they refuſed to redeem their priſoners upon any new terms; and could not be brought to make any overtures of Peace, either to *Hanibal*, or the Senate at *Carthage*; but for want of others, they arm'd their old men, and their ſervants, and reſolved wholly upon war; of which obſtinacy and refractorineſs, when *Hanno* was told, he made a ſpeech to that Senate, and remonſtrated how little they were to preſume upon their Victory at *Cannæ*: we ſee then the *Romans* were not to be terrified or diſcouraged by any adverſity of fortune; we ſhall ſhew now how far they were on the other ſide from inſulting in their good. *Antiochus*, before he came to a Battel, ſent Embaſſadors to *Scipio* to deſire a treaty: *Scipio* ſent him theſe Conditions, that he ſhould return with his Army into *Syria*, and leave the reſt to the *Romans*. *Antiochus* thought that unreaſonable, fought him, was beaten, and afterwards ſent Embaſſadors again to *Scipio*, with inſtructions to accept of whatever terms the Conqueror ſhould give: *Scipio* never thought of altering his firſt propoſitions, though made before the Battel was won, but told them, *Quod Romani ſi vincuntur, non minuuntur animis, nec ſi vincunt inſoleſcere ſolent*; *That the Romans were never dejected by ill fortune, nor elated by good.* The *Venetians* acted quite the other way, who having got a little good fortune, (aſcribing it to a wrong cauſe, as if it had proceeded from their own power and virtue) had the inſolence to call the King of *France* Son of St. *Mark*, and taking a fancy that they ſhould bring their Common-wealth to as great a condition of grandeur and power as the *Romans*, they deſpis'd the Church, and all the Princes of *Italy* beſides. Afterwards, when their fortune began to change, and they received a ſmall defeat at *Vaila* by the French; they loſt their whole Empire in a day; part revolted, and part they gave up themſelves to the Pope, and King of *Spain*; and ſo much had they abandoned themſelves to fear and conſternation, that they ſent Embaſſadors to the Emperor to make themſelves his Tributaries, and writ poor and mean Letters to the Pope to move him to compaſſion, and to this extremity of dejection they were brought in four days time, by the loſs but of one half of their Army; for the other of their *Proveditori* retreated, and came off ſafe to *Verona* with more than 25000 horſe and foot; ſo that had there been any courage either in the Citizens or Senate, they might quickly have recruited, and ſhewn their faces again; and if they could not have conquered, they might at leaſt have loſt all with more reputation, or poſſibly have brought the enemy to ſome honourable accord: but the poorneſs of their ſpirit, and the illneſs of their military diſcipline took from them at one time both their courage and ſtate: and ſo it will be with whoſoever follows the example of the *Venetians*: for this inſolence in good fortune, and dejection in bad, proceeds from their manner of education; which if vain and idle, will make you ſo too; whereas if it be otherwiſe, it will give you a better notion of the World, and teach you in both fortunes to behave your ſelf with more moderation: and as this is true in ſingle Perſons, ſo it is in Com-

Common-wealths, which are good or bad according to their manner of living. We have often ſaid it before, and think it not amiſs to repeat it again, That the foundation of all Governments conſiſts in their Military diſcipline; and that where that is defective, neither their Laws, nor any thing elſe can be good; for thorow the whole tract of this Hiſtory, it appears that there is a neceſſity your Militia ſhould be good, and that cannot be good, but by continual exerciſe, which you cannot be ſure of, unleſs it conſiſts of your own Subjects. And becauſe you are not always in War, and it is impoſſible you ſhould be, therefore it is neceſſary that they be exerciſed in times of Peace, which is not to be done by any but your own Subjects, in reſpect of the charge.

Camillus (as is ſaid before) marched out with his Army againſt the *Tuſcans*, but his Soldiers having had a ſight of the Enemy, found their Army ſo great, that they were diſcouraged and diſmay'd, and thought themſelves ſo much inferiour, that they were not able to fight them. *Camillus* underſtanding this terror in his Camp, went up and down among the Soldiers, and having reprehended their fear, and ſaid many things to encourage them, and drive that fancy out of their heads, at laſt without further directions, Come (ſaid he) Courage! *Quod quiſque didicit aut conſuevit, faciet. Do what you have been taught and accuſtomed, I deſire no more.* From whence it may be collected that he would not have uſed thoſe words, had not his Army been exerciſed before, and that in times of Peace as well as War: For no good is to be expected, nor no General to truſt himſelf to an unexperienced and undiſciplined Army, which will certainly be his ruine, though he were as good a Commander as *Hanibal* himſelf. And the reaſon is, becauſe when an Army is engaged, the General cannot be preſent in all places, to ſupply all defects, and remedy all errors; ſo that he muſt neceſſarily miſcarry, unleſs he has ſuch perſons diſpoſed up and down in the Army, as are capable of underſtanding his mind, and executing his Orders. Which being ſo, the *Roman* diſcipline is to be followed, and the Citizens of every City are to be inured to their Arms in times of Peace as well as War, that when they are brought to fight, they may not be at a loſs, or meet with any thing new, or unaccuſtomed to them; by which means it will come to paſs, that they will not be ſurprized or terrified in any condition, but retain ſtill the ſame courage and ſence of their dignity. But where the Citizens are undiſciplin'd, and rely more upon their fortune, than experience; their hearts will change with their fortune, and they will give the ſame teſtimony of themſelves, as the *Venetians* have done.

CHAP. XXXII.

The ways which ſome people have taken to prevent a Peace.

THe *Circei*, and the *Velitræ* two of the *Roman* Colonies, revolted in hopes the *Latini* would have been able to defend them. The *Latins* being defeated, and they fruſtrated of their hopes, it was the advice of ſeveral Citizens, that they ſhould ſend Embaſſadors to *Rome* to reconcile themſelves to the Senate: But thoſe who had been ring-leaders in the defection, apprehending the puniſhment would fall heavy upon their heads, perverted that deſign; and to run things beyond all poſſibility of Terms, they incited the people to arm, and invade the Frontiers of the *Romans*. And doubtleſs when Prince or Common-wealth are deſirous to prevent an agreement, there is no ſafer nor ſurer way than by running the people into ſome unpardonable offence, that the fear of being puniſh'd may keep them averſe from all overtures of Peace. After the firſt War betwixt the *Carthaginians* and *Romans*, thoſe Soldiers which had been employed by the *Carthaginians* in *Sicily* and *Sardigna*, as ſoon as the Peace was concluded, went over into *Affrica*, where being denyed or delayed in the demands of their pay, they took Arms, and putting themſelves under the command of two of their Officers, *Matho*, and *Spendio*, they plundered ſeveral of the *Carthaginian* Towns, and poſſeſſed themſelves of others. The *Carthaginians* (to try all ways, before they came to extremity) ſent *Aſdrubal* (one of their Principal Citizens) Embaſſador to them; who having been formerly their General, it was probable might have ſome authority among them. *Aſdrubal* being arrived, and *Matho*, and *Spendio* deſirous to put the Soldiers beyond all poſſibility of pardon, perſwaded them that the beſt and moſt ſecure way would be, for them to kill all the *Carthaginians* that were Priſoners with them, and *Aſdrubal* among the reſt. Whereupon they killed them all, with a thouſand circumſtances of cruelty and torture; to which piece of wickedneſs they added another by publiſhing an Edict importing, That all the *Carthaginians* which

ſhould

ſhould be taken for the future, ſhould be treated the ſame way. And thus they prevented all propoſitions of Peace, and rendered their Soldiers obſtinate and implacable to the *Carthaginians*.

CHAP. XXXIII.

To the obtaining a Victory, it is neceſſary your Army has a confidence not only in one another, but in their General.

TO win a Battel, and overcome an Enemy, it is neceſſary to give your Army ſuch a confidence, as may make them believe that nothing is able to withſtand them; and the way of infuſing this confidence is, by Arming, and Exerciſing them well, and giving them a knowledge and acquaintance one with the other; which confidence and acquaintance is not to be expected, but where your Soldiers are your own Subjects, and have been brought up together. The General is to be ſo qualified, that the Soldiers may have confidence in his Wiſdom, and Conduct; and they will always have ſuch a confidence if they ſee him careful, and regular, and couragious, and one who preſerves the majeſty of his command with diſcretion and reputation; which he will do if he puniſhes ſtrictly, and put his Soldiers upon no over-hard and impertinent duty; keeps his promiſes; repreſent victory eaſie, either by concealing or extenuating the dangers, or by encouraging them bravely againſt them; and theſe things rightly obſerved, are of great conſequence both to the authority of the General, and the obtaining the Victory. The way which the *Romans* took to give this aſſurance to their Armies, was, by pretence of Religion; for which cauſe before the creation of their Conſuls; the railing, or marching, or engaging of their Armies, their *Augures* and *Auſpices* were conſulted: and without ſome of theſe, no wiſe General would undertake any great Enterprize, believing they ſhould certainly miſcarry, unleſs the Soldiers were thorowly convinced that the Gods were on their ſide. And when any of their Conſuls or other Commanders fought in defiance of theſe Auſpices, he was puniſhed, as *Claudius Pulcher* for deſpiſing the Omen of the Chickens. And although this is obvious in every part of the *Roman* Hiſtory; yet it is better prov'd by the complaint of *Appius Claudius* to the people, againſt the inſolence of their Tribunes, where he tells them that by their means, the Auſpices, and other religious Cuſtoms were neglected or corrupted: His words are theſe, *Eludant nunc licet Religionem; quid enim intereſt ſi pulli non paſcentur, ſi ex cavea tardius exierint, ſiccinuerit avis? Parva ſunt hæc, ſed parva iſta non contemnendo, Majores noſtri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt. Let them laugh at Religion as they pleaſe; and cry, what are we concerned if the Pullets won't eat, if they come lazily out of their Penns; or if a bird be diſpoſed to ſing? 'Tis true they are but trifles, yet by not deſpiſing thoſe trifles, our Anceſtors brought this Common-wealth to the Grandeur it is at.* And it was true; for thoſe little things were ſufficient to keep the Soldiers confident and united, which are two things go very far in a Victory, though without virtue and valour, they are not always ſucceſsful. The *Preneſtini* being in the Field with their Army againſt the *Romans*, they went and lodged themſelves upon the River *Allia* (in a place where the *Romans* had been beaten by the *French*) that the conſideration of the place might be an encouragement to their own men, and a terror to the *Romans:* And though this deſign was not improbable for the reaſons aboveſaid, yet it appeared by the ſucceſs that true courage is not diſturbed by every little accident, as was well expreſſed by the Dictator to his Maſter of the Horſe, *Vides tu, fortuna illos fretos, ad Alliam conſediſſe, at tu fretus armis, animiſq; invade mediam aciem. You ſee, by their poſting themſelves upon the Allia, they rely wholly upon Fortune; do you truſt to your Arms, and your courage, and attack their main Battel.* And he was in the right; for true courage, good diſcipline, and a confidence ariſing from ſo many Victories, cannot be diſcompoſed by ſuch frivolous ſtratagems; light things will not diſmay them, nor every diſorder diſtract them. For even in the abſence of their Officers, Soldiers that are expert, and accuſtomed to Arms, are not eaſily beaten. As appeared by the two *Manlii* (both Conſuls, and making War upon the *Volſci*) who having indiſcreetly ſent part of their Army to forrage, it fell out, that both the commanded party, and thoſe which were left behind, were encompaſſed by the Enemy, and as it were beſieged both at a time, , out of which danger the Soldiers were delivered more by their own courage, than any Conduct in the Conſuls; whereupon *Livy* tells us, *Militum, etiam ſine Rectore ſtabilis virtus tutata eſt. The ſtedfaſt courage of the Soldier defended them, without any help from their General.* *Fabius* had likewiſe an excellent

excellent way to confirm his Soldiers, and poſſeſs them with a confidence, which I cannot omit: Having invaded *Tuſcany* with a new Army; ſuppoſing the novelty of the Country, and their inexperience of that Enemy might have ſome influence upon them, to give them a confidence, he called them together before the Battel, and having in a grave Oration given ſeveral reaſons why they might hope for the Victory, he told them, That he had another reaſon behind, more certain than all of them, but in that he muſt be private; for to diſcover it, would be to defeat it. A wiſe way, and deſerves well to be imitated.

CHAP. XXXIV.

What vogue, fame or opinion diſpoſes the people firſt to favour ſome particular Citizen; and whether they, or a Prince diſtributes their Offices with moſt prudence and judgment.

WE have ſhown before, how *Titus Manlius* (called afterwards *Torquatus*) preſerved his Father *L. Manlius* from an accuſation which *Pomponius* the Tribune had exhibited againſt him to the people. And although the way which he took to preſerve him was violent and irregular; yet his filial affection to his Father was ſo grateful to the people, that they not only not reprehended him for what he had done, but advanced him to honour; for being not long after to chooſe Tribunes for their Legions, *T. Manlius* was the ſecond that was made. And here I think it not amiſs to conſider the way which the the people of *Rome* took in the diſtribution of their honours, and election of Magiſtrates; and to enquire into the truth of what I aſſerted before, That the diſtributions of the people are better, and more exact than the diſtributions of a Prince; for the people follow the common and publick character of every man, unleſs by ſome particular notion of his actions, they preſume, or believe otherwiſe. There are three ways by which a man may gain eſteem and reputation with the people. The firſt is by extraction, when the Parents having been great men, and ſerviceable to the Common-wealth, the people take a fancy that their Children muſt of neceſſity be the ſame, until by ſome ill act they convince them of the contrary. The ſecond way is to aſſociate with grave perſons, of good eſteem, and ſuch as are reputed diſcreet and ſober by every body; and becauſe nothing indicates and diſcovers a man ſo much as the Company which he keeps; he who keeps good Company, may be concluded to be good; for of neceſſity perſons ſo converſant together, muſt have ſomethink of ſimilitude. But there is another way of gaining the favour of the people, which exceeds them both; and that is by performing ſome extraordinary action, whether publick or private, it matters not, ſo you come honourably off. And the judgments which are made in this caſe, are much better than the other: For the arguments taken from the virtue of the Parents, are doubtful and falacious; nor can any man conclude any thing, till experience reſolves him. The preſumptions in the ſecond from their converſations and Company, are much better than the firſt, but not comparable to the third; for reputation from Anceſtors or Company depends barely upon opinion, and hopes, till ſome great action be performed that teſtifies your virtue, and determines the doubt; and then if this action be performed when you are young, it makes the impreſſion much deeper, and ſo fixes your reputation, that you muſt commit many ill actions before you can expunge it: Thoſe therefore who would advance themſelves in a Common-wealth, are to take this courſe, and endeavour to do ſome remarkable thing at firſt; which was done at *Rome* very frequently by ſeveral young perſons, either by the promulgation of ſome Law for the benefit of the publick; or by the accuſation of ſome great perſon for tranſgreſſing the Law; or doing ſome other great or new thing that may make you be talk'd of. Nor are theſe things neceſſary only to recommend you at firſt; but they are neceſſary likewiſe to maintain and augment your reputation; ſo that they are to be renewed and repeated often as long as you live; as *Manlius* did; for after he had defended his Father ſo honourably, and by that noble action laid the foundation of his eſteem, many years were not paſt before he fought ſingly with a French man, and having ſlain him very bravely, he took a Gold Chain from his neck, which gave him the name of *Torquatus*; and having given theſe teſtimonies of his courage in his youth, when he came to riper years he made himſelf as famous for diſcipline and juſtice by the example upon his Son, whom he cauſed to be put to death for fighting contrary to Orders, though he defeated the Enemy; which three great inſtances of his courage and virtue,

made

made his name ſo honourable both then and ever ſince, that no Victory, no Triumph could have done more. And good reaſon, for in Victories, many equalled, and ſome exceeded him; but in theſe three very few came near, but no body exceeded him.

Scipio the elder was not ſo glorious by all his triumphs, as for having in his youth ſo manfully defended his Father at the Battel upon the *Teſin*; and after the Battel of *Cannæ* forced certain young *Romans* with his Sword drawn to take an Oath not to deſert their Country as they had reſolved to do before; which two actions were the foundations of his following reputation, and ſerved as ſteps to his Triumphs both over *Spain* and *Africa*: which favour and good opinion of him was highly encreaſed, by his returning a Daughter and a Wife (both of them great Beauties, and both of them his Priſoners) immaculate and untouched, one to her Father, and the other to her Husband, in his Wars in *Spain*. And this way of proceeding is not only neceſſary for ſuch as would gain honour and promotion in a Common-wealth; but for Princes likewiſe and Kings who are deſirous to retain their reputation with their Subjects. For nothing recommends a Prince more efficaciouſly to the people, than in his youth to give them ſome taſte or ſpecimen of his virtue, by ſome remarkable act, or propoſal for the benefit of the publick; eſpecially if it has any tendancy to juſtice, magnanimity, liberality, or the like; for things of that nature that are extraordinary, whether acted, or ſpoken, are tranſmitted to poſterity with ſo much reverence, that they even come to be Proverbs among the people: But to return, I ſay then, when the people deſigns to confer honour upon a Citizen, upon one of theſe three accounts, they go upon very good grounds, but eſpecially upon the laſt, when ſeveral and reiterated examples make him more known; for then 'tis not poſſible they ſhould be deceived, and in young perſons they are certain preſages of their deportment for the future. I ſpeak only of thoſe degrees which are given at firſt, before any firm experience has made them better known, or that they paſs from one action to a contrary, in which, both as to miſtakes, and corruption, the people do not erre ſo often as Princes. And becauſe it may happen that the people may be deceived by report or opinion, or perhaps the actions of a man, as believing them more conſiderable and eſtimable than they are (which cannot eaſily happen to a Prince, by reaſon of his Council which are by, and always ready to inform him) that the people may not want ſuch Monitors; thoſe who have laid right foundations for a Common-wealth, have provided that when the great and ſupream Offices of a City are to be ſupplyed, where it would be dangerous to entertain any incapable perſons, if they find the people diſpoſed to the creation of any man who is known to be improper, it may be lawful for any Citizen; nay, an honour to any one that ſhall publickly diſcover his defects, that thereby the people underſtanding him better, may be better able to chooſe. That this was the practice in *Rome* appears by the Oration of *Fabius Maximus*, which he made publickly to the people in the ſecond Punick War, when at the creation of the Conſuls, the people were enclined to create *T. Ottacilius*, whom *Fabius* conceiving an unfit man for thoſe times, remonſtrated his thoughts ſo effectually to them, that he put him by that degree, and prevailed with the people to give it another perſon that deſerv'd it much better. Which being ſo, the people in the election of their Magiſtrates do judge according to the beſt and trueſt tokens that they can obſerve; and could they be as well counſelled in theſe affairs as Princes, they would commit fewer errors than they do. So that that Citizen who would work himſelf into the favour of the people, muſt do ſome great matter, or expreſs ſome great inſtance of his virtue or parts, that he may ſeem to imitate *Manlius*, and get as much honour as he.

CHAP. XXXV.

What dangers they incur, who make themſelves authors of any Enterprize, and the more extraordinary the deſign, the greater the danger.

IT would be too long, and difficult a task to diſcourſe at large of the danger there is in being the head in any new enterprize; what hazards there are in the Conduct, and how impoſſible to maintain it. Reſerving that therefore for a more convenient place; I ſhall ſpeak here only of the dangers to which ſuch Citizens, or other perſons are ſubject who advice a Prince to make himſelf head of any important deſign, and do it with that eagerneſs and impetuoſity, that the whole enterprize may be imputed to him. The firſt thing I would recommend to their obſervation is, that Counſels are commonly judged by their ſucceſs; if their ſucceſs be unfortunate, the whole ſcandal of the miſcarriage falls upon

upon the author. If it proſpers, and the event be good, he is commended, but at a diſtance, and his reward is not commenſurate with the danger. The preſent Emperor of the Turks *Sultan Selimus* (as it is reported by ſome that came lately out of that Country) having made great preparations for an Expedition into *Syria* and *Egypt*, changed his deſign upon the perſwaſion of one of his *Baſſa*'s, and with a vaſt Army march'd againſt the *Sophie* of *Perſia*. Arriving in an open and large Country, but for the moſt part Deſarts and dry, and no Rivers to ſupply them, many Diſeaſes were contracted in his Army, inſomuch as with hunger and ſickneſs, it dwindled away (as many of the *Romans* had done in that Country before) till at laſt (though he had the better of the War) he had loſt moſt of his men; upon which the Emperor being highly enraged, cauſed the *Baſſa* who had counſelled him thither to be ſlain. We read likewiſe of ſeveral Citizens adviſing an Enterprize, upon the miſcarriage of which they were all of them baniſhed. At *Rome* certain Citizens propoſed and promoted very earneſtly the making one of the Conſuls out of the people, and having prevailed, the firſt of them which went out with their Army being beaten and over-thrown, the authors would doubtleſs have found the inconvenience of their Counſel, had not the people (in whoſe favour it was given) appeared in their protection. So that this is moſt certain, all Counſellors of this kind (whether to Princes or Common-wealths) are betwixt thoſe two rocks; if they do not adviſe what in their judgments they think profitable for their Maſters, and that frankly and without reſpect, they fail in their duties, and are defective that way; again if they do counſel freely, they bring their lives and fortunes in danger, becauſe ſuch is the natural blindneſs of Mankind, they cannot judge of the goodneſs or badneſs of any thing, but by the ſucceſs; and conſidering with my ſelf, what way was moſt likely to avoid this infamy or danger, I can find no better than to take all things moderately, to aſſume and impropriate no enterprize; to deliver your opinion frankly, but without paſſion, and to defend it ſo modeſtly, that if it be followed by your Prince or Common-wealth, it may appear to be their voluntary act, and not done upon your importunity; in that caſe it will not be reaſonable to complain of your Counſel, when executed by the concurrence of the reſt; for if there be any danger, it is where things are done in contradiction to the reſt of the Counſel, who upon any miſcarriage will be ſure to combine againſt you, and procure your deſtruction: and though perhaps in this caſe there may want ſomething of that glory which accrews to a ſingle perſon, who carries a deſign againſt the oppoſition of the reſt, eſpecially if it ſucceeds; yet there are two advantages on your ſide; for firſt you will not run ſo great a hazard in the miſcarriage, and then if you adviſe a thing modeſtly, which by the obſtinacy and contradiction of the reſt is carried againſt you, the miſcarriage of their Counſel, will make much more to your reputation. And although a good Citizen is not to deſire to raiſe his credit upon the misfortunes of his Country, nor indeed to rejoyce in what happens of it ſelf; yet when a thing is done, it is more ſatisfaction to have your Counſel applauded, than to be in danger of being puniſhed. Wherefore I am of opinion, in theſe doubtful and difficult caſes, there can be no better way for the Counſel either of a Prince or State, than to deliver themſelves modeſtly and freely; for to be ſullen and ſay nothing, would not only betray your Country, but expoſe your ſelf, becauſe in time you would become ſuſpected; and perhaps it might befall them as it did to one of the Counſel of *Perſeus* King of *Macedon*, who being defeated by *Emilius Paulus*, and eſcaping with ſome few of his friends, one of them (in diſcourſe of his Maſter's misfortune) began to find fault, and blame ſeveral paſſages in his Conduct, which as he pretended might have been managed much better. At which the King being inraged, turn'd to him, told him, *And do you (like a Traytor as you are) tell me of it now, when 'tis paſt remedy?* and killed him with his own hands; ſo that he pay'd dear for being ſilent, when it was his duty to have ſpoke, and for ſpeaking when it was diſcretion to have been ſilent; nor did his forbearing to give his advice ſecure him from danger; ſo that I am confirmed in my opinion that the beſt way is to obſerve the directions aboveſaid.

CHAP. XXVI.

The reaſons why at the firſt Charge, the French *have been, and ſtill are accounted more than Men, but afterwards leſs than Women.*

THe arrogance of that *French* man who challenged the ſtouteſt of the *Romans* to fight with him upon the Bridge of the *Arrien*, and was afterwards killed by *T. Manlius Torquatus*, puts me in mind of what *Livy* ſays in many places of the *French*, that in their firſt attack they are more fierce and daring than men, but afterwards more fearful and puſilanimous than Women. And many people enquiring into the cauſe, do attribute it to the peculiarity of their temperature and nature: I am of opinion that there is much of that in it; yet I cannot think but that Nature which makes them ſo furious at firſt, may be ſo invigorated and improved by art, as to continue their courage to the laſt. To prove my opinion, I do affirm there are three ſorts of Armies. In the firſt there is courage and fury, joyn'd with order and diſcipline; and indeed their courage and fury proceeds from their diſcipline. And of this ſort were the Armies of the *Romans*, for all Hiſtories do agree that there was always good order by reaſon of their long diſcipline and experience. Nothing was done in their Armies, but with great regularity, and expreſs order from their General. They neither eat, nor ſlept, nor bought, nor ſold, nor did any other action either military or civil, but by permiſſion of the Conſul; and therefore theſe *Roman* Armies, who by their diſcipline and courage ſubdued the whole world, are the beſt example we can follow; they who do otherwiſe, do ill, and though perhaps they may do ſomething extraordinary ſometimes, yet 'tis more by accident than judgment: But where well ordered courage meets with good diſcipline, and is accommodated to the circumſtances of manner, and time, nothing diſmays them, nothing withſtands them; for the goodneſs of their order giving new life and courage to their men, makes them confident of Victory, and that confidence never ſuffers them to give ground, till their whole order be broken. There is another ſort of Armies which are acted more by fury than diſcipline (as in the Armies of the *French*) and there it is quite otherwiſe, becauſe not ſucceeding in their firſt charge, and not being ſuſtained by a well ordered courage, that fury upon which they wholly rely'd growing cold and remiſs, they are quickly overthrown. Whereas the *Romans* fearing nothing of danger, by reaſon of their good order and diſcipline, without the leaſt diffidence or queſtion of the Victory, fought on ſtill obſtinately, being animated with the ſame courage, and agitated by the ſame ardor at laſt as at firſt, and the more they were preſs'd, the better they reſiſted. The third ſort of Armies is where there is neither natural courage, nor diſcipline and order, as in our *Italian* Armies now adays, which are ſo uſeleſs and unſerviceable, that unleſs they light upon an Enemy who runs by ſome accident, they are never like to have a Victory; and this is ſo obvious every day, it needs no example to prove it. But becauſe by the teſtimony of *Livy* every one may know what is the right diſcipline, and what is the wrong, I will give you the words of *Papirius Curſor* in his reprimande to *Fabius* the Maſter of his Horſe. His words are theſe, *Nemo hominum, nemo Deorum verecundiam habeat. Non edicta Imperatorum, non auſpicia obſerventur: Sine Commeatu, vagi milites in pacato, in hoſtico errent; immemores Sacramenti, ſe ubi velent exauctorentur; infrequentia deſerantur ſigna; neq; conveniatur ad edictum: nec diſcernatur interdiu, noctu; æquo, iniquo loco, juſſu, injuſſu Imperatoris pugnetur; Non ſigna, non ordines ſeruentur; latrocinii modo, cæca & fortuita, pro ſolenni & ſacrata Militia, ſit. Let them bear no reſpect or reverence either to God or Man: Let neither the orders of the General, nor the directions of the Auſpices be obſerved; Let the looſe and vagabond Soldier infeſt his own Country as much as the Enemies: Let them forget their Oaths, and disband as they pleaſe: Let them run from their Colours as they think good, and not come back when they are required: Let them fight hand over head, without conſideration of time, or place, or order of their Officers: Let their ranks be confuſed, and their Colours deſerted: In a word, Let their whole Conduct be blind and fortuitous like thieves, rather than the ſolemn and ſacred Militia of the* Romans. By this we may eaſily ſee whether the Militia of our times be blind and fortuitous, or whether it be ſolemn, and ſacred; how far is it ſhort of the old diſcipline of the *Romans*, which conſiſting in exact order, produced courage and conſtancy in the Souldier; and how far behind the *French*, among whom though there is not that juſt order and conſtancy, yet there is courage enough.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Whether fighting in ſmall parties, or pickeering before a Battel be neceſſary; and how the temper of a new enemy is to be found without them.

IN humane affairs (as we have ſaid before) there is not only a perpetual and unavoidable difficulty in carrying them to their perfection, but there is always ſome concomitant miſchief ſo inſeparable from it, that it is impoſſible to arrive at the one without the other. This is viſible in all the actions of mankind, ſo that that perfection is acquir'd with much difficulty, unleſs you be ſo favoured by fortune, that by her force ſhe overcomes that common and natural inconvenience: and of this, the duel betwixt *Manlius Torquatus* and the French-man put me in mind, where, as *Livy* tell us, *Tanti ea dimicatio ad univerſi belli eventum momenti fuit, ut Gallorum exercitus, relictis trepide Caſtris, in Tiburtem agrum, mox in Campaniam tranſierit; The ſucceſs of that duel was of ſo much importance to the ſucceſs of the War, that thereupon the French Army drew off in a great fear into the Tiburtine Country, and afterwards march'd away into* Campania. From whence I infer, on the one ſide, that a good General is to avoid any thing that (carrying but ſmall advantage with it) may have an ill influence upon his Army; to fight therefore in parties, and venture your whole fortune upon leſs than your whole Army, is raſh and imprudent, (as I have ſaid before, where I diſſwaded the keeping of paſſes). On the other ſide, I obſerve, when an experienced General comes againſt a new enemy that has the reputation of being ſtout, before he brings him to a Battel, he is obliged to try him by ſlight skirmiſhes and pickeerings, that by ſo doing he may bring his Souldiers acquainted with their diſcipline, and way of fighting, and remove that terror, which the fame and reputation of their courage had given them. And this in a General is of very great importance, and ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that he who engages an unknown enemy with his whole Army, before he has made an eſſay of his courage, runs himſelf and his Army into manifeſt danger. *Valerius Corvinus* was ſent by the *Romans* with an Army againſt the *Samnites*, a new enemy with whom they had never had any conflict before; and *Livy* tells us he ſent ſmall parties abroad, and cauſed them to entertain light skirmiſhes with the enemy, *Ne eos novum bellum, ne novus hoſtis terreret; Leſt his Souldiers ſhould be terrified with a new war, and a new enemy.* But then the danger is, that your men being overcome, their terror ſhould be encreaſed, and that which you intended to animate, ſhould diſcourage and diſmay them: and this is one of thoſe good things which have ſo near a conjunction with evil, that 'tis no hard matter to take one for the other. My advice therefore is, that a wiſe General abſtains from any thing that may ſtrike a terror into his Army; for then the Souldiers begin to apprehend, when they ſee their Camrades kill'd before their face. For which reaſon thoſe pickeerings and ſlight skirmiſhes are to be avoided by all means, unleſs upon great advantage, or ſome more than ordinary hopes of ſucceſs. Again, it is not his intereſt certainly to defend any paſs, where he cannot upon occaſion bring his whole Army to engage: neither are any Towns to be made good, but ſuch as are of importance to the ſubſiſtance of his Army, and without which both that and himſelf muſt be ruined; and no ſuch Towns are to be fortified, but where not only a good Garriſon may be diſpoſed and ſupplyed, but where in caſe of a Siege your whole Army may be brought to relieve it: other Towns are rather to be quitted than kept; for to abandon a Town whilſt your Army is in the field, is no diſrepute to you, nor diſcouragement to your Souldiers: but when you loſe a place that you undertook, and every body expected you would defend, that abates much of your credit, and is a great prejudice to you; ſo that it will be with you as it was then with the French, a trifling loſs will endanger the whole war.

Philip of *Macedon* (the Father of *Perſeus*) a martial Prince, and of great reputation in his time, being invaded by the *Romans*, quitted and deſtroyed a great part of his Country, which he ſuppoſed he ſhould be unable to defend, as judging it better, and more conſiſtent with his honour to ſuffer it to be poſſeſſed by the enemy as waſte and neglected, than to undertake, and not be able to defend it. The affairs of the *Romans* being in a very ill condition after the battel at *Cannas*, they refuſed their aſſiſtance to ſeveral of their friends and allies, giving them leave to defend themſelves if they could: which reſolutions are much better than to attempt to defend that which is not in our power; for in the firſt caſe we loſe only our friends; but in the laſt, both our friends and our ſelves. To return therefore to our skirmiſhes, I ſay, that when ever for the diſcovery of the enemy, or acquainting his Souldiers with the way of their fighting, a General is conſtrained to make uſe of them, he is to do it with that art and advantage, that he may run no hazard of being worſted: or elſe to follow the example of *Marius*, (which is the better way of the two)

who marching againſt the *Cimbri*, a fierce and numerous people which had invaded *Italy* for prey, and beaten one *Roman* Army already; obſerving his Army to be afraid, he thought it would be neceſſary before he came to a general engagement, to contrive ſome way or other to diſpoſſeſs them of their fear; whereupon, as a wiſe Officer, he diſpoſed his Army (more than once or twice) in ſome ſecure place upon the road by which the *Cimbrian* Army was to paſs, from whence his men might have a view of their march, and accuſtom themſelves to the ſight of them; to the end that ſeeing them to be nothing but a confuſed and diſorderly multitude, incommoded with baggage, and either very ill accoutred, or utterly unarm'd, they might recover their ſpirits, and grow impatient to be at them: and this prudent invention of *Marius* ought to be diligently imitated by other people, leſt they fall into the dangers aforeſaid, and come off like the *French*, *Qui ob rem parvi ponderis in Tiburtem agrum, & in Campaniam tranſierunt; Who upon a trifling accident, diſponded, and retired.* And becauſe I have mentioned *Valerius Corvinus* in this Chapter, I ſhall make uſe of his words in the next, to ſhew how a General ſhould be qualified.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

How a General is to be qualified, that his Army may rely upon him.

AS we have ſaid before, *Valerius Corvinus* was gone with his Army againſt the *Samnites*, a new enemy, with whom the *Romans* had had no conteſt before. To encourage his Souldiers, and acquaint them with the diſcipline of the *Samnites*, he inured his men to them, by ſeveral ſmall skirmiſhes, but leſt that ſhould not do, he made a ſpeech to them before the Battel, remonſtrating with all poſſible efficacy of words, how little they were to value the enemy; and how much they might expect from their own valour, and his conduct: *Livy* brings him in with theſe words in his mouth, which gives us an exact character of a General in whom his Army may confide. *Tum etiam intueri cujus ductu auſpicioq; ineunda pugna ſit; utrum qui audiendus, duntaxat magnificus adhortator ſit, verbis tantum ferox, operum militarium expers; aut qui & ipſe tela tractare, procedere ante ſigna, verſari media in mole pugnæ ſciat. Facta mea, non dicta vos milites ſequi volo, nec diſciplinam modo, ſed exemplum etiam a me petere, qui hac dextra mihi tres Conſulatus, ſummamq; laudem peperi; Then you may ſee under whoſe Conduct you fight; whether he that ſpeaks to you be only a magnificent boaſter, valiant in words, but ignorant in whatever belongs to a Souldier; or whether he be one that knows how to manage his Arms, lead up his Men, charge in the head of them, and behave himſelf manfully in the very heat of the Battel; I would not (fellow Souldiers) that you ſhould follow my words more than my deeds; or take only my precepts, and not my example, who with this hand have gained three Conſulſhips, and immortal reputation.* Which words, if well conſidered, are ſufficient to inſtruct any man what courſe he is to take to make himſelf reputed a great General; he who acts otherwiſe, will find in time that that command (however he came by it, whether by ambition or fortune) will rather ſubſtract than add to his honour: for it is not titles that make men honourable, but men their titles: and it is to be obſerved likewiſe, that if great Captains have been forced to ſuch unuſual language to confirm the hearts of an old veteran Army, when it is to fight with a new enemy; how much more care and art is to be uſed in a new inexperienced Army, that never ſaw an enemy before. For if a ſtrange enemy be terrible to an old Army, well may he be ſo to an Army that is new raiſed, and was never engaged: nevertheleſs all theſe difficulties have been overcome by the prudence of ſeveral Captains, as by *Gracchus* the *Roman*, and *Epaminondas* the *Theban*, who with new raiſed men defeated old veteran Troops, that had been long experienced in matters of war; and their way was to prepare them for ſome months by continual exerciſe, and counterfeit battels; by uſing them to their ranks, and holding them to ſtrict diſcipline and obedience; after which, they advanced againſt the enemy, engaged with great confidence, and performed very well. Let no man therefore (that is any thing of a Souldier) deſpair of making his Army good, if he has but men enough; for that Prince who abounds with men, and wants Souldiers, is rather to complain of his own lazineſs and imprudence, than of their incapacity and dulneſs.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIX.

A General ought to know the Country, and how to take his advantage in the ground.

AMong the many things that are neceſſary in a General of an Army, the knowledg of Coaſts and Countrys is one, and that not only in a General, but in an exquiſite and more particular way, without which he ſhall not be able to do any great thing: and becauſe all knowledge requires uſe and exerciſe to bring it to perfection, ſo is it in this knowledg of places; and if it be enquired what uſe, and what exerciſe is required in this caſe, I anſwer, Hunting, and Hawking, and ſuch like recreations; and therefore it is that the Heroes which anciently govern'd the World, were ſaid to be brought up in woods and foreſts, and accuſtomed to thoſe kind of exerciſes; for hunting (beſides the acquaintance which it gives you of the Country) inſtructs you in many things that are neceſſary in war; *Xenophon* in the Life of *Cirus* tells us, that when *Cirus* went to invade the King of *Armenia*, aſſigning ſeveral offices and places to the ſeveral parts of his Army, he told them that, *Queſta, non era altro ch'una di quelle caccie le quali molte volte havenano fatte ſeco*; *That this expedition was no more than one of thoſe Chaces which they had taken frequently with him.* Thoſe whom he placed as Scouts upon the Mountains, he reſembled to them who ſet their nets upon the hills; and thoſe who were to make excurſions upon the plain, were like them who were employed to rouſe the Deer, and force them into the Toyls. And this is ſaid by *Xenophon*, to ſhew the reſemblance and ſimilitude betwixt hunting and war: for which cauſe thoſe kind of exerciſes are not only honourable, but neceſſary for great perſons; and the rather, becauſe nothing gives a man ſo true a knowledg of the Country, or imprints it more deeply and particularly in the memory: and when a man has acquainted himſelf thorowly with one Country, he may arrive more eaſily at the knowledg of other, becauſe all Countries and Coaſts have ſome kind of proportion and conformity betwixt them; ſo that the knewledg of the one contributes much to the underſtanding of the other. But if before you have acquainted your ſelf with your own, you ſeek out new Regions, you will hardly without great labour, and long time, come to the knowledg of either. Whereas he that is well vers'd and practiſed in one, ſhall at the firſt caſt of his eye give you an account how that plain lies; how that mountain riſes; and how far that valey extends; and all by his former knowledg in that kind. To confirm all this, *Titus Livius* gives us an example in *Publius Decius*, who being a military Tribune in the Army which the Conſul *Cornelius* commanded againſt the *Samnites*, and finding the ſaid Conſul and Army fallen by accident into a Vale where they might have been encompaſſed by the enemy, and cut off, *Vides tu Aule* Corneli (ſaid *Decius* to the Conſul) *cacumen illud ſupra hoſtem? Arx illa eſt ſpei ſalutiſq; noſtræ; ſi eam (quoniam cæci reliquere Samnites) impigre capimus; Do you ſee, Sir, that hill which hangs over the enemies Camp? there lies our hope; the blind* Samnites *have neglected it, and our ſafety depends upon the ſeizing of it quickly.* For, ſaid *Livy* before, *Publius Decius Tribunus militum, unum editum in ſaltu Collem, imminentem hoſtium Caſtris, aditu arduum impedito agmini, expeditis haud difficilem*; *Publius Decius* the military Tribune obſerved a hill over the enemies Camp not eaſily to be aſcended by thoſe who were compleatly arm'd, but to thoſe who were lightly arm'd, acceſſible enough. Whereupon being commanded to poſſeſs it by the Conſul with 3000 men, he obeyed his orders, ſecur'd the *Roman* Army, and deſigning to march away in the night, and ſave both himſelf and his party; *Livy* brings him in ſpeaking theſe words to ſome of his Camrades, *Ite mecum, ut dum lucis aliquid ſupereſt, quibus locis hoſtes præſidia ponant, qua pateant hinc exitus exploremus. Hæc omnia ſagulo militari amictus, ne Ducem circuire hoſtes notarent, perluſtravit*; *Come along with me, that whilſt we have yet light, we may explore where the enemy keeps his Guards, and which way we may make our retreat: and this he did in the habit of a private Souldier, that the enemy might not ſuſpect him for an Officer.* He then who conſiders what has been ſaid, will find how uſeful and neceſſary it is for a General to be acquainted with the nature of the Country; for had not *Decius* underſtood thoſe things very well, he could not ſo ſuddenly have diſcerned the advantage of that hill, and of what importance it would be to the preſervation of the *Roman* Army; neither could he have judged at that diſtance whether it was acceſſible or not; and when he had poſſeſſed himſelf of it, and was to draw off afterwards, and follow the Conſul, (being ſo environed by the *Samnites*) he could never have found out the beſt way for his retreat, nor have gueſſed ſo well where the enemy kept his Guards. So that it muſt neceſſarily

ſarily be that *Decius* had a perfect knowledg of the Country, which knowledg made him ſecure that hill, and the ſecuring of that hill was the ſecurity of the Army. After which, by the ſame knowledg (though he was as it were beſieged by the enemy) he found a way to make his own retreat, and bring off his whole party.

CHAP. XL.

How fraud in the management of War is honourable and glorious.

THough fraud in all other actions is abominable, yet in matters of War it is laudable and glorious; and he who overcomes his enemies by ſtratagem, is as much to be praiſed as he who overcomes him by force. This is to be ſeen by the judgment of thoſe who write the Lives of great Perſons, eſpecially of great Commanders; for they command and applaud *Hanibal* and the reſt in all their inventions of that nature. There are many examples in them to this purpoſe, which I ſhall not repeat here; only this I muſt advertize, that I do not intend that fraud which conſiſts in betraying a truſt, or breaking an agreement, to be honourable; for though by them you may acquire Power, and 'tis poſſible a Kingdom, (yet, as I ſaid before) it cannot be with honour; but by fraud, I mean that artifice which is ſhewn in ſtratagems and circumventions, againſt an enemy that is not only in hoſtility, but a ſtate of defiance, (for where he repoſes any confidence in you, it alters the caſe) and ſuch as I mean, was the artifice of *Hanibal* when he pretended to fly, only to poſſeſs himſelf of ſome paſſes, and ſo block up the Conſul and his Army; as alſo when to clear himſelf of *Fabius Maximus*, he found out the invention of binding fire-brands and other combuſtible matter about the horns of the Cattel, and turning them out upon the enemy. And much of this nature was that of *Pontius* General for the *Samnites*; which he uſed to circumvent the Roman Army *ad Furcas Caudinas*. *Pontius* having diſpoſed his Army privately upon the mountains; ſent ſeveral of his Souldiers habited like Shepherds with ſeveral herds of Cattel thorow the plain: being all taken and examined by the *Romans* where the Army of the *Samnites* was, they unanimouſly concurred in the ſtory which *Pontius* had put into their mouths, that it was gone to beſiege *Nocera*; which being credited by the Conſul, he brake up from his poſt, and marching thorow the plain for the relief of *Nocera*, he ran himſelf into the trap, and was no ſooner entred, but he was block'd up by the enemy. This exploit was fraudulently performed, yet it would have been very honourable to *Pontius*, had he followed his Father's advice, who would have had him either diſmiſſed the *Romans* frankly, that they might have been obliged by their uſage, or elſe have put them all to the ſword, that they might have taken no revenge; but he took the middle way, *Quæ neq; amicos parat, neq; inimicos tollit*; *Which neither multiply'd his friends, nor leſſened the number of his foes.* Which way has always been pernitious in matters of ſtate, as has been ſhewn elſewhere.

CHAP. XLI.

That ones Country is to be defended by all means, and whether honourable or diſhonourable it imports not, 'tis well defended.

THe *Roman* Army and their Conſul (as is ſaid before) were block'd up by the *Samnites*, who having propoſed terms to them which were very diſhonourable, as that they ſhould be diſmiſſed *ſub jugum*, and diſarm'd (in token of bondage), and then ſent back again to *Rome*. The Conſuls were amazed at the motion, and the whole Army was in deſpair; when *Lentulus* the *Roman* Legate ſtood up, and told them that in his judgment no conditions were to be ſcrupled at that time when their Country was at ſtake: for the ſafety of *Rome* conſiſting in the ſafety of that Army, the Army was to be preſerved, and that Country which is defended, is well defended, let the way be as it will, honourable or not honourable, it matters not: for if that Army was preſerved, in time *Rome* might work off that diſgrace; but if it were loſt, (though it periſhed never ſo bravely) Country, and Liberty and all would be loſt with it: and ſ his counſel was followed. And this ought to be conſidered and obſerved by every man whoſe office it is to adviſe for the good of his Country; for where the ſafety of that is in queſtion, no other conſideration ought to

to be coincident, as whether the way be juſt or unjuſt; merciful or cruel, honourable or diſhonourable; but poſtponing all other reſpects, you are to do that which ſhall procure the ſafety of your Country, and preſervation of its liberty. And this is effectually imitated by the *French* both in their words, and deeds, whenever the Majeſty of their Prince, or the intereſt of their Country is at ſtake. For there is nothing they bear with leſs patience, than to hear a man ſay ſuch a thing is diſhonourable for their King; for they believe their King uncapable of diſhonour, be his Counſels or his fortune what they will, becauſe whether he wins or loſes, or whatever is done, all makes for the King.

CHAP. XLII.

That forc'd Promiſes are not binding.

THe Conſuls being returned to *Rome*, with their Army diſarmed, and a ſcandal upon them for the diſhonourable conditions to which they had ſubmitted; the firſt who ſpake againſt the keeping them, was *S. Poſtumius* the Conſul, who perſwaded the Senate that only himſelf, and thoſe who accepted them, were obliged thereby; and that they did not extend to the people of *Rome*; wherefore if the people of *Rome* would be never ſo exact, the moſt that could be expected from them, would be but to deliver up him, and all thoſe who had engaged themſelves into the hands of the *Samnites*; and this he maintained with ſo much obſtinacy and zeal, that the Senate was convinced, and ſent him and the reſt back Priſoners to the *Samnites*, with a proteſtation againſt the Peace, as not extending to them; and fortune was ſo favourable to *Poſtumius* in the buſineſs, that the *Samnites* not retaining him, he return'd to *Rome*, and was in greater reputation there after his loſs, than *Pontius* was among the *Samnites* after his Victory. And here there are two things more particularly remarkable: One is, That there is no action, but is capable of producing honour and renown; in victory there is nothing more frequent: In loſs, it is poſſible, by making it appear that it came not by your fault; or elſe by doing ſome action preſently after, that may recompence and repair it. The other is, That it is not ſcandalous to break ſuch promiſes as are extorted by force. For in promiſes relating to the publick, if they be obtained by force, when the force ceaſes, the promiſe ceaſeth with it, and may be neglected without any diſgrace. Of this, all Hiſtory is full of examples, and there is not a day but preſents us with new: For as we ſee Princes make no Conſcience of performing any thing that they are obliged to by force, eſpecially if the force be removed; ſo they are as little tender of their promiſes in other things, when the cauſe which preſs'd them to promiſe is taken away: which whether commendable or not in a Prince, or binding or not binding, I ſhall not determine in this place, having ſpoken of it ſo largely in my Treatiſe called *The Prince*.

CHAP. XLIII.

Thoſe who are born in the ſame Country, retain almoſt the ſame Nature thorow all the variety of times.

WIſemen were wont to ſay (and perhaps not unworthily) That he who would know what will be, muſt conſider what has been already, becauſe there is nothing in the world now, nor will be hereafter, but what has, and will have conformity with the productions of former times; and the reaſon is, becauſe proceeding from men who have, and have had always the ſame paſſions, they muſt neceſſarily have the ſame effects. 'Tis true indeed their actions are ſometimes better and more virtuous in this Province, than in that, and in that more than in another, according to the difference of their Education, for from the manner of their breeding, people take the firſt rudiments of their converſation; and it makes it more eaſie to conjecture future events, by what is paſſed, when we ſee ſome Nations retaining their humours and peculiarities a long time. So one Nation has been always covetous, another fraudulent; and ſo on the other ſide, one has been conſtantly famous for one virtue, and another for another. He who peruſes the paſſages of old in our very City of *Florence*, and compares them with our modern, will find that it has been all along expoſed to the avarice, pride, cruelty, and falſhood of the *Germans* and *French*:

French: Every one knows how unfaithfully we have been dealt withal: How often *Charles* VIII. of *France* received our Money, and promiſed to reſtore the Citadels at *Piſa*; but never perform'd, which was a great inſtance of his infidelity, and avarice. But to wave ſuch recent examples, every one knows what hapned in the War betwixt the *Florentines*, and the *Viſconti* Dukes of *Milan*. The *Florentines* being deſtitute of other expedients, reſolved to bring the Emperor into *Italy*, to fall upon *Lombardy* with all his power and reputation. The Emperor engaged to bring a great Army into *Italy*; to make War upon the *Viſconti*, and to defend *Florence* againſt them, upon condition the *Florentines* pay'd him 100000 Ducats by way of advance, and as much more when they came into *Italy*. The *Florentines* agreed, paid their firſt Money down, and the reſt when they enter'd *Italy*; yet when he had marched as far as *Verona*, he turned back without doing any thing, complaining of the *Florentines* for want of performance: So that had not *Florence* been under ſome extraordinary neceſſity, or paſſion, or had they ever read and conſidered the ancient cuſtoms of thoſe Nations, they would never have been ſo often over-reached, ſeeing they have been always alike, and uſed the ſame practices in all places, with all people. Thus they ſerved the *Tuſcans* of old, who having been many times over-power'd and routed, and diſperſed by the *Romans*, and finding their own force unable to defend them; they articled with the *French* on this ſide of the *Alps* to give them a Sum of Money, for which the *French* were to joyn their forces with the *Tuſcans*, and march with them againſt the *Romans:* But when the *French* had got their Money, they refuſed to perform the conditions on their part, alledging that they received it not to make War upon the *Romans*, but to forbear infeſting them themſelves: by which infidelity and avarice in the *French*, the poor *Tuſcans* were at once defeated both of their Money and aſſiſtance. From whence we may conclude that the *Tuſcans* were formerly of the ſame nature as now, and eſpecially the *Florentines*, and the *French* and other foreign Nations had always the ſame inclination to deceive them.

CHAP. XLIV.

Confidence and boldneſs does many times obtain that which would never be compaſſed by ordinary means.

THe *Samnites* were invaded by the *Romans*, and their Army ſo weak, it durſt not meet them in the field: whereupon it was reſolved, That all their Garriſons ſhould be reinforced, and with the reſt of their Troops they ſhould paſs into *Tuſcany* (which was then at peace with the *Romans*) and try if they could tempt them to take up Arms, and break their Peace; and in the *Harangue* which was made by the *Samnites* to the *Tuſcans* to remonſtrate upon what occaſion they had taken up Arms themſelves, they had this expreſſion, *Rebellaſſe quod pax ſervientibus gravior, quam liberis bellum.* They had *rebelled, becauſe Peace was more inſupportable in ſervitude, than War to men that are free.* And ſo partly by perſwaſions, and partly by the preſence of their Army, they prevailed with them to take Arms againſt the *Romans*, which they had refuſed to their Embaſſadors before. From whence it is to be obſerved, that when a Prince deſires to obtain any thing of another (if occaſion permits) he ought not to give him time to conſider, but is to act ſo as he may ſee a neceſſity upon him of reſolving immediately; and this is done when the perſon to whom the demand is made ſees that in either denying it abſolutely, or delaying his anſwer, he runs a manifeſt danger. This way was uſed very handſomly in our days by Pope *Julius* with the *French*; and *Monſieur de Foix* (the King of *France*'s General) againſt the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*. Pope *Julius* reſolving to drive the Family of the *Bentivogli* out of *Bolonia*; and judging that to do it, he ſhould have need of the aſſiſtance of the *French*, and that it would be convenient the *Venetians* ſhould ſtand Neuter; To this purpoſe he ſent Embaſſadors to them both, but could get nothing but uncertain and ambiguous anſwers; wherefore to ſurprize them, and bring them that way to his lure whether they would or no, he got what Forces he could together, and marching directly to *Bolonia*, ſent to the *Venetians* to let them know he expected they ſhould ſtand Neuter; and to the *French* to ſend him Supplies: Both of them finding themſelves under a neceſſity of anſwering immediately, and that there was no time allowed to conſider, fearing the diſpleaſure and indignation of his Holineſs, they both of them complyed; the *Venetian* did not meddle; and the *French* ſent him aſſiſtance. *Monſieur de Foix* being another time with his Army in *Bolonia*, and underſtanding the defection of *Breſcia*, he reſolved to go immediately and endea-

endeavour to reduce it. There were but two ways that he could poſſibly paſs; one was thorow the Dominions of his Maſter, but that was tedious and about; the other was a ſhorter cut, thorow the Territories of the Marqueſs of *Mantoua*; but then he was not only to force his way thorow that Country, but he was to paſs certain Sluces betwixt Fens and Lakes (with which that Country abounds) and that was not to be done without great difficulty, in reſpect of ſeveral Forts which were upon them, and all well guarded by the Marqueſs: However *de Foix* reſolved upon the ſhorteſt, in ſpite of the difficulty; and that the Marqueſs might have no time to deliberate, he marched with his Army, and at the ſame moment ſent a Meſſenger to the Marquſes for the Keys of ſuch Caſtles as ſtood in his paſſage; and the Marqueſs ſurprized with the ſuddenneſs and confidence of the demand, ſent them immediately, which he would never have done had they been more modeſtly deſired; the Marqueſs being in League with the *Venetian* and *Pope*, in whoſe hands he had likewiſe a Son at that time; all which, had he had time to have conſidered, would have been very laudable reaſons to have denyed it: But being preſs'd of a ſudden, he ſent them (as is ſaid before): Juſt ſo it was betwixt the *Tuſcans*, and the *Samnites*; the preſence of the *Samnian* Army having forced them to take Arms, which they had refuſed before, and had ſcarcely done then, had they had liberty to have adviſ'd.

CHAP. XLV.

Whether in a Battel it is beſt to give or receive the Charge.

Decius, and *Fabius* two Roman Conſuls, were in the field with two Armies againſt the *Samnites*, and *Tuſcans*; and being come to a Battel, it is obſervable that they took two ſeveral ways in the manner of their fighting, and it is worth our enquiry which of them was the beſt. *Decius* charged the Enemy with all imaginable fury, and engaged his whole Army at once: *Fabius* received the charge, and (judging that way the moſt ſafe) reſerved his effort till the laſt, when (as we ſay) the Enemy had ſpent their fire, and the heat of their fury was over. By the ſucceſs of the Battel, it appeared that the deſign of *Fabius* was better than that of *Decius*, who tired with the vehemence of his firſt charge, and ſeeing his men engaged farther among the Enemy, than otherwiſe they would have been, to gain that honour by his death, which he could not hope for by the Victory, in imitation of his Father, he ſacrificed himſelf for the *Roman* Legions. Which when *Fabius* underſtood, that he might not gain leſs honour by living, than his colleague ſhould do by his death, he advanced with his Reſerves, and charg'd the Enemy ſo briskly, that he overthrew them, and gained a happy and moſt memorable Victory. By which it appears that the way of *Fabius* was more imitable and ſecure.

CHAP. XLVI.

How it comes to paſs that in a City the ſame Family retains the ſame manners and cuſtoms a long time.

IT appears that not only one City has its manners and inſtitutions different; and produces men more auſtere, or effeminate than the reſt; but in the ſame City Families are frequently found to have the ſame difference. Of this there are multitude of Examples, and particularly in *Rome*. The *Manlii* were always rigid and ſevere: The *Publicoli* benign, and lovers of the people: The *Appii* ambitious and enemies to the people, and ſo in ſeveral other Families they had their peculiar qualities that diſcriminated them from the reſt; which cannot proceed barely from their extraction and blood (for that muſt of neceſſity have been altred by the variety of their Marriages) but rather from the diverſity of their Education, in the ſeveral Families; for it is a great matter when a man is accuſtomed to hear well or ill of any thing from his infancy; and makes ſuch an impreſſion in him, that from thence he many times regulates his converſation as long as he lives; and if this were not ſo, it would have been impoſſible that all the *Appii* ſhould have been agitated by the ſame paſſion and ambition, as *Livy* obſerved in moſt of them; and particularly in one of the laſt, who being made *Cenſor*, and to depoſite his Office at the expiration of 18 months according to Law, refuſed it abſolutely (though his Colleague reſigned) inſiſting upon an

old Law made by the *Cenſors* to continue their Magiſtracy for five years: and though there were many meetings, and great contention and tumult about this; yet in ſpite both of Senate and People he could not be brought to depoſite. And he who reads the Oration which he made againſt *P. Sempronius* the Tribune of the people, will diſcern the inſolence of that Family, and the bounty and humanity of ſeveral other Citizens expreſſed by their obedience to the Laws, and their affection to their Country.

CHAP. XLVII.

A good Citizen is to forget all private injury, when in competition with his love to his Country.

Manlius the Conſul being employed in the Wars againſt the *Samnites*, received a wound that diſabled him for executing his charge; upon which the Senate thought fit to ſend *Papirius Curſor* the Dictator to ſupply his place; and the Dictator being by the Laws to be nominated by *Fabius*, who was then with his Army in *Tuſcany*, they were fearful (in reſpect of an old quarrel betwixt them) that *Fabius* would not name him. Whereupon the Senate diſpatched two Embaſſadors toward him, to intreat that (laying aſide all private animoſity) he wou'd name *Curſor* for Dictator, which *Fabius* did out of love to his Country; though by his ſullenneſs and ſilence, and ſeveral other ſigns he ſignified his reluctancy, and that that Election went againſt the hair: From hence therefore all good Citizens are to take example, and learn to prefer the publick good, before any private quarrel of their own.

CHAP. XLVIII.

When an Enemy commits any grand fault, 'tis to be ſuſpected for a fraud.

Fulvius being left Lieutenant of the *Roman* Army in *Tuſcany*, upon the Conſuls going to *Rome* to be preſent at ſome Ceremony, the *Tuſcans* to draw him into a trap, lay'd an Ambuſcade for him not far from his Camp; and having diſguiſed ſome of their Soldiers in the habit of Shepheards, they cauſed them to drive certain Cattel within ſight of the *Romans*; and the Shepheards were ſo exact in their obedience, that they came up to their very Stoccadoes: The Lieutenant wondered at their confidence; and the unreaſonableneſs of the thing gave him occaſion to ſuſpect; whereupon he found out a way to diſcover the fraud, and fruſtrate the whole plot: From whence we may obſerve that a General is not to preſume upon any groſs error that his enemy commits; becauſe it is not rational to believe he would be ſo ſottiſh, and inconſiderate, were there not ſome ſtratagem at the bottom; yet many times men are ſo blinded with deſire of Victory, that they ſee nothing but what makes for themſelves. The *French* having overthrown the *Romans* not far from the *Allia*, and purſuing them to *Rome*, found the gates open, and without any guards to defend them: They apprehended it a deſign, and ſtood drawn up all that day and the next night, without daring to enter, not imagining the *Romans* could have been ſo abject and imprudent as to have abandoned their Country. In the year 1508. when the *Florentines* beſieged *Piſa*, *Alfonſo del Mutolo* a conſiderable Citizen of that Town, being Priſoner in the Camp, promiſed that if they would give him his liberty, he would deliver one of the Gates into their hands; the *Florentines* believed and diſcharged him; but coming afterwards to negotiate more particularly with certain Commiſſioners deputed to that purpoſe, he was ſo far from coming privately, that he was always accompanied with ſeveral of the *Piſans*, only when they came to treat, he deſired them to withdraw. Forаſmuch therefore as he came publickly, and attended by ſeveral *Piſans*, the *Florentines* had good reaſon to ſuſpect the performance of his promiſe: But the *Florentines* were ſo blinded with a deſire to have the City, that following the direction of *Alfonſo*, they came up to the Gate towards *Lucca*, expecting to be let in; but all things being prepared for them, they received a great loſs, and left many of their beſt Officers and Soldiers behind them.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLIX.

A Common-wealth which deſires to preſerve it ſelf free, has need of new proviſions every day; and upon what ſcore Fabius *was called* Maximus.

IT falls out of neceſſity (as has been ſaid before) that in a great City there is not a day but ſome accidents occur that have need to be remedied; and as they are of more or leſs importance, ſo their Phyſician ought to be more or leſs expert. And if ſtrange and unexpected accidents ever hapned in any City, it was in *Rome*: one of which ſort, was the the general conſpiracy of the *Roman* Women againſt their Husbands: ſome had poyſoned their Husbands already, and all the reſt had their materials ready to do as much by theirs. Of the ſame ſort was the conſpiracy of the *Bucchanals*, diſcovered during the time of the *Macedonian* War, in wich many thouſands of Men and Women were engaged; which would have been very dangerous for that City, had it not been diſcovered; or the *Romans* not had a cuſtom of puniſhing whole multitudes when they offended. And here we cannot but admire the fortitude, the ſeverity, the magnanimity of the *Romans* in puniſhing offenders; which (if there were nothing elſe to evince it) would be a great teſtimony of their virtue and power. For ſo great was their juſtice, they made no ſcruple to execute a whole Legion, or City at a time: ſometimes they baniſhed 8 or 10000 men together with ſuch conditions as would have been inſupportable to a ſingle man: ſo it hapned to thoſe who eſcaped from the Battel at *Cannas*, they baniſhed them all into *Sicily*, forbidding them to Quarter in any Town, or to commit any diſorder. But the moſt terrible of all their executions was the decimation of their Armies, in which every tenth man was put to death by lot quite thorow their Army; nor for the puniſhment of a multitude can any way be found more formidable; for where a multitude tranſgreſſes, and no certain Author is known, to puniſh the whole with death would be too ſevere; and to puniſh one part, and excuſe another would be injuſt to thoſe who were puniſh'd, and encourage the other to commit the ſame offence again: But where all are alike guilty, to execute every tenth man by lots, gives him who is to be puniſhed, occaſion to complain only of his fortune; and makes him who eſcapes affraid againſt the next time. The good Women then who would have poyſon'd their Husbands; and the Prieſts of *Bacchus* were puniſhed as they deſerv'd; and though theſe maladies in a Common-wealth have many times very ill Symptoms, yet they are not mortal, becauſe there is ſtill time enough for the cure. But where the State is concern'd, it is otherwiſe, and time may be wanting; and therefore if they be not ſeaſonably and prudently redreſſed, the whole Government may miſcarry. And this may be clear'd to us, by what hapned in *Rome*. The *Romans* having been very free in beſtowing the freedom and priviledges of their City upon ſtrangers, the ſtrangers grew ſo numerous by degrees, and to have ſo great a Vote in the Councils, that the whole Government began to totter, and decline from its old, to its new Inhabitants; which being obſerved by *Quintus Fabius* the *Cenſor*, he applyed a remedy in time, by reducing all the new Citizens into four *Tribes*; that being contracted into ſo narrow a ſpace, they might not have ſo malignant an influence upon the City; and this ſo timely and ſo uſeful expedient, was taken ſo thankfully from him by the people, that they gave him the addition of *Maximus*, and he was called *Fabius Maximus* ever after.

THE

THE ART OF WAR, IN SEVEN BOOKS.

By *NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.*

Newly tranſlated into Engliſh; and for the benefit of the Reader divided into

CHAPTERS.

LONDON,

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THE TRANSLATOR TO THE READER.

Kind Reader,

IT may ſeem ſtrange to you at firſt, that I have divided the Books of Machiavel, *and diſpoſed them into Chapters, contrary to the order of his Dialogues; but I am aſſured when you conſider my intention, you will rather applaud than condemn me. I was always ſenſible that no man could blame me, if I kept exactly to my Author; nevertheleſs I thought this way more beneficial, the length of a Diſcourſe being commonly tireſome to any man who affects brevity; beſides that in all ſorts of Books, theſe kind of breaches and ſections are very helpful to the memory. For this reaſon the Works of* Ariſtotle, Vitruvius *and* Pliny, *which were originally in another method, have been reduc'd ſince into this manner of diviſion. I have preſum'd to do the ſame in this my Tranſlation, having had more regard to the eaſe and advantage of the Reader, than to the exact order of the Author, whom I have not followed* verbatim, *by reaſon of the diverſity of the Languages, yet his ſenſe I have obſerved as ſtrictly as would conſiſt with the propriety of our own Language, aſſuring my ſelf that your bounty will diſpence with ſome faults, ſeeing nothing can be done ſo accurately, but will be ſubject to many.*

THE PREFACE OF *NICOLO MACHIAVELLI*, TO *Lorenzo* the Son of *Philippo Strozzi*, Gentleman of *FLORENCE*.

MAny have been, and are ſtill of opinion, that in the whole world no two things are more incongruous and diſſimilar than a Civil, and a Military life; inſomuch that many times when a man deſigns himſelf for a Soldier, he not only takes upon him a new habit, but he changes his Cuſtoms, his Company, his manner of Diſcourſe, and leaves off all ways of civil converſation; for he who would be light and nimble, and ready for the execution of all ſort of violence, looks upon a civil habit as improper and cumberſom; civil cuſtoms are unſuitable to him who thinks them ſoft and effeminate, and inconſiſtant with the life he propoſes; and indeed it would be undecent if a man whoſe buſineſs it is to look big, and Hector, and frigbt the whole world with his Oaths and his Blaſphemies, ſhould carry himſelf demurely, and behave himſelf with the uſual gentleneſs and complacency of other men; and this is it which in our days makes this opinion true: But if we conſider the condition and method of old times, we ſhall find no two things more united, more conformable; nor more neceſſarily amicable than they. For all the Arts which are contrived in a City for the common good; all the courſes invented to keep men in fear of God and the Laws would be uſeleſs and vain, were not force provided for their defence; which force (if well ordered) will be able to make them good, though perhaps the Laws are not ſo exact in themſelves; for this is moſt certain, good Orders without Military coerſion will quickly moulder to nothing, and run to decay like a Noble and Princely Palace that is uncovered at the top, and has nothing but the ſplendor and richneſs of its furniture to defend it from the weather. And if anciently Kingdoms and States imploy'd great induſtry to keep people in peace, and in the faith and fear of God; certainly in the regulation of their Military Diſcipline they employed much more; for where can ones Country

repoſe greater confidence, than in him who has promiſed to dye for it? Where can there be greater inclination to Peace, than in him who is not capable of moleſtation or injury, but by War? Where can there be more fear of God, then in him who being obnoxious to hourly dangers, has more need of his divine aſſiſtance. This neceſſity being well conſidered by thoſe who gave Laws to Kingdoms, and thoſe who had the Command of their Armys, was the cauſe that the life of a Souldier was in great reputation with all people, and much imitated and follow'd. But military diſcipline being now totally deprav'd, and degenerated from the practice of the ancients; that depravity hath been the occaſion of ſeveral ill opinions, which have brought that Diſcipline into contempt, and made all people hate and avoid the converſation of a Souldier. But conſidering with my ſelf both from what I have ſeen and read, that it is not impoſſible to revive the diſcipline of our Anceſtors; and reduce it to its primitive excellence, I reſolved (to keep my ſelf from idleneſs) to write what I thought might be to the ſatiſfaction of ſuch perſons as were ſtudious of the art of War, and lovers of Antiquity; tis true, tis more than ordinary boldneſs to treat of this Subject, where others have been ſo ſcrupulous and wary; yet I cannot think it an error to write of what others have profeſſed and exerciſed with much more audacity and preſumption; For my faults in writing, may be corrected without prejudice to any body; but thoſe faults which they commit in the execution, cannot be repair'd, but by the deſtruction and ruine of ſeveral people; conſider then (Sir) the quality of my labours, and according to your judgment let them be approved or rejected, as you think they deſerve: I ſend them to you as a teſtimony of my gratitude, though my abilities are not in the leaſt commenſurat with the greatneſs of your favours: beſides it being the cuſtome to addreſs things of this nature to perſons that are Illuſtrious for their Birth, wealth, parts, or generoſity: I knew you had not many equals in your Nobility and Fortune, fewer in your parts; but in Generoſity and Liberality, none at all.

THE

THE ART of WAR, IN SEVEN BOOKS.

LIBER I.

CHAP. I.

How the Seigneur Fabritio Colonna *being refreshing himself one evening with some other Gentlemen in a beautiful Garden, took occasion to enter upon this discourse of War.*

SEeing I am of opinion, that after a man is dead, it is lawful for any body to commend him without danger of reproof, (because there can be no occasion nor suspition of flattery) I shall make no difficulty to speak something in praise of our renowned and true friend *Cosimo Rucellai*, whose name I cannot remember without tears in my eyes, having known in him all the good qualities which one good Friend or good Citizen would desire in another; for I know not any thing so dear to him, that he would not have sacrificed for his friend; nor any thing so dreadful, that he would not have undertaken for his Country: and I confess freely among all with whom I have had any acquaintance and conversation, I do not know any man whose heart was more disposed to great and magnificent things. At his death nothing troubled him so much (as he complained often to his friends) as that he should die young, and in his own house without honour, or the satisfaction of having been serviceable to any man as he desired; for he was sensible that no more could be said of him than that he died a good friend. However it follows not but we who were acquainted with him, may bear testimony of his virtues and good qualities, seeing there is nothing left of his works or actions to recommend him to the World: and yet fortune was not so much his enemy but she suffered him to leave a short monument of the dexterity of his wit, which appears in certain Sonnets, and amorous Verses of his composition; in which way (though he was not amorous) he entertained himself at idle times in his youth, till his Stars had conducted him to higher thoughts, by which Verses it may easily be discerned with what comelineſs and felicity he could have expressed his conceptions, and how honourable he would have made himself by his Poetry, had he made it his business. But fortune having deprived us of such a friend, it seems to me that no better remedy can be applyed, than for us (as far as is possible) to make as much of his memory as we can, and recollect such of his sayings, or arguments, as were either witty or solid. And because there is nothing of him more fresh than the discourse which he had lately with *Fabritio Colonna* in his Garden, (where the said *Fabritio* gave a large account of all the mysteries of War on the one side, and *Cosimo* proposed, and objected, and argued with as much gravity on the other) being then present by accident with other of our friends, I have thought fit to put it in writing, that by reading it, such of *Cosimo*'s friends as were there may renew the memory of his Virtues; such as were not there, may be

troubled for their abſence, and learn ſeveral things profitable not only for military, but civil converſation.

I ſay then *Fabritio Colonna* returning from *Lombardy*, where for a long time he had done very honorable ſervice for the King of *Spain*, paſſing by *Florence* to repoſe himſelf ſome time in that City, viſit the Duke, and enjoy the company of certain Gentlemen with whom he had had a former acquaintance, *Coſimo* held himſelf obliged to invite him to his Gardens; not ſo much to ſhew his own liberality and magnificence, as to have larger opportunity of diſcourſing with him, and informing himſelf of ſuch things as might be expected from a perſon of his experience, and ſpending a whole day in diſcourſing of what might be to the ſatisfaction of his mind. *Fabritio* accepted his invitation, came to his houſe, and was entertained very nobly by *Coſimo*, with ſeveral other of his more particular friends, as *Zanobi Buondelmonti*, *Battiſta dalla Palla*, *Luigi Alamanni* and others, all of them young Gentlemen, his intimate friends, and ardently ſtudious of the ſame things, of whoſe qualifications I ſhall ſay nothing in this place, becauſe being ſtill living, their own actions do recommend them every hour of the day.

Fabritio was regall'd with as much pomp and magnificence as were conſiſtent with the time and the place: but dinner being ended, the tables taken away, and all the formalities of the Feaſt over, (which among perſons of great minds, whoſe thoughts are employed upon more honourable things, are not ſo tedious as with other people) the day being long, and heat exceſſive, *Coſimo* thought it convenient for the better ſatisfaction of his deſigns, under pretence of avoiding the heat, to carry *Fabritio* into a cloſe and ſhady Arbour in the Garden, where they might diſcourſe with more leiſure and privacy; and having brought him and the reſt of the Company to the place, ſome of them diſpoſed themſelves upon the graſs, (which was very pleaſant and green) and others upon ſeats under the ſhadow of thoſe lofty trees; *Fabritio* began to applaud the delightſomneſs of the place, and then looking particularly upon the trees, and not knowing of ſome of them, he ſtood ſtill, as it were in ſuſpence, which being obſerved by *Coſimo*, he told him, 'tis poſſible, Sir, you may not be acquainted with thoſe trees, but 'tis no wonder, for ſome of them were in more requeſt with our fore-Fathers than they are with us, and having told him their names, and what delight *Seignor Bernardo* his Grand-father took in planting, *Fabritio* replyed, I thought they were as you ſay; but the pleaſantneſs of this place, and the innocence of that employment puts me in mind of ſome Princes in the Kingdom of *Naples* who delighted themſelves exceedingly in thoſe kind of diverſions, and would plant, and make delicate Arbours to keep themſelves from the heat; and thereupon breaking off ſhort in his diſcourſe, he ſtood ſtill for a while, as in ſome ſerious ſuſpence, but preſently he told them, if I thought I ſhould not misbehave my ſelf, (which among my friends I ſuppoſe is not eaſy) I would give you my opinion of it, not to traduce or calumniate them, but for diſcourſe ſake, and to paſs away the time; for doubtleſs thoſe Princes (under correction) had done much better to have imitated their Anceſtors in great and heroick, rather than in ſoft and effeminate things; to have followed their examples in the heat of the Sun, rather than to have retir'd and withdrawn themſelves into the coolneſs of a ſhade; and rather to have perſonated their fore-Fathers in what was ſolid and perfect, than in what was delicate, and corrupt; for ſince theſe kind of entertainments have been pleaſing to our Country-men, our Country has gone to ruine, and all things declined.

Coſimo. You have opened a way to a diſcourſe which I deſir'd exceedingly, and therefore I beg of you that you would ſpeak of it frankly, without reſpect to any body, ſeeing I intend to interrogate you with the ſame freedom, and if in my demands or replies I excuſe, or accuſe any man, it will not be barely to excuſe or accuſe him, but to underſtand the truth.

Fabritio. I ſhall be well pleaſed to inform you of any thing I know, and ſhall leave it to your diſcretion to judge whether what I ſay be true or falſe, expecting to learn as much from your demands, as you will do from my anſwers; for a wiſe queſtion makes a man conſider many things which perhaps he regarded not before; and underſtand others, which without interrogation he had never underſtood.

Coſimo. I will return to what you ſaid firſt, that my Grand-father, and your fore-Fathers would have done more prudently to have imitated their Anceſtors in difficult and generous things, rather than in what was delicate and ſoft; and in this I will excuſe my part, and leave the other to be defended by you. I am of opinion that there was not a man in his time who deteſted all kind of effeminacy more than he, and who was a greater lover of that kind of activity and vigour which you ſo much commend, nevertheleſs he found that he could not make uſe of it either in his own perſon, or in the perſons of his children, being born in ſo corrupt an age, that a man who ſhould have deviated from che common

common practice of those times, would have made himself contemptible to every body. For if a man in the heat of Summer should have lien basking upon the sands; or in the midst of Winter should have taken up his quarters in the snow, (as *Diogenes did*) he would have been thought a fool, or a mad-man: should a man have followed the *Spartan* way, brought up his children in some cottage, taught them to sleep in the fields; to run about bare-foot and bare-headed; wash in cold water; to inure them to hardship, and by making them less fond of life, to make them less sensible of death, he would have been despised for his pains; and have been thought rather a bruit than a man. Again should a man have been observed to starve his own carkass, and to live only upon beans and pease, and such kind of pulse, and have made as small account of mony as *Fabritius* did of what was offered him by the *Samnites*, 'tis possible he might have been commended by some few, but he should have been followed by no body: being discouraged therefore by the practice of the present age, he followed not the example of his Ancestors exactly, but followed them as much as he could, with as little notice and admiration to the World.

Fabritio. You have excused your Grand-father very handsomly in that particular, and what you have said is doubtlesly true; but I did not speak so much of that hard and rustick way of living, as of other ways that are more soft and effeminate; have greater conformity and correspondence with our present times, and are (in my judgment) easily to be introduced by any man who has the government of affairs: and in my discourse of this matter I shall not need to straggle into other Countries for examples, for the *Romans* (my own Country-men) will furnish me abundantly; whose Practices, and order of Government, if well considered, will not be found so impossible to be introduced in any other City where there is but the least spark of virtue and goodness.

Cosimo. What are those things which you would introduce according to the example of our Ancestors?

Fabritio. To honour and reward virtue; not to despise poverty; to value order and discipline of war; to constrain Citizens to love one another; to live without factions; to postpone all private interest to the publick; and several other things that may easily accommodate with our times; and these things are not difficult to be introduced, provided it be done deliberately, and by right means, because in them the truth is so manifest and apparent, that the commonest capacity may apprehend it. He therefore who orders his affairs in this manner, plants himself trees which will afford him a happier and more pleasant shelter and protection than these.

Cosimo. I will not reply to what you have said, but refering it to the discretion of the company, (who can easily judge of it) I shall address my discourse to you, who seems to find fault with all those who in their great and weighty affairs do not follow the examples of our Ancestors, supposing thereby I may be more easily satisfied in my intention. I would know therefore how it comes to pass that, on one side you condemn all those who do not imitate the practice of our Ancestors; and yet on the other, in your wars (which is your profession, and excellence) it does not appear that you have made use of any thing of the ancient method and discipline, or done any thing that resembled it.

Fabritio. You are now come to the point where I expected you, and indeed my discourse deserved, and I my self desired no other demand. And though I might save my self the labour, with a very plausible excuse, yet I will satisfy both your desire and my own, and that the more largely, because both time and place concurs to our convenience. Men who are desirous to do any great action, are first to prepare themselves with all diligence and industry, that when occasion is offered, they may be ready to execute and compleat it. And because where those preparations are made cautiously, they are not to be discovered; no man is to be accused of negligence, unless occasion discovers him first, in which if he be remiss, and makes not use of his time to execute his design, it gives us to understand, that either he has not prepar'd as he ought to have been, or that he had not thought of it at all: and therefore no occasion having presented it self to me to discover the preparations which I had made to reduce our Militia into the form of the ancients; if I have not yet reduced it, I conceive I cannot justly be condemned, either by you, or any body else: and this I think is a sufficient answer to your accusation.

Cosimo. It would be sufficient indeed, could I be assured that you never had any occasion.

Fabritio. But because I find you may doubt whether ever such occasion were offered or not, I am content to discourse more largely (upon condition you will have the patience to hear me) what preparations are necessary to be made; what occation is necessary to be had; what difficulties obstruct our preparatives, and hinder our occasion; and how this is easy and hard to fall out at the same time, which seems a contradiction.

Cosimo.

Cosimo. You cannot do me and the whole company a greater favour; and if it will be no trouble to you to inlarge, it will be none to us to attend: but because the discourse is like to be long, I desire I may have the assistance of my friends, yet with your license and permission; wherefore they and I do make it our request, that you would not take it amiss if we interrupt you sometimes with some importunate demand.

Fabritio. I am very well contented, that you (*Cosimo*) and these young Gentlemen your friends, ask any thing of me, because I believe the heat of your youth makes you inclinable to arms, and by consequence more apt to give credit to what I shall say: and these other Gentlemen shall have the same liberty, because their grey heads, and their cold blood, makes them commonly enemies to warfare, and incorrigible, as people possessed with an opinion that it is the times, not the ill customs which constrains men to live at that rate. Question me then freely, as you please; 'tis the thing I desire, because I shall thereby have some respit, and repose; and withal, the satisfaction of clearing your doubts, and leaving nothing unanswered in your minds.

CHAP. II.

A person of honour and condition is not to make War his profession.

Fabritio. I Will begin my discourse with what you said, that in matter of War (which is my profession) I never made use of any thing of the ancients. To which I answer, that War being a profession by which men cannot live honourably at all times, it is not to be taken up as a trade, unless it be by a Common-wealth, or a Kingdom, and if they be well constituted, they will neither of them suffer any of their Citizens or Subjects, or any other good man to make it his business; for he will never be thought a good man who takes upon him an employment, by which if he would reap any profit at any time, he is obliged to be false, and rapacious, and cruel, and to entertain several other qualities that are not consistent in a good man; nor can any man (great or small) who makes war his profession, be otherwise than vitious; because that that trade being not to be followed in time of peace, they are necessitated either to prevent or obstruct peace; or in time of war to provide so for themselves, that they may subsist in time of peace; and neither of those two ways are practicable to an honest man; for from the desire of providing for themselves against the evil day, when the wars should be ended, proceed the robberies, and thefts, and murders which are committed daily by such kind of people, and that upon their friends as well as enemies. And from the desire of obstructing the peace, proceed all the frauds and juglings which the Officers use with those who pay them, and all to continue the war; but if by accident peace be concluded contrary to their endeavors and design, it is to be feared that the Officers finding themselves destitute of pay, and their old liberty and licentiousness, will get together such Souldiers of fortune as have nothing to subsist upon, and falling into some Province, plunder and rifle it without any compassion. Do you not remember that here in *Italy* we had several of these disbanded Souldiers, which got together when the wars were done, called themselves *the Companies*, and went up and down ransacking Towns, and pillaging the Country, and all without remedy? Have you not read how after the first *Carthaginian* War, the disbanded Souldiers united under the command of *Matho* and *Spendius*, (two of their Officers) and in a tumultuous manner made a more dangerous War upon the *Carthaginians* than that which they had had with the *Romans*? In the days of our Predecessors *Francis Sforza* not only betraid the *Milanois* who had made him their General, but usurped upon their liberty, and made himself their Prince, and for what, but that he might live in the same splendor when the Peace was concluded. And all the rest of the great Officers in *Italy* were like him, (especially if War was their profession) and though *de facto* they did not all make themselves Dukes of *Milan* by their treachery, they were the more to be blamed, because without the temptation of so great advantage their lives and exorbitances were as bad. The Father of *Francis Sforza* being in the service of Queen *Jane*, constrained her to cast her self into the protection of the King of *Arragon*, having deserted her on a sudden, and left her disarm'd in the midst of her enemies, and all to satiate his ambition, to satisfy his revenge, or to have got her Kingdom for himself. *Braccio* with the same industry endeavoured to possess himself of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and had he not been defeated and slain at *Aquila*, he had certainly effected it; and these confusions proceeded from nothing else but from the employing of such men as were mercenary, and had nothing to subsist upon but their pay? Have you not

not a Proverb which confirms what I say, and tells us, that *War makes Thieves, and Peace brings them to the Gallows*; the reason is, for that those persons who have no other way of livelihood, nor so much temper and ingenuity as to take to any other course that may honestly sustain them, are forced by necessity to rob upon the high-ways, and then justice is forced to dispatch them.

Cosimo. You have represented this trade and profession of a Souldier so vile and contemptible, that to me it seems now to be worse than none at all, whereas before I thought it one of the most noble and excellent things in the World: so that unless you satisfy me better, I shall never be contented; for if it be so as you say, I cannot imagine how it should come to pass that *Cæsar*, and *Pompey*, and *Scipio*, and *Marcellus*, and so many other great Captains of the *Romans* should become so famous as to be worshipped like Gods.

Fabritio. I have not yet thorowly examined those two things which I proposed in the beginning; one is, that a good man cannot take up that calling as his profession: the other is, that no well constituted Government (whether Common-wealth or Kingdom) will suffer its Subjects or Citizens to make War their whole business. To the first I have spoke what I thought fit; it remains now that I speak to the second, in which I shall have occasion to reply to your last demand.

CHAP. III.

How a Common-wealth ought not (in prudence) to permit any of its Citizens to make War their profession.

Fabritio. TOuching the *Romans* which you mentioned, it is true *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, and most of the great Captains who were at *Rome* after the last *Carthaginian* War, arrived at great reputation, but it was rather as brave and generous, than good and virtuous men; whereas those who were before them, were famous as much for their virtue as conduct, and the reason was, because these made not War their profession, and the others did.

Whilst the *Roman* Common-wealth was incorrupt and immaculate, there never was any Citizen who presumed by means of this profession to make his own fortune or party in time of Peace; by breaking the Laws, exacting upon the Provinces, usurping and tyrannizing over his Country, and using all means to make himself rich. No man of inferior condition ever thought of violating his Oaths; maintaining of Parties; disrespecting the Senate; or promoting of tumults or any tyrannical sedition with design of making himself a fortune by the profession of Arms. But those who had the command of their Armies, contented with their triumphs, returned joyfully to their private affairs; and the Officers who were under them laid down their Arms with more alacrity than they had taken them up; every man returning to his former course of life, without any hopes of advancing himself by plunder and rapine. And of this we have strong and evident cause of conjecture from the example of *Regulus Attilius*, who being General of the *Roman* Armies in *Africa*, and having in a manner conquered the *Carthaginians*, desired leave of the Senate to return, that he might look to a Farm of his in the Country which his servants had neglected. From whence it is as clear as the day, that had he made War his profession, or designed to have raised his own fortune out of the ruines of other people, having so many Provinces at his mercy, he would never have been so careful of the improvement of a Cottage, when every day would have brought him in more than his whole Patrimony was worth. But because good men, and such as are not desirous to make a trade of War, are unwilling to reap any other fruit therefrom but labour, and danger, and glory; when they are arrived at a sufficient proportion of the later, 'tis their ambition to return quietly to their houses, and live upon their old professions in Peace. As to the common and private Souldier, 'tis clear they were of the same humour, and declin'd any such profession; for though when they were at home, they desired many of them to be in the wars, yet when they were in the wars, they were as willing to be dismissed. This is manifest by several arguments, but especially by the privileg which the *Romans* granted to their Citizens, that none of them should be constrained to the wars against his own inclination. So that *Rome* whilst it was well governed (which was till the time of the *Gracchi*) had never any Souldier who made it his profession to be so, by which means few of them were dissolute, and those who were, were punished severely. A City then well

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conſtituted and governed is to take care that this Art of War be uſed in time of Peace only as an exerciſe, and in time of War only for neceſſity, and the acquiſition of glory; leaving the conſtant practice and profeſſion of it to the State, as the *Romans* did anciently to the Common-wealth of *Rome*. That Citizen who has any other deſign in the profeſſion of Arms, let him be what he will, is no honeſt man; and that City which is governed any other way, is as much in the wrong.

Coſimo. I am very well ſatisfied with what you have ſaid hitherto, and do acquieſce in your concluſion as far as it relates to a Common-wealth, but as to Kings I am apt to diſſent, becauſe I am apt to think it convenient a King ſhould have thoſe about him who made Arms their profeſſion.

CHAP. IV.

That a King ought not to permit his Subjects to make Arms their profeſſion, for the miſchiefs which do frequently enſue.

Fabritio. A Kingdom well govern'd ought the more carefully avoid people of that condition, becauſe it is they who debauch their King by being the only Miniſters of his Tyranny. And do not object to me any of our preſent Kingdoms; for I ſhall deny abſolutely that they are as well governed as formerly, when Kings had no Soveraignty, nor abſolute power, but in the Armies, becauſe there (and no where elſe) there is a neceſſity of ſpeedy reſolutions; and that ſuch a power ſhould be repoſed in a ſingle perſon; in other caſes they ought to do nothing without their Counſel, and it is to be the particular care of all that are of Counſel to a Prince, to keep off ſuch perſons from about him as promote War in time of Peace, becauſe they cannot frame themſelves to any other way of ſubſiſtance. But I will diſcourſe ſomething more largely of this matter, not ſtanding ſo much upon a Kingdom that is perfectly good according to the model of the Antients, but ſuppoſing ſuch a one as is like the Kingdoms of our days; in which likewiſe a King ought to be fearful of ſuch as live wholly by War, becauſe the Nerves and ſtrength of all Armies lyes certainly in the Infantry.

Wherefore if a King orders his matters ſo ill, that his foot be not content to return to their ſeveral callings in time of Peace, and live as formerly by their labour, he muſt neceſſarily be ruined; for of all the Soldiers in the world, none are ſo dangerous as thoſe who make War their profeſſion; and the reaſon is, becauſe you muſt be always at War, or keep them always in pay; otherwiſe you will run a great hazard of being turn'd out of your Kingdom; and becauſe it is impoſſible either to maintain War perpetually, or keep them in continual pay, you will be in great danger of being driven out of your Kingdom. My Country-men the *Romans* (as I ſaid before) whilſt they were wiſe, and honeſt never ſuffered their Citizens to make that exerciſe their calling, though in reſpect of their perpetual Wars, they were able to have pay'd them perpetually: But to avoid the inconveniencies which might follow thereupon, ſeeing the condition of their times did not alter, they altered their Men, ordering their affairs in ſuch manner, that every fifteen years their Legions were renewed, and filled up again with young men in the flower of their age; that is to ſay, betwixt eighteen and thirty five years of age; during which time their legs, their hands, and their eyes do correſpond one with the other, and are in the ſame diſpoſition; for they did not keep them till their ſtrength and vigour decayed, and their frowardneſs and inſolence encreaſed, as they did afterwards when the times were more corrupt.

For *Octavian* firſt, and afterwards *Tiberius* (preferring their private power before the profit of the publick) began to diſarm the people (that thereby they might have them more eaſily at command) and to keep ſtanding Armies upon the Frontiers of their Empire. But becauſe they thought them inſufficient to curb the people, and awe the Senate of *Rome*; they eſtabliſhed another Army (which they called the *Pretorian*) which was quartered always about the City, and intended as a guard. But when afterwards the Emperors permitted them who were liſted in thoſe Bands, to lay aſide all other profeſſions, and devote themſelves to War, they grew inſolent immediately, and became not only terrible to the Senate, but pernicious to the Emperors, inſomuch that many of them were put to death by the fury and inſolence of thoſe Soldiers, who created, and depoſed their Emperors as they pleaſed; and ſometimes it fell out that at the ſame time ſeveral Emperors were created by the ſeveral Armies, which occaſioned the diviſion firſt, and by degrees the deſtruction of the Empire. Thoſe Kings therefore who are deſirous to live in ſafety

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and peace, ought to have their Armies compoſed of ſuch perſons, as when there is a neceſſity of War, will take up Arms freely for the defence of their Country; and when Peace is concluded, will as readily acquieſs, and return to their old habitations and callings; which may eaſily be done, if they make their Levies of ſuch men as have profeſſions before: A King is likewiſe (upon the publication of Peace) to command his Generals and great Officers to their reſpective charges and governments elſewhere; the Reformades and Gentlemen to their own Houſes and Eſtates; and the common Soldiers to their Original Trades and Occupations. And by the election of ſuch men, they will fight ſtoutly to procure Peace, but never diſturb Peace to create a War.

Coſimo. I muſt confeſs your diſcourſe to me ſeems very conſiderable; yet being ſo contrary to what I fancied before, my mind is not ſo well ſatisfied but there remains ſome doubt behind which is ſtill to be cleer'd: for I obſerve ſeveral Lords and Gentlemen who in times of Peace maintain themſelves wholly by the profeſſion of Arms; as ſeveral great Commanders of your acquaintance and quality, who are in pay under ſeveral Princes and States; beſides moſt of the men at Arms are continued in pay for the guard and ſecurity of ſuch Cities and Caſtles as are requiſite to be kept; ſo that in my judgment there is employment enough for them all in time of Peace.

Fabritio. I do not believe that you can think that in time of Peace there is entertainment for them all; for if no other reaſon was to be alledged, the ſmallneſs of the numbers requir'd to the furniſhing the Garriſons, would be ſufficient to refute it. What proportion is there betwixt the Bodies of foot which are to be raiſed for carrying on a War, and thoſe which are required for ſupplying the Garriſons in time of Peace: for thoſe Cities and Caſtles which in time of Peace are kept with a few men, are reinforced with great numbers in time of War; beſides which, great Levies are made for the Field Armies, which upon the concluſion of Peace are conſtantly disbanded. And as to ſuch as are retained in the nature of Guards to the State, Pope *Julius* and you, have demonſtrated how much thoſe are to be apprehended who will not entertain any other vocation but War; having turned them out of your Guards for their inſolence, and entertained *Swizzers* in their places, as people born and brought up under Laws, and choſen by the Comunalty by a more regular election; ſo that tell me no more there is employment for them all in times of Peace. As to the men at Arms, and their being continued in pay in times of peace, the anſwer I confeſs is more difficult; yet upon cloſer examination it will not be found impoſſible, becauſe this cuſtom of keeping men at Arms in pay is corrupt, and inconvenient; the reaſon is, for that they are people who having no other Vocations, are occaſions of daily diſorders in the State, eſpecially where their numbers are great; but where they are not ſo numerous as to make an Army of themſelves, the danger of them is ſo much the leſs. Yet many times they have done miſchief enough, as I have ſaid before in the caſes of *Francis Sforza*, his Father, and *Braccio da Perugia*. So that I cannot approve this Cuſtom of keeping men at Arms in conſtant pay, having ſeen ſo much experience of their corruptions, and the inconvenience which has followed thereupon.

Coſimo. Would you have no ſuch Forces in pay at all? or if you would have them, how would you have them entertained?

Fabritio. Not as the men at Arms in *France*, for they are as dangerous and inſolent as ours, but rather according to the method of the Ancients, who raiſed their Cavalry out of their own Subjects, whom they ſent home again to their houſes when Peace was concluded to follow their old Callings, as ſhall be ſhown more largely before we end our Diſcourſe; ſo that if theſe kind of Soldiers do now (even in times of Peace) receive pay, and live under that profeſſion, it proceeds from corruption in their cuſtoms. And as to the Penſions which I, and my fellow Officers receive, I ſay that that alſo is a corrupt cuſtom; for a wiſe, and well ordered Government ought not to entertain any ſuch Penſioners, but is rather to employ their own Citizens for Generals in time of War, and when that is done, diſmiſs them to their own private affairs. And with a wiſe King it is the ſame; he is either to give no ſuch Penſions at all, or if he does, it ought to be in recompence of ſome ſignal exploit, or to oblige ſome excellent perſon in time of Peace as well as War. And becauſe you have inſtanced in me, I am content to ſtand for an example; and therefore I ſay I never made War my profeſſion. My buſineſs is to govern my Subjects, to defend them, to prefer Peace, but yet to know how to manage my ſelf in War; and if I have received honour or reward from the King, it is not for my underſtanding or experience in War, ſo much as for my integrity and counſel in times of Peace. A wiſe Prince ought not therefore to have any about him, but ſuch as are ſo conſtituted; for if they be too zealous either for Peace or for War, they will draw him into inconvenience. This (according to my propoſition at firſt) I could not but ſay as to the firſt point; if it be inſufficient, you muſt apply your

ſelf elſewhere for farther ſatisfaction. But by what is ſaid, you may perceive the difficulty of reviving the cuſtoms of the Ancients in our preſent Wars: What preparations are requiſite to be made by any man that is wiſe, and what opportunities are to be expected to bring them to perfection: But you will underſtand them better if your patience will give me leave to diſcourſe them from point to point, and compare all the cuſtoms of the ancients, with the particular practices of our times.

Coſimo. If we deſired at firſt to hear you diſcourſe of theſe things, certainly what you have diſcourſed already, has much encreaſed our deſire; wherefore as we give you thanks for what you have done, ſo we do earneſtly beg of you that you would proceed to the remainder.

CHAP. V.

In what Countrys the beſt Soldiers are to be raiſed.

Fabritio. SEeing you are hitherto ſo well pleaſed, I will deduce my diſcourſe of this matter from the fountain, that thereby you may comprehend it the better, and I be enabled to demonſtrate it more copiouſly. When War is reſolved, every man's chief buſineſs is to put himſelf into a condition of giving the Enemy Battel, and fighting him fairly in the field. To enable himſelf for this, it is neceſſary to raiſe an Army; to raiſe an Army, there is a neceſſity of men, of arming them, diſciplining them, exerciſing them, (and that in great as well as ſmall bodies) of teaching them to encamp, and acquainting them with the Enemy by degrees, either by frequent facing or confronting him, or by encamping ſomewhere near his march, where they may have the proſpect of his Army as he paſſes by. In this the whole addreſs and induſtry of a Campania, or field War conſiſts, which doubtleſs is more neceſſary and honorable than any other; and he who underſtands well how to draw up an Army, and preſent his Enemy Battel, may be excuſed for all his other errors in the management of the War; but if he be ignorant or defective in that, though in other things he be ſufficient enough; yet he ſhall never bring his War to any honourable concluſion. For win a Battel, and you cancel all your former miſcarriages; loſe one, and all that ever you did well before evaporates, and comes to nothing.

It being ſo neceſſary then to find men, the firſt thing to be done, is to know how to make our choice (which the ancients called *Delectus*, and we Levies) of which I ſhall give you ſome light.

They who have given us rules for the management of War, have recommended to us to make our Levies in temperate regions, that our Soldiers may be both valiant, and cunning. For hot Countrys are obſerved to produce wiſe and ſubtle people, but not couragious; cold Countrys on the other ſide do afford ſtout men, and hardy, but then they are ſeldom diſcreet. This Rule was proper enough for a Prince that was Monarch of the whole world, and might make his Levies where he pleas'd: But to give a rule that all may follow, I muſt needs ſay that all Common-wealths, or Kingdoms, are to make their Levies in their own Countrys, whether hot or cold, or temperate, 'tis the ſame thing; becauſe by ancient experience we find that in any Country, Exerciſe and Diſcipline makes good Soldiers; for where Nature is defective, induſtry will ſupply; and in this caſe 'tis the better of the two. And indeed to raiſe men in other Countrys cannot be call'd properly a *delectus*, for *delectum habere* is to pick and cull the beſt men in a Province, and to have power to chooſe thoſe who are unwilling as well as thoſe who are willing to the War; which kind of *delectus* cannot be made exactly but in your own dominion; for in Countrys belonging to another Prince, yo muſt be contented with ſuch as are willing, it being not to be expected that you ſhould have liberty to chooſe as you pleaſe.

Coſimo. Yet among thoſe who are willing, you may pick and chooſe, take and leave what you think good, and therefore it is not ſo improper to call that a *delectus*.

Fabritio. You are in the right as to one way; but if you conſider the ſecret defects of ſuch an Election, you will find that in ſtrictneſs it is not an Election; and that for theſe following reaſons. Firſt, thoſe who are not your Subjects, but are willing to the Wars, are none of the beſt, but generally the lewdeſt and moſt diſſolute perſons in the Province; for if any be ſcandalous, idle, incorrigible, irreligious, diſobedient to their Parents, Blaſphemers, Cheats, and altogether ill bred, they are thoſe who are moſt likely to liſt themſelves for the War, and there is nothing ſo contrary to good and true diſcipline, as ſuch kind of humours: When of ſuch kind of Cattle you have more offer themſelves, than the number you deſign to entertain, you may take your choice indeed, but the whole maſs being

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ing bad, your choice can never be good. But many times it falls out, that there being not ſo many of them as you have occaſion to employ, you are glad to take all, and in that caſe you cannot be ſaid *habere delectum* ſo properly, as *milites conſcribere:* And of ſuch kind of diſorderly people, the Armies of *Italy* and moſt other places do conſiſt at this day; only in *Germany* it is otherwiſe, becauſe there no man is preſs'd or liſted barely upon the Emperor's command, but as he ſtands willing and diſpoſed to the Wars himſelf; you may judge then what part of the ancient diſcipline of the *Romans* can be introduced into an Army made up of ſuch a medly of wickedneſs.

Coſimo. What way then is to be taken?

Fabritio. That which I recommended before, which is to chooſe out of your own Subjects, and to exerciſe your authority in your choice.

Coſimo. If your election be made in that manner, can any ancient form be introduced?

Fabritio. You know it may, if it be in a Kingdom, and he who commands be their Prince, or lawful Soveraign; and if in a Common-wealth it is the ſame, ſo he be a great Citizen, and made General for that time, otherwiſe it is no eaſie matter to do any thing that ſhall ſucceed.

Coſimo. Why Sir?

Fabritio. I ſhall tell you that hereafter, at preſent this may ſuffice, that no good is to be done any other way.

Coſimo. Well then, theſe Levies being to be made in your own Territory, is it beſt to make them in the Cities, or Country?

CHAP. VI.

Whether it be beſt to chooſe you men out of the Cities, or Country.

Fabritio. THoſe Authors who have writ any thing of this Nature, do agree unanimouſly that the beſt choice is in the Country where they are inur'd to difficulty and labour; acquainted more with the Sun than the ſhade, accuſtomed to the Spade and the Plough, and to carry burthens, without any ſhifting, or mutiny. But becauſe our Armies do conſiſt of Horſe as well as Foot, my advice is, that the Horſe be raiſed in the Cities, and the Foot in the Country.

Coſimo. Of what age would you chooſe them?

Fabritio. Were I to raiſe a new Army, I would chooſe them betwixt ſeventeen, and forty; were I only to recruit an old one, I would have them always of ſeventeen.

Coſimo. I do not well underſtand your diſtinction.

Fabritio. I will tell you, were I to raiſe an Army, or ſettle a Militia where there was none before, it would be neceſſary to make choice of the moſt apt and experienced that I could find (provided their age was ſuitable to the VVar) to inſtruct them as I ſhall direct. But if I were to raiſe men to recruit and reinforce an Army that was grown weak, I would take none above ſeventeen, becauſe thoſe who are there already will be able to teach them.

Coſimo. You would order your Militia then, as ours is ordered with us.

Fabritio. You ſay well, but I would Arm, and Officer, and Exerciſe, and Order them in a way I know not whether you be acquainted with in your Country.

Coſimo. Then you are for Train'd Soldiers.

Fabritio. Why would you have me blame them?

Coſimo. Becauſe ſeveral wiſe men have always condemn'd them.

Fabritio. I think you are in a miſtake to ſay a wiſe man can be againſt training of Soldiers: a man may be thought wiſe, ('tis poſſible) and be no ſuch thing.

Coſimo. The ill ſucceſs which thoſe Trained-bands have always had, is a great argument of the truth of that opinion.

Fabritio. Have a care the fault was not more in you, than in them; of which perhaps you may be convinced before I have done my diſcourſe.

Coſimo. You will do us a very great favour. But I will tell you firſt in what it is this Militia is condemn'd, that you may afterwards juſtifie it the better.

CHAP. VII.

Of the inconvenience, and convenience of Trained-Bands, or a ſetled Militia.

Coſimo. IT is objected that either they are inexperienced and uſeleſs, and then to rely upon them is to ruine the State. Or elſe they are ready and skilful, and ſtrong, and then he who has the command of them may do what he pleaſes. They inſtance in the *Romans* who loſt their liberty by theſe kind of men. They inſtance likewiſe in the *Venetian*, and the King of *France*; the firſt of which makes uſe only of foreign Arms, leſt ſome time or other they ſhould fall under the ſubjection of ſome of their Citizens: and the latter has diſarmed his Subjects, with the more eaſe to keep them under command. But thoſe who are againſt theſe Trained-Bands, are more fearful when they are raw, and inexperienced than otherwiſe, and to this purpoſe they give two conſiderable reaſons. One is, becauſe they are unskilful, the other is, becauſe they are unwilling, and they ſay that people any thing in years, never learn any thing well; and a man never does good when he is forced to the Wars.

Fabritio. The reaſons which you have alledged, are produced only by perſons who underſtand things at a diſtance, as I ſhall demonſtrate plainly. And firſt as to their unſerviceableneſs, I ſay, there are no Soldiers more uſeful than ones own Subjects, and no Subjects can be ordered a better way. And this being clear, and indiſputable, I will not ſpend time in proving it farther, becauſe I have the concurrence of all ancient Hiſtory to confirm it. As to the inexperience and force wherewith they are charged, I ſay (and it is true) and inexperience makes a man Cowardly, and force makes a man Mutinous; but courage that experience both are infuſed into them by arming, and exerciſing, and accommodating them well, as ſhall be ſhown in my following diſcourſe. But as to the point of force, you muſt know that ſuch perſons as are raiſed by the command of a Prince, are neither to be altogether preſs'd, nor altogether Voluntiers; becauſe to have them altogether Voluntiers, would be to incur the inconveniences which I have mentioned before; it would not be a fair election, and there would be very few go along with you, and wholly to force them, would be as dangerous on the other ſide: wherefore a middle way is to be taken, neither too forcible on the one ſide, nor too frank on the other; but ſuch a one as may tempt them to the War out of their reſpect to their Prince, whoſe diſpleaſure they fear above all other puniſhments; ſuch a courſe as this, tempered ſo cunningly betwixt fair means and foul, cannot be dangerous, nor produce that diſcontent and mutiny which occaſions ſo much miſchief. I do not ſay that an Army ſo choſen and exerciſed, is abſolutely invincible, for the *Roman* Armies were many times overcome; and *Hanibal*'s Army was defeated; wherefore an Army cannot be ſo ordered and diſciplin'd, that one may promiſe himſelf it ſhall never be broken. The wiſe men therefore of whom you ſpeak, are not to calculate the uſeleſneſs of an Army, from the loſs of one Battel, but are rather to believe that having miſcarried once, they will be more cautious afterwards, and do ſomething (as occaſion offers) to expiate their diſgrace: and if the buſineſs ſhould be thorowly examined, it would not be found to be the defect of the form ſo much, as want of perfection in their Order. And this (as I ſaid before) is to be provided againſt, not by blaming, or exploding the way of train'd men, but by improving and correcting it where it ſhall be found amiſs; and how that is done, I will ſhow you particularly. As to your doubt that ſuch an order of Soldiers, meeting with an Officer equally diſpoſed, may uſurp upon you, and turn you out of your Government; I anſwer, that Arms put orderly and legally into the hands of Citizens or Subjects, never did, nor will do any harm. And Cities are kept longer innocent and incorrupt with thoſe, than any other forces, nay than they are commonly without them. *Rome* had its Citizens in Arms four hundred years together, and yet kept its liberty entire; *Sparta* preſerved its liberty 800 years in the ſame poſture; ſeveral Cities have been diſarmed, and kept their liberties; but how long? Not forty years any of them, and the reaſon is, becauſe great Cities have occaſion for Soldiers, and when they have none of their own, they are forced to entertain Strangers, which commonly do much more miſchief than their own, for they are more eaſily debauched, and a popular Citizen may more eaſily corrupt and employ them as Inſtruments of Uſurpation and Tyranny, when they have nothing but naked, and unarmed people to deſtroy. Beſides, a City ought in reaſon to be more fearful of two Enemies than one. For in entertaining of Strangers, a City is to have an eye over her Mercenaries and her Natives; and to prove that this jealouſie is natural and reaſonable,

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remember what I ſaid before of *Francis Sforza*; whereas a City which employs only his own inhabitants, fears no body elſe. But to uſe one reaſon for all, let me tell you, no man ever eſtabliſhed a Common-wealth, or Kingdom, who did not believe that the inhabitants (if arm'd) would be willing to defend it.

And had the *Venetians* been as wiſe in this, as in other counſels, they would have ſet up a new Monarchy in the World; and they are the more inexcuſable that they have not, becauſe their firſt Legiſlators put arms into their hands, and gave them ability to defend themſelves. But their territory being little at land, they employed their arms only at Sea, where they performed many great things, to the enlargement of their Country. But in proceſs of time, being forced to take arms by land for the relief of *Vicenza*, they entertained the Marqueſs of *Mantua* into their ſervice, and made him their General, whereas they ſhould rather have committed that charge to one of their own Citizens, and ſent him to have engaged the enemy at land. This unhappy reſolution was that which clip'd the wings of their ſucceſs, and kept them from extending their Empire; if they did it out of an opinion that their experience was not ſo great in Land as in Sea affairs, their diffidence was imprudent; for a Sea Captain accuſtomed to the conflicts of the winds and the water, and the elements, and the enemy, ſhall ſooner make a good Land-Officer, where he has nothing to fight with but men; than a Land-Officer ſhall make a good Captain at Sea. My Country-men the *Romans* who were ſo knowing at Land, being at wars with the *Carthaginian* that was ſo potent at Sea; never troubled themſelves to entertain either Grecian or Spaniard into their ſervice, though they were both ſo good Souldiers at Sea, but they committed that charge to their Land-Officers, who fought the *Carthaginians*, and beat them. If the *Venetians* did it to prevent the uſurpation of any of their fellow Citizens, I think it was an unneceſſary fear; for (beſides the reaſons aforeſaid) if a Citizen with his Sea-forces never made himſelf Maſter of any Sea Town, he could have done it much leſs with any Land-force. So that hence it may be ſeen that it is not putting the Citizens in arms, that is the cauſe of tyranny; but ill order, and ill management in the Government; for whilſt good order is preſerved, there is no danger of their being arm'd, wherefore their reſolution in that point being imprudent, has robb'd them of much reputation and happineſs. And as to the King of *France*'s error in not keeping his ſubjects in diſcipline, and prepared for the Wars, which is by you urg'd for an example, there is no body (laying aſide his private paſſion) but muſt conclude that ſingle neglect to be a great weakneſs to his Kingdom.

But my digreſſion has been too great, and perhaps beyond my deſign, yet I have done it the more willingly to demonſtrate to you that foreign force is not to be relied upon ſo much as ones own ſubjects; nor can ones own ſubjects be prepared and adapted for the wars any way ſo well, as by training and exerciſe. Nor can there be any better way of forming an Army, or eſtabliſhing a Militia in any place than that which I have preſcribed. If you have read the orders of the firſt *Roman* Kings, and eſpecially of *Servius Tullius*, you will find his orders like ours, and driving at nothing more than putting the Citizens into ſuch a poſture, that upon any emergence they might be brought ſuddenly together, and form'd into an Army for the defence of the City.

CHAP. VIII.

Of what ſort of people an Army is to be compoſed.

Fabritio. But to return to our levies, I ſay again, that being to recruit an old Army, I would chooſe my men of about ſeventeen; but to raiſe a new one that might be made fit for ſervice in a ſhort time, I would take in any betwixt ſeventeen and forty.

Coſimo. Would you in your election make any difference of their trades?

Fabritio. Many Authors which have written on that ſubject, have made a difference of their trades, and will not allow of Faulconers, Fowlers, Fiſhers, Ruffians, or any perſons who make ſports their profeſſion, or are in any manner ſubſervient to pleaſure: thoſe who they recommend to be choſen, are Labourers, Husband-men, Smiths, Farriers, Carpenters, Butchers, Huntſmen, and the like. But for my own part, I ſhould not ſo much conſider the quality of the profeſſion, as the goodneſs of the man, and which way he may be employed with moſt advantage. For this reaſon I think your Plough-men, and Day-labourers in the Country are more uſeful generally than any other; for they take more pains

pains, and do more ſervice in an Army than all the reſt. After them are your Smiths, Farriers, Carpenters, Joyners, and ſuch people to be choſen; of which ſort it is convenient to have good ſtore, becauſe their arts are uſeful in an Army upon ſeveral occaſions: and 'tis a good thing to have Souldiers who have two ſtrings to their bow, and yield you double advantage.

Coſimo. How are thoſe who are fit, or unfit for the Wars, to be diſtinguiſhed and known?

Fabritio. I ſhall ſpeak of the manner of chooſing a Militia to form it afterwards into an Army, becauſe we ſhall have occaſion again of ſpeaking of the election to be made upon the recruiting of an old Army. I ſay therefore that the fitneſs of a perſon to be choſen for the Wars, is to be known by experience, (in ſome great atchievement) or by conjecture.

This proof and trial of their courage is not to be found among new raiſed men, it is neceſſary therefore where this experience is not to be had, to have recourſe to conjecture, which is to be deduced from their age, arts, and ſtature. Of the two firſt we have ſpoken before; it remains that we ſpeak now of the third, and tell you, that ſome perſons (as *Pirrhus*) have been altogether for large and tall men. Others (as *Cæſar*) would have them ſtrong, well knit, and vigorous, which is to be judged by the compoſition of their members, and the quickneſs of their aſpect. Wherefore thoſe who treat of that ſubject, have recommended a lively and quick eye, a nervous neck, a large breaſt, a muſculous arm, a long finger, a ſmall belly, round and firm thighs, and thin feet; this kind of contexture does always import activity and ſtrength, which in a Souldier are two things principally to be deſired. But above all, reſpect is to be had to their manners, and that they be indued with honeſty, and modeſty, otherwiſe you chooſe an inſtrument of ſcandal, and a beginning of corruption; for no body can expect that with bruitiſhneſs and diſhoneſty, any laudable virtue ſhould conſiſt. Upon this occaſion it ſeems to me not impertinent (for your better underſtanding the importance of this way of election) to let you know the manner in which the *Roman* Conſuls in the beginning of their Magiſtracy made their elections for the *Roman* Legions. In which levies (by reaſon of their continual wars) being mix'd of new and Veteran Souldiers, they could proceed in the Veterans by experience, and by conjecture in the new. You muſt know then, theſe levies were made either for preſent ſervice, or to exerciſe them firſt, and employ them afterwards as occaſion was offered. And although I have ſpoken already of what is to be obſerved in the election of ſuch as are to be diſciplin'd and employed afterwards, yet my intention being to ſhew how an Army may be ordered in a Country where there is no military diſcipline, and where men are not to be raiſed for immediate ſervice, I ſhall ſpeak of it farther. But in thoſe Countries where it is the cuſtom to raiſe Forces by the Princes command, there they may have them always ready for preſent ſervice, as it was anciently in *Rome*, and is among the *Swizzers* at this day. For if in theſe kind of levies there be new Souldiers, there are many which are old and experienced, which mingled with the new, will make a good Army. Notwithſtanding this, the Emperors (after they began to keep ſtanding Forces and Garriſons upon the Frontiers) appointed Maſters for the training and inſtructing their new men whom they called *Tyrones*, as may be ſeen in the life of *Maximus* the Emperor. Which cuſtom was not practiſed in the Armies whilſt *Rome* enjoyed her liberty, but only in the City in which thoſe military exerciſes being much uſed by the youth, it came to paſs, that being drawn out for the wars, they were ſo well verſed and experienced in that counterfeit diſcipline, that when afterwards they came to it in earneſt, they behaved themſelves very well. But when by degrees the Emperors diſuſed or aboliſhed that cuſtom of training, they were conſtrained to thoſe ways which I have ſhewn you before.

CHAP. IX.

How the Romans *raiſed their Legions.*

TO proceed therefore to the manner of the election of the *Roman Legions*, I ſay, that after the *Roman* Conſuls (in whoſe hands the adminiſtration of the war was wholly depoſited) had taken upon them the Magiſtracy, being to raiſe an Army according to cuſtom, which gave to each Conſul two Legions of the beſt men, (who were eſteemed the ſtrength and flower of their Army) they created four and twenty military Tribunes, (ſix for each Legion) and inveſted them with the ſame authority as we do our Captains. After

ter this they aſſembled all the Romans who were able to bear arms, and placed the Tribunes of each Legion a-part; after which they drew lots in which Tribe they ſhould begin their election, and where the lot fell, out of that Tribe they choſe four of the beſt, and out of them four, one was choſen by the Tribunes of the firſt Legion; and out of the other three, one was choſen by the ſecond Legion; and out of the remaining two, another was choſen by the third Legion; and the fourth perſon belonged to the fourth Legion: theſe four being diſpoſed in this manner, they proceeded to the election of four more, the firſt of which was choſen by the Tribunes of the ſecond Legion; the ſecond by the Tribunes of the third; the third by the fourth, and the fourth by the firſt Legion. After which they had a third election; the firſt choſe the third; the ſecond the fourth; the third the firſt; and the fourth the ſecond: and in this manner they varied their elections, till at length all the Legions became perfect and equal, and were then united. As we ſaid before, the *Romans* had the convenience of making this election for preſent ſervice, becauſe a good part of ſuch as were choſen, were old Souldiers, well experienced in their trade, and all of them well diſciplin'd and train'd; ſo that their elections were made by experience, and conjecture both; but where an Army is to be new raiſed, and choſen, not ſo much for preſent as future ſervice; the election in that caſe is to be made by conjecture only, and that from the age and perſon of the man.

Coſimo. I believe what you have ſaid to be true; but before you paſs to another diſcourſe, I would be ſatisfied in a thing of which you put me in mind, by ſaying that levies to be made of ſuch perſons as have not been trained up in the wars, are to be made by conjecture; and of this I am the more curious, becauſe I have obſerved in many places our Militia's to be condemned, and eſpecially as to our numbers; for many are of opinion a leſs number were better, in reſpect that the fewer there were, the better they would be taught, and by conſequence the elections would be better, the confuſion leſs, and they would be more capable of reward, (which is that which keeps them content) and to be ſure be under better command. I would know therefore your opinion, whether you are for a great number or a ſmall, and what meaſures you would take in your elections both of the one and the other.

CHAP. X.

Whether it is beſt for a Militia to conſiſt of a great number or a ſmall

Fabr. SEeing it is your deſire to be ſatisfied, which is beſt, a great number or a ſmall; without doubt a great number is beſt, and not only more neceſſary, but (to ſpeak frankly) a compleat & perfect Militia is not to be had in any place where there is not great plenty of men; and as to your obſervation in other places, it is eaſily refuſed. For firſt, the ſmalneſs of your number does not better your ſouldiers, (where plenty is to be had, as in *Tuſcany*) nor mend your election; becauſe men being to iudge by experience, in that Country few people would be found whoſe experience would recommend them; forafmuch as few of them have been actually in the wars; and of thoſe few, fewer have given ſuch teſtimony of themſelves as to deſerve to be choſen before the reſt; ſo that he who makes his election in ſuch places, is to lay aſide his experience, and to chooſe by way of conjecture. Other people therefore being in this pexplexity, I would know, if twenty young perſons of good aſpects were brought before me, by what rules or method I was to chooſe or reject. I do not doubt but every man would confeſs the beſt way, to take, and arm, and exerciſe them all, (it being impoſſible to judg till then which will be the beſt) and to reſerve your election, till having all had the ſame exerciſe and inſtruction, it be eaſy to diſcern which is moſt vigorous, and likely to do ſervice: ſo that upon the whole, to deſire but few in this caſe, that your election may be better, is without queſtion an error. As to the objection of being leſs inconvenience to the Country, and to the people; I anſwer, that a Militia (be it as little or imperfect as it may) is no prejudice to either. Becauſe it takes away no man from his employment; obliges no man from his buſineſs; for to appear only on idle days to exerciſe, is rather a recreation to the People, and advantage to the Country, than otherwiſe. Whereas if they had no ſuch divertiſement, the young men would be apt on thoſe days to run out into ſome debauchery, or extravagance, which would be much worſe than thoſe innocent recreations, which being a handſome ſpectacle, gives great entertainment to young people.

Whereas

Whereas it is alledged that a leſs number is eaſier paid, and by conſequence kept in better order and obedience; I anſwer, That no Levies can be made of ſo few, as that they will be paid always to their ſatisfaction. For example, a Militia is to be eſtabliſhed of five thouſand foot: To pay them to their content would require at leaſt 10000 Ducats a month. Firſt, 5000 Foot is not a competent Army, and 10000 Ducats a month would be inſupportable to a State, and yet inſufficient to ſatisfie them, or to oblige them to any extraordinary enterprize. So that in ſo doing, your expence would be great, your force but ſmall, and unable to defend you, much leſs to make any vigorous attack. If you encreaſed their pay, or their number, it would be the more impoſſible to pay them: if you gave them leſs, or liſted leſs, they would be ſo much the more diſſatisfied, and unſerviceable.

They therefore who talk of raiſing Soldiers, and paying them whilſt they are not in ſervice, talk ridiculouſly, and of things either impoſſible or uſeleſs. 'Tis true, when they are to be raiſed for immediate Service, they are always to be paid; yet if in times of Peace they be the occaſion of any diſorder or inconvenience, (which I cannot believe) the advantages of a well diſciplin'd and ready Militia does abundantly recompence it; for where there is no ſuch force, there is nothing ſecure.

I conclude then, That he who would have a ſmall number, to pay them the better, or for any other of your reaſons, is mightily ignorant. For though it agrees with my opinion, that let your number be what it will, it will leſſen upon your hands, (by the many accidents that are not poſſible to be avoided) yet a ſmall number would quickly dwindle to nothing: Beſides, a great number is of more real ſervice and reputation. To this it may be added, That if in order to the exerciſing, you ſelect a few perſons in Countrys where plenty is to be had; they are ſo remote, and at ſuch diſtance from one another, that you cannot bring them to a Rendezvouz without great inconvenience; and without exerciſing, Militia's are uſeleſs, as ſhall be ſhown in due place.

Coſimo. You have ſatisfied me as to my former demand, but I deſire you would reſolve me another doubt; and that is whether ſuch great numbers do not produce more confuſion and diſorder in the Country.

Fabritio. That opinion is as idle as the other, and for the reaſons I ſhall give.

CHAP. XI.

How the inconveniencies which follow great Armies, may be prevented.

Fabritio. THoſe who are deſigned for the Wars, may occaſion diſorder two ways, either among thmſelves, or with other people; but the remedy is eaſie, though their diſcipline ſhould not prevent it (for as to quarrels and mutinies among themſelves, diſcipline will obviate them) If the Country where your Levies are to be made, be weak, that they have no Arms among them, or ſo unanimouſly united among themſelves, that they have no head, this Order and Militia will make them more fierce and couragious againſt Strangers, without any impediment to their unity. For men who are well diſciplin'd, are as tender of breaking the Laws when they are Armed, as much as when they are diſarmed, nor can they be any ways altred, unleſs the Officers which you ſet over them debauch them, and which way that is to be done, I ſhall ſhow you preſently. But if the Country where your Levies are to be made, are in Arms, and diſunited, this way will be ſufficient to unite them; for though they had Arms and Officers of their own before, yet they were ſuch Arms as were uſeleſs in War, and ſuch Officers as rather bred and provoked mutinies, than prevented or ſuppreſs'd them. And the reaſon is, becauſe in thoſe Countrys as ſoon as a man is offended, he repairs immediately to the head of his party, who to maintain his own reputation, encourages him to revenge; whereas a publick General proceeds quite contrary. So then by this way Seditions are prevented, Unity eſtabliſhed, Provinces united (but weak) continue their union, and are freed of their weakneſs: Provinces diſunited and mutinous, are reconciled and compoſed, and their ferocity which was employed formerly in diſorders, is employed now to the advantage of the publick. As to the proviſion that is to be made that they injure not other people, it is to be conſidered that that is not to be done, but by the fault of their Officers; and to prevent the Officers from occaſioning ſuch diſorders, it is neceſſary that care be taken that they do not uſurp too great an authority over their Soldiers, which authority is to be gained two ways, either by nature, or accident; the way by nature, is to be prevented by providing that he who

who is born in a place, be never put to command the Forces raiſed in the ſame place, but be put at the head of ſuch Troops as are raiſed in other Countrys, with whom he has no natural converſe. As to the accidental way, things are to be ſo ordered, that the Commanders in chief be changed every year; for the continuation of a command over the ſame men, contracts ſuch a friendſhip and intimacy betwixt them, as is many times perverted to the prejudice of the Prince. Which changes, how uſeful they have been to thoſe who have uſed them, and how much the omiſſion of them have been prejudicial to other people, may be obſerved by the examples of the Kingdom of *Aſſyria*, and the Empire of the *Romans*; for that Kingdom continued a thouſand years without Tumult or civil War, which proceeded from the annual changing of the Officers of the Army. And in the *Roman* Empire, after *Julius Ceſar* was killed, all the civil Wars, and Conſpiracies which hapned betwixt the Officers and the Emperors, proceeded from nothing but holding the Officers continually in command. And if any of the firſt Emperors, or thoſe who rul'd afterwards with any reputation (as *Adrianus*, *Marcus*, *Severus* and the like) had had the providence to have introduced that cuſtom into their Armies, without doubt their Empire would have been more quiet and durable; for their Generals would not have had ſo much opportunity to rebel, the Emperors would not have had ſo much occaſion to fear, and the Senate (in default of ſucceſſion) having more authority in the election of a new Emperor, would undoubtedly have choſen better. But ill cuſtoms (either thorow the ignorance, or inadvertancy of mankind) are not to be eradicated by examples either good or bad.

Coſimo. I fear my demands have drawn you from your intended diſcourſe, for from ſpeaking of Levies and Militia's, and ſuch things, we are got clear upon another Subject; ſo that had I not excuſed my ſelf before, I ſhould think I deſerved reprehenſion.

Fabritio. Let not that trouble you, all that we have ſaid is pertinent enough, for being to treat of the way of Militia's (which is condemned by many people) and I to defend it, was convenient that we ſhould begin with the way of elections; and firſt as to the Cavalry.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Cavalry.

Fab. THe Cavalry anciently was raiſed out of the richeſt and moſt conſiderable of the City, but with reſpect to the age, and quality of the perſon. Of theſe there were only three hundred to a Legion; ſo that in each Conſular Army, the *Romans* had never above ſix hundred Horſe.

Coſimo. Would you have a ſtanding Militia of Horſe to exerciſe them at home, and employ them afterwards in the War?

Fab. To do well, you cannot do otherwiſe, if you would have Soldiers of your own, and not rely wholly upon ſuch as make War their profeſſion.

Coſimo. How would you chooſe them?

Fab. I would imitate the *Romans*, chooſe them out of the wealthieſt, give Officers as they do at this day, and ſee them well armed, and well exerciſed.

Coſimo. Would it be well to allow them any pay?

Fab. Yes truly it would, yet it ſhould be no more than would keep their Horſe; for otherwiſe lying continually upon them, they would become grievous to the Subject, and give them occaſion to complain of you.

Coſimo. What numbers would you have, and how would you Arm them?

Fab. You are too quick, and paſs from one thing to another; I'll anſwer you to that in another place, when I have told you how the Foot are to be Armed, and prepared for a field Battel.

THE SECOND BOOK.

CHAP. I.

What arms were moſt uſed by the Ancients in their Wars.

Fabr. WHen you have raiſed your men, the next thing is to furniſh them with Arms, and before you do that, I think it not amiſs to examine what Arms were moſt uſed by the Ancients, and chooſe the beſt. The *Romans* divided their Infantry into thoſe who were compleatly, and thoſe who were ſlightly armed. Thoſe who were lightly armed, were called *Velites*, under which name all were comprehended who carried Bows, and Slings, and Darts; the greateſt part of them had Caſques upon their heads for their defence, and a kind of Buckler upon their arm. They fought in no order, and at diſtance from thoſe who were arm'd compleatly; Their Arms conſiſted of a Head-piece or Morrion which came down to the Shoulders, a Brigandine down to their knees, their legs and arm were covered with Greeves, and Gauntlets, a Buckler covered with Iron, about two yards long, and one broad, an Iron ring about it without to keep off the blows, and another within to keep it from the dirt when it was lay'd upon the ground. Their offenſive Weapons were a Sword at their left thigh, about a yard and half long, with a Dagger on their right ſide. They carried a Dart in their hand which they called *Pilum*, which upon a Charge they darted at the Enemy.

Theſe were the Arms with which the *Romans* conquered the whole world. And though ſome of their ancient Writers do give them a Spear in form of a Spit; I do not ſee how ſuch a Weapon could be handled by one that carried ſuch a Buckler, for it was too heavy to be managed with one hand; beſides (unleſs it were in the Front where they had room to make uſe of them) it was impoſſible to uſe them in their ranks; for the nature of Battels is ſuch (as I ſhall ſhow hereafter) that they do always contract and keep cloſe, as being in much leſs danger, than when they are drawn up looſer and at a diſtance: So that in that cloſe order, all Arms that are above two yards long, are not to be uſed, for having a Spear that is to be managed with both hands, if your Buckler were no hinderance, it could not hurt your Enemy when he was near. If you take it in one hand, and manage your Buckler with the other, you muſt take it in the middle, and then there will be ſo much of it behind, that they who come after you will hinder you from handling it: So that it is true, either the *Romans* had no ſuch *Haſtæ*, or if they had, they made but little uſe of them. For if you read the Hiſtory of *Titus Livius*, in the deſcription of all his Battels, you will ſcarce ever find he mentions thoſe *Haſtæ*, but tells you all along that having darted their *Pila*, they fell to the Sword. My opinion therefore is, that this *Haſta* be lay'd aſide, and that in imitation of the *Romans* we make uſe of their Sword and Buckler, and other Arms, without troubling our ſelves with that.

The *Greeians* for their defence did not arm ſo heavily as the *Romans* but for offence, they relyed more upon the Spear, than the Sword, eſpecially the *Macedonian Phalanx*, who carried of thoſe Javelins which they called *Sariſſæ*, with which they brake the Enemies Battels, and kept their own firm and entire. And though ſome Writers ſay that they alſo had their Bucklers, (yet I know not (for the reaſons aboveſaid) how they could conſiſt. Beſides in the Battel betwixt *Paulus Emilius* and *Perſeus* King of *Macedon*, I do not remember that any mention was made of any Bucklers, but only of their *Sariſſæ*, and yet the *Romans* had much ado to overcome them. So that my opinion is, the *Macedonian* Phalanx was juſt ſuch a Body as the *Swizzers* Battalion, whoſe whole force lyes in their Pike. The *Romans* were likewiſe accuſtomed to adorn their Soldiers with Plumes of feathers in their Caps, which renders an Army beautiful to their Friends, and terrible to their Enemies.

Enemies. In the firſt beginning of the *Roman* Wars, their Horſe uſed a round Shield, a Helmet upon their Heads, and all the reſt of their body naked; their offenſive Arms were a Sword and Javelin with a long thin ſpike at the end of it; and ſo being incumbered with Shield and Javelin, they could uſe neither of them well, and being unarmed, they were more expoſed to the Enemy.

Afterwards they came to arm themſelves like their Foot, only their Shield was a little ſhorter, and ſquarer, their Launce or Javelin thicker, with pikes at each end, that if by accident one of them ſhould miſcarry, the other might be ſerviceable. With theſe Arms both for Horſe and Foot, my Country-men the *Romans* went thorow the whole world, and by the greatneſs of their ſucceſſes, 'tis likely they were as well accoutred as any Army ever was. And *Titus Livius* in many places of his Hiſtory makes it credible where comparing the Armies of the Enemies, ſays, But the *Romans* for courage, faſhion of their Arms, and diſcipline were before them all. And for that reaſon I have choſen to ſpeak particularly rather of the Conqueror's Arms, than the Arms of the Conquered. It follows now that I ſay ſomething of the way of Arming at preſent.

CHAP. II.

Of the Arms which are uſed at preſent, and of the invention of the Pike.

Fabritio. THe Soldiers of our times do wear for defenſive Arms, Back and Breaſt, and for offenſive a Launce nine yards long, which they call a Pike, with a Sword by their ſide rather round than ſharp. Theſe are generally the Arms which they wear at this day, few wear Greaves and Gauntlets, and none at all Head-pieces. Thoſe few who have no Pikes, do carry Halbards, the ſtaff three yards long, and the head like an Axe. They have among them Muſquetiers, who with their Fire Arms do the ſame Service which was done formerly by the Bows and Slings. This manner of arming with Pikes, was found out by the *Germans*, and particularly by the *Swizzers*, who being poor, and deſirous to preſerve their liberty, were and are ſtill neceſſitated to contend againſt the ambition of the Princes of *Germany* who are rich, and able to entertain Horſe, which the *Swizzers* are not able to do. So that their Force conſiſting principally in Foot, being to defend themſelves againſt the Enemies Horſe, they were obliged to revive the old way of drawing up, and find out Arms that might defend them againſt them. This neceſſity put them upon continuing, or reviving the old Orders, without which (as every wiſe-man knows) the Foot would be uſeleſs; for which cauſe they make uſe of Pikes not only to reſiſt and keep off, but to attack and ſometimes to diſorder the Horſe. And by virtue of theſe Arms, and theſe Orders, the *Germans* have aſſumed the confidence with 15 or 20000 of their Foot to attack a vaſt Body of Horſe, of which 'tis not above 25 years ſince we had a moſt ſignal experiment; and ſo many great examples there are of their courage (founded upon their Arms, and their Order) that after *Charles* VIII's Expedition into *Italy*, all Nations made uſe of them, inſomuch as thereby the *Spaniards* grew into great reputation.

Coſimo. Which manner of arming do you prefer, the *German*, or the ancient *Roman*.

Fabritio. The *Roman* without doubt, and I will tell you the uſefulneſs and inconvenience of them both.

CHAP. III.

Whether the ancient, or modern is the beſt way of arming.

THe *German* Foot are able not only to ſuſtain, but to beat the Cavalry, they are better for expedition, and can draw themſelves up better, becauſe not over peſtered with Arms. On the other ſide Foot are more expoſed to wounds both at hand and at a diſtance. They are not ſo uſeful likewiſe in Storming of Towns, and are in great danger where there is vigorous reſiſtance. But the *Romans* were ſo well armed, they could encounter and baffle the Horſe as well as the *Germans*, and were ſecure againſt their blows by virtue of their Arms, could manage themſelves better in an engagement with their Swords, than

the *Germans* with their Pikes, and aſſault a Town better under the ſhelter of their Targets. So that the only inconvenience was the weight of their Arms, and the trouble of carrying them along, which they eaſily ſurmounted by accuſtoming themſelves to all kind of difficulties and hardſhips, and you know cuſtom is a ſecond Nature. You muſt know likewiſe that Foot are many times to engage both againſt Horſe and Foot together, and conſider alſo that theſe kind of Soldiers would be altogether unſerviceable, and could never ſtand againſt Horſe; or if they could bear up againſt them, yet they would ſtill be affraid of the Foot, leſt they ſhould be better armed, and better ordered than they. Now if you conſider the *Romans* and *Germans* together you will queſtionleſs diſcover that the *Germans* had much the advantage in charging and breaking a body of Horſe (as we ſaid before) but to engage a Body of Foot armed, and ordered like the *Romans*, they have much the diſadvantage. So that by this you ſee what advantage and diſadvantage the one has of the other, the *Romans* were able to fight Foot and Horſe both, and the *Germans* are able to deal only with Horſe,

Coſimo. I would deſire you to give us an example, that we may underſtand it the better.

Fabritio. I ſay you will find in many places of our Hiſtory, the *Roman* Foot have overcome great Bodies of Horſe, and you ſhall never find that they were overcome by Foot, by reaſon of any defect in their Arms, or any advantage which the Enemy had in theirs. For had their way of arming been found inconvenient, one of theſe two things would have followed, they would not have advanced with their Conqueſts ſo far (their Enemy being better arm'd), or elſe they would have arm'd as the Enemy did, and left their own way; and becauſe neither the one nor the other was done, it follows probably that their way of arming was the beſt. With the *Germans* it was otherwiſe as appears by the ill ſucceſs which they have had whenever they have been engaged with Foot that were well ordered, and as valiant as they; which proceeded from the advantage the Enemy had of them in their Arms. *Philippo Viſconte* Duke of *Milan* being aſſaulted by 18000 *Swizzers*, ſent againſt them the Count *Carmignuola*, who was his General at that time. *Carmignuola* with 6000 Horſe, and a few Foot went to encounter them, and coming to an engagement, was beaten for his pains. *Carmignuola* being a wiſe man, quickly diſcovered the advantage which the Enemy had in their Foot over his Horſe, having rallyed and recruited his Army, he advanced againſt the *Swiſſers* again, and when he came near them, he cauſed his Horſe to diſmount, and engaging them ſmartly in that poſture, he put them all to the rout, and moſt of them to the Sword, only 3000 were left, who finding themſelves paſt remedy, threw down their Arms.

Coſimo. How comes that great diſadvantage?

Fabritio. I told you before, but ſince you did not regard it, I will repeat it again. The *German* Infantry have little or no defenſive Arms, and for offenſive they have the Pike and the Sword, and with theſe weapons, and in that order they attack the Enemy. But if the Enemy be well provided for his defence (as the Cavalry were which *Carmignuola* cauſed to diſmount) and receives them in any good order, they may deal well enough with the *Swizzers* if they can but come to the Sword; for when they once get within them, the length of their Pikes make them uſeleſs, and falling then to their Sword, they have the diſadvantage of wanting defenſive Arms, with which the Enemy is provided. So that conſidering the advantage and diſadvantage on both ſides, it will appear that they who have no defenſive Arms are without remedy if the Enemy charges but home, and paſſes their Pikes; for Battels do always advance (as I ſhall ſhow, when I have told you their manner of drawing up) and preſſing on perpetually, they muſt of neceſſity come ſo near as to reach one another with their Swords, and though ſome few perhaps may be killed or tumbled down with their Pikes, yet thoſe that are behind preſſing ſtill on, are ſufficient to carry the Victory, and this was the reaſon why *Carmignuola* overcame with ſo great ſlaughter of the *Swiſſes*, and ſo little of his own Army.

Coſimo. Conſidering that *Carmignuola*'s Forces were men at Arms, and (though on foot) yet armed compleatly, in my judgment it would be convenient upon any great enterprize, to arm your Foot in that manner.

Fabritio. Had you remembred what I told you before about the way of the *Romans* arming themſelves, you would not have been of that opinion: For a Foot Soldier with a Head-piece, Breaſt-plate, Shield, his arms and his legs covered with Iron, is better able to defend himſelf againſt the Pikes, and break into them, than one of the men at Arms diſmounted.

I will give you a modern example. Certain Companies of *Spaniſh* Foot were tranſported out of *Sicily*, and landed in the Kingdom of *Naples*, being to ſupply *Gonſalvo*, who was beſieged

beſieged in *Barletta* by the *French*. *Monſieur d'Aubigny* had notice of their march, and went to meet them with his men at arms, and ſome 4000 German foot, who preſſed upon them with their pikes, and opened the *Spaniſh* body, but by the help of their bucklers, and the agility of their bodies, having got under their pikes, and ſo neer as that that they could come at them with their ſwords, the *Spaniards* had the day with the ſlaughter of moſt of the *Swiſſes*. Every one knows how many of the *Swiſſers* foot were cut off at the battel of *Ravenna*, and all upon the ſame account, the *Spaniſh* foot having got to them with their ſwords, and had cut them certainly in pieces, had they not been reſcued by the *French* horſe: and yet the *Spaniards* drawing themſelves into a cloſe order, ſecured themſelves. I conclude therefore, a good Infantry ought to be able not only to ſuſtain the horſe, but to encounter the foot, which (as I have ſaid many times before) is to be done by being well arm'd and well ordered.

Coſimo. Tell me therefore, I beſeech you, how you would have them arm'd?

CHAP. IV.

How foot ſhould be arm'd, and of the force and convenience of men at arms.

Fabritio. I would take both of the *Roman* and *German* arms, and half my men ſhould be arm'd with the one, and half with the other; for if in 6000 foot (as I ſhall explain to you hereafter) I ſhould have 3000 with bucklers like the *Romans*, 2000 pikes, and 1000 muskets, like the *Swiſs*; I think I ſhould do well enough; for I would place my pikes either in my front, or where-ever I ſuſpected the enemies horſe might make any impreſſion; my bucklers and ſwords ſhould ſecond my pikes, and be very conducing to the Victory, as I ſhall demonſtrate. So that I think an Infantry thus ordered would be too hard for any other.

Coſimo. What you have ſaid about the Foot, is ſufficient. I pray let us now hear what you judge of the horſe, and which way of equipping them is the beſt, the ancient, or modern.

Fabr. I think the preſent way is the beſt, in reſpect of the great ſaddles and ſtirrups, (which were not in uſe among the ancients) and make men ſit ſtronger and firmer upon their horſe. I think our way of arming now is more ſecure, and a body of our horſe will make a greater impreſſion than a body of the old. Yet I am of opinion that Cavalry are not to be more eſteemed now than of old, becauſe (as I have ſaid) they have in our days been oft worſted by the foot, and ſo they always will be, if the foot be arm'd and ordered as aboveſaid. *Tigranes* King of *Armenia* came into the field againſt the Roman Army, under the command of *Lucullus*, with 150000 horſe, many of them arm'd like our men at arms, (which they called *Catafracti*) the Romans conſiſting only of 6000 horſe, and 15000 foot. Whereupon, in contempt of their number, when *Tigranes* ſaw them, he ſaid, *That they were liker the Train of an Embaſſador than an Army.* Nevertheleſs when they came to fight, he was beaten; and he who writes the ſtory, blames the *Catafracti*, and declares them unſerviceable; for (ſays he) having beavers over their faces, they cannot ſo well ſee how to offend the enemy, and being laden with arms, if by accident their horſe be killed, or throws them upon the ground, they cannot get up again, nor help themſelves in any manner. I ſay then, that Nation or Kingdom which prefers their horſe to their foot, ſhall always be weak, and in danger of ruine, as Italy has experimented in our time, having been expoſed to ruine and depredation by ſtrangers, for want of foot, which has been very much neglected, and all the Souldiers ſet on horſe-back. Not but it is good to have horſe too, yet not to make them the ſtrength of their Army, but ſufficient to ſecond the foot; for they are of great uſe for ſcouting, making inroads into the enemies Country, raiſing Contributions, infeſting the enemy, and cutting off Convoys and ſupplies of Proviſions; nevertheleſs when they come to a Field-fight, which is the main importance of a War, and the very end for which Armies are raiſed they are not ſo ſerviceable as foot, though indeed in a rout they are better to purſue.

Coſimo. I cannot concur with you in this for two reaſons, one is, the *Parthians* uſed nothing but horſe, and yet they had their ſhare of the World as well as the *Romans*; and the other is, becauſe I cannot ſee which way the Cavalry can be ſuſtained by the Foot, and from whence proceeds the ſtrength of the one, and the weakneſs of the other.

Fabr. I think I have told you, or elſe I will tell you now, that my diſcourſe of military affairs ſhall extend no farthar than *Europe*. Being intended no farther, I do not think my

ſelf obliged to give a reaſon for their cuſtoms in *Aſia*, yet this I may ſay, that the *Parthian* diſcipline was quite contrary to the *Roman*; for the *Parthians* fought always on horſe-back in confuſion and diſorder, which is a way of fighting very uncertain. The *Romans* fought generally on foot, in cloſe and firm order, and they overcame one another variouſly, as the place where they fought was open, or ſtraight: in ſtraight places the *Romans* had the better; in champian, the *Parthians*, who were able to do great things in reſpect of the Country which they were to defend, it being very large, a thouſand miles from the Sea, not a River ſometimes within two or three days march, & Towns & Inhabitants very thin. So that an Army like the *Roman*, peſtered and incumbred with their arms, and their order, could not paſs thorow the Country without great loſs, by reaſon the ſtrength of the enemy conſiſted in horſe which were nimble, here to day, and to morrow fifty miles off. And this may be a reaſon why the *Parthians* prevailed with their horſe, ruined the Army of *Craſſus*, and put *Marc Anthony* into ſo much danger. But as I ſaid before, my intention is not to ſpeak any thing of the Armies out of *Europe*, and therefore I ſhall inſiſt only upon the *Romans*, the *Grecians*, and the *Germans*.

CHAP. V.

The difference betwixt men at arms and foot, and upon which we are moſt to rely.

Fabr. WE come now to your other demand, in which you deſire to underſtand what order, or what natural virtue it is that makes the foot better than the horſe.

I ſay in the firſt place, horſe cannot march in all Countries as foot can; they are not ſo ready to obey orders when there is any ſudden occaſion to change them: for when they are upon their march, if there be occaſion to wheel, or face about, to advance, or ſtop, or retreat, they cannot do it with that dexterity as the foot. Upon any rout or diſorder, horſe cannot rally ſo well, (though perhaps they are not purſued) which is not ſo with the foot.

Again, it is frequently ſeen, a brave and a daring man may be upon a bad horſe, and a coward upon a good, and that inequality is the occaſion of many diſorders. Nor let any one think ſtrange that a body of foot can ſuſtain the fury of the horſe, becauſe an horſe is a ſenſible creature, and being apprehenſive of danger, is not eaſily brought into it. And if it be conſidered what forces them on, and what forces them off, it will be found that that which keeps them off, is greater than that which pricks them on; for that which puts them forward is but a ſpur, whilſt that which keeps them off, is a pike or a ſword. So that it has been many times ſeen both by ancient and modern experience, that a body of foot are ſecure, and inſuperable by horſe. If you object, that coming on gallopping to the charge, makes the horſe ruſh furiouſly upon the enemy, and to be leſs careful of the pike than the ſpur. I anſwer, that though a horſe be in his career, when he ſees the pikes, he will ſtop of himſelf; and when he feels them prick, he will ſtop ſhort; and when you preſs him on, will turn either on the one ſide or the other: and if you have a mind to make the experiment, try if you can to run a horſe againſt a wall, and you ſhall find very few that will do it. *Cæſar*, when he was in *France*, being to fight a battel with the *Swizzers*, cauſed all his horſe to diſmount, and ſend their horſes away, as being fitter to fly than to fight upon. But though horſe are naturally ſubject to theſe impediments, he who commands the foot is to march ſuch ways as are likely to be moſt difficult for horſe, and he ſhall ſcarce come into a Country but ſuch ways are to be found. If you march over mountainous and hilly places, the very ſituation will ſecure you againſt the fury of the horſe; if your march be in a plain, you will ſeldom march any where but you will have plow'd-fields, or hedges, or woods to ſecure you: for every ditch, every bank, how inconſiderable ſo ever, takes off from the fury of the horſe, and every plow'd-field or vineyard retards them. And if you come to a battel, it will be the ſame as in a march; for every ſmall accident that happens to a horſe, diſmays him and takes off of his courage. However, I will not omit to tell you one thing that the *Romans* truſted ſo much to their orders, and arms, that had it been in their power to have choſen a place that had been ſteep, and convenient to ſecure them againſt horſe, (though they had not been able to draw themſelves up) or an open place (more obnoxious to the horſe) where they might put themſelves handſomly in Battalia, they

choſe

choſe always the laſt, and rejected the firſt. But it being time to come now to their manner of exerciſe, having arm'd our foot according to the ancient and modern way, let us ſee what exerciſe the *Romans* gave them before they brought them to a battel.

CHAP. VI.

How the Souldiers were exerciſed.

THough they be never ſo well choſen, and never ſo well arm'd, Souldiers are carefully to be exerciſed, for without exerciſe they are good for nothing. And this exerciſe ought to be three-fold, one is to inure them to labour and hardſhip, and make them dexterous and nimble; another to teach them how to handle their arms; and the third to teach them to keep their ranks and orders in their marches, battels, and encampments; which are three great things in an Army. For if an Army marches, is drawn up well, and encamps regularly and skilfully, the General ſhall gain reputation, let the ſucceſs be as it will. Wherefore all ancient Common-wealths provided particularly for theſe exerciſes by their Cuſtoms and Laws, ſo that nothing of that nature was omitted. They exerciſed their youth to learn them to be nimble in running, active to leap, ſtrong to throw the bar, and to wreſtle, which are all neceſſary qualities in a Souldier, for running and nimbleneſs fits them for poſſeſſing a place before the enemy; to fall upon them on a ſudden in their quarters, and purſue with more execution in a rout: activity makes them with more eaſe avoid their blows, leap a ditch, or climb a bank; and ſtrength makes them carry their arms better, ſtrike better, and endure the ſhock better: and above all to enure them to labour, they accuſtomed their Souldiers to carry great weights, which cuſtom is very neceſſary; for in great expeditions it happens many times that the Souldiers are forced to carry (beſides their arms) ſeveral days proviſions, which without being accuſtomed to labour, would be more tedious to them, and by this, great dangers are many times avoided, and great victories many times obtained. As to their way of accuſtoming them to their arms, they did it in this manner. They made their young men wear head-pieces twice as heavy as thoſe which they were to wear in the field, and inſtead of ſwords, they gave cudgels with lead run into them, much heavier than their ſwords. They cauſed each of them to fix a pale into the ground three yards high, and faſten it ſo ſtrong that no blows might be able to batter or ſhake it: againſt which pale or ſtake the youth were accuſtomed to exerciſe themſelves with their cudgel and buckler, as it had been an enemy; ſtriking it ſometimes as it were on the head, ſometimes on the face, then on the ſides, legs, before and behind; ſometimes retreating, and then advancing again: and by this way of exerciſe they made themſelves dexterous and skilful how to defend themſelves, and offend an enemy. And for the heavineſs of their counterfeit arms, they did it to make the true ones appear more light. The *Romans* taught their Souldiers rather to thruſt than to cut with their ſwords, becauſe thruſts are more mortal, more hard to be defended; and he that makes it is not ſo eaſily diſcovered, and is readier to double his thruſt than his blow. Do not admire that the ancients concerned themſelves in ſuch little things, for when people come to handy ſtrokes, every ſmall advantage is of great importance; and this is not my own opinion only, but is taught by many Authors. The ancients thought nothing more beneficial in a Common-wealth, than to have ſtore of men well exerciſed in arms; for 'tis not the ſplendor of their gemms, not their gold, that makes the enemy run, but the fear of their arms.

The faults which one commits in other things may be repaired, but thoſe which are committed in war are never to be redreſſed; beſides, experience in this kind makes men more audacious and bold, for no man fears to do that which he thinks he underſtands: the ancients therefore would have their Citizens exerciſe themſelves in all military actions, and made them caſt darts (much heavier than the true ones) againſt their pales: which beſides that it taught them dexterity, it was a great ſtrengthener of their arm. They brought up their youth likewiſe to the bow and the ſling, in all which exerciſes there were profeſſed Maſters; ſo that when afterwards they were drawn out to the wars, they were perfect Souldiers both in courage and diſcipline, nor were they defective in any thing but keeping their ranks in their marches, and receiving orders in their fights; which was quickly learn'd by mixing them with ſuch as had ſerv'd a long time.

Coſimo. What exerciſes would you recommend at preſent?

Fabritio.

Fabritio. Several of thoſe which I have mentioned, as running, leaping, throwing the bar, accuſtoming them to heavy arms, teaching them to ſhoot in the croſs, and long bow, and musket, which is a new engine, (as you know) but very good. And to theſe exerciſes I would accuſtom all the youth in my Country, but with more induſtry and ſolicitude thoſe exerciſes which are uſeful in war, and all their muſters ſhould be in idle days. I would have them learn to ſwim likewiſe, which is a very uſeful thing, for they are not ſure of bridges where-ever they come, and boats are not always to be had. So that your Army not knowing how to ſwim, is deprived of ſeveral conveniencies, and loſe many fair opportunities of action. The reaſon why the *Romans* exerciſed their youth in the *Campus Martius*, was, becauſe of its nearneſs to the *Tyber*, where after they had tired themſelves at land, they might refreſh, and learn to ſwim in the water.

I would have alſo the Cavalry exerciſed as of old, which is moſt neceſſary, for beſides teaching them to ride, it teaches them to ſit faſt when they come to a charge. To this end they had horſes of wood upon which they exerciſed, vaulting upon them ſometimes with their arms, and ſometimes without, very neatly and exactly, without any aſſiſtance; ſo that upon a ſignal from their Captain they were immediately on horſe-back, and upon another ſignal as ſoon upon the ground. And as thoſe exerciſes both for horſe and foot were eaſy in thoſe times, they would be the ſame now to any Prince or Common-wealth that would employ their youth that way, as is to be ſeen in ſeveral Cities in the Weſt, where they are continued. They divide their inhabitants into ſeveral parties, and every party is denominated by the arms which they wear; and becauſe they uſe pikes, halbards, bows, and harquebuſſes, they are called Pike-men, Halbardiers, Bow-men, and Harquebuſſiers: every inhabitant is to declare in what Company he will be liſted; and becauſe ſome for their age and other impediments are not apt for the wars, there is a choice made out of every order, of ſuch perſons as are called, the *Giurati* being ſworn to ſee the reſt exerciſed in their ſeveral arms, according to their reſpective denominations, and every one of them has a certain place appointed where their exerciſes are to be made; and all that belong to that Order (beſides the *Giurati*) repair thither with ſuch monies as are neceſſary for their expence. What therefore is done actually by them, we may do as well, but our imprudence will not ſuffer us to imitate any thing that is good. By theſe exerciſes the ancients Infantry were very good, and at this day the weſtern foot are better than ours, becauſe the ancients exerciſed them at home, (as in the Common-wealths) or in the field (as by the Emperors) for the reaſons aforeſaid. But we will not exerciſe them at home, and in the field we cannot, they not being our ſubjects, are not to be compelled but to what exerciſes they pleaſe: and this want of authority to exerciſe them, has cauſed our Armies to be firſt negligent and remiſs, and afterwards our diſcipline; and has been the cauſe that ſo many Kingdoms and Common-wealths (eſpecially in *Italy*) are ſo weak and inconſiderable.

But to return to our order, and the buſineſs of exerciſing, I ſay, that it is not ſufficient to make an abſolute Souldier, to enure a man to labour, to make him ſtrong, ſwift, and dexterous, but he muſt learn likewiſe to keep his ranks well, to obey orders, and the directions of the trumpet and drum; to know how to do right, ſtanding ſtill, retiring, advancing, fighting, and marching; for without this diſcipline be obſerved with all accurate diligence, your Army will never be good. And without doubt men who are furious and diſorderly, are much more unſerviceable than cowards; for order drives away fear, and diſorder leſſens a mans courage.

CHAP. VII.

Of what number of men, and of what arms a battalion is to conſiſt; and of exerciſing in Companies to make them ready either to give a charge, or receive it.

AND that you may the better underſtand what is ſaid before, you muſt know that there is no Nation which, to put in order its men of war, has not conſtituted a principal member; which member, or body, though they have altered it as to their name, yet it is not much altered as to the number of their men; for in all places they conſiſt of betwixt ſix and eight thouſand. This body among the *Romans* was called a *Legion*, among the *Grecians* a *Phalanx*, among the *French Caterve*; the ſame thing by the *Swizzers* (who are the only people which retain any thing of the diſcipline of the ancients) is called that in their

their language, which in ours is called Battalion. True it is, that afterwards every one divided it into companies, and ordered them as they pleaſed. My advice is, that we found our diſcourſe upon the name which is moſt known, and range it as well as we may according to the order both of the ancients and moderns. And becauſe the *Romans* divided their Legions which conſiſted of betwixt 5 and 6000 men, into ten *Cohorts*, I think fit that we divide our Battalions into ten Companies, and the whole conſiſting of 6000 men, allot to every company 450, of which 400 may be compleatly armed, and the remaining fifty ſlightly. The compleatly arm'd may be 300 with ſwords and bucklers called *Scudati*, and an hundred with pikes called Pike-men. Thoſe which are lightly arm'd may be fifty foot, carrying Harquebuſſes, Croſs-bows, Partizans and Halbards, which according to the old name may be called *Velites*; ſo that all the ten Companies make 3000 bucklers, 1000 ordinary Pikes, and 500 ordinary *Velites*, which in all will amount to 4500 foot. But becauſe we ſay that our Battalion is to contain 6000 men; 1500 more are to be added, of which 1000 are pikes, which we will call Pikes in extraordinary, and the other 500 are to be ſlightly arm'd, and called *Velites* in extraordinary. So that my foot (as is ſaid before) will be compoſed half of Bucklers, and the other half of Pikes, and other Arms. I would have every Battalion have a Commander in chief, four Centurions, and forty *Capidieci* or Corporals, and over and above, a Commander in chief of the *Velites* in ordinary, with five File-leaders. I would aſſign to the *Velites* in extraordinary two Officers in chief, five Centurions, and fifty Corporals, and then make a General of the whole Battalion. I would have every Conſtable to have his Colours and Drums, by which means the Battalion would conſiſt of ten Companies, 300 Bucklers, 1000 Pikes in ordinary, 1000 extraordinary, 500 *Velites* in ordinary, and 500 in extraordinary; ſo as they would amount in all to 6000 foot, among which there would be 600 Corporals, 15 Conſtables, 15 Drums, 15 Colours, 55 Centurions, 10 Commanders of the *Velites* in ordinary, and one General of the whole Battalion, with his Standard and Drum.

I have repeated this order the oftner, that afterward when I ſhew you the way of ordering a Battel or Army, you may not find your ſelf confounded. I ſay therefore, that a King or Common-wealth is to order his ſubjects, which he deſigns for the wars, with theſe arms, and into theſe diviſions, and raiſe as many Battalions as his Country will afford. And when he has diſpoſed them ſo, being to exerciſe them in order, he is to exerciſe them in their ſeveral diviſions. And although the number of each of them cannot bear the form of a juſt Army, yet thereby every man may learn what belongs to his own duty, becauſe in Armies there are two orders obſerved, one what men are to do in every battel, or diviſion diſtinctly; and the other what they are to do when united with the reſt; and thoſe men who know the firſt well, will eaſily learn the other; but without knowledg of the firſt, they will never arrive at the diſcipline of the ſecond.

Every one (then) of theſe Companies may learn by it ſelf to keep the order of their ranks in all motions and places, to open and cloſe, and underſtand the direction of their Drums, by which all things are commanded in a battel; for by the beating of that (as by the whiſtle in the Gallies) every man knows what he is to do, whether to ſtand firm to his ground, to advance, or fall back, and which way they are to turn their faces and arms. So that underſtanding the order of their files in that exactneſs that no motion, nor no place can diſorder them; underſtanding the commands of their Officer, derived to them by h; Drum, and how to advance, & fall back into their places, theſe Companies (as I have ſaid before) as ſoon as joyned, may eaſily be taught what an united body of all the Battalions is is obliged to do when they are drawn together into an Army. And becauſe this univerſal practice is of no ſlight importance, in time of peace it would be convenient once or twice in a year to bring them to a general *Rendezvous*, and give them the form of an Army, exerciſing them for ſome days as if they were to fight a battel with an enemy, drawing them up, and diſpoſing them into front, flank, and reſerve. And becauſe a General orders his Army for a battel, either upon the ſight or apprehenſion of an enemy, he is to exerciſe his Army accordingly, and teach them how to behave themſelves upon a march, and how in a battel, and how upon a charge, either upon one ſide or other. When they are exerciſed as if an enemy was before them, they are to be taught how they are to begin the fight, how they are to retreat upon a repulſe, who are to ſucceed in their places; what Colours, what Drums, what words of command they are to obey, and ſo to train them up, and accuſtome them to theſe falſe alarms, and counterfeit battels, that at length they become impatient to be at it in earneſt. For an Army is not made valiant and couragious for having brave and valiant men it, but for the good order which is obſerved; for if I be in the forlorn, and know, being beaten, whither I am to retire, and who are to ſucceed in my place, I ſhall fight boldly, becauſe my relief is at hand. If I be of the ſecond body that is to

engage, the diſtreſs, or repulſe of the firſt will not fright me, becauſe I conſidered it might happen before, and perhaps deſired it, that I might have the honour of the Victory, and not they. Where an Army is new, this way of exerciſing is abſolutely neceſſary, and where it is old, it is convenient; for we ſee the *Roman* Captains before they brought them to fight, continually exerciſed their men after this manner, though they had been brought up to their Arms. *Joſephus* tells us in his Hiſtory, that this continual exerciſing in the *Roman* Army was the cauſe that all the multitude of idle people which followed the Camp either for Traffick or gain, were made uſeful and ſerviceable, becauſe they underſtood their orders and ranks, and how to preſerve them in time of Battel. But if you have raiſed an Army of young men never in the Wars before, whether you intend them for preſent Service, or to eſtabliſh them as a Militia, and engage them afterwards without this way of exerciſing by ſingle Companies, and ſometimes a conjunction of them all, you do nothing. For order being perfectly neceſſary, it is convenient with double induſtry and labour to teach ſuch as are not skilful already, and practiſe ſuch as are; as we have ſeen ſeveral excellent Commanders, to practiſe and inſtruct their Soldiers, take extraordinary pains without any reſpect to their dignities.

Coſimo. It ſeems to me that this diſcourſe has a little tranſported you, for before you have told us the way of exerciſing by Companies, you have treated of entire Armies, and the managing of a Battel.

Fabritio. You ſay right, and the true reaſon is the affection I bear to thoſe orders, and the trouble I am under that they are no more uſed; yet do not think but I will recollect my ſelf and return. As I told you before, in the exerciſing of a Company, the firſt thing of importance is to know how to keep your ranks; to do this, it is neceſſary to exerciſe them in that order which they call *Chiocciole*, or the Snail order. And becauſe I have ſaid that one of theſe *Battalias* or Companies is to conſiſt of four hundred Foot compleatly armed, I will keep to that number.

Theſe four hundred men (then) are to be reduced into 80 files, five in a file, after which they are to be carried forward upon a quick march, or a ſlow, wheeling, and doubling, charging or retreating, which indeed is more demonſtrable to the eye, than the underſtanding. But this *Snail way* of exerciſing a Company is not ſo neceſſary, becauſe every one that knows any thing of an Army, knows how 'tis to be done; and indeed it is not conſiderable in any reſpect, but to teach Soldiers how to move in their files; but let us now draw up one of theſe Companies and diſpoſe them into their ranks.

CHAP. VIII.

Of three principal ways of drawing up a Company, and putting them into a poſture to fight.

I Say that there are three principal forms of drawing up men; the firſt and moſt uſeful is to draw them up cloſe, in the figure of two Squares. The ſecond is to draw them up in a ſquare with two wings. The third is to draw them up with a vacuity in the middle, which they call *Piazza*. To draw them up in the firſt figure, there are two ways. One is to double their files, that is the ſecond file entring into the firſt, the fourth into the third, the ſixt into the fift, and ſo ſucceſſively; ſo that whereas they were 80 files of five in a file, they may become forty files of 10 in a file. After this you are to double them again in the ſame manner, thruſting one file into another, and then they will be 20 files, and twenty men in a file. This makes two ſquares or very near; for though there be as many men on one ſide as the other, yet towards the head they joyn together, ſo as one flanck may touch the other; but on the other ſide, their diſtance is at leaſt two yards one from the other; ſo that the ſquare is longer from the Rear to the Front, than from one flanck to another. And becauſe we are to ſpeak often of the fore part, the hinder part, and the ſides, of this *Battalia* or Company, and of the whole Army when joyned; you muſt know that when I ſay the head or the front, I mean the fore part of the Battel; when I ſay the ſhoulders, I mean the hinder part; and when I ſay the flancks, I mean the ſides. The fifty *Velites* in ordinary, do not mingle with the reſt of the files, but when the *Battalia* is formed, they are diſpoſed by its flanks. The other way of drawing up a Company is this, (and becauſe it is better than the firſt, I reſolve to deſcribe it ſo plain, that you ſhall underſtand it as well as it were before your eyes) I ſuppoſe you remember of what number of men, of what Officers it is compoſed, and what Arms it is to carry. The form therefore

of

of this *Battalia* is of twenty files, twenty men in a file, five files of Pikes in the front, and fifteen files of Bucklers in the rear. Two Centurions in the front, and two in the rear, which the ancients called *Tergiductores*. The Conſtable or Captain with his Colours and Drum is to ſtand in the ſpace betwixt the five files of Pikes, and the fifteen files of Bucklers, Corporals, upon the flank of every file one; ſo that each of them may have his men by his ſide; thoſe who are on the right hand, will have them on their left, thoſe on the left on their right; the fifty *Velites* are to be drawn up on the flancks and rear. Now that your Soldiers may put themſelves into this poſture in their ordinary march, it is to be done in this manner. You are firſt to reduce your *Battalia* into 80 files, five men in a file, leaving your *Velites* either in the front or the rear, but they muſt be ſure to be placed without this order. Every Centurion is to be at the head of twenty files, five of Pikes are to be immediately behind him, and the reſt Bucklers.

The Conſtable or Captain is to ſtand with his Drum, and Colours in the ſpace betwixt the Pikes and the reſt of the Bucklers belonging to the ſecond Centurion, and may take up the place of three of the Bucklers. Of the *Capidieci* or Corporals, twenty are to ſtand in the flanck of the files of the firſt Centurion, upon the left hand, and twenty upon the flanck of the laſt Centurion upon the right hand. And it is to be obſerved that every Corporal who leads the Pikes, is to have a Pike in his hand: and they who lead the *Scudi* are to have Bucklers in theirs.

Having put your files into this order, and being deſirous upon their march to reduce them into a *Battalia* to make head againſt an Enemy, you muſt cauſe the firſt Centurion with his firſt twenty files to make a halt, and the ſecond Centurion to continue his march to the right all along by the ſides of thoſe twenty files which ſtand firm, till he comes cheek by jole with the firſt Centurion, where he alſo makes his ſtand, and then the third marching on likewiſe on the right hand by the flanck of the ſaid files, advances till he be even with the other two Centurions, and then he making his ſtop, and ſo the reſt; which being done, two of the Centurions only are to depart from the front into the rear of the *Battalia*, which by this means is in the ſame order as I ſaid before. The *Velites* are to be drawn up by the ſide, as they are diſpoſed in the firſt way, which is called *redoubling by a right line*, for the ſecond way redoubles them in the flanks. The firſt way is more eaſie, this is more orderly and uſeful, and may be better corrected and reformed to your mind, for in the firſt you are obliged to conform to your number, for five doubled, make ten, ten twenty, twenty forty; ſo that if you would double your files in a right line, you cannot make a front of fifteen, five and twenty, thirty, nor thirty five, but you muſt go where the number will carry you. And therefore it happens every day upon particular rencounters, that it is neceſſary to make head with 7 or 800 foot, and in ſo doing to double in a right line would undo you. For theſe reaſons this way pleaſes me beſt, and the difficulties therein, are eaſily removed by exerciſe and practice. I ſay then that nothing is of greater importance than to have Soldiers which can put themſelves inſtantly into their ranks, and to learn that it is neceſſary to exerciſe them in theſe Companies at home, to teach them the quick and the ſlow march, to advance or retreat, and to paſs thorow ſtraights, and difficult places without diſturbing their order: For Soldiers that can do that well, are good Soldiers, and may be called old Soldiers, though they never looked an Enemy in the face; whereas on the contrary, if a man has been in a thouſand Battels, and underſtands not that, he is but a Novice, and a freſh-water Soldier. This is only as to cloſing their ranks upon a march when they are in ſmall files; but having cloſed their files, and being afterwards broken by ſome accident (either from the place, or the Enemy) to rally, and recollect themſelves then, there lyes the difficulty and importance which requires great exerciſe and practice, and by the ancients was endeavoured with much induſtry. In this caſe it is neceſſary therefore to do two things.

CHAP. IX.

The manner of rallying Soldiers after a rout, and to make them face about a whole Company at a time.

Fabr. WHen a Squadron is broken, to rally and bring them again ſuddenly into order, two things are convenient; firſt, that ſeveral Colours or Countermarks be aſſigned to every *Battalia:* and ſecondly to obſerve this rule, that the ſame Foot ſtand ſtill in the ſame files. For example, if a Soldiers place was formerly in the ſecond file, let him

continue in that file, and not only in that file, but in the ſame place; and in order to that, as I ſaid before, ſeveral Countermarks are neceſſary. And firſt it is convenient that the Enſigns and Colours of each Company be ſo handſomly diſtinguiſhed, that being joyned with other Squadrons, they may know one another. Next, that the Captains and Centurions have Plumes of feathers or Scarfs, or ſomething that may make them conſpicuous and remarkable; and laſt of all (as being of more importance) the *Capidieci* or Corporals are to be ſo accoutred that they may be known; and of this the ancients were ſo extraordinarily curious, that their numbers were written upon their Helmets in great Characters, calling them the firſt, ſecond, third and fourth, *&c.* And not content with this, every Soldier had the number of his file, and the number of his place in that file engraven upon his Buckler. Your Companies being in this manner made diſtinguiſhable by their Colours, and accuſtomed to their ranks and files by practice and experience, it is no hard matter though they be diſordered, to rally, and reduce them ſuddenly again; for as ſoon as the Colours are ſtuck down in the ground they are immediately viſible, and the Captains and Officers knowing which are their own, repair themſelves, and diſpoſe their Soldiers immediately to their places, and when thoſe on the left have placed themſelves on the left hand, and thoſe which belong to the right hand on the right; the Soldiers directed by their rules, and the difference of their Colours fall immediately into their ranks, as eaſily as we put together the Staffes of a barrel when we have marked them before. Theſe things if learned with diligence and exerciſe at firſt, are quickly attained, and hardly forgot; for your raw men are directed by the old, and in time a Province by theſe exerciſes might be made very fit for the War. It is neceſſary therefore to teach them how to turn all together, when to face about in the rear, or the flancks, and make rear and flanck of the firſt ranks when occaſion is offered.

And this is no hard matter to do, ſeeing it is ſufficient, that every man faces to that ſide he is commanded, and where they turn their faces, that is the front. True it is, when they face to the flank, their ranks do not hold their proportion, becauſe the diſtance betwixt the front and the rear is thereby much leſſened, and the diſtance betwixt the extremity of the flancks is much encreaſed, which is quite contrary to the genuine order of a *Battalia*, for which cauſe great practice and diſcretion is required to rectifie it, and yet this may be remedyed by themſelves. But that which is of greater conſequence, and which requires more practice, is when an Officer would turn his whole Company together, as if it were a ſingle man, or a ſolid and maſſy body of it ſelf. And this requires longer experience than the other. For if you would have it turn to the left, the left corner muſt ſtand ſtill, and they who are next them, march ſo leiſurely, that they in the right may not be put to run; if they be, it will breed confuſion.

But becauſe it always happens that when an Army marches from place to place, that the Companies which are not in the front, are forced to fight in the flanks, or rear, ſo that one and the ſame Company is many times compelled to face about to the flancks and rear at one and the ſame time, that theſe Companies therefore may in this exigence hold their old proportion, according to what is ſaid before, it is neceſſary that they have Pikes in that flanck which is moſt likely to be attacked, and *Capidieci* Captains, and other Officers in their proper places.

CHAP. X.

To range a Company in ſuch order that it may be ready to face the Enemy, on which ſide ſoever he comes.

Fabr. WHen you have marſhalled your fourſcore files, five in a file; you are to put all your Pikes into the firſt twenty files, and place five of your Corporals in the head of them, and five in the rear. The other 60 files which follow, are Bucklers all, and conſiſt of 300 men. So then the firſt and laſt file of every Company, are to be Corporals; The Captain with his Enſign and Drum, is to ſtand in the midſt of the firſt hundred of Bucklers, and every Centurion at the head of his Diviſion. When they are in this order if you deſire to have your Pikes on the left hand, you are to double them Company by Company from the right flank; if you would have them on the right, you are to double from the left; and this is the way by which a Company turns with the Pikes upon one flanck, with their Officers at the head and the rear of them, and their Captain in the midſt, and it is the form which is obſerved in a march. But upon the approach of an Enemy, when

when they would make a front of a flanck, they have no more to do but to command that all of them face about to that flanck where the Pikes are; and in so doing the whole Battalia turns with its files and Officers at the same time in the manner aforesaid; for (unless it be the Centurions) they are all in their old places, and the Centurions can quickly be there. But when a Battalia marches in the front, and is in danger to be engaged in the reer; the files are to be so ordered, that the Pikes may be readily behind; and to do this there needs no more, but whereas usually in every Battalia, every Century has five files of Pikes in the front, those five files may be placed in the rear, and in all other places the same order to be observed as before.

Cosimo. If my memory fails not, you said that this way of exercise is in order to the uniting these Battalia's into an Army, and that this practice is sufficient to direct them in that. But if it should happen this Squadron of 450 Foot should be to fight singly and by its self, how would you order it then?

Fabritio. He who commands them is to judge where his Pikes are to be disposed, and place them as he thinks fit, which is not at all inconsistant with what I have prescribed before; for though that be a way to be observed in Battel upon an union or conjunction of several Squadrons, yet it may serve as a rule in what ever condition you fall into. But in showing you the two other ways which I recommended for the ordering of a Battalia, I will satisfie you farther.

CHAP. XI.

To draw up a Company with two horns, or another with a Piazza, *or vacuity in the middle.*

TO come to the way of drawing up a Battalia or Squadron with two horns or points, I say you must order your 80 files, five in a file, after this manner.

In the midst you must place a Centurion with 25 files, two of Pikes to the left, and three of Bucklers to the right: when those five are disposed, bring up the other twenty, with twenty files and file-leaders, all of them to be placed betwixt the Pikes and the Bucklers, only those who carry Pikes are to stand with the Pikes. After these twenty five files are so placed, draw up another Centurion with fifteen files of Bucklers; after which the Constable or Captain is to draw into the middle with his Drum and his Colours, with other fifteen files of Bucklers. This being performed, the next to march up is the third Centurion, who is to be at the head of 25 files, of five in a file, three Bucklers to the left, and two Pikes to the right; and after the five first files, let there be twenty file-leaders placed betwixt the Pikes and the Bucklers, and after these the fourth Centurion: Having drawn your men into this order; to make a Battalia consisting of two horns, the first Centurion is to make a stand with his 25 files at his heels; then is the second Centurion to advance with his fifteen files of Bucklers, and place himself on the right hand of the first Centurion, and marching along by the side of the 25 files, he is to advance till he comes to the fifteenth file, and there he is to stop. The next that marches is the Captain with his division of 15 files of Bucklers behind him, and advancing on the right hand by the flanck of the other fifteen files, he is to march up to their front. After him the third Centurion is to move with his 25 files, and the fourth Centurion after him, and passing along by the right flanck of the last fifteen files of Bucklers, they are not to stop at the front of the said files, but to advance till the last of the twenty five files be parallel with the files which are behind them. As soon as this is done, the Centurion at the head of the first fifteen files of Bucklers, is to remove into the left angle in the rear, and by this means you shall form a Battalia of five and twenty firm files of twenty men in a file with two horns, on each side of the front one, each of them consisting of ten files of five in a file, with a space betwixt the two horns, sufficient to receive ten men a breast. Betwixt the two horns the Captain is to be placed, and a Centurion at each point or angle; there are likewise to be two files of Pikes, and twenty Corporals on each flanck. These horns or wings are useful to receive and secure Carriages or Artillery, when they have any with them; The *Velites* are to be drawn up along the flancks under the shelter of the Pikes. But to reduce this horn'd Squadron into another figure with a space in the middle, no more is to be done, then out of the fifteen files of twenty in a file, to take eight, and place them upon the point of the two horns, which will make a good rear, and turn it into a Battalia *della Piazza*, or a Battalia with a space in the midst; in this space or Area, the Carriages are disposed, and the Captain

tain and his Colours, but not the Artillery, for they are placed either in the front, or along the flancks. Theſe are the forms to be obſerved in a Battalia or Squadron when it marches alone thorow dangerous places. But the ſingle Battalia without horns or vacuity is better, though to ſecure ſuch as are diſarmed, the horned figure is convenient. The *Swiſſes* have ſeveral forms of drawing up their Battalia's, one is in the faſhion of a Croſs, placing their Harquebuſſiers betwixt the Arms of the ſaid Croſs to ſecure them from the Enemy. But becauſe thoſe figures are proper only when Squadrons fight ſingly and by themſelves, and my intention being to ſhow they may fight united and in conjunction, I ſhall not trouble my ſelf with them.

Coſimo. I fancy I do ſufficiently comprehend the way that is to be obſerved to exerciſe men in theſe Battalia's; but (if I miſtake not) you told us that to the ten Battalia's, (which united, make a Battalion) you would add a thouſand extraordinary Pikes, and four hundred of the extraordinary *Velites*. And theſe would you not adviſe ſhould be exerciſed?

Fabritio. I would, and with very great diligence, exerciſing the Pikes with the ſame care as the reſt, becauſe I would make more uſe of them than the reſt upon all private occaſions, as in conducting convoys of proviſions, depredations, and ſuch like: But my *Velites* I would exerciſe at home without bringing them together; for it being their office to fight looſe and confuſed, it is not neceſſary that they ſhould be always exerciſed as the reſt; for it is enough if they underſtand their own buſineſs well. They ought then (as I ſaid before,) and I am not troubled to repeat it again) ſo to exerciſe their men in theſe Battalia's, that they may know to keep their ranks, underſtand their places, wheel readily, and ſhift handſomly either upon ſight of an Enemy, or inconvenience of the place. For when they can do this well, they will eaſily learn which are their places, and what are their duties in a Battel. And if a Prince or Common-wealth grudges not to take pains, and employ themſelves in ſeeing their Subjects thus exerciſed, they would have always good Soldiers, be always too hard for their Neighbours, and would be in a condition rather to give, than receive Laws from other people. But (as I have ſaid before) the diſorder in which we live, is the cauſe that we do not only neglect, but deſpiſe thoſe things, and that is the true reaſon our Souldiers are no better; and though there may be Officers and Soldiers too that perhaps are both valiant and skilful; yet they have no occaſion or encouragement to ſhow themſelves.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Baggage and Train belonging to a Company; How neceſſary it is that they have ſeveral Officers, and of the uſefulneſs of Drums.

Coſimo. I Would ask you now, what Carriages you would allot to each of theſe Battalia's?

Fabritio. In the firſt place I would not allow that either Centurion or Corporal ſhould march on Horſeback; and if the Captain muſt ride, I would allow him only a Mule. I would allow him two Carriages, one to every Centurion, and two betwixt every three Corporals, becauſe we quarter them together in our Camp, as ſhall be ſhown in its due place; ſo that to every Battalia there ſhould be 36 Carriages, which I would have carry the Tents, and Utenſils for their Cookery; their Hatchets, and other Iron Inſtruments to ſet up their Huts, Tents, and Pavilions; and if there be afterwards any place left, let them carry what they pleaſe.

Coſimo. I am of opinion that the Officers which you have appointed in every of theſe Battalia's are neceſſary, yet I ſhould be affraid ſo many Commanders ſhould confound them.

Fabritio. What you ſay would be true, were they not ſubordinate to one; but depending ſtill upon one perſon, they proceed very regularly, nay without them, they could not poſſibly be governed. For a wall that is tottering in all places, requires that its Buttreſſes and Supporters be rather many than ſtrong, becauſe the ſtrength and goodneſs of one, will not hinder the ruine which will follow. And therefore in all Armies, and among every ten men, it is convenient to have one of more life, more courage, and more authority than the reſt, who with his alacrity, and language, and example, may encourage the reſt, and diſpoſe them to fight. And to prove the neceſſity of theſe things in an Army, (*viz.* Enſigns, Officers and Drums) it appears by our Armies, where there are of them all, but

but none of them do their office, according to the intent of their eſtabliſhment. Firſt your *Capidieci* or File-leaders, if they anſwer the end for which they were eſtabliſhed, are to have their men a-part, lodg with them, charge with them, and be always in the ſame file with them; for being kept to their due places, the File-leaders are a rule and temper to the reſt, keeping them firm and ſtreight in their files, ſo as it is impoſſible almoſt that they be diſordered, and if they be, they are quickly reduced. But in our days we make no otherwiſe of them but to give them greater pay, and enable them to make particular factions. 'Tis the ſame with our Enſigns; for they are uſed more for pomp and parade, than any military ſervice; whereas formerly the Captains employed them as guides, and directions in caſe of diſorder; for every man, as ſoon as the Enſign was fix'd, knew his place immediately, and immediately return'd to it. They knew likewiſe thereby how they were to move, or to halt: it is neceſſary therefore in an Army that there be ſeveral of theſe ſmall Bodies; that every Body has its Colours, and Enſign, and Guide; for where there are many Bodies, there ought to be many Arms, and many Officers. The Souldiers (then) are to follow the motion of their Colours, and their Colours the direction of their Drum, which (being well ordered) commands the Army, and advertizes how they are to march with a motion ſuitable to the time which it beats, which is a great preſervation to their order. For this cauſe the ancients had their flutes and pipes which made an excellent harmony: and as he that dances, keeps himſelf exactly to the time of the muſick; and whilſt he does ſo, is not capable of erring: ſo an Army that in its motions obſerves the beating and direction of its Drums, cannot be eaſily diſordered. For this reaſon they varied their ſounds when they would excite, or aſſwage, or continue the courage of their men. And as their ways of beating were various, ſo they gave them ſeveral names. The *Dorick* way provoked to conſtancy and firmneſs; the *Phrigian* inflam'd the Souldiers into a martial fury and violence. It is reported that *Alexander* being one day at dinner, and hearing a Drum beating ſuddenly, the *Phrigian* way, was tranſported with ſo great a vehemence and commotion, that he clap'd his hand upon his ſword, and drew it, as if he had been going to fight. So that in my judgment it would be very convenient to revive the ancient dialects of the Drum, and practices of our Anceſtors, and if that ſhould prove too difficult, yet thoſe perſons ſhould not be deſpiſed and laid aſide, who would teach and inſtruct the Souldier how to obey them; yet thoſe ways may be changed and varied as every man pleaſes, provided he enures his Souldiers ears to underſtand the variety: but now a-days the greateſt uſe of the Drum, is to make a great noiſe.

Coſimo. I would fain know of you (if you have ever conſidered it with your ſelf) how it comes to paſs that ſuch military exerciſes are in our times grown ſo low and contemptible.

Fabr. I ſhall tell you freely what I think may be the cauſe.

CHAP. XIII.

A diſcourſe of the Author about military Virtue; and how it is become ſo deſpicable in our days.

Fabr. YOu know *Europe* (according to the teſtimony of ſeveral Authors) has afforded many excellent Captains; *Affrick* has had ſome, and *Aſia* fewer: and the reaſon (as I conceive) is, becauſe thoſe two quarters of the World have had but one or two Monarchies among them, and very few Common-wealths; but *Europe* has had ſeveral Kingdoms, and more Common-wealths; and men are induſtrious, and by conſequence excellent, as they are employed and preferred by their Prince, or their State. Where therefore there are many Princes, there are many brave men; where there are but few of the firſt, there are fewer of the other. We find in *Aſia* there was *Ninus*, *Cyrus*, *Artexerxes*, *Mithridates*, and ſome few others of that rank. In *Affrica* (beſides the Ægyptian antiquity) there were *Maſſiniſſa*, *Jugurtha*, and thoſe great Captains which were trained up in the *Carthaginian* wars, which notwithſtanding in reſpect of the numbers which have been produced in *Europe*, were very few; for in *Europe* their brave Generals are innumerable in Hiſtory, or at leaſt they would have been, had the Hiſtorians (with thoſe they have already recorded) made mention of ſuch as are now forgotten by the malignity of time. For there people are more virtuous, where there have been frequent revolutions of State, and where the Governments have favoured virtue either out of neceſſity, or compaſſion.

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As for *Asia*, it has not produced many extraordinary men, because that Province was wholly under a Monarchy, which (by reason of its greatness, the greatest part of it being always at peace) could not produce such excellent men, as where there was action and war.

In *Affrica* it was the same, yet there they were more numerous, by reason of the Carthaginian Republick: for Common-wealths do furnish the World with more brave men than Kingdoms; because in States, virtue is many times honoured and advanced; in Monarchies and Kingdoms it is suspected; from whence it proceeds that in the one it is encouraged, in the other exploded. He then who shall consider *Europe*, shall find it full of Common-wealths, and Principalities, which in respect of the jealousies and animosities betwixt them, were constrained to keep up the old military discipline, and advance those who in it were any ways eminent; for in *Greece*, besides the *Macedonians*, there were many Republicks, and in each of them, several excellent men.

The *Romans*, the *Samnites*, the *Tuscans*, *Cisalpine Gauls*, *France* and *Germany* were full of Republicks and Principalities, and *Spain* was the same. And though in respect of the *Romans*, the numbers which are mentioned of them in History, are but small; that proceeds from the emulation and partiality of the Historians, who following fortune, content themselves with commending the Conqueror; but 'tis unreasonable to imagine that among the *Samnites* and *Tuscans* (who waged war with the *Romans* 150 years together before they were totally subdued) there were not many brave men; and so in *France* and in *Spain*; but the virtue which Authors do not celebrate in particular men, they impute generally to the whole people whom they exalt to the skies for their constancy, and adherence to their liberty.

It being true then, that where there are most Principalities and Governments, there are more excellent men; it follows, that when those Governments and Principalities extinguish, their brave men and virtue extinguish with them, there being less occasion to exert it. After the *Roman* Empire had dilated it self so strangely, and subverted all the Common-wealths and Principalities in *Europe*, and *Affrica*, and the greatest part of those in *Asia*; virtue declined in all places but in *Rome*. Whereupon virtuous men began to grow thinner in *Europe* and *Asia*, and by degrees came afterwards to a total declination; for the virtue of the whole World being as it were incloſed in the walls of *Rome*, when it grew depraved and corrupted there, the whole World became corrupt, and the *Scythians* were encouraged to make their inroads and depredations upon the Empire which had been able to consume and extinguish the virtue of all other places, but was not able to preserve it at home. And though afterwards by the inundation of those Barbarians it was divided into several Cantons; yet for two reasons their virtue was never restored: one was because when Laws and Orders are once neglected and disused, it is with no little pain that they are reassumed: the other, our way of living in these times (in respect of the Christian Religion) imposes not that necessity of defending our selves, as anciently it did: for then those who were overcome in war, either killed themselves, or remained in perpetual slavery, in which they lived afterwards in continual misery. The Towns that were taken were either totally demolished, or the Inhabitants banished, their Goods plundered, their Estates sequestred, and themselves disperced all over the World; so that he who was overcome, suffered such miseries as are not to be expressed. People being terrified by these insupportable cruelties, kept up the reputation of military discipline, and advanced all those who were excellent therein.

But at present we are under no such apprehensions: no man kills himself for being conquered: no man is kept long a prisoner, because it is more easy to set him at liberty. If a City rebells twenty times, it is not immediately razed and demolished; the Citizens are continued in their Estates, and the greatest punishment they fear, is a mulct or a tax: so that men will not now submit to military orders, nor apply themselves to those labours to avoid a peril which they do not apprehend. Besides, the Provinces of *Europe* are under few heads in comparison of what they were anciently: for all *France* is under one King; all *Spain* under another: *Italy* is divided into four parties, so that the weaker Cities that are unable to maintain war of themselves, defend themselves by alliances with the Conqueror; and those who are strong (for the reasons aboveſaid) are in no fear of ruine.

Cos. And yet within these five and twenty years several Cities have been sack'd, and several Kingdoms subverted, which example should teach others to reassume, and live according to the custom of our ancestors.

Fabr. 'Tis true as you say, yet if you observe what those Towns were which have suffered in that nature, you will find that they were no capital Cities, but subordinate, and depending

pending: ſo we ſee though *Tortona* was demoliſhed, *Milan* was not, though *Capua* was deſtroyed, *Naples* was not: *Breſcia* was ſack'd, but *Venice* was not: *Ravenna* was pillaged, but *Rome* was not. These examples do not make him who governs recede from his deſigns, but makes him rather more refractory and obſtinate, and purſue them with more vehemence, to recompence himſelf with taxes and new impoſitions. This it is that makes men unwilling to expoſe themſelves to the trouble of military exerciſes, looking upon it partly as unneceſſary, and partly as a thing which they do not underſtand. Thoſe who are ſubjects, and ought to be affrighted with ſuch examples of ſervitude, have not power to help themſelves; and thoſe who are Princes, having loſt their dominion, are unable, as having neither time nor convenience: Whilſt thoſe who are able, either cannot, or will not; chooſing rather to run along with fortune, without any diſquiet, than to trouble themſelves to be virtuous; for believing that all things are governed by fortune, they had rather follow her ſwing, than contend with her for maſtery. And that you may believe what I have ſaid to be really true, conſider the Country of *Germany*, where, by reaſon of their ſeveral Principalities and States, their diſcipline is good, and depends upon the example of thoſe people, who being jealous of their States and Seigneuries, maintain themſelves in honour and grandeur, as fearing to fall into a ſervitude, out of which they could not ſo eaſily emerge.

This I ſuppoſe is ſufficient to ſhew the reaſon of the vileneſs and depravity of our preſent diſcipline; I know not whether you may be of the ſame opinion, or whether my diſcourſe may not have raiſed ſome ſcruple in your mind.

Coſimo. Not at all, I am rather perfectly ſatisfied, only I deſire (returning to our firſt ſubject) to know of you how you would order your horſe with theſe Battalia's, in what numbers you would have them, how you would have them arm'd, and how officer'd.

CHAP. XIV.

What number of horſe are to be put into a Battalion, and what proportion is to be obſerved for their baggage.

Fabr. You may think perhaps I forgot it, but do not wonder, for I ſhall ſpeak of it but little for two reaſons. One is, becauſe the nerve and ſtrength of an Army is the Infantry; the other is, becauſe the horſe are not ſo much debauched and degenerated as the foot; for the Cavalry is equal, if not better at this day than in ancient times. Yet I have ſaid ſomething before of the way how they are to be exerciſed, and as to the manner of arming them, I would arm them according to our preſent faſhion, both light horſe, and men at arms. But the light horſe (if I might preſcribe) ſhould carry croſs-bows, with ſome few harquebuſſes among them, which (though in other affairs of war they are but of little uſe) are here very neceſſary, to frighten the Country people, and force them from their paſſes, which perhaps they have undertaken to defend: for one harquebuſs will ſcare them more than an hundred other arms. But to come to their number, having undertaken to imitate the Roman Militia, I would take but 300 good horſe for every battalion, of which 150 ſhould be men at arms, and 150 light horſe; and I would appoint a Captain to each of theſe ſquadrons, 15 Corporals to each, and a Trumpet and Enſign. I would allow every ten men at arms five Carriages, and every ten light horſe, two; which Carriages (as with the foot) ſhould carry the Tents, Utenſils, Hatchets, and other Inſtruments and Harneſs. Think not that what I ſay would be any diſorder, ſeeing their men at arms had each of them four horſes in their equipage, which is a thing much corrupted; for now in *Germany* you ſhall ſee men at arms with but one horſe, and themſelves, and twenty of them are allowed but one Wagon to carry their neceſſaries. The Roman horſe were likewiſe alone, but the *Triarii* were lodg'd always by them, who were obliged to aſſiſt them in the looking to their horſes, which may be eaſily imitated by us, as ſhall be ſhewn in the diſtribution of our lodgments: what there the Romans did of old, and what the Germans do at this day, we may do likewiſe, and we do very ill if we do not.

Theſe horſe being liſted and called over, may be muſtered ſometimes with the Battalion, at a general Muſter of all the Companies, and be appointed to make charges, and counterfeit skirmiſhes with them, rather to bring them acquainted, than for any thing elſe. What we have ſaid already is ſufficient for this part: let us now come to marſhal our Army, and draw it up in a poſture to fight, and with hopes of ſucceſs, which is the great end of all kind of military diſcipline, in which men employ ſo much ſtudy and diligence.

THE THIRD BOOK.

CHAP. I.

The Order observed by the Roman Legions when a Battel was presented.

Cosimo. SEeing we change our subject, I shall yield my place of expostulating to another man; for presumption being a thing which I condemn in other people, I would not be too much guilty of it my self: therefore I dismiss my self of that office, and will transfer it to which of our friends will vouchsafe to accept it.

Zanobi. It would have been very grateful to us all, had you pleased to have continued; but seeing 'tis not your pleasure, tell us at least which of us it is you will depute to succeed you.

Cosimo. I shall leave that to the election of Signor *Fabritio.*

Fabr. I am content to undertake it, and do desire that we may follow the Venetian custom, by which the youngest of the company has the liberty to speak first, and in this case not without reason; for this being the proper exercise of young men, I perswade my self young Gentlemen are the fittest to discourse of it, as being most ready to follow it.

Cosimo. 'Tis then your province *Luigi*, and as I do much please my self in my successor, so you may be as well satisfied with his interrogations. But that we lose no time, let us return to our business.

Fabritio. I am certain, that to demonstrate how well an Army is to be marshall'd and prepared for a Battel; it would be necessary to declare how the *Greeks* and *Romans* ordered the Troops in their Armies: but because these things are sufficiently obvious in History, I shall pass by several particulars, and address my self only to such as I think most useful for our imitation, and fittest to give perfection to the discipline of our times, which will be the occasion that at once I give you a prospect how an Army is to be ranged in order to a Battel; how they are to confront and charge one another in a real engagement; and how they may be exercised in a counterfeit. The greatest disorders committed in the drawing up an Army for a Battel, is to give it only a front, because they leave them and their fortune to the success of one charge: and this error proceeds from nothing but from having lost the old way of closing their ranks, and thrusting one into another. Without that way there is no relieving of the front, no defending them, nor no supplying their places in the heat of their engagement, which among the *Romans* was most accurately observed. To the end therefore that you may comprehend this way, I say that the *Romans* divided each Legion into three Bodies.

The first were *Hastati*, the second *Principes*, the third *Triarii*. The *Hastati* were in the front of the Army, in thick and firm ranks. The *Principes* behind them, but their ranks not altogether so close: and after them the *Triarii* in so loose an order, that they could receive both *Principes* and *Hastati* into their body upon any distress. Besides these they had their Slingers, their Bow-men, and their *Velites*; not drawn up in this order, but placed at the head of the Army, betwixt the Cavalry and the Foot.

These light arm'd Souldiers began the fight, and if they prevailed, (which was very seldom) they followed the Victory; if they were repulsed, they fell back by the flanks of the Army, or thorow certain spaces appointed on purpose, and retired among those who had no arms. When they were retir'd, the *Hastati* advanced against the enemy, and finding themselves overpowred, they retir'd softly to the *Principes*, and fell into their ranks, and together with them renewed the Fight; but if they also were too weak to sustain the fury

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of the Battel, they retreated all into the ſpaces of the *Triarii*, and all together being conſolidated into a firm maſs, they made another effort more impetuous than before; if this miſcarried, all was loſt, for there was no farther reſerves. The Horſe were plac'd at the corners of the Army, like two wings to a body, and fought ſometimes on Horſeback, and ſometimes on foot, as occaſion was offered. This way of reinforcing three times, is almoſt impoſſible to be maſter'd, becauſe fortune muſt fail you three times before you can be beaten, and the Enemy muſt be ſo valiant as to conquer you as often.

CHAP. II.

The form obſerved in their Battels by the Macedonian *Phalanx.*

THe *Grecians* ordered not their Phalanx, as the *Romans* did their Legions, and though they had many Officers among them, and ſeveral ranks, yet they made but one body, or rather one front. The way which they obſerved to relieve one another, was not to retire one rank into another, like the *Romans*, but to put one man into the place of another, which was done in this manner. Their Phalanx being reduced into files (and let us ſuppoſe each file to conſiſt of fifty men) being afterwards with the front towards the Enemy, of all the files, only the ſix firſt could charge, becauſe their Lances (which they called *Sariſſæ*) were ſo long, that the ſixt rank charged with the point of his Launce thorow the firſt rank: In the fight therefore, if any of the firſt rank was either killed or diſabled, he who was behind in the ſecond rank ſupplyed his place; and the vacuity in the ſecond rank, was filled up out of the third, and ſo ſucceſſively, and on a ſudden the ranks behind, ſupplyed what was defective before; ſo as their ranks remained always entire, and no place left void but the laſt rank, which was not reinforced, becauſe there was no body behind to ſupply them: So that the loſs in the firſt rank, exhauſted the latter, and yet it ſelf was continued entire. So that theſe *Phalanges* were ſooner conſumed and annihilated than broken, becauſe the cloſeneſs and groſſeneſs of the body made them impenitrable. The *Romans* at firſt uſed theſe Phalanges, and inſtructed their Legions in that way: Afterwards they grew weary of that order, and parted their Legions into ſeveral diviſions, *viz.* into *Cohortes* and *Manipuli*, judging (as I ſaid before) that body to be moſt vigorous and fulleſt of life, that conſiſted of moſt members, ſo conſtituted as that they could ſubſiſt and govern themſelves.

CHAP. III.

How the Swiſſes *ordered their Battalions.*

Fab. THe *Swiſſes* at preſent do uſe the ſame method with their Battalions, as the *Macedonians* did anciently with their Phalanxes, both enranging them entire and in groſs, and in relieving one another. When they came to a Battel, they diſpoſed their Squadrons one in the flank of another, and not behind. They have not the way of receiving the firſt into the ſecond upon a repulſe, but to relieve one another, they obſerve this order; they put their Battalions one in the flank of another, but ſomewhat behind it, towards the right hand; ſo that if the firſt be in any diſtreſs, the ſecond advances to relieve it. The third Battalion they place behind the other two, but at the diſtance of the ſhot of a Harquebuſs, that if the two Battalions ſhould be worſted, the third might advance in their reſcue, and that which advances, and the other which retire may have ſpace to paſs by one another without any claſhing or colliſion; for groſs bodies cannot be received ſo commodiouſly as little; and therefore ſmall bodies, diſpoſed at a diſtance (as they were in the *Roman* Legions) might better receive, and relieve one another upon occaſion. And that this order of the *Swiſſes* is not ſo good as the ancient order of the *Romans*, is demonſtrated by many examples of their Legions when they were engaged with the *Macedonian* Phalanxes; for theſe were ſtill worſted by the other: The faſhion of their Arms, and their way of Reſerves being more effectual, than the cloſeneſs and ſolidity of a Phalanx.

CHAP. IV.

How the Author would make uſe of both Greek *and* Roman *Arms for his Battalion, and what was the ordinary Army of the* Romans.

BEing therefore according to theſe Models to range and marſhal an Army, I think it beſt to retain ſomething of the Arms, and Orders both of the Phalanx and Legion. For this reaſon I have ſaid in a Battalion I would have 2000 Pikes (which were the Arms of the *Macedonian* Phalanx) and 3000 *Scudi* or Shields and Swords, which are the Arms of the *Romans*. I have divided a Battalion into ten Battalia's or Companies, as the *Romans* divided their Legions into ten *Coborts*. I have ordered the *Velites* or light-arm'd to begin the fight, as they did formerly. And becauſe as the Arms are mix'd, they participate of the one Nation and the other; that they may participate likewiſe in their orders, I have appointed that every Company may have five files of Pikes in the front, and the reſt of Bucklers, that the front may be enabled to keep out the Horſe, and break more eaſily into the Foot, having Pikes in the firſt charge as well as the Enemy, by which they may be fortified to ſuſtain it bravely, till the Bucklers come up, and perfect the Victory. And if you conſider the ſtrength and virtue of this order, you will find how all theſe Arms perform their office exactly. For Pikes are very uſeful againſt Horſe, and againſt Foot too, before the Battels be joyned, but after they are joyned, they are utterly uſeleſs. For this reaſon, behind every third rank of Pikes, the *Swiſſers* put a rank of Halbards, which was to make room for their Pikes, though indeed it was not enough. Placing therefore our Pikes before, and our Bucklers behind them, they are enabled to ſuſtain the Horſe, and when they come to charge, they do open and preſs hard upon the Foot; but when the fight is begun, and the Battels are joyned, the Bucklers ſucceed with their Swords, as being manigable more eaſily in the crowd.

Luigi. We deſire now to underſtand how with theſe Arms and Orders you would manage your Army to give the Enemy Battel.

Fabritio. I ſhall ſhow you nothing at preſent but this: You muſt know that in an ordinary Army of the *Romans* (which they called a Conſular Army) there were no more but two Legions of Citizens, conſiſting in all of 600 Horſe, and about 11000 Foot. They had beſides theſe as many more Horſe and Foot ſent them in by their Friends and Confederates: Theſe Auxiliaries were divided into two parts, the right wing, and the left; for they would never ſuffer them to exceed the number of the Foot of their Legions, though their Horſe indeed they permitted to be more. With this Army conſiſting of 22000 Foot, and about 2000 Horſe, a *Roman* Conſul did all his buſineſs, and attempted any thing. Yet when they were to oppoſe a greater power, they joyned two Conſuls together, and their two Armies. You muſt know likewiſe that in the three great Actions of an Army (their march, their encampment, and engagement) they placed the Legions in the middle, becauſe the force in which they repoſed their greateſt confidence they thought fit ſhould be more united and compact, as I ſhall ſhow you more at large when I come to treat of thoſe things.

Theſe Auxiliary Foot by virtue of their converſation with the Legionary Foot, grew to be as Serviceable as they, becauſe they were train'd and diſciplin'd with them, and upon occaſion of Battel, drawn up in the ſame figure and order. He therefore who knows how the *Romans* marſhalled one ſingle Legion in the day of Battel, knows how they diſpoſed of them all: When I have told you therefore how they divided a Legion into three Squadrons, and how one Squadron received another; I ſhall have told you how a whole and entire Army is to be ordered, when it is to be drawn up for Battel.

CHAP. V.

The way of drawing up a Battalion, according to the intention of the Author.

BEing to prepare for a Battel according to the method of the *Romans*, as they had two Legions, ſo I would take two Battalions, and by the ordering of them, you may gueſs how to order a compleat Army: For to add more men, is only to multiply their ranks. I think it unneceſſary to repeat what foot there are in a Legion, what Companies, what Officers, what Arms, what *Velites* in ordinary, what in extraordinary, what Pikes, and what other things. For it is not long ſince I told you diſtinctly, and preſs'd it upon your memories as a thing very neceſſary for the underſtanding all other Orders; wherefore I ſhall paſs on without farther reflection.

It ſeems to me beſt that one of the ten Battalions, or Companies of a Battalion be placed in the left flank, and the other ten of the other Battalion on the right. Thoſe on the left are to be ordered in this manner: Put five Battalia's (one on the ſide of the other) in the front, ſo as there may remain a ſpace of four yards betwixt each, draw them up ſo as they may poſſeſs in breadth 140 yards of ground, and in depth forty: behind theſe five Battalia's, I would place three others, diſtant in a right line from the firſt about forty yards; of theſe three, I would have two follow directly the Companies which are upon the two extremities or corners of the five firſt, and the third ſhould be diſpoſed in the midſt; by which means theſe three Companies ſhould take up as much ground both in breadth and depth as the other five, which have only five yards diſtance betwixt the one and the other, whereas the three laſt ſhould have thirty three. This being done, I would cauſe the two Companies remaining to advance, and place themſelves behind the three former in a right line, and at the diſtance of forty yards; but it ſhould be in ſuch a ſort, that each of theſe two Companies ſhould be ranged directly behind the extremity of the three precedent Companies, and the ſpace left betwixt them ſhould be 91 yards: By theſe means all the Companies thus diſpoſed ſhould extend themſelves in front 161 yards, and in depth 201 After this I would extend the Pikes extraordinary along the flanks of all the Companies on the left hand, at about twenty yards diſtance; and I would make of them 140 ranks of ſeven in a rank, ſo that they ſhould ſecure all the left flank (in depth) of the ten Battalia's, drawn up as I ſaid before; and I would reſerve forty files of them to guard the Baggage, and the unarmed people in the rear, diſtributing their Corporals and other Officers in their reſpective places. The three Conſtables or Captains I would place one at the head of them, another in the midſt, and a third in the rear, who ſhould execute the Office of a *Tergiductor*, who was always placed in the rear of the Army. But to return to the front of the Army; I ſay, that after the Pikes extraordinary, I would place the *Velites* extraordinary (which are 500) and allow them a ſpace of forty yards. By the ſide of theſe on the left hand I would place my men at Arms, with a ſpace of 150 yards; after them I would advance my light Horſe, at the ſame diſtance as I allowed to my men at Arms. As to the *Velites* in ordinary, I would leave them about their Battalia's, which ſhould take up the ſpace which I left betwixt each Company, unleſs I found it more expedient to put them under the *Pikes extraordinary*, which I would do or not do, as I found it more or leſs for my advantage. The Captain General of the Battalion ſhould be placed in the ſpace betwixt the firſt and ſecond orders of Battalia's, or elſe at the head of them, or elſe in the ſpace betwixt the laſt of the firſt five Battalia's, and the *Pikes extraordinary*, as I found it moſt convenient: he ſhould have about him 30 or 40 ſelect men, all brave and experienc'd, and ſuch as underſtood how to execute their Commiſſion with prudence, and how to receive and repel a charge; and I would have the Captain General in the midſt of the Drums and the Colours.

This is the order in which I would diſpoſe my Battalion on the left wing, which ſhould contain half the Army, and take up in breadth 511 yards, and in depth as much as I have ſaid before (without reckoning the ſpace that was poſſeſſed by the Pikes extraordinary, which ſhould be as a Shield to the people without Arms, and take up a ſpace of about a hundred yards); The other Battalion I would diſpoſe on the right ſide, leaving betwixt the two Battalions a diſtance of about 30 yards, having order'd it as the other: At the head of that ſpace I would place ſome pieces of Artillery, behind which ſhould ſtand the Captain General of the whole Army, with the Drums, the Standard or chief Enſign, and two hundred choice men about him (moſt of them on foot) and amongſt them ten or more

more fit to execute any command. The General himſelf ſhould be ſo mounted, and ſo arm'd, that he might be on Horſeback, and on foot as neceſſity required. As to the Artillery, ten pieces of Cannon would be enough for the taking of a Town. In the Field I would uſe them more for defence of my Camp, than for any Service in Battel. My ſmaller pieces ſhould be of 10 or 15 pound carriage, and I would place them in the front of the whole Army, unleſs the Country was ſuch that I could diſpoſe them ſecurely in the flank, where the Enemy could not come at them.

This form and manner of ranging an Army, and putting it in order, may do the ſame things in a Battel as was done either in the *Macedonian* Phalanx, or the Legion of the *Romans*; for the Pikes are in the front; and all the foot placed in their ranks; ſo that upon any charge or engagement with the Enemy, they are able not only to bear and ſuſtain them, but (according to the cuſtom of the Phalanx) to recruit and reinforce their firſt rank, out of thoſe which are behind.

On the other ſide if they be over-power'd, and attack'd with ſuch violence that they are forced to give ground, they may fall back into the intervals of the ſecond Battalia behind them, and uniting with them, make up their body, and charge them briskly again: And if the ſecond Battalia is not ſtrong enough to relieve them, they may retire to the third, and fight all together in conjunction; ſo that by this order (as to the buſineſs of a Battel) we may ſupply and preſerve our ſelves according to the *Grecian* and the *Roman* way both.

As to the ſtrength of an Army, it cannot be ordered more ſtrong, becauſe the two wings are exactly well fortified with Officers and Arms; nor is there any thing weak but the rear, where the people which follow the Camp without Arms are diſpoſed, and they are guarded with the *Pikes extraordinary*; ſo that the Enemy cannot aſſault them any where, but he will find them in very good order; neither is the rear in any great danger, becauſe an Enemy can be hardly ſo ſtrong as to aſſault you equally on all ſides; if you found he was ſo ſtrong, you would never take the field againſt him. But if he was three times as many, and as well ordered as you, if he divides, and weakens himſelf to attack you in ſeveral places, beat him in one, and his whole enterprize is loſt. As to the Enemies Cavalry, though they out-number you, you are ſafe enough; for the Pikes which encompaſs you, will defend you from any impreſſion from them, though your own Horſe be repulſed. The chief Officers are moreover plac'd in the flank, ſo as they may commodiouſly command, and as readily obey; and the ſpaces which are left betwixt one Battalia and the other, and betwixt one rank and another, ſerve not only to receive thoſe who are diſtreſſed, but gives room for ſuch perſons as are ſent forward and backward with orders from the Captain: And as I told you at firſt, as the *Romans* had in their Army about 24000 men, I would have our Army conſiſt of the ſame number, and as the Auxiliaries took their method of fighting, and their manner of drawing up, from the Legions; ſo thoſe Soldiers which you would joyn to your two Battalions, ſhould take their form and diſcipline from them. Theſe things would be very eaſie to imitate, ſhould you have but one example; for by joyning either two other Battalions to your Army, or adding as many Auxiliaries, you are in no confuſion, you have no more to do but to double your ranks, and whereas before you put ten Battalia's in the left wing, put twenty now; or elſe you may contract, or extend them as your place and Enemy will give leave.

Luigi. In earneſt, Sir, I am ſo well poſſeſs'd of your Army, that I fancy I ſee it drawn up before my eyes, which gives me an ardent deſire to ſee it engaged: I would not for any thing in the world that you ſhould prove a *Fabius Maximus*, and endeavour no more than to avoid fighting, and keep the Enemy in ſuſpence; for I ſhould blame you more, than the *Romans* did him.

CHAP. VI.

The deſcription of a Baitel.

Fabr. DO not queſtion it, Hark, do not you hear the Artillery? Ours have fired already, but done little execution upon the Enemy; the *Velites* extraordinary, together with the light Horſe advance to the charge in Troops, with the greateſt ſhout and fury imaginable; The Enemies Artillery has fired once, and the ſhot paſſed over the head of our Foot, without any prejudice at all. That it might not have time for a ſecond Volley, our *Velites*, and our Cavalry have marched up in great haſte to poſſeſs it, and the Enemy

Enemy advancing in its defence, they are come ſo cloſe, that neither the Artillery of one ſide or the other can do any miſchief. See with what courage and bravery our Souldiers charge; with what diſcipline and dexterity they demean themſelves, thanks to the exerciſe to which they have been uſed, and the confidence that they have in our Army: See our Battalions marching up, with their Drums beating, Colours flying, and men at Arms in their wings in great order to the charge: Obſerve our Artillery, which (to give place, and make room for our men) is drawn off by that ground which was left by the *Velites*: See how the General encourages his men, and aſſures them of Victory: See how our *Velites* and light Horſe are extended and returned to the flanks of our Army, to ſee if there they can find any advantage to make an impreſſion upon the Enemy; Now, now they are met; See with what firmneſs our Battalions have received the charge without the leaſt noiſe or confuſion: Obſerve the General how he commands his men at Arms to make good their ground; not to advance upon the Enemy, nor deſert the Foot upon any occaſion whatever. See our light Horſe marching to charge a Body of the Enemies Harquebuſſiers that was firing upon our flank; and how the Enemies Horſe come in to their reſcue, ſo that being encloſed betwixt the Cavalry of one ſide and the other, they cannot fire, but are forced to retreat behind their Battalia's: See with what fury our Pikes addreſs themſelves to the fight, and our foot advanced already ſo near, that the Pikes are become unſerviceable; ſo that according to our Diſcipline the Pikes retire by little and little among the Shields: See in the mean time how a Body of the Enemies men at Arms, has diſordered our men at Arms in the left wing; and how according to our Diſcipline, retiring under the protection of our *Pikes extraordinary*, by their aſſiſtance they have repulſed the purſuers, and killed moſt of them upon the place. See the Pikes in ordinary of the firſt Battalia's, how they have ſheltred themſelves under the *Scudati*, and left them to make good the fight: See with what courage, with what ſecurity, with what leiſure they put the Enemy to the Sword. Behold how they cloſe their ranks in the fight, and are come up ſo near they have ſcarce room left to manage their Swords. See with what fury the Enemy flyes, becauſe being armed only with Pike and with Sword, both of them are become unſerviceable; one becauſe of its length, the other becauſe the Enemy is too well armed. See how they throw down their Arms, how they are wounded, killed or diſperſed. See how they run in the right wing; ſee how they fly in the left. So now we are ſafe, and the Victory our own.

CHAP. VII.

The Authors reaſons for the occurrences in the Battel.

Fabr. WHat do you think now, have we not got the Victory very fortunately; but we would have had it with more advantage, had I been permitted to have put all things in execution. You ſee there is no neceſſity of making uſe either of the ſecond or third order; becauſe our Van was ſufficient to overcome the Enemy; ſo that I am enclined to ſpeak no farther upon this Subject, unleſs it be to reſolve any doubt that may ariſe in your mind.

Luigi. You have gain'd this Victory with ſo much courage and gallantry, that I fear my tranſport will not give me leave to explain my ſelf, whether I have any ſcruple or not. Nevertheleſs preſuming upon your quickneſs, I ſhall take the boldneſs to tell you what I think. Firſt, therefore let me deſire you to inform me, why you made uſe of your Artillery but once? why you cauſed them to be drawn off into your Army, and made no mention of them afterward? It ſeems to me that you placed the Enemies too high, and ordered them as you fancied; which might poſſibly be true; but if their Cannon ſhould be ſo placed (as I do not queſtion but many times they are) as that they ſhould play among your Troops, I would fain underſtand what remedy you would preſcribe; and ſince I have begun to ſpeak of the Artillery, I ſhall propoſe all my ſcruples in this place, that I may have no occaſion to mention them hereafter. I have heard many perſons find fault with the Arms and orders of the ancients, as things of little or no uſe in our days, in reſpect of the fury of our Cannon; becauſe they break all ranks, and pierce all Arms at ſuch a rate, that it ſeems to them no leſs than madneſs to oppoſe any ranks or orders of men againſt them, and to tire your Souldiers with the carriage of Arms that will not be able to defend them.

Fabritio.

Fabr. Your demand conſiſting of many heads, requires a large anſwer. 'Tis true, I cauſed my Artillery to play but once, and I was in doubt whether they ſhould do that; and the reaſon is, becauſe it concerns a man more to keep himſelf from being hurt, than to miſchief his enemy. You muſt underſtand, that to provide againſt the fury of great Guns, it is neceſſary to keep where they cannot reach you, or to place your ſelf behind ſome wall or bank that may ſhelter you, for there is nothing elſe that can ſecure you; and then you muſt be ſure that either the one or the other are able to protect you. Thoſe Generals who put themſelves into a poſture to give battel, cannot place their Armies behind a wall or a bank, or at a diſtance where the enemies Cannon cannot reach them; and therefore ſeeing they have no way to defend themſelves abſolutely, the beſt courſe is to ſecure themſelves as well as they can, and that is by poſſeſſing their Cannon with as much ſpeed as is poſſible.

The way to poſſeſs themſelves of it, is to march up to it ſuddenly, and in as wide an order as is convenient; ſuddenly, that they may fire but once; and wide, that the execution may be the leſs. This is not to be done by a band of ſouldiers in order; for if they march any thing wide, they diſorder themſelves; and if they run on in a huddle, it will be no hard matter for the enemy to break them. And therefore I ordered my Battel ſo, that it might do both the one and the other; for having placed 1000 of the *Velites* in the wings, I commanded that as ſoon as our Artillery had fired, they ſhould advance with the light horſe, to ſeize upon their Cannon; for which reaſon our Artillery was ſhot off but once, and that the enemy might not have time to charge the ſecond time, and fire upon us again; for we could not take ſo much time our ſelves, but they would have had as much to do the ſame; wherefore the reaſon why I fired not my Cannon the ſecond time, was, that if the enemy fired once, they might not have leiſure to fire any more. To render therefore the enemies Artillery unſerviceable, the beſt remedy is to attack it with all poſſible ſpeed; for if the enemy deſerts it, 'tis your own; if he undertakes to defend it, he muſt advance before it, and then being betwixt it and us, they cannot fire but upon their own men. I ſhould think theſe reaſons ſufficient without farther examples; yet having plenty of them from the ancients, I will afford you ſome of them. *Ventidius* being to fight the *Parthians*, (whoſe ſtrength conſiſted principally in their bows and arrows) was ſo ſubtil as to let them come up cloſe to his Camp before he would draw out his Army, which he did, that he might charge them on a ſudden, before they had leiſure to ſhoot their arrows. *Cæſar* tells us, that when he was in *France*, being to engage with the enemy, he was charged ſo briskly, and ſo ſuddenly by them, that his men had not time to deliver their darts according to the cuſtome of the *Romans*. You ſee therefore that to fruſtrate a thing in the field which is to be diſcharged at a diſtance, and to prevent its doing you any hurt, there is no better way than to march up to it with all ſpeed, and poſſeſs it if you can. Another reaſon moved me likewiſe to fire my Artillery no more, which may ſeem trivial to you; yet to me it is not ſo contemptible. There is nothing obſtructs an Army, and puts it into greater confuſion than to take away, or hinder their ſight; for ſeveral great Armies have been broken and defeated by having their ſight obſtructed either with the duſt or the Sun: now there is nothing that cauſes greater obſcurity, or is a greater impediment to the ſight, than the ſmoke of Artillery; and therefore I think it more wiſdom to let the enemy be blind by himſelf, than for you to be blind too, and endeavour to find him. Theſe things conſidered, I would either not fire my Artillery at all, or elſe (becauſe that perhaps would not be approved, in reſpect of the reputation which thoſe great Guns have obtained in the World) I would place them in the wings of my Army, that when they fire, the ſmoke might not fly in the faces of my front, which is the flower and hopes of my Army. And to prove that to trouble the ſight of an enemy, is a thing of more than ordinary advantage; I need bring no more than the example of *Epaminondas*, who to blind the eyes of his enemy, before he advanced to charge them, cauſed his light horſe to gallop up and down before their front to raiſe the duſt, and hinder their ſight; which was done ſo effectually, that he got the Victory thereby. As to your opinion that I placed the enemies Cannon, and directed their bullets as I pleaſed, cauſing them to paſs over the heads of my foot, I anſwer, that greats Guns do without compariſon oftner miſs the Infantry, than hit them; becauſe the foot are ſo low, and the Artillery ſo hard to be pointed, that if they be placed never ſo little too high, they ſhoot over; and never ſo little too low, they graze, and never come near them. The inequality of the ground does likewiſe preſerve the foot very much; for every little hill or bank betwixt the artillery and them, ſhelters them exceedingly. As to the horſe, eſpecially the men at arms, becauſe their order is cloſer than the order of the light horſe, and they are to keep firmer in a body, they are more obnoxious to the Cannon, and are therefore to be kept in the rear of the Army, till the enemy has fir'd his

his Cannon. This is moſt certain, your ſmall Field-pieces, and your ſmall ſhot does more execution than your great pieces, againſt which the beſt remedy is to come to handy-blows as ſoon as you can; and though in the firſt ſome men fell, (as be ſure there always will); yet a good General and a good Army are not to conſider a particular loſs, ſo much as a General; but rather are to imitate the Swiſſers, who never refuſed a Battel for fear of great Guns, but puniſhed them with capital puniſhment who for fear of them forſook their ranks, or gave any other ſign or expreſſion of fear. I cauſed my Artillery to be drawn off as ſoon as I had fired them, that they might leave the field clear for my Battalions to advance; and I made no mention of them afterwards, as being quite uſeleſs when the Armies were joyned. You have ſaid likewiſe, that in reſpect of the violence and impetuoſity of thoſe Guns, many do judge the arms and the orders of the ancients to be altogether uſeleſs; and it ſeems by that, that the people of late have found out arms and orders which are ſufficient to ſecure them: if you know any ſuch thing, you will oblige me to impart it; for as yet I know none, nor can I believe that there is any to be found: So that I would know of them why the Infantry of our times do carry Corſlets of iron upon their breaſts, and the horſe are arm'd *Cap a pied*; for ſeeing they condemn the ancient way of arming as uſeleſs in reſpect of the Artillery, they may as well condemn what is practiſed now-a-days. I would underſtand likewiſe why the *Swizzers*, according to the cuſtom of the ancients, make their Battalions to conſiſt of ſix or eight thouſand foot; and why other Nations have imitated them, ſeeing that order is expoſed to the ſame danger (upon account of the Artillery) as others are. I think it cannot eaſily be anſwered, yet if you ſhould propoſe it to Souldiers of any judgment and experience, they would tell you firſt, that they go ſo arm'd, becauſe though their arms will not defend them againſt great Guns, yet they will ſecure them againſt ſmall ſhot, and pikes, and ſwords, and ſtones, and all ſuch things. They would tell you likewiſe that they keep that cloſe order like the Swiſſes, that they may more eaſily engage the enemies foot, that they may better ſuſtain their horſe, and put fairer to break them.

So that we ſee Souldiers are affraid of many things beſides Artillery, againſt which they are to provide by their arms, and their orders: from whence it follows, that the better an Army is armed, and the cloſer and ſtronger it is drawn up, the ſafer it is. So that whoever is of that opinion, is indiſcreet, or inconſiderate: for if we ſee that a ſmall part of the arms of the ancients which is uſed at this day, (as the Pike) and a ſmall part of their order (which are the Battalions of the Swiſſers) have been ſo ſerviceable, and contributed ſuch ſtrength to our Armies, why may we not believe that the other arms and orders which are laid aſide, might have been as beneficial and uſeful? Again, had we no regard to the Artillery in placing our ſelves in that ſtraight cloſe order like the Swiſſers, what other orders could make us more fearful? No order certainly can make us more fearful of the Artillery, than that which keeps men firm and cloſe together. Beſides, if I be not frighted by the Artillery of the enemy when I encamp before a Town, where they can fire upon me with more ſecurity, becauſe I cannot come at them by reaſon of the wall, nor hinder them, but by my own Cannon, which will be a buſineſs of time; if I be not affraid, (I ſay) where they can multiply their ſhot upon me as they pleaſe, why ſhould I fear them in the field where I can run upon them, and poſſeſs them immediately? So that I conclude Artillery, in my opinion, is no ſufficient impediment why we ſhould not uſe the methods of our anceſtors, and practiſe their virtue and courage. And had I not diſcourſed formerly with you about this ſubject, I ſhould have enlarged more; but I ſhall refer my ſelf to what I ſaid then.

Luigi. We have heard (or at leaſt it is our own faults if we have not) what you have diſcourſed about the Artillery; and that the beſt courſe that can be taken againſt it, is to make our ſelves maſters of it with as much expedition as we can, if our Army be in the field, and drawing up ready to engage. Upon which I have one ſcruple, becauſe to me it ſeems poſſible that the enemy may place his Artillery in the flanks of his Army, ſo as that it might offend you more, and yet be more capable of being defended. You have made (if you remember) in the ranging of your Army for a Battel, a ſpace of four yards from Company to Company, and another ſpace of twenty yards from the Battalia's to the Pikes extraordinary: if the enemy ſhould draw up his Army in your own way, and place his Cannon in thoſe intervals, I believe from thoſe places they might gaul you exceedingly, and with great difficulty, becauſe you could not enter into the enemies body to poſſeſs them.

Fabr. Your ſcruple is rational, and I will endeavour to diſcuſs it, or apply a remedy. I have told you that thoſe Battalia's are in continual motion, either for a battel, or a march, and do naturally ſo ſtraighten and cloſe themſelves, that if you make your intervals narrower where you place your Artillery, they will be cloſed up in a ſhort time, ſo as they will

not be able to do any execution. If you make your diſtances large, to avoid one danger, you incur a greater, by giving the enemy opportunity not only to poſſeſs himſelf of your Cannon, but to rout your whole Army. But you muſt underſtand it is impoſſible to keep your Artillery among your ſquadrons, eſpecially thoſe which are upon Carriages, becauſe being drawn one way, and their mouths lying the other, it is neceſſary to turn them before you can fire upon the enemy, and to turn them takes up ſo much ſpace, that fifty of thoſe Carriages are enough to diſorder a whole Army. So that it is neceſſary the Artillery be placed without their ſquadrons; and being ſo, they may be attacked, as is ſaid before. But let us ſuppoſe it might be placed within the ſquadrons, and that a way might be found out of retaining it in the middle, and that it ſhould not hinder the cloſing of their bodies, nor leave a way open to the enemy. I ſay that even in that caſe the remedy is eaſy, and that is by making ſpaces and intervals in your Army for the bullets to paſs; by which means the fury of their Artillery will become vain: and it will be no hard matter to do this, becauſe the enemy being deſirous that it may be ſecure, will place it behind in the fartheſt part of the intervals, ſo that to prevent their ſhot from doing miſchief among their own men, it is neceſſary that it paſs always in a right line, ſo that by giving place on your ſide, it is eaſily avoided. For this is a general rule, we muſt give place to any thing that we are not able to reſiſt, as the Ancients did to the Elephants, and forked Chariots. I believe, and am aſſured that you think I have ranged the Armies, and won the day; yet let me tell you, (if what I have told you already be inſufficient) it would be impoſſible for an Army ſo armed and ordered, not to beat in the very firſt encounter any other Army that ſhould be arm'd and ordered according to the method of our times; which many times affords but one front, without any bucklers, and ſo ill arm'd, that they are not able to defend themſelves againſt any enemy that is near them.

And for their way of drawing up, they do it in ſuch manner, that if they place their Battalia's in the flank one of another, they make their Army too thin; if they place them behind one another, not having the way of receiving them into one another, they are all in confuſion, and their ranks eaſily broken. And though they give three names to their Armies, and divide them into three Bodies, the Van-guard, Battaile, and Rear-guard, yet they ſerve only upon a march, and for diſtinction of quarters; but in a fight they are all at the mercy of fortune, and one ſmall charge defeats the whole Army.

Luigi. I have obſerved by the deſcription of the Battel, that your horſe were repulſed by the enemies horſe, and retired to your Pikes extraordinary, by whoſe aſſiſtance they not only ſuſtained the enemy, but beat him back again. I believe as you ſay, the Pikes may keep off the horſe in a cloſe and groſs body like that of the *Swizzers*; but in your Army you have but five ranks of Pikes in the front, and ſeven in the flank, ſo that I cannot ſee how your foot ſhould be able to ſuſtain them.

Fabr. Though I told you formerly that in the *Macedonian Phalanx* ſix ranks of Pikes could charge at one time, yet you muſt underſtand, that if a Battalion of *Swizzes* ſhould conſiſt of a thouſand ranks, there could charge at once not above four or five at the moſt; becauſe their Pikes being nine yards long, a yard and an half is taken up betwixt their hands; ſo that in the firſt rank they have free ſeven yards and an half. In the ſecond rank (beſides what is taken up betwixt their hands) a yard and half is conſumed betwixt one rank and the other, ſo as there remains but ſix yards that can be uſed. In the third rank for the ſame reaſons there remains but four yards and an half; in the fourth, three yards; and in the fift but one and an half. The other ranks therefore are not able to reach the enemy, yet they ſerve to recruit the firſt ranks, as we have ſaid before, and are as a rampart and bulwark to the other five. If then five of their ranks are ſufficient to ſuſtain the enemies horſe, why may not five of ours do as much, having other ranks behind to reinforce them, and give them the ſame ſupport, though their Pikes be not ſo long? And if the ranks of extraordinary Pikes which are placed in the flanks ſhould be thought too thin; they may be put into a ſquare, and diſpoſed in the flank by the two Battalia's which I place in the laſt ſquadron of the Army, from whence they may with eaſe relieve both the front or the rear, and give aſſiſtance to the horſe as occaſion requires.

Luigi. Would you always uſe this order when-ever you were to give the enemy Battel.

Fabr. No by no means; for the form of your Army is to be changed, according to the ſituation of the place, and the ſtrength or number of the enemy, as I ſhall ſhew by example before I finiſh my diſcourſe. But this form or model is recommended to you not as the beſt, (though in effect it is ſo) but as a rule from whence you may take your other orders, and by which you may underſtand the other ways of drawing up an Army; for every Science has its Generalities upon which it is moſt commonly founded. Only one thing I

would

would preſs upon you to remember, and that is, That you never draw your Army up ſo, as that your front cannot be relieved by your rear; for whoever is guilty of that error, renders the greateſt part of his Army unſerviceable, and can never overcome, if he meets with the leaſt oppoſition and courage.

Luigi. I have a new ſcruple that is riſen in my mind. I have obſerved that in the diſpoſing of your Battalia's, you make your front of five Battalia's drawn up by the ſides one of another; your middle of three; and your rear of two; and I ſhould think it would have been better to have done quite contrary; becauſe in my opinion an Army is broken with more difficulty, when the Enemy which charges it finds more firmneſs and reſiſtance the further he enters it; whereas it ſeems to me, that according to your order, the farther he enters it, the weaker he finds it.

Fabr. If you remembred how the *Triarii* (which were the third order of the *Roman* Legions) conſiſted only of 600 men, you would be better ſatisfied, when you underſtood they were placed always in the rear: for you would ſee that I according to that example, have placed two Battalia's in the rear, which conſiſt of 900 men; ſo that I chooſe rather in my imitation of the *Romans* to erre in taking more men than fewer. And though this example might be ſufficient to content you, yet I ſhall give you the reaſon, and it is this: The front of the Army is made thick and ſolid, becauſe it is that which is to endure the firſt ſhock and inſult of the Enemy; and being not to receive any recruits from elſewhere, it is convenient that it be well man'd, for a few would leave it too weak, and the ranks too thin. But the ſecond Squadron, being to receive its friends into it, before it is to engage with the Enemy; it is neceſſary that it has too great intervals, and by conſequence muſt conſiſt of a leſs number than the firſt: For ſhould it conſiſt of a greater number, or be but equal to the firſt, either there muſt be no ſpaces or intervals at all; which would occaſion diſorder; or by leaving of ſpaces, they would exceed the proportion of the firſt Squadron, which would make your Army look very imperfect. As to what you ſay touching the impreſſion of the Enemy, That the farther he enters your Army, the weaker he finds it, it is clearly a miſtake; for the Enemy cannot engage the ſecond body, before the firſt is fallen into it; ſo that he finds the middle Battalion rather ſtronger than weaker, being to fight both with the firſt and ſecond together. And it is the ſame thing when the Enemy advances to the laſt Squadron; for there he has to encounter not only two freſh Battalia's, but with all the Battalions united and entire: And becauſe this laſt Battalion is to receive more men, it is neceſſary the diſtances be greater, and by conſequence that their number be leſs.

Luigi. I am very well ſatisfied with what you have ſaid; but pray anſwer me this; If the five firſt Battalia's retire into the three Battalia's which are in the middle, and then thoſe eight into the two Battalia's in the rear, I cannot conceive it poſſible that the eight Battalia's firſt, and afterwards the ten, can be comprehended (when eight or ten) in the ſame ſpace as when they were but five.

Fabr. The firſt thing I anſwer is this, That the ſpace is not the ſame; for the five Battalia's in the front were drawn up with four ſpaces in the middle, which were cloſed up when they fell in with the three Battalia's in the midſt, or the two in the rear. Beſides there remains the ſpace betwixt the Battalions, and that alſo which is betwixt the Battalia's and the Pikes extraordinary; which ſpace altogether, do give them room enough.

To this it may be added, That the Battalia's take up another place when they are drawn up in order before their retreat, than they do after they are preſſed; for in their retreat, they either contract or extend their Orders. They open their orders, when they fly: they contract them when they retreat; ſo that in this caſe it would be beſt to contract. Beſides the five ranks of Pikes in the Van, having received the firſt charge, are to fall back thorow the Battalia's into the rear of the Army, and give way to the *Scudati* or Shields to advance; and thoſe Pikes falling into the rear of the Army, may be ready for any Service in which their Captain ſhall think fit to employ them; whereas, did they not retire after the Battel was joyned, they would be altogether uſeleſs. And by this means the ſpaces which were left to that purpoſe, are made big enough to receive all forces that are remaining. And yet if thoſe ſpaces were not ſufficient, the flanks on both ſides are men and not walls, which opening and enlarging their ranks, can make ſuch diſtances as will be able to receive them.

Luigi. The ranks of Pikes extraordinary which you place in the flank of your Army, when the Battalia's in the front fall back into the Battalia's in the middle, would you have them ſtand firm, and continue, as two wings to the Army, or would you have them retire with the Battalia's? If you were willing they ſhould, I do not ſee how it was poſſible, having no Battalia's (with intervals) behind them to give them reception.

Fabr. If when the Enemy forces the Battalia's to retire, he does not preſs them too hard, they may ſtand firm in their order, and flank the Enemy when the Battalia's in the front are retired. But if they be charged (as may be reaſonably expected) and the Enemy be ſo ſtrong as to force the other, they may retire with them, and that without difficulty, though there be no Battalia's behind with ſpaces to receive them; for the Body in the midſt may double to the right, and thruſt one file into another, as we ſhall ſhow more at large when we ſpeak of the manner of doubling of files. 'Tis true, to double in a retreat you muſt take another way than what I have deſcribed, for I told you the ſecond rank was to enter into the firſt, the fourth into the third, and ſo on: But here in this caſe we muſt not begin in the front, but in the rear, to the end that by doubling our ranks we may retreat, and not advance.

CHAP. VIII.

The Exerciſes of an Army in general.

Fabritio. TO anſwer now to whatever may be objected againſt my Battel, as I have drawn it up before you, I muſt tell you again that I have ordered and engaged it in that manner for two reaſons; one to ſhow you how it is to be drawn up; the other to ſhow you how it is to be exerciſed. As to the drawing up of an Army, I doubt not but you underſtand it very well; and as to the exerciſing, I muſt tell you, it ought to be done as often as is poſſible, that the Captains may learn to keep their Companies in theſe orders; for it belongs to every particular Souldier to keep the orders exact in every Battalia; and to every Captain to keep his Company exact with the order of the whole Army, and know how to obey the command of the General. It is convenient likewiſe that they underſtand how to joyn one Battalia with another, how to take their place in a moment; and therefore it is convenient that the Colours of each Company may have its number of Soldiers deſcribed in it; for the greater commodity of commanding them, and that the Captain and Soldiers may underſtand one another with the more eaſe; and as in the Battalia's, ſo it is convenient likewiſe in the Battalions, that their numbers ſhould be known, and deſcribed in the Colonel's Enſign: That you ſhould know the number of the Battalion in the left or right wing; as alſo of the Battalia's in the front, or the middle, and ſo conſequently of the reſt. It is convenient likewiſe that there be degrees of Offices and Commands to raiſe men as it were by ſteps, to the great honours of an Army. For example, The firſt degree ſhould be File-leaders, or Corporals; The ſecond ſhould have the command of fifty ordinary *Velites*; The third of a hundred, with the title of *Centurion*: The fourth ſhould command the firſt Battalia; the fift, the ſecond; the ſixt, the third; and ſo on to the tenth *Battalia*, whoſe place ſhould be next in honour to the Captain General of the *Battalion*, to which command no perſon ſhould be advanced, but he who has paſſed all thoſe degrees. And becauſe beſides theſe Officers, there are three *Conſtables* or Commanders of the Pikes extraordinary, and two of the *Velites* extraordinary, I did not much care if they were placed in the ſame quality with the Captain of the firſt *Battalia*, nor would it trouble me if ſix men more were preferred to the ſame degree, that each of them might put himſelf forward, and do ſome extraordinary thing to be preferred to the ſecond *Battalia*. If then each of theſe Captains underſtands in what place his *Battalia* is to be ranged, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that at the firſt ſound of the Trumpet (the Standard being erected) the whole Army will fall into its place. And this is the firſt exerciſe to which an Army is to be accuſtomed, that is to ſay, to cloſe and fall in one with another, to do which, it is convenient to train them often, and uſe them to it every day.

Luigi. What mark and difference would you appoint for the Standard of the whole Army, beſides the number deſcribed as aforeſaid?

Fabritio. The Lieutenant General's Enſign ſhould have the Arms of his General or Prince, and all the reſt ſhould have the ſame Arms with ſome variation in the Field or Colours, as the Prince ſhall think beſt, for it imports not much what their Colours are, ſo they diſtinguiſh one Company from another. But let us paſs to the other exerciſe, in which an Army is to be train'd; that is in its motions, to be taught how to march, advance, or fall back with exact diſtance and time, and to be ſure that in their marches a juſt order be obſerved. The third exerciſe is, Teaching them to manage their Arms, and charge, in ſuch a manner, as that afterwards they may do both dexterouſly when they come to fight; teaching them how to play their Artillery, and how to draw them off when there is

is occaſion; Teaching the *Velites* extraordinary to advance out of their places, and after a counterfeit charge, to retreat to them again. Teaching the firſt *Battalia's* (as if they were over-powered) to fall back into the intervals of the ſecond, and all of them afterwards into the third, and having done ſo, to divide again, and return to their old poſts; in ſhort, they are to be accuſtomed in this exerciſe, that every thing may be known and familiar to every Soldier, which with continual practice is eaſily obtained. The fourth exerciſe inſtructs your Soldiers in the uſefulneſs of the Drums, and Trumpets, and Colours, informing them of the commands of their Captain, by the beating of the one, the ſounding of the other, and the diſplaying and flouriſhing of the third: for being well uſed to them, they will underſtand what they are to do by them, as well as if they were directed by word of mouth: And becauſe the effect of theſe commands depend altogether upon theſe kind of ſounds, I ſhall tell you what kind of Inſtruments the Ancients made uſe of in their Wars. The *Lacedemonians* (if we may believe *Thucidides*) in their Armies made uſe of the Flute, conceiving that Harmony more apt to infuſe gravity than fury into their Soldiers. Induced by the ſame reaſon, the *Carthaginians* ſounded their charges upon the Harp; with which Inſtrument they began the fight. *Aliatte* King of *Lydia*, in his Wars made uſe of them both: But *Alexander* the Great, and the *Romans* uſed Horns and Trumpets, ſuppoſing the clangor and noiſe of thoſe Inſtruments would enflame the courage of their men, and make them more valiant in fight. But as in the arming of our Army, we have followed the way both of the *Greek* and the *Roman*; ſo in the choice of our Inſtruments of Intelligence, I would follow the Cuſtoms both of the one Nation and the other. I would have therefore the Trumpets placed by the Lieutenant-General as Inſtruments not only proper to excite and enflame your Army, but fitter to be heard, and by conſequence apter to derive your commands than any of the other. The reſt of thoſe kind of Inſtruments I would have placed about the Captains and Colonels of the Battalions: I would have alſo a ſmaller ſort of Drums and Flutes, which ſhould be beaten and played upon not as we do now in our fights, but as our Tabours and Flagelets do in our feaſts: The General with his Trumpets ſhould ſignifie when his Army is to make a ſtand, when to advance, when to wheel, when to retire, when to make uſe of the Artillery, when the *Velites* extraordinary are to move, and by the variation of the ſounds, to direct his Army in all the Marches and Counter-marches that are generally uſed; and I would have the Trumpets followed afterwards by the Drums. And becauſe this exerciſe is of great conſequence in an Army, it imports very much that it be frequently taught. As to the Horſe, they ſhould have Trumpets too, but of a leſſer and different ſound from thoſe about the Lieutenant-General. And this is all that has occurred to my memory in the ordering, and exerciſing of an Army.

Luigi. I beſeech you Sir, let me not trouble you too much, if I deſire to be ſatisfied in one thing more; and that is, for what reaſon you cauſed your light Horſe and *Velites* extraordinary to advance againſt the Enemy with great ſhouts and clamours, and crys; and when afterwards the Body and remainder of the Army came to charge, they did it with extraordinary ſilence? I confeſs I cannot comprehend the reaſon, and therefore I beg your explanation.

Fabr. The opinion of the ancient Generals have been different in that point, whether an Enemy was to be charged ſilently and without noiſe, or with all the clamour could be made: The ſilent way is beſt to keep your men firm in their orders, and to ſignifie the Commands of the General: but the obſtreperous way is beſt to excite the courage of your Soldiers, and diſmay the Enemy: and becauſe I thought in both caſes there was ſomething of advantage, I made uſe of them both, and cauſed thoſe to advance with clamour, and theſe with ſilence; for I cannot think that an univerſal and perpetual noiſe can be any advantage, becauſe it hinders orders from being derived, which is a moſt pernicious thing: nor is it likely that the *Romans* uſed thoſe ſhouts after the firſt ſhock, for Hiſtory tells us, that many times by the exhortation and encouragement of their Officers, the Souldiers which were flying, were ſtopped, and rallyed, and diſpoſed immediately into new Orders, which could not be, where the Officers could not have been heard.

THE

THE FOURTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

The conſiderations and ſubtleties to be uſed in the drawing up an Army to fight.

Luigi. SEeing the Victory has been ſo honourably obtained under my Conduct, I think it diſcretion to tempt fortune no farther, knowing how much ſhe is variable, and inconſtant. Wherefore my deſire is to reſign my Authority, and that *Zanobi* may take it upon him according the Order propoſed of transferring it to the youngeſt: and I know he will not refuſe that honour, (or rather trouble) both in complacency to me, and as being naturally the more couragious of the two; for he fears not to engage in theſe kind of conflicts, though there be as much likelyhood of his miſcarriage as conqueſt.

Zanobi. I ſhall refuſe no Office into which you ſhall put me, though I muſt needs ſay, I could more willingly have been an auditor; for your ſcruples and demands have hitherto given me more ſatisfaction, than any thing I could have objected my ſelf. But I think, *Seignor Fabritio*, it would be better if you proceed (provided your patience will ſerve, and that we do not tire you with our Ceremonies).

Fabritio. You rather oblige me Sir, for this variety of Interrogators, gives me to underſtand the vanity of your judgments and appetites. But is there any thing behind that you would have added to what has been ſpoken before?

Zanobi. There are two things of which I would willingly be ſatisfied before we paſs any farther. One is, whether you have any other way of drawing up an Army: The other is, what reflections or conſiderations a General is to have, before he comes to a Battel; and when any accident intervenes, how it is to be avoided.

Fabr. I ſhall endeavour to ſatisfie you, but not by anſwering diſtinctly to your demands; for whilſt I anſwer to one, it happens many times that I ſeem to anſwer to the other; I have told you how I would have my Army drawn up, that according to that model, any other figure may be taken, as the number of the Enemy, and the nature of your ground does require; for in that caſe, one is to act according to the condition both of the one and the other.

But take notice of this, That there is no way more dangerous, than to extend the front of your Army too much, unleſs it be very numerous and ſtrong: Otherwiſe you are to draw it up cloſe and thick, rather than wide and thin. For when your Forces are few in reſpect of the Enemy, you muſt look out for other remedies, as by drawing your Army up, ſo as it may be fortified by ſome River, or Fen, that may ſecure you behind; or fortified in the flanks by ſome ditch or entrenchment, as *Cæſar*'s was in *France*; and this ought to be a general rule to you, that you extend or contract your front according both to your own number, and the number of your Enemy. If the Enemy be not ſo numerous, and your men as well diſciplin'd as they, you are to make choice of an open place, where you may not only encompaſs the Enemy, but diſtend your own ranks: For in ſtraight and narrow places, not being able to make uſe of your orders, you cannot make uſe of your advantage. For this reaſon the *Romans* did moſt commonly make choice of open and cleer places, and avoided ſuch as were difficult and cloſe. But if your Army be ſmall, or your men inexperienced, you muſt do quite contrary (as I ſaid before) and muſt find out ſome place where your few men may defend themſelves, or where their inexperience may do you no hurt: In that caſe you are to chooſe ſome hill or eminence from whence you may come down upon the Enemy with more force; yet muſt you have this caution not to draw up your Army upon any Strand or Sea-coaſt, nor under the command of any hill,

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of which the Enemy may poſſeſs himſelf, becauſe you will be expoſed thereby to the Enemies Cannon without remedy, and be unable to do them miſchief with any convenience. In the drawing up an Army for Battel, great regard is likewiſe to be had to the ſun and the wind, that neither the one nor the other be in your face, for they are great impediments to your fight, one with its beams, and the other by raiſing the duſt, and carrying the powder into your eyes; beſides, the wind being contrary, is a great diſadvantage in rendring the blows which they give the Enemy more languid and weak; and as to the Sun, you muſt not only take care that it be not in your face, nor does you no prejudice in the beginning of the fight, but that it does you no injury when it gets up: wherefore the beſt way is when you draw up your men, to have it if poſſible on their backs, that many hours may paſs before it can come about into their faces.

Hanibal knew this advantage very well, and made uſe of it in the Battel of *Cannæ*, and *Marius* did the ſame againſt the *Cimbrians*. If you be weaker in Horſe, it is your beſt way to draw up among the Vines or the Woods, and ſuch other impediments, as in out times the *Spaniards* did when they beat the *Freneh* in the Kingdom of *Naples* near *Cirignuola*. And it has been many times ſeen that the ſame Soldiers which have been worſted and baffled before; by only changing their order, and ſhifting their ground, have recovered the Victory; Thus it was with the *Carthaginians*, who having been many times worſted by *Marcus Regulus*, were afterwards Victorious by the Conduct of *Xantippus* the *Lacedemonian*, who cauſed them to come down into the plain, where they might have room for their Horſe, and their Elephants, and by ſo doing they were too hard for the *Romans*.

According to the practice of the Ancients, I have obſerved, That all great Generals when they have known which quarter of the Enemy was the ſtrongeſt, and where they have fortified moſt; they have not oppoſed the ſtrongeſt part of their Army againſt it; but have choſe rather to confront it with the weakeſt of their diviſions, and with their ſtrongeſt attack the weakeſt of the Enemies. When afterwards they came to engage, they commanded the ſtrongeſt of their Squadrons that they ſhould not only ſtand firm, and receive the charge without making any advance, whilſt the weaker parts had orders to ſuffer themſelves to be overcome, and by giving ground gradually, to fall behind the rear of the Army. This Artifice procures two great diſorders to the Enemy. The firſt is, that the ſtrongeſt part of his Army is environ'd inſenſibly; the other is, that imagining their Victory certain by the retreat of their Enemy, they fall frequently into diſorder, which many times robs them of that Victory of which they thought themſelves ſo certain. *Cornelius Scipio* being in *Spain* againſt the *Carthaginians*, under the command of *Aſdrubal*; and knowing that *Aſdrubal* underſtood very well that in the drawing up his Army, he put the *Roman* Legions (which were the ſtrength and flower of his Army) in the midſt, and that *Aſdrubal* in probability would do the like. When they came afterwards to fight, he changed his order, put his Legions in the Wings, and his light arm'd men in the body; when the Battel was joyned, he commanded his Body to ſlacken their march on a ſudden, and the Wings to double their pace; ſo that only the Wings on both ſides engaged, and the Bodies on both ſides being at a diſtance one from the other, came not up to one another, and the ſtrongeſt part of *Scipio*'s Army, fighting better than the weakeſt of *Aſdrubal*'s, he overcame them. In thoſe days that ſtratagem was well enough; but in our days by reaſon of our Artillery, it is unpracticable; for the ſpace which would be left betwixt the two Bodies would give opportunity to the Artillery to play, which as we ſaid before, would be very dangerous: So then that way is to be laid aſide; and the way which I recommended before is to be uſed, which is to charge with your whole Army, and let your weakeſt Squadrons retire. When a General finds his Army ſtronger than his Enemies, if he would encompaſs it inſenſibly, and that the Enemy may not prevent him, let him draw up his Army to an equal front with the adverſary: afterwards in the heat of the fight let him order them by little and little to retire in the front, and let the Wings advance as gradually, and it will always happen that the Enemy ſhall be encompaſſed before he is aware.

When a General would fight, and be ſure not to be routed, let him draw up his Army near ſome place of retreat or ſecurity, as either Fens, Mountains, or ſome ſtrong inexpugnable Town; for in that caſe he may purſue the Enemy, but the Enemy cannot purſue him. *Hanibal* made uſe of this cunning when his fortune began to decline, and he began to apprehend the Conduct of *Marcellus*. Some Generals to diſturb the orders of the Enemy, have commanded their light armed men to begin the Battel, and when it is once joyned, to retire among the ranks. When afterwards it grows hotter, and both ſides are thorowly engaged, they have had orders to draw forth out of the flanks of the Army, and having flanked the Enemy unexpectedly, they have diſordered and broke him. If any

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one finds himſelf weaker in Horſe, beſides the ways propoſed before, he may place a Battalia of Pikes behind them, and draw them up in ſuch manner, that in the heat of the Battel they may open, and give way for the Pikes to paſs thorow them, and by ſo doing, he ſhall be ſure to prevail. Several have accuſtomed their light armed men to fight among their Horſe, and they have been found to give the Horſe very good aſſiſtance.

Of all thoſe who are famous for drawing up Battels, *Hanibal* and *Scipio* are the moſt renowned for the great skill that both of them expreſſed in their conflict in *Affrica*; but becauſe *Hanibal*'s Army was compoſed of *Carthaginians*, and Auxiliaries of ſeveral Nations, he placed 80 Elephants in his front; behind them he placed his Auxiliaries, next them his *Carthaginians*, and laſt of all his *Italians*, in whom he could not ſafely confide: and the reaſon why he ordered them ſo, was becauſe the Auxiliaries having the Enemy in their faces, and finding themſelves cloſed up with *Carthaginians* at their backs, ſhould not think of flying, but being under a neceſſity to fight, he did hope they might either overcome, or ſo harraſs the Enemy, that when he came up with his freſh men, he might the more eaſily overthrow them. Againſt this order *Scipio* placed his *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii* in his accuſtomed manner, ſo as upon occaſion they might be received one into the other.

The front of his Army he made up with great ſpaces, but that it might appear cloſe and united to the Enemy, he filled them up with his *Velites*, with order that as ſoon as the Elephants came upon them, they ſhould retire, and entring among the Legions by the ordinary ſpaces, leave a way open for the Elephants to paſs, by which means the fury and execution of the Elephants being evaded, they came preſently to handy-blows, and the *Carthaginians* were overcome.

Zanobi. In your deſcription of the fight, you have cauſed me to remember how *Scipio* in the engagement cauſed not his *Haſtati* to retire into the ranks of the *Principes*, but divided them, and cauſed them to retire into the Wings of the Army to give place to the *Principes* when they were to advance againſt the Enemy: I would know therefore for what reaſon he differed from the ordinary cuſtom.

Fabritio. I will tell you: *Hanibal* had placed the ſtrength of his Army in the ſecond diviſion; ſo that *Scipio* to oppoſe them with equal courage, united the *Principes* and the *Triarii* together, inſomuch as the intervals of the *Principes* being filled up by the *Triarii*, there was no ſpaces left for the reception of the *Haſtati*; wherefore he cauſed the *Haſtati* to open to the right and left, and fall in with the Wings of the Army. But you muſt obſerve that this way of dividing the firſt Squadron, is not to be uſed but when the other is Superior; for then you may do it conveniently, as *Scipio* did; but being inferiour or under any repulſe, it is not to be done without manifeſt danger, and therefore it is neceſſary that you have ſpaces behind in your other Squadrons that may be ready to receive you.

But to return to our diſcourſe. The ancient *Aſians* among other contrivances to miſchief their Enemy, made uſe of certain Chariots with Sythes faſtned to the Sides of them, which ſerved not only to open the Squadrons of the Enemy with their force, but to cut and kill them with their Sythes. Againſt theſe Chariots, they had three ways to defend themſelves; either by the cloſeneſs of their ranks, or by receiving them into their ranks (as they did the Elephants) or by ſome other vigorous reſiſtance, as *Silla* the *Roman* did againſt *Archelaus*, who had ſtore of thoſe Chariots; to repel them *Silla* cauſed ſeveral ſtakes to be pitched into the ground before his firſt Squadron, which putting a ſtop to the carreer of the ſaid Chariots, prevented the execution which they would otherwiſe have done. And it is obſervable the new method that *Silla* uſed in ranging his Army; for placing his *Velites* and light Horſe behind; and all his compleat arm'd Soldiers before, he left intervals ſufficient to receive them which were behind when they had occaſion to march up; ſo that the fight being begun, by the aſſiſtance of the Horſe (who had room to paſs thorow the firſt Squadron to the charge) he obtained the Victory.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

The arts which are to be uſed during the Fight.

Fabr. TO diſturb the Army of the enemy when the Battel is joyned, it is neceſſary to invent ſome way or other to affright them, either by ſpreading a report of ſupplies that are hard by, or counterfeiting ſome repreſentation of them that may diſmay the enemy, and facilitate their defeat.

Minutius Ruffus, and *Acillus Glabrio* two of the Roman Conſuls were skilful in this art. *Caius Sulpitius* cauſed all the boys and refuſe of his Army to mount upon mules and other beaſts that were unſerviceable in fight, and placed them at a diſtance upon a hill, and drawn up in ſuch order that they appeared like a compleat body of horſe, when he was engaged with the French, and the enemies apprehenſion of that body got *Sulpitius* the Victory. *Marius* made uſe of the ſame ſtratagem when he fought againſt the *Germans*: if then theſe falſe alarms and repreſentations are of ſuch uſe and advantage in time of Battel, true ones muſt needs be more efficacious, eſpecially if they fall upon the enemies flank or rear whilſt the battel is joyned: which indeed is not eaſy to be done, unleſs the nature of the Country contributes; for if it be open and plain, you cannot conceal any part of your Forces, as is neceſſary to be done in thoſe caſes; but in woody or mountainous Countries you may conceal ſome of your Troops in ſuch manner as they may fall ſuddenly and unexpectedly upon the enemy, which will give you a certain Victory. It is many times of great importance to ſpread a rumour abroad during the Fight, that the enemies General is ſlain, or that he is beaten in another part of the Army, which (as the other) has many times been the cauſe of a Victory. The enemies horſe are often diſordered by the repreſentation of ſtrange figures, or the making of ſome unuſual noiſe, as *Cræſus* did, who oppoſed camels againſt horſe; and *Pyrrhus* when he confronted their Cavalry with his Elephants; the ſtrangeneſs of which ſight affrighted them ſo, that nothing was ſtrong enough to keep them from diſorder. In our days the Turk defeated the *Sophi* of *Perſia*, and the *Soldan* of *Syria* only with the noiſe of his Guns, which being unuſual to their horſe, diſordered them in ſuch manner, that the Turk got the Victory without any great trouble. The Spaniards to diſtract the Army of *Amilcar*, placed in the front of their Army certain Chariots filled with flax, and drawn by oxen, to which flax (when the enemy came up to charge) they put fire, and the oxen running from the fire, ruſh'd furiouſly into the Army of *Amilcar*, and put it to the rout. It is an unuſual practice (as we have ſaid before) to ſurprize and diſturb the enemy with ambuſcades where the Country is convenient: but where it is open and large, many have made great holes in the ground, and covered them with ſtraw and earth lightly, leaving certain ſpaces ſolid and firm for their own retreat; over which having retired cunningly in the heat of the fight, the enemy purſuing, has fallen in, and been ruined. If during the fight any ill accident happens that may diſcourage your Souldiers, 'tis prudence to diſſemble it, and turn it to advantage, as *Tullus Hoſtilius* did, and *Lucius Scilla* who obſerving in the heat of the Battel a party of his Troops go over to the enemy, to the great diſheartening of the reſt, cauſed it to be publiſhed quite thorow his Army that it was done by his order, which not only diſpelled the apprehenſion that was among them, but encouraged them in ſuch manner that it got him the Victory. *Silla* having commanded out a party upon ſome enterprize, and all of them being killed in ſight of his Army, that the reſt might not be terrified, told them he ſent them on purpoſe, becauſe he had found them unfaithful. *Sertorius* fighting a battel in *Spain*, ſlew one of his own men, who brought him news that one of his great Officers was killed, and the reaſon was, leſt telling it to the reſt, it might poſſibly have diſcouraged them. It is no eaſy matter to detain an Army, (if it be once tottering and inclining to run) and to bring it to fight again: but you muſt conſider it with this diſtinction, either it is wholly diſordered, and then it is impoſſible to recover it; or elſe it is diſordered but in part, and there is ſome remedy. Many of the Roman Generals have ſtop'd the flight of their Armies by putting themſelves at the head of them, and as it were upbraiding them by their cowardize. *Lucius Silla* ſeeing part of his Troops routed, and purſued by the forces of *Mithridates*, rode up to the head of them with his ſword in his hand, and cryed out to them, *If any body ask you where you have left your General, tell him you left him fighting in* Boetia. *Attilius* the Conſul oppoſed thoſe who fought bravely againſt thoſe who ran away; telling them that if they did not face about, they ſhould be killed by their friends as well as their enemies. *Philip* King of *Macedon* underſtanding that his Souldiers were affraid of the *Sythians*, placed be-

hind his Army certain of the faithfulleſt of his horſe, with commiſſion to kill any man that fled; ſo that his men chooſing to die rather fighting than flying, overcame their adverſaries. Several of the Roman Generals have wreſted an Enſign out of the hands of their Souldiers, and throwing it among the enemy, promiſed a reward to him who ſhould recover it; and this they did not ſo much to hinder the flight of their own men, as to give them occaſion of doing ſome greater exploit upon the enemy.

CHAP. III.

Stratagems after the Fight.

Fabr. I Do not think it impertinent to add to this diſcourſe ſuch things as happen after the Fight, eſpecially ſeeing they are but ſhort, and not to be omitted becauſe they are conformable to the matter which we have in hand. But ſince one of theſe two things muſt happen, either that we gain the Victory, or loſe it; I ſay, that when we gain it, we are to purſue it with the greateſt diligence we can, and rather imitate *Cæſar* in this caſe than *Hanibal*, who for not following his Victory, and puſhing it on after he had defeated the Romans at *Cannas*, loſt the whole Empire of the *Romans*, which fortune had almoſt thruſt into his hands. *Cæſar* on the other ſide never reſted after a Victory, but followed the enemy with greater fury than he attacked them at firſt. But when the day is loſt, a wiſe General is to conſider the beſt that he can make of it, eſpecially if there be any thing of his Army remaining.

The advantage that may ariſe, is from the inadvertency of the enemy, who many times tranſported with his ſucceſs, grows negligent and remiſs, and gives opportunity to the enemy to revenge himſelf, as *Martius* the Roman did upon the Carthaginian Army, who having ſlain the two *Scipio*'s, and routed their forces, not valuing thoſe which remained, were ſuddenly aſſaulted and broken; for it is frequently ſeen, nothing is perpetrable ſo eaſily, as what the enemy fancies you can never attemp; for commonly men ſuffer moſt, where they are moſt ſecure. A General therefore, when he cannot carry the Victory, is to endeavour with all poſſible induſtry that his loſs may be as little as may be; and to do this, it is neceſſary to order things ſo that the enemy may not eaſily purſue, or be in a capacity to retard you.

As to the way of hindering the purſuit of the Conqueror; ſeveral Generals, as ſoon as they found their condition, and that it was not poſſible to continue the Fight, have ordered their inferior Commanders to ſeparate, and fly in ſeveral parties, and meet again at a place which he aſſigned; and the enemy not daring to divide his Army for fear of a deſign, has let all, or the greateſt part of the conquered eſcape. Others have thrown the beſt of their goods in the way, that the enemy following might be delayed by the prize, and ſuffer them to get off. *Titus Dimius* uſed no ſmall art to conceal the loſs which he had ſuſtained in the fight; for having endured the brunt of the Battel from morning till night with the loſs of many of his men; when night came, he cauſed moſt of them to be buried privately: the next morning the enemy finding ſo many of their own men dead, and ſo few of the *Romans*, concluded themſelves beaten, and fled. And now I ſuppoſe (though confuſedly) I have in ſome meaſure ſatisfied your demands.

CHAP. IV.

Two other ways of ranging an Army to fight.

Fabr. TIs true, as to the form and model of drawing up an Army to fight, it remains that I let you know that ſometimes ſome Generals have drawn them up in the figure of a wedge pointing in the front, ſuppoſing it the propereſt way to pierce, and make an impreſſion upon the enemy. In oppoſition to this, the way was for the adverſary to draw up in the figure of a pair of ſhears, which being opened, were to receive the point of the wedge, encloſe it, and charge it on all ſides. And about this, let me recommend to you this General rule, that the beſt remedy to be uſed againſt the deſign of an enemy, is to do that bravely of your ſelf, to which you perceive he would endeavour to force you: for doing it voluntarily you do it orderly, and to your own profit and advantage; whereas

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if you do it by conſtraint, you do it to your ruine. I will not repeat any thing that I have ſaid before, to confirm my diſcourſe. But this is moſt certain, if your adverſary thinks to open, and as it were cleave your Army with his wedge, if you keep your Army open in the figure of the ſhears, and receive them in the middle, you cut them to pieces, and they can do you no hurt.

Hanibal placed his Elephants in the front of his Army, thinking thereby to have pierced the Army of *Scipio* with more eaſe; but *Scipio* ranging his men in the form of a pair of ſhears, and receiving him in an open poſture, gain'd the Victory, and *Hanibal* was loſt.

Asdrubal placed the beſt and ſtrongeſt of his men in the front of his Army to make the better charge upon the enemy; *Scipio* commanding his middle men in the front to retreat inſenſibly, and give place, was ſo cunningly obeyed, that the enemy was drawn in, and defeated: ſo that you ſee thoſe deſigns are many times the occaſion of his Victory againſt whom they are deſigned.

CHAP. V.

Of the conſtraint and advantage a man may have to fight.

Fabr. IF my memory does not fail, it remains yet that I ſay ſomething touching the things which a wiſe General is to conſider before he comes to an engagement. And the firſt thing I ſhall ſay upon this ſubject is, that a General is never to come to a Field-fight unleſs he be conſtrained, or has ſome more than ordinary advantage. His advantage may lye in the nature of the Place, in the diſcipline of his Army, or the number or excellence of his Men. And his neceſſity conſiſts in finding his condition ſuch, that without fighting he muſt be certainly deſtroyed: as where money is wanting, where victuals are defective, and where the enemy is in expectation of ſupplies: in theſe caſes a General is always to venture, though he fights upon diſadvantage; for 'tis better fighting where fortune may favour you, than not to try her at all, and be certainly ruined; and in this caſe it would be as great a fault in a General not to fight, as it would be if he had an opportunity of defeating his adverſary, and was either too ignorant to know it, or too cowardly or delatory to make uſe of it. The advantages which occur in the conduct of war do many times proceed from the enemy, and ſomtimes from your own prudence. Many have been ſurprized and routed in their paſſage over Rivers, by the dexterity of the enemy, who having forborn them till half of them were over, have fallen ſuddenly upon them, and put them to the rout, as *Cæſar* ſerved the *Swizzers* when he cut off a fourth part of their Army, by reaſon that they were ſeparated by a River. Sometimes it happens that your enemy is tired, and weary, having followed you with too much haſte and inconſideration; and in that caſe finding your own Army vigorous and ſtrong, you are not to loſe your opportunity. Beſides, if your enemy preſents you Battel in the morning betimes, you are not immediately to draw out your Army and fight him, but are rather to protract and ſpin out the time for ſome hours, (ſtill offering and pretending to come forth) that their impatience of delay, or ſtanding ſo long to their arms, may rebate the fury with which they came; and as ſoon as you find them cool, and off of their firſt ardor, then you may come forth, and charge them as ſmartly as you can. *Scipio* and *Metellus* made uſe of this way in *Spain*, the one againſt *Aſdrubal*; the other againſt *Sertorius*. If the enemy has leſſened his power by dividing his Army, (as *Scipio* did in *Spain*) or by any other occaſion, then alſo a good General may try his fortune with credit.

The greateſt part of the graveſt Generals have choſen rather to receive than give the charge, becauſe the fury of an enemy is eaſily ſuſtained by thoſe who ſtand firm and cloſe in their ſtation; and being once check'd, it turns into cowardize. *Fabius* being ſent againſt the *Samnites* and the *Gauls*, received their fury with that indiſcompoſednes and tranquility, that he conquered them both, but *Decius* his Colleague not following his example, miſcarried, and was ſlain. Some who have been poſſeſſed too much of the courage of their enemy, have choſe to begin the Fight in the evening towards night, that their Army being worſted, might get off, or defend themſelves by the benefit of the darkneſs. Others underſtanding the ſuperſtition of the enemy, and that on certain days they devote themſelves wholly to Religion, and will not endeavour to fight, have choſen that time to attack them, and have carried the Victory. *Cæſar* made uſe of this way againſt *Arioviſtus* in *France*, and *Veſpatian* did the ſame in *Syria* againſt the *Jews*, who upon their Sabbath would not ſo much as defend themſelves againſt the *Romans*.

CHAP. VI.

Directions for a General.

Fab. THere is nothing of more importance to the General of an Army, than to have about him persons that are faithful, experienced in war, and prudent in counsel, with whom he may constantly advise, and confer both about his own men, and the enemy; as which is the most numerous, which the best arm'd, which the best mounted, which the best exercised, which the most patient of labour and distress, and whether the horse or the foot are to be relied upon most.

The next thing to be considered is the place where he is, whether it be more advantagious for the enemy than for him; which is most easily supplyed with provisions; whether it be best to fight presently, or protract; and what he may gain or suffer thereby: for many times the Souldiers disgusted at the tediousness of the war, grow lazy and remiss, and coming at length to be weary, they either grow mutinous, or run away. But above all things, I would advise a General to inform himself of the nature and qualification of his adversary the enemies General, whether he be rash, or wary, and what counsel he has about him. The next thing he is to consider is, whether he can confide in his Auxilliaries or not: and be sure never to bring his Army to a Battel, if he finds them under any apprehension, or with the least distrust of the Victory; for the greatest sign of miscarriage, is despair, and when they think it impossible to prevail. In this case therefore you are to avoid fighting either by following the example of *Fabius Maximus*, (who encamped his Army in places of such advantage, that *Hanibal* durst not attack him) or else if you suspect the enemy will venture upon you in your entrenchments, and that you shall not be able to defend them, your best way will be to remove, divide your Army, and dispose them in parties into several Towns, that the tediousness of a siege, and length of time, which will be required, may discourage the enemy.

Zanobi. Is there no other way of avoiding a Battel, but to divide your Troops, and to dispose them into several Towns?

CHAP. VII.

Which way a Battel is to be avoided, though pressed never so earnestly by the enemy.

Fabr. IF I be not mistaken I have discoursed to some of you before, how he that is in the field cannot avoid fighting when pressed by an enemy who will fight upon any terms; and that the best way he can take, is to keep himself at fifty miles distance, that he may have time to remove when he hears of his advance. *Fabius Maximus* did not refuse fighting with *Hanibal*, but would fight at his own time, and advantage; and *Hanibal* was too wise to attack him, where he was sure he could do no good; for had he believed he could have conquered him, *Fabius* would have been constrained to have fought him, or fled. *Philip* King of *Macedon*, Father of *Perseus*, being at war with the Romans, posted his Army upon an high mountain, that he might not be compelled to fight; but the *Romans* assaulted, and defeated him. *Cingentorix* General of the *Gauls* to avoid fighting with *Cæsar* who had passed a river contrary to his expectation, quitted the Country, and march'd away with his Army. The Venetians in our times, if they had had no mind to have fought the French King, they should not have staid till his Army had passed the *Adda*, but have removed farther off, as *Cingentorix* did before them; but they staid so long that they had time neither to draw up handsomely to fight, nor to make their retreat; for the French were so near before the Venetians dislodged, that the French fell upon them, and put them to the rout. So then by what I have said, it is manifest that a Battel cannot be avoided, when the enemy presses it upon any disadvantage; and let not any body tell me of *Fabius*, for *Hanibal* refused to fight in that case as much as he.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

How Souldiers are to be encouraged to fight; and how they are to be cooled and asswaged when their courage is too high.

Fabr. IT many times happens that your Souldiers are impatient to be fighting, but if you do not find it convenient in respect of the number of your Army, the disadvantage of the place, or some other consideration, you would do well to turn them from that inclination. It happens again that necessity or occasion constrains you to fight when your Souldiers are diffident or averse: in one case it is necessary that you affright them, in the other that you excite them. In the first case, when remonstrances and exhortations will do no good, the best way is to suffer some of them to be cut off by the enemy, that those who have fought, and those who have not, may believe you another time. What *Fabius Maximus* did by accident, may be done on purpose, and by art. You know the Army of *Fabius* was very fierce to be fighting with *Hanibal*, and his Master of the Horse was of the same mind with the Army: *Fabius* was of another opinion, and thought it better to protract; and this diversity of opinions occasioned the dividing of the Army: *Fabius* kept his division in his trenches, the Master of the Horse went out, fought, was worsted, and had certainly been cut off, had not *Fabius* relieved him; by which example the Master of the Horse, and the whole Army were convinced that their wisest way was to have obeyed the orders of *Fabius*. As to the other point of animating your Souldiers, and raising their courages to a pitch, it is good to incense them by possessing them of the contumacy and insolence of the enemy: by pretending intelligence among them, and that you have corrupted a considerable party; by posting your Army so near them, that they may see one another, and skirmish with them slightly every day, (for things which are done daily, we easily despise) by counterfeiting your self angry, and in a solemn and grave oration reprehending and upbraiding their backwardness, and telling them, that if they leave you, you will charge the enemy alone. But to make your Souldiers bold and couragious, you are by no means to permit any of them to send any thing to their own houses (or to deposit it any where else) till the war be done, that they may know that though in running home they may save their lives, yet it must be with the loss of their prize; the love of which renders people commonly as valiant as the love of their lives.

Zanobi. You say that Souldiers may be encouraged, and disposed to fight, by a speech or oration: do you intend it should be delivered to the whole Army, or only to the Officers?

CHAP. IX.

A General ought to be skilful and eloquent to perswade or disswade as he sees occasion.

Fabr. IT is an easy matter to perswade or disswade any thing with a small number of persons, because if words will not do, you have force and authority to back them: but the difficulty is to remove an opinion out of the heads of the multitude when it is contrary to your own judgment, or the interest of the publick; for there you can use nothing but words, which must be heard and understood by every body, if you would have every body convinced. For this reason it is requisite an excellent General should be a good Orator, to inflame or asswage the courage of his Souldiers as he has occasion; for unless they can tell how to speak to a whole Army, there is little good to be expected; and yet in our times this way of haranguing them is quite laid alide. Look over the Life of *Alexander* the Great, and see how often he was put to it to speak in publick to his Army; and had he not done it, he would never have been able to have conducted it (when laden with so much riches and prey) thorow the desarts of *Arabia*, and in *India*, where it endured so much misery and distress; for there is scarce a day but something or other happens that causes confusion and ruine to an Army where the General is either ignorant or careless of speaking to them. The way of making speeches to them takes away their fear, quickens their courage, augments their confidence, discovers their cheats, secures their rewards, remonstrates their dangers, and the ways to avoid them. In short, by those kind of Orations a General reprehends, entreats, threatens, encourages, commends, reproaches, and

and does every thing that may either enhance, or depreſs the paſſions of his men; wherefore that Prince, or that Common-wealth that ſhould deſign to eſtabliſh a new Militia, and give it a reputation, is to accuſtome his Souldiers to the harangues of their chief Officers, and to chuſe ſuch Officers as know how to accoſt them.

CHAP. X.

Certain conſiderations which encourage Souldiers, and make them as virtuous as valiant.

Fabritio. THe worſhip which the ancients paid to their Gods (though they were falſe) Religion, and the oath which was taken before they were liſted in the Army, was in thoſe days ſufficient to keep their Souldiers to their duty; for upon every miſdemeanor they were threatned not only with ſuch puniſhments as they were to expect from their Officers, but ſuch as could be inflicted (as they thought) by nothing but their Gods; which opinion being tempered with other religious ceremonies and ſuperſtitions, made all enterprizes eaſy to the Generals of thoſe times, and would do ſo ſtill, were we as careful and obſervant of our Religion as they were of theirs. *Sertorius* knew how to make his advantage that way, pretending conference with a white Hart, which (as he gave out among his Souldiers) came from Heaven to aſſure him of Victory. *Silla* to make his deſigns the more credible, pretended to diſcourſe with an Image that he had taken out of the Temple of *Apollo*, which directed him how he was to ſteer. Others have pretended dreams and viſions that have commanded them to fight: in the days of our Fathers, *Charles* the Seventh of *France* during his wars with the Engliſh, pretended to be adviſed by a maid that was ſent from Heaven to give him inſtructions, which maid was called the *Pucelle d'Orleans*, and gained him many a Victory. There are other ways of making an enemy contemptible; *Ageſilaus* the *Spartan* having taken ſeveral *Perſians*, ſtrip'd them naked, and ſhew'd them to his men, to the end that ſeeing the delicacy and tenderneſs of their contexture, they might have leſs occaſion to fear them. Some have by deſign brought their men into extremity, that they might be neceſſitated to fight, as having taken from them all hopes of preſervation, but in Victory; which indeed is the ſureſt and beſt way to make your Souldiers fight, and to infuſe courage into them, and then this courage and obſtinacy is highly encreaſed by their confidence in their General, and their love to their Country. Their love to their Country is natural; their confidence in their Captain is more from his experience and conduct, than from any thing elſe. There may be many other obligations, but none ſo ſtrong as that which binds you either to conquer, or dye.

THE

THE FIFT BOOK.

CHAP. I.

How the Romans *marched in an Enemies Country, and in what manner they are to be imitated.*

Fabr. I Have ſhown you how an Army is drawn up and marſhalled in order to a Battel; I have told you how an Enemy is overcome, and ſeveral circumſtances which occur therein. So that it is time now to inform you how an Army is to be ordered, which has not an Enemy in view, but is in continual probability of an aſſault: This may happen when an Army marches in an Enemies Country, or at leaſt a Country that is ſuſpected. And firſt you muſt underſtand the *Roman* Armies had always ſome Troops of Horſe which were ſcouting abroad in order to the diſcovery of the Roads. After which followed the right Wing, and after them the Carriages which belonged to that Squadron: Then followed a Legion, and after them their Carriages. Then another Legion and their Carriages; and after them the left Wing, and the remainder of the Cavalry after them. This in ſhort was the manner in which the *Romans* marched moſt commonly; and if it hapned in their march that their Army was aſſaulted either in the front or the rear, they cauſed all their Carriages to withdraw to the right wing or the left, as they found it convenient, and moſt agreeable with the nature of the place; and then when they were cleared of their Baggage, and diſincumber'd, all of them unanimouſly make head againſt the Enemy. If they were aſſaulted in the flank, they drew their Carriages on that ſide where they were like to be moſt ſafe, and then addreſſed themſelves againſt the Enemy.

This way being good and well govern'd, ought in my judgment to be imitated, by ſending your light Horſe to ſcout about the Country, and having four Battalions of Foot, they are to follow one the other ſucceſſively, each of them with its Carriages in the rear: And becauſe Carriages are of two ſorts, one belonging to particular perſons, and others for the common uſe of the Camp, I would divide the publick Carriages into four parts, and aſſign one to every Battalion; I would likewiſe divide the Artillery, and the followers of the Camp into four parts, that each Battalion ſhould have equal ſhare in their impediments and Carriages. But becauſe it happens many times that you march thorow a Country not only ſuſpected, but ſo openly your Enemy, that you expect every hour to be aſſaulted; it will be neceſſary that to ſecure your ſelf you change the form of your march, and put your ſelf into ſuch a poſture, as that neither the Paiſants, nor the Enemies Army may be able to offend you, though they come upon you never ſo ſuddenly. In theſe caſes your Generals of old were wont to march in a ſquare order, which they called a ſquare; not that it was exactly of that figure, but becauſe it was ordered ſo, as it was able to fight in four places at once, and by that means they were always ready either to march or to fight. I ſhall follow this model for ordering my two Battalions which I have choſen to that purpoſe in ſtead of a compleat Army.

CHAP. II.

How an Army is to be marſhalled to march in an Enemies Country.

Fabr. TO march (therefore) ſecurely in an Enemies Country, and to be able to make good every part when ſurprized and aſſaulted by the Enemy, I am to reduce my Army into a ſquare according to the model of the ancients; I would have a ſquare whoſe area, or vacuity within ſhould conſiſt of 212 yards, in this manner; I would firſt place my flanks diſtant one from the other 212 yards; I would have five Battalia's in each flank marching length ways in files, and at three yards diſtance the one Battalia from the other; ſo that each Company taking up forty yards, all of them together (with the ſpaces betwixt them) ſhall take up 212 yards. Between the front and the rear of theſe two flanks, I would diſpoſe the other ten Companies, in each of them five; ordering them ſo that four of them ſhould be placed in the front of the right flank, and four in the rear of the left flank, leaving a ſpace of four yards betwixt each Company, and of the two Companies that are left, I would have one placed at the head of the left flank, and the other in the rear of the right. And becauſe the ſpace betwixt one flank and the other conſiſts of 212 yards, and theſe Battalia's drawn ſideways in breadth rather than length, will take up (intervals and all) 134 yards, there will remain a ſpace of 78 yards betwixt the four Companies in the front of the right flank, and the ſame ſpace will be poſſeſſed by the four Companies in the rear; nor will there be any difference but that one ſpace will be behind towards the right wing, and the other before towards the left. In the ſpace of 78 yards before, I would put my ordinary *Velites* in the ſpace behind, my *Velites* extraordinary, which would not amount to a thouſand for each ſpace. But to contrive it ſo, that the great ſpace within ſhould conſiſt of 212 yards ſquare, it would be convenient that the five Companies which are placed in the front, and the five Companies in the rear ſhould take up none of that ſpace which belongs to the flanks; wherefore it is neceſſary that the five Companies behind ſhould with their front touch the rear of the flanks, and thoſe five Companies in the Van, with their rear ſhould touch the front of the flanks; ſo that there ſhould remain on each ſide of the Army, a diſtance ſufficient to receive another Company. And becauſe there are four ſpaces, I would take four Enſigns of the Pikes extraordinary, and place one in each of them, and the two Enſigns which would remain, I would place in the midſt of the ſpace of my whole Army in a ſquare Battalion; at the head of which, the General of the Army ſhould ſtand with his Officers about him: But becauſe theſe Battalia's thus ordered, do march all of them one way at once, but do not ſo when they fight; when they are drawn up, thoſe ſides are to be put into a fighting poſture, which are not guarded by other Battalia's: And therefore it is to be conſidered that the five Battalions in the front are defended on all ſides, but juſt in the front; ſo that they are to be drawn up in great order with the Pikes before them. The five Companies behind are guarded on all ſides but behind, ſo as they are likewiſe to be ordered with Pikes in their rear, as we ſhall ſhow in its place.

The five Companies in the right flank are guarded on every ſide but only on the right flank. The five in the left flank are the ſame, only on the left flank they are open; and therefore in the managing your Army, you muſt obſerve to place your Pikes ſo as they may turn about to that flank which is naked and expoſed; and your Corporals are to be in the front, and in the rear, that (being to fight) the whole Army, and every member of it may be in their proper places, and the manner of doing it, we have declared before, when we diſcourſed of putting the Companies in order; I would divide my Artillery, and place part of it without my right flank, and the other without my left. My light Horſe I would ſend before to ſcour the Country; my men at Arms I would diſpoſe part behind my right wing, and part behind my left, at about forty yards diſtance from the Battalia's. And this general rule you are to obſerve by all means in the drawing up your Army, that your Horſe are to be placed either in the rear, or upon the flanks, for to place them before, at the head of the Army, would occaſion one of theſe two things, either they muſt be placed at ſuch diſtance, that upon a repulſe they may have ſpace and time enough to wheel off without falling foul upon the foot; or elſe draw up the foot with ſuch intervals, that the Horſe may paſs thorow without putting them into diſorder: Certainly no body ought to look upon this as a thing of ſmall importance; for many have been ruined and routed by their own men, for want of timely conſideration.

But to return to our buſineſs, the Carriages, and the people unarmed are placed in the void place of the Army, and ſo diſpoſed, that there is paſſage left for any to paſs from one part of the Army to another. Theſe Companies (without the Horſe and Artillery) do take up a ſpace of 282 yards: And becauſe this ſquare conſiſts of two Battalions, it is convenient to let you know what part of them makes one Battalion, and what the other. Now becauſe Battalions are denominated from their number, and each of them (as you know) conſiſts of ten Battalia's (or Companies) and a Colonel, I would have the firſt Battalion place five of firſt Companies in the front, the other five in the left flank, and the Colonel in the left angle of the front. The ſecond Battalion ſhould place its five firſt Battalia's upon the right flank, and the other five in the rear, with the Colonel in the right corner to ſecure the rear, and perform the office of him whom the *Romans* called by the name of *Tergiductor*.

CHAP. III.

How to put an Army preſently into order, and draw it up, ſo as if upon a march it ſhould be attack'd, it may defend it ſelf on all ſides.

Fabr. HAving put your Army into this poſture, you are to cauſe it to march, and in its march obſerve the ſame order, for without doubt it is ſafe enough againſt the tumults and incurſions of the Peaſants, againſt which, it is ſufficient if the Colonel commands out parties of Horſe, or certain Companies of his *Velites* to repel them. Nor is there any danger that thoſe kind of people will ever come to handy ſtrokes with you; for men without order, are always fearful of men in order, and 'tis the practice of ſuch peopeople to alarm you with great ſhouts and crys, but never to come near; like little Curs that bark at a Maſtiff, but keep far enough off. When *Hanibal* invaded *Italy* with ſo much detriment to the *Romans*, he paſſed thorow *France*; was frequently infeſted by the Bores, but he valued them not. But it is not ſufficient to have your Army in this order, but if you intend to march, you muſt have Pioneers, and ſuch kind of people to plain the ways, make your entrenchments, *&c.* and theſe Pioneers are to be ſecured by the Horſe which you ſend up and down the Country. In this order an Army may march ten miles a day, and be time enough at their journeys end to Sup, and take up their Quarters by day-light; for many times an Army will march in one day twenty miles. But if it happens to be attacked by a formed Army, it cannot be ſo ſudden, but you will have time to put your ſelf into a poſture of defence, becauſe an orderly Army marches ſlowly, and you will have leiſure to draw your ſelf up in Battalia, and put your Army either into the ſame figure as I have preſcribed, or into ſuch another. If you be aſſaulted in the Van, you have no more to do but to bring your Artillery thither out of the flanks, and bringing your Horſe out of the rear into the Van, to put them into the ſame place and diſtance as I have directed. The 1000 *Velites* which are before, may advance, divide themſelves into two parties of five hundred a piece, and enter into their own place betwixt the Horſe and the wings of the Army; and then into their places are to ſucceed the two Companies of Pikes extraordinary which I placed before in the great vacuity of the Army. The 1000 *Velites* in the rear are to remove from their poſt, and dividing themſelves, repair to the two flanks and fortifie them, and by the ſpace and chaſm which they leave at their departure, the Carriages may march out, and all thoſe who are unarmed, and put themſelves behind in the rear: The ſpace in the middle being now void, and every man in his place, the five Battalia's which I ordered behind the Army may advance by the void ſpace betwixt the two flanks, and march towards thoſe in the Van. Three of them may march up within 40 yards (with equal intervals betwixt the one and the other) and the other two may remain behind at the ſame diſtance of forty yards. This is a form that may be ordered on a ſudden, and has ſome reſemblance with the firſt model of an Army which we recommended before; for though it be ſtreighter in the front, it is firmer in the flanks, and by conſequence ſtronger. But becauſe the five Battalia's in the rear have Pikes with them for the reaſons aboveſaid, it is neceſſary to cauſe them to advance to fortifie the front of the Army, and therefore either you muſt cauſe your Companies to turn Company by Company as they were ſolid bodies; or elſe paſs them into the front thorow the files of the Bucklers, which way is a better way, and leſs diſorderly, than to cauſe them to wheel in whole Companies like a ſolid body: and the ſame thing is to be done with thoſe in the rear upon any aſſault, as I have ſhown before. If the Enemy preſents himſelf in the rear; you have no more to do

but to face about with your whole Army, and immediately the figure is altered, the rear becomes the front, and the front the rear; after which you are to obſerve all the ways of fortifying your front, as I have directed before. If the enemy appears upon your flank, your Army is to face about to that ſide, and do the ſame things to ſtrengthen your front: ſo that your Horſe, your *Velites*, your Artillery may be in ſuch places as are convenient for the making up that front; and if there be any difference in this variation of fronts, it is only this, that ſome of thoſe who are to remove, have farther to advance than others. Nevertheleſs, in making a front of your right flank, your *Velites* are to enter into the intervals betwixt the wings of the Army, and the horſe ſhould approach to the left flank, into whoſe place the two Companies of Pikes extraordinary (which were placed in the middle) ſhould ſucceed: but the carriages ſhould remove, and the unarm'd people, (by the great ſpace and overture that is made) and retire behind the left flank, which is now become the rear of the whole Army: and the other *Velites* who were placed in the rear at firſt, are not to budge in this caſe, becauſe that place ſhould not remain open, being of the rear become the flanks: all other things are to be done as in my firſt directions for the making of a front.

What is ſaid before of making a front of the right flank, will ſerve for making a front of the left flank, for the ſame order is to be uſed: if the enemy comes upon you ſo ſtrong that he is able to attack you on both ſides, you muſt fortify the places where you ſuſpect he will charge by doubling your ranks from the places where he does not prepare to fall on; by dividing your Artillery, your *Velites*, and your Horſe, & diſtributing them equally in both places. If he aſſaults you in three or four ſides at once, you or he muſt be very imprudent; for had you been wiſe, you would never have put your ſelf into a place where an enemy could have come at you on ſo many ſides, eſpecially with a form'd and well ordered Army. For to ruine you ſecurely, it is neceſſary the enemy be ſtrong enough to attack you on all ſides, and with as many men in every place almoſt, as in your whole Army: and if you be ſo indiſcreet to march into his Country, or put your ſelf into the power of an enemy whoſe men are three times as many, and as well experienced as yours, if you miſcarry, you can blame no body but your ſelf: but if misfortune happens not by your fault, but by accident of war, no body will condemn you, and it will fare with you as it did with *Scipio* in *Spain*, and *Aſdrubal* in *Italy*. But if the enemy be not much ſtronger than you, and yet ventures to aſſault you in ſeveral places, the raſhneſs will be on his ſide, and the ſucceſs in all probability on yours; for of neceſſity he muſt ſo weaken himſelf, that you may receive him in one place, and charge him briskly in another, and then you will eaſily ruine him. This way of ordering an Army againſt an enemy that is not in ſight, but is hourly expected, is very neceſſary: and it is very uſeful to accuſtome your Souldiers to cloſe, and change, and march in this order, and in their march to ſhew them how to fight according to my firſt front, and then falling into their march again, upon a new alarm in the rear, to turn that into a front; and then each of the flanks, and ſo in their firſt poſture again: and theſe exerciſes are very neceſſary, if you would have your Army ready and well diſciplin'd. For which cauſe I would recommend it to all Princes and great Captains to reſtore theſe practices of the ancients; for what is military diſcipline, but to know how to command and execute theſe things well? what is a well diſciplin'd Army, but an Army train'd up well in theſe kind of exerciſes? and he who in our times would but frame his diſcipline to this, I am confident could never be worſted. But to continue our diſcourſe; if this ſquare figure be difficult, it is not to be laid aſide for that, for that difficulty is neceſſary: nevertheleſs exerciſe will make it eaſy; for having learn'd how to draw your ſelf up, and preſerve your figure, you will eaſily underſtand afterwards how to maintain other figures in which there is not ſo much difficulty.

Zanobi. I am of your mind, that thoſe orders are neceſſary, and cannot tell (as to my ſelf) what can be added or ſubſtracted. Yet I would willingly be ſatisfied in two things. One is when you would make a front of your rear, or one of your flanks, and would have your men face about, how you do ſignify your commands, whether by word of mouth, or ſound of trumpet? The other is, whether thoſe you ſend before to plain the ways, and make them paſſable for your Army, are to be Souldiers drawn out of your Battalia's, or other Country people deſigned on purpoſe for that work.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of Commands derived by word of mouth, by Drums, and Trumpets, and of the nature of Pioneers.

Fabr. YOur firſt demand is of very great importance, for many Armies have been ruined when the Captain's orders have been miſtaken, or not heard: for which reaſon the words of Command in ſuch great dangers ought to be clear and intelligible: and if you would ſignify your commands by the ſound of your Trumpets or Drums, great care is to be taken that the ſounds be ſo different and diſtinguiſhable one from the other, that they cannot be miſtaken. If your commands are by word of mouth, you muſt uſe particular, and be ſure to avoid general terms, and in your particular words you muſt be cautious to uſe none that may be liable to an ill interpretation. Many times the crying *back, back*, has been the loſs of an Army: wherefore that word is to be avoided, and inſtead of it you are to ſay *retreat*. If you would change your front, and make it either in the flank or the rear, you muſt not ſay *turn, but face about to the right or the left, to the front or the rear*: and in like manner all the words of command are to be plain and intelligible, as *march on, ſtand firm, advance, retreat:* and what ever may be done by word of mouth clearly and diſtinctly, is to be ſignified that way: what cannot be done that way, is to be done by the Trumpet and Drum. As to the Pioneers, which is your ſecond demand, I would have that office performed by my own Souldiers, as well becauſe it was the practice of anoient times, as becauſe thereby I ſhould have fewer idle perſons in my Army, and by conſequence fewer impediments. I would command out of every Battalia what number I thought neceſſary; I would furniſh them with Pickaxes, and Spades, and cauſe them to leave their arms with their next ranks, who ſhould carry them for them; ſo that when the enemy appeared, they ſhould have no more to do but to fall back to their ranks, and take them again.

Zanobi. But who ſhould carry their Pickaxes and Spades?

Fabr. There ſhould be Waggons on purpoſe.

Zanobi. I fear you would never prevail with your Souldiers to work.

Fabr. We will talk of that in its proper place: at preſent I ſhall lay it aſide, and diſcourſe of the way how they are to be ſupplyed with proviſions; for having tired them thus long, 'tis but reaſonable to refreſh them with victuals.

CHAP. V.

Of the Proviſions that are neceſſary for an Army.

Fabr. YOu muſt know, a Prince is to keep his Army as free, and as fit for expedition as poſſible, and to rid it of all encumbrances that may make his enterprizes difficult. The firſt difficulty to be removed, is want of proviſions, and therefore he is to take particular care that they be furniſhed with bread and wine. The ancients did not think of providing of wine, for when they wanted wine, they made uſe of water with a little vinegar to give it a taſte; ſo that among the proviſions for the Army, vinegar was provided, but not wine. Their bread was not baked ready to their hands, as in the Towns, but every Souldier had his proportion of meal, which he ordered as he pleaſed, with a certain quantity of bacon, and ſeam, which gave their bread a guſt, and rendred them ſtrong. So that the proviſion for the Souldiers was meal, vinegar, bacon, and ſuet or ſeam, and barly for the horſes. They had commonly herds of Cattel great and ſmall which followed the Armies, which being driven, and not carried, were no great encumbrance. By reaſon of this order, of old an Army marched many days journey thorow difficult and ſolitary places without want of proviſions, becauſe they lived upon ſuch things as might eaſily be carried with them. But in our Armies now a-days we find it quite contrary; for the Souldiers cannot ſubſiſt without wine and biſket, as when they are at home, of which, proviſion cannot be made for any conſiderable time, inſomuch as they are many times famiſhed; or if proviſion be made, it is with much trouble, and vaſt expence. I would endeavour therefore that my Army might not be ſupplyed at that rate; nor would I have them have any bread but what they make themſelves. As to wine, I would not hinder their drinking it, nor pro-

hibit that any ſhould come into the Army; but I would take no pains, nor uſe no induſtry to ſupply them: and for other proviſions, I would follow exactly the model of the ancients: which way, if rightly conſidered, will ſhew what difficulties are removed, what wants and diſtreſſes are prevented to an Army and General, and what convenience is added to any enterprize that ſhall be undertaken.

Zanob. Since we have routed the enemy, & marched afterwards into his Country, 'tis but reaſonable to believe that we have made our depredations, tax'd his Towns, taken ſeveral Priſoners: I would know therefore how the ancients proceeded in theſe caſes.

CHAP. VI.

How the ancients divided the ſpoil; and of the pay which they gave to their Souldiers.

Fabr. I will ſatisfy you as to that: I do not queſtion but you have conſidered (becauſe I have diſcourſed it formerly with ſome of you) how our preſent wars do impoveriſh not only thoſe Princes which are overcome, but thoſe who are Conquerors; for as one loſes his Country, ſo the other loſes his Mony: which was otherwiſe in ancient times, becauſe the Conqueror enriched himſelf by the war. The reaſon of this difference is, becauſe in our times no publick account is taken of the prizes, (as formerly) but all is left to the diſcretion of the Souldier, which occaſions two very great diſorders; the firſt is as before; the other, it renders the Souldier more deſirous of plunder, and leſs obſervant of order and military diſcipline. And we have heard of many inſtances, where their impatience to be pillaging has wreſted the Victory out of their hands who had almoſt perfectly obtained it. Whilſt the Romans had the command of their own Armies, they provided very well againſt both theſe inconveniencies, appointing all the prizes to be delivered in, and appropriated to the publick, and that afterwards the publick ſhould diſtribute as it pleaſed. To this purpoſe they had their *Queſtores*, (which wsre like our Chamberlains) in whoſe hands all their prizes and taxes depoſited, of which the Conſul or General of their Army diſpoſed as he thought good, for the payment of his Souldiers, the curing of the wounded, or ſick, and diſcharging the other neceſſities of the Army.

'Tis true, the Conſul had power to give the plunder of a Town to his Souldiers, and he frequently did it, but that liberty never bred any diſorder; for when a Town was taken, or an Army defeated, all the prize was brought into a publick place, and diſtributed man by man, according to every ones merit.

This cuſtom made the Souldiers more intent upon victory than plunder: the practice of the Roman Legions was, to break and diſorder an enemy, but not to purſue; for they never went out of their ranks upon any occaſion whatever. Only the horſe, the light arm'd men, and what other Souldiers were not of the Legions, followed the chaſe: whereas if the plunder of the field had belonged to any man that could catch it, it would have been neither reaſonable nor poſſible to have kept the Legions to their ranks, or to have expoſed them to ſo many dangers. Hence it was that upon a Victory the publick was always enriched; for when a Conſul entred in triumph, he brought with him great riches into the Treaſury of *Rome*, and they conſiſted of Taxes, Contributions, Ranſoms, and Plunder. The ancients had likewiſe another cuſtom that was very well contrived, and that was, out of every Souldiers pay to cauſe a third part to be depoſited with the Enſign of their reſpective Companies, who never reſtored it before the War was ended. This they did for two reaſons; firſt, that every Souldier might have a ſtock of his own; for moſt of them being young, and profuſe, the more they had, the more they would have ſquandred. The other reaſon was, that knowing their ſtocks were in their Enſigns hands, they ſhould have the more care of him, and defend him with the more courage; and this cuſtom contributed much to their valour, and is neceſſary to be obſerved by any man who would reduce his Souldiers to the diſcipline of the Romans.

Zanobi. I believe it impoſſible for an Army not to meet with ſeveral ill accidents whilſt it marches from one place to another; and that it requires great induſtry in the General, and great courage in the Souldiers to prevent or avert them: you would oblige me much if you would tell me what has occurr'd to your knowledge in the caſe.

CHAP. VII.

To know the ſurprizes which are contriving againſt you upon your march.

Fabr. I Shall ſatisfy you willingly, as being particularly neceſſary to any man who is deſirous to give a perfect ſcheme of this diſcipline.

Whilſt an Army is marching, the Generals are above all things to be vigilant that they fall not into any ambuſhments, which may be done two ways; one when you fall into it bluntly of your ſelf: the other when you are drill'd and wheedled into it by the enemy before you perceive it. To prevent the firſt way, it is convenient to ſend out ſtrong parties to diſcover the Country, who are to be the more diligent, by how much the Country is more apt and proper for ſuch things, as where it is woody or mountainous; for ambuſcades are commonly laid behind ſome hill, or under the ſhelter of ſome wood, and, as if you do not diſcover them in time, they are very pernicious; ſo, if your care be ſufficient, they are as eaſily prevented. The birds and the duſt have many times diſcovered the enemy; for when ever the enemy approaches in any great number, he will be ſure to raiſe the duſt, which will give you the alarm. Several Generals obſerving the Pidgeons to riſe in ſome place where they were to paſs, (or other birds that fly together in flocks) and to hover over their heads without falling again, have thereby diſcovered the ambuſhments of the enemy, and either prevented or defeated them.

As to the ſecond way of being drawn in by the artifices of the enemy, you muſt be cautious of believing any thing eaſily, that is not reaſonable to be ſuppoſed: as it would be, if an enemy ſhould leave ſomething for you to pillage on purpoſe, you muſt ſuſpect there is ſome deſign at the bottom, and be careful it does not ſucceed. If a great number of the enemie be beaten, and purſued by a few of your men. If a few of the enemie attacks a greater party of yours. If the enemy runs unexpectedly, and without any viſible occaſion, in thoſe caſes you muſt always ſuſpect; and never fancy your enemie ſo weak as not to underſtand his own buſineſs: on the contrary, if you would be leſs expoſed to his ſtratagems, and run your ſelf leſs into danger, the weaker and more careleſs you obſerve him to be, the more you are to apprehend him. In this caſe you are to comport your ſelf in two different manners, you are to fear him in your own thoughts, and order your affairs accordingly; but in your words and outward behaviour you are to ſeem to deſpiſe him; this laſt way makes your Souldiers more confident of Victory, the other makes you more cautious, and leſs apt to be circumvented. And you muſt know, that to march thorow an enemies Country is more dangerous than to fight a field Battel.

CHAP. VIII.

One is to know the Country perfectly well thorow which he is to paſs, and keep his enterprizes ſecret.

Fabritio. THe marching thorow an enemies Country being ſo extraordinarily dangerous, it is neceſſary that a General doubles his diligence; and the firſt thing he is to do, he is to have a Carte made of all the Country by which he is to paſs, that he may know the Towns, their number, and diſtance, the roads, the mountains, the rivers, the fens, and the nature and qualities of them all: and to better his knowledge, it is convenient that he diſcourſes and interrogates ſomebody who underſtands the places, objecting, and asking them ſeveral queſtions, and obſerving their anſwers. He is likewiſe to ſend ſome parties of his light horſe before, under the command of prudent Officers, not ſo much to face the enemie, as to ſpeculate the Country, and ſee whether it agrees with his map, and the deſcription which he has received. He is alſo to ſend out ſpies and guides with good guards, promiſing them rewards if they tell true, and threatning them with puniſhment, if falſe. But above all he is to have a care that his Army knows nothing of his deſign; for in the whole Art of War there is nothing ſo uſeful as to conceal the enterprizes that you are about.

CHAP. IX.

Of certain things which are requiſite upon a march.

Fabr. That no ſudden attack may be able to diſorder your Souldiers, you muſt command them to ſtand ready with their arms, for things that are foreſeen and expected, are leſs terrible and hurtful. Many perſons to avoid confuſion in their march have diſpoſed their Carriages, and unarm'd people near the Colours, with command to follow them cloſe, that upon a hault, or retreat, (if there ſhould be occaſion) they might do it more eaſily, which is a good way, and I like it well. A General is likewiſe to have a great care that his men do not ſtraggle in their march, or march unequally, ſome too faſt, others too ſlow, which would weaken his Army, and expoſe it to great diſorder. It is convenient therefore to place their Officers in the flanks, that they may keep them uniform in their motion, reſtraining thoſe who are too haſty, and ſoliciting thoſe who are too ſlow, and that cannot be done better than by the Trumpets and Drums. The ways are likewiſe to be enlarged and repair'd, ſo as one Company at leaſt may always march in order. Beſides this, the cuſtome, quality and humour of your enemy is to be conſidered, whether he be like to aſſault you in the morning, at noon, or at night. Whether he be ſtrongeſt in horſe or in foot, and as you are inform'd of that, you order your men, and provide every thing neceſſary. But to come to ſome particular accident.

CHAP. X.

How to avoid fighting near a River, though preſſed by the enemy; and in what manner you may paſs it.

Fabr. IT falls out ſometimes that you are forced to decline the enemy, as thinking your ſelf too weak, and are therefore unwilling to engage him: the enemy follows you what he can to ſtop you, or cut you off in your paſſage over the river, to which you are marching to that purpoſe; and your paſſage will take up ſo much time, that in probality the enemy will reach you. Some who have been in that dangerous condition, have drawn a trench round the rear of their Army; fill'd it with fagots, and other combuſtibles, and ſet them on fire, whilſt in the mean time their Army paſſed over without any impediment from the enemy, by reaſon the fire that was betwixt them hindred their deſigns.

Zanobi. I cannot eaſily believe that ſuch a fire as that could hinder them, becauſe I remember I have heard how *Hanno* the Carthaginian being beſieged by an enemy; on that ſide where he deſigned to eſcape, cauſed ſtore of wood and faggots to be laid, and then ſet them on fire: ſo that the enemy not obſerving him ſo ſtrictly on that ſide, he paſſed his Troops thorow the flames, only by ordering them to hold their Targets before their faces.

Fabr. You ſay well, but conſider a little what I told you, and what *Hanno* did; I told you that the Generals I mentioned cauſed a trench to be digg'd, and filled with combuſtible matter; ſo that when the enemy was to paſs, he was to encounter with two great difficulties, the trench and the fire. *Hanno* made his fires without any ditch, and becauſe he deſigned to paſs over them, he commanded that they ſhould not bee made too violent; for without a trench, that would have ſtop'd him. Do you not know the ſtory of *Nabis* the Spartan, who being beſieged in *Sparta* by the Romans, he ſet part of the Town on fire to hinder the advance of the Romans, who had already entred in ſome places; and by that fire he not only hindred their advance, but repulſed them.

But to return to our buſineſs. *Quintus Lutatius* the Roman, having the *Cimbri* upon his heels, and being arrived at a river; that the enemy might give him time to paſs, he pretended a reſolution to fight them, pitch'd his Camp, entrench'd himſelf, ſet up his Standard, and ſent out parties of horſe to provide forrage. The *Cimbrians* conceiving he would encamp there, came and encamped by him, and divided themſelves into ſeveral parties, to ſupply them with proviſions; of which *Lutatius* having notice, ſlip'd over the river before they could have time to diſturb him. Some have turned the courſe of a river, and by a cut carrying the water on the back-ſide of the Army, have made the river fordable,

dable, and paſſed it with eaſe. When the waters are rapid and the ſtream ſtrong, to facilitate the paſſage of the Foot, they put the ſtrongeſt of their Horſe betwixt the ſtream and the Foot, to keep off the torrent; and another party below to bear up the Foot, if the water ſhould be too ſtrong for any of them. Rivers that are unfordable, are likewiſe to be paſſed with Bridges and Boats; ſo that it is good to carry in your Army materials for all theſe things. It happens ſometimes that when you would paſs a River, the Enemy is got on the other ſide, and oppoſes. To remove this difficulty, I know nothing you can do better, than to follow the example of *Cæſar*, who having brought his Army to the ſide of a River in *France*, with deſign to have paſſed it, but finding *Vercingetorix* with his Army on the other ſide ready to obſtruct him, he marched down the River ſeveral days journey on one ſide, whilſt *Vercingetrix* did the like on the other.

But *Cæſar* having made a place in a Wood convenient for the concealing of ſome of his men, drew out three Companies out of each Legion, cauſed them to ſtay behind there, and when he was gone, commanded that they ſhould ſet up a Bridge over the River, and fortify it; and in the mean time he followed his march. *Vercingetrix* obſerving the ſame number of Legions, not ſuſpecting that any part of them were left behind, followed him on the other ſide; but *Cæſar* when he judged the Bridge finiſhed, faced about on a ſudden, and finding every thing as he expected, he paſſed the River without any difficulty.

Zanob. Have you any rules whereby you may diſcover a ford?

Fabr. Yes, we have: where-ever in a River you ſee the water tremble, and carry certain ſtreaks betwixt the place where it ſtagnats, and the current, you may be ſure the bottom is good, and the place fordable, becauſe the gravel and ſand which the River does commonly carry along with it, is more fixed there, as has been often ſeen by experience.

Zanobi. Suppoſe the flood ſhould have looſened the earth at the bottom of the ford, ſo as the horſe ſhould ſink in; what remedy then?

Fabr. You muſt make grills or lettices of wood, ſink them into the River, and let them paſs over them. But to follow our diſcourſe.

CHAP. XI.

How to make your paſſage thorow a ſtraight though you be preſſed by an Enemy.

Fabr. IF a General by accident be conducted with his Army betwixt two Mountains, and that he has but two paſſages, one before, and the other behind, and the Enemy has got poſſeſſion of both, he can have no better remedy than to do as has been done before; that is, to dig a deep *Trench* behind him, and make it as unpaſſable as he can, that the Enemy may believe he intended to ſtop him there in the rear, that with his whole force he might make his way thorow the paſſage in the Van: Which being obſerved by the Enemy, he concluded according to appearance; ſent what ſtrength he could make to the other end of the paſs; and abandoned the Trench, whereupon the other clap'd a wooden bridge over the Trench immediately (which he had prepared on purpoſe) and paſſed back again without any obſtruction. *Lucius Minutius* a Roman Conſul was in *Liguria* with an Army, and was ſhut up by the Enemy betwixt the Mountains, ſo as he could not diſingage himſelf: being ſenſible of his condition, he ſent certain *Numidians* which he had in his Army upon ſmall ſcrannel Horſes towards the places where the Enemy had their Guards: At firſt ſight the Enemy put themſelves into a poſture to defend the Paſſes, but when they obſerved the *Numidians* in ill order, and ill mounted in reſpect of themſelves, they began to deſpiſe them, and to be more remiſs in their Guards; which was no ſooner perceived by the *Numidians*, but they clap'd ſpurs to their Horſes, and charging ſuddenly upon them, they paſſed on in ſpight of all their oppoſition; and being paſſed the miſchief and devaſtation that they made in the Country, conſtrained the Enemy to give free paſſage to the whole Army. A certain General being infeſted by a numerous Enemy, drew up his Army ſo cloſe, that the Enemy was able to encompaſs him round, and afterwards he fell ſo ſmartly upon that Quarter where the Enemy was weakeſt, that he not only worſted them, but diſintangled himſelf. *Marcus Antonius* in his retreat from the *Parthians* obſerved

ſerved that every morning by break of day they were upon his back as ſoon as he moved, and continued skirmiſhing and moleſting him quite thorow his march; whereupon he reſolved not to remove before noon. The *Parthians* obſerving, concluded he would not ſtir that day, and returned to their Poſts, inſomuch that *Marcus Antonius* had opportunity to march all the reſt of that day without interruption. The ſame perſon to avoid the Darts of the *Parthians*, commanded his Men that when the *Parthians* came near them, the firſt rank ſhould fall down upon their knees, and the ſecond rank clap their Bucklers over the heads of the firſt rank, the third over the ſecond, the fourth over the third, and ſo on; ſo as the whole Army lay as it were under a Shield, and was defended from their Arrows. And this is all I can remember about the accidents to which an Army is ſubject upon a march. I ſhall paſs now to another thing, unleſs you have ſomething elſe to demand.

THE SIXTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

What kind of places the Greeks *and the* Romans *choſe out for their Camps, with a ſhort recapitulation of what has been ſaid before.*

Zano. I Think it very convenient that *Battiſta* takes upon him the Office of demanding, and that I lay it down; by doing ſo we ſhall ſeem to imitate the good Generals of old, who (as I have been taught by Seignor *Fabritio*) did uſually place the valianteſt of their Soldiers, in the front, and in the rear of the Army; conceiving it neceſſary to have thoſe in the Van who would begin the fight bravely, and ſuch in the rear as would bravely maintain it. And as *Coſimo* began this diſcourſe with a great deal of prudence, ſo *Battiſta* may finiſh it with the ſame; *Luigi* and I having born the brunt in the middle as well as we could; and ſeeing hitherto every man has taken his part willingly, I do not think *Battiſta* will refuſe.

Battiſta. Hitherto I have ſuffered my ſelf to be governed, and am reſolved to do ſo for the future; let me deſire you therefore Signor *Fabritio* to purſue your diſcourſe, and hold us excuſed if we interrupt you with theſe kind of demands.

Fabr. As I told you before, you do me a very great kindneſs, for this interruption, and changing of perſons, rather refreſhes than troubles my fancy: But to follow our buſineſs, I ſay that it is now high time that we diſpoſe our Army into its quarters, for you know every thing deſires reſt, and ſecurity; for to repoſe without ſecurity, is not properly to repoſe. I do fancy you would rather have had me lodg'd my Army firſt, and march'd and fought them afterwards, but we have done quite contrary, and indeed not without neceſſity; for being to ſhow how an Army in a march was to quit that form, and put it ſelf into a poſture to fight, it was neceſſary firſt to ſhow how they were to be drawn up for a Battel. But to return, I ſay, that if you would have your Camp ſafe, you muſt have it ſtrong, and well ordered: The diſcretion of the General puts it in good order, but it is art or ſcituation that makes it defenſible and ſtrong. The *Grecians* were ſo curious in this point, that they would never encamp but where there was ſome River, or Wood, or Bank or other natural rampart to defend them: But the *Romans* ſtood not ſo much upon the ſtrength of the ſituation, as their own ways of fortification, nor would they ever encamp, but where according to their own Diſcipline they could draw up their Army. For this reaſon the *Romans* obſerved one conſtant form in their encampments; for they would rather make the ſituation of the place comply with their methods, than permit their cuſtoms, to comply

comply with the ſituation; but with the *Grecians* it was otherwiſe, becauſe following the condition and form of the place, it was neceſſary that they varyed the manner of their encampment, and the form of their Camp. The *Romans* therefore where the ſituation was weak, ſupplyed it by art and induſtry: And becauſe in this diſcourſe I have propoſed the *Romans* for a Preſident, I ſhall not leave them in my manner of encampment, nevertheleſs I ſhall not follow their practice in every thing, but picking and ſelecting ſuch parts as I think moſt agreeable with our times. I have told you often how the *Romans* in their Conſular Armies had two Legions of *Romans*, conſiſting of about 11000 Foot, and 600 Horſe; they had moreover about 11000 more foot, ſent in by their friends and allies to their aſſiſtance: but this was a rule, their Auxiliaries never exceeded the number of the Legions, unleſs it were in horſe, and in them they were not ſo curious. I have told you likewiſe how in all their battels their Legions were placed in the middle, and their Auxiliaries in the flanks, and it was the ſame in their encampments, as you may read in ſuch Authors as make any mention of their Hiſtory: I will not therefore be ſo exact in my relation, I ſhall content my ſelf only to tell you in what order I would lodge my Army at preſent, and you will underſtand by that what I ſhall have borrowed from the Romans. You know that in imitation of their Legions I have taken two Battalions conſiſting of 6000 foot, and 300 horſe of ſervice for the Battalion: you know into what Companies, into what Arms, and into what names I divided them. You know how in ordering my Army to march and to fight, I have ſaid nothing of more men, only what was to be done, was to be done by doubling their ranks, not by any reinforcement of men. But being now to ſhew you the manner of encamping, I think it not convenient to ſtick to my two Battalions, but to unite our whole Army, compoſed according to the model of the Romans of two Battalions, and as many Auxiliaries, which I do the rather, that the form of our Camp may be the more compleat, by the reception of a compleat Army; which in my other demonſtrations I have not thought altogether ſo neceſſary. Being therefore to lodge a compleat Army of 24000 foot, and two thouſand horſes of ſervice, to be divided into four Battalions, (two of Natives, and two of ſtrangers) I would take this way.

CHAP. II.

The form of a Camp.

Fabr. HAving found a place convenient for my Camp, I would ſet up my Standard in the midſt of a ſquare of fifty yards deep. The four ſides of that ſquare ſhould reſpect the four quarters of the World, and look Eaſt, Weſt, North, and South. In this ſquare I would ſet up the Generals Pavilion: and becauſe I think it diſcreet, and in part the practice of the ancients, I would divide my men which carry arms, from them who have none; and thoſe who are free, from thoſe who are incumbred. All or the greateſt part of my arm'd men I would lodge towards the Eaſt; my men that were diſarm'd and incumbred, I would lodge towards the Weſt, making my front towards the Eaſt, and my rear towards the Weſt; and the North and South ſhould be my flanks. To diſtinguiſh the quarters of thoſe which bore arms, I would take this courſe, I would draw a line from the Standard towards the Eaſt of 680 yards long. Then I would draw two other lines, (with the firſt in the middle) of the ſame length, but each of them at a diſtance of fifteen yards from the firſt; at the end of theſe lines I would have my Eaſtern Port, and the ſpace betwixt the two outward lines ſhould make a ſtreet which ſhould go from that Gate to the General's quarters, and take up a ſpace of thirty yards in bredth, and 630 in length, (for the General's quarter would take up fifty) and this ſhould be called the General's ſtreet. Then I would cauſe another ſtreet to be drawn out from North to South, and it ſhould paſs by the end of the General's ſtreet, not far from the General's quarter towards the Eaſt, which ſhould contain in length 1250 yards, (for it ſhould take up all the bredth of the Camp) and be called the Croſs-ſtreet. Having deſign'd the General's quarters, and theſe two Streets, I would mark out quarters for the two Battalions that were my own Subjects, and one of them I would diſpoſe on the right hand of the General's ſtreet, and the other on the left. And then paſſing over the Croſs-ſtreet, I would aſſign 32 lodgments on the left hand of the General's Street, and as many on the right, leaving betwixt the ſixteenth & ſeventeenth lodgment a ſpace of thirty yards wide, as a traverſe way to paſs thorow all the lodgments of the Battalions. I would lodge the Captains of the men at Arms at the front of thoſe two orders of lodgments which joyn to the Croſs-ſtreet, and their men at Arms in

the fifteen lodgments that are next them; ſo as every lodgment ſhould contain ten men at Arms, the whole number that I have allotted to each Battalion, being an hundred and fifty. The Captains lodgments ſhould be forty yards wide, and ten in length; and you muſt take notice that when I ſay *wide*, I mean from North to South; and when *long*, from Eaſt to Weſt. The lodgment for the private men at arms ſhould be fifteen yards long, and thirty wide. In the other fifteen lodgments which follow on both ſides of the ſtreet, (which begin at the traverſe way, and ſhould have the ſame allowance of ground as I have given to the other) I would diſpoſe my light horſe. And becauſe there are likewiſe of them belonging to each Battalion 150, I would put ten of them into each of the fifteen lodgments, and the ſixteenth I would reſerve for the Captain with the ſame ſpace of ground as is allowed to the Captain of the men at arms; and ſo the lodgments of the horſe of the two Battalions ſhould come down to the middle of the General's Street, and be a direction to the quartering of the foot, as I ſhall ſhew. You have ſeen how I have lodged the 300 horſe of both Battalions, with their Officers in 32 lodgments ſet up near the General's Street, and beginning at the Croſs-ſtreet; and how betwixt the ſixteenth and the ſeventeenth there was reſerved a ſpace of thirty yards to make a croſs-way. Being therefore to lodge the twenty Battalia's or Companies in the two ordinary Battalions, I would appoint lodgments for every two Battalia's behind the lodgments of the horſe, and they ſhould each of them contain in length 15 yards, and in bredth thirty, according to the dimenſions of the horſe-lodgment, and they ſhould be ſo cloſe that they ſhould touch one another.

In the firſt lodgment on each ſide butting upon the Croſs-ſtreet, I would lodge the Captain of each Company over againſt the lodgment of the Captain of the men at Arms: and this lodgment alone ſhould be twenty yards wide, and ten long. In the other fifteen lodgments which ſucceed on both ſides as far as the traverſe way, I would quarter a Company of foot, which being 450, ſhould be diſpoſed 30 to a lodgment. The other 15 lodgments ſhould be ſet up on each ſide by the lodgments of the light horſe, with the ſame dimenſions of ground; and on each ſide I would place a Battalia of foot.

In the laſt lodgment on each ſide I would place the Captain of the Company (right over againſt the Captain of the light horſe) with a ſpace of ten yards in length, and twenty in bredth: and ſo theſe two firſt ranks of lodgments would be half horſe, and half foot: but becauſe (as I ſaid before) theſe horſe are all horſes of ſervice, which have no proper perſons either to dreſs or to feed them, I would have the foot which are quartered behind, obliged to look to them, and for ſo doing they ſhould be exempt from other duties in the Camp; and this was the method of the Romans. After this I would leave a ſpace of thirty yards on each ſide, which ſhould make ſtreets, and be called, one of them, the firſt Street on the left hand, and the other the firſt Street on the right. I would then on each ſide ſet up another row of 32 lodgments, with their backs one to the other, with the ſame ſpaces as I aſſigned to the other; and having ſeparated ſixteen of them, (as with the reſt) to make a traverſe way, I would diſpoſe in each ſide four Companies with their Captains at the head of them, and other Officers in the rear. After I had left on both ſides a diſtance of thirty yards for a way, which on one ſide ſhould be called the ſecond Street on the right hand, and on the other ſide the ſecond Street on the left hand; I would ſet up another rank of 32 lodgments with the ſame diſtances and ſeparations, where I would lodge on each ſide four Companies with their Officers: and by doing this, all the Cavalry, and the Companies of both the Battalions would be lodged in three rows of lodgments, and the General's quarter in the middle. The two Battalions of Auxiliaries (having made them to conſiſt of the ſame number of men) I would quarter on both ſides of the two ordinary Battalions, with the ſame number of rows, and in the ſame order as they, placing firſt one order of lodgments conſiſting half of horſe, and half of foot, diſtant from the next order thirty foot, which diſtance ſhould make a Street, and be called on one ſide, the third Street on the right hand; and on the other ſide the third Street on the left hand. And then I would make on each ſide two more rows of lodgments with the ſame diſtances and diſtinctions as in the lodgments of the other Battalions, which ſhould make two other Streets, and be called according to their number, and the hand on which they are placed; ſo that this whole Army will be lodged in twelve double rows of lodgments, and there will be thirteen Streets, reckoning the General's Street, and the Croſs-ſtreet: when I have deſign'd my circumference, and appointed my lodgments for my four Battalions, I would leave a ſpace betwixt the lodgments and the trenches of an hundred yards broad, which ſhould go round my Camp: and if you compute all the ſpaces, you will find that from the middle of the General's lodgment, to the Eaſt Gate, are 680 yards. There are two other ſpaces, one from the General's quarter to the South Gate, and the other

other from the ſame place to North the Gate, each of them 635 yards commencing at the Center. Subſtracting afterwards from each of theſe ſpaces fifty yards for the General's quarter, and five and forty more on each ſide for a Piazza, and thirty yards for a Street that divides each of the ſaid ſpaces in the middle; and an hundred yards round betwixt the lodgments and the trenches; there remains on all ſides for lodgments a ſpace of 400 yards wide, and an hundred long, meaſuring the length with the ſpace which is taken up by the General's quarter; then dividing the ſaid length in the middle, there will be on each ſide of the General forty lodgments, in length fifty yards, and twenty wide, which in all will be 80, in which the general Officers of the Battalions ſhould be quartered; the Treaſurers, the *Maſtres de Campe*, and all ſuch as have any office in the Army, leaving ſome ſpaces empty for ſtrangers, or ſuch Voluntiers as follow the wars meerly out of affection to the General: on the back-ſide of the General's quarters I would make a Street from South to North thirty yards broad, and it ſhould be called Front-ſtreet, and run along all the 80 lodgments aboveſaid. From this Front-ſtreet, by the General's quarter I would have another Street that ſhould go from thence to the Weſt Gate, thirty yards wide, anſwering both for ſituation and length to the General's Street, and it ſhould be called the *Piazza*-ſtreet. Having ſetled theſe two Streets, I would order a *Piazza* or Market-place, and it ſhould be at the end of the *Piazza*-ſtreet over againſt the General's lodging, and not far from the Front-ſtreet. I would have it ſquare, and every ſquare to contain 121 yards: on the right and left hand of this Market-place I would have two rows of lodgments, each of them double, and conſiſting of eight lodgments, in length twelve yards, and in bredth thirty: ſo that on each ſide of the *Piazza* I would have ſixteen lodgments, with that in the middle, ſo that in all they would be 32; in which I would place thoſe horſe which remain undiſpoſed of, that belong to the Auxiliary ſquadrons: if theſe would not be ſufficient to receive them, I would conſign them ſome of the lodgments about the General's quarters, eſpecially thoſe which look towards the trenches. It remains now that we lodge the Pikes, and the *Velites* extraordinary which I have aſſigned to each Battalion, which as you know conſiſted (beſides the ten Companies) of a thouſand Pikes extraordinary, and five hundred *Velites*. So that the two Battalions had 2000 Pikes extraordinary, and 1000 *Velites* extraordinary, and the Auxiliaries had the ſame; ſo that we have ſtill 6000 foot to lodge, which I would diſpoſe in that part toward the Weſt, and along the ditch. From the end of the Front-ſtreet towards the North, leaving a ſpace of 100 yards betwixt that and the ditch, I would have a row of five double lodgments, which ſhould contain in length all of them 75 yards, and 60 in bredth: ſo as when the bredth is divided, there ſhall belong to each lodgment 15 yards in length, and thirty in bredth; and becauſe there will be but ten lodgments in this rank, there ſhall be lodged 300 foot, 30 in a lodgment. After that, leaving a ſpace of 31 yards; I would ſet up in the ſame manner, and with the ſame diſtances another row of five double lodgments, and after that another, till they came to be five rows of five double lodgments, in all fifty, placed in a right line from the North, all of them 100 yards from the foſs, and ſhould entertain 1500 foot. Turning then towards the Weſt Gate, in all that ſpace from them to the ſaid Gate, I would have five other double orders, in the ſame manner, and with the ſame ſpaces, (but with a diſtance of but 15 yards from one row to another) where I would lodge 1500 foot more. And ſo all the *Velites*, and Pikes extraordinary of both the proper Battalions ſhould be lodged from the North Gate to the Weſt Gate, according to the turning of the trenches, and ſhould be diſtributed into 100 lodgments in ten rows, ten lodgments in a row. The Pikes and the *Velites* extraordinary of the two Auxiliary Battalions ſhould be lodged in the ſame manner betwixt the Weſt Gate and the South, as the trenches incline in ten rows, ten lodgments in a row, as I ſaid of the other: the Captains or their Lieutenants may take ſuch quarters as they think moſt convenient on that ſide towards the trenches. The Artillery I would diſpoſe every where upon the banks of the trenches, and in all the other ſpace which remains towards the Weſt I would beſtow all the baggage, and ſervants, and impediments of the Army. By impediments you muſt underſtand (and you know it very well) the ancients intended all their train, and whatever elſe was neceſſary for an Army, beſides the Souldiers, as Carpenters, Smiths, Shoomakers, Engineers, and Cannoneers, (though theſe indeed might be numbred among the Souldiers) Butchers with their Beefs and their Muttons, Cooks, Paſtry-men, and all that prepared meat for the Army; and in ſhort, all other profeſſions which followed the Camp for ſubſiſtence: they reckoned likewiſe among them all the carriages for publick proviſions, and arms. I would not make any particular diſtinction of lodgments, only I would order the Streets ſo as that they might not be taken up by them. As to the other ſpaces betwixt the Streets, which would be four in all, I would conſign them in general to all the ſaid impediments, that is, one to the Butchers, another to

the Artificers and Masters of several Professions; a third to the carriages for Provisions; a fourth for the carriages for Arms. The Streets that I would have left free, should be the Street to the *Piazza*; the Front-street, and another Street called the middle Street, which should begin in the North, and pass thorow the middle of the Market-street (or Street to the *Piazza*) towards the South, which on the West side should do the same service as the Traverse-street does on the East. And besides this, I would have another back-street along by the lodgments of the Pikes and the *Velites* extraordinary, and I would have all these Streets thirty spaces wide. The Artillery I would place afterwards upon the trenches on the hinder part of the Camp.

Battista. I do acknowledge my ignorance, nor do I think it reproachful where it is not my profession to be otherwise: nevertheless I am very well pleased with your order, only I would desire you to resolve me two doubts: one is, why you make the Streets and the spaces about the lodgments so large; the other (which troubles me most) is, how you would employ the spaces which you design for the lodgments.

Fabr. You must understand I assign 30 yards to the bredth of the Streets, that a Battalia of foot may march together a breast; for (if you remember) I told you often that each Company took up in bredth betwixt 25 and 30 yards. That the space betwixt the trench and the lodgments should be 100 yards broad, is very necessary for drawing up the Battalia's, managing the Artillery, conveying and disposing of the booty, besides the convenience of retiring upon occasion, and making new Ramparts, and new Intrenchments within. Moreover, the lodgments are better at that distance from the trenches, as being farther from fire-works and other things which an enemy might cast in among them: as to your second demand, I do not intend that every space that I have designed for a lodgment should be covered with one Tent, or one Pavilion only, but that it should be employed as is most commodious for those who are to lodge there with more or fewer Tents as they please, provided they do not exceed their allowance of ground.

To make a just distribution of these lodgments, you must have persons that are well vers'd and experienced in that affair, and good Architects, who as soon as the General has made choice of his place, can immediately put it into form, distribute the lodgments by dividing the Streets, and distinguishing the places for the several lodgments with a cord and pikes thrust into the ground, with so much dexterity, that all things shall be presently in order. And if you would prevent confusion, you must turn your Camp alwaies one way, that every man may know in what Street, and in what quarter he may find his Tent. This must be observed in all times and places, and in such manner that it may seem a moving City, which, where-ever it moves, carries with it the same Gates, the same Streets, the same Houses, and the same Figure; which is a thing that cannot be practised by those who make choice of places of natural strength, for they must frame their Camp according to the variety of the situation. But the Romans fortified their Camps with Trenches, and Ramparts, and Mounts; for they left a good space round about their Camp, and before it they made a ditch commonly six yards wide, and three yards deep. They made these spaces greater or less, according to the time which they design'd to stay there, or according to their apprehension of the enemy: for my own part I would not enclose my Camp with Stoccado's, unless I intended to winter in it: I would have my Trench and my Parapet not less than theirs, but bigger upon occasion. Upon every corner and side of the Camp I would raise a kind of half-moon, from whence my Artillery might play, and flank any enemy that should attempt the ditch. In this exercise, to understand how to mark out a Camp, your men are to be trained frequently, and your other Officers are by practice to be made ready in designing, and your Souldiers as dexterous in knowing their own quarters, nor is there any great difficulty in it, as I shall shew else-where, for at present I shall pass to the Guards of the Camp, because without them all the other pains and punctilio's would be vain.

Battista. Before you proceed to the Guards, I would be informed when you would pitch your Camp near your enemy, what method you would use; for I cannot imagine that you should have time enough to do it without manifest danger.

Fabr. You must know no man incamps near an enemy, but he who is desirous to fight when ever the enemy will give him opportunity; and when the enemy is disposed to it as well as he, the danger is no more than ordinary; for two parts of the Army are drawn out to fight, and the third orders the Camp. In this case the Romans committed the fortification and ordering of their Camp to the *Triarii*; whilst the *Principes* and *Hastati* stood to their Arms. And this they did, because the *Triarii* being to fight last, had time (if the enemy advanced) to leave their work, stand to their arms, and fall every man into his place.

You,

You, if you would imitate the *Romans*, muſt cauſe your Camp to be made by the Battalia's in your rear, which are inſtead of the *Triarii*; but now to the Guards of the Camp.

CHAP. III.

Of the ſeveral Watches and Guards about the Camp.

Fabr. I do not remember in Hiſtory to have found that the Ancients for the ſecurity of the Camp in the night, did ever make uſe of out Guards or Sentinels without the Ditches, as we do now. The reaſon, as I take it, was becauſe they thought the Army thereby might be eaſily ſurprized, by the difficulty of diſcerning their Sentinels, and Scouts; beſides their Sentinels might be over-powred or corrupted by the Enemy, ſo that to rely upon them either in part or in whole, they concluded would be dangerous: wherefore all their Guards were within their Trenches, placed with ſuch diligence and exactneſs, that it was no leſs than death for any man to deſert his poſt. How theſe Guards were diſpoſed by them, I think it unneceſſary to relate, becauſe if you have not ſeen it already, you may do it when you pleaſe; only this I ſhall tell you in ſhort what I would do in the Caſe. I would have every night one third of the Army in Arms, and of them a fourth part upon the Guard, diſtributed all along the works, and in all convenient places quite thorow the Camp: with a Main Guard in each of the four quarters of your Camp, of which a party ſhould remain conſtantly upon the Guard, and another party ſhould Petrole from one quarter to the other. And this order I would uſe likewiſe in the day time, if my Enemy was near. As for giving the word, and changing it every night, and other things which are obſervable in the like caſes, I ſhall paſs them by as notorious and known. One thing only I ſhall mention, as being of importance, and that which brings much advantage to any man that uſes it, and as much diſadvantage where it is neglected.

CHAP. IV.

To obſerve who goes and comes to the Camp.

Fabr. HE who would be ſecure in his Camp, is to require notice with great exactneſs of all ſtrangers that lodge in his Camp, and to have a ſtrict account of all goers and comers; and this no hard matter to do, if the Tents be but viewed all along as they ſtand in their orders; becauſe every lodgment has its preciſe and definitive number, and when you find them more or leſs than their proportion, let them be examined and puniſhed. He who obſerves this courſe exactly, ſhall keep the Enemy from practiſing your Officers (at leaſt without great difficulty) or from having knowledge of your affairs. Had not the *Romans* been very exact obſervers of this courſe, *Claudius Nero* (when *Hanibal* lay ſo near him) could never have ſtole ſo privately from his Camp in *Lucania*, and have marched into *la Marca*, and back again, before *Hanibal* had miſſed him.

CHAP. V.

Of Military Juſtice, and the method uſed by the Ancients in the puniſhment of Offenders.

Fabr. BUt it is not enough to contrive good orders, unleſs they be ſtrictly obſerved for ſeverity is no where ſo requiſite as in an Army: wherefore to keep your Soldiers to their duty, ſtrict and ſevere Laws are to be made, and they are to be executed as ſtrictly: The *Romans* puniſhed it with death to be abſent from the Guard, when it was a mans duty to be there. It was no leſs capitol to abandon the place aſſigned him in Battel. To carry any thing privately out of his Quarters. To boaſt and appropriate to himſelf ſome great exploit, which he never did. To fight without the General's order. To throw away ones Arms in fear. If at any time it happened a whole Troop or Company had offended

fended in that nature, they were not all put to death, but an imburſation was made of their names, and drawing them out by lotts, every tenth man was executed. And this way of Decimation was uſed, that though all were not actually ſenſible, yet all might be affrighted. But becauſe where the puniſhments are great, the rewards ought to be proportionable, that men may be as well encouraged as deterred, they ordain'd recompences for every remarkable exploit. As to him who in the fight, ſaved the life of a Citizen. He who firſt ſcal'd the Walls of an Enemies Town. He who firſt entred into the Enemies Camp. He who wounded or killed the Enemies General, or diſmounted him from his Horſe. By this means no ſignal act was performed, but it was recompenſed by the Conſul, and applauded publickly by the reſt: and thoſe who received any of theſe prizes for any generous act, (beſides the glory and fame which they acquired among their fellow Soldiers) when they returned home into their Country, they exhibited them to the view of their Relations and Friends, and were received with great acclamation. It is not then to be admired if that people extended its Empire ſo far, being ſo ſtrict in their diſcipline, and in the obſervation of their puniſhments and rewards, towards ſuch as by the generoſity of their actions had merited the one, or by their offences the other; of which things I am of opinion the greateſt part ſhould be obſerved now. I think it not amiſs to mention one of their puniſhments, and it was this; The Criminal being convict before the Tribune or Conſul, was by him ſtrook gently over the ſhoulders with a rod, after which the Malefactor had liberty to run, but as he had liberty to run, ſo the reſt of the Soldiers had liberty to kill him if they could; ſo that immediately ſome threw ſtones at him, ſome darts, ſome ſtroke him with their Swords, ſome with one thing, ſome with another, ſo that his life was but ſhort, for ſeldom any eſcaped, and thoſe who did eſcape could not return to their houſes, but with ſo much ignominy and ſcandal, that they had much better have dyed. This ſort of puniſhment is in ſome meaſure uſed ſtill by the *Swiſſers* who cauſe thoſe who are condemned, to paſs thorow the Pikes, which is a puniſhment well contrived, and moſt commonly well executed; for he who would order things ſo that a man ſhould not ſide, or defend a Malefactor, cannot do better, than to make him an inſtrument of his puniſhment; becauſe with another reſpect he favours, and with another appetite he deſires his puniſhment, when he is Executioner himſelf, than when the execution is committed to another. To the end then that a Malefactor may not be favoured by the people, nor upheld in his offence, the beſt remedy is to refer him to their judgment. To confirm this, the example of *Manlius Capitolinus* may be brought, who being accuſed by the Senate, was defended by the people, till they were made his Judges; but when his caſe fell once into their Cognizance, and they were made Arbitrators in the buſineſs, they condemn'd him to death. This then is the true way of puniſhing, to prevent Seditions, and execute Juſtice. But becauſe neither fear of the Laws, nor reverence to men was ſufficient to keep Soldiers to their duties, and to a juſt obſervation of their diſcipline, the Ancients added the fear and authority of God. For this cauſe they made their Soldiers to ſwear with great Ceremony and Solemnity to preſerve their diſcipline, that if they tranſgreſs'd they might be in danger not only of humane Laws, but divine Juſtice, endeavouring by all induſtry to poſſeſs them with principles of Religion, however they were falſe.

Battiſt. I pray ſatisfie me whether the *Romans* permitted any Women in their Armies, and whether they ſuffered their Soldiers to game, as we do now adays in ours.

CHAP. VI.

The Ancients had neither Women, nor Gaming in their Armies; and of the manner how they diſcamp'd.

Fabr. THe *Romans* allowed neither the one nor the other, and indeed it required no great difficulty to prevent them; for to ſpeak truth, the exerciſes to which they kept the Soldier conſtantly, either in parties, or together were ſo many that they had no time either for dalliance or play, nor for any thing elſe that could make them mutinous or unſerviceable.

Battiſta. What you ſay pleaſes me very well: But pray tell me when your Army Diſcamps, what orders do you obſerve?

Fabritio. The General's Trumpet ſounds three times: The firſt ſound they take down the Tents, and the Pavillions, and pack them up: The ſecond ſound they load their Sumpters; and the third they march in the ſame order as I ſaid before, with their Baggage and

and Train behind every Battelia, and the Legions in the midſt. Then the Auxiliary Battalion moves, and its Baggage and Train after it, and a fourth part of the common Baggage and Train, which ſhould conſiſt of all thoſe who were lodged in either of the quarters which I have ſhown before in the deſcription of my Camp. Wherefore it was convenient that each of the ſaid quarters ſhould be aſſigned to a Battalion, that upon the motion of the Army every man might know in what place he was to march. So that every Battalion was to march with its own Baggage, and a fourth part of the common Baggage behind it, and this was the manner which the *Roman* Army obſerved in its march, as you may underſtand by what we have ſaid.

Battiſta. Tell us I beſeech you, in the placing of their Camps, did the *Romans* uſe any other cuſtoms beſides what you have related?

CHAP. VII.

The ſafety and health of a Camp is to be regarded, and it is by no means to be beſieged.

Fabr. I muſt tell you again that the *Romans* in their Encampments, were ſo conſtant to their old method, that to retain that they applyed themſelves with incredible diligence, not regarding what pains, or what trouble it required: But two things they obſerved with a curioſity more than ordinary; one was to place their Camp in an Air that was healthful and freſh. And the other was to place it where the Enemy might not eaſily beſiege them, or cut off their proviſions. To avoid the unhealthfulneſs of the place they avoided all fenny and boggiſh places, or where the wind was cold and unwholſome, which unwholſomneſs they did not ſo much compute from the ſituation of the place, as from the complexion of the Inhabitants, and when they found them ſwarthy or blowſy, they never encamped there. As to the other thing, never to be beſieged or ſtraightned by an Enemy: you muſt conſider the nature of the place both where your Friends are placed, and where your Enemies; and then to make your conjecture whether you can be beſieged or no. It is neceſſary therefore a General be very skilful in the ſituation of the Country, and that he have thoſe about him who underſtand it as well as he. Beſides this, there is another way of preventing diſeaſes, and that is by providing that no diſorder be uſed in your Army; for to keep it ſound and in health, the way is that your Army ſleep in Tents, That they be lodged as often as may be under Trees that are ſhady, (where they may have firing to dreſs their meat) that they may not be obliged to march in the heat. So that in the Summer time you muſt diſlodge them before day, and have a care in the Winter that they march not in the ſnow, nor upon the ice, without the convenience of fires. That they want not neceſſary cloths, nor be conſtrained to drink ill water; you muſt command the Phyſitians of the Army to have a particular care of thoſe who are ſick, for a General will find himſelf overlaid, when he is at once to contend with an Enemy and a Diſeaſe. But of all remedies, nothing is ſo powerful as exerciſe, and therefore it vvas a cuſtom among the Ancients to exerciſe them continually. Think then of vvhat importance exerciſe is, vvhen in the Camp it keeps you ſound, and in the Field it makes you Victorious.

CHAP. VIII.

Directions as to Proviſions.

Fabr. AS to Famine, you muſt not only have a care that the Enemy cannot cut off your Proviſions; but you muſt conſider from vvhat place you may be ſupplyed, and ſee that what you have already be not imbezled. It is convenient therefore that you have with you always a months Proviſion before hand, and then you are to oblige your Neighbours and Friends to furniſh you daily with more. You muſt likewiſe have a good Magazine for Amunition, in a ſtrong place, which is to be diſtributed with great care, giving every man a reaſonable proportion every day, and keep ſuch an eye over it, that want of it may occaſion no diſorder: for in matters of War every thing elſe may be repaired in time, but hunger the longer it laſts, will the more certainly deſtroy you. Nor will any Enemy that

that can maſter you with Famine, ever ſeek to attach you with his Arms; becauſe though the Victory be not ſo honourable, it is more eaſie and ſecure.

That Army therefore in which Juſtice is not obſerved: That Army which ſquanders and conſumes laviſhly as it pleaſes, cannot ſo well barricado, or fortifie its Camp, but that Famine will find the way in; for where juſtice is neglected, Victuals is not conſtantly ſupplyed; and where Soldiers are laviſh and profuſe, though they have plenty, it is quickly conſumed: For this cauſe among the Ancients it was commanded that the Soldiers ſhould eat what was given them, and at a prefixed time, for no Soldier durſt eat but when the General went to dinner; but every body knows how little this is obſerved in our days, and if then the Soldiers might be juſtly term'd ſober and orderly, they may now with as much juſtice be ſaid to be licentious and debauched.

Battiſta. When you began firſt to order your Camp, you told us you would not confine your ſelf to two Battalions, but take four, that you might ſhow us how a juſt and compleat Army was to be lodg'd: I deſire therefore that you would ſatisfie me in two things: One is, when I have either more or leſs than four Battalions, how I am to diſpoſe of them. The other is, what number of Soldiers would ſuffice you, to expect, and engage any Enemy whatever.

CHAP. IX.

How to lodge more or leſs than four Battalions, and what number of men is ſufficient to make head againſt an Enemy, be he as numerous as he may.

Fabr. TO your firſt demand I anſwer, that be your Army compoſed of more or leſs than four or ſix thouſand men you may increaſe or leſſen their lodgments as you pleaſe, and in the ſame manner, you may proceed to leſs or more *in infinitum*: Nevertheleſs when the *Romans* ioyn'd two Conſular Armies together, they made two Camps, and turned the place of the unarmed men one againſt the other.

To your ſecond demand I reply, That the ordinary *Roman* Army conſiſted of about 24000 men, but when by accident they were over-preſſed with numbers, they never exceeded 50000, with this number they oppoſed 200000 *Gauls* which aſſaulted them after their firſt War with the *Carthaginians*; with this number they oppoſed themſelves againſt *Hanibal*: and you muſt obſerve that the *Romans* and the *Greeks* always carried on their Wars with a few men, fortifying themſelves with their good order, and the excellence of their diſcipline; whereas the Eaſtern and Weſtern Nations did all by their multitudes, but the Weſtern people performed all by their natural fury, and the Eaſtern by their ſubmiſſion and obedience to their King. In *Greece* and in *Italy* where their natural fury, and their natural reverence to their King was not ſo great, it was neceſſary to apply themſelves to diſcipline, which was of ſuch efficacy, that it has made a ſmall Army prevail againſt the fury and natural obſtinacy of a greater. I ſay therefore that if you would imitate the *Romans* and the *Greeks*, you are not to exceed the number of 50000 men, but are rather to be fewer, becauſe more do but breed confuſion, and hinder the order and diſcipline that you have learn'd. *Pyrrhus* uſed ordinarily to ſay that with 15000 men he would go thorow the world.

But let us paſs now to another part of our diſcipline.

CHAP. X.

Certain Artifices, and Advertiſements of War.

Fabritio. WE have gained a Battel with our Army, and ſhown moſt of the accidents which may happen in it: We have cauſed it to march, and diſcourſed with what impediments it might be incumbered in its march, and at length we have brought it into its Camp, where it is to take not only a little repoſe after its travel and fatigues, but conſider and deliberate how it is to finiſh the War. For in the Camp many things are tranſacted, eſpecially there being an Enemy in the Field, and Towns to be ſuſpected of which it is good to ſecure your ſelf, and to reduce ſuch as are in hoſtility. It is neceſſary therefore

therefore to come to ſome demonſtrations, and paſs theſe difficulties with the ſame glory and honour with which we have proceeded thus far. To deſcend therefore to particulars, I ſay, that if many people or perſons have any thing in controverſy betwixt them to your advantage, and their own detriment, (as if they ſhould beat down the walls of their City, or ſend ſeveral of their Citizens into baniſhment) you muſt cajole them in ſuch manner that none of them may think it has any relation to them, to the end that neither of them relieving one another, they may all of them be oppreſſed without remedy; or elſe you muſt command all of them what they are to do the ſame day, that each of them believing himſelf particularly commanded, may think rather of obeying than looking out for a remedy; and by that means your commands be executed without ſedition or diſorder. If you ſuſpect the fidelity of a people, and would aſſure your ſelf of them, and ſurprize them unawares, you cannot do better than to communicate ſome deſign with them, deſire their aſſiſtance, and pretend to ſome farther enterprize, without the leaſt ombrage or ſuſpition of them: and by doing ſo, (not imagining you have any jealouſie of him) he will neglect his own defence, and give you opportunity of effecting your deſigns.

If you ſuſpect that there is any body in your Army that gives advice of your deſigns to the enemy; the beſt way to make your advantage of his treachery, is, to impart ſome things to him which you never intend to do; and to conceal what you intend; to pretend doubts where you are perfectly reſolved; and to conceal other things that you have abſolutely determined: by this means you will put the enemy upon ſome enterprize (upon preſumption that he knows your deſigns) in which you may eaſily circumvent and defeat him.

If you reſolve (as *Claudius Nero* did) to leſſen your Army, and ſend relief to your friend ſo privately that the enemy ſhould not perceive it; you muſt not take down your Tents, nor diminiſh the number of your hutts; but keep up your Enſigns, and preſerve your ranks intire, with the ſame fires and guards as before. If any ſupplies come up ſuddenly to your Army, and you would not have your enemy perceive you are reinforced, you muſt not augment the number of your Tents; for nothing is more uſeful than to keep ſuch accidents ſecret. *Metellus* being in *Spain* with his Army; one took the confidence to demand of him what he intended to do the next day: he replyed, *That if he thought his ſhirt knew, he would burn it.* *Marcus Craſus* being ask'd by one when he would diſcamp, anſwered him, *Are you the only man think you that will not hear the Trumpets?*

If you deſign to underſtand the ſecrets of your enemy, and to know his order and condition; you muſt do as others have done, ſend Embaſſadors to him, with wiſe and experienced Souldiers in their train, who may take their opportunity to view his Army, and conſider his ſtrength and weakneſs ſo, as may give occaſion to overcome him. Some have pretended to baniſh ſome one of their Confidents, and by that means had information of his enemies deſigns. They are diſcovered likewiſe ſometimes by the taking of priſoners: *Marius* whilſt he was at war with the *Cimbrians*, to feel the fidelity of the *Gauls*, (who at that time inhabited *Lombardy*, and were in League with the Romans) ſent to them two ſorts of Letters, one open, the other ſeal'd. In the Letters that were open, he writ that they ſhould not open thoſe which were ſealed till ſuch a time as he directed, before which time he ſent for them again, and finding them open, he found he was to repoſe no confidence there.

CHAP. XI.

How to rid ones ſelf of an Army that is preſſing upon ones heels.

Fabr. SEveral Generals have been invaded, and not marched their Army immediately againſt the enemy, but made an inroad into his Country, and conſtrained him to return to defend it; and this way has many times ſucceeded, becauſe yours are fleſh'd with victory, and loaden with plunder, whilſt the enemy is terrified, and inſtead of a hopeful victory, like to go by the loſs: ſo that they who have uſed this kind of diverſion, have many times proſpered. But this is practicable only to thoſe whoſe Country is ſtronger than the enemies Country; for if it be otherwiſe, that diverſion is pernicious. If a General be block'd up in his Camp by the enemy, he cannot do better than to propoſe an accord, or at leaſt a truce with him for ſome days, for that makes your enemy the more negligent in every thing; of which negligence you may take your advantage, and give him the ſlip. By this way *Silla* diſintangled himſelf twice, and cleared himſelf of his enemies: by the

ame artifice *Asdrubal* extricated himself in *Spain* from the forces of *Claudius Nero* who had block'd him up; it would likewise contribute much to the freeing a man from the power of the enemy, to do something (besides what has been said already) that may keep him in suspence. And this is to be done two ways, by assaulting him with part of your forces, that whilst he is employed upon them, the rest may have time to preserve themselves. There is another way likewise, and that is by contriving some new thing or other that may amuse or astonish the enemy, and render him uncertain which way he is to stear: so *Hanibal* served *Fabius Maximus* when he had shut him up on the mountains; for causing little wisps of brush-wood to be tied to the horns of several Oxen, he set them on fire; and *Fabius* not understanding the depth of the stratagem, supposing it worse than it was, kept upon his guard within his Camp, and suffered him to pass.

CHAP. XII.

How a man may make a Princes Favourite suspected, and divide his forces.

A General above all things is to endeavour to divide the enemies forces, either by rendering his Confidents suspicious; or by giving him occasion to separate his Troops, and by consequence weaken himself. The first is done by preserving the estates or goods of those he has about him; *as in* time of war, to spare their houses, or possessions; and returning their children or relations safe, and without ransome. You know when *Hanibal* burned all about *Rome*, he exempted what belonged to *Fabius Maximus*. You know how *Coriolanus* coming with a strong Army to besiege *Rome*, preserved the possessions of the Nobility. *Metellus* being at the head of an Army against *Jugurtha*, moved it to the Embassadors which the enemy sent to him, to deliver up *Jugurtha* prisoner, and writing Letters to them afterwards to the same purpose, he continued his correspondence till *Jugurtha* got the alarm, suspected his whole Counsel, and made them away after several manners.

When *Hanibal* was fled to *Antiochus*, the Roman Embassadors practised so cunningly, that *Antiochus* grew jealous, and trusted him no farther.

As to the way of dividing the enemy, there is not any more certain than to cause an incursion to be made upon his Country, that he may be constrained to leave the war, and go back to defend himself. This was the way which *Fabius* used when he had an Army against him of *French* and *Tuscans*, *Umbrians* and *Samnites*. *Titus Didius* having a small Army in respect of the enemy, expecting another Legion from *Rome*, which the enemy was desirous to intercept; he gave out in his Army that the next day he would give the enemy Battel, and ordered it so, that certain prisoners which he had in his Camp at that time, took their opportunity to escape, and gave intelligence to the enemy that the Consul had given orders to fight; upon which news, that they might not lessen their forces, they did not march against the other Legion, and by that means it was preserved; some there have been who to divide or weaken the force of their enemy, have suffered him to enter into their Country, and possess himself of several Towns, that by putting Garrisons into them, he may lessen his Army, and give them occasion to attack and defeat him. Others designing against one Province, have pretended to invade another, and used such industry in the business, that being entred unexpectedly into that Country, they have conquered it before the enemy had time to relieve it: for the enemy being uncertain whether you will return back and invade the Country which you threatned before, is constrained to keep his Post, and not to leave one place to secure another, and it falls out many times that he is unable to defend either the one or the other.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

In what manner ſeditions and mutinies in an Army are to be appeaſed.

Fabr. BEſides what has been ſaid already, it is of great uſe and reputation to a General, if he knows how to compoſe mutinies and diſſentions in his Army. The beſt way is by puniſhing the Ringleaders, but then it is to be done ſo neatly, that they may have their reward before they have news that it is intended. The way to do that is, if they be at any diſtance, to ſummon both nocent and innocent together, that they thinking themſelves ſafe, and not in danger of any puniſhment, may not be refractory, and ſtand upon their guard, but put themſelves quietly into your hands to be puniſhed. If they be preſent, and at hand, the General is to make himſelf as ſtrong as he can with thoſe who are innocent, and others in whom he can confide, and then puniſh as he thinks fit. When the quarrel is private, and among themſelves, the beſt way is to expoſe them to danger, and let them fight if they think good; for the fear of that does many times reconcile them. But above all things, there is nothing that keeps an Army ſo unanimous as the reputation of the General, which proceeds principally from his courage; for it is neither birth nor authority can do it without that.

The chief thing incumbent upon a General is to pay well, and puniſh well; for whenever the Souldiers want pay, 'tis but reaſonable that they ſhould want puniſhment; for you cannot in juſtice chaſtiſe any exorbitance in a Souldier, when you diſappoint him of his pay; nor can he forbear ſtealing, unleſs he be willing to ſtarve: but if you pay, and do not puniſh them, they are inſolent again; and you will become deſpicable in holding a Command that you are not able to manage, and by not maintaining your dignity and authority, of neceſſity tumults and diſorders muſt follow, which will be the utter ruine of your Army.

CHAP. XIV.

How the Ancients relyed much upon their auguries, and other accidents.

Fabr. THe Generals of old were ſubject to one moleſtation, from which in our days we are exempt: and that is how to pervert an ill augury, and interpret it to their advantage: for if an Arrow fell down in an Army: if the Sun or the Moon was eclipſed: if there hapned an Earth-quake, or it was the General's fortune to fall down, either as he got up on horſe-back, or diſmounted, it was look'd upon by the Souldiers as an ill omen, and was the occaſion of ſuch fear in them, that coming afterwards to a Battel they were eaſily beaten: and therefore the Generals in times paſt when ſuch an accident happened, immediately gave ſome reaſon for it, and referr'd it to ſome natural cauſe, or elſe wreſted and perverted it to their own profit and advantage.

Cæſar paſſing over into *Affrica*, tumbling down upon the ground as he came out of the Ship, graſping the graſs in his hands, he cryed out *Teneo te O Affrica*, Affrica *you are mine, for I have you in my hands.* And ſeveral others have given reaſons (according to their own intereſt) for the Earth-quakes and Eclipſes of the Moon: but in our daies theſe artifices cannot paſs, becauſe our men are not now ſo ſuperſtitious, and our Religion explodes ſuch opinions as heatheniſh and vain: but when ever we ſhould be ſo blind as to reaſſume thoſe ſuperſtitions, we muſt revive the cuſtome of the Ancients.

CHAP. XV.

That we are not to fight with an enemy reduced to deſpair; and ſeveral arts that may be uſed to ſurprize him.

Fabr. WHen famine, natural neceſſity, or humane paſſion has brought your enemy to ſuch deſpair, that impelled by that, he marches furiouſly to fight with you, you muſt keep within your Camp, and decline fighting as much as poſſibly you can. The *Lacedemonians* acted in that manner againſt the *Meſſeni*; *Cæſar* did the ſame againſt *Afranius* and *Petreius*. When *Fulvius* was Conſul againſt the *Cimbrians*, he cauſed his horſe to attack the enemy for ſeveral days together; and obſerving in what numbers they came forth to engage them, he placed an ambuſh one day behind their Camp, cauſed them again to be aſſaulted; and the *Cimbrians* iſſuing forth in their old numbers to encounter them; *Fulvius* fell in the mean time upon their Camp, entred it, and ſack'd it. Some Generals have made great advantage (when they lye near the enemies Army) to ſend out parties with the enemies Colours to plunder their own Country; for the enemy ſuppoſing them ſupplies ſent to relieve them, have iſſued forth to meet them, and aſſiſt them to plunder, whereby they have been put to diſorder, and given opportunity to the adverſary to overthrow them. *Alexander* of *Epirus* did the ſame againſt the *Sclavonians*: and *Leptene* the *Syracuſan* againſt the *Carthaginians*, and both with ſucceſs: many have been too hard for their enemies by giving them opportunity of eating and drinking too much, making a ſhew of being afraid, and leaving their Camp full of wine and proviſions; with which the enemy having gorg'd himſelf without meaſure, the others have fallen upon them with advantage, and put them to the ſword. *Tomyris* provided ſuch an entertainment for *Cyrus*; and *Tiberius Gracchus* regall'd the *Spaniards* in the ſame manner: others have poiſoned their meat and their drink, to ruine the enemy that way the more eaſily. I ſaid before, that I did not find it in any Hiſtory that the Romans did ever in the night place any Centinels without their Camp, ſuppoſing they omitted it to prevent the miſchiefs that might enſue; for it has been often ſeen that the Centinels which are placed abroad in the day-time to hear and deſcry the enemy, have been the deſtruction of thoſe who have ſent them; for being often times ſurprized by the enemy, they have been forced to give the ſignal with which they were to call their own men, and they coming immediately according to the ſign, have been all killed, or taken priſoners.

To over-reach and circumvent an enemy, it is good ſometimes to vary your cuſtome, that the enemy depending upon it, may be diſappointed and ruined. Thus it happened with a General, who being accuſtomed to give the ſignal of the approach of the enemy in the night by fire, and in the day time by ſmoak; commanded that they ſhould make ſmoke and fire together without intermiſſion, and that when the enemy came, they ſhould put them both out; the enemy ſuppoſing he was not perceived, (becauſe he ſaw no ſignal given) marched on in diſorder, and gave his adverſary the victory.

Memnon the *Rhodian* deſiring to draw his enemy out of his ſtrong hold, ſent one by the way of a fugitive into their Army, with news that *Memnon*'s Army was in a mutiny, and that the greateſt part of them were gone from him; and to confirm it the more, he cauſed diſorders and tumults to be pretended in his Camp; whereupon the enemy taking encouragement, advanced out of his hold to attack *Memnon*, but was cut off himſelf.

Beſides the things above-mentioned, great care is to be had never to bring your enemy to deſpair. *Cæſar* was very cautious of this in his war with the Germans, and opened a way for them, when he ſaw that not being able to fly, they muſt of neceſſity fight, and that more couragiouſly than otherwiſe; wherefore he choſe rather the trouble of purſuing them when they fled, than the danger of fighting them when they were forced to defend themſelves. *Lucullus* obſerving a party of his horſe going over to the enemy, cauſed a Charge to be ſounded immediately, and commanded other parties to follow them; whereupon the enemy believing *Lucullus* intended to fight, ſent out a party to charge thoſe *Macedonians* who were running away; and they did it ſo effectually, that the *Macedonians* were glad to ſtand upon their guard, by which means of fugitives intended, they became good Subjects in ſpight of their teeths.

CHAP. XVI.

How a ſuſpected Town or Country is to be ſecured, and how the Peoples hearts are to be gained.

Fabr. IT is a great thing in a General to know how to ſecure a Town that you ſuſpect, either after a Victory or before; as ſeveral ancient examples do demonſtrate. *Pompey* being jealous of the *Catinenſes*, beg'd of them that they would give entertainment to ſome of his ſick men, and under the diſguiſe of ſick, ſending ſtout and valiant men, they ſurprized the Town, and kept it for *Pompey*. *Publius Valerius* was diffident of the *Epidauni*, and cauſed a General indulgence to be given in one of the Churches without the Town, the people thronging thither for pardon, he ſhut the Gates upon them, and received none back again but ſuch as he could truſt. *Alexander* the great being to march into *Aſia*, and by the way ſecure himſelf of *Thrace*; carried along with him all the principal perſons of that Province, giving them commands in his Army, and leaving the people to be governed by thoſe of their own condition; by which means he ſatisfied all parties; the Nobility by paying them, and the Populace, by leaving no Governor that would oppreſs them. But among all the ways wherewith the people are to be cajoled, nothing goes ſo far as examples of chaſtity and juſtice, as that of *Scipio* in *Spain*, when he returned a beautiful young Lady to her Parents, and Husband untouched, a paſſage that contributed more than his Arms to the ſubduction of that Country. *Cæſar* only for paying for the wood which he cauſed to be cut down to make Stoccadoes about his Camp in *France*, got ſuch a name for his juſtice, that it facilitated the Conqueſt of that Province. I know not now that their remains any thing to ſay further about theſe accidents; or that there is any thing which we have not already examined. If there be any thing, it is the way of taking and defending of Towns, which I am willing to ſhow, were I ſure I ſhould not be tedious.

Battiſta. Your civility is ſo great, that it makes us purſue our deſires without the leaſt fear of preſumption; for you have offered us that frankly, which we ſhould have been aſhamed to have requeſted. We do aſſure you therefore you cannot do us a greater favour than to finiſh this diſcourſe; but before you proceed, let me entreat you to reſolve me, whether it be better to continue a War all Winter long (as they do now adays) or carry it on only in the Summer, and in the Winter go to their Quarters.

CHAP. XVII.

War is not to be continued in the Winter.

Fabr. OBſerve Gentlemen, had it not been for the prudence of *Battiſta*, a very conſiderable part of our diſcourſe had been omitted: I tell you again that the Ancients did every thing with more prudence and diſcretion than we, who if we be defective in any thing, are much more in matters of War.

Nothing is more imprudent and dangerous for a General than to begin a War in the Winter; and he who is the agreſſor is more liable to miſcarry, than he that is invaded. The reaſon is this, all the induſtry employed in Military Diſcipline, conſiſts in preparing your men and putting them into order for a Battel. That is it, at which a General is principally to aim, becauſe a Battel does commonly decide the buſineſs, whether it be loſt or won. He therefore who knows beſt how to put his Army in order; and he who knows beſt how to prepare and equip them, has doubtleſs the advantage, and is in moſt hopes to overcome. On the other ſide, nothing is more inconſiſtent with good order than ſteep places, or cold rainy weather; for ſteep places will not ſuffer you to open or extend your ranks according to diſcipline; cold and wet weather will not permit you to keep your men together, nor preſent them in cloſe order before the Enemy, but conſtrains you of neceſſity to lodge them up and down, aſunder without order, at the mercy of all the Caſtles, and Towns, and Villages that receive you; ſo that all the pains you have taken to diſcipline your Army, is (for that time) utterly uſeleſs.

Do not admire, If now adays we make War in the Winter, for our Armies being without diſcipline, it is not to be imagined what inconveniences they ſuffer by not being quartered

tered together; for it troubles them not, that they cannot keep thoſe orders, and obſerve that diſcipline which they never had. Yet it ought ſeriouſly to be conſidered what prejudice has followed upon encampments in the Winter: and it ought likewiſe to be remembred that the *French* in the year 1503. were broken and ruined near *Garigliano*, rather by the extremity of the weather, than the magnanimity of the *Spaniards*. For as I told you before, the Invador is under greateſt incommodity, as being more expoſed to the weather in an Enemies Country, than at home: for to keep his men together he is neceſſitated to endure the cold and the rain; or to avoid it, to divide his men, which is mightily to expoſe them. But he who is upon the defenſive part can chooſe his place and his way, attend him with freſh men, which he can joyn in a moment, and fall upon ſome party of the Enemies with ſuch fury, as they will not be able to endure the ſhock. It was the weather therefore which diſordered the *French*, and 'tis the weather that will always ruine any man that begins War in Winter, if his adverſary have any ſhare of diſcretion. He therefore who would have his force, his order, his diſcipline, and his courage of no uſe or advantage to him, let him keep the field, and carry on his War in the Winter: For the *Romans* (who deſired all thoſe things in which they employed their induſtry and diligence ſhould be uſeful to them) avoided the incommodities of Winter, as much, as the aſperities of the Alps, the difficulty of places, and whatever elſe might hinder them from ſhowing their dexterity and courage. And thus much as to your demand, we will diſcourſe now of taking and defending of Towns, and of their Natural, and Artificial ſtrength.

THE SEVENTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

How Towns, or Caſtles are to be fortified.

Fabr. YOu muſt underſtand that Towns and Caſtles are ſtrong two ways, by Nature or by Art. They are ſtrong by Nature which are encompaſſed by Rivers or Fens, (as *Mantua*, and *Ferrara*) or ſeated upon ſome Rock, or craggy Mountain (as *Monaco*, and *Sanleo*) for other places ſeated upon Mountains, if not difficult of acceſs, are in our days rather weeker than otherwiſe, in reſpect of our Artillery and Mines: and therefore at preſent being to build a City, or erect a Fort that may be ſtrong, we chooſe to do it in a Plain, and fortifie it artificially with Ramparts and Baſtions, and our firſt care is to make the Walls crooked and retort, with ſeveral Vaults and places of receipt, that if the Enemy attempts to approach, he may be oppoſed and repulſed as well in the flank as the front: If your Walls be made too high, they are too obnoxious to the Cannon; if they be too low, they are eaſily ſcaled; if you make a Ditch before the Wall: to make the *Scalado* more difficult, the Enemy fills it up (which with a great Army is no hard matter) and makes himſelf Maſter immediately. My opinion therefore is this (but with ſubmiſſion to better judgments) that to provide againſt both inconveniences the beſt way will be to make your Wall high, and a Ditch on the inſide rather than without; and this is the ſtrongeſt way that you can build, becauſe it keeps you both from their Artillery and aſſaults, and gives the Enemy no capacity of filling up the Ditch. Your Wall then is to be of the beſt height you can contrive; three yards thick at the leaſt to reſiſt their Batteries; it is to have Towers and Bulwarks at the diſtance of every 200 yards. The Ditch within is to be 30 yards broad at leaſt, and 12 in depth; and all the earth which is taken out of the Ditch is to be thrown towards the Town,

Town, againſt a Wall which is to be brought for that purpoſe from the bottom of the Ditch, and carried up a man's height above the ground, which will make the Ditch more deep and ſecure. Towards the bottom of the Ditch every two hundred yards, I would have a Caſemat from whence the Artillery may ſcour, and play upon any body that ſhall deſcend. The great Guns which are uſed for the defence of a Town, are to be planted behind the Wall on the inſide of the Ditch; for to defend the firſt wall, Falcons and ſuch ſmall Pieces are eaſier managed, and do as good Execution. If the Enemy comes to ſcale you, the height of the firſt Wall defends you eaſily: If he comes with his Artillery, he muſt batter down the firſt Wall, and when he has done that, it being Natural in all Batteries for the Wall and rubbiſh to fall outward, there being no Ditch without to ſwallow and receive it, the ruines of the Wall will encreaſe the depth of the Ditch, in ſuch manner as that you cannot get forward, being obſtructed by the ruines, hindred by the Ditch, and interrupted by the Enemies great Guns within the Walls that do great ſlaughter upon you. The only remedy in this caſe is to fill up the Ditch, which is very hard in reſpect of its dimenſions, and the danger in coming to it, the Wall being crooked, and Vaulted, and full of Angles, among which there is no coming without manifeſt hazard, for the reaſons aboveſaid; and to think to march with Faggots over the ruines, and to fill it up that way is a chimerical thing; ſo that I conclude a City ſo fortified is not to be taken.

Battiſta. If one ſhould make a Ditch without, beſides that within the Wall, would not your Town be the ſtronger?

Fabr. Yes, without doubt; but my meaning is, if one Ditch only be to be made, it is better within than without.

Battiſta. Would you have water in your Ditch, or would you rather have it dry?

Fabr. Opinions are divided in that point; for Ditches with water are more ſecure againſt Mines, and Ditches without are harder to be filled up: But upon conſideration of the whole, I would have them without water, becauſe they are more ſecure; for it has been ſeen, that the freezing of the Ditch in the Winter has been the taking of many a Town, as it hapned at *Mirandola* when Pope *Julius* beſieged it: And to prevent Mines, I would carry my Ditch ſo low, that whoever would think to work under it, ſhould come to the water. Caſtles I would build (as to my Ditches and Walls) in the ſame manner, that they might have as much trouble who ſtormed them. But let me give one caution to any man who defends a City, and it is this, that he makes no redoubts without, at any diſtance from the Wall, and another to him that builds and fortifies a Caſtle, and that is, that he makes no works within for retreats in caſe the firſt Wall be taken.

The reaſon that makes me give this Counſel is, becauſe no man ought to do that which may leſſen his reputation at firſt; for the diminution of that makes all his other orders contemptible, and diſcourages thoſe who have undertaken his defence. And this that I ſay will always happen when you make Baſtions without, and oblige your ſelf to defend them, they will certainly be loſt, for ſuch ſmall things being now adays to contend with the fury of Artillery, 'tis impoſſible they ſhould hold out, and the loſs of them being a leſſening to your reputation, the leſſening of your reputation will be the loſs of the place. When *Genoua* rebelled againſt *Lewis* King of *France*, he cauſed certain Baſtions to be erected upon the Hills which were about the Walls, which Baſtions were no ſooner loſt (and they were loſt preſently) but the City was taken.

As to my ſecond advice, I do affirm that there is nothing ſo pernicious to a Caſtle as to have thoſe works of retreat; for the hopes that men have of preſerving themſelves by deſerting their Poſts, makes them abandon them often, and the loſs of their Poſts, is afterwards the loſs of the Fort. We have a freſh example of this in the taking of the Caſtle at *Furli*, when the Counteſs *Catharina* defended it againſt *Cæſar Borgia*, the Son of *Alexander* VI. who had brought the *French* Army before it. This Caſtle was full of thoſe retreats; for firſt there was a Citadel, than a Fortreſs, and betwixt both a good Ditch with a draw bridge. The Caſtle within was divided into three parts, and each part ſtrongly ſeparated from the other with Ditches and Water, and Draw-bridges, by which they communicated. As ſoon as the Duke had made his approaches, he with his great Guns battered one part of the Caſtle, and laid open a good part of the Wall; whereupon *Giovanni da Caſale* who had the command of that quarter, never ſtood to make good the breach, but left it to retire into another part, ſo that the Enemy having entered the firſt quarter with little difficulty, it was not long before they made themſelves Maſters of all, by ſecuring the Draw-bridges (in the hurry) which conveyed them one to another: This Caſtle therefore which was thought inexpugnable was loſt by two faults; one was for having ſo many Redoubts; the other was becauſe none of them commanded the Bridges; the ill contrivance therefore of the Fortreſs, and the imprudence of him that defended it, was a ſhame

and

and diſappointment of the magnanimous enterprize of the Counteſs, who had the courage to expect an Army which neither the King of *Naples*, nor the Duke of *Milan* had the confidence to attend. Yet though ſhe miſcarried in her deſigns, ſhe reaped the honour which her magnanimity deſerved, as appeared by many Epigrams compoſed in thoſe times in her praiſe. If then I were to erect a Fort, I would do it with as ſtrong Walls, and with as good Ditches as I have preſcribed; and within it, I would build only houſes for habitation, and thoſe low and weak, and ſuch as ſhould not hinder the proſpect of all the Walls, from thoſe who were in the *Piazza*; that the Commander might have the advantage to diſcern with his eye from the main guard, whither he was to direct his ſupplies, and that every man might underſtand when the Wall and the Ditch was loſt, the Caſtle was not to be kept. And when I made any redoubts and retrenchments within, I would do it in ſuch manner that they ſhould each of them command the Bridges which ſhould be rais'd upon Pillars in the middle of the Ditch.

Battiſta. You have ſaid that ſmall places are not to be defended in our days, and I ſuppoſe I have heard quite contrary; that is to ſay, the leſſer a place is, the better it is defenſible.

Fabritio. You were then miſinformed, for no place can be now adays ſtrong, where the defenders have not room for new Ramparts and Retrenchments to retire to; for ſuch is the fury of the Artilery, that he who preſumes upon the protection of one Wall or one Rampart, will find himſelf deceived. And becauſe Baſtions or Forts (provided they do not exceed their juſt meaſure, for in that caſe they will be rather Caſtles and Towns) are not made in ſuch manner that there is ſpace to retreat, they muſt preſently be loſt. It is wiſdom therefore to place theſe Baſtions without, and to fortifie within, eſpecially the entrys into the Towns, and to ſecure the Gates with Ravelins, ſo as that no body may come in or go out in a direct line, and that from the Ravelin to the Gate there may be a Ditch with a Draw-bridge. The Gates are to be fortified with Portculliſſes, to receive their men back again into the Town when they have gone out to engage the Enemy, and when it happens that they are repulſed, and the Enemy purſues, that they may diſtinguiſh betwixt their own men and the Enemy, and prevent their entring Pell-mell amongſt them. To this purpoſe Portculliſſes (which the Ancients called *Cateratte* or Pigion-holes) were invented, which being let down excluded the Enemy, and preſerved their Friends, whereas without them, neither Bridges nor Gates would be of any uſe, being poſſeſſed by the multitude.

Battiſta. I have ſeen theſe Portculliſſes of which you ſpeak in *Germany*; and they were made of bars of wood in the faſhion of Iron Grates, whereas ours are made of maſſy Rafters or Girders all of a piece, now I would willingly be informed from whence this difference proceeded, and which is moſt effectual.

Fabr. I tell you again, that the ways, and cuſtoms and orders of War are laid aſide all the world over, in reſpect of what was uſed among the Ancients, but in *Italy* they are utterly forgot, and if there be any thing better than other, we have it from the *Ultramontani*, or Northern Nations. You may have heard, and perhaps ſome of theſe Gentlemen may remember how weakly we fortified before the coming of *Charles* 8 into *Italy*, in the year 1494. The battlements of our Walls were made but half a yard thick; the Port-holes for our great Guns, and Muſquets or ſmall ſhot were made narrow without, wide within, with many other defects which I ſhall forbear to mention, leſt I ſhould become tedious; for thoſe thin battlements were quickly beaten down, and our Guns were as eaſily diſmounted.

But now adays we have learn'd of the *French* to make our battlements large and thick, and our Port-holes large within, cloſe again in the middle, and wide again without; by which means our Artillery are not ſo eaſily diſmounted, nor our Soldiers beaten from their Works. Beſides theſe the *French* have ſeveral other good ways, which our Soldiers have not ſeen, and ſo have not ſo much as conſidered; and among the reſt thoſe open Portculliſſes like grates is one, and they are much better than ours, for if to defend and fortifie your Gate, you have a cloſe Portcullis, when you let it down to keep out the Enemy, you ſhut up your ſelves, and cannot afterwards do him any hurt, ſo that with Pick-axes, Hatchets, Petards, or fire, he may do what he pleaſe without any interruption. But if your Portcullis be made Lettice-wiſe and tranſparent, when it is let down thorough thoſe holes and intervals you may defend it with your Pikes, ſmall ſhot, or any other kind of Arms.

Battiſta. I have obſerved in *Italy* another Northern invention, and that is to make the wheels of your Carriages for your great Guns with ſpokes crooked or bending towards the Axel-tree, Now I would gladly know the reaſon of that way, becauſe to me the ſtraight ſpokes ſeem ſtronger.

Fabr.

Fabr. Do not imagine that things which deviate from common uſe, are done by accident; or if you fancy they were made in that faſhion for beauty, you are miſtaken; for where force and ſtrength is required, they never ſtand upon beauty; but the reaſon why they were changed, was becauſe theſe kind of ſpokes are much more ſecure and ſtrong; and the reaſon they are ſtronger is this; when a Carriage is loaden, it is either equally poiz'd, or hang'd too much on one ſide. When it is equally poiz'd, the wheels bear equally, and the weight being equally diſtributed, does not burthen them much: But when it inclines to one ſide, the weight lyes all upon one of the wheels: If the ſpokes be made ſtreight, they are eaſily broken, for when ever the wheel bends, the ſpoke bends with it, as being unable to keep up the weight, ſo that when the weight is well poiz'd, or is otherwiſe but moderate, your ſtraight ſpokes are ſtrong enough, but when your Carriage goes awry, and enclines to one ſide, they are too weak to ſupport it. On the contrary, the ſpokes of your *French* Carriages that are made bending, are made ſo with great reaſon, for when a Carriage enclines to one ſide, the ſpokes on that ſide being made bending, will come to be ſtreight, and will be able to ſuſtain the whole weight better, than when it hangs equal, and (being crooked) bears but half. But to return to our Towns and our Caſtles. The *French*, beſides what we have mentioned, have another way of ſecuring their Gates, and for the ſallying and retiring of their Soldiers during a Siege, than I have yet ſeen practiſed in *Italy*: and it is this, On the outward point of the Draw-bridge they ſet up two Pillars, and upon each of them they faſten a beam in ſuch manner that one half of it hangs over the Bridge, and the other half without. Then that part which is without the Bridge, they joyn together with Croſs bars like a grate, and to the end of each of the beams that hang over the Bridge, they faſten a chain: when therefore they would ſhut up the Bridge, ſo as no body ſhould come in from without, they looſen the chains, and let down that part of it that is made with croſs bars, which ſhuts up the Bridge; when they would open the Bridge, they dravv the chains, and that part comes up again, and it is to he raiſed gradually, ſo as to receive a man on Foot, and no Horſe, or a Horſeman as they pleaſe, and it is raiſed or let dovvn vvith unimaginable dexterity. This vvay is better than your Portculliſſes, becauſe they can hardly be hindred by the Enemy from being let dovvn, not falling in a direct line as your Perculliſſes do, vvhich are eaſily ſtop'd by putting any thing under them. They then who would make a Town ſtrong, are to do it in the ſame manner as I have preſcribed.

Moreover they are to prohibit Cultivation or building within a Mile round; all ſhould be a plain without any hills, houſes, banks or trees to hinder the proſpect of the beſieged, or give any ſhelter to the Enemy in his approaches. And you muſt know that where the Ditch is without the Walls, and there are eminencies above the level of the Country, that Town is but weak; for thoſe eminences are blinds to the Enemy in their approaches, and when they are poſſeſs'd, they are convenient for their Batteries: But let us paſs on and come into the Town.

CHAP. II.

What order is to be obſerved by him who ſhuts himſelf up in a Town, with reſolution to defend it.

Fabr. I will not loſe ſo much time as to ſhew you how convenient it is (beſides what has been ſaid before) to have your ſtores of Ammunition and Victuals, becauſe they are things that every body knows cannot be wanted, and without them all other proviſions are vain. Two things then are generally to be obſerved, you are to ſecure what you can poſſibly to your ſelf, and to prevent the Enemy of any commodity, eſpecially in your own precincts. Wherefore if there be any ſtraw, or Corn, or Cattle that you cannot carry off into the Town, you muſt be ſure to deſtroy it. He who undertakes the defence of a Town is likewiſe to obſerve this order, not to ſuffer any thing to be done tumultuouſly and diſorderly, and to provide that upon every accident, every man may know what he is to do, and the way is by cauſing the Women, Children, old, lame and infirm to keep within their Houſes, and leave the Town to be defended by thoſe who are vigorous and ſtrong, who being armed as is requiſite, are to be diſtributed into all places, ſome upon the Walls, ſome at the Gates, ſome in the principal places of the City, to relieve their Companions upon any diſtreſs; another party there ſhould be likewiſe, not obliged to any particular place, but always ready to ſuccour where neceſſity is required; & things being thus ordered,

ſcarce any Sedition can happen to diſorder you. Again, there is one thing I will recommend to your memories, both in the beſieging and defending of a Town: And that is, that there is nothing animates an Enemy ſo much, or gives him ſuch hopes of carrying a Town, as when he knows his adverſary has not been uſed to the ſight of an Enemy; for many times fear only without any experiment of their ſtrength, has cauſed a Town to be ſurrendred: He therefore who comes before a City ſo qualified is to make all the ſhows and oſtentations of terror that he can; and on the other ſide, he who is aſſaulted, is to oppoſe men of reſolution and courage, and ſuch as are not to be terrified with ſhows, nor any thing but force and violence of Arms; for if the firſt brunt be ſuſtained, the beſieged are encouraged, and the beſiegers will have no hopes left but in their reputation and valour.

The Ancients had ſeveral inſtruments of War with which they defended their Towns, as Rams, Scorpions, Bows, Slings, Clubs, *&c.* Again, they had ſeveral Engines which they uſed in their Leaguers, as Rams, Towers of wood, *Vineæ*; They had alſo their *Falx*, their *Pluteus*, *Teſtudo*, and others; inſtead of which, we now make uſe of Artillery which is uſeful both for him that is beſieged, as well as him that beſieges. But to return.

CHAP. III.

Advertiſements for ſuch as are diſtreſſed for Proviſions within a Town, and for ſuch as beſiege them, and would reduce them to that neceſſity.

Fabr. HE who takes upon him the defence of a Town, is to ſee ſuch proviſion made both of Victuals and Ammunition, that he may be in no danger of loſing it, either by ſtarving or ſtorm. As to ſtarving (as is ſaid before) it is neceſſary before the ſiege be laid, that you furniſh your ſelf well with Victuals; but becauſe ſuch proviſion cannot be made, but a long ſiege may exhauſt it, you muſt betake to extraordinary ways, and look out for friends that may relieve you, eſpecially if you have a River running thorow the Town. Thus the *Romans* did when their friends were beſieged by *Hanibal* in the Caſtle of *Catalino*, for not being able to relieve them otherwiſe, they flung great quantities of Nuts into the River which were carried down by the ſtream in deſpight of the Enemy, and gave the Garriſon very good relief. Some who have been beſieged, to make their Enemy believe that they had plenty of Corn, and render them deſperate of carrying them by ſtarving, have thrown bread over their Walls; or elſe given Corn to ſome of their Cows, and ſuffered her afterwards to be taken by the Enemy, that when they kill'd her, they might find Corn in her paunch, and conclude that Corn was as plentiful in the Town as in the Camp. On the other ſide, wiſe Generals have uſed as much Art and Stratagem for the reduction of Towns: *Fabius* permitted the *Campani* to ſow their ground, that preſuming upon it, they might make no other proviſion, and he came afterwards and utterly deſtroyed it.

Dionyſius having beſieged *Rhegium*, pretended a treaty, and whilſt things were in tranſaction, he provided himſelf with Victuals with all poſſible diligence, but when he had effectually ſupplyed himſelf, he brake off the treaty, block'd them up again, and conſtrained them to ſurrender.

Alexander the great being deſirous to reduce *Lucadia*, he took, plundered, and deſtroyed all the Caſtles about it, but gave the Garriſons ſafe Conduct to *Lucadia*, by which policy he ſo throng'd them with men, that their numbers quickly diſtreſs'd them, and they were forced to ſurrender.

CHAP. IV.

Other advertiſements both for the beſiegers and the beſieged.

Fabr. IN matters of aſſault, I ſay, the firſt thing to be provided againſt, is the Enemies firſt Effort; for by that way the *Romans* gain'd many a Town, aſſaulting it ſuddenly, and in all places at once, and this they called *Aggredi urbem Corona*, or to make a general aſſault, as *Scipio* did when he took new *Carthage* in *Spain*. But if the beſieged can ſtand the firſt ſhock, it gives him ſuch courage, he will hardly be taken afterwards.

And

And if things ſhould go ſo far, that a breach ſhould be made, and the Enemy enter; yet the Citizens have their remedy if they will ſtand to one another: for many Armies have been repelled, and defeated after they have entered a Town. The remedy is this, that the Inhabitants make good the higheſt places of the City, and fire upon them from the windows and tops of their houſes. But againſt this the Aſſailers have made uſe of two inventions, one was to open the Gates of the City, and give the Inhabitants opportunity to eſcape; The other is, to make Proclamation, that whoever throws down his Arms, ſhall have quarter, and none put to the Sword but ſuch as are taken in Arms; and this artifice has been the taking of many a Town. Moreover a Town is taken with more eaſe, when it is ſo ſuddenly attacked, as when an Army keeps at ſuch a diſtance, as that the Town believes either you will not at all, or cannot attempt it before they ſhall have the alarm of your motion, becauſe it is at preſent ſo far off. Wherefore if you can come upon them ſuddenly and ſecretly, not once in twenty times but you will ſucceed in your deſign.

I ſpeak very unwillingly of the occurrences of our times, becauſe it muſt be done with reflection upon me and my friends; and if I ſhould diſcourſe of other people, I ſhould not know what to ſay. Nevertheleſs I cannot paſs by the example of *Cæſar Borgia* (called Duke *Valentino*) who being with his Army at *Nocera*, under pretence of making an inroad into the Dutchy of *Camerin*, turned ſuddenly upon the State of *Urbin*, and maſter'd it without any trouble in one day, which another man would not have been able to have effected in a much longer time.

CHAP. V.

A man is not to depend upon the Countenance of the Enemy, but is rather to to ſuſpect what even he ſees with his eyes.

Fabr. THoſe who are beſieged, are to be very careful of the tricks and ſurprizes of the Enemy, and therefore they are not to relye upon the countenance that he carries, but are rather to ſuſpect there is ſome fraud or deceit that will fall heavily upon them, if they ſuffer themſelves to be deluded.

Domitius Calvinus beſieging a Town, made it his cuſtom every day to march round about the Walls with a good part of his Army: The Garriſon fancying by degrees that it it was only for his recreation, began to ſlacken their Guards, of which *Domitius* having notice, fell ſuddenly upon them, and carried the Town.

Other Generals have had intelligence of relief that was expected in the Town, and having habited a certain number of their Soldiers, and diſpoſed them under counterfeit Enſigns, like thoſe which the beſieged expected, they were received into the Gates, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the Town. *Cimon* an Athenian General having a deſign to ſurprize a Town, in the night ſet fire on a Temple that was without it, and the Inhabitants flocking out to extinguiſh the fire, they fell into an Ambuſcado and loſt their Town. Others having taken ſome of the Servants, and ſuch people as came forth for forrage, put them to the Sword, and diſguiſing their own Soldiers in their Cloths have entred the Gates, and made themſelves Maſters of the Town.

CHAP. VI.

How to diſfurniſh a Garriſon of its men, and to bring a terror upon a Town.

Fabr. THe Ancients have (beſides theſe) made uſe of ſeveral Stratagems and Artifices to unfurniſh the Enemies Garriſons of their men: When *Scipio* was in *Affrica*, being deſirous to poſſeſs himſelf of ſome of the Garriſons, which the *Carthaginians* had in their cuſtody, he made many offers to beſiege them, but pretending fear, he not only drew off on a ſudden, but marched away with his Army to a great diſtance. *Hanibal* ſuppoſing his apprehenſion real, to follow him with the greater force, drew out his Garriſons, which *Scipio* underſtanding ſent *Maſſiniſſa* to ſurprize them, and he did it with ſucceſs. *Pyrrhus* making War in *Sclavonia*, advanced againſt the chief Town in that Province, in the defence of which Town, ſeveral people having got together, he pretended

to deſpair of carrying it by force, and turning his Arms againſt other Towns which were not viſibly ſo ſtrong, he proſpered ſo well in his deſign, that the ſaid Town drawing out a good part of its Garriſon in relief to their Neighbours, left it ſelf ſo weak, as it became a prey to the Enemy. Many have corrupted and defiled the waters, and turned Rivers out of their Channels, to make themſelves Maſters of a Town, and have miſcarried when they have done. It is a way likewiſe that contributes much to the taking of a Town to affright them with reports, as of ſome great Victory that you have obtained, ſome great ſupplies that you have received, and an obſtinate reſolution if they do not ſurrender quickly to put them all to the Sword.

CHAP. VII.

To corrupt a Garriſon, and take it by treachery.

Fabr. SOme Generals of old have endeavoured to take Towns by treachery, by corrupting ſome of the Garriſon, and they have done it ſeveral ways: Some have ſent of their own men as fugitives into the Town, thereby to put them into credit and authority with the Enemy, and give them opportunity to betray them. Some by this means have diſcovered the ſtrength of the Garriſon, and by that diſcovery have taken the Town. Some under feigned pretences have ſtopped up the Gates of a Town from ſhutting, with a Cart, or beam, or ſuch kind of thing, and given their party the convenience of entring. *Hanibal* beſieging the Town of *Tarentum* in *Calabria*, which was defended by the *Romans* under the Conduct of *Levius*, corrupted a perſon in the Garriſon called *Eoneus*, and ordered him that he ſhould go out a hunting in the night, and pretend he durſt not do it in the day for fear of the Enemy. *Eoneus* obſerved his directions, went out and in ſeveral nights together, and the Guards had not the leaſt ſuſpition; at length *Hanibal* diſguizing ſome of his men in the habit of Huntſmen, ſent them in after him, who killed the Guards, poſſeſſed themſelves of the Gates, and let *Hanibal* into the Town. A Garriſon is likewiſe to be cheated by drilling them a good diſtance out of Town, and pretending to fly when they come to charge you. Many (and *Hanibal* among the reſt) have ſuffered their Camps to be poſſeſſed by the Enemy, that they might have opportunity to clap between with their Army, and get into the Town. Again, they are ſometimes deluded by pretending to raiſe the Siege as *Formio* the Athenian did, who having plundred and harraſſed the Country of *Calcidon*, received their Embaſſadors afterwards with propoſitions of Peace: He gave them very good words, and ſent them back full of ſecurity and fair promiſes, upon which the poor people preſuming too much, *Formio* fell ſuddenly upon them, and overcame them. Thoſe who are ſhut up in a Town, are to keep a ſtrict eye upon ſuch as they have any reaſon to ſuſpect, but they are ſometimes to be ſecured and obliged to you by preferment as well as by puniſhment. *Marcellus* knew that *Lucius Baucius* the *Nolan* was a great favourer of *Hanibal*, yet he carryed himſelf to him with ſo much kindneſs and generoſity, that of an Enemy, he made him his intimate Friend.

CHAP. VIII.

Good Guard is to be kept in all places and times.

Fabr. THoſe who are in any fear of being beſieged, are to keep diligent guard as well when the Enemy is at a diſtance, as at hand: and they are to have moſt care of thoſe places where they think themſelves moſt ſecure; for many Towns have been loſt by being aſſaulted on that ſide where they thought themſelves impregnable; and this miſcarriage ariſes from two cauſes; either becauſe the place is really ſtrong and believed inacceſſible; or elſe becauſe of the policy of the Enemy, who with great clamour and noiſe pretends to ſtorm it on one ſide, whilſt on the other he does it as vigorouſly, but with all the ſilence imaginable. And therefore it concerns the beſieged to be very careful, and keep good Guards upon the Walls, eſpecially in the night, and that as well with Dogs as with Men, for if they be fierce and watchful, they will give an alarm (if the Enemy approaches) as ſoon as any thing: And not only Dogs, but Birds have been known to have preſerved a Town, as it happen'd to the *Romans*, when the *French* beſieged the Capitol: when the

Spartans

Spartans lay before *Athens*, *Alcibiades* to diſcover how his watches were kept, commanded that in the night when-ever he held up a light, each of the Guards ſhould hold up another, and great puniſhment was to be inflicted upon any that neglected it. *Iſocrates* killed a Centinel that he found a-ſleep, with this expreſſion, *I leave him as I found him.*

CHAP. IX.

Ways to write privately to ones Friends.

Fabr. THoſe who have been beſieged have contrived ſeveral ways of conveying intelligence to their friends; not daring to truſt their affairs to the tongue of a meſſenger, they write in cyphers many times, and conceal them ſeveral ways. The cyphers are made according to every mans fancy, and the ways of concealing them are divers: ſome have writ on the in-ſide of a ſcabard of a Sword; others have put their Letters up in Paſte, baked it, and then given it for ſuſtenance to the meſſenger that is to carry it: ſome have hid them in their privities; ſome in the collar of the meſſenger's dog.

There is another very uſeful and ingenious way, and that is by writing an ordinary Letter about your private affairs, and afterwards betwixt every two lines to write your intrigues with a certain kind of water that will never be diſcovered but by dipping it into other water, or by holding it to the fire; and by ſo doing the Letters will be viſible. And this trick has been very ſubtilly practiſed in our times, in which a certain perſon having a deſire to ſignify a ſecret to ſome of his friends, and not daring to truſt it to a meſſenger, he ſent out Letters of Excommunication written very formally, but interlined as aboveſaid, and cauſed them to be fixed to the doors of the Churches, which being known to his friends by ſome private marks, they underſtood the whole buſineſs: and this is a very good way, for he who carries it may be deceived, and he that writes it is in no great danger.

There are a thouſand other ways invented according to every mans fancy and wit. But it is much eaſier to write to thoſe who are block'd up in a Town, than for thoſe who are beſieged to write to their friends abroad, becauſe theſe Letters cannot be conveyed but by ſomebody who muſt pretend to run away out of the Town, which is a hard and a dangerous thing, if the enemy be any thing careful. But 'tis otherwiſe with Letters to be ſent into a Town, for a man has a thouſand occaſions to come into a Leaguer, where he may watch his opportunity, and ſlip into the Town.

CHAP. X.

How to repair a breach, and the way to defend it.

Fabr. BUt let us come now to the preſent way of beleaguering of Towns: I ſay, that if you be aſſaulted in a Town that is not fortified with ditches on the in-ſide, (as I have mentioned before) that your enemy may not enter at the breaches which the Artillery make, (for againſt other breaches there is no remedy) it is neceſſary whilſt the Artillery is playing, to cut a new ditch behind the breach of at leaſt thirty yards wide, and to throw all the earth that comes out of it towards the Town, that it may make a good Rampart, and adde to the depth of the ditch; and this work is to be carried on with ſuch diligence, that when the wall falls, the ditch may be at leaſt five or ſix yards deep; and whilſt they are at work to make this ditch, it is neceſſary that they be ſecured with two Caſemats, that may flank the enemy in caſe he ſhould endeavour to diſturb them: and if the wall be ſo ſtrong as to give you time to make your ditch and your caſemats; that part which is battered will be the ſtrongeſt part about the Town; for that Rampart will be of the ſame form and model which we propoſed for the ditch within. But where the wall is ſo weak as to allow you no time, then you muſt ſhew your courage, and preſent your ſelf bravely at the breach, your Souldiers well arm'd, and with as much chearfulneſs as is poſſible. This way of throwing up new works was obſerved by the Piſans when you beſieged it, and they might do it well enough; for their walls were ſtrong, which gave them time, and the earth good and proper for Ramparts; whereas had they wanted either of thoſe conveniences, they muſt of neceſſity have been loſt. It is wiſdom therefore to make theſe ditches round about the Town before there be any neceſſity, as we ſaid before; for in that caſe you may expect the enemy without fear.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of Mines.

Fabr. THe ancients took ſeveral Towns by mining under ground, and that two ways, either by carrying their mines under ground into the Town, and entring thereby, (as the Romans did when they took the City of *Vejentum*) or by undermining only the walls, and ſo tumbling them down. At preſent this latter way is more uſed than the other, and renders thoſe Towns which ſtand high, weaker than the reſt, becauſe more ſubject to be min'd, and then adding but a good quantity of powder, which takes fire in an inſtant, you do not only ruine the wall, but you open the very mountain, and cleave the works into pieces. The way to prevent this, is to fortify in a flat Country, and make the ditch which encompaſſes your Town ſo deep, that the enemy may not dig under it without coming to the water, which is the beſt defence againſt mines. But if you be to defend a Town upon an eminence, your beſt way will be to make ſeveral deep holes in the wall that may give vent to the powder when the enemy ſets it on fire.

There is another way likewiſe to prevent them, and that is by countermining, if you find where the enemy mines, but 'tis a hard matter to diſcover them, eſpecially if you be beſieged by a cautious enemy.

CHAP. XII.

Good guards are always to be kept, and your Souldiers not to be divided.

Fabr. HE who is beſieged is to take extraordinary care that he be not ſurprized in time of repoſe, as after a ſtorm; after the Guards are ſet, (which is either at break of day, or at the ſhutting in of the evening) or eſpecially whilſt you are at dinner, in which time many Towns have been taken, and many ſallies have been made to the deſtruction of the beſiegers. Wherefore it is neceſſary to be upon the Guard in all quarters, and your men generally arm'd: and here I cannot omit to tell you that nothing makes a Town or Camp harder to be defended, than the dividing of your forces; for the enemy being able to attack you when he pleaſes with all his power at once, you muſt be ready on all ſides, and having parted your Forces, you will be forced to defend your ſelf with a part, and to keep the ſame guards with the remainder when ever the enemy aſſails you, as you ſhould have done when your whole Garriſon was together; which is a great diſadvantage, for he can attack you with his whole power, when you have but a part of yours to defend your ſelf.

CHAP. XIII.

That when one ſees himſelf block'd up on every ſide, it is good to expoſe ones ſelf now and then, and of the advantages which have enſued.

Fabr. IF he who is beſieged be beaten conſiderately, he is certainly loſt; but the Beſieger can only be repulſed: for which reaſon many who have been beſieged (either in Camp or Town,) though they have been inferior in number, have nevertheleſs ſallied with their whole force at a time, and been too hard for the enemy. Thus *Marcellus* did at *Nola*; thus *Cæſar* did in *France*, when his Camp was encompaſſed with a vaſt number of *Gauls*, for finding he was not able to defend it, becauſe he muſt divide his men into parties, and diſtribute them round; and finding alſo that ſtanding within his Stoccado's he could not do ſo much execution upon the enemy as he deſired, he opened his Camp on one ſide, and iſſuing out of it with his whole force, charged the enemy with ſuch fury and courage that he put them to the rout. Beſides, the obſtinacy and reſolution of the beſieged does many times aſtoniſh and terrify the enemy. *Pompey* being encamped againſt *Cæſar*, and *Cæſar*'s Army in great diſtreſs for proviſions, *Pompey* had preſented him a piece of *Cæſar*'s bread which was made of herbs, and look'd upon as a very ſtrange thing; *Pompey* having

having viewed it, commanded that it ſhould not be ſhewn in his Army, leſt it ſhould diſcourage them to conſider the obſtinacy of their enemy. Nothing was more honourable to the *Romans* in their war with *Hanibal* than their conſtancy, becauſe in the greateſt of their diſtreſs, and in the worſt of their fortune, they never demanded peace, nor diſcovered any token of fear: on the contrary, when *Hanibal* was under their walls, they ſold the ground in which he was encamped, at an higher rate than it would have been ſold at another time: and they were ſo true and firm in their enterprizes, that they would not draw off from *Capua* to defend their own City, though they had an Army before that, when *Hanibal* appeared before *Rome*.

I am ſenſible that I have told you ſeveral things which you underſtood, and perhaps conſidered already; yet I have done it (as I ſaid before) by that means to give you a better comprehenſion of the quality of this Army; and to ſatisfy ſuch (if there be any ſuch here) as have not had the opportunity to underſtand it ſo well as you. I ſuppoſe now there remains nothing but that I give you ſome general rules which are very obvious and common.

CHAP. XV.

General Rules to be obſerved in Military Diſcipline.

Fabr. THat which is beneficial to you, is prejudical to your enemy, and that which is beneficial to him, is prejudicial to you.

He who in war is moſt vigilant to obſerve the deſigns and enterprizes of the enemy, and takes moſt pains in exerciſing and diſciplining his Army, ſhall expoſe himſelf to leſs danger, and have greater probability of victory.

Never bring your men to fight till you have ſome juſt confidence in their courage, till you have ſeen them well arm'd, and well ordered; and never let them engage but when you find them cheerly, and hopeful of ſucceſs.

It is better to conquer an enemy by hunger than fighting, in which laſt victory, fortune has more ſhare than virtue or courage.

No reſolution is ſo likely to ſucceed, as that which is concealed from the enemy till it comes to be executed.

Nothing is of more importance in the whole art of war, than to know how to take advantage when it is offered.

Nature produces few perſons ſtrong; but induſtry and exerciſe makes many.

Order and diſcipline is more available in war, than valour or force.

When any come over to your ſervice from the enemy, they are of great advantage to you, provided they be faithful; for it is more diminution to the enemies ſtrength to have Souldiers revolt, than to have ſo many ſlain, though the name of a fugitive is ſuſpicious to new friends, and abominable to old.

It is better in the drawing up your battalions for a Battel, to draw them up with reſerves, and place ſuch behind the front as may ſupply it upon occaſion; than to enlarge your front, and make as it were but one rank of your whole Army.

He who underſtands his own forces, and the enemies too, can hardly miſcarry.

The courage of Souldiers is better than their number.

The ſituation of the place is ſometimes more effectual than the courage of your men.

New and unexpected things are an aſtoniſhment to ſome Armies.

Your Souldiers deſpiſe things that are common, and are weary of any thing that is tedious; I would adviſe therefore that by pickeering and little skirmiſhes you acquaint your men with your enemy before you bring them to a Battel.

He who purſues an enemy that is diſordered, in diſorder himſelf; ſhall loſe the victory he had gained, and perhaps give it to the enemy.

He who makes not proviſion of victuals, will be beaten without a blow.

He who relies more upon his horſe than his foot, or his foot than his horſe, muſt accommodate himſelf to the place.

If you would know at any time whether you have any ſpies in your Army, you have no more to do but to command every man to his Tent.

If you find the enemy has any knowledge of your designs, you must change them.

What you are to do, you may advise with many; what you are resolved to do, communicate with few.

When Souldiers are in their quarters, they are to be kept in order by fear and by punishment; when in the field, with hopes and reward.

A good General never comes to a Battel but when necessity requires, or some great advantage invites him.

You must endeavour that your enemy may not know how you intend to draw up your Army when you come to fight; and let your figure be what it will, be sure your first Companies be so ordered as that they may fall back into the second, and both into the third.

When you are engaged, never employ any of your Battalia's about any thing but that to which you deputed them at first; if you would avoid putting things into disorder.

Sudden accidents are not easily prevented; but those which are foreseen are prevented without difficulty.

Men, arms, mony and provisions are the nerves of war; but the first two are most necessary, because men and arms will find mony and victuals; but mony and victuals can never find men.

The rich man unarm'd, is but a prey to the Souldier.

Use your Souldiers to abominate luxury either in diet or clothes.

This is as much as I can think fit to speak of in general, though I am sensible other things would have fallen in well enough with my discourse. As how and in what manner the ancients ordered their Squadrons, how they were habited, and how they exercised them in several other things, and I could have added several particulars, which I have not thought necessary at this time, because you may know it your self, and likewise because it was not my intention at first to shew you exactly how the ancient Militia was constituted, but how it was to be done in our times.

For this reason I have thought unnecessary to speak any farther of those kind of antiquities, than what might be serviceable to this introduction. I know likewise I might have inlarged my self more about the exercising of horse, and come afterwards to discourse of Sea-fights, for to distinguish Militia's, their Armies at Sea, and Armies at Land; Armies of Foot, and Armies of Horse: but of Sea discipline I shall not presume to say any thing, because I know nothing of it: I shall leave that to be treated of by *Genoueses* or *Venetians*, who by their experience in that kind, have done very great things formerly. Nor shall I speak any farther of Horse than what I have said before, because they are not so corrupt and disorderly. For if your Foot (which is the strength of an Army) are well disciplin'd, and in good order, your Cavalry must be good of necessity.

CHAP XV.

The way to have many Horse in your Country.

Fabr. I Would however remember him who is desirous to settle and establish a good Militia in his Country, that to furnish it handsomely with Horse, he should do two things; one is, that he should distribute a certain number of good Stalions up and down, that the Country-men may breed, and drive a Trade with Foles and Colts, as you do in this Country with calves and young mules. The other is, that there might not want chapmen for the Colts, I would oblige every man that keeps a mule, to keep an horse; and he that would keep but one thing for his saddle, should be enjoyned to have it an horse; besides, I would constrain every man that wore cloath-clothes, to keep an horse in his Stable.

This order was taken not long since by a Prince of our times, and succeeded so well, that in a short time he had a most excellent Cavalry. As to other things relating to horses, I refer you to what has been said this day, and what has been practised of old.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

A General is to invent of himself, and not follow altogether the practises of his Predecessors.

Fabr. But perhaps you would desire to know what parts and qualifications there ought to be in a General; and I will satisfie you in short, for I cannot make choice of a properer man, than he who understands all those things which I have recommended this day; and yet that would not be sufficient, unless he had abilities to invent some thing of his own; for never any man was Master of a Trade, who had no invention of his own; and if invention be honourable in any thing, it is most certainly in this: This is manifest in all Authors who have constantly applauded all sorts of inventions, how slight and inconsiderable soever, as appears by the great Character they bestowed on *Alexander* the great, for his wisdom in appointing a Cap to be put upon the top of a Launce as a signal for the dislodging of his Army, rather than to do it by sound of Trumpet as formerly, because it imported him much that they should remove privately. He was commended likewise for ordering his Soldiers upon a charge to fall down upon their left knee, as an expedient that would make them receive the charge with the more strength and firmness, which invention got him the Victory, and occasioned him so much honour, that all Statues erected afterwards in his honour, were erected in that posture. But because it is time to conclude our discourse, I will leave where I began, to avoid the reproach which is incident to such persons as when once straggled know not how to return.

CHAP. XVII.

The Author returns, and with a short Discourse concludes his Book.

Fabr. If you remember (*Cosimo*) you told me, That you could not imagine the reason why in one place I should commend Antiquity, and blame those which would not imitate it in great things; and yet I have not imitated it my self in my Martial affairs, in which I have taken much pains, and spent a great deal of my time.

To which I answer, That men who are to execute any thing, are first to learn which way it is to be done, that they may be afterwards the more able, when it comes to operation. Now whether or no I understand how to establish a Militia according to the method of the Ancients, I leave you to judge, who have heard me discourse of it so long; from whence you may imagine how much time has been spent in those thoughts by me; what great desire I have had to bring them to effect; and whether I have already, or ever may have occasion to do it. But to satisfie you farther, and justifie my self, I will give you the reasons, and thereby observe my promise in some measure, by showing you the conveniencies and inconveniencies in such imitations. I say then that no action this day among men is more easily executed according to the method of the Ancients, than Military discipline; but it must be among such Princes as are able to bring together 15 or 20000 of their own Subjects, against an Enemy. On the other side, there is nothing more difficult to such Princes as have not that convenience: And that you may comprehend it the better, you must understand that Generals are commended upon two several accompts, some are famous for that with an Army ordered and prepared by their own natural discipline, they have performed great things; so it was with most of the *Roman* Citizens, and others who had the command of Armies; whose only task was to keep their Soldiers good, and Conduct them securely. Others have been not only to contend with and conquer the Enemy, but they were first to instruct and exercise their Army; and these doubtless were worthy of more praise than they who with their old and well experienced Soldiers performed such Exploits: Of this sort was *Pelopidas*, *Epaminondas*, *Tullus Hostilius*, *Philip* of *Macedon*, *Cyrus* King of *Persia*, and *Gracchus* the *Roman*: All those were forced to model and discipline their Armies before they ventured them to fight; and all these were able to do it in respect of their own experience, and that they had other persons which were able to exercise their Soldiers as they desired. Nor would it ever have been possible that any of those Generals, how good and excellent soever, could ever have done any great thing in another Province full of corrupt men, unless it had been accustomed to some honest obedience. It

is not ſufficient then in *Italy* to underſtand how to manage a Veteran Army; but you muſt firſt know how to make and prepare it, and then how to govern and conduct it. Again, thoſe who do this, muſt be ſuch Princes as have great revenues, and many Subjects, in which number I am not to be reckoned, as one who never commanded, nor never can, unleſs it be foreign Forces under ſome other Prince, into which foreigners, whether it be poſſible or not to infuſe any of theſe things of which I have diſcourſed, I leave you to judge. How could I perſwade a Soldier of our days to carry more Arms than he was accuſtomed, and beſides his Arms, two or three days Proviſion at his back, and a Spade or Pickaxe at his girdle? How could I prevail with him to work or digg all day; to ſtand all day to his Arms in counterfeit exerciſes, that I might rely the more confidently upon him when he came to it in good earneſt? How could I work upon him to abſtain from play, laſciviouſneſs, blaſphemy, and inſolence, which is their practice every day? How long would it be before I could reduce them into ſuch order, ſuch diſcipline, and awe, that if an Apple tree was never ſo full, and ſtood in the middle of their Camp, none of them ſhould venture to touch it? as is many times read of the *Roman* Armies. What is it that I can promiſe them that may make them either fear me, or love me, when the War being ended, I ſhall have no farther to do with them? How can I make them ſenſible of ſhame, who have been born and bred without any? How ſhould they pay me a reſpect whom they do not know? By what God, by what Saint ſhall I conjure them? By the Gods which they adore, or by the Gods which they blaſpheme? Which it is that they adore I cannot tell, but am ſure they blaſpheme them all. How can I expect they ſhould keep their promiſe, which they do hourly deſpiſe? How can they who pay no honour to God, expreſs any to men? What good diſcipline then are we like to imprint upon ſo depraved a Maſs? If you object that the *Swizzers* and *Spaniards* are good Soldiers, I confeſs them much better than the *Italians*; but if you conſider what I have ſaid, and the manner of proceeding of both thoſe Nations, you will find them come ſhort in many things of the perfection of the Ancients. The *Swizzers* are become good Soldiers by natural practice of thoſe things which I have recommended; and the *Spaniards* by neceſſity; for their Wars lying in Foreign Provinces, where they are conſtrained either to overcome or dye (becauſe they can never hope to get off by flying) are grown good, and yet their goodneſs is in many things defective; for their excellence is only to ſtand and receive the Enemy at puſh of Pike, and the Swords point; beſides, there is not any man among them fit to inſtruct another in what is neceſſary, much leſs if he be not of their own Country. But to return to our *Italians*, who having wanted wiſe Princes, have not been capable of good orders; and having wanted that neceſſity which was incumbent upon the *Spaniards*, they have not taken it up of themſelves, ſo that now they are the very ſcorn and contempt of the world, not for any fault in the people, but in their Princes, who thereby have been chaſtiſed for their ignorance, and juſtly puniſhed for loſing their Territories ſo ignominiouſly, without any conſiderable reſiſtance. Will you ſee that what I ſay is true? Conſider what Wars we have had in *Italy* ſince the Expedition of *Charles* 8th. to this day: and although other Wars rendered Soldiers formidable and martial; theſe Wars by how much they were more great, and more furious, by ſo much both Officers and Soldiers became more diſſolute and cowardly: And this muſt neceſſarily proceed from ill orders which are not much better at this day, and the miſery is, there was nor is none able to reform them: Do not think that there is any way to recover reputation to the Arms of the *Italians*, but by this way that I have propoſed, and by means of ſuch Princes as have great Territories there; for this form may be imprinted in men that are ſimple, and plain, and ones own Subjects, much ſooner, than in ſuch as are lew'd, and diſorderly, and ſtrangers. A good Sculptor never expects to make a good Statue out of a piece of Marble that is mangled and has been ill handled; but he will do well enough if it has never been touched. Our Princes in *Italy* before they were ſenſible of their Wars with the Northern Nations, believed it was enough for a Prince to know how to write a civil anſwer; how to direct a Letter with all its Punctilio's; how to ſhow himſelf witty and quick in his *reparties*; how to juggle, and diſſemble; how to dreſs himſelf handſomly, and diſpoſe of his Jewels to the beſt advantage; how to eat, and ſleep in more ſtate and magnificence than other people; to have a thouſand dalliances and pleaſures about him; to behave himſelf haughtily and extort from his Subjects; to live in idleneſs and eaſe; to diſpoſe of Military commands to their Paraſites; to deſpiſe thoſe who propoſed any thing of Virtue; to require that their words ſhould be like Oracles, and of as much authority, as if ſpoken by God himſelf; to employ ſuch as had no knowledge in affairs; to commit great things to thoſe who durſt attempt nothing; to believe every thing immediately without pondering and debating either their words or arguments that ſpoke them; and ſeveral other imperfections which hindered them from ſeeing that at laſt

they

they muſt become a prey to any that would attack them. Theſe things in the year 1494. were the occaſion of thoſe flights, and fears, and depredations by which three of the moſt potent States in *Italy* were frequently deſtroyed. But the worſt is, they which remain, continue in the ſame errors, and live in the ſame diſorder, without any conſideration that thoſe who formerly deſired to preſerve their Dominions, did all that I have preſcribed this day; and that their whole ſtudy was to accuſtom themſelves both minds and bodies to labour, to trouble, and deſpiſing of danger: And this was the cauſe that *Cæſar*, and *Alexander* and all the valiant and brave Princes were always at the head of their Armies, compleatly arm'd and on foot, and rather than loſe their ſtates they would loſe their lives; ſo as they lived and dyed with a great deal of honour: And though perhaps ſome of them might be condemned for their ambition, and exorbitant deſire to Reign; yet they could never be accuſed of effeminacy, or doing any thing that might render them delicate and unmanly. Which paſſages if they were read and believed by the Princes of our times, it would be impoſſible but they muſt alter their courſe of life, and their Provinces their fortune. But becauſe in the beginning of our diſcourſe you complained of your Militia, I tell you that if you have ordered it according to my aboveſaid direction, and it has not anſwered your expectation, you have reaſon to complain; but if it be not ordered and exerciſed according to my rules, the complaint lyes more properly againſt you, who has made it rather an abortion, than a perfect production. The *Venetians*, and the Duke of *Ferrara* began very well, but they did not perſevere, and it was imputable rather to themſelves, than their Soldiers. And let me affirm this to you for a truth, that among all the preſent Princes of *Italy*, he who takes this way firſt, and obſerves theſe rules and theſe orders, ſhall make himſelf greater than any Prince in that Country, and it ſhall happen to his Subjects as to the Kingdom of *Macedon*, which falling under the Dominion of King *Philip*, was improved to that height by this order and exerciſe (whilſt the reſt of *Greece* were idle, and if employed at all, it was in following Plays and Balls, and ſuch effeminate entertainments) that in a few years time he was able to conquer the whole Country, and leave a foundation to his Son to make himſelf Monarch of the whole world. He then who deſpiſes this Doctrine, if he be a Prince deſpiſes his own Principality, and if a Citizen, his own City. And in this I cannot but complain of Nature, who ſhould either have not ſuffered me to have known theſe things; or have given me power to have executed them, which is a thing I can never hope for now, as growing old, and towards the end of my days: For this reaſon I have diſcourſed the more frankly with you who are young, and ſo qualified that you may be able (if you be ſatisfied with what is ſaid) to give the ſame Counſel to your own Princes when occaſion ſhall be offered, and I hope with ſucceſs; and of this I beg you would not diſpond; for this Province ſeems to have a peculiar faculty of reviving things that are dead, as it has done Poetry, and Painting, and Sculpture, though for my own part I cannot expect to ſee it, as having one foot already in the grave. Certainly had fortune indulged me in my young days, ſo far as to have afforded ſo much Territory as ſuch an enterprize required, I believe in a ſhort time I would have demonſtrated to the world the power and efficacy of the orders of the Ancients, by means of which I ſhould have enlarged my Dominions with honour, or loſt them without ſhame.

THE MARRIAGE OF BELPHEGOR.

BY

Nicholas Machiavel.

IT is recorded in the ancient Chronicles of *Florence*, that a certain holy Perſon, whoſe life was the admiration of that age, falling one day into a Trance, had a very ſtrange apparition: it ſeemed to him, that the ſouls of married men that came trooping in great numbers to Hell, cried out all of them as they paſſed, that their Marriage was the cauſe of their miſery, and their Wives the occaſion of their coming thither: *Minos Radamanth*, and the whole infernal Privy-Council were amazed at the clamour; at firſt they could not believe there was any thing in the buſineſs, but at laſt obſerving the ſame complaints continually multiplyed, they thought it fit to make *Pluto* acquainted: *Pluto* underſtanding the report, without imparting any thing to his wife, (who had taken Phyſick that week, and kept her Chamber) reſolved the matter ſhould be accurately examined, and ſuch courſe be taken, as was likelieſt to make the ſpeedieſt diſcovery of the truth: he iſſued out his Writs immediately, and aſſembled his Courts; his Princes, Dukes, Counts and Barons were all preſent; never was Senate ſo full, nor never was affair of that importance before it: the holy Father that beheld all, affirms poſitively, that *Pluto* delivered himſelf in this manner.

Right Truſty and well-Beloved,

Though our Kingdom was aſſigned us from Heaven, and the fatal decree has anciently determined our Dominion: though that ſentence be irrevocable, and above the cogniſance of any humane Power; yet ſeeing his prudence is moſt ſafe, that is dictated by Laws; and his judgment moſt ſolid, that is fortified with others; we are reſolved to take your counſels along with us, which way we are to ſteer in an affair, that otherwiſe may prove (in time) of great diſhonour to our Government. The ſouls of married men, that are continually flocking into our Dominions, do unanimouſly exclaim againſt their Wives, as the only perſons that ſend them tumbling hither; to us it ſeems impoſſible: yet foraſmuch as a peremptory and determinate ſentence upon their bare allegations, would not ſuit with our Satanical mercy; ſo a careleſs pretermiſſion on the other ſide could not be without reflexion on our Juſtice: that matters of ſuch importance therefore may have their due diſquiſition, and our adminiſtration be defended from obloquy or ſcandal, that no inconveniency may follow for want of deliberation, and that ſome better expedient may be found out, than our ſelves have happily thought on, we have thought good to call you together, being confident, and aſſured by the aſſiſtance of your counſels, the honour and reputation of our Empire will be continued as unqueſtionable for the future, as it has been preſerved hitherto, by our own proper care and ſolicitude.

There was not one preſent, but acknowledged it a buſineſs of importance, and well worthy an exact conſideration: it was the opinion of the whole Board, that all imaginable means was to be uſed to find out the truth, but what means that was, could not be agreed on; ſome were of opinion, a ſingle perſon was to be diſpatch'd into this World, and no more; others judged it better to ſend ſeveral, and that the diſcovery would be more certain from the experience of many, than of one; a third ſort, more brisk and ſevere in their counſels, thought that clutter unneceſſary, and that clapping good ſtore of them together upon the rack, would be enough doubtleſs to extort a confeſſion. However it was at laſt carried by the plurality of voices, that a ſingle perſon only ſhould be ſent, and in this

this reſolution the whole company acquieſced: nevertheleſs there being no body found that would voluntarily undertake the employment, it was concluded the election ſhould be by lot; and at the ſame time, having made their billets, and ſhuffled them, the lot fell upon *Belphegor*.

One may ſay, and ſay true, that fortune never decided any thing ſo juſtly; for *Belphegor* was no ordinary Devil, and *Pluto* having made him formerly Generaliſſimo of his Armies, 'tis to be preſumed he was no novice; for all this he had a months mind to be quit of his embaſſy; but the order being unalterable, he was forced to ſubmit, and accept theſe conditions that were ſolemnly decreed, *That an hundred thouſand Ducats ſhould be paid him immediately, to defray the expences of his journey; that he ſhould aſſume the ſhape of a man; that he ſhould take a woman to his wedded Wife, and live with her (if poſſible) ten years; that at the end of the term, (pretending to die) he ſhould give her the ſlip, repair immediately to his old quarters, and make affidavit upon his own experience of all the pleaſures and calamities of Matrimony.* It was declared to him alſo, that during this metamorphoſis, he was to be ſubject to the pains and misfortunes of humanity, as ſickneſs, impriſonment, and poverty: but that if by his cunning or dexterity he could diſintangle himſelf, it ſhould be allowed him, and not imputed as any ſcandal or reproach. *Belphegor* accepts the conditions, receives his Ducats, and having drawn a ſpruce party of horſe out of his Guards, and furniſhed himſelf with Pages and Footmen good ſtore, he ſet out immediately for this World, and arrived at *Florence* in a very fair equipage: he choſe that place above all other, for the conveniency of improving his monies, and putting it to intereſt with greater advantage. He called himſelf *Don Roderick* of *Caſtile*; he took a very noble Houſe in the Fauxburg of *All-Saints*; and that his quality might be undiſcovered, he gave out that he was a Spaniard, that being young he took a Voyage into *Syria*, that he had dwelt ſome time in *Aleppo*, where he had got moſt part of his Eſtate: but being weary there, he was come into *Italy*, as a Country more agreeable with his humour, with intention (if any fair opportunity was offered) to marry: *Don Roderick* ſeemed to be a very handſome man, about thirty years of age; and in ſhort time after his arrival, he made it evident enough that he was rich, and by his liberality, that he knew how to make the beſt uſe of them; inſomuch as ſeveral Gentlemen of *Florence*, that had more Daughters than mony, took all poſſible pains to inſinuate how welcome he ſhould be into their alliance. *Don Roderick*, that had choice of Miſtreſſes, preferr'd one that was tranſcendently handſome before them all; the ſtory ſays, ſhe was called *Honeſta*, and was the Daughter of *Americ Donati*, who had three more alſo to marry, and three Sons between twenty or twenty five years of age: but though *Seigneur Americ* was of one of the nobleſt Families of *Florence*, yet he was look'd upon as down the wind, and one that was overlaid with too many children, and the unavoidable charges of his Nobility: but *Don Roderick* took an order for that, defraying the whole expence of his Wedding; out of his own purſe managing all things with that ſplendor and magnificence, that there was nothing omitted that was deſirable upon ſuch an occaſion. It was mentioned before, as one of the conditions propoſed to *Belphegor*, that as ſoon as he was out of the Infernal Dominions, he ſhould be ſubject to all the paſſions of mankind; and accordingly he began immediately to take delight in the honours and gallantry of the World; and as cunning a Devil as he was, to be wheedled with the flatteries and applauſes of men: but that which delighted him ſo much, coſt him dear; beſides that he had not been long with *Honeſta*, but he fell ſtark mad in love with her, and finding ſomething or other extraordinary in her, that I cannot think of, he was ſo far inamoured, he never thought himſelf happy before; inſomuch as when ſhe was melancholy, or out of humour, he would curſe his Commiſſion, and take his corporal Oath his very life was tedious. On the other ſide it is not to be forgot, that *Honeſta* marrying *Roderick*, and bringing him Beauty and Nobility inſtead of a Portion, ſhe thought it not fit to leave her pride and untractableneſs behind her; theſe two good qualities were ſo eminently in her, that *Roderick* who had been uſed to *Lucifers*, and had more than once had experience of it, ſwore point-blank his Wives inſolence was beyond it: for when ſhe once found the fondneſs and paſſion her Husband had for her, believing ſhe could manage him with a ſwitch, and order him as ſhe pleaſed, ſhe carried her ſelf like his Soveraign, and handled him without pity or reſpect; and if it happened he denied her any thing, ſhe gave him immediately to underſtand, that ſhe was alſo as eloquent in ſcoulding, as others of her quality. By this you may judge what a cooler this was to *Don Roderick*: nevertheleſs the conſideration of his Father-in-Law, his Wives Brothers, the Kindred he had by that bleſſed Marriage, but above all the paſſion and tenderneſs he had for her, made him endure all patiently. I ſhall not mention the expence of his clothes, which though never ſo rich, he was forced to change every week, according to the ordinary vanity of the Ladies in *Florence*. Beſides theſe, there were

were other things were of no leſs inconvenience; he was forced (to preſerve the peace) to aſſiſt his Father-in-Law in the Marriage of his other Daughters, which coſt him a good round ſum: moreover that all things might go well, and his correſpondency continue with his Conſort, he was glad to ſend one of her Brothers into the *Levant* with woollen Stuffs, another into *France* and *Spain* with Silks, and to furniſh the third with wherewithal to ſet up a Goldſmith's-ſhop in *Florence*: all which afflictions together were ſufficient to diſcompoſe any Devil of a thouſand, yet he had other thrown into the bargain: there is not any Town in all *Italy* more extravagant in their expences, in their Carnivals and Feaſts of St. *John*, than *Florence*; and *Honeſta* upon that occaſion muſt needs have her *Roderick* outdo all people of his Rank, in the ſumptuouſneſs of his Entertainments, in the magnificence of his Balls, and other divertiſements that are uſual at thoſe times: he ſuffered all theſe calamities for the ſame reaſons he endured the reſt; and though perhaps theſe difficulties were very hard and unpleaſant, he would have thought them ſupportable, could he have been ſatisfied, his patience would have procured any quietneſs in his Family, and that he might have peaceably attended the hour of his deſtruction. But *Don Roderick* found the clear contrary; beſides the expence you have heard ſhe occaſioned, her inſolence was accompanied with a thouſand other inconveniencies, inſomuch as he could keep neither officer nor ſervant in his houſe above three days together. This was ſevere trouble to him to find it was impoſſible for him to keep any body about him, though never ſo well experienced or affected to his affairs: nor indeed could any body blame them for taking their leaves, when the Devils themſelves that he brought along with him, did chooſe rather to return, and toaſt the bottoms of their feet againſt the fire of Hell, than live in this World under the dominion of ſo ſuper-deviliſh a woman. *Roderick*'s life being thus miſerably uncomfortable, and his ſtock that he had reſerved, exhauſted by her extravagant expences, he was reduced to that paſs, he ſubſiſted only upon the hopes of the advantage he ſhould make by the return of ſome Veſſels he had ſent into the Eaſt and Weſt. And whereas before he had very good credit in that Town, to continue it, and keep up his Port, he borrowed mony of ſuch as are uſed in that place to put it out; but thoſe kind of people being ſuch, as are not uſually ſleepy or negligent in their affairs, they took notice immediately he was not over-punctual to his day: his purſe being already empty, and he reduced to the higheſt extremity, at one daſh he receives news of two as diſaſterous accidents as could poſſibly befall him. The firſt was, that one of *Honeſtas* Brothers had loſt at Hazzard all that *Roderick* had intruſted in his hands; and the other was no more welcome, which was, that his other Brother-in-Law returning into *Italy*, was himſelf caſt away, and all his goods. The buſineſs was no ſooner known in *Florence*, but his Creditors had a meeting, where giving him over for one that was irrecoverably loſt, and not daring to diſcover themſelves, becauſe the time of payment was not yet come, they concluded he was to be watch'd very cloſe, leſt he ſhould chouſe them, and ſhew them a light pair of heels. *Don Roderick* of *Caſtile* on the other ſide, conſidering with himſelf his affairs were paſt remedy, and alſo the terms he was obliged to by the infernal Law, reſolves to take horſe and be gone without more ado, which he performed without much difficulty, living conveniently for that by the Port *del Prato*: yet he was no ſooner march'd off, but the alarm was taken by his Creditors; they repair immediately to the Magiſtrates, and purſue him not only with Poſt and Officers, but leſt a certain number of Ducats ſhould debauch that kind of Cattle, who are no better in *Italy* than other places, and prevail with them for an abatement of their ſpeed, they follow him themſelves in a full body, with impatience of hearing ſome tidings of him. *Roderick* in the mean time was no fool, but conſidered very well what he had to do; as ſoon as he was gallop'd about half a league from the Town, he leaves the high-way, and his horſe with it, (the Country being incloſed, and full of ditches on both ſides) and was forced to make the reſt of his journey on foot, which he did very ſucceſsfully; for wandring up and down under the ſhelter of the Vines and Reeds that abound much in thoſe parts, he arrived at laſt at *Peretola*, at the houſe of *Jean Matteo del Bricca*, Baily to *Jean del Bene*.

By very good fortune he meets *Matteo* carrying fodder to his Cattel; he accoſts him immediately, and promiſes him as he was a Gentleman, that if he would deliver him from the Catchpoles that were in purſuit of him, with deſign to clap him up, and ſtarve him in Priſon, he had an invention in his pate would make him rich out of hand, and of this he would give ſuch evidence before he departed, as ſhould aſſure him of his truth and fidelity; and if I do not, ſays he, with a damn'd imprecation, I will be content to be delivered up into their clutches that perſecute me. Now you muſt underſtand, that though *Matteo* was an Hinde and a Peaſant, yet the fellow had cunning enough, and knew on which ſide his bread was butterred; he conſidered, if he undertook him, and miſcarried, he had nothing

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to loſe; and that if he ſucceeded, he ſhould be made for ever; without any more ado therefore he promiſes him protection, and clapping him cloſe upon a dunghill that was before the gate, he covered him over with bruſh-faggots and reeds, and ſuch other fewel as lay there in readineſs for the fire: And indeed he was no ſooner in his retirements, but in came the Creditors with full cry; they ſwaggered and laid about them like Lords, but all to no purpoſe, *Matteo* could not be perſwaded to confeſs ſo much as that he ſaw him; inſomuch as marching on ſtill in the purſuit, but with as little ſucceſs as they came thither, they gave *Roderick* and their Money over for loſt, and returned to *Florence* every jot as wiſe as they were before: The Coaſt being clear in this manner, and the alarm over, *Matteo* ſteals to the cloſet where he had left *Roderick*, gives him a little freſh air, and conjures him to be as good as his word: *Roderick* was very honeſt in that point, and I dare ſay never any Devil, as to matters of gratitude, had more of a Gentleman; he gave him thanks for the great obligation he had received; he ſwore over and over again, he would do whatever lay in his power to diſcharge himſelf of his promiſe, and in the heat and height of his compliments, to convince him that he meant as he ſaid, he gives him the whole ſtory as you have had it, and at laſt told him the very way that he had pitch'd upon to make him a Prince: Know then, ſays he, that whenever you hear of any Lady that is poſſeſs'd, 'tis no other Devil but I that have poſſeſs'd her; and be ſure I will never leave her, till you come your ſelf and force me from my quarters, after which you have wit enough to make your own terms for your payment. They had very few words more, he only gave him the Summerſet once or twice, and ſhewed him two or three jugling tricks, and vaniſh'd.

A while after there was a great noiſe about the Town, that *Meſ. Ambroſio Amidei*'s Daughter, that was Married to *Bonaculo Thebalducci*'s Son, was poſſeſs'd; her Father and Mother did not fail to uſe all the remedies are uſual in ſo deplorable a caſe; they brought before her *St. Zanobes* Head, and *St. J. Galbert*'s Cloak, which was nuts to *Belphegor*, and made him nothing but laugh: There was no body in her but *Don Roderick de Caſtile*, who was as ingenious a Gentleman-devil as one would wiſh, and that the world might take notice that this was no fantaſtick imagination, nor fit of the Night-mare, nor any ſuch trifle, but that ſhe was really poſſeſſed, ſhe ſpake Latin better than *Tully* ever Writ, diſputed in Philoſophy, and diſcovered the ſecrets and ſins of ſeveral people that were there, who were very much ſurprized to find the Devil concern himſelf with thoſe kind of affairs.

Amongſt the reſt there was one holy Father he did a great diſcourteſie to, in blurting out before the whole company, as if he had kept a young Laſs four years together in his Cell, in the habit of a young Monk; and after all this, let any body judge whether the profeſſion was not like to be true; *Ambroſio* in the mean time was in great affliction for his Daughter; he had tryed all the ways that Phyſick or Religion could propoſe, but to no purpoſe; ſo as he was brought to the higheſt point of deſpair, when *Matteo* came to him, and undertook the cure of his Daughter, if he would give him five hundred *Florins*, which he deſigned to lay out in Land at *Peretola*: In ſhort, *Matteo* was an honeſt fellow, and would have done the miracle *grâtis*, and like a Gentleman, but his pockets were hollow, and he had great occaſion for Money at that time; Seignior *Ambroſio* accepts the conditions, and *Matteo* falls to work; he began very civilly with certain Maſſes and other Ceremonies, that he might appear the more formal in the buſineſs; at length he ſtole to the Ladies ear, calls *Roderick*, and tells him he was come thither to him, and did require him to be as good as his word. Content ſays *Roderick*, and that you may ſee I ſhall deal with you like a perſon of quality, take notice, that becauſe this expedition is not enough to inrich you, and do your buſineſs, I will befriend you more than once, for which reaſon as ſoon as I am departed from hence, away I'le march into the Daughter of *Charles* the King of *Naples*, and don't fear but I'le ſtick to her, till you come to exorciſe me, ſo as there you may make up your markets at a blow, and become conſiderable for ever, but be ſure after that I be troubled with you no more; and as ſoon as he had ſaid ſo, whip ſays he out of the Lady, and was gone to the great joy and aſtoniſhment of the whole Town.

Belphegor in the mean time was as good as his word, as he promiſed *Matteo*; away he goes, and in two or three days time it was all over *Italy*, that the Daughter of *Charles* King of *Naples*, was in the ſame condition; which was good news for *Matteo*, who was at this bout to gain the Philoſophers-ſtone: In ſhort, he tryed all means poſſible; the Monks went to work with their prayers, and their croſſes, but to no purpoſe; The Devil would not budge till *Matteo* came himſelf, who had formerly obliged him. The King had news of what had happened at *Florence*, and ſends away immediately for *Matteo* to his Court, who came accordingly, and after ſome few ceremonious formalities, counterfeited for concealment of the myſtery, he cures his Daughter. However *Roderick* before his departure, as is reported in the Chronicle, accoſted him in this manner. You ſee, *Matteo*,

I have been as good as my word; you ſee you are become rich in a trice, and may take your eaſe for the future; ſo as if I be not miſtaken, I have diſcharged my ſelf as to you very honeſtly, hereafter have a care how you come near me; for as hitherto I have done you knights-ſervice, henceforward I will do you as much miſchief as I can. *Matteo* being returned to *Florence* very wealthy, (for the King of *Naples* had given him above five thouſand Ducats) he thought of nothing now but injoying that peaceably he had got, never imagining *Roderick* would do him any harm; but his deſigns were much fruſtrated by a report out of *France*, that *Lewis* the ſeventh's Daughter was poſſeſs'd as the former: *Matteo* was in great trouble, on the one ſide he was not ignorant of the power of that Prince, on the other he remembred *Roderick*'s laſt words; the King uſed all means poſſible, but without any ſucceſs; he was told what feats *Matteo* had done, and diſpatched a Poſt to him immediately, to deſire his Company at *Paris*; but *Matteo* pretending I know not what indiſpoſitions, that rendred him incapable of ſerving his Majeſty, the King was forced to write to the Magiſtrates, who ſent away *Matteo* immediately.

Being arrived at *Paris*, he was in great affliction, becauſe he knew not which way for his life to perform what was expected from him. At laſt he goes to the King, and tells him, that true it was indeed, he had formerly wrought ſome cures in that kind, but that it was not in reaſon to be expected he could diſpoſſeſs all people he met with, ſeeing there were ſome Devils ſo refractory and croſs-grain'd, neither threats nor enchantments, nor devotion it ſelf would do no good on: That he ſaid not this out of any repugnancy or unwillingneſs to do as he was deſired, but that in caſe his endeavours were ineffectual, he might have his Majeſties pardon. The King was ſtark mad at the ſtory, and told him in plain terms, if he did not rout the Devil out of his Daughter, as he had done out of others, he would hang him forthwith; for he ſaw no reaſon why Miracles were not as feaſible at *Paris*, as at *Florence* and *Naples*: Theſe words toucht *Matteo* to the quick, he thought there was no pleaſure to be taken in being hang'd in that manner, and that what the King had ſaid, was without any equivocation: However he recollected himſelf a little, or at leaſt pretended ſo, and calling for the Princeſs that was poſſeſs'd, he makes his approaches, and whiſpering her in the ear, told *Roderick* he was his very humble ſervant, and put him in mind of the good office he had done him, when he delivered him out of the talons of the Law; adding withall, that if he left him in the lurch, in the extremity of danger he was then in, the whole World would cry out on his ingratitude; *Roderick* heard him with no more patience than needs muſt, he ſwaggers, ſwears, ſtorms, and lays about like a Devil in good earneſt, gives him a thouſand and a thouſand ill words, but they could diſtinguiſh only theſe few at the laſt: How now, you Raſcally Traitor, have you the impudence to come near me again? have you forgot it was I that made you your fortune? but I'le make all the World ſee, and you too, with a pox to you, that I can take away as well as give; beſides which, you ſhall not fail to be hang'd before you get away from *Paris*: Poor *Matteo* ſeeing no other remedy for his misfortunes, he fell a thinking of ſome other way, and having ſent back the Lady to her Chamber, he made this ſpeech to the King. Sir, I have told you before, that there are certain ill-natur'd capricious Spirits, one knows not which way to deal withall, and of this ſort is that which poſſeſſes your Daughter; if what we ſhall adminiſter might be ſufficient, your Majeſty ſhould be happy in your deſires, and mine alſo; but if things prove otherwiſe, and your Majeſty be not ſatisfied with my endeavours, I ſhall ſubmit, and your Majeſty may deal with me as I deſerve: In the mean time, I deſire your Majeſty would give order a Theatre be erected in the Church-yard of *Noſtre Dame*, big enough to receive all the Nobility and Clergy in the Town: Let this Theatre, if your Majeſty think good, be hung with Cloath of Gold, and other rich Stuffs, and an Altar ſet up in the middle on Sunday next; I would deſire your Majeſty to be there, with all the Princes and Nobility in *Paris*, and after a grand Maſs is ſung, let the Princeſs be brought alſo: Beſides this, it is neceſſary there ſhould be twenty perſons at leaſt, with Trumpets, Horns, Drums, Hoboys and Symbals, ready in ſome by-place, when I throw up my Cap into the air, to advance towards the Theatre with all the noiſe they can make; which Muſick, with ſome other ingredients that I have, will I hope ſend the Devil packing from the Princeſs: The King gave order all things ſhould be done as *Matteo* requeſted; and Sunday being come, and the Theatre throng'd with a multitude of perſons of quality, and the Church-yard of *Noſtre Dame* full of people, the Princeſs was led in by two Biſhops, and followed by ſeveral Lords of the Court; *Roderick* was in a terrible amaze, to behold ſo magnificent a preparation, and pondering with himſelf, was over-heard to pronounce theſe words: I would fain know what this raſcally Peaſant means to do; I have ſeen many places, I have more than once ſeen the whole pomp of Heaven, nor am I ignorant of what is moſt formidable in Hell, yet can I not tell what to make of this; but

I'le

I'le handle him like a Rogue, as he is, and if I fail, *Pluto* requite me; *Matteo* came up close to him, and desired him very civilly to depart; but *Roderick* cryed out, Oh the wonderous cunning that is in you! do you think by this whimsey to save your self from my power, and the indignation of the King? but think what you will, you scoundrel, I am resolved you shall hang for't, or else let me pass for the most miserable poor-spirited Devil in the World; *Matteo* persisted in his request, but *Belphegor* gave him worse Language than before; but all that frighted not *Matteo*, for without losing more time, he threw his hat up into the air, and at an instant the Trumpets, Horns, and all the rest of the Musick struck up, and advanced towards the Theatre; *Roderick* was startled at the noise, and made it manifest that there are some Devils as fearful as men, and not able to imagine the reason, he called out to *Matteo*, and asked what was the matter? *Matteo* being a cunning Rogue every inch of him, as if he had been terribly frighted, informs him thus: Alas! poor *Roderick*, says he, 'tis your Wife *Honesta* is come to seek you at *Paris*; he said no more, but it is not to be imagined what disorder these four or five words put the Devil into; they took away his wit and judgment, so as without any consideration, whether the news was possible or not, without speaking one word, away he stole from the Princess; choosing rather to go back into Hell, and give up his accounts there, than to return again into the thraldom of Matrimony, that had already cost him so many sorrows and dangers. As soon as he arrived, he demanded audience, and in the presence of *Pluto*, *Æacus*, *Minos*, and *Radamanthus*, all of them Counsellors of State, he declared that the Souls of Men were in the right on't, and that 'twas their Wives that sent them to Hell: *Matteo* that had been too crafty for the Devil, returns to *Florence* in great triumph; the Chronicle mentions not any great matter the King gave him, but it says, that having gained sufficiently by the two former, he esteemed himself very happy that he had escaped hanging at *Paris*.

FINIS.

THE PUBLISHER TO THE READER

Concerning the following LETTER.

Courteous Reader,

IT hath been uſual with moſt of thoſe who have Tranſlated this Author into any language, to ſpend much of their time and paper in taxing his impieties, and confuting his errors and falſe principles as they are pleaſed to call them, if upon peruſal of his Writings I had found him guilty of any thing that could deceive the ſimple, or prejudice the reſt of Mankind, I ſhould not have put thee to the hazard of reading him in thy own Language; but rather have ſuffered him ſtill to ſleep in the obſcurity of his own, than endanger the world; but being very well aſſured of the contrary, and that the Age will rather receive advantage than damage by this Publication, I did yet think that it was fit to ſay ſomething in a Preface to vindicate our Author from thoſe Slanders which Prieſts, and other byaſs'd Pens have laid upon him; but ſtill I thought, that it might prove a bold and preſumptuous undertaking, and might excite laughter, for a perſon of my ſmall parts and abilities, to Apologize for one of the greateſt VVits and profoundeſt Judgments that ever lived amongſt the Moderns: In this perplexity, I had the good fortune to meet with this Letter of his own writing; which hath delivered me from thoſe ſcruples, and furniſhed me with an opportunity of juſtifying this great perſon by his own Pen. Receive then this choice Piece with benignity, it hath never before been publiſhed

in any Language, but lurk'd for above 80 *years* in the private Cabinets of his own Kindred, and the Deſcendents of his own admirers in *Florence*, till in the beginning of the *Pontificat* of *Urbane* the 8*th*. it was procured by the Jeſuits and other buſie-bodies, and brought to *Rome* with an intention to divert that wiſe *Pope* from his deſign of making one of *Nicholas Machiavel*'s Name and Family *Cardinal*, as (notwithſtanding all their oppoſition) he did, not long after. When it was gotten into that City, it wanted not thoſe who had the judgment and curioſity to copy it, and ſo at length came to enjoy that priviledge which all rare Pieces (even the ſharpeſt Libels and Paſquils) challenge in that Court, which is to be ſold to Strangers, one of which being a Gentleman of this Country, brought it over with him at his return from thence in the year 1645. and having tranſlated it into *Engliſh*, did communicate it to divers of his friends, and by means of ſome of them, it hath been my good fortune to be capable of making thee a preſent of it, and let it ſerve as an Apology for our Author and his Writings, if thou thinkeſt he need any. I muſt confeſs I believe his Works require little, but rather praiſe and admiration; yet I wiſh *I* could as well juſtifie one undertaking of his not long after the writing of this Letter; for we find in the Story of thoſe times, that in the Month of *Auguſt* following, in the ſame year 1537. this *Nicolo Machiavelli* (except there were another of that name) was committed Priſoner to the *Bargello*, amongſt thoſe who were taken in Arms againſt *Coſimo* at the Caſtle of *Montemurli*, notwithſtanding all his Compliments in this Letter to that Prince, and profeſs'd Obligations to him; if this be ſo, we muſt impute it to his too great zeal, to concur with the deſires of the univerſality at that time, in reſtoring the liberty of their Country, which hath ſo far dazel'd the judgments even of great and wiſe men, that thou ſeeſt many grave Authors amongſt the Ancients have even commended and deifyed the ingratitude and treachery of *Brutus* and *Caſſius*. But certainly this crime of his would have been much more unpardonable, if he had lived to ſee his own Propheſie fulfilled in the Perſons and Deſcendents of this great *Coſimo*, for there was never any ſucceſſion of Princes ſince the world began, in which all the royal virtues and other qualities neceſſary to thoſe who rule over men, were more eminently perſpicuous in every individual of this line; ſo that thoſe people have as little cauſe as ever any had to lament the change of their Government; their great *Dukes* having been truly Fathers of their Country, and treated their Subjects like Children, though their power be above all limitation, above all fundamental Laws; but they having no

Law,

Law, are a Law to themſelves. *I* cannot chuſe but inſtance in ſome few of their benefits to their people, firſt the making the River *Arno* Navigable from *Piſa* to *Florence* in a year of Dearth, that ſo the poor might be ſet on work and have Bread, and the Traffick of both Cities infinitely facilitated, their making at their own charge a *Canal* from *Livorne* to *Piſa*, their erecting at *Piſa* a famous Univerſity, paying the Profeſſors, who are eminent for Learning, and diſcharging all other incidencies out of their own Revenue, beſides the raiſing ſtately Buildings for Schools and Libraries, their founding a renowned Order of *Knighthood*, and keeping the Chapter in the ſame City, and ordering a conſiderable number of Knights conſtantly to reſide there, both which were intended and performed by them, to encreaſe the concourſe, and reſtore the wealth to the once opulent Inhabitants of that place. Their new Building fortifying and enfranchizing *Livorne*, that even by the aboliſhing their own Cuſtoms they might enrich their Subjects, and make that Port (as it now is) the Magazine of all the *Levant* Trade. And laſtly, Their not having in 140 years ever levyed any new Tax upon their people, excepting in the year 1642. to defend the Liberties of *Italy* againſt the *Barbarians*. Theſe things would merit a Panegyrick if either my parts, or this ſhort Advertiſement would admit it, *I* ſhall conclude then after *I* have born a juſt and dutiful teſtimony to the merits of the Prince who now governs that State, in whom (if all the Princely virtues and endowments ſhould be loſt) they might be found and reſtored again to the world: As ſome ingenious Artiſts in the laſt Age, retrieved the Art of Sculpture by certain *bas relievos* remaining on ſome Pillars and Walls at *Rome*; The Prudence, Magnanimity, Charity, Liberality, and above all the humanity, courteſie, and affability of this Prince, though they exceed my expreſſions, yet they are ſufficiently known, not only to his own Subjects (the conſtant objects of his care and goodneſs) but even to all Strangers, more particularly to our Nation, he having undertaken a troubleſom Journey to viſit this Kingdom, and to make it witneſs and partaker of his tranſcendent generoſity and bounty, which he hath continued ever ſince, as can be teſtified by all who have had the honour to wait upon him in his own Country, or the good fortune but to ſee him in ours. I my ſelf who have been ſo happy to be admitted into his preſence, and have been honoured ſince in having his Highneſs my cuſtomer for many choice Books to encreaſe (not his knowledge, for that is beyond receiving any addition by Books) but his curioſity and his Library, do think my ſelf bound in Duty to take this poor opportunity of teſtifying my gratitude and devotion to this

this excellent Prince. As to this Letter I have nothing more to ſay, but that thou mayeſt ſee how right this Author was ſet in Principles of Religion, before he could have the information, which we have had ſince from the Pens of moſt learned and rational Controverſiſts in thoſe points, and therefore thou mayſt admire the ſagacity of his Judgment. Read him then, and ſerve God, thy King, and thy Country, with the knowledge he will teach thee. Farewel.

NICHO-

Nicholas Machiavel's

LETTER

TO

ZANOBIUS BUONDELMONTIUS

IN

VINDICATION

Of Himself and His

WRITINGS.

THE Discourse we had lately (dear *Zenobio*) in the delightful Gardens of our old deceased Friend *Cosima Rucellai*, and the pressing importunity of *Guilio Salviati*, that I would use some means to wipe off the many aspersions cast upon my Writings, gives you the present trouble of reading this Letter, and me the pleasure of writing it; which last would be infinitely

greater

greater, if I were not at this day too old, and too inconſiderable, and by the change of our Government wholly uncapable of performing, either with my brain or my hand, any further ſervice to my Country; for it hath ever been my opinion, that whoſoever goes about to make men publickly acquainted with his actions, or apologize to the world for imputations laid upon him, cannot be excuſed from vanity and impertinence, except his parts and opportunities be ſuch as may enable him to be inſtrumental for the good of others, and that he cannot atchieve that excellent end, without juſtifying himſelf from having any indirect and baſe ones, and procuring truſt from men, by clearing the repute of his juſtice and integrity to them. But although this be far from my caſe; yet I have yielded (you ſee) to the entreaty of *Guilio* and the reſt of that Company, not only becauſe I am ſufficiently (both by the reſtraint of our Preſs, and the diſcretion of the perſon I write to) aſſured that this Letter will never be made publick; but for that I eſteem it a Duty to clear that excellent Society from the Scandal of having ſo dangerous and pernicious a perſon to be a member of their converſation; for by reaſon of my age, and ſince the loſs of our liberty, and my ſufferings under that Monſter of luſt and cruelty *Alexander de Medici*, ſet over us by the divine vengeance for our ſins, I can be capable of no other deſign or enjoyment than to delight and be delighted in the company of ſo many choice and virtuous perſons, who now aſſemble themſelves with all ſecurity, under the happy and hopeful reign of our new Prince, *Coſimo*, and we may ſay, that though our Common-wealth be not reſtored, our ſlavery is at an end, and that he coming in by our own choice, may prove (if I have a good Skill in Propheſying as I have had formerly) Anceſtor to many renowned Princes, who will govern this State in great quietneſs, and with great clemency; ſo that our Poſterity is like to enjoy eaſe and ſecurity, though not that greatneſs, wealth, and glory, by which our City hath for ſome years paſt (even in the moſt factious and tumultuous times of our Democracy) given Law to *Italy*, and bridled the ambition of foreign Princes. But, that I may avoid the Loquacity incident to old men, I will come to the buſineſs. If I remember well, the exceptions that are taken to theſe poor things I have publiſhed, are reducible to three;

Firſt, *That in all my Writings, I inſinuate my great affection to the Democratical Government, even ſo much as to undervalue that of Monarchy in reſpect of it, which laſt I do, not obſcurely in many paſſages, teach and, as it were, perſwade the People to throw off.*

Next, *That in ſome places I vent very great impieties, ſlighting and villifying the Church, as Author of all the miſgovernment in the world, and by ſuch contempt make way for Atheiſm and Prophaneneſs.*

And Laſtly, *That in my Book of the Prince I teach Monarchs all the execrable Villanies that can be invented,*

invented, and inſtruct them how to break faith, and to oppreſs and enſlave their Subjects.

I ſhall anſwer ſomething to every one of theſe; and that I may obſerve a right method, will begin with the firſt.

Having lived in an Age when our poor Country and Government have ſuffered more changes and revolutions, than ever did perhaps befall any people in ſo ſhort a time, and having had till the taking of *Florence*, my ſhare in the managing of affairs, during almoſt all theſe alterations, ſometimes in the quality of *Secretary* of our *City*, and ſometimes employed in Embaſſages abroad, I ſet my ſelf to read the Hiſtories of Ancient and Modern times, that I might by that means find out whether there had not been in all Ages the like viciſſitudes and accidents in State affairs, and to ſearch out the cauſes of them, and having in ſome ſort ſatisfied my ſelf therein, I could not abſtain from ſcribling ſomething of the too chief kinds of Government, *Monarchy* and *Democracy*, of which all other forms are but mixtures, and ſince neither my parts nor Learning could arrive to follow the ſteps of the *Ancients*, by writing according to Method and Art, as *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and many others have done upon this Subject, I did content my ſelf to make ſlight obſervations upon both; by giving a bare Character of a modern *Prince*, as to the *Monarchical* frame, and as to the popular chuſing the perfecteſt and moſt ſucceſsful of all Governments of that kind upon earth, and in my diſcourſes upon it, following the order of my Author, without ever taking upon me to argue problematically, much leſs to decide which of theſe two Governments is the beſt; if from my way of handling matters in my diſcourſes upon *Livy*, and from thoſe incomparable virtues, and great actions we read of in that *Hiſtory*, and from the obſervations I make, men will conclude (which is, I muſt confeſs my opinion) that the excellency of thoſe Counſels and Atchievements, and the improvement which mankind, and, as I may ſo ſay, humane nature it ſelf obtained amongſt the *Romans*, did proceed naturally from their Government, and was but a plain effect and conſequence of the perfection of their Common-wealth; I ſay if Readers will thus judge, how can I in reaſon be accuſed for that; it would become thoſe who lay this blame upon me to undeceive them whom my Papers have miſled, and to ſhew the world to what other cauſes we may impute thoſe admirable effects, thoſe Heroick qualities and performances, that integrity and purity of manners, that ſcorning of riches and life it ſelf, when the publick was concerned: If they pleaſe to do this, they will oblige my Readers, who will owe to ſuch the rectifying of their Judgments, and not at all offend me, who have reaſoned this matter impartially and without paſſion, nor have poſitively affirmed any thing. But what if this part of my accuſation had been true? Why ſhould I be condemned of hereſie or indiſcretion for preferring a *Common-wealth* before a *Monarchy*? was I not born, bred, and imployed in a City, which being at the time I writ, under that form of Government, did owe all wealth and greatneſs, and all proſperity to it? If I had not very deſignedly avoided all dogmaticalneſs in my obſervations (being not willing to imitate young Scholars in their Declamations) I might eaſily have concluded from the premiſes I lay down, that a *Democracy* founded upon good orders is the beſt and moſt excellent Government, and this without the leaſt fear of confutation; for I firmly believe, that there are none but Flatterers and Sophiſters would oppoſe me, ſuch as will wreſt *Ariſtotle*, and even *Plato* himſelf, to make them write for *Monarchy*, by miſapplying ſome looſe paſſages in thoſe great Authors, nay, they will tell their Readers, that what is moſt like the Government of the world by God is the beſt, which wholly depends upon his abſolute power; to make this Compariſon run with four feet, theſe Sycophants muſt give the poor Prince they intend to deifie, a better and ſuperior Nature to humanity, muſt create a neceſſary dependance of all Creatures upon him, muſt endow him with infinite wiſdom and goodneſs, and even with omnipotency it ſelf. It will be hard for any man to be miſled in this Argument by proofs wreſted from

from *Theology*, since whosoever reads attentively the Historical part of the *Old Testament*, shall find that God himself never made but one Government for men, that this Government was a *Common-wealth* (wherein the *Sanhadrim* or *Senate*, and the Congregation or *popular Assembly* had their share) and that he manifested his high displeasure when the rebellious people would turn it into a *Monarchy*; but that I may not strike upon the rock I profess to shun, I shall pass to that which is indeed fit to be wip'd off, and which if it were true, would not only justly expose me to the hatred and vengeance of God, and all good men, but even destroy the design and purpose of all my Writings, which is to treat in some sort (as well as one of my small parts can hope to do) of the *Politicks*; and how can any man pretend to write concerning policy who destroys the most essential part of it which is obedience to all Governments. It will be very easie then for *Guilio Salviati*, or any other member of our Society, to believe the Protestation I make, that the animating of private men either directly or indirectly to disobey, much less to shake off, any Government how despotical soever, was never in my Thoughts or Writings; those who are unwilling to give credit to this, may take the pains to assign in any of my Books, the passages they imagine to tend that way, (for I can think of none my self) that so I may give such person more particular satisfaction; I must confess I have a discourse in one of my Books, to encourage the *Italian* Nation, to assume their ancient valour, and to expel the *Barbarians*, meaning (as the ancient *Romans* used the word) all Strangers from amongst us; but that was before the *Kings* of *Spain* had quiet possession of the Kingdom of *Naples*, or the *Emperor* of the *Dutchy* of *Milan*; so that I could not be interpreted to mean that the people of those two Dominions should be stir'd up to shake off their Princes, because they were Forcigners, since at that time *Lodovic Sforza* was in possession of the one, and K. *Frederick* restored to the other, both *Natives* of *Italy*; but my design was to exhort our Country-men not to suffer this *Province* to be the Scene of the Arms and ambition of *Charles* the 8th. or K. *Lewis* his Successor, who when they had a mind to renew the old title of the House of *Anjou* to the Kingdom of *Naples*, came with such force into *Italy*, that not only our Goods were plundered, and our Lands wasted, but even the liberty of our Cities and Governments endangered, but to unite and oppose them, and to keep this *Province* in the hands of *Princes* of our own Nation, this my intention is so visible in the Chapter it self, that I need but refer you to it. Yet that I may not answer this imputation barely by denying, I shall assert in this place what my principles are in that which the world calls *Rebellion*, which I believe to be not only a rising in Arms against any Government we live under, but to acknowledge that word to extend to all clandestine Conspiracies too, by which the peace and quiet of any Countries may be interrupted, and by consequence the lives and estates of innocent persons endangered. *Rebellion* then so described, I hold to be the greatest crime that can be committed amongst men, both against Policy, Morality, and *in foro Conscientiæ*; but notwithstanding all this, it is an offence which will be committed whilst the world lasts, as often as Princes tyranize, and by enslaving and oppressing their Subjects make Magistracy, which was intended for the benefit of mankind, prove a Plague and Destruction to it; for let the terrour and the guilt be never so great, it is impossible that humane Nature which consists of passion as well as virtue can support with patience and submission the greatest cruelty and injustice, whenever either the weakness of their Princes, the unanimity of the people, or any other favourable accident, shall give them reasonable hopes to mend their condition, and provide better for their own interest by insurrection. So that Princes and States ought in the Conduct of their affairs, not only to consider what their people are bound to submit to, if they were inspired from Heaven, or were all Moral Philosophers, but to weigh likewise what is probable *de facto* to fall out, in this corrupt age of the world, and to reflect upon those dangerous tumults, which have happened frequently not only upon oppression, but even by reason of Malversation, and how some *Monarchies* have been wholly subverted and changed into *Democracies* by the tyranny of their Princes, as we see (to say nothing of *Rome*) the powerful *Cantons* of *Switzerland* brought by that means a little before the last age, to a considerable *Common-wealth*, courted and sought to by all the *Potentates* in *Christendom*. If *Princes* will seriously consider this matter, I make no question but they will rule with Clemency and Moderation, and return to that excellent Maxim of the Ancients (almost exploded in this Age) that the interest of *Kings*, and of their people is the same, which truth it hath been the whole design of my Writings to convince them of.

I am charged then, in the second place, with *impiety*, *in villifying the Church*, *and so to make way for Atheism*. I do not deny but that I have very frequently in my Writings, laid the blame upon the *Church of* Rome, not only for all the misgovernment of *Christendom*; but even for the depravation and almost total destruction of Christian Religion it self in this Province; but that this discourse of mine doth, or can tend to teach men impiety; or to make way for Atheism, I peremptorily deny: and although for proof of my innocence herein, I need but refer you and all others to my Papers themselves, as they are now published (where you will find all my reasons drawn from experience, and frequent examples cited, which is ever my way of arguing) yet since I am put upon it, I shall in a few lines make that matter possibly a little clearer; and shall first make protestation, that as I do undoubtedly hope, by the merits of Christ, and by Faith in him, to attain eternal Salvation; so I do firmly believe the Christian profession to be the only true Religion now in the world: Next, I am fully perswaded, that all divine verities, which God then designed to teach the world, are contained in the Books of Holy Scripture, as they are now extant and received amongst us. From them I understand that God created man in purity and innocence, and that the first of that Species, by their frailty, lost at once their integrity and their paradise, and intail'd sin and misery upon their posterity; that Almighty God to repair this loss, did out of his infinite mercy, and with unparallel'd grace and goodness, send his only begotten Son into the world, to teach us new truths, to be a perfect example of virtue goodness and obedience, to restore true Religion, degenerated amongst the Jews into superstition, formality, and hypocrisie, to dye for the salvation of mankind, and in fine, to give to us the Holy Spirit, to regenerate our Hearts, support our Faith, and lead us into all truth. Now if it shall appear, that as the lusts of our first Parents did at that time disappoint the good intention of God, in making a pure world, and brought in by their disobedience the corruptions that are now in it; so that since likewise the *Bishops* of *Rome*, by their insatiable ambition and avarice, have designedly, as much as in them lyes, frustrated the merciful purpose he had, in the happy restauration he intended the world by his Son, and in the renewing and reforming of humane Nature, and have wholly defaced and spoil'd Christian Religion, and made it a worldly and a Heathenish thing; and altogether uncapable, as it is practised amongst them, either of directing the ways of its Professors to virtue and good life, or of saving their Souls hereafter. If, I say, this do appear I know no reason why I, for detecting thus much, and for giving warning to the world to take heed of their ways, should be accused of Impiety or Atheism, or why his Holiness should be so inraged against the poor Inhabitants of the Valleys in *Savoy*, and against the *Albigesi* for calling him Antichrist; but to find that this is an undoubted truth, I mean that the *Popes* have corrupted Christian Religion, we need but read the New Testament (acknowledged by themselves to be of infallible truth) and there we shall see, that the Faith and Religion Preach'd by Christ, and setled afterwards by his Apostles, and cultivated by their sacred Epistles, is so different a thing from the Christianity that is now profess'd and taught at *Rome*, that we should be convinc'd, that if those Holy men should be sent by God again into the world, they would take more pains to confute this *Gallimaufry*, than ever they did to Preach down the tradition of the *Pharisees*, or the Fables and Idolatry of the *Gentiles*, and would in probability suffer a new Martyrdom in that City under the Vicar of Christ, for the same Doctrine which once animated the Heathen Tyrants against them. Nay, we have something more to say against these Sacrilegious pretenders to Gods power; for whereas all other false worships have been set up by some politick Legislators, for the support and preservation of Government, this false, this spurious Religion brought in upon the ruines of Christianity by the *Popes*, hath deformed the face of Government in *Europe*, destroying all the good principles, and morality left us by the Heathen themselves, and introduced instead thereof, sordid, cowardly, and impolitick notions, whereby they have subjected mankind, and even great *Princes* and *States*, to their own *Empire*, and never suffered any Orders or Maxims to take place where they have power, that might make a Nation wise, honest, great or wealthy; this I have set down so plainly in those passages of my Book which are complained of, that I shall say nothing at all for the proof of it in this place, but refer you thither, and come to speak a little more particularly of my first assertion, that the *Pope* and his Clergy have depraved Christian Religion. Upon this subject I could infinitely wish, now Letters begin to revive again, that some Learned Pen would employ it self, and that some person vers'd in the Chronology of the Church (as they call it) would deduce out of the Ecclesiastical Writers, the time and manner how these abuses crept in, and by what arts and Steps this *Babel* that reaches at Heaven, was built by these Sons of the Earth; but this matter as unsuitable to the brevity of a Letter, and in-

deed more to my ſmall parts and Learning, I ſhall not pretend to, being one who never hitherto ſtudyed or writ of Theology, further than it did naturally concern the *Politicks*; therefore I ſhall only deal by the New Teſtament as I have done formerly by *Titus Livius*; that is, make obſervations or reflections upon it, and leave you and Mr. *Guilio*, and the reſt of our Society to make the judgment, not citing like Preachers, the Chapter or Verſe; becauſe the reading of Holy Scripture is little us'd, and indeed hardly permitted amongſt us. To begin at the top, I would have any reaſonable man tell me, whence this unmeaſurable power, long claim'd, and now poſſeſs'd by the *Biſhop of Rome*, is derived, firſt of being Chriſt's Vicar, and by that (as I may ſo ſay) pretending to a Monopoly of the Holy Spirit (which was promiſed and given to the whole Church, that is, to the Elect or Saints) as is plain by a clauſe in St. *Peter*'s Sermon, made the very ſame time that the miraculous gifts of the Spirit of God were firſt given to the Apoſtles, who ſays to the Jews and Gentiles; *Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jeſus Chriſt for the remiſſion of Sins, and you ſhall receive the gift of the Holy Ghoſt, for this promiſe is to you and to your Children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God ſhall call*, Next, to judge infallibly of Divine Truth and to forgive Sins as Chriſt did. Then to be the Head of all Eccleſiaſtical perſons and cauſes in the world; to be ſo far above *Kings* and *Princes*, as to judge, depoſe, and deprive them, and to have an abſolute juriſdiction over all the affairs in Chriſtendom, *in Ordine ad Spiritualia*; yet all this the Canoniſts allow him, and he makes no ſcruple to aſſume, whilſt it is plain that in the whole New Teſtament there is no deſcription made of ſuch an Officer to be at any time in the Church, except it be in the Prophecy of the *Apocalyps*, or in one of St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles, where he ſays, who it is that ſhall ſit in the Temple of God, ſhewing himſelf that he is God. Chriſt tells us his Kingdom is not of this world, and if any will be the greateſt amongſt his Diſciples, that he muſt be ſervant to the reſt, which ſhews that his followers were to be great in ſanctity and humility, and not in worldly power.

The Apoſtle *Paul* writing to the Chriſtians of thoſe times, almoſt in every Epiſtle commands them to be obedient to the higher Powers, or Magiſtrates ſet over them, and St. *Peter* himſelf (from whom this extravagant Empire is pretended to be derived) in his firſt Epiſtle, bids us ſubmit our ſelves to every ordinance of man for the Lords ſake, whether it be to the King, or, *&c.* and this is enjoyn'd although it is plain that they who govern'd the world in thoſe days, were both Heathen Tyrants and Uſurpers, and in this ſubmiſſion there is no exception or proviſo for Eccleſiaſtical immunity. The practice as well as Precepts of theſe Holy men ſhews plainly that they had no intention to leave Succeſſors, who ſhould deprive Hereditary Princes from their right of reigning for differing in Religion, who without all doubt are by the appointment of the Apoſtle, and by the principles of Chriſtianity, to be obeyed and ſubmitted to (in things wherein the fundamental Laws of the Government give them power) though they were Jews or Gentiles. If I ſhould tell you by what Texts in Scripture the *Popes* claim the Powers before mentioned, it would ſtir up your laughter, and prove too light for ſo ſerious a matter; yet becauſe poſſibly you may never have heard ſo much of this Subject before, I ſhall inſtance in a few: They tell you therefore that the juriſdiction they pretend over the Church, and the power of pardoning Sins, comes from Chriſt to St. *Peter*, and from him to them. *Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church. I will give thee the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; whatſoever thou ſhalt bind on earth ſhall be bound in heaven, and whatſoever thou ſhalt looſe on earth*, &c. From theſe two Texts ridiculouſly applyed, comes this great tree which hath with its branches over-ſpread the whole earth, and kill'd all the good and wholſom Plants growing upon it; The firſt Text will never by any man of ſence be underſtood to ſay more, than that the Preaching, Suffering, and Miniſtry of *Peter*, was like to be a great foundation and pillar of the Doctrine of Chriſt; the other Text (as alſo another ſpoken by our Saviour to all his Apoſtles, *whoſe ſins ye remit they are remitted, and whoſe ſins ye retain they are retained*) are by all the Primitive fathers interpreted in this manner, whereſoever you ſhall effectually Preach the Goſpel, you ſhall carry with you grace and remiſſion of Sins to them which ſhall follow your inſtructions; but the people who ſhall not have theſe joyful tidings communicated by you to them, ſhall remain in darkneſs, and in their Sins. But if any will conteſt, that by ſome of theſe laſt Texts, that Evangelical Excommunication, which was afterwards brought into the Church by the Apoſtles, was here præſignified by our great Maſter, how unlike were thoſe cenſures to thoſe now thundered out (as he calls it) by the *Pope?* theſe were for edification, and not deſtruction, to afflict the fleſh for the ſalvation of the Soul; that Apoſtolical ordinance was pronounced for ſome notorious Scandal or Apoſtacy from the Faith, and firſt decreed by the Church; that is, the whole Congregation preſent, and then denounced by the Paſtor,

Paſtor, and reached only to debar ſuch perſon from partaking of the communion or fellowſhip of that Church, till repentance ſhould readmit him, but was followed by no other proſecution or chaſtiſement, as is now practiſed. But ſuppoſe all theſe Texts had been as they would have them, how does this make for the Succeſſors of St. *Peter*, or the reſt? or how can this prove the *Biſhops of Rome* to have right to ſuch ſucceſſion? But I make haſte from this ſubject, and ſhall urge but one Text more; which is, *The ſpiritual man judgeth all men, but is himſelf judged of none*; from whence is inferred by the Canoniſts, that firſt, the *Pope* is the Spiritual man; and then, that he is to be Judge of all the world, and laſt, that he is never to be liable to any judgment himſelf; whereas it is obvious to the meaneſt underſtanding, that St. *Paul* in this Text means to diſtinguiſh between a perſon inſpired with the Spirit of God, and one remaining in the ſtate of Nature, which latter he ſays cannot judge of thoſe Heavenly gifts and graces, as he explains himſelf when he ſays, *The Natural man cannot diſcern the things of the Spirit, becauſe they are fooliſhneſs unto him.* To take my leave of this matter wholly out of the way of my Studies, I ſhall beg of you *Zenobio* and of *Guilio*, and the reſt of our Society to read over carefully the New Teſtament, and then to ſee what ground there is for Purgatory (by which all the wealth and greatneſs hath accrew'd to theſe men) what colour for the Idolatrous worſhip of Saints, and their Images, and particularly for ſpeaking in their Hymns and Prayers to a piece of wood (the Croſs I mean) *Salve Lignum*, &c. and then *fac nos dignos beneficiorum Chriſti*, as you may read in that Office, what colour, or rather what excuſe for that horrid unchriſtian, and barbarous Engine called the *Inquiſition*, brought in by the command and authority of the *Pope*, the Inventor of which, *Peter* a Dominican Fryer having been ſlain amongſt the *Albigeſi*, as he well deſerved, is now Canoniz'd for a Saint, and ſtil'd *San Pietro Martine*: In the dreadful Priſons of this Inquiſition, many faithful and pious Chriſtians (to ſay nothing of honeſt Moral *Moors* or *Mahometans*) are tormented and famiſh'd, or, if they out-live their ſufferings, burnt publickly to death, and that only for differing in Religion from the *Pope*, without having any crime, or the leaſt miſdemeanor proved or alledged againſt them, and this is inflicted upon theſe poor Creatures, by thoſe who profeſs to believe the Scripture, which tells us, that *Faith is the gift of God*, without whoſe ſpecial illumination no man can obtain it, and therefore is not in reaſon or humanity to be puniſhed for wanting it: And Chriſt himſelf hath ſo clearly decided that point in bidding us let the tares and the wheat grow together till the Harveſt, that I ſhall never make any difficulty to call him Antichriſt, who ſhall uſe the leaſt perſecution whatſoever againſt any differing in matters of Faith from himſelf, whether the perſon ſo diſſenting, be *Heretick*, *Jew*, *Gentile*, or *Mahometan*: Next, I beſeech you to obſerve in reading that Holy Book (though Chriſtian faſts are doubtleſs of Divine right) what ground there is for enjoyning fiſh to be eaten (at leaſt fleſh to be abſtained from) for one third part of the year, by which they put the poor to great hardſhip, who not having purſes to buy wholſom fiſh, are ſubjected to all the miſeries and diſeaſes incident to a bad and unhealthful dyet, whilſt the rich, and chiefly themſelves and their *Cardinals*, exceed *Lucullus* in their Luxury, of *Oyſters*, *Turbats*, *tender Crabs*, and *Carpioni* brought ſome hundreds of miles to feed their gluttony, upon theſe penitential days of abſtinence from *Beef* and *Pork*. It may be it will lye in the way of thoſe who obſerve this, to enquire what St. *Paul* means when he ſays, *That in the latter days ſome ſhall depart from the faith forbidding to marry, and commanding to abſtain from meats which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving*; but all theſe things, and many other abuſes brought in by theſe Perverters of Chriſtianity, will I hope e're long be enquired into by ſome of the Diſciples of that bold Fryer, who the very ſame year in which I prophecyed that the ſcourge of the Church was not far off, began to thunder againſt their Indulgencies, and ſince hath queſtioned many tenets long received and impoſed upon the world. I ſhall conclude this diſcourſe after I have ſaid a word of the moſt Helliſh of all the innovations brought in by the *Popes*, which is the *Clergy*; theſe are a ſort of men under pretence of miniſtring to the people in holy things, ſet a part and ſeparated from the reſt of mankind (from whom they have a very diſtinct, and a very oppoſite intereſt) by a humane Ceremony called by a divine name, *viz.* Ordination, theſe wherever they are found (with the whole body of the Monks and Fryers, who are called the regular Clergy) make a Band which may be called the *Janizaries of the Papacy*, theſe have been the cauſers of all the Soloecifms and Immoralities in Government, and of all the impieties and abominations in Religion, and by conſequence of all the diſorder, villany, and corruption we ſuffer under in this deteſtable Age; theſe men by the Biſhop of *Rome*'s help, have crept into all the Governments in *Chriſtendom*, where there is any mixture of *Monarchy*, and made themſelves a third eſtate; that is, have, by their temporalities (which are almoſt a third part

of all the Lands in *Europe* given them by the blind zeal, or rather folly of the *Northern* people, who over-ran this part of the world) ſtept into the throne, and what they cannot perform by theſe ſecular helps, and by the dependancy their vaſſals have upon them, they fail not to claim and to uſurp, by the power they pretend to have from God and his Vicegerent at *Rome*. They exempt themſelves, their Lands and Goods from all ſecular juriſdiction; that is, from all Courts of Juſtice and Magiſtracy, and will be Judges in their own Cauſes, as in matters of tithe, *&c.* and not content with this, will appoint Courts of their own to decide Soveraignty in teſtamentary matters, and many other cauſes, and take upon them to be the ſole Puniſhers of many great Crimes, as Witchcraft, Sorcery, Adultery, and all uncleanneſs; to ſay nothing of the fore-mentioned judicatory of the Inquiſition: in theſe laſt caſes they turn the offenders over to be puniſh'd (when they have given Sentence) by the ſecular arm, ſo they call the Magiſtrate, who is blindly to execute their decrees under pain of Hell fire; as if Chriſtian Princes and Governours were appointed only by God to be their Bravo's or Hangmen. They give Protection and Sanctuary, to all execrable offenders, even to Murderers themſelves (whom God commanded to be indiſpenſably puniſh'd with death) if they come within their Churches, Cloyſters, or any other place, which they will pleaſe to call Holy ground; and if the ordinary juſtice, nay, the Soveraign power, do proceed againſt ſuch offender, they thunder out their Excommunication; that is, cut off from the body of Chriſt, not the Prince only, but the whole Nation and People, ſhutting the Church dores, and commanding divine offices to ceaſe, and ſometimes even authorizing the people to riſe up in Arms, and conſtrain their Governours to a ſubmiſſion, as happened to this poor City in the time of our Anceſtors, when for but forbidding the ſervant of a poor Carmelite Fryer (who had vowed poverty, and ſhould have kept none) to go arm'd, and puniſhing his diſobedience with impriſonment, our whole Senate with their *Gonfalonier* were conſtrained to go to *Avignon* for abſolution, and in caſe of refuſal, had been maſſacred by the people. It would almoſt aſtoniſh a wiſe man to imagine how theſe folks ſhould acquire an Empire ſo deſtructive to Chriſtian Religion, and ſo pernicious to the intereſts of men, but it will not ſeem ſo miraculous to them who ſhall ſeriouſly conſider, that the Clergy hath been for more than this thouſand years upon the catch, and a form'd united corporation againſt the purity of Religion, and the intereſt of mankind, and have not only wreſted the Holy Scriptures to their own advantage (which they have kept from the layity in unknown languages, and by prohibiting the reading thereof) but made uſe likewiſe firſt of the blind devotion and ignorance of the *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Huns*, &c. and ſince of the ambition and avarice of Chriſtian Princes, ſtirring them up one againſt another, and ſending them upon fooliſh errands to the Holy Land, to loſe their lives, and to leave their Dominions, in the mean time, expoſed to themſelves and their Complices. They have beſides kept Learning and Knowledge amongſt themſelves, ſtifling the light of the Goſpel, crying down Moral virtues as ſplendid ſins, defacing humane policy, deſtroying the purity of the Chriſtian faith and profeſſion, and all that was virtuous, prudent, regular and orderly upon earth; ſo that whoever would do good, and good men ſervice, get himſelf immortal honour in this life, and eternal glory in the next, would reſtore the good policy (I had almoſt ſaid with my Author *Livy* the ſanctity too) of the *Heathens*, with all their valour, and other glorious endowments; I ſay, whoever would do this, muſt make himſelf powerful enough to extirpate this curſed and apoſtate race out of the world, and that you may ſee this is lawful as well as neceſſary, I ſhall ſay but one word of their calling and original, and then leave this ſubject. The word *Clergy* is a term, wholly unknown to the Scriptures, otherwiſe than in this ſence; a peculiar People or Gods lot, uſed often for the whole Jewiſh Nation, who are likewiſe called a Kingdom of Prieſts in ſome places. In the New Teſtament the word *Cleros* is taken for the true Believers, who are alſo called the Elect, and often the Church, which is the Aſſembly of the Faithful met together, as is eaſily ſeen by reading the beginning of moſt of St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles, where writing to the Church, or Churches, he uſually explains himſelf, *To all the Saints in Chriſt*; ſometimes, *To all who have obtained like faith with us*; ſometimes, *To all who in all places call upon the Name of the Lord Jeſus*, &c. by which it appears, that neither the word Church nor Clergy was in thoſe days ever appropriated to the Paſtors or Elders of the flock; but did ſignifie indifferently all the people aſſembled together; which is likewiſe the literal conſtruction of the word *Eccleſia*, which is an aſſembly or meeting; in theſe Congregations or Churches was performed their Ordination, which properly ſignifies no more than a decree of ſuch Aſſembly; but is particularly uſed for an Election of any into the Miniſtry. The manner was this, ſometimes the Apoſtles themſelves in their Perigrinations, and ſometimes any other eminent Member of the Church, did propoſe to the Society (upon vacancy, or

other

other neceſſity of a Paſtor, Elder, or Deacon) ſome good Holy man to be Elected, which perſon if he had parts or gifts, ſuch as the Church could edifie by, was choſen by the lifting up of hands, that is by ſuffrage, and oftentimes hands were laid upon him, and Prayer made for him. Theſe men ſo ſet apart did not pretend to any conſecration, or ſacredneſs more than they had before, much leſs to become a diſtinct thing from the reſt of mankind, as if they had been metamorphos'd, but did attend to perform the ſeveral functions of their calling, as prophecying; that is, Preaching the Goſpel, viſiting the Sick, *&c.* and never intermitted the ordinary buſineſs of their Trade or Profeſſion, unleſs their Church or Congregation was very numerous, in which caſe they were maintained by alms or contribution, which was laid aſide by every member, and collected the firſt day of the week by the Deacons, this was ſaid to be given to the Church, and was imployed by ſuffrage of the whole Collective Body to the poor, and to other incidencies; ſo far was it from Sacriledge in thoſe days to employ Church goods to Lay uſes. From theſe words, *Church*, *Clergy*, *Ordination*, *Paſtor*, (which laſt hath been tranſlated of late years *Biſhop*) you ſee what concluſions theſe men have deduced, and how immence a ſtructure they have raiſed, upon ſo little a foundation, and how eaſily it will fall to the ground, when God ſhall inſpire Chriſtian Princes and States to redeem his truths, and his poor enſlaved Members out of their Clutches, and to bring back again into the world, the true original Chriſtian faith, with the Apoſtolical Churches, Paſtors, and Ordination, ſo conſiſtent with moral virtue and integrity, ſo helpful and conducing to the beſt and moſt prudent Policy, ſo fitted for obedience to Magiſtracy and Government, all which the world hath for many years been deprived of, by the execrable and innate ill quality, which is inſeparable from Prieſt-craft, and the conjuration or ſpell of their new invented ordination; by which they cry with the Poet,

Jam furor humanum noſtro de pectore ſenſum
Expulit & totum ſpirant præ-cordia Phœbum.

which makes them ſo Sacred, and Holy, that they have nothing of integrity, or indeed of humanity left in them. I hope I ſhall not be thought impious any longer, upon this point, I mean for vindicating Chriſtian Religion from the aſſaults of theſe men, who having the confidence to believe, or at leaſt profeſs themſelves the only inſtruments which God hath choſen or can chooſe to teach and reform the world (though they have neither Moral virtues, nor Natural parts equal to other men for the moſt part) have by this pretence prevail'd ſo far upon the common ſort of people, and upon ſome too of a better quality, that they are perſwaded their ſalvation or eternal damnation depends upon believing or not believing of what they ſay. I would not be underſtood, to diſſwade any from honouring the true Apoſtolical Teachers, when they ſhall be re-eſtabliſhed amongſt us, or from allowing them (even of right, and not of alms or courteſie) ſuch emoluments as may enable them cheerfully to perform the duties of their charge, to provide for their Children, and even to uſe hoſpitality as they are commanded by St. *Paul.* But this I will prophecy before I conclude; that if Princes ſhall perform this buſineſs by halves, and leave any root of this Clergy or Prieſtcraft, as it now is, in the ground; or if that famous reformer, fled ſome years ſince out of *Picardy* to *Geneva*, who is of ſo great renown for learning and parts, and who promiſes us ſo perfect a reformation, ſhall not in his model wholly extirpate this ſort of men, then I ſay I muſt foretel, that as well the Magiſtrate as this Workman, will find themſelves deceived in their expectation, and that the leaſt *fibra* of this plant will over-run again the whole Vineyard of the Lord, and turn to a diffuſive Papacy in every Dioceſs, perhaps in every Pariſh: So that God in his mercy inſpire them to cut out the core of the Ulcer, and the bag of this impoſture, that it may never ranckle or feſter any more, nor break out hereafter, to diffuſe new corruption and putrifaction through the body of Chriſt, which is his Holy Church, nor to vitiate and infect the good order and true policy of Government.

I come now to the laſt branch of my charge, which is, that I teach Princes villany, and how to enſlave and oppreſs their Subjects; in which accuſation I am dealt with as poor *Agnolo Canini* was, who, as they report, being a very Learned P[illegible] of the Laws, and left Practiſer the only man of this profeſſion (one Autumn) in our City, the reſt of the Advocates being fled into the Country for fear of a contagious Diſeaſe which then reigned, was commanded by our Judges to aſſiſt with his Counſel both parties, and to draw Pleas as well for the Defendant as the Plaintiff, elſe the Courts of Juſtice muſt have been ſhut up. In the ſame manner my accuſers handle me, and make me firſt exhort and teach Subjects to throw off their Princes, and then to inſtruct Monarchs how to enſlave and oppreſs them; but I did

not

not expect ſuch ingratitude from mine own Citizens, or to be ſerved as *Moſes* was, when he was upbraided for killing the *Egyptian*, by one of his own people for whoſe ſake he had done it, whereas he believed they would have underſtood by that action, that he was the perſon whom God intended to make uſe of in delivering them from the horrid ſlavery they were then under. If any man will read over my Book of the Prince with impartiality and ordinary charity, he will eaſily perceive, that it is not my intention therein to recommend that Government, or thoſe men there deſcribed, to the world; much leſs to teach them to trample upon good men, and all that is ſacred and venerable upon earth, Laws, Religion, Honeſty, and what not; if I have been a little too punctual in deſigning theſe Monſters, and drawn them to the life in all their lineaments and colours, I hope mankind will know them the better to avoid them, my Treatiſe being both a Satyr againſt them, and a true Character of them; I ſpeak nothing of great and honorable Princes, as the Kings of *France*, *England*, and others, who have the States and Orders of their Kingdoms with excellent Laws and Conſtitutions to found and maintain their Government, and who reign over the hearts as well as the perſons of their Subjects; I treat only of thoſe vermin bred out of the corruption of our own ſmall Commonwealths and Cities, or engender'd by the ill blaſts that come from *Rome*, *Olivaretto da Fermo*, *Borgia*, the *Baglioni*, the *Bentivoglio*, and a hundred others; who having had neither right nor honourable means to bring them to their power, uſe it with more violence, rapine, and cruelty upon the poor people, than thoſe other renowned Princes ſhew to the Boars, the Wolves, the Foxes, and other ſavage beaſts which are the objects of their chaſe and hunting: whoſoever in his Empire over men is ty'd to no other rules than thoſe of his own will and luſt, muſt either be a Saint to moderate his paſſions, or elſe a very Devil incarnate; or if he be neither of theſe, both his life and reign are like to be very ſhort; for whoſoever takes upon him ſo execrable an employment as to rule men againſt the Laws of nature and of reaſon, muſt turn all topſy turvy, and never ſtick at any thing, for if once he halt, he will fall and never riſe again: I hope after this I need ſay little to juſtifie my ſelf from the calumny of adviſing theſe Monſters to break their faith, ſince to keep it is to loſe their Empire; faithfulneſs and ſincerity being their mortal enemies, and *Uguccione della Faggivola* to one who upbraided him, that he never employed honeſt men; anſwered, *Honeſt men will cut my throat, let the King uſe honeſt men*, meaning the King of *Naples*, who was eſtabliſhed in his Throne, and had right to it. But that I may have occaſion to juſtifie my ſelf againſt a little more than I am accuſed of, I will confeſs, that in a work where I deſired to be a little more ſerious, than I was in this Book of the Prince, I did affirm, that in what way ſoever men defended their Country, whether by breaking or keeping their faith, it was ever well defended, not meaning in a ſtrict moral ſence, or point of honour, but explaining my ſelf that *de facto* the infamy of the breach of word, would quickly be forgotten and pardoned by the world, which is very true; Nay, what if I had ſaid that good ſucceſs in any enterprize (a far leſs conſideration than Piety to our Country) would have cancell'd the blame of ſuch perfidy as *Cæſar* (whom I compare to *Cataline*) us'd toward his fellow-Citizens, not only not deteſted by poſterity, but even crown'd with renown and immortal fame; inſomuch as Princes to this day (as I have obſerved elſewhere) think it an honour to be compared to him, and the higheſt pitch of veneration their flatterers can arrive at, is to call them by the name of one who violated his faith, and enſlav'd his Country. I hope that in ſhewing as well theſe Tyrants as the poor people who are forced to live under them, their danger, that is by laying before the former, the helliſh and precipitous courſes they muſt uſe to maintain their power, by repreſenting to the latter, what they muſt ſuffer, I may be inſtrumental, firſt, to deter private Citizens from attempting upon the liberties of their Country, or if they have done it, to make them lay down their ill gotten authority; and then to warn the reſt of the Nobility and People, from theſe factions and malignancies in their ſeveral Commonwealths and Governments, which might give hope and opportunity to thoſe who are ambitious amongſt them, to aſpire to an Empire over them. However it prove, I hope I am no more to be blamed for my attempt, than that excellent Phyſician of our Nation is, who hath lately taken ſo much pains to compoſe an excellent Treatiſe, of that foul Diſeaſe which was, not long ſince, brought from the new world into theſe parts; wherein though he be forced to uſe ſuch expreſſions as are almoſt able to nauſeate his Readers, and talk of ſuch Ulcers, Boyls, Nodes, Botches, Cankers, *&c.* that are ſcarce fit to be repeated, eſpecially when he handles the cauſes of thoſe effects, yet he did not intend to teach or exhort men to get this Diſeaſe; much leſs did he bring this lamentable infirmity into the world, but deſcribes it faithfully as it is, to the end men may be deterred, and avoid the being infected with it, and may diſcern and cure it, whenever their incontinence and folly ſhall procure it them. I ſhall ſay no more in this matter, but to conclude all make a proteſtation,

teſtation, that as well in this Book, as in all my other Writings, my only ſcope and deſign is to promote the intereſt and welfare of mankind, and the peace and quiet of the world, both which I am ſo vain as to believe, would be better obtained and provided for, if the principles I lay down were followed and obſerved by Princes and People, than they are like to be by thoſe Maxims which are in this Age moſt in vogue. For my ſelf I ſhall only ſay (and call you all to witneſs for the truth of it) that as by my birth, I am a Gentleman, and of a Family which hath had many *Gonfaloniers* of Juſtice in it; ſo I have been uſed in many employments of great truſt, both in our City and abroad, and at this hour I am not in my eſtate one peny the better for them all, nor ſhould I have been, although I had never ſuffered any loſſes by the ſeiſure of my eſtate in the year 1531. for my carriage it hath ever been void of faction and contention; I never had any prejudice againſt the Houſe of *Medici*, but honoured the perſons of all thoſe of that Family whom I knew, and the memory of ſuch of them as lived before me, whom I acknowledge to have been excellent Patriots and Pillars of our City and Common-wealth. During the turbulent times of *Piero*, and after his expulſion out of *Florence*, though my employments were but Miniſterial, my advice was ask'd in many grave matters, which I ever delivered with impartiality and indifference, not eſpouſing the heady opinions of any, much leſs their paſſions and animoſities; I never ſided with any party further than that the duty of my charge obliged me to ſerve the prevailing party, when poſſeſs'd of the Government of our City; this I ſpeak for thoſe changes which hapned between the flight of the ſaid *Piero de Medici*, and the horrid Parricide committed by *Clement* the *7th.* upon his indulgent Mother, joyning with his greateſt enemies, and uniting himſelf with thoſe who had uſed the moſt tranſcendent inſolence to his own perſon, and the higheſt violence and fury the Sun ever ſaw to his poor Courtiers and Subjects, that ſo accompanied he might ſheath his Sword in the bowels of his own deſolate Country. At that time, and during that whole Seige, I muſt confeſs I did break the confines of my nutrality, and not only acted as I was commanded barely, but rouz'd my ſelf, and ſtir'd up others haraunging (in the Streets and places of the City) the People to defend with the laſt drop of their blood, the Walls of their Country, and the Liberty of their Government; taking very hazardous Journeys to *Ferruccio*, and then into the *Mugello* and other parts, to bring in Succours and Proviſions to our languiſhing City; and acting as a Soldier (which was a new profeſſion to me) at the age of above ſixty, when others are diſpenſed from it. For all which, I had ſo entire a ſatisfaction in my mind and conſcience, that I am perſwaded this cordial made me able to ſupport the ſufferings which befell me after our Cataſtrophe, and to rejoyce in them ſo far, that all the malice and cruelty of our enemies, could never draw one word from me unſutable to the honour I thought I merited, and did in ſome ſort enjoy, for being inſtrumental to defend (as long as it was poſſible) our Altars and our Hearths. But all that I have undergone, hath been abundantly recompenced to me by the favour and courteſie of the moſt excellent Signior *Coſimo*, who hath been pleaſed to offer me all the preferments the greateſt ambition could aſpire to, which I did not refuſe out of any ſcruple to ſerve ſo incomparable a Prince, whoſe early years manifeſt ſo much courage, humanity, and prudence, and ſo fatherly a care of the publick good, but becauſe I was very deſirous not to accept of a charge which I was not able to perform, my years and infirmities having now brought me to a condition in which I am fitter to live in a Cloyſter than a Palace, and made me good for nothing but to talk of paſt times, the common vice of old Age: So that I did not think it juſt or grateful to reward this excellent perſon ſo ill for his kindneſs, as to give him a uſeleſs Servant, and to fill up the place of a far better. This is all I think fit to ſay of this matter, I chuſe to addreſs it to you *Zenobio*, for the conſtant friendſhip I have ever entertained with you, and formerly with your deceaſed Father, the companion of my Studies, and ornament of our City. And ſo I bid you farewel.

Chief Magiſtrate.

The firſt of April,
1537.

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